PROPERTY will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]).
MOVABLE /IMMOVABLE PROPERTY:
Parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would
be real property. Standard Oil Company v. Jaramillo
A building may be validly mortgaged separately from the land upon which it is built. Prudential
Bank v. Judge Panis
To be considered as real property by destination, the machinery etc. must be ( 1) essential and
principal elements of the industry and (2) the industry must be carried out in a building or piece
of land. Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor
A stipulation in the lease agreement to treat the real property as personal is binding upon the
parties. The parties are estopped from claiming otherwise. Serg’s Products v. PCI Leasing
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by destination because
they are essential and principal elements in the industry.” In that sense, petitioners are correct
in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of
the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are
not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
For purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of personal
property and may be attached and executed upon. Sibal v. Valdez
PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION:
LAUREL VS. GARCIA G.R. NO. 92013 JULY 25, 1990
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 (19751). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]).
We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of
the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET.AL.
G.R. NO. 155650 JULY 20, 2006
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public
for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport
Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway
does not change the character of the road as one for public use.
WOODRIDGE SCHOOL INC. et.al. vs. ARB CONSTRUCTION INC. G.R. No. 157285 February
16, 2007
In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “the road lots in a private
subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.” Otherwise, they
remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
Contrary to the position of petitioners, the use of the subdivision roads by the general
public does not strip it of its private character. The road is not converted into public
property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public’s passage through it. To
repeat, “the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation,
if they are to be utilized as a public road.”
MACASIANO V. DIOKNO [G.R. No. 97764. August 10, 1992]
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and
are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Local governments have no authority to regulate use of public properties unless
authority is vested upon by Congress; e.g. Closure of roads
Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
OWNERSHIP:
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. HON. PONFERRADA G.R. No. G.R. No. 168943 October 27, 2006
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An
accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material possession
of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession from
defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of
ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action
whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession.41 Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file
an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus
vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case,
respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property and
the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce
their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from
fencing the property.
ALLUVION
What are the forms of accretion?
1. Allluvium
2. Avulsion
3. Change of course of rivers
4. Formation of islands
Cases:
IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO [L-12958 MAY 30, 1960 MAY 30, 1960
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of
rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for
coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
DE BUYSER VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL. [G.R. NO. L-22763 MARCH 18, 1983
Land formed by accretion from the sea is part of the public domain. It cannot be acquired by
adverse possession. It is outside the commerce of man unless otherwise declared by the
executive and legislative branch of the government
GRANDE, ET AL. VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. [G.R. NO. L-17652 JUNE 30, 1962
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article 966 of
the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land to which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title
thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of
the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
REP. OF THE PHIL VS. CA, ET AL G.R. NO. 61647 OCTOBER 12, 1984
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose
husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve
hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had
already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and
imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
AVULSION
Alluvium Avulsion
Gradual Sudden or abrupt
Soil cannot be Identifiable
identified
Belongs to owner of Belongs to owner from
property to which it is whose property it was
attached attached
QUIETING OF TITLE:
An action for Quieting of Title is not a remedy to settle a boundary dispute:
ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES,
G.R. No. 95748. November 21, 1996
We agree with respondent Court. The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of
boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real
property of any interest therein."
In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. Thus,
petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that
respondent Court erred in holding that there was “no xxx evidence of any muniment of title,
proceeding, written contract, xxx”, and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such
contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his brothers
(including the petitioners’ father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares
in the inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the
redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale.
However, these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of
petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties’ failure to situate and fix the
boundary between their respective properties.”
Where the plaintiff is in possession of the land, the prescriptive period within which to quiet title
accrues only form the time the adverse claim is made known. Faja v. CA
An action to quiet title brought by a person who is in possession of the property is
imprescriptible.
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
Cases: SARMIENTO VS. AGANA 129 SCRA 122
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain
the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under Article 453 (now
Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under Article 361
(now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building.
But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is
entitled to such demolition only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails
to pay for the same
BALUCANAG VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO G.R. NO. L-34199, MAY 30, 1983
But even in the absence of said stipulation, respondent Stohner cannot be considered a builder
in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code, relied upon by respondent judge, applies only to a
case where one builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply
where one's only interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract.
Being a lessee, the law applicable is Article 1678: [Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though
the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but
he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing,
and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is
extinguished.
FLOREZA VS. EVANGELISTA, 96 SCRA 130
We uphold the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that Article 448 of the Civil Code is inapplicable
to the factual milieu herein. Said codal provision applies only when the builder, planter, or sower
believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow because he thinks he owns the land or
believes himself to have a claim of title. In this case, petitioner makes no pretensions of
ownership whatsoever. Xxx xxxxx xxxx.
The rights of petitioner are more akin to those of a usufructuary who, under Article 579 of the
Civil Code (Art. 487 of the old Code), may make on the property useful improvements but with
no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property: For if the improvements made by the
usufructuary were subject to indemnity, we would have a dangerous and unjust situation in
which the usufructuary could dispose of the owner's funds by compelling him to pay for
improvement, which perhaps fie would not have made.
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO VS. ABESIA 160 SCRA 379
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner
builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow
upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is
not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-
ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears
that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land
pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of
Article 448 of the now Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said
provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been
established.
PNB vs. DE JESUS G.R. No. 149295 September 23, 2003
“Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in
actuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers
to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built
some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is
the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise
for, elsewise stated, “where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the
issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.”
ISMAEL MACASAET et.al. vs. SPOUSES MACASAET G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004
“This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title
thereto.[65] It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere
tenant, agent or usufructuary.[66] From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the
belief that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow
thereon.[67]
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good
faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,[68] this provision was
applied to one whose house -- despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner --
overlapped with the land of another.[69] This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder
had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law
deemed the builder to be in good faith.[70] In Sarmiento v. Agana,[71] the builders were found
to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly
believed to be the owner of the land.[72]
Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The
established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements
introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation,
the parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements introduced
thereon.[73] Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the
structures on those lots.
The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier.[74] In that case, this Court deemed the
son to be in good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and
consent of his father, to whom belonged the land upon which it was built. Thus, Article 448[75]
was applied.”
TITLE III- OWNERSHIP d. Cuizon v. Remoto- Sale should not go beyond what is legally permissible

Art 484. Ownership defined Kinds of Co-ownership (from the viewpoint of):
- Is that state where an undivided thing or right belongs to two or more persons 1. Subject Matter:
- It is “the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual (or a. Co-ownership of an undivided thing
ideal) part of anything which is not physically divided” b. Co-ownership of an undivided right- like a lease right inherited from a
- A co-ownership is not a juridical person, nor is it granted any form of juridical deceased father
personality. Thus, it cannot sue in court. 2. Sources:
- Co-owners may, of course litigate in their individual capacities a. Contractual co-ownership
b. Non-contractual co-ownership
Salvador v CA- possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as 3. Rights of the co-owners
adverse to the other co-owners a. Tenancy in common (or ownership in common or just co-ownership as
contemplated)
Nufable v. Nufable- a co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned b. Joint Tenancy- Joint Ownership
property.
Tenancy in Common (Co- Joint Tenancy (Joint
Sanchez v. CA- a co-owner may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party. A co- ownership) Ownership)
owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises Physical whole but there is Physical whole but there is NO
the right of dominion but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. ideal (abstract) division; each ideal (abstract) division; each and
There is no co-ownership when the different people are already concretely determined and are co-owner being the owner of ALL of them own the WHOLE
separately identifiable even if not yet technically described. his own ideal share thing
- Any co-owner may file an action under Art 487 not only against a third person bu also May dispose his undivided may not dispose of his own share
against another who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of share without he consent of without the consent of the
the property the others others; because he has no ideal
share
What governs Co-ownership: Co-owners dies; his share goes Joint-tenant dies, his share goes
1. Contracts to his heirs by accretion to the other-joint
2. Special legal provisions tenants by virtue of their
3. Provisions of the Title on Co-ownership survivorship or jus accrecendi
co-owner is a minor; does not Is under a legal disability; this
Sources of Co-ownership (How It Arises): benefit the others; prescription benefits the others against whom
1. By law- Adriano et al vs. CA et al- property acquired by a man while living with a runs against them the prescription will not run
common-law wife during the subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even
when the property was titled in the name of the common-law wife. In such a case, a Characteristics of Co-ownership:
constructive trust is deemed to have been created over the property which lawfully 1. There must be more than one subject or owner
pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage. Tumlos vs. Sps 2. There is one physical hole divided into IDEAL
Fernandez- if the actual contribution of a party is not proved, there will be no co- (undivided) shares
ownership and presumption of equal shares 3. Each IDEAL share is definite in amount, but is not physically segregated from the rest
2. By contract- two cousins bought a property and agreed not to divide for 10 years 4. Regarding the physical whole, each co-owner must respect each other in the
3. By chance- commixtion, confusion, hidden treasure common use, enjoyment or preservation of the physical whole
4. By occupation or occupancy- wild beast caught by several persons. Co ownership 5. Regarding the IDEAL share, each co-owner holds almost absolute control over the
must be because of an implied agreement same
5. By succession or will- intestate heir before partition. However, if after partition the 6. It is not juridical person
heirs decides that some of them will still be co-owners of a certain portion of the 7. A co-owner is in a sense a trustee for the other co-owners
estate, the rule for legal redemption will not be the rule concerning co-owners.
a. Del Mundo v. CA- if a father and his daughter declare in a deed of Skipped: Distinguishing Part
partition that they are co-owners of a parcel of land which is really
paraphernal land of his second wife, co –ownership is NOT necessarily Art 485. Shares in Benefits and Charges
created, for the lot remains paraphernal. a) The share in the benefits and charges is proportional to the interest of each
b. Rep. vs. Estanzo- Res judicata also applied to adjudications of co- b) Contrary stipulation is VOID
ownership c) Each co-owners shares proportionately in the accretion or alluvium of the property.
c. Romana v. PCIB- There can be res judicata even if the doctrine or issue This is because an increase in area benefits all
involved was resolved not in the decision of the first case but only in the
incidental order issued after the promulgation of said decision. – fishy  Taxes- if a co-owner has paid for the taxes to prevent forfeiture of the common property for tax
read page 318. delinquency- he can compel contribution for his co-owners
Art 486. Right to Use Property Owned in Common What Reimbursement Covers
- Only Necessary Expenses
GEN RULE: Right to use the property for the purpose intended (said Purpose being alterable by o Preservation of a house in a ruinous condition
express or implied agreement) o INVALID- useful improvement; even if they increase the value of the house

LIMITATIONS: Reimbursement from the Estate of a Deceased Co-owner

a) The interest of the co-ownership must not be injured or prejudiced - Provided no renunciation has been made
b) And the other co-owners must not be prevented from using it
When Renunciation Cannot be Implied:
Pardell v. Bartolome- A and B owned in common a two story house (upper- dwelling; lower - Implied: mere refusal to pay the proportionate share
office). If A occupies on the second floor- no rent; if she occupies a room in the 1st floor- shall - Refusal to pay; but no renunciation- the creditor can still collect from the delinquent
be- B shall be entitled to half worth of rent owner

Art 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment Art 489. Number of Co-owners who must consent
Repairs, ejectment action One (Art 489)
- Allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment without the necessity of joining all Alterations or actions of ownership ALL (Art 491)
the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the said is deemed to be instituted for All others, like useful improvements, luxurious Financial Majority
the benefit of all embellishments, administration and better (not numerical)
- NOTE: if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, enjoyment
the action should not be allowed to propser
Rule as to Necessary Repairs
Mendoza v. Coronel- attorney-in-fact- of the plaintiff co-owner does not need authority from - A Co-owner may go ahead with necessary repairs even against the opposition of all
alt he co-owners he needs authority only from the co-owner instituting the ejectment suit the rest
o If he has money- advance the funds, and recover later from the others
Action Covered by the Term ‘Ejectment’: o If he doesn’t have money- he can contract with the repairman, and all the
a) Forcible entry co-owners shall be liable proportionately to the creditors.
b) Unlawful detainer  Another option is to renounce
c) Accion publiciana
d) Accion reivindicatoria Suppose, though it was practicable to do so, no notification was made, would the
e) Quieting of title rest still be liable?
f) Replevin - YES, since the repairs were essential

Lao vs. CA- As a general rule, the main issue in an ejectment suit is possession de facto, not Art 490. Perpendicular Co-ownership
possession de jure. In the event the issue of ownership is raised in the pleadings, such issue - Different stories belong to different persons
shall be taken up only for the limited purpose of determining who better right to possession - Shall only apply if there is no contrary provision in the titles of ownership or
agreement
- READ CASES!!!! Page 326-328
Rules:
Art 488. Expenses for Preservation Proportionate contribution is required for the preservation of:
- Co-owner has the right to compel the others to share in the expenses of preservation, The main walls
even if incurred without prior notification to them BUT he must notify if practicable The party walls
- EXEMPT: if the co-owner renounces so much of his undivided share as may be The roof
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes The other things used in common
o The one renouncing DOES NOT necessarily renounce his entire interest in Each floor owner must bear the expenses of his floor
the co-ownership Stairs are to be maintained from story to story, by the user
o Renouncing cannot be done if the co-ownership will be prejudiced
- Ground floor distinct from the first floor
What the renouncing requires:
a) If the renouncing is in favor of the creditor- C must give his consent (debtor gives The Condominium Act:
something else in payment of his debt)
b) If the renouncing is in favor of the other co-owners (form of substitution of debtor)- When is ownership acquired?
consent of the co-owners and of the creditor
a. Creditor’s consent would of course be needed only if the expenses have Condominium Corporation v. Campos- the buyer of a unit only after he has paid in full its
already been incurred purchase price
Separate Interest- (supra) automatically makes him a shareholder in the condominium
Union Bank vs. Housing and Land Use regulatory Board- act of a subdivision developing
mortgaging the subdivision without informing the buyer by installment is violative of PD 957.
Cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Skyworld Condominium Owners Association vs. SEC- incorporation of the condo
corporations must be unit owners
Casa Filipina Realty Corp vs. Office of the President- PD 947 was designed to stem the
tide of “fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
seller and operators
G.O.A.L Inc vs. CA- common areas and facilities are “portions of condominium property not
included in the units”. Whereas, a unit is “a part of the condominium property which is to be
subject to private ownership”
- Parking spaces nto being subject to private ownerhsup form part of the common area over
which the condominium unit owners hold undivided interest
Art 491. Alterations
- None of the co-owners shall without the consent of the others make alterations in the
thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom
Defined- Alternation is a change:
1. Which is more or less permanent
2. Which changes the use of the thing
3. Which prejudices the condition of the thing or its enjoyment by the others
a. Alteration is an act of ownership; may be material or metaphysical (change
in use) and gives rise to a real right over the property owned in common
Castro et al v. Atienza- if a co-owners decides to cancel with respect to his ideal share no
approval, concurrence or sent of the other co-owners is essential.
- NOTE: this deals only with the undivided or ideal share; on the other hand, a lease of
real property if registered OR if for over a year- act of OWNERSHIP requiring
unanimous consent on the part of the co-owners
- Unanimous consent may be given impliedly but only for the purpose of making the
alteration legal but implied or tacit consent is not enough to make the other co-
owners liable for the expenses for the construction of the house
PNB vs. CA- conjugal property which is inherited by the surviving spouse and the child is co-
owned. – SS can’t by herself alone mortgage the property
Replacement- is not considered alteration
Alteration is ILLEGAL- when made without the express or implied consent of the other co-
owners
- Effects:
a. The co-owner responsible may lose what he has spent
b, Demolition can be compelled
c. He would be liable for losses and damages
d. BUT whatever benefit the co-ownership derives will belong to it
e. In case of house is constructed on common lot, all the co-owners will be entitled to
proportionate share of the rent
Art 492. Administration and Better Enjoyment
- The resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding
o There shall be no majority- UNLESS, the resolution is approved by the co-
owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the co-
ownership
o NO Majority or seriously prejudicial- the court shall order such measures as
it may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator
- Shall apply only to the part owned in common
Acts of Administration or Management:
They are those:
1. That do not involve an alteration
2. Those that may be renewed from time to time
3. Those that have transitory effects, that is, do not bind the co-ownership for a long
time in the future
4. Those that do not give rise to a real right over the thing owned in common
5. Those which even if called an alteration, do not affect the substance or nature of the
thing
6. Those for the common benefit of all the co-owners and not for only one or some of
them
Examples:
1. Lease of one year or less (of real property) provided it is not registered
2. Acts of management
a. Appointment of manager or administrator
Limitation of Right of the Financial Majority:
1. Although they can approve resolutions for administration and better enjoyment, still
before l Pa decision is made, there should first be notice to the minority of that they
can be heard
2. The majority would be justified in proceeding only when he urgency of the case and
the difficulty of the meeting them render impracticable the giving of notice
3. The minority may APPEAL to the court against the decision of the majority
Art 493. (READ CODAL PROVISION) Right with respect to the Ideal or Proportionate
Share
- Right to the whole property but only with the right to the IDEAL or metaphysical share
of each co-owner
o RULES:
 Each co-owner has FULL ownership of his part, and of his share
of the fruits and benefits
 And therefore, he may ALIENATE, ASSIGN, or MORTGAGE his
ideal share. Without prejudice to the exercise by the others of
their right to legal redemption
Pamplona v. Moreto- if there has been no express partition, the transaction is entirely valid.
Now then, if there has been no express partition yet, but the co-owner who sells, points out to
his buyers the boundaries of the part he was selling and the others co-owners make no
objection- Partial Partition and the definite portion can no longer be assailed
Caro v. CA- Redemption of share of co-owner cannot be assailed if there has already been a
partition of the property formerly owned in common. And this is so even if the share had been
sold while the co-ownership was still existing
Unauthorized sale of the Entire Property- valid to the extent of his share; unless consent
was given