I General Principles prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the

gambling spirit and to corrupt

A.Definitions public morals. There being no element of consideration in
said contest, the spirit of
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar the law is preserved.
Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966) B. Nature of the rules in Statutory Constractions
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211
FACTS: Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Nat’l
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” Telecommunications Commission
where participants Case No. 121
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983)
pump can dispense FACTS:
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule
consideration required to be for Subscriber
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent.
in order to join the Petitioner states that SIP schedule
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature
advertising and communications, and, therefore, illegal and
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster baseless, because the Respondent Commission has
General but was denied not yet promulgated the
citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non- required rules and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D.
mailable matter under the 217 which provides, “The
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Petitioner filed a petition for Communications through its Board
declaratory relief. of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall
ISSUE: see to it that the herein
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the declared policies for the telephone industry are
term “gift enterprise” immediately implemented and for
which is banned by the Postal Law. this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be
HELD: promulgated ...”
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” ISSUE:
is defined as a W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) discretion.
consideration, (2) chance, HELD:
and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in Yes. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and
the provision of the Postal untested such that
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or existing substantive and procedural laws would not be
scheme for the distribution of applicable. Thus, the SIP was
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public
drawing of any kind” telecommunications
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the
element. The intent of the population at minimum cost
the benefits of a telephone facility. Without promulgation C. Rules in Ambiguity
of rules and regulation
there would be confusion among the rights of Private National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma
Respondent, the consumers Case No. 84
and the government itself. The plan to expand the G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)
company program and/or FACTS:
improve its service is laudable, but the expenses should not Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal
be shouldered by the termination of their
telephone subscribers. Considering the multi-million profits union leader and underpayment of their monthly
of the company, the cost allowance. In the process, they
of expansion and/or improvement should come from part blocked the roads and prevented customers and
of its huge profits. suppliers from entering the
LATIN MAXIM: premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for
8b, 9d, 11b, 12a damages for obstruction of private
property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this
case belongs to Labor
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT Arbiter and not for courts to decide.
(Resolution) ISSUE:
Case No. 94 W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for
G.R. No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984) damages filed by
FACTS: an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC?
Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it HELD:
is joining Private Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with
adopting it as its own. The original jurisdiction.
decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of
delegated in Section 2 of first instance with original
P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But
Transportation and again P.D. 1691 amended Sec.
Communications as mandatory, which construction is not 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters.
supported by the actual Additionally, BP 130 amended the same
phraseology of said Section 2. section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA
ISSUE: over money claims arising
W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory from employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear,
to set rules and respondent Judge has no
regulations implementing P.D. 217 should be reconsidered. jurisdiction to act on the case.
HELD:
Yes. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the
word used in the law
must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary
intent is manifest from the law
itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not
be construed to mean
"shall" or "must".
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte FACTS:
Case No. 84 RA 590 declares that no salary received by a
G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) public officer shall be
Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50 considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is
FACTS: hereby declared not to be
Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8,
Quirino Bonilla and Sec. 9 of the Constitution
Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by
stating that under Art. 335 law, which shall not be
of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners
legitimated, acknowledged question the legality of RA
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. 590.
Petitioners stated that the ISSUE:
Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
who is the deceased HELD:
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is
also have the Petitioners as not a decrease in
grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not
that the adopting would be diminished during their
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the
result in the reduction of separation of powers, such a
their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are
Respondent Court ruled in favor for exempt from taxes on his
Agonoy. salary not for his own benefit but for the public,
ISSUE: to secure and preserve his
W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. independence of judicial thought and action.
HELD:
No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who
cannot adopt in E. On Executive Construction
Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly
defined meaning in law and, Ramos v. CA
do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren Case No. 253
in this article where no G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967)
grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193
what is expressly included FACTS:
would naturally exclude what is not included. The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the
then National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an
D. On legislative interpretation obligation created by agreement
confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations
Endencia and Jugo v. David directing NARIC to pay 25% for
Case No. 98 additional compensation for overtime work, night
G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) work and work rendered on
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33
Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and FACTS:
employees. Rice and Corn Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions
Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was (NAFLU) in the
possessed with a distinct certification elections for the exclusive bargaining
and separate corporate existence, they are merely an office agent of the employees in
directly under the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.
President, a governmental machinery to carry out a Tallied votes are as follows:
declared government policy to NAFLU 429
stabilize the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for PAFLU 414
profit. To carry out this Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted)
function, by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise Abstained 4
known as the Budget Act, RCA Total Ballots 864
depends for its continuous operation on (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.)
appropriation yearly set aside by the Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered
General Appropriations Act. There has been consistent as in the ruling in a
administrative interpretation previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the
by the Office of the President as to what may, under law, previous case was based
be granted to RCA workers on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by
and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays the present Labor Code
and holidays. Not a matter and as such cannot apply to the case at bar.
of right, such compensation was given upon authority of ISSUE:
the Budgetary Act. W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
ISSUE: by not allowing
W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the
to exist and RCA previous case of Allied Workers
was created – for the said obligation. Association of the Philippines vs. CIR.
HELD: HELD:
While executive construction is not necessarily There was no grave abuse of discretion made by
binding upon courts, it is Respondent since the basis
entitled to great weight and consideration. The of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been
reason for this is that such superseded by the present Labor
construction comes from the particular branch of Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the
government called upon to present Labor Code has
implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless been already been made known to public and as such has
the President specifically the enforcing power in
appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not the case at bar.
liable to the abovementioned
obligation. Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC
Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-50320 (March 30, 1988)
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. FACTS:
Bureau of Labor Relations A collective bargaining agreement was made
Case No. 120 between Petitioners and
G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)
Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by
1977 and was signed on Respondent (then Secretary of
September 7, 1977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 increase in DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution
monthly wage of workers that to enforce the arbiter’s
will retroact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was
same year, P.D. 1123 granted granted. IBAA then
a P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this
from January 1, 1977, point, IBAA filed a motion
provided that those who were granted an increase of less for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent
that P60.00 will be given granted IBAA’s motion for
the difference. Management argues that since on reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for
April 2, there has been an certiorari charging Respondent of
agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
difference of P38.00. ISSUE:
Moreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the 1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by
Undersecretary of Labor supporting Respondent
the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase considering that it has become final and had been partially
does not fall within the executed.
exemption since the CBA was signed on September after 2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction
P.D. 1123 has been passed. No. 9 are valid.
ISSUE: HELD:
W/N the case falls under the exception of P.D. 1123. A judgment in a labor case that has become executory
HELD: cannot be revoked
No. There was no formal agreement on April 2, 1977 after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived
regarding the increase. its right to appeal by
Moreover, the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have
based on a wrong premise accepted the judgment
and misinterpretation by PAI Management. It was unlawful as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null
and beyond the scope of and void since they
law. amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has
been held that where the
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must
(IBAAEU) v. Inciong be taken to mean
Case No. 62 exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous
G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984) construction is so erroneous, the
FACTS: same must be declared null and void.
Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against
Insular Bank of Asia Orencia v. Enrile
and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Case No. 92
Petition was granted and G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974)
IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying FACTS:Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of
the holiday wage in court of the Clerks of Court
compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has
Regulations implementing the been performing functions
of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store
and recognized as such located in the City of
until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries
Divisions, among others, was or to retail dealers for
implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the
of the nine other divisions Treasurer of the City of Manila
of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which
and extended increased represents the alleged deficiency
compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of
after usual admissions and flour to bakeries after
denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of
for the position of Assistant resale.
Chief, and being a new position created under RA 4040, the ISSUE:
same can only be filed W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to
by a qualified person; that Respondent, being a lawyer, is be manufactured
more qualified than into bread are retail or wholesale.
Petitioner, who is only a high school graduate with HELD:
second grade civil service The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread
eligibility, and praying that the petition be dismissed and to be resold
ISSUE: to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law
W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy on the matter, should be
clerk of court of the treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to
Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration the retail tax law.
Commission.
HELD: Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation
For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Case No. 47
Since there was a new G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)
legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to FACTS:
follow the approach of Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees
counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose of Respondent
to follow the principle Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working
that a public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a in underground mining
contemporaneous construction, operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca,
one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional recovered damages under the
postulate, is entitled to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on
highest respect from the judiciary. the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent
F. On Judicial Interpretation Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent
Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento Corporation’s reckless and
Case No. 150 wanton negligence.
G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951) ISSUE:
FACTS: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing
of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in statute must be considered together with the
the regular courts under the other parts, a kept
Civil Code for higher damages. subservient to the general intent of the e
HELD: nactment, and not separately and
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil independently. The term “agent” used in par. 1 of Sec.
Code for higher 189 is defined in par. 2 of the same section. Applying
damages. However, in light of the fact that they have the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to the
already recovered damages agent in par. 1 would give harmony to the
from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are aforementi oned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189.  A
statute must be construed so as to harmonize
awarded a greater amount in the
and give eff ect to all its provisions wherever
regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be
possible. Every part of the statute must be
deducted to prevent the
considered together with the other parts and kept
instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot
subservient to the general intent of the whole
pursue both courses of action enactment.
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular
courts, the Court stated that it
did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave
effect to the constitutional China Banking Corporation v. Ortega
guarantees of social justice.
Case No. 21G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)
G. Legislative Intent FACTS:

Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People
Case No. 6G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982)Chapter
VI, Page 248, Footnote No. 8
FACTS:
 P e ti ti o n e r Mrs. Aisporna was
c h a r g e d   w i t h   v i o l a ti o n   o f   S e c .   1 8 9 o f   t h e
Insurance Act for allegedly acti ng as an
insurance agent without fi rst securing a
certificate of authority to act as such from the office of
the Insurance Commissioner. Mrs. Aisporna, however,
maintained that she was not liable because she only
assisted her husband, and that she did not receive any
compensation.
ISSUE:
 W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential
element for violation of Sec.189.
HELD:
 Receipt of compensati on is essenti al to be
considered an insurance agent. Every part of a
A complaint was fi led against B&B Forest
Development Corporati on for the collection of a
sum of money. The trial court declared the said
corporation in default. The Plainti ff sought the
garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest
with current Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and
served on Peti ti oner Bank through its cashier,
Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disclose the sought
information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which
prohibits the disclosure of any informati on relati ve
to bank deposits to any person except upon
writt en permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA
1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or
employee of a banking institution who breaks the
confidential nature of this law.
ISSUE:
W/N a banking insti tuti on may validly refuse
to comply with a court process garnishing the
bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA
1405.
HELD: compared to a natural child is equitable. An
acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and
No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place following the words of the law, they should be allowed
bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy adoption.
a final judgment. The discussion of the conference
committ ee report of the two houses
of Congress indicates that the prohibiti on
against examinati on of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its
People v. Concepcion
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
Case No. 205G.R. No. 19190 (November
29, 1922)Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.202
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
FACTS
Case No. 125G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor
Peti ti oner seeks to adopt four children which
of Puno Y Concepcion,S. en C, a co-partnership.
he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children
Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-
without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General
partnership. Defendant was found guilty of violating
opposed this stati ng that Art. 338 of the Civil
Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National
Code allows a natural child to be adopted by
Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any
his father refers only to a child who has not
of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank
been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains
nor to agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in
that in order that a natural child may be adopted by
effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938
his natural father or mother there should not be an
approved on January 30, 1921.
acknowledgment of the status of the natural child
for it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of
W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections
acknowledged natural children of the father or
of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act No. 2938.
mother.
HELD:
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child
be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow In the interpretation and construction, the primary
adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act
acknowledged natural child are much less than those No.2747 provides a punishment for any person who
of a legitimated child. Contending that this is shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant
unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No.
chance to acquire these rights. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal
  prosecuti on. The Court holds that where an act
The trend when it comes to adopti on of children of the Legislature which penalizes an off ense
tends to go toward the liberal. repeals a former act which penalized the same
  off ense, such repeal does not have the eff ect
The law does not prohibit the adopti on of an of thereaft er depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to
acknowledged natural child which when
try, convict and sentence offenders charged with
violations of the old law.
De Jesus v. City of Manila
Case No. 86G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24,
1914)Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.41
FACTS:
In 1907, Peti ti oner bought from an original
owner a piece of land in Manila which
was under the Torrens system. Apparently,
the original owner incorrectly declared the size
of the land. So, from 1901 – 1907, the original
owner was paying lesser taxes than he should
have and same for Peti ti oner from 1907 – 1910.
Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct
amount of taxes, Petitioner paid the taxes, fees, and
interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the
years 1901-1910.Soon aft er, he protested and
fi led an acti on to recover the same amount.
Petitioner was awarded P1, 649.82.Peti ti oner
contends that the supposed taxes from before
1910 were not actually taxes because they had not
yet been assessed. Taxes may not be due and payable
until they are assessed.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were
not assessed before.
HELD:
Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the
owner of the property.
The plaintiff is liable for all taxes and assessments which were levied or
assessed, or which might have been levied or assessed, during his
ownership of the lands. It appears that he realized that he was so liable
and has paid the taxes for the years 1907 to 1910. He claims only the
right to recover for the taxes paid for the years previous to the date of
his purchase; and those taxes not having been either due or payable and
not having ever been assessed or levied prior to the time when he
purchased the land, his contention is well founded.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255G.R. No. L-42293 (February
13, 1935)Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25
FACTS:
Peti ti oner was Justi ce of Peace of Malinao,
Albay. On November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899 which
provided for the age retirement among justices was
approved. Afew years later, Petitioner became 65
years of age (age retirement as provided bySec.
203 of the Administrati ve Code, amended
further by Act. No.3899). Shortly thereafter,
Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to
take the place of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934,
Villar assumed office.
ISSUE:
 W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the
Administrative Code, as further amended by Act No.
3899, the Justi ces of Peace and auxiliary
justi ces appointed prior to the approval of the Act
shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of65.
HELD:
 Justi ces appointed prior to the approval of the
Act will not be aff ected by said amendment (Act
No. 3899).
H. Literal Construction
Abellana v. Marave
Case No. 3
G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974)
Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71
FACTS:
Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries
through reckless
imprudence. The criminal case was filed with the city court
of Ozamis City, which
found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.
decision to the CFI. At
this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties
filed with another branch (IBAAEU) v. Inciong
of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Case No. 62
Judge, a separate and G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984)
independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for FACTS:
the dismissal of such Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against
action principally on the ground that there was no Insular Bank of Asia
reservation for the filing thereof in and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The
the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not Petition was granted and
persuaded and issued the order IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying
to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. the holiday wage in
ISSUE: compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and
W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Regulations implementing the
HELD: Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by
Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioner’s literal Respondent (then Secretary of
reading DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution
to enforce the arbiter’s
of the Sec. 1 of Rule decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was
111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of granted. IBAA then
appealed cases from city appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this
courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such point, IBAA filed a motion
interpretation, does likewise, give rise to for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent
a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive granted IBAA’s motion for
right in accordance to Art. reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for
33 of the Civil Code. certiorari charging Respondent of
2 grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitution, ISSUE:
the 1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by
grant of power to this Court does not extend to Respondent
any diminution, increase or considering that it has become final and had been partially
modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled executed.
doctrine that a court is to 2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner No. 9 are valid.
as would give rise to a HELD:
constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal A judgment in a labor case that has become executory
construction of the law is not cannot be revoked
favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived
in its function if through an its right to appeal by
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have
legal norm, particularly a accepted the judgment
procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null
a litigant being given an and void since they
amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has
been held that where the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must
be taken to mean
exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous
construction is so erroneous, the
same must be declared null and void.
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1
took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees
Association, in representation of its monthly
paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the
Regional Office IV, Department of Labor,
now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against
Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10
unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and
overtime differentials for worked legal holidays
from 1 November 1974.
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the
petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid
employees the holiday pay and the premium or
overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered
work during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of
the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner’s
claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule
IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and
Policy Instruction 9, claiming the rule that “If the monthly
paid employee is receiving not less than
P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his
monthly pay is uniform from January to
December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid
legal holidays. However, if deductions are
made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in
months where they occur, then he is still
entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.”
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in
maintaining that monthly paid employees are not
entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered
work during said legal holidays are entitled
to the premium or overtime pay differentials.
Held:
When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the
law must be taken to mean exactly
what it says. An administrative interpretation, which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what
the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In
the present case, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday
pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both
the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy
Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as
far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the
law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their
regular holiday pay.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by executive officers
whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by
the courts, still if such construction is so
erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. It is
the role of the Judiciary to refine and,
when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government,
almost always in situations where some agency
of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately
from some legitimate area of governmental
power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to
implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction
was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus
applies in the case at bar. Since the private
respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and
policy instruction, it is clear that the
employees belonging to the petitioner association are
entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays
under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from
their monthly salary. They are not among
those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday
pay
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor
Minister’s 7 September 1976 order, and
reinstated with modification (deleting the interest
payments) the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC
affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor
Arbiter.
II. Subject of Construction
A. Constituion/State
Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts
The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9,
that the members of the Supreme
Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”.
It also provides that “until Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto
assumed office, Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by
fixing a different salary for associate
justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the
Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a
year.
The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary
as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount
under protest. He contended that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the
reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of
a member of the Judiciary amount
to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.
Held:
The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a
member of the judiciary amounts to a
diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it would appear that,
in the matter of compensation and power and need of
security, the judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing
state of affairs. Further, the Constitution
provides that judges shall hold their offices during good
behavior, and shall at stated times receive for
their services a compensation which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Thus,
next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more
to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision for their support. In the general course of
human nature, a power over a man’s
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The
independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing
their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation
is not really a gratuity or privilege. It is
essentially and primarily compensation based upon
valuable consideration. The covenant on the part
of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as
much as part of the consideration agreed as is
the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular
value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the compensation upon a
permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be
prudently accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but
are not possessed of such a private fortune
as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern.
On the other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its
professional emoluments, sever their
connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves
exclusively to the discharge of the onerous
duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the
guaranty against a reduction of salary by the
imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the
sense of freedom from a burden or service
to which others are liable. The exemption for a public
purpose or a valid consideration is merely a
nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or
the public purpose promoted is received in
the place of the tax.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts:
Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue
collected income taxes from Justices
Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court respectively. The lower court held that under the
doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the
salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
Respondent, through the Solicitor General
contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress
enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income
tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not
to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue:
Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection
of income tax on the salary of a
public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of
his salary, after the Supreme Court has
found and decided otherwise.
Held:
The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of
income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of
the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate
a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land. In the case at bar,
Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained
the meaning of the phrase “which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is
assigned the task and the power to make
and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true
with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere
of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional
government, the Legislative department is
assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive
department is charged with the execution
or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the
interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to
the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether
a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the
pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if
there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the
doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the
effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution, is reiterated. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws
belong to the Judiciary.
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts:
The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office
to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from
salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and
other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the
Supreme Court en banc on 4 December
1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges
presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila. They seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of
the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries. With the
filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the
issue through judicial pronouncement,
even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.
Issue:
Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to exempt justices and judges
from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.
Held:
The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people
in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the
present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain
that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law
fixing another rate of compensation of Justices
and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from
taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates,
interpolations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies
of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of
the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the
Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for
printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold
though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be
prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in
violation of the Constitution.
Held:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. When
the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy,” they thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What
it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase
“advantageous to the Government” does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to
appropriate, use or apply of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect
or church. In the case at bar, the issuance
of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. The purpose of the
issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event
considered of international importance to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract
more tourists to the country. Thus, instead
of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map
of the Philippines, the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
FACTS:
The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its
Ordinance No. 13, section
2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the
industry known as fishing,
with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before
engaging in fishing in the bay
of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line
of this municipality, are
obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this
municipal government,
after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three
months.” The authority
for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270
of the Administrative
Code.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now
Section 2324 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid.
HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now
section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate
Paragraph 17, section 5 of
the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local
bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in
the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is
neither a private nor a local
bill.
The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act
amending the
Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17,
section 3 of the Jones Law,
which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more
than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the
title of the bill,” because
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the
Administrative Code enacted for the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the
Reorganization Act.
Sumulong v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 149
G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular
Front Party of Abad
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority
election inspector in the first
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular
Front Party of Petitioner, the
minority inspector in the second congressional district of
the said province. Eleven
days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the
minority inspector to the
Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Where the minimum number of votes required by law was
polled by a mere
coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to
minority representation in the
board of election inspectors to which such coalition is
entitled, cannot be claimed by
any of the component parties which have thereafter
separated. Respondent shall
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
People v Echavez,
95 SCRA 663 (1980)
Facts:
Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate in formations against
sixteen people for squatting which was punishable under
PD No. 772. FIve of the informations were raffled to Judge
Vicente Echavez, Jr. TheJudge dismissed the five
informations before the accused could be arraigned. One
of the Judge's grounds for the dismissal was that under the
rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the
dismissal order be reconsidered.
Issues:
Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar
acts, applies to agricultural lands.Ruling/
Held:
No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply
to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegalconstructions in squatter areas
made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained
of involvespasture lands in rural areas.
B. Publication Requirements
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1
took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of
public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. They maintain
that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The
respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-
General, that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend
that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws
provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is
not indispensable.
Issue:
Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for
the effectivity of laws
Held:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date — for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenthprovides for the date when it goes into effect. This
is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the
light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non
excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
In the present case, Presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. The implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application and that unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners
move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on
various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is
a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took
place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor
General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3,
Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the clause
“unless otherwise provided”.Held: The clause “unless it is
otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication. The legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. Publication
requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by
the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations
for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of
that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the
details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or
it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
C. Ordinance
TOPIC:CHAPTER V – SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTIOND.
ORDINANCES TITLE:JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE 
MUNICIPALITY OFURDANETA,PANGASINAN, ET AL.(93
SCRA 462, G.R. No. L-26702 18 OCTOBER 1979)
FACTS:A criminal complaint
w a s   fi l e d
against plaintiff Primiscias
f o r violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964
after beingapprehended by a member of the Municipal
Police for
overtakinga   t r u c k .   P r i m i s c i a s   t h e r e a ft e r   fi
led for the annulment of thes u b j e c t   o
rdinance with prayer for issuance 
o f   p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c ti o n   t o   r e s t r a i n  
d e f e n d a n t s   f r o m   e n f o r c i n g   t h e   s a i d ordi
nance. The Court of First Instance rendered Ordinance No.
3,S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA 4136 also
known asthe Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Appellant appealed thedecision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No.
3, Series of 1964 enacted by
t h e Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is null and
void.
H E L D :
Y e s , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
r u l e d t h a t s u b j e c t o r d i n a n c e
h a s b e e n repealed by the enactment of RA 4316
and has therefor, becomenull and void stating that a later
law prevails over an earlier law. The Supreme Court further
averred
that local ordinances, in thisc a s e ,   a   m u n i c i p
a l   o r d i n a n c e ,   a r e   i n f e r i o r   i n 
s t a t u s   a n d subordinate to the laws 
o f   t h e   s t a t e   a n d   w h e n e v e r   t h e r e   i s confli
ct between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance
mustgive way.
Assignment The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609
refers to the finished
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
product as expressed by the National Institute of Science
Enrolled Bill and Technology, and is

Case No. 48 distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which
are separate chemicals
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)
used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one
Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31 mentioned in the law is a finished
FACTS: product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw
materials. Hence, the
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic
resin glues. It sought importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt
from the imposition of the
the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law) margin fee.
stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a
uniform margin fee of 25% on
Astorga v. Villegas
foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the
Widrawal of authentication, effect
Bank refused to pass in
Case No. 23
audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that
Petitioner’s separate G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37
with the provisions of Sec. 2,
FACTS:
par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this
statute reads: “The margin House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of
Representatives to the
established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed
upon the sale of foreign Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial
amendments which were
exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea
formaldehyde for the approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said
amendments, thereafter
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by
and for the exclusive use signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both
houses certified and attested
of end-users.”
to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon
ISSUE: became RA 4065. Senator
W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of
the payment of the House Bill No. 9266 was a
margin fee. wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by
HELD:
him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate Marines to join in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
President and the President The Pres. invoked his Comm.-in-Chief powers under Sec 18,
Art VII of the Constitution. The IBP seeks to nullify the order
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as
invalid. Petitioner argued that on constitutional grounds. 

the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress ISSUE: Does it have standing?
is conclusive proof of a

bill’s due enactment. HELD:

ISSUE: Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial

interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this
HELD: case, IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
withdrew their
& nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, an interests that
was not duly enacted and is shared by other groups & the whole citizenry. IBP’s
fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the
therefore did not become a law.
law profession & improve the administration of justice,
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.
journal. An importance

of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or

evidence of the bill’s due Bagatsing v. Ramirez
enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the General over special laws/ ordinance
Congress to verify such.
Case No. 28
“Where the journal discloses that substantial
amendment were introduced and G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976)

approved and were not incorporated in the printed text Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83
sent to the President for
FACTS:
signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been
duly enacted and did not The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
7522, “An Ordinance
become a law.”
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing
Fees for the Rentals of

IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000) Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for
other Purposes.”
On locus Standi
Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the
FACTS: Ordinance for the

reason that a) the publication requirement under the

Following an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro
Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the Phil.
Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay
Committee was not given any damages.

participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision
and Corrupt Practices over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages
suffered by Teotico.
Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate
P.D. 7 prescribing the
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the
products. streets aforementioned were and have been constantly
kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by
ISSUE: the defendant City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the
City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance is under its control and supervision.
enacted by the Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or
Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
Local Tax Code.
which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
HELD: that the province, city or municipality have either "control
or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
law creates the circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's
"control or supervision."
presumption that the special law is to be considered an
exception to the general.

The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in Drilon vs Lim (Ordinance)

general whereas the Local
Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes,
fees or other charges” in
particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.
City of Manila vs. Teotico
General over special laws
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:
1.    The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of
the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he
stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he
hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with
the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the
GR No. 112497
August 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality
of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.
RTC’s Ruling:
sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the
Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution.
Petitioner’s Argument:
 An order quashed the information because it did not allege
1.    The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that facts which constitute
the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code essential element of the
had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally
dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the
accused of a bladed,
certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it
anyway.) pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the
2.    Grounds of non-compliance of procedure occasion of, connected with or
a.    No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
Local Government Code
organized lawlessness or public
b.    Not published
c.    Not translated to tagalog disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9
Supreme Court’s Argument: shows that the prohibited acts
1.    Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only
need not be related to subversive activities and that they
the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What are essentially malum
he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not
control but supervision. prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
2.    Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if ISSUE:
not followed order the act undone or re-done.
Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed. W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts
3.    Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null need not be related to
and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions subversive activities.
(2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its
enactment but were followed. HELD:
The requirements are upon approval of local
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a
development plans and public investment programs of legislative measure
LGU not to tax ordinances.
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. Legislative intent is the

People of the Philippines v. Purisima controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall under P.D. 9,
Constitutionality of the Statute
it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of
Case No. 221 the decree and this can
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) be found among others in the preamble or “whereas”
clauses which enumerate the
Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
FACTS:
and the stiff sanctions
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the
stated therein.
respective Defendant

with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of

Presidential Decree No. 9.