May 17, 2019 04:01 AM GMT

MORGAN STANLEY C.T.V.M. S.A.

Week Ahead in Latin America | Latin America Arthur J Carvalho
ECONOMIST
Arthur.Carvalho@morganstanley.com +55 11 3048-6272
Latin America: Navigating MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC
Luis A Arcentales, CFA
Choices ECONOMIST
Luis.Arcentales@morganstanley.com +1 212 761-4913

MORGAN STANLEY C.T.V.M. S.A.

This week we published our Global Economic Outlook and all the regional Fernando D Sedano
outlooks as well (EUA, Europe, China, Japan, CEEMEA and Asia Ex-Japan). It is an ECONOMIST
Fernando.Sedano@morganstanley.com +55 11 3048-6605
auspicious time to publish an outlook given the resurgence in trade tensions; our Thiago A. Machado, CFA
base case is that these will dissipate over the next few weeks, but risks are ECONOMIST
Thiago.Machado@morganstanley.com +55 11 3048-6249
skewed toward prolonged tensions, generating downside risks to our growth Lucas B Almeida
forecasts. For the region, on top of this more uncertain external backdrop, we see ECONOMIST
Lucas.Almeida@morganstanley.com +55 11 3048-6026
two groups: one where growth is holding steady and inflation is well behaved,
and another where growth is struggling, with important (and tough) choices
ahead. The first is comprised of the Andean countries (Chile, Colombia, and Peru)
which, despite having their own problems, have been well served by a strong
orthodox policy playbook. The second group has Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico –
unfortunately the region’s biggest economies – which have to deal with legacies
of previously poor policies or choices of which path they will take ahead, namely
between orthodoxy or a more creative playbook.
What's new?
In Brazil, we saw plenty of news on the political front, but the bottom line is that
government still does not have a working coalition. We believe it is possible that
Congress could pass the pension reform even if there is no coalition; the problem
could be the reforms scheduled to come after the pension reform. On the
economic front, the central bank kept rates unchanged at 6.50%, acknowledging
worse growth, but this has not changed the inflation assessment. And growth
indicators continued to show weakness such as IP (-1.3% m-o-m) and the IBC-Br (-
0.3%). The early-2019 growth slump in Mexico was not enough for Banxico to
soften its cautious tone: the May 16 statement in fact turned more hawkish as
one key risk, namely pressures from wages, seems to be materializing –
something which, policymakers argued, may contribute to keeping core inflation
"elevated" and could mean that despite a weak economy, inflation may not
necessarily drift lower. Inflation finally began to show signs of subsiding in
Argentina with the April CPI rising 3.4% sequential (consensus looked for +4.0%);
while a re-emergence of pressure on some tradable prices poses reason for
concern, we think we are past the worst and price pressures should keep easing
ahead. The April fiscal balance, meanwhile, kept portraying adjusting fiscal
accounts: we think policymakers are on track to deliver on this year's target as
agreed with the IMF. In the political arena, Cordoba elections yielded a landslide
victory for the Peronist incumbent, a result that could help the moderate
opposition camp gain some traction, an elusive objective so far. Colombia
released its 1Q GDP: the report kept portraying a moderately rebounding
economy; some watchers may be concerned with the flat sequential growth seen
in the reading, but we think that this bout of weakness is likely to be temporary For important disclosures, refer to the Disclosure Section,
as the composition of growth remained encouraging (weak construction was located at the end of this report.

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responsible for much of the downside). A noisy week in Chile's political arena:
early in the week lawmakers rejected the administration's pension reform
proposal in the labor commission of the lower house. The project was then sent
to the plenary of the lower house and put to another vote to decide whether to
continue discussing it; after making important concessions to the opposition –
namely the establishment of a public pension fund manager – the project was
ultimately approved, a step in the right direction after the early week setback.
Activity in Peru rose in March at the strongest pace (up 0.8% from the prior
month) in half a year, with positive contributions from both commodity-linked
and other sectors; the gains in both February and March, however, were not
sufficient to pull first-quarter GDP higher – which will be released May 22 –
because of the sharp commodity-led weakness at the turn of the year.
What's next?
In Brazil, it will be important to follow the provisional measures that need to
have a vote next week before these expire June 3rd (see Reform tracker) as a
barometer of the government coalition. We should have a quiet week on the
economic front, with inflation continuing to show some deceleration, due to
payback on negative supply shock on fresh produce. We are keeping an eye on
the first-quarter balance of payments report from Mexico, particularly FDI
figures for any signs that foreign companies may be retrenching in a context of
domestic policy uncertainty; April formal job figures should be released next
week as well, another important signpost – the first four months of the
administration saw the slowest hiring pace since 2009 – to assess how
uncertainty seems to be taking a heavy toll on activity. In Argentina, the March
economic activity report should portray a meaningful sequential decline after
three months of positive growth – we keep thinking that activity stabilized in 1Q
– while the April trade report should show a meaningful surplus, as imports
likely remained depressed while exports should start accelerating on the back of
the soybean harvest. In Colombia, the release of soft data – confidence
indicators – should help us asses the prospects for growth in coming months.
Chile unveils the first quarter GDP: activity decelerated materially at the start of
the year – we see near flat sequential growth – yet the downside was
exaggerated by temporary disruptions in mining, with other sectors maintaining a
near-trend pace of growth.
Saludos,

Arthur Carvalho
Luis Arcentales
Fernando Sedano
Thiago Machado
Lucas Almeida

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Latin America: Navigating Choices
The region has struggled over the past few months in many ways, but its solid
fundamentals, such as well-behaved inflation and healthy external accounts, have
provided some support. As we look ahead, not only do we continue to be very cautious
about growth, but we also believe the region faces critical choices in all its major
economies. And in many cases the right choices – those that put the economies on an
improving path – are politically costly and involve difficult compromises. In Brazil, the
government has to choose between building or not building a strong coalition. In Mexico,
the government will have to choose between being fiscally conservative or beefing up
social programs. In Argentina, the new government elected in October will have to
choose between sticking to the current relatively orthodox playbook (and continue
rebalancing its economy) and favoring policy reversal.

The external backdrop is supportive in our base case, albeit risks are skewed to the
downside for growth. The global economy has swung back to a regime of policy
dominance, according to our Global Economics Team. Unlike 2017-1H18, when the
private sector was on a self-sustained recovery and policy accommodation could be
withdrawn, the global economy is again highly dependent on policy support. However, if
trade tensions persist for longer, this would be the second major blow to corporate
confidence in a short span of time. In our view, the damage to corporate confidence
would risk becoming entrenched, spending would fail to pick up, and a negative
feedback loop of weaker global growth and tighter financial conditions could begin.

We have reduced regional growth forecasts from 1.8% to 1.4%, led by Brazil amid its
political uncertainty. Indeed, we believe the clearing up of political uncertainty is what
will lead to stronger growth in 2020, when we forecast the region to grow 2.4%, with
both Brazil and Argentina accelerating. While inflation is not a problem for most
countries in the region – indeed, we still forecast rate cuts in Mexico this year –
Argentina continues to struggle with high inflation. How to solve this problem will be
central in the upcoming elections.

Brazil
The Brazilian economy has continued to stutter in early 2019, but we believe that once
political noise clears we will see an acceleration, albeit not a very strong one. We had
long expected that there would be some political noise around Brazil’s pension reform
approval – reform critical to delivering fiscal stability – but we have been surprised by
the intensity. The disappointment regarding growth has been widespread, but
investments as expected have been the weakest component over the past few months.
We believe this is partially due to the heightened uncertainty from the election last year
and also the very tight monetary conditions that Brazil experienced until October, with
government bond yield for 2027 averaging 10.8%. Not all uncertainty has cleared,
especially that related to the pension reform, but since October, monetary conditions
have eased, which should feed through into the economy around mid-year and should
help to reaccelerate it. Also, we believe that, once fiscal uncertainty is reduced after

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approval of a diluted version of the pension reform, banks will accelerate consumer
lending, giving the consumer recovery more legs. The road in the next few months ahead
is far from smooth, as the government has still not managed to form a strong working
coalition in Congress: Brazil’s most pressing issue continues to be the pension reform.
The government has submitted an ambitious reform that after several weeks has
cleared the first hurdle (for more details, see our Brazil reform tracker).

On the monetary front, The central bank of Brazil should keep rates on hold despite
the weaker growth: We believe that there are two reasons: i) Although inflation is
running below the target, the forecasts point to a 20bp difference for the 2020, which
should not alarm the monetary authority; and ii) The timing of a cut would be after the
pension reform approval and fiscal uncertainty is cleared; this would be later in the year
when inflation will have already accelerated from the September bottom. The only
scenario where we see a cut is if there is material FX appreciation (10%+) which would
deliver lower inflation in 2020. On the fiscal front, this is a long-term issue with little
short-term solution. Weaker growth will mean lower revenues over the next few
months and, in the absence of other major spending cuts. In case there is no deal in the
trade tensions, we believe this could hurt growth at least 50 bps in 2019 and 70 bps in
2020.

Argentina
We keep calling for Argentina’s economy to rebound marginally, but the pickup is
conditional on relative FX stability which should help reduce inflation and improve real
wages. We think growth stabilized in 1Q2019, and we keep our call that agriculture
should lift the economy out of recession in 2Q2019. For this rebound to be sustained –
even if mildly – real wages will have to improve via a combination of decelerating
inflation and higher nominal wages. Now, a relative FX stability is a necessary condition
given the strong link between currency moves and consumer prices in Argentina: in the
event FX volatility is contained, we do think inflation will gradually decelerate on the
back of tight monetary policy and the absence of regulated tariff hikes ahead, leading to
a timid improvement in sentiment and consumption. The external and fiscal adjustments,
moreover, remain on track, with the current account deficit poised to close this year
around the 2% of GDP handle – a sizable improvement versus last year’s -5.2% – while
the authorities should deliver on fiscal targets by enacting further spending cuts to
compensate for disappointing revenues amid the recession.

Risks to the outlook are clearly to the downside and are centered on the likelihood of
a policy reversal scenario post-election and on external factors. Further escalation of
trade tensions could translate into a stronger USD for longer and lower global growth,
both of which could potentially fuel FX volatility and risk the mild rebound we expect
under our base case. While our base scenario sees some degree of policy continuity after
the presidential elections, if inflation fails to recede we think the odds of a policy
reversal scenario would increase, feeding currency weakness and unleashing a vicious
cycle. A scenario of policy reversal following the elections would likely entail a much
weaker FX, pressuring inflation and potentially prompting capital and import controls.
We also think the IMF’s backing could be under pressure in this scenario.

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Mexico
Mexico remains on a slippery slope of gradual deterioration, with the economy stuck
below trend over the forecast horizon. We keep seeing activity struggling below trend
at 1.3% this year with several headwinds playing a role starting with the uncertainty
from domestic policies, exacerbated by a volatile path for passing USMCA that likely
lingers past 2019, both of which keep weighing on already stagnant investment. With
business cautious, dampened investment spending seems to be hitting hiring plans: since
December formal job growth has been running at the slowest pace for a four-month
period since 2009. Rising real wages are providing some offset, but not powerful
enough to prevent consumption from decelerating (to a decade-low of 1.6% this year).
Last and similar to past transition years, the public sector is struggling to spend on a
timely basis. Support from external demand coupled with lack of initial macro
imbalances – fiscal and external accounts, plus leverage metrics all seem healthy –
prevent a more severe deceleration. As public spending execution normalizes and capex
inflects from low levels, the economy sees a shallow recovery to a 1.9% pace in 2020.
Even under our below-consensus view on growth, we see risks biased to the downside:
an economy running below trend is more vulnerable to shocks, such as the negative
spillovers from rising trade protectionism; Mexico, moreover, has limited ability to
provide fiscal or monetary stimulus under a bear scenario, in our view. With the current
policy setup, Mexico seems to be on a deteriorating path of slow growth in a context of
policy uncertainty and weak investment, with prospects for rising fiscal pressures over
time. With the “slope” of this deteriorating trend steady and gradual at this point, we
think policymakers still have time to shift course and focus on addressing Mexico’s low
productivity challenge, our bull case. Such a scenario would entail a focus on building
stronger institutions, encouraging formalization and creating conditions to attract
investment, including in energy. Conversely, should weak growth erode the
administration’s currently high approval ratings, the executive could favor populist
policies such as deficit spending, outsized minimum wage hikes and expansion of the role
of the state. Such a policy mix, exacerbated by the drag from escalation in trade
tensions, could undermine Mexico’s investment narrative and confidence, further hurting
growth.

The central bank still seems poised to cut rates in 2019, but the starting date comes a
bit later. Starting off a tight policy stance, we see conditions in place for rates to come
lower starting in September (versus our previous call for August). By then, the central
bank should have further confirmation that the economy remains sluggish and that
inflation pressures are gradually moderating after a temporary uptick in the second
quarter. By September, moreover, policymakers will be able to see the market’s reaction
to a series of risk events, including the 2020 budget proposal, Pemex’s business plan
and greater visibility about USMCA’s future. In all, Banxico should find room to push
rates down to 7.00% in quarter-point increments by mid-2020, leaving policy still in
restrictive territory consistent with a risk management approach.

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Colombia
Colombia’s positive cycle still holds: relatively higher oil prices and a recovery in
domestic demand suggest the rebound will continue, even if at a gradual pace.
Prospects for moderate growth in consumption this year and a modest investment
rebound in 2020 – when the investment-friendly measures of the tax reform start
kicking in – should allow growth to keep accelerating gradually. Net exports, however,
are poised to be a drag on growth as exports have little upside while imports are likely
to keep expanding amid the domestic demand rebound. We think inflation will remain
well-behaved through our forecast horizon: we project the CPI to average 3.3% in 2019
and 3.4% next year, with our call underpinned by 1) our strategists’ call for a stronger
FX, 2) benign indexation dynamics due to falling inflation over the past couple years and
3) the currently negative output gap, which should cap price pressures amid firming
domestic demand. Accordingly, we maintain our call for a central bank on the sidelines
this year and a shallow tightening in 2020 (to 4.75%) amid well behaved inflation and as
growth disappoints the authorities’ expectations. The key risk to this scenario would be
materialization of an external shock, such as re-emergence of trade tensions. Despite our
constructive short-term view, fiscal concerns keep us cautious on Colombia’s longer-
term outlook: while we think that the recently-revised fiscal balance target (-2.7% of
GDP) is attainable this year, it will be hard to comply with targets beyond 2020 without
further spending cuts or another revenue-boosting tax reform, both of which look
difficult amid the administration’s reduced political capital. Accordingly, our bull and
bear cases hinge materially on external conditions and political dynamics: should global
growth inflect lower, oil prices would likely fall and Colombia’s current account deficit
would widen further. Moreover, should the administration continue lacking political
capital to approve another fiscal reform, the government would likely have to further
cut the public capex budget in order to comply with fiscal targets, hurting growth.
Conversely, a benign outcome to trade tensions would mean firmer external demand
while a resolution to the Venezuelan crisis could halt migrant flows, improving fiscal
dynamics.

Chile
We continue to see near-trend, investment-driven growth over our forecast horizon,
with the domestic reform agenda and the external backdrop representing major risk
factors to our constructive view. The economy is undergoing an orderly slowdown
towards trend pace following a year-long period of rapid expansion. A very sluggish
start to the year – activity barely expanded in the first quarter – was exaggerated by
weather-linked disruptions in mining, with the rest of the economy running at a 2.8%
sequential annualized pace in the period, not far from trend (estimated around 3%). We
keep our long-standing call for an economy sustaining this trend-like pace (3.2%) in both
2019 and 2020, with our call underpinned by three main factors. First, we see moderate
progress in the reform agenda – despite the ruling coalition’s recent pension reform
defeat in a congressional commission – with our base case involving approval of the tax
reform in the second half of the year. Second, both fiscal and monetary policies are
poised to tighten slightly over our forecast horizon, but are still fostering growth.
Finally, our base scenario sees the external backdrop staying supportive thanks to
dovish central banks across major economies, our colleagues’ call for higher copper
prices and prospects for firming global growth in the second half of this year. Turning to

6
inflation, we see further gradual normalization of prices, off from the current 2% annual
rate towards the 3% target by early next year as activity keeps expanding. Accordingly,
we think the hiking cycle remains alive – our base case sees another 25bps hike by
yearend and two more in the back-half of 2020 – although uncertainty is high given
that policymakers will provide a comprehensive rethink of their estimates for neutral
rates and the output gap in their mid-year Monetary Policy Report. Despite our still-
constructive view on the economy, risks are clearly skewed to the downside: Chile’s
small, open economy would be hit particularly hard by any downside to global growth
which could ensue from escalating trade tensions. Domestically, moreover, failure to
advance the administration’s business-friendly reform agenda could pose downside risk
to prospects for investment in 2020.

Peru
We expect a steady outlook for Peru’s economy and its ongoing expansion, despite a
sluggish start to the year. That matters in a region of so many uncertainties that risk
disrupting the prospects for recovery, ranging from Brazil’s pension reform to elections
in Argentina; indeed, Peru’s moderate rebound places it once again as the outperformer
among major Latin American economies. To be clear, we remain materially below
consensus (3.3% in 2019, 3.2% in 2020) which continues to look for strong rebounds at
3.8% on average in both 2019 and 2020. Sectors outside commodities are likely to keep
trending higher, with positive implications for the sustainability of the ongoing recovery,
following on the positive performance from last year. The normalization from past
disruptions in construction activity seems poised to carry on, propped up by mining
capex, housing, and public works as local government spending ramps up after the
election-related did in early 2019. Positive macro fundamentals and ample policy
buffers cap the downside, in our view: Peru enjoys low gross debt to GDP levels, high
international reserves, limited external vulnerabilities and a healthy banking system.
Persistently low inflation and a healthy starting point for public accounts have allowed
Peru to keep an expansionary policy stance, which was warranted. But just as the
downside has been capped by healthy fundamentals and counter-cyclical policy,
dysfunctional politics have limited the upside. Polarization and recurrent scandals have
meant that reform efforts to boost the economy’s potential have stalled; the
deterioration in the approval of the executive keep us cautious about prospects for any
reform progress during the rest of the term, which runs through 2021. Monetary policy
should remain expansionary over the forecast horizon. We see interest rates unchanged
at 2.75% throughout 2019 and into early 2020, with modest tightening starting only
next year. Factors prompting the central bank to keep rates low include: a negative
output gap, low inflation (due to a stable exchange rate, lack of domestic-side pressures,
and favorable weather conditions), expectations anchored in the 1-3% tolerance band,
and more recently the dovish shift among major central banks.

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Venezuela
Amid a weakening economy and dwindling hard currency flows, we believe the current
policy mix is increasingly unviable. Venezuela’s economic depression is deepening: we
now see GDP shrinking by 28.4% this year, leaving activity levels at 40% of those seen at
the onset of the crisis in 2014. The worsening of the depression is partly a product of US
sanctions which are hurting oil output – and with it hard currency flows – but principally
of disruptions in electricity supply that have impacted activity in March and should
become the new normal. With the shrinking economy, hyperinflation has slowed in
recent months: we now expect inflation to end 2019 in the high five-digit or low six-digit
level, off from two million percent late last year. We think heightened uncertainty still
prevails around Venezuela’s outlook, but with the economy in an unsustainable
disequilibrium, prospects for policy change have increased considerably, in our view. Our
base case calls for improvement in the political situation at some point next year, with
the government pursuing an orthodox macro adjustment with help from foreign
countries and the IMF. Our bear case would revolve around maintenance of the current
policy mix, whose outcomes of hyperinflation and economic depression are well-known.
Conversely, our bull case entails a faster-than-anticipated improvement in the political
situation would accelerate the deployment of a stabilization package.

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O Que Aconteceu? / ¿Qué Pasó?
Recent Economic Releases (May 3 - May 16)
Argentina

Industrial Production (March)

Actual: -13.4% y-o-y; Consensus: -10.1% y-o-y
Manufacturing resumed sequential declines down 4.3% m-o-m after some recovery in January-February, which sufficed to leave 1Q sequential growth up 1.2%,
first positive quarter since 3Q2017. In the annual comparison, sector shrank 11.1% in 1Q.

Construction Activity (March)

Actual: -12.3% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
Similar to manufacturing (see above), construction posted 3.5% sequential decline after bouncing in January and February. Sequential growth in first quarter
stood at +4.4% q-o-q – best since 4Q17 – but sector shrank 11.3% in annual comparison.

Vehicle Production – ADEFA (April)

Actual: -33.9% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
Auto sector kept struggling into April, with output now down 31.6% YTD. Domestic sales remained deeply depressed down 60.9% y-o-y (-57.8% YTD) while export
growth was muted up 3.2% (-11.4% YTD).

National CPI (April)

Actual: 3.4% m-o-m; Consensus: 4.0% m-o-m
Inflation decelerated versus March's +4.7% reading, yet the annual print rose nonetheless (+55.8%, from +54.7%). Core prices showed milder deceleration (+3.8%
m-o-m, versus the 1Q average 4.2% run-rate) likely pressured by FX-sensitive prices. Of note, foods inflation (+2.5% m-o-m) finally shifting lower.

Budget Balance (April)

Actual: Ar$0.5 billion; Consensus: n/a
Adjustment on track with primary balance narrowing by Ar$10.8 billion versus year ago. Primary revenues declines 6.4% y-o-y in real terms – tax segment seems
to be improving down -5.3% versus -7.2% in 1Q – while spending shrank -11.3% in period amid broad-based declines. YTD primary balance at +0.1% of GDP.
Brazil

Monetary Policy Meeting

Actual: 6.50%; Consensus: 6.50%
In a widely expected decision, BCB kept rates unchanged for the ninth meeting. Despite policymakers acknowledge the worse growth, this has not changed the
inflation assessment, adding a hawkish tilt to its stance.

Monetary Policy Minutes

Actual: n/a; Consensus: n/a
In a slightly dovish tilt, policymakers highlighted that inflation risks are still symmetric, despite the higher likelihood of weaker growth. Also, they voted to suppress
the “cautious, serenity and perseverance” sentence, but this should not be seen as a change in the BCB’s communication.

GDP Proxy (IBC-Br) (March)

Actual: -2.5% y-o-y; Consensus: -2.2% y-o-y
GDP Proxy contracted sequentially by -0.3% m-o-m, dragged by weaker industrial production (-1.3% m-o-m) and the services sector (-0.7%), which was only partly
offset by broad retail sales (1.1%). This means a 0.7% contraction in the first quarter. This is bad news for first quarter GDP.

Industrial Production (March)

Actual: -6.1% y-o-y; Consensus: -4.7% y-o-y

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Industrial production contracted by 1.3% m-o-m, closing 1Q at a weak -0.7% sequential pace. Almost all categories posted negative numbers, such as consumer
(-2.0% m-o-m) and intermediate goods (-1.5%). This compromises 1Q GDP numbers, and hence over 2019 GDP growth.

Retail Sales (March)

Actual: -4.5% y-o-y; Consensus: -2.4% y-o-y
Retail sales expanded 0.3% m-o-m, leading the quarterly print to a 0.2% sequential expansion. Nevertheless, the main categories posted negative numbers, such
as supermarket sales (-0.4% m-o-m) and fuels & lubricants (-0.8%). The broad measure expanded 1.1%, owing to strong auto sales (4.5%).

PMI Services (April)

Actual: 49.9; Consensus: n/a
For the first time in seven months, PMI Services is below the 50 threshold. Firms signaling contraction blamed weaker demand and unfavorable public policies.
Services jobs were shed to greatest extent year-to-date. On the expectation front, business optimism fell to a ten-month low.

IPCA (April)
Actual: 0.57% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.62% m-o-m
Prices up to April are up to 4.9% y-o-y – the highest level since January 2017. The acceleration came from a one-off adjustment on medicine prices. Food prices,
though decelerating from previous prints, also contributed. Core average inflation edged up to 3.4% y-o-y, from 3.1% last month.

IGP-DI – FGV (April)

Actual: 0.90% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.81% m-o-m
Prices decelerated from last month’s 1.07% m-o-m. The deceleration came mainly from food prices both to the producer and consumer, as they recover from
previous supply shocks. Conversely, upward pressures came from one off hike on medicine prices and gasolines prices in both fronts.

IGP-10 – FGV (May)

Actual: 0.70% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.72% m-o-m
Prices decelerated from last month’s 1.0% m-o-m. The deceleration came mainly from fresh produce, as they have been recovering from previous negative
supply shocks. Conversely, upward pressures came from the standalone hike on medicine prices.
Chile

IMACEC (March)
Actual: 1.9% y-o-y; Consensus: 1.9% y-o-y
Activity posted 0.6% sequential bounce (+0.1% in first quarter) lifted by recovery in mining (+4.4%) yet sector's performance in quarter was poor (-5.4% versus prior
quarter). Rest of economy grew 0.2% versus February, putting first quarter pace of expansion at a near-trend (2.8% annualized) pace.

Retail Sales – INE (March)

Actual: 0.7% y-o-y; Consensus: 1.0% y-o-y
Although March's sales edged up 0.7% sequential, overall performance in first quarter was disappointing with sales down 1.4% versus the prior quarter. Of note,
barring October's outsized gain, retail front has gone nowhere over past year or so, consistent with slow job growth and weak sentiment.

Business Confidence (IMCE) (April)

Actual: 52.1; Consensus: n/a
Seasonally adjusted index slipped by one point to 50.9; details still showing similar trend to that seen over past few quarters: gauges of current conditions (50.2)
hovering close to neutral threshold while expectations (52.3), though still positive, keep deterioration off nearly 19 points from July 2018 peak.

Trade Balance (April)

Actual: $612 million; Consensus: $1.0 billion
Soft start to second quarter: seasonally adjusted exports moved 4.2% lower versus March on widespread weakness; of note, ex-mining exports keep shifting
lower and are now nearly a tenth below December's peak. Imports (-4.0% sequential) also been shifting lower across the board, with stable capital goods
outperforming.

CPI (April)
Actual: 0.3% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.3% m-o-m

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Annual headline rate unchanged from March's at 2.0% with main positive contributor being higher gasoline prices (+3.5%). Core inflation rose 0.1% versus March,
decelerating in the annual comparison to 1.9% (2.1% in March) as both tradable and non-tradable pressures remained muted.

Wages (Nominal) (March)

Actual: 4.8% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
Nominal gains accelerated to a ten-month high on the back of minimum wage hike (4.5%) effective March 1, leaving first-quarter average annual pace of
increases at 4.3% – fastest since first half of 2018. Real wage growth rose to 2.0% in first quarter, also fastest three-month stretch since second quarter of 2018.

Monetary Policy Meeting

Actual: 3.00%; Consensus: 3.00%
Expected on-hold decision. Statement was uneventful, highlighting slight pickup in inflation since start of the year led by food and fuel prices, and that investment
prospects remained positive. Policymakers reiterated that the future rates path would be "re-evaluated" in June's Monetary Policy Report.
Colombia

Monetary Policy Minutes

Actual: n/a; Consensus: n/a
Minutes again uneventful with board comfortable with current policy stance. Board stated both activity and inflation are in line with their base case, albeit they
have singled out uncertainties on growth outlook. Assessment of external backdrop still cautious, but better global liquidity should be supportive factor.

GDP (1Q)
Actual: 2.8% y-o-y; Consensus: 3.0% y-o-y
Economy posted flat sequential growth on downside from construction front, which dragged fixed investment (-1.2% q-o-q) lower. Private consumption showed
positive behavior up 1.4% sequential – best since late 2014 – while external sector remained a drag as exports moved 1.2% lower while imports rose another
3.1%.

Economic Activity Index (March)

Actual: 2.6% y-o-y; Consensus: 3.2% y-o-y
Another disappointing release with activity down 0.1% m-o-m and leaving 1Q GDP up 0.3% versus 4Q2018, not far from official GDP (which showed flat growth).
Disappointment in month mostly a product of downside in manufacturing (-2.7% m-o-m) while most of services activity kept expanding in period.

Industrial Production (March)

Actual: 3.2% y-o-y; Consensus: 3.5% y-o-y
Moderate growth in industry carries on – 1Q expanded 3.1% y-o-y – with profile broad based: mining grew 3.4% y-o-y in March (+3.2% in 1Q) on stronger oil output
while manufacturing accelerated to 3.2% (+3.0% in 1Q) owing to strength in auto sector. Utilities also contributing up 3.0% in March (and +3.5% in 1Q).

Retail Sales (March)

Actual: 5.3% y-o-y; Consensus: 5.5% y-o-y
Another solid reading leaving 1Q growth at +4.8% y-o-y (+6.2% in 2018); March's strength was a product of strong growth in foods (+6.4% y-o-y) as well as
electronic goods (+20%). Of note, auto sales (+7.0%) seemingly regaining traction after Jan-Feb soft patch.

CPI (April)
Actual: 0.50% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.39% m-o-m
Headline inflation remained well-behaved at 3.25% y-o-y (3.21% in March) with main pressures coming from non-core items, namely foods and energy. Core
inflation remained well-behaved up 0.36% m-o-m and running at 2.95% y-o-y, a slight acceleration from March's 2.8% rate.

Trade Balance (March)

Actual: -$764.4 million; Consensus: -$793.0 million
March's deficit widened by $0.5 billion versus year ago – leaving 1Q shortfall $1.3 billion wider – as exports shrank 0.8% y-o-y in month amid widespread declines
beyond oil (non-oil exports down 12.7%, oil exports up 20.9%). Imports still growing briskly (+10.1%) across the board with capital goods keeping momentum.
Mexico

Industrial Production (March)

Actual: -0.1% y-o-y; Consensus: -0.3% y-o-y

11
Terrible report: industry plunged -1.3% from February, leaving output at the lowest level since March 2014. Other than manufacturing which rose for third straight
month (+0.3%) propped up by still supportive, though slowing, export demand, all other sectors posted big declines led by construction (-3.4%).

Fixed Investment (February)

Actual: -1.9% y-o-y; Consensus: -2.5% y-o-y
Investment in January-February running -0.1% below the same period in 2018, as stagnant trend carries on. February's weak result – off -2.5% seasonally
adjusted, reversing part of January's big 8.0% sequential jump – came from declines in both construction and, in particularly, machinery outlays.

Private Consumption (February)

Actual: 1.8% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
Seasonally adjusted index down slightly (-0.2% sequential) in February, leaving consumption levels nearly flat in the past six months – consistent other weak
figures such as services activity. With employment growth weakening, consumer spending is likely to remain sluggish in coming months.

Retail Sales – ANTAD (April)

Actual: 3.7% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
Disappointing: looking at March-April combined to smooth out the Easter effect, sequential sales barely grew at a 1.0% annualized rate. Poor sales performance
reflects weaker job growth, sluggish credit and flattening remittances are more than offsetting benefit from rising real wages.

Leading Economic Indicator (March)

Actual: 0.05% m-o-m; Consensus: n/a
Leading index up for second consecutive month – reversing part of the downshift between October and January – hinting at improvement in activity after what
turned out to be a lackluster first quarter. February's coincident index of current activity (-0.10%) extended its downtrend to ten months.

Consumer Confidence (April)

Actual: 110.9; Consensus: 113.2
Confidence slipped further, now -5.1% below February's record; downside led by erosion in views about country's current conditions (-7.8%) and expectations (-
7.2%) – possibly the first signs of some consumer disappointment with weak economy and lack of apparent progress with other government priorities.

Contractual Wages (April)

Actual: 4.9% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
While April's average wage adjustment was slowest in half a year, that was largely a function of negotiation from public sector (3.4%); private salaries rose 5.9%,
not far from the 6.3% first quarter average, suggesting that pressures – likely linked to minimum-wage policy and rising labor activism – persist.

CPI (April)
Actual: 0.05% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.06% m-o-m
Annual headline rose to 4.41% and core hit a thirteen-month high of 3.87%. The bulk of April's upside came from services (which spiked to 4.98%); pressures
seemed to go beyond seasonal factors linked to Easter, possibly reflecting rising labor costs after big minimum-wage hike at turn of the year.

Employment Report (1Q)

Actual: n/a; Consensus: n/a
Wage mass rose 0.6% sequential to a new high – 0.5% above previous mid-2018 record. Whereas most high frequency indicators had suggested weaker hiring
and rising wages, the wage mass gains from this broader survey came from an uptick in employment; real quarterly earnings, by contrast, were flat.

Monetary Policy Meeting

Actual: 8.25%; Consensus: 8.25%
Unanimous vote to keep rates unchanged. Statement more hawkish, mainly on signs of cost pressures emerging from wage hikes – even in context of more
sluggish economy – leaving risk balance for inflation biased to upside. Again, board stressed high degree of uncertainty, both domestic and external.
Peru

Monetary Policy Meeting

Actual: 2.75%; Consensus: 2.75%
New month, exact same story: rates unchanged at 2.75% as expected. Guidance again neutral: policymakers see "appropriate to maintain an expansive policy
stance" in a context of anchored inflation expectations and economic activity still running below potential.

12
GDP (March)
Actual: 3.2% y-o-y; Consensus: 3.1% y-o-y
Activity rose at a 0.8% sequential pace – sharpest gain in half a year with positive contributions from both commodity-linked and other sectors. Construction also
improved in March, suggesting that some of the early-year drag from a plunge in local government investment may be easing.

Unemployment Rate (April)

Actual: 7.3%; Consensus: 7.4%
Unemployment rate, once seasonally adjusted, nearly unchanged at 7.0% – close to the top of the range seen over the past three years. The elevated jobless rate
reflects mainly sluggish employment growth – up just 0.4% in the past three months compared to same period in 2018 and 0.1% in April.

Trade Balance (March)

Actual: $430 million; Consensus: n/a
Surplus in first quarter reached $1.2 billion, narrowing from $1.9 billion in same period last year. The main swing factor was a -10.1% decline in commodity
exports, both a function of lower prices (-8.6%) and sightly volume drop (-1.7%). Imports held up much better, nearly unchanged from a year ago (-0.9%).

Source: Government data, Morgan Stanley Latam Economics

13
What's Next? – Upcoming Data Releases (May 17 - May 24)

Friday, May 17
MS Forecast/
Consensus Last2
Brazil
Formal Job Creation n/a -43,196
(April)1 n/a
CPI – FIPE (Second Preview) n/a n/a
(Apr 16 - May 15) 0.27% y-o-y
Tax Collections n/a R$ 109.8 billion
(April)1 n/a
Colombia
Consumer Confidence n/a 1.2
(April) 3.2
Mexico
Formal Employment 2.8% y-o-y 2.9% y-o-y
(April)1 n/a

Monday, May 20
MS Forecast/
Consensus Last2
Brazil
IGP-M (Second Preview) n/a 0.78% m-o-m
(May) n/a
Chile
GDP 1.8% y-o-y 3.6% y-o-y
(1Q) (See Exhibit 1) n/a
Balance of Payments -$1.9 billion (C/A) -$3.6 billion (C/A)
(1Q) (See Exhibit 2) n/a
Peru
GDP 2.3%y-o-y 4.8% y-o-y
(1Q) (See Exhibit 3) n/a

14
 Wednesday, May 22
MS Forecast/
Consensus Last2
Argentina
Economic Activity Index (EMAE) -7.3% y-o-y -4.8% y-o-y
(March) (see Exhibit 4) n/a
Mexico
Retail Sales – INEGI n/a 1.8% y-o-y
(March) n/a

Thursday, May 23
MS Forecast/
Consensus Last2
Argentina
Consumer Confidence n/a 34.41
(May) n/a
Trade Balance n/a $1.2 billion
(April) n/a
Brazil
FGV - Consumer Confidence n/a 89.5
(May) n/a
Mexico
CPI n/a 0.06% 1H/2H
(1H May) (See Exhibit 5) n/a

Friday, May 24
MS Forecast/
Consensus Last2
Brazil
IPCA-15 0.42% m-o-m 0.72% m-o-m
(May) (see Exhibit 6) 0.43% m-o-m
Mexico
GDP 1.3% y-o-y 1.7% y-o-y
(1Q) (see Exhibit 7) 1.4% y-o-y
IGAE 1.5% y-o-y 1.1% y-o-y
(March) n/a
Balance of Payments -$8.3 billion (C/A) -$3.4 billion (C/A)
(1Q) (See Exhibit 8) n/a
Trade Balance n/a $1.4 billion
(April) n/a

n/a = not available or not applicable

1 Earliest possible release date

2 Last denotes last published data by a non-Morgan Stanley source.

Source: Morgan Stanley Latam Economics estimates

15
On the Horizon
AR BR CL CO MX PE VE Region**
Real GDP growth (%)
2016 -2.1% -3.3% 1.3% 2.0% 2.9% 3.9% -16.5% -0.2%
2017 2.7% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% 2.1% 2.5% -15.4% 1.7%
2018 -2.5% 1.1% 4.0% 2.7% 2.0% 4.0% -18.8% 1.4%
2019E -1.3% 1.4% 3.2% 3.1% 1.3% 3.3% -28.4% 1.4%
2020E 2.1% 2.5% 3.2% 3.3% 1.9% 3.2% -7.7% 2.4%
Inflation (year-end, %)
2016 39.3% 6.3% 2.7% 5.7% 3.4% 3.2% 482.3% 8.7%
2017 24.8% 2.9% 2.3% 4.1% 6.8% 1.4% 2798.8% 6.5%
2018 47.6% 3.7% 2.1% 3.2% 4.8% 2.2% 2111640.6% 8.8%
2019E 38.1% 4.0% 2.6% 3.5% 3.6% 2.2% 86193.5% 7.5%
2020E 25.2% 3.8% 2.9% 3.3% 3.7% 2.0% 9183.8% 6.0%
FX rate (year-end vs. US$)
2016 15.87 3.15 667 3001 20.73 3.35 n/a
2017 18.60 3.31 615 2984 19.79 3.24 n/a
2018 37.65 3.87 696 3250 19.68 3.37 n/a
2019E * 46.00 3.75 640 3010 19.00 3.28 n/a
2020E * 52.00 3.65 600 2975 19.60 3.20 n/a
Current account balance (% GDP)
2016 -2.7% -1.3% -1.4% -4.4% -2.1% -2.7% n/a -2.0%
2017 -4.9% -0.4% -2.1% -3.3% -1.7% -1.2% n/a -1.7%
2018 -5.2% -0.8% -3.1% -3.8% -1.8% -1.5% n/a -2.0%
2019E -1.9% -1.1% -3.0% -4.1% -1.6% -1.7% n/a -1.7%
2020E -2.4% -1.6% -2.5% -4.2% -1.9% -1.8% n/a -2.1%
Trade balance (US$ bn)
2016 2.0 47.7 5.4 -13.1 -13.1 1.9 6.6 37.3
2017 -8.3 67.0 7.4 -8.2 -11.0 6.6 21.0 74.4
2018 -3.8 58.7 4.7 -9.4 -13.7 7.0 15.8 59.3
2019E 10.2 49.0 4.9 -7.0 -16.8 5.5 3.5 49.2
2020E 7.7 45.0 5.6 -8.5 -20.2 4.8 6.0 40.4
Interest rate (year-end)
2016 24.75% 13.75% 3.50% 7.50% 5.75% 4.25% n/a
2017 28.75% 7.00% 2.50% 4.75% 7.25% 3.25% n/a
2018 59.25% 6.50% 2.75% 4.25% 8.25% 2.75% n/a
2019E 60.00% 6.50% 3.25% 4.25% 7.50% 2.75% n/a
2020E 40.00% 8.00% 3.75% 4.75% 7.00% 3.25% n/a
International reserves (US$ bn)
2016 39.3 365.0 40.5 46.7 176.5 61.7 11.0 740.8
2017 55.1 374.0 39.0 47.6 172.8 63.7 9.5 761.7
2018 65.8 375.0 39.9 48.4 174.8 65.0 9.0 777.9
2019E 65.0 375.0 40.0 53.0 175.0 65.0 8.0 781.0
2020E 70.0 375.0 40.0 55.0 175.0 65.0 8.0 788.0
Public sector balance (% GDP)
2016 -5.8% -9.0% -2.7% -3.8% -2.5% -2.6% n/a -5.6%
2017 -5.9% -7.8% -2.7% -3.6% -1.1% -3.1% n/a -4.7%
2018 -5.0% -7.1% -1.7% -3.1% -2.1% -2.5% n/a -4.5%
2019E -3.6% -6.8% -1.5% -2.7% -1.9% -2.5% n/a -4.1%
2020E -2.9% -5.4% -1.4% -2.6% -2.4% -2.3% n/a -3.6%

E = Morgan Stanley Forecast

Source: Morgan Stanley Research, *FX Strategy Team, Updated forecasts in bold,
**Regional inflation and GDP figures exclude Venezuela

16
What's Next? – A Closer Look
Monday, May 20
Exhibit 1: Chile: Real GDP Growth (% change) Chile's 1Q GDP
16%
q-o-q, annualized, SA Forecast: 1.8% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
12% y-o-y

8%
Economic activity decelerated materially at the start of the
year, as suggested by the IMACEC proxy which barely rose in
4% the period. Much of the early-year weakness, however, seems
0% to be linked to temporary factors such as weather-related
disruptions in mining (which shrank -5.4% versus the last
-4%
quarter of 2018).
-8%
Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16 Dec-17 Dec-18
Source: BCCh
The rest of the economy kept chugging along up at a 2.8%
sequential annualized pace in the first quarter,consistent with our call for growth
to converge to trend-pace (around 3%) in 2019. We see 3.2% growth this year amid
still-favorable prospects for investment, monetary and fiscal policies that are still
fostering growth as well as still-supportive external conditions. (see "Chile: Looking
Out for Reforms," in Latin America Macro Mid Year Outlook, May 13, 2019 ).

Risks to the outlook are skewed to the downside: further escalation of trade
tensions would hit Chile's small, open economy particularly hard via slower
external demand, deteriorating terms of trade and tightening of financial
conditions. Domestically, the government's reform agenda remains the defining
factor for Chile' outlook.

Exhibit 2: Chile: Current Account Balance (4Q-rolling, as % of GDP) Chile's 1Q Balance of Payments
3.0%
Forecast: -$1.9 billion (C/A); Consensus: n/a
1.5%
The impact on exports from lower copper prices was the main
0.0% factor behind the worsening in the first-quarter trade
accounts – the merchandise surplus was $1.9 billion in the
-1.5% first three months of the year, off from $3.0 billion a year ago
– translating into a widening in the overall current account
-3.0%
deficit.
-4.5%
Dec-08 Dec-10 Dec-12 Dec-14 Dec-16 Dec-18
Source: Bcch
The first quarter deterioration in the current account, which
has been ongoing for over a year, is coming in a context of
strong investment spending rather than a consumer binge or from a government
spending beyond its means.

17
Exhibit 3: Peru: Real GDP Growth (% change) Peru's 1Q GDP
15% Forecast: 2.3% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
% q-o-q, SAAR % y-o-y

10% Peru's economy contracted in the first quarter of the year, as

suggested by the monthly activity indicator, maintaining a
5%
trend of high growth volatility; indeed over the past year,
0%
activity contracted in two quarters, surging at an above-trend
pace in the quarters in between.
-5%

-10%
Dec-2008 Dec-2010 Dec-2012 Dec-2014 Dec-2016
The negative first-quarter figures, importantly, reflect
Dec-2018

Source: INEI weakness mainly from commodity-linked sectors at the turn

of the year; since then, the economy has been on an uptrend
rising over 6% annualized in the February-March period.

Wednesday, May 22
Exhibit 4: Argentina: Economic Activity Index (3mma) Argentina's March Economic Activity Index
15% q-o-q, SAAR Forecast: -7.3% y-o-y; Consensus: n/a
% y-o-y
10%

5%
Higher frequency data suggests activity shifted lower in March
after the economy staged three consecutive months of
0%
positive sequential growth (December-February). Our model,
-5% however, suggests that March's print still suffices to keep first
-10% quarter growth stable sequentially after four consecutive
-15%
quarters of declines in 2018.
-20%
Feb-12 Feb-13 Feb-14 Feb-15 Feb-16 Feb-17 Feb-18 Feb-19
Source: Indec More broadly, the latest events – ranging from higher-than-
expected inflation to trade tensions abroad – have led us to
revise lower our growth forecast for this year (to -1.3%, from -1.0%). We think FX
stability is a necessary condition to ensure continuity of the ongoing rebound, given
its positive implications over sentiment and inflation, which would lead to some
recovery in workers' incomes following wage negotiations. We think consumption
will help sustain the rebound beyond the agriculture-led boost in 2Q2019; further
weakening of the FX could trigger renewed inflationary pressures, thus putting the
rebound at risk (see "Argentina: About Policy Continuity or Policy Reversal," in Latin
America Macro Mid Year Outlook, May 13, 2019 ).

18
 Thursday, May 23
Exhibit 5: Mexico: Headline and Core Inflation (% change y-o-y, semi- Mexico's 1H May CPI
monthly index)
7.0%
Forecast: n/a; Consensus: n/a
6.0% Following a disappointing April report which saw the annual
5.0% rate of core inflation – an area of concern for the central bank
– rise to a thirteen-month high of 3.87%, May's inflation
4.0%
figures will be critical to assess if April's spike was temporary
3.0% or whether it reflects a more persistent deterioration in price
2.0%
dynamics.
Headline
Core
1.0%
Apr-09 Apr-11 Apr-13 Apr-15 Apr-17 Apr-19
Source: INEGI The main area of concern is the evolution of services costs,
which jumped sharply in April. While seasonal pressures
linked to the Easter holiday played a role, the adjustments to items like tourism
packages and hotels were quite large (and didn't fully revert in the last two weeks
of the month) and other groups also moved higher, which could reflect companies'
attempts to pass on to consumers higher labor costs linked to the government's
big minimum wage adjustment at the start of the year. Indeed, the central bank's
hawkish tone from the May 16 statement focused on concerns over wage-related
pressures.

Friday, May 24
Exhibit 6: Brazil: Goods and Services Inflation (% change y-o-y) Brazil's May IPCA-15
15
Forecast: 0.42% m-o-m; Consensus: 0.43% m-o-m
12

9 Inflation up to mid-May should decelerate from April. The

6 main reason behind it should be the payback from the
3
negative supply shock on fresh produce. On the other hand,
0
we see two main upside pressures: higher electricity tariffs and
also gasoline prices, which should continue to be at high
-3
levels due to weaker FX. We think that both services and core
-6
Apr-07 Apr-09 Apr-11 Apr-13 Apr-15 Apr-17 Apr-19
services inflation should edge up.
Non and Semi Durable Goods Durable Goods Services
Source: IBGE

Inflation should peak in May on a yearly basis due to negative

supply shock on food inflation and due to base effects from the truck drivers’
strike last year, but we should start to see a deceleration in June. As for the
remainder of the year, we should see inflation at low levels, but the recent protein
prices noise could create some pressures ahead.

19
Exhibit 7: Mexico: Real GDP Growth Mexico's 1Q GDP
5.00% 8%
Forecast: 1.3% y-o-y; Consensus: 1.3% y-o-y
3.75% 6%

2.50% 4% The economy had a difficult start to the year, contracting -

1.25% 2%
0.2% compared to the final quarter of 2018, based on the
preliminary GDP report released late April. The surprising
0.00% 0%
weakness in the first quarter should lead to additional
-1.25% -2%
downward revisions to consensus growth estimates (currently
-2.50%
Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18
-4%
Mar-19
at 1.5%) closer to our 1.3% estimate.
Sequential annualized change (seasonally adjusted) % change y-o-y (LHS)
Source: INEGI

Industry continued to struggle, off -0.6% from the previous

quarter, the third decline in the past four quarters; the biggest surprise came from
marked weakness in services (-0.2%), whose resilience has been the brightest spot
in Mexico's growth story this cycle.

Exhibit 8: Mexico: Current Account Balance (4Q-rolling, as % of GDP) Mexico's 1Q Balance of Payments
0.0% Forecast: -$8.3 billion (C/A); Consensus: n/a
-0.5%
Mexico's current account is running at a manageable level –
-1.0% we see a gap of 1.6% of GDP this year, slightly narrower than
-1.5%
1.8% of GDP last – and, in fact, it likely improved slightly in
early 2019 thanks to a narrower trade gap and elevated
-2.0%
remittances.
-2.5%

-3.0%
Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16 Dec-17 Dec-18 Rather than the current account, however, our main focus will
Source: Banxico be on the capital account and foreign direct investment in
particular given that decisions to reinvest earnings by Mexico-
based foreign companies tend to be front-loaded. A low figure – probably around
$10 billion or below – would signal that the uncertainty generated by the new
administration's policies is quickly taking a toll on investment, as other figures (such
as imports of capital goods) are already indicating.

20
Recent Reports
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EM Strategy and Economics: Banxico Under the 4T: A Text-Mining Analysis May 15, 2019
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Argentina: Will the New FX Policy Work? May 3, 2019
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Mexico: The Gasoline Challenge (And How to Improve It) April 26, 2019
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Brazil: Reform Tracker Update April 11, 2019
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Colombia: Why BanRep May Hold Rates April 5, 2019
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Chile: Rethinking Normalization April 1, 2019
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Brazil: The Credit Question March 29, 2019
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Argentina: Navigating Politics and the Post-elections Policy Mix March 22, 2019
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Mexico: Recalibrating the New Course March 15, 2019
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Agribusiness and Economics: Argentina: Agri Should Jump-Start a Recovery February 28, 2019
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Brazil Equity & Fixed Income Strategy and Economics: Social Security Reform: Client February 26, 2019
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Mexico Economics & Strategy: PEMEX: New Plan, Same Challenges February 21, 2019
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21
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