Note:

The chapter IV below is an extract from:

Wahyudi, Agus. “Dealing with Difference: Pancasila In Post Suharto Indonesia.” A Dissertation.
Northern Arizona University. 2018

CHAPTER IV
THE MAINSTREAM, COMPROMISED SECULAR NATIONALISTS:
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY GROUPS AND THE DEFICIT OF LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Kaum Radikal berbahaya,

tetapi kaum oportunis jauh lebih berbahaya.
Mereka bisa pura pura moderat, biar selamat.
(Amin Mudzakkir, Peneliti LIPI,
Facebook’ page 26 Nopember 2017)

INTRODUCTION

As a continuation of our previous chapter III, this chapter will further show the

peculiarity of attitudes of the mainstream, compromised secular nationalist group and how this

relates to Islamic radicalism. As has already been indicated in the previous chapter, and will be

further discussed in this chapter, even though the group of the mainstream, compromised secular

nationalist shares an understanding of the important roles of Pancasila in dealing with difference

or conflict, it has also been instrumental in promoting state policies that nourish or help create an

environment for radical, intolerant groups, if not quietly supportive of and complicit in the

Islamic radicals’ demands. This, I will argue, has to do with the affinity or resemblance of the

political values and commitments between the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists and

the Islamic radicals in Indonesia with regard to ‘a state perfectionism.’1 However, as I have

mentioned in chapter III, the existence of mainstream, compromised secular nationalists still is

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and always will be pivotal to the needs of addressing the challenges posed by violence and

terrorist extremism in the context of Indonesia’s current democratic project as well as the future.

The aim of this chapter is it provides yet another sketch of the involvement or the

entanglement of some top public officials and political elites of post-Suharto Indonesia with the

contemporary Islamic radical groups. The chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first

part, I will discuss the responses and reactions of the mainstream, compromised secular

nationalists concerning the rights of the minority groups, a theme that has been discussed in

previous chapters II, represented by individual figures of Bramantyo, Hartoyo and Sue Tjen

Marching. The context in which the analysis will be taken place in this section is particularly that

of the eras of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY) and Joko Widodo (known as

Jokowi), even though the discussion will also touch upon a relevant historical occurrence related

to the previous era during the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid. In the second part, I will

discuss the deficit of liberal constitutionalism contributed by the mainstream, compromised

secular nationalists to further understand the character of the group. The phenomena in question

are the “Bela Negara” (State Defense) program and the aspiration to return to the old 1954

Indonesian Constitution. The final part of this chapter provides conclusion and assessment of the

otherwise promising roles importantly played by the mainstream, compromised secular

nationalists in relation to the efforts to ease the danger of contemporary Islamic radicalism.

THE MINORITY GROUPS AND THE PERFECTIONIST, CONSERVATIVE FORCES

Despite the acceptance of the Pancasila, and of the democratic values established since

1998, no agreed formula has been established among Indonesian nationalists regarding how to

respect the rights of minority groups from the radical Islamic groups’ attacks, which have been

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occurring since the “reformasi” era began in 1998. 2 The main targets of violence and

interventionism attitudes perpetrated by the radical Islamic groups, in which the entanglement of

the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists has played a part, are limited only by the

Islamic radical groups’ perceived understanding of who their assumed enemies are. In other

words, everything that is different from them, or things that are opposed to their perceived

political positions are identified as the targets of violence in most cases.3 It is often the case that

“when a group is perceived as the “other,” it’s easier to attack the other, or to strip it of civil

rights.”4 It goes without saying that, since 1998, Indonesian politics has been inundated by the

issues of rights violations against minority groups, ranging from, but not limited to violent

actions against such groups as Ahmadiyyah, or Syiah, and other local religious groups, the

sexual orientation (LGBT) communities, the political ideologies of former families and

sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia), sexism in

the form of the rejection of women as political leaders, and even acts of racism, such as anti-

Chinese phenomena and so on and so forth.

In order to further explain the ways the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists

have been entangled with Islamic radical forces, I will demonstrate in the following session that

the explanation for the entanglement of the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists with

the Islamic radical forces partly lies in the persistence of the forces of perfectionism and

conservatism underpinning the former groups’ understanding and practices of the Pancasila. It is

partly these secular political values embraced by the groups of nationalists, which interestingly

intersect with the political values of Islamic radical groups, that help explain their aversion to the

liberal constitutionalism principles, despite their acceptance of democratization5. As the aim of

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all kinds of perfectionist ideology and conservatism is predominantly in the direction of

“homogenization” and the “imposition of a certain comprehensive doctrine” against other

comprehensive doctrines, 6 the ideological characteristics of the mainstream, compromised

secular nationalists mirror the very perfectionist inclination similar to those of the character of

Islamic radical ideologies. The roots of perfectionist inclinations that have marked the political

attitudes and views of the current mainstream, compromised secular nationalists can be traced

back to, at least, the early formation of the Indonesian Constitution.7 In the political arena, some

members of the group of secular nationalists have been demonstrating actions that defend the

anti-democratic, anti-liberal and romantic visions about the integralist or organicist state.8

When it comes to the need to ease and moderate political tensions as a result of the

violence and coercive actions of a dominant, forceful group towards minority groups within

Indonesian society, for example those actions taken invisibly through sanctions, the mainstream,

compromised secular nationalists, at best, employ opportunistic and pragmatist approaches, and

at worst, allow minority rights to be blatantly violated. In this sense, the general understanding

among them seems to be that there is no such thing as an inherent absolute right for minority

groups. The minority rights are a contingent right: the rights defined based on what the

“political” are according to their assumed political interests. The minority groups have

conditional rights only, that is, their rights are not inherent in their group identity or not part of

their collective identities. The actions of mainstream, compromised secular nationalists, for this

reason, contradict the very notions commonly known in the concept of maximal democracies,

which represent the essence of constitutional liberalism.9 Hence, for such groups, the rights of

minority groups may not be problematized or not be intruded on as far as they do not actively

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show their very existence, or as far as they do not attempt to seek for a public and political

recognition. 10 As a result, the minority groups have often become the first victims and have

become the most vulnerable groups from the possible attacks of the Islamic radical groups. Such

attacks are clearly in collaboration with the elites or government authorities in many various

cases.

As one shall see, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)’s tenure (20 October 2004-20

October 2014), and later in some degree President Jokowi’s policies (2014-Present), provide rich

and vivid examples of the practices of the politics of perfectionism and conservatism and its

serious implications for minority groups. Being elected democratically and directly for the first

time in July and September 2004 in a two-stage process by Indonesians, SBY and his vice

President, Jusuf Kalla, 11 inherited still “three foundational issues that faced the newly

independent Indonesi[a]” one of which took the form of a rising tide of religious conservatism

that not only threatened “the civil and political rights of some individuals and groups” but also

one day would “threaten the secular state itself.” 12 However, another and more sympathetic

account regarding SBY’s policy towards the wave of Islamic power has suggested that despite

regular mention of his professed principles of tolerance, democracy had left him with nothing but

the smart politics he needed to practice to stay in power.13

Starting since in the early years of SBY’s presidency, scholars had even readily observed

“the increasing cooperation and collusion between powerful politicians and conservative Islamic

leaders in Indonesia’s democratic era,” and under President SBY the condition had often been

described as an era when a reversal was happening in which “religious dynamics were shaping

the political regimes,” unlike in the past when the case was more like “the political regimes

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setting the religious agenda.”14 This unfortunate reversal was particularly evident, for instance, in

the empowerment of the existence of the ‘Indonesian Ulama Council” (known as MUI—Majelis

Ulama Indonesia) or Islamic religious leaders15---a once toothless organization set up by Suharto

on 26 July 1975 as part of his system of social control—and its subsequent political implications

for minority groups. A Muslim activist suggested that SBY’s recognition of the MUI, a

conservative Sunni religious group, in 2005 as the only authorized interpreter of Islam and the

government’s pledge of openness to the MUI’s views, had been responsible for the rising

violence that emerged in Indonesia afterwards (Suady 2014).16 SBY was noted to have opened

the national congress of the Ulama Council on July 26, 2005, in which he said that,

“We want to place [the council] in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so
that it becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state
and the areas where the government or state should heed the fatwas from [the council]
and ulamas” (cited in Scott).

Even though fatwas issued by the council were not binding legally nor did they have any

legislative standing, the authority given by SBY to the council regarding all Islamic issues had

made the council immensely influential17 (Scott 2016). An expert on terrorism with International

Crisis Group, Sidney Jones, commented that SBY’s decision to attend the meeting was

“unfortunate,” while a leading Indonesian Islamic scholar, Azyumardi Azra said that the

government ‘doesn’t know what to do. It’s afraid to oppose the conservatives because certain

groups could radicalize” (cited in Unmacht 2005).

The exact reason behind SBY’s move---why SBY handed over the power to pronounce

on Islamic issues to an unelected council and backed MUI as ‘police’ for issues pertaining to

morality and belief---has perhaps remained an open question.18 However, the implication was

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quite vivid and far deeper than what might have been seen, as its serious and long repercussion

went beyond SBY’s tenure: Indonesians were now seeing the rise of conservatism, and the

continuing inclination toward a disregard for constitutional liberalism, which proved to have

consequential impacts for the lives of many citizens from minority groups. The democratic

election that replaced SBY in 2014 and gave President Joko Widodo the presidency did not help

the plight of minority groups much. I will further clarify this assertion by examining the

following three main issues: the plights of unrecognized and local/tribal religions and beliefs; of

the LGBT community; and of the victims of the 1965 massacre.

The Religious Minorities: The Plight of the Tribal and Unrecognized Belief and/or Religion

The elite government’s entanglement with the conservative, reactionary Islamic forces

accounted for the various plights of the unrecognized and local religious belief groups in

Indonesia. As we shall see, this was particularly obvious during the era of SBY. As Bastiaan

Scherpen has noted, “Yudhoyono gave the representatives of conservative Islam practically free

rein from 2005, with his support for a greater role for the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI),

which increasingly came under the control of illiberal figures.”19 A fatwa issued by the Council

during its seventh National Congress in July 2005, which held pluralism, liberalism and

secularism as being against Islam is a striking indication of the conservative push in Indonesian

politics.20 The MUI and its supporters called the three words pluralism, liberalism and secularism

Sipilis, which was intended to sound like “syphilis,” invoking a notion of diseases that will

destroy Indonesia. Many elements of non-Muslim and Muslim groups alike saw the fatwa as a

setback that would take Indonesia in a backwards direction and could potentially be used to
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delegitimize the national consensus of Pancasila that respected the values of pluralism.21 Yet,

SBY backed the MUI’s ‘controversial’ fatwa,22 and MUI’s role as morality and belief ‘police’

was indicated in his speeches at many of the MUI’s important organizational events from 2005-

2010 (Hasyim 2015: 491). The government’s open backing of the fatwa and of the MUI’s views

revealed the position of SBY’s administration. As the MUI’s ‘controversial’ fatwa supporters

evidently had been some radical Muslim groups, scholars like John Olle painstakingly argued for

the connection between the MUI fatwa with several attacks on ‘heretics’ due to the fact that the

attackers used the MUI’s fatwa as their justification for the attacks (cited in Sirry 2013: 101).

While some scholars viewed the fatwa regarding “pluralism, liberalism and secularism” as an

indication in which the conservative groups behind the MUI have become more influential,23

others suggested that the MUI fatwa should not be exaggerated as it is the case that MUI views

were basically “tolerant ones but not liberal.”24 However, there was an interesting connection

between the MUI’s institutional role and its ties to street protest.25

More troublingly, amid the already heavily increased violence against Ahmadiya groups

in Lombok, in West Java and in other parts of the country, the MUI declared in its seventh

National Congress in July 2005 that the Ahmadis outside Islam and its members apostates.

Following similar fatwa issued by the Saudi-dominated Muslim World League, Rabita, MUI had

already issued this kind of fatwa in 1980s, but the political backgrounds and the environment are

now different: while the MUI fatwa against the Ahmadis in 1980s neither endorsed by the public

nor the government, the fatwa in 2005 “was picked up by the government and the politicians

often used it to legitimize or to excuse violence” (Schafer 2015: 498). The MUI’s campaign

against Islamic heresy had in fact been endorsed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,

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Attorney General Hendarman Soepandji dan National Police Chief General Sutanto, which

implied granting the “MUI greater legitimacy to decide matters of public piety” (Menchik 2007).

On 9 June 2008, a joint degree of the Minister of Religious Affairs (Muhammad M. Basyuni),

the Attorney General (Hendarman Supandji), and the Ministers of Home Affairs/the Interior

Minister (H. Mardiyanto) regarding the Ahmadiyya Community was issued by the government,

which prohibits promulgation and the Ahmadi beliefs and teachings, despite stopping short of an

outright band.26 This decree pleased no one, but it demonstrated “how radical elements…have

been able to develop contacts in the bureaucracy and use classic civil society techniques to

influence government policy.27 In November 2007, before a national MUI meeting, the President

went further in supporting the MUI’s decisions, stating that,

“In accordance with its regulations, the MUI issues fatwas. The president cannot issue a
fatwa. But after a fatwa is issued, the tools of the state can do their duty. Hopefully our
cooperation will deepen in the future…We must all take strict measures against deviant
beliefs” (cited in ICG, 2008: 9).

President SBY’s endorsement sparked an immediate response from many observers and

democratic activists alike. An assessment asserted that while President SBY had often been

regarded by the International community as a force of moderation, in fact he was not; he had

neither been a force nor particularly moderate. 28 Andreas Harsono, Indonesian researcher at

Human Rights Watch similarly stated that President SBY had “laid down the most sectarian

regulatory infrastructure in Indonesia.”29 There was strong indication that the government under

President SBY had not only been guilty of gross negligence regarding the rise of Islamic

radicalism, but had been complicit with the prospect of Islamic radicalism. When his minister of

religious affairs, Suryadharma Ali, called for the Ahmadiyah to be banned entirely, President

SBY also remained silent (Parameswaran 2011), and hence the President was assumed to have

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supported the decision. As MUI’s war against heresy has expanded beyond Ahmadiyah dan

SIPILIS, it has also resulted in the growing intolerance practices ranging from low-level

harassment and legal restrictions to damage of property, enforced relocation and bloody violence

with “often with the connivance or indifference of state authorities.” 30 Following the brutal

attack against the Ahmadi groups in the Cikeusik sub-district of Banten on 6 February 2011, the

response of the government ministers did not help, and only hardened public attitudes against

Ahmadiyah. As Greg Fealy explained in detail regarding the government actors involved, noting

that,

The Minister for Justice and Human Rights at the time, Patrialis Akbar, a senior
Muhammadiyah member and PAN politician, told the press that he had no reason to
believe that the Ahmadis’ human rights had been breached. The Minister for Religious
Affairs, Suryadharma Ali, repeatedly criticised Ahmadis during the following weeks for
offending Muslims with their beliefs and urged them to ‘rejoin’ the Islamic community.
A week after the attack, Minister for Home Affairs Gamawan Fauzi met a number of the
most virulent anti-Ahmadiyah campaigners, including Habib Rizieq Shihab from the
Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, or FPI), at a meeting he described as
‘warm and friendly’. The Minister for Defence, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, endorsed a
‘prayer mat’ operation during which soldiers in West Java and Banten ‘occupied’
Ahmadiyah mosques seeking to ‘persuade’ Ahmadis to return to the ‘true path’.
Purnomo’s approval came despite NGO claims that dozens of Ahmadis had been coerced
into renouncing their faith. SBY was more circumspect, denouncing the violence and
calling on the police to apprehend those who had broken the law. As in past cases of
Ahmadiyah attacks, he carefully avoided naming the organisation, probably because he
did not want to be seen as defending it, but also quite possibly because, like so many
Indonesian Muslims, he actively dislikes Ahmadiyah and its beliefs (Fealy 2011: 348-9).

At the regional level in many different parts of Indonesia, a variety of similar versions of

regulations have been issued as well. The central government applauded the regional government

decisions to ban Ahmadiyah, as can be seen in the backing of at least three ministers under the

President SBY—the ministers for Justice, Home Affairs and Religious Affairs-over the local

administrations that had assisted the national government in implementing its Joint Ministerial

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Degree and for safeguarding the purity of religious teaching (Fealy 2011: 349). The steady

increase in the incidences of violence, forcible closure of places of worship and other violations

of freedom of religion or belief during the years of SBY’s presidency and afterwards arguably

connected to the government policy and political decisions.

However, despite the fact that the most egregious and systematic religious rights abuses

were experienced by the Ahmadiyah sect, the religious intolerance had expanded beyond the

Ahmadi’s groups, but impacted tremendously other religious minority groups and local religions

as well. For example, following the burning down of Ahmadiyah followers’ houses in 2008 by

the Islamic vigilante group of the FPI, the Bekasi government closed the HKBP Filadelfia church

in 2009, and in 2010, the Bogor government defied the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the

establishment of the GKI Yasmin church,31 while in 2012 Shia Muslims in Sampang, Madura,

were relocated by force.32 With respect to the violence against the Shia families of Sampang,

SBY’s condemnation was loud and clear, yet his Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali,

had ironically repeatedly stated on September 2012 that the Shia were not Muslims, and that Shia

families in Sampang should “convert” to Sunni Islam to order to return to their communities.33

However, at no time did SBY reprimand his minister for his inflammatory statement. When a

delegation of Sampang Shia visited Commission VIII, which deals with religious affairs in the

nation’s parliament, to tell their plight, their beliefs and ethnicity were ridiculed by MPs from

both Islamic and secular parties.34

The plight of Indonesia’s minority religious groups has been a nationwide concern,

affecting all these groups -- Shi’a and Sufi Muslims, Christians – both Protestant and Catholic –

as well as Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, Baha’is--not to mention those experienced by

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adherents of traditional indigenous beliefs and of people with no ‘religion’ like the case of

Alexander Aan who was jailed due to his conviction as an atheist. 35 While progressive,

pluralistic-minded Muslims are also threatened, in addition to the cases of attacks by radical

Islamists on Canadian Feminist Irshad Manji on 9 May 2012 and the cancellation of a concert in

Jakarta by the pop singer Lady Gaga.36 With regard to indigenous traditional religions, attacks

were worse, as a follower of one indigenous traditional religion, known as ‘Sapta Dharma’, was

noted to have lamented that “the problem for our members starts when they are born and

continues until they die. 37 It was no secret that followers of local and indigenous beliefs in

Indonesia who numbered fewer than 245, had been systematically marginalized due to the

government political decisions.38

Some scholars have argued that the proliferation of laws and regulations limiting

religious practices in Indonesia makes the country’s public sphere one of the most highly

regulated in the world.39 While it is perhaps safe to suggest that the laws and regulations in

question have always involved the participation of the mainstream, compromised secular

nationalists, under SBY’s presidency the plight of minority groups shows Indonesia’s democratic

stagnation and partial regression.40 This seems to have been evident despite the fact that SBY’s

administration was considered to have contributed to democratization.41 The state has complicity

emboldened radical groups to new acts of anti-minority intimidation (Mary E. McCoy 2013:

286). In sum, the persistence of various laws and decrees during SBY’s presidency and its

institutionalizations, either old or new, 42 tended to restrict religious freedom among minority

groups, in addition to creating passivity of police when it came to protecting minorities. That

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combined with the involvement of the military in various forms of intimidation all accounted for

the growing intolerance by which the state has attempted to impose its implicit sanctions.

Sexual Minorities: The Plight of the LGBT Community

The second entity that has been badly hurt by the entanglement of political elites and

public officials (government apparatus) with Islamic radicalism is the group made up of sexual

minorities, otherwise known with the acronym LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and

Transgender).43 While the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1988 resulted

in rising expectations of the proliferation of human rights discourses in many emerging LGBT

groups and organizations in the post-Suharto era, the reality found by the LGBT community

stands in contrast to that of the pro-democratic group’s expectations. The fact remains that the

majority of the public officials and political elites showed a predilection for treating the practices

of homosexuality as deviant behavior, refusing to acknowledge the existence of LGBT people,

let alone legitimize same-sex relationships and/or homosexual identity.

Two opposing forces are at play along with the dynamics of Indonesian LGBT in the post

Suharto era. In the first place, there has been the phenomenon of a rising circulation of LGBT

terms due to an influx of foreign funding and transnational connections with LGBT activists and

organizations overseas. This has not only resulted in the increasing popularity of the term LGBT

(or other associated terms) among the larger population, but also in the widening network and

sense of solidarity among many LGBT activists in Indonesia with international LGBT

movements, that in turn has enhanced the drive for an alternative citizenship model that is more

sensitive to the universalization of LGBT identities. As a recent report from UNDP indicates, the

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change of government in 1998 from the Suharto dictatorship to a multiparty democracy

witnessed that “LGBT people are to be found everywhere, and more recently they have become

more visible,” despite the pertinacious hurdles in organizing them.44 Secondly, the burgeoning of

the Islamic politics previously suppressed since 1998 was equally prevalent, with its corollary

that the political landscapes are getting infiltrated by Islamic-based organizations and that the

Shariah-based laws are being imposed using decentralization. With the support from, and

collaboration with some secular nationalist politicians these rising trends of Islamic politics have

been sustaining if not increasingly enforcing the practices of what Chantal Mouffe called

“moralizing politics,” a politics that oppresses the very identity of LGBT groups and

individuals45. As a result, we see the backlash against Indonesia’s LGBT community together

with the above mentioned rising popularity of the term LGBT, including a fatwa issued by

religious groups and the calls for media self-censorship by the government.46

It may be argued that to overcome the further plight of LGBT people, the path forward

would depend on the position of the top government figures and political elites, who mostly

constitute the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists. As has already been discussed,

instead of observing its own legal obligations and contributing to their safety and equal treatment

as fellow citizens, the statements and attitudes of many government figures, public officials and

political elites have provoked the current anti-LGBT sentiments in Indonesia.

What accounts for the government officials and many elite figures anti-LGBT

sentiments? One scholar suggests that the antipathy against the LGBT people among many

especially those in the governments has to do with the fear of “gerakan” (movement), as indeed,

the very idea of a “movement” drew the ire of militant Islamists and their government enablers

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who accused [the] LGBT movement of having a grand design that would threaten national

unity.47

However, there is also a strong indication that many of the highest-ranking political elites

and government officials’ reactions toward LGBT phenomena have been informed by a complete

ignorance about the LGBT community and various misconceptions about them. For instance,

they accept false constructions of sexual orientation and gender identity as “mental illness” and

“a disease,” and the LGBT people and homosexuals as ‘sick” or “dangerous” individuals.48

While such misconceptions against the LGBT community are widely held among Islamic

radicals and religious moderate organizations alike,49 the actions of public officials and political

elites in response to pressures from Islamist groups that hold those views present challenging

political and constitutional issues. The rhetoric of upholding “religious moral standards” has

become a practice commonly used by the Indonesian political elites and government officials in

relation to their preferred policy choice towards LGBT related issues, and other issues such as

such as drugs and prostitutions. Unrelated to the LGBT, this tendency of “moralizing politics,”

using Mouffee’s term, is often incommensurable with and should be distinguished from a

standard notion of morality generally understood within the traditions of democratic societies as

well as political theories and social philosophy, either left or rights, which embrace the ethico-

political principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality.’ The religious moral standards upheld by the

Indonesian political elites and government official are best captured in Mouffe’s term as “moral

register” (Mouffe 2005: 5; Mouffe 2013: Kindle Location 2072; Ruitenberg 2009), the

consequence of which has been that the many minorities-right related issues, including the

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LGBT people, would be discriminated between good and evil, and the issues of LGBT people

are also often seen in terms of rights and wrong.

The inclinations to adopt such “moral register” had been a constant preoccupation of

especially the governments of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) which have also continued in

Indonesia in some degree under the leadership of Joko Widodo (Jokowi)’s administration. SBY’s

dislike to LGBT community was widely known, and he was not allowing performances of any

singer at the State Palace, who showed the slightest amount of skin, while President Jokowi was

rather different in terms of not being so straight-laced, and the images of him laughing

hysterically at a performance by national trans-gender icon Dorce Gamalama circulated on social

media and have provided some hope that he will inject a note of reality into the debate.50 There

is, however, a different account among observers as to whether President Jokowi is the problem

or could be the solution with regard to the issued facing the LGBT community. Some assert that

unlike SBY, Jokowi himself is not the problem, but it is his mainly conservative officials that

have been the constraints regarding President Jokowi’s ability to stake an independent position

on the issue of morality.51 However, President Jokowi, or his agents, have “shut down dozens of

websites, ordered broadcasters to stop airing programs depicting gays and demanded instant

messaging applications remove all emoticons depicting same-sex relationships” just like what

President SBY did, and so it seems that President Jokowi is not actually prepared to set a more

liberating course of personal freedoms as some of his supporters might have expected. As far as

the issues of rising intolerance are concerned, he remained to be coopted by the old forces of the

New Order State.52

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For example, it has been under the Jokowi Presidency that a known moderate government

official sympathetic to LGBT causes, then Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and

Security Affairs, Luhut Pandjaitan, was noted as saying when he was giving an address to a joint

meeting between government officials and the House of Representative on February 15, 2016

that “there is no guarantee that any normal family can avoid [having an LGBT child], and that

homosexuality is a disease of a chromosome, and it should be treated.”53 Pandjaitan was not

alone. A comment from Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu on the LGBT community has

been perhaps the most adverse in Jokowi’s cabinet. He considered the emergence of the LGBT

movement in the country as a new form of “proxy” war to weaken the sovereignty of the state

without deploying a military force. He said that “this is a kind of modern warfare,” adding that

“the state needs to be more cautious in reacting to the demands of LGBT communities for

equality before the law.”54 No less devastating of a position was taken by the current chairman of

the People’s Consultative Assembly, Zukifli Hasan, who was noted to have called for opposition

against LGBT, insisting that the government must be firm [against the LGBT movement],

because it is against the law, adding that if nothing is done [by the government], “one generation

of Indonesia will be lost.”55 More troubling yet, President Jokowi’s spokesperson, Johan Budi

stressed in a response to HRW’s report on the rights of LGBT people in Indonesia that

“protecting LGBT rights was not a priority” and that “there is no room for the proliferation of the

LGBT movement in Indonesia including rights to assembly and creating organizations,” despite

adding that “rights of citizens like going to school and getting an ID card are protected.” 56

President Jokowi himself has remained silent amid the increasing vitriol and hostility directed

against the LGBT community by his aids and deputy.57

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It was particularly under Jokowi’s Presidency that “various government representatives

making a series of public and hostile statements and actions against homosexuality and the

LGBT people” following decades of sporadic, and up and down of the Indonesian government’s

negative attitudes towards the LGBT community.58 The averse attitudes of President Jokowi’s

subordinates and agents to the LGBT community has taken the form of not only rhetorical

onslaught but has taken the road of creating financial and economic hurdles for LGBT

organizations. For instance, vice President Jusuf Kalla in early 2016 had summoned the UN

Development Program Indonesia, asking for a clarification regarding the US $8 million funding

allocated for LGBT programs in several Asian Countries including Indonesia, and demanded that

any LGBT programs in Indonesia be terminated, arguing that the programs were not in

accordance with values in ASEAN countries.59 Despite recognizing a need for the government to

respect citizens’ rights to diverse sexual expression, he said that “exercising such rights should

not include campaigns to encourage other people to join the LGBT cause, insisting that when

LGBT “comes to privacy, it is no problem, but if it deals with disseminating information…then

we disagree.”60

Moreover, there were reports of more than 18 elites and government official statements

that showed anti-LGBT positions as recorded by Human Right Watch. 61 The wave of these

negative sentiments toward the LGBT people had conspicuously occurred in the aftermath of

unfortunate comments by the minister of Research, Technology and Higher Education,

Mohammad Nasir in response to a poster made by a Support Group and Resource Center on

Sexuality Studies (SGRC) at the University of Indonesia (UI)62 in early 2016. Nasir condemned

the institution publicly and demanded clarification for the University Rector about the group’s

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status, claiming that LGBT-identifying people should be banned from entering university

campuses.63 He openly said that he “forbade the existence of LGBT-oriented academic groups at

Universities,” even though later he was left scrambling to clarify his position via social media

after receiving a deluge of response in both traditional and new media.64 According to Nasir,

“LGBT individuals should receive the same treatment in the eyes of the law,” but he added that

“this does not mean the state should legitimize LGBT status.”65 Nasir’s approaches, however,

open the way for unintended forms of oppression toward LGBT people. Thus, when University

of Andalas, in West Sumatra, was making a policy of admission entering the University that

required that ‘all the candidates of students be free from any LGBT associations.’ 66 Nasir

defended his earlier policy on LGTB people by saying that “it was only the organizations that

should be forbidden ‘to enter’ the University.”67

Such anti-LGBT statements by public officials and top government figures not only

increased harassment and incidents of violence against LGBT groups and communities, but also

have other negative repercussions regarding the already disadvantaged social and political

positions of the LGBT people.68 On the surface, as far as LGBT people are concerned, under the

current government LGBT organizations are not actively being repressed but they are not being

protected by the government either, with perhaps an exception of local governments like Aceh

“where government officials have tried to make it difficult for LGBT people to organize,”69

while in some other places of Indonesia there are local ordinances to criminalize homosexuality

such as in South Sumatra Province; Banjar, South Kalimantan Province; Tasikmalaya, West

Java; and Padang Panjang, West Sumatra. 70 In addition, an official of Indonesia’s National

Children’s Protection Commission (KPAI, Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia) issued a

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statement in early February 2016 that “strictly forbade ‘distribution of LGBT propaganda or

information [about LGBT issues) to children and minors,”71 which wrongly equated basic factual

information on gender and sexuality with “propaganda.” 72 Her statement was considered

ignorant and dangerous because of “conflating distribution of socially valuable information to

youth with rape and other criminal activity.”73 Moreover, a call to ban “protection for children

and adolescents that are vulnerable to duplicating LGBT deviant behavior” was issued two

weeks later by the National Broadcasting Commission (KPI, Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia), a call

that was also supported by the KPAI.74 The actions of these two institutions were condoned by

the Parliamentary commission responsible for defense, foreign affairs, and information which

stated its support for “measures for the [KPI] to tighten controls over broadcasting LGBT-related

content, as well as sanctioning strict punishment for violation of LGBT content delivery.” 75

Based on, and as a result of this, the Ministry of Information and Communication’s similar

policy followed, announcing its own guidelines barring broadcasters from showing men wearing

“feminine dress” or speaking in a feminine manner.”76

The most recent events of a police raid against a gay party raised serious misgivings

about the state’s intentions in protecting the rule of law, especially when it comes to those who

happen to be gay. As it was widely reported during April and May 2017, “the raid is just the

latest in a series of anti-LGBT actions by Indonesian authorities…with was having a chilling

effect on the community” according to Andreas Harsono, a Human Rights Watch Researcher, as

he added that "So much fear, I meet them almost every day if not every other day. I've been

helping many of them to escape arrest or to deal with abuses, give them counseling.” 77

Commenting on a similar raid conducted by the police, Phelim Kine, deputy Asia Director of

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Human Rights Watch said that “Indonesian police are again violating the basic rights of LGBT

people by invading their privacy” underlining that Despite President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s

rhetorical support for the basic human rights of Indonesia’s LGBT community, the authorities

target the vulnerable minority with impunity.”78

In sum, the views and action of many political elites and public officials, which

presumably affected or mirrored the views of common people show widespread misconceptions

of LGBT people. Yet, the underlying statements and actions of those elites and public officials

are not corresponding to other Indonesians who contrarily perceive “Indonesia as a modern

nation with liberal, democratic and humanities values,” instead they represent more of “the

conservative heteronomity and gender binarism derived from early 20th century secular and

religious modernity that turned their backs on the old values.”79 In Indonesia there remain the

vestiges of the pre-modern acceptance of diverse gender and sexualities in many ethnolinguistic

groups, and the views of the Indonesian elites and public officials stand in sharp contrast to these

vestiges. Therefore, the LGBT’s phobia characterized the elites and public officials views

reinforce the oppressive aspects of both traditional and modern culture and hinder the chances

for building Indonesian society where differences, including in sexual orientation and gender

identity, are fully accepted. The penetration of heterosexist norms remains ongoing, operating

not only at the level of cultural attitudes, [but also] they are institutionalized, both formally and

informally along with such Indonesian public officials and political elites attitudes. It could be

expected sadly therefore that the LGBT people would continue to suffer from heterosexism, as

the elites and public officials mostly continue supporting the authoritative construction of norms

that naturalize heterosexuality and stigmatize homosexuality.

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Ideological Minority Groups: The Plight of the Victims of the 1965 Massacre’s Families

The third minority group that continues to be seriously impacted by the entanglement or

collaboration of the political elites and public officials with political Islam and Islamic

radicalism is the ideological minority group, namely, those of the former political prisoners and

family members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) and its

sympathizers from the mid-1960s that maybe called the victims of the 1965 massacre. While the

actual bloody event occurred between October 1965 and March 1966, in which approximately

500,000 people were killed in Indonesia, 80 the impact and repercussion of this tragic event

continues affecting the prisoners of the 1965 massacre and their families, as well as those

associated with the left’s politics until these days. What was no less significant as Andrian

Vickers (2010: 46) expounded, the 1965 killings marked not only the coming of a new regime,

by bringing Major-General Suharto to power, but also a new version of the Indonesian state with

an authorized account of legimitizing mythology for the new regime’s origin. In the New Order

mythology, the subsequent killings of communists had been erased from history, and thus

resulted in “a powerful image of monstrous communists that precludes any possible sympathy; it

makes the victims of the killings so inhuman that the death of 500,000 people is seen as just

retribution for the deaths of six [generals]” (Vicker 2010: 48). However, the questions remain

regarding those former communists, their children, or former leftist military officers and their

families whose voices have been suppressed for so long and have been systematically demonized

with the defeated PKI in 1965.

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It is therefore worth highlighting that similar to our previous stories about LGBT people,

the minority group that could be labeled here as adherents of “leftist ideology” has continuously

been subjected to demonization by the dominant views of public officials and political elites,

especially some segments of the military with constant pressures from some Islamist groups.

Hadiz pointed out that most of the Indonesian local and national elites that are currently in power

have social backgrounds related to social and political organizations very complicit in the violent

elimination of the left (Hadiz 2006: 554). It is no surprise that as the construction of historical

narratives of the authoritarian New Order version regarding the events of 1965 has underlain the

vested interest of many public officials in post 1998 and strongly affecting their memories, it is

very likely that they continue to preserve the status-quo of the New Order’s mindset. As a

consequence, the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of those associated with the Indonesian

Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) as well as millions of other people who

suffered curtailment of their human rights because of their association with the Communist Party

would be simply ignored. Describing the plight of the 1965 victims, Robert Cribb noted,

During the 10 years which followed the killings, over a million and a half people passed
through a system of prisons and prison camps on the grounds of their communist
connections. When they were finally released, their lives were blighted by continuing
discrimination, they were banned from government jobs, they were not permitted to vote
and they faced difficulties in day-to-day dealings with the authorities. In the late 1980s,
the authorities introduced a new concept, bersih lingkungan (environmentally clean),
under which government employees and workers in education, the media and law, as well
as economically important sectors such as the oil industry and public transportation, were
expected to come from a family and social environment untainted by communism. In
other words, communism was treated as a permanent, semi-hereditary condition which
might afflict even people born after 1965 (Cribb 2001: 236-7)

It must be recognized that for many scholars focusing on Indonesia, the killing of 1965

remains a difficult and dark subject.81 There are various and even contradictory readings with

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regard to the 1965 affair and what followed.82 However, the argument for reexamining the dark

events of 1965 in Indonesian history has been strongly recommended by some scholars to ensure

that the bloodletting will not happen again. In this sense, reconciliation and rehabilitation must

be perceived as a way of drawing a line between present and past, so that past conflicts can be

regarded as shared national tragedy, rather than as the victory of one side over another (Cribb

2002: 561). Moreover, the massacre of 1965-1966 can be seen as an example of the moment

when political conflict took the form of an antagonism, that is, struggle between enemies, rather

than in the form of an ‘agonism,’ that is struggle between adversaries, in Chantal Mouffe’s terms

(Mouffe 2013: 6-7). There were some domestic factors inseparable behind such tragic events as

Robert Cribb discussed eloquently related to the cultural, social and ideological dimensions

involved in the1965 affair (Cribb 2001: 226; Cribb 2002). But there was also an international

context in which the tumultuous events of 1965 required to be linked with the interests of the

USA (and Britain) as the events were not independently occurred but related to the Cold War

politics being played in Southeast Asia and Indonesia included.83

Apart from that, until the second half of 1998, any account regarding the killing of 1965

that was not in line with the version of Suharto’s New Order Government would be hit by the

ban. Suharto’s administration (1967-1988) prohibited any public discussion of the killings, and

that any mention of the killings in public documents were censored by state agencies (Vicker

1998: 2010: 46). However, with the arrival of the reform era since 1998, alternative views have

had a better chance to be expressed and the topic has been dealt in a way that is different from

Suharto’s era. One of its implications was that the official history has been challenged to

question Suharto’s historical legitimacy (Budiawan 2000). Yet, a stumbling block for gaining a

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genuine national reconciliation remains intact. There exist actual circumstances that account for

the difficulties in investigating the mass killings of 1965-1966 and in accepting the further

impacts of the investigation for national lives as has been argued forcefully by Robert Cribb and

others (see Cribb 2002). I will argue however that the stumbling block could not be fully

comprehended without considering the persistence of illiberal democratic orientations underlying

segment of public official and political elites themselves.

During the first years of Indonesia’s reform era, the political step taken by President B.J.

Habibie is worth mentioning. Habibie tolerated the mass euphoria of ‘de-Suhartoization,’

pledged to support the democratization process, and even asserted that public questioning of

previously taboo topics should be allowed because this was part of reformasi. One critic has

pointed out, however, that the reason behind Habibie’s move was not necessarily democratic but

that it could be because a few public figures and political elites would be ready not to be

acknowledged as “true reformers” or the “most reformed-minded,” Habibie was aware of the

importance of his public image being of tolerance towards the issues of left politics, and even to

politicize them.84 According to this view, Habibie did not want to appear like a pariah of the tidal

wave of reform movement that was occuring. Apart from the questions of motives, however, his

rhetoric was followed by a concrete step: under Habibie, several political prisoners, including the

remaining ten associated with the 1965 affairs that had been imprisoned for more than thirty

years and faced life imprisonment were pardoned and then released. The rationale of the action,

according to his aids and especially the Minister of Justice Muladi, was humanitarian concern

(cited in Budiwan 2000: 38).

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After Habibie, President Wahid’s decisive and radical actions regarding the 1965

massacre were worth discussing, given that Wahid’s family members were involved in the

killings. President’s Abdurrahman Wahid’s decisive and radical actions regarding the 1965

massacre were a telling story in this regard. President Wahid’s policy steps and moves regarding

the truth of 1965 had been considered to strike “at the heart of the weakening specter of

communism in Indonesia through an attempt to demystify an ever present yet relentlessly

suppressed bogey,” and so he has challenged “the foundation of the New Order itself.”85 In this

sense, Gus Dur had rightly started to question the justification of the existence of an entire social

order built under the New Order. As has already been mentioned earlier, this had especially to do

with his initiative, which was and remains to be very sensitive and politically risky to be taken by

any Indonesian politician or state person in these days, to call “for a revocation of the ban on

Marxism-Leninism, known as Decree No. 25 of 1966 of the People’s Consultative Assembly.”86

However, as far as the case of 1965 affairs were concerned, Gus Dur had contributed a lot more,

that is, by embracing various significant political decisions that proved to represent a deeper

commitment which was in contradiction with the beliefs and practices of conservative politics.

As Mary S. Zurbuchen has noted at length that after elected to be president in October 1999,

Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly referred to as Gus Dur) quickly set a new tone and raised the

ante in the political stakes around the truths of 1965, especially when he asked his government

ministers to take steps to restore the civil rights of former detainees and exiles during his visit in

Europe in 2000, which according to Zurbachen,

These actions spurred heightened attention to the conditions of the detainees and their
families, and led to calls for revocation of onerous regulations mandating control and
surveillance of “ET” individuals [note: ET stands for “Ex Tahanan” or former political
prisoner] (Zurbuchen 2002: 571-2)

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Moreover, Wahid also express apology for the actions of the elements of his mass organization

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Council of Scholars) in the killings of alleged communists, and

encouraged citizens to “open up” the history of 1965 and other incidents of human rights abuses.

President Wahid’s views and actions regarding the 1965 affairs had immediately attracted strong

reactions, and had to meet a determined resistance from Islamic and military groups, and thus his

attempt to revoke the ban of Marxism-Leninism soon dropped from the political agenda (Cribb

2001: 562; Wieringa 2011: 546). Why was President Wahid’s attempt to repeal the 1966

legislation that outlawed Marxism/Leninism in Indonesia strongly rebuffed by the majority of

political elites of newly democratized Indonesia? According to Vedi R. Hadiz, this was not

completely surprising, as it is evident that “whole generations of politicians, bureaucrats,

generals, businessmen, activists, and even artists, still ‘need’ to cling to at least major parts of the

official New Order narrative of history” (Hadiz 2006: 556).

We will see shortly various political occurrences resulted from such tenacious New Order

government interests that have affected the ideology of the majority of political elites and public

officials of newly democratized Indonesia. The fact remains that President Gus Dur was finally

impeached from the presidency, which showed that “a strong backlash, especially from the

military, who worked closely with the political party of Megawati Soekarnoputri to remove Gus

Dur in a constitutional coup” (Vickers 2010: 50) did work to contain his anti-hierarchical

approach.

Nevertheless, Gus Dur’s decisive actions related to the 1965 affairs brought about a sense

of direction among many of his followers about the proper political principles that should

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adapted for a true democratic Indonesia.87 Therefore, after the establishment of the Institute for

Research on the Victims of the 1965-66 Killings (YPKP, Yayasan Penelitian Korban

Pembunuhan 1965-66) on April 7, 1999, by a group of eks-Tapols,88 the attempts to set up a

national reconciliation got stronger at the local level and among young people. A case in a point

was the efforts by the members of ‘Syarikat’ (Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat, Santri

Society for People’s Advocacy), that was set up in Yogyakarta in 2003 and which was affiliated

with NU, dedicated “to documenting the experiences of victims” and thus to disentangle “their

parents which have created insurmountable rifts between the families of the killers and of their

victims.”89 In defining the meaning of reconciliation, these groups decidedly conceived the goal

as not mainly to call for accounting the perpetrator, even though some members of them might

have wanted it, but only as acknowledgement of their suffering and of what occurred (Vickers

2010: 50). They knew that to aim at calling for the accountability of the perpetrator would be too

ambitious as it had to be clear that “the heirs and collaborators of the perpetrators still hold

political power” (Vickers 2010: 50). When ‘Syarikat’ was launched, there was an interesting

report regarding the confession of the members of Ansor, the youth movement of NU as follows,

[m]embers of Ansor , the youth movement of the NU, confessed to having butchered PKI
members in 1965/66. In tears they declared they thought they had been doing the right
thing at the time, ‘‘cleansing’’ society from the perceived communist evil. In any case,
they said, they had had little choice as they had acted under threat of the military (cited in
Wieringa 2011: 545)

The role of Syarikat has been crucial in changing the minds of some actors who used to be anti-

communist, to see the true promise and genuine meaning of reconciliation.90 Needless to say, the

existence of such a initiative has invited a tempered public reaction. Not even a month after the

declaration of YPKP 1965/66, two entities known as ‘Forum Indonesia Baru’ (New Indonesia

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Forum) and other ad hoc committees adopting Islamic names coordinated two mass gatherings in

Jakarta and Bekasi in which they “chant the rhetoric of ‘waspadai bahaya laten komunis’

(beware of the latent threat of Communism), pointing out that in the establishment of YPKP

1965-66 and in public statements of eks-tapols were indications of latent Communist threats

aimed at "cleaning their hands from the dirt of the past" and in "the decision of some eks-tapols

to join certain political parties ... [in short] they take advantage of the democratization movement

for their own interests" (cited in Budiawan 2000: 39). However, such examples of blocking the

process of reconciliation through violent agitation by the public were not without stimulus or

consent by those currently in political power, especially from some public officials and elements

of the Indonesian military. More importantly, the confrontation also suggested that the dream for

opening up the public debate was a matter of impossibility as both sides more often engage in

polemics. For the mainstream side represented by the many views of the government and

military, the restatements of the New Order version of events were all that mattered As was

noted by Andrian Vickers (2010: 52), in a local television program network in Yogyakarta in

2003 which was showing a program on ‘the need for reconciliation of victims and perpetrators’

there was “a pro- military representative angrily declaring that the ‘real facts’ of 1965 were that

the PKI killed six generals, and refused to acknowledge that there was any possibility of going

beyond those ‘facts.’”

An incident of Kaloran, Wonosobo in Central Java on March 25, 2001 as filmed by Lexy

Rambadeta was another case in point.91 The incidence was part of the YPKP initiative of the

exhumation from a mass grave of individuals killed, following information from a living

witness’s testimony that the bodies were those of people who had been part of those arrested

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during the violence of 1966-166. The story occurred at the end of the processes of exhumation

when one family attempted to bury its dead, but was stopped by an angry mob from a local

Muslim youth group, under the rubric of Forum Ukhuwah Islamiya Kaloran. They not only

demanded the YPKP to be disbanded by local legislature but also seized and broke open coffins

and scattered the remains, carrying signs reading “PKI not welcome here” (Zurbuchen 2002:

578; Vickers 2010: 56). According to Zurbuchen, the Kaloran’s incidence not only shows ‘the

persistence of anti-PKI sentiment in Indonesia,” but also demonstrates that “resistance within

parts of the Muslim community toward re-examination of the events of 1965-66,” and this was

why “efforts for reconciliation and rehabilitation on the national level must be seen as fragile at

best” (Zurbuchen 2002: 580).

During SBY’s presidency such a bleak and pessimistic prospect regarding the national

reconciliation and rehabilitation was clearly on sight, and various violent incidences led to

human rights abuses regarding free speech and the right to assemble especially among the left

politics groups and their sympathizers variously occurred even without a proper handle.

President SBY who himself was ex-military was widely considered to have an ambiguous

attitude. This was perhaps due to the fact that his father-in-law, General Sarwo Edhy, had been

one of the military leaders that was most responsible for the killings in Java and Bali (Vickers

2010: 56-7). However, he was reported to be the president that showed a commitment to

continuing to resolve the issue of 1965, and listened to a suggestion to explicitly declare an

apology toward the family victims of 1965,92 an initiative that was only to be cancelled later due

to the pressures of conservative groups.

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It was under SBY that after conducting a four year study, and interviewing 349 survivors

across the country, the national Commission for Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM) finally

released a report containing 850 pages in July 2012, which later proved to have serious

implications as it “found that the military conducted the killings in a systematic way and that this

constituted a gross violation of human rights.” 93 The report called for a national apology to

victims, a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, and a criminal investigation, stating that

there was sufficient evidence to warrant an official investigation by the Attorney General’s

Office (AGO). Without waiting for too long, however, hostile reactions were spewed out by

members of the political and military elite in response to those findings. The attorney general,

Basrief Arief, rejected the findings, pointing at the lack of evidence in that which Komnas had

gathered, and thus rendered the office unable to justify any official investigation regarding the

killings.94 Equally bitter reactions had come from military figures, such as General Solihin G.P.,

the former Governor of West Java, Djoko Suyanto, the coordinating minister for political, legal

and security affairs and former chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and Kiki Syahnakri,

former vice chief of staff of the Army. 95 Solihin called for continued vigilance against

communism, while Djoko Suyanto defended the military’s actions by appealing to historical

context, which a critic suggested as proof of how the governments remained reactionary when it

came to the question of the victims of the killings.96 There was no doubt, however, that behind

these negative reactions were the conservative and reactionary politics of certain Islamic

segments and other old political interests of the New Order forces which perpetuated the culture

of impunity.97

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While it was unthinkable during the reformasi era, book burnings were ordered by

Indonesia’s Attorney General, Abdul Rahman Saleh, in March 2007, for copies of around 13

school history books from 10 publishers.98 The attorney general argued that the book burning

was done for a reason that, after listening to the request of the minister of National Education,

Bambang Sudibyo, the books made no reference to the ‘communist rebellion’ at Madiun in 1948,

an event that has long been depicted by the anti-communists when the Indonesian Communist

Party (PKI) stabbed the young republic fighting against the Dutch in the back. Critics questioned

the policy’s basis and the Attorney General’s legitmacy in banning the books. 99 The book

burnings by the Attorney General confirmed that “the Suharto era interpretations of history

continue to be taught to a new generation of school children in Indonesia.”100

In addition, various art products attempted to foster a national conversation regarding the

killings of 1965 as a human rights abuse, which faced violent threats from the conservative

groups and the anti-communist military. This can be seen in the release of The Act of Killing

(2012) which was then followed by its companion piece, The Look of Silence (2014, both by

American filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer, which were intended to “consciously confront the

narrative and symbolism in the Suharto-era Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI film.”101 However, many

conservative groups reacted angrily against the film, and as a result, the national Film Censorship

Institute placed a ban on commercial screenings of The Look of Silence.102 Since the conservative

groups interpreted such a censorship as a blanket ban, the disruptions of private screenings

throughout the country by Islamists and anti-communist military groups occurred without the

state’s deliberate efforts to impair them. In many cases, such disruptions resulted in the public’s

abuses of freedom of speech and their right to assemble.103

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With the continued phenomena of disruptions and various forms of intimidation by the

conservative politics towards anything that was considered ‘communism’ even after SBY’s

presidency, the current President, Joko Widodo’s record regarding the plight of the victims of

1965’s families has been considered equally ambivalent.104 As Natalie Sambhi (2016/2017: 108)

pointed out, on the one hand, one of Jokowi’s campaign promises was “to resolve cases of

serious human rights abuses” and despite not explicitly mentioning the 1965 killings, many

thought that he would be more likely to address the historical injustice of the 1965 killings. After

all, he has no ties with Suharto, while interestingly his opponent accused him as being “a child of

PKI” to denigrate his reputation and acceptability among some Muslim voters. On the other

hand, he was being surrounded by a number of military figures in his cabinet and inner circle

whose interests were to see the reconciliation process quashed, while they were also strident

supporters of anti-communist activities. So strong were the influences of these inner circles and

the political environment of anti-communism that later they would explain the very obstacle for

any leadership in Indonesia to act based on a political principle of upholding civil and political

liberties for all its citizens. Jokowi’s personal style of leadership, after all, has been to play safe

without risking himself by rocking the boat; he committed to resolving the problem, without

using the confrontation approach.105

Since Jokowi took office in 2014, the practices of sweeping and banning of the “leftist”

books that had been warranted under the SBY administration continued. Defense Minister retired

General Ryamizard Ryacudu said that “the TNI has the right to conduct sweeps for books on

communism on the grounds that they disrupt security,” while citing a number of Indonesian

Laws to justify his claim.106 It is worth noting that like SBY, Jokowi also rejected the idea of

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apologizing to the families of the former Indonesian Communist Party, a move that apparently

was well calculated by the people around him apparently to reduce the political risks given the

strong anti-communist sentiment within his power circle, and especially within the military.107

Jokowi thus, according to an assessment, had “backtracked on this commitment and ignored

appeals to finally end the half-century of impunity with regard to the anti-communist hysteria in

1965.”108 The fact remained, however that, since the circulation of Joshua Oppenheimer’s film,

the sweeping intimidation of all activities assumed to relate to “communist” symbols kept

occurring. The screening of the film and its discussions organized by students, communities and

activists of social movements were met with intimidation and threat from intolerant social

organizations, which were supported or even in many cases initiated by the police and military.

The trend was worrying as the sweeping was then targeted, not only at the Oppenheimer film

screening but also to all the leftist activities and phenomena including the following: “Tan

Malaka’s Book Review, Turn-Left Festival, a.k.a. BelokKiri Fes., Tan Malaka Theater

Monologue, Pulau Screening: Pulau Buru Tanah Air Beta (Pulau Buru My Home Land), Forced

Dissolution of Karl Marx’s School, up to the discourse of the regular playback of the Film

Penghianatan G30S/PKI.”109 Thus, the complexities of the situation have been described by one

observer as follows:

Recently the situation has become increasingly complex, especially because the [current]
state apparatus directly involved the sweeping over of the symbols and books suspected
of containing communist ideas. The involvement of the police and military institutions in
the sweeping actions indicated that anti-communism sentiment was a symptom needed to
be taken more seriously. Regardless of whether or not the resurrection of communism as
was often told to the people had legitimized this action, it seems that it was getting
uneasy to mock the situation. The seriousness of the situation was indicated by the recent
cases, where the state apparatus took on a more significant role rather than the mass
organizations. The state apparatus had not only become a loyal collaborator in
accompanying the mass organizations when the sweeping took place, but also gave an

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example to their paramilitary wings about how to destroy the elements of communism
more systematically, that is, by narrowing the life chance of communism starting on
one’s mind.110

Some hopeful developments however emerged from that troubling situation. In the first place,

the initiative of setting up an international People’s Tribunal in 2014 by victims of groups and

human rights activists, academics and journalists was a case in point. 111 Believing that “the

impunity around the ‘events of 1965’ is much larger than the great injustice,” allowing the mass

killers to walk free and enabling situation where the victims and their families are faced with

enduring stigma, marginalisation and economic deprivation, the organizer took its main aim “to

stop the impunity around ‘the events of 1965,’” as it represented ‘a social cancer that affects

Indonesian society in multiple ways.’ 112 Held from November 10 to 13 in The Hague, the

tribunal was intended “to draw international attention to the case, and to…urge the state to

conduct legal and equitable formal proceedings in relation to human rights violations

surrounding the massacres of 1965.”113 As such, the tribunal was neither “a criminal court,” nor

intended to “ensure justice and compensation for the victims” as this latter task was the task of
114
the state. Natalie Sambhi has best summarized the Tribunal’s processes and its

accomplishment:

A panel of international judges participated in four days of hearings last November,

which included oral submissions from witnesses and extensive documentary material.
The final report from the tribunal was handed down in July and includes a number of
major findings. Like the 2012 Komnas HAM report, the tribunal confirmed the extent of
systematic human rights abuses during 1965, including torture, sexual violence, wrongful
imprisonment, and forced labor. It also held the government responsible for crimes
against humanity and for creating false propaganda that led to the “dehumanization” of
victims. Lastly, the tribunal has called on the government to prosecute living perpetrators
and pay reparations to victims. The tribunal, though, has no legal basis for its formation,
and its findings are nonbinding (Sambhi 2016/2017: 107)

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As it has been widely reported, the Indonesian government reactions regarding the tribunal have

not been positive.115 Not long after the tribunal was announced, the chief security minister Luhut

Panjaitan questioned the fairness of the tribunal, and rejected the recommendations based on the

suspicion of external interference, while Attorney General, H.M. Prasetyo, reacted angrily that

the tribunal was taking place outside the country. H.M. Prasetyo was known to have repeatedly

refused to launch an inquiry into findings of gross violations of human rights in the 1965 purge

as detailed by the government-funded rights watchdog.116 Jokowi’s own position was equally

sitting on the fence, as he responded to the Tribunal saying, according to State Secretary

Pratikno, that “the government was working to prepare a systematic solution to the human rights

violations”, and the President has given “a direction” to his ministers to work for a solution

“based on our own justice system.”117

Such negative top government figures’ reactions, notwithstanding, the 1965 Tribunal has

caused the ‘internationalization’ of the 1965 case, and given rise to another hope, yet this later

re-confirmed the ambiguity of the public officials and secular nationalist political elite groups

regarding the killings of 1965. The phenomenon of Agus Widjojo’s brainchild—the “National

Symposium: Dissecting the 1965 Tragedy, A Historical Approach”, or ‘national symposium’ for

short, that was held in April 2016 was particularly interesting.118 The April national symposium

had been made possible particularly by two figures, Sidarto Danubroto and Agus Widjojo.119

Beside the important roles of Sidarto Danusubroto, a member of the presidential advisory

committee, Wijoyo’s role had been crucial as he was the key initiator of the ‘National

Symposium.120 His pivotal role in organizing the ‘national symposium,’ with a liberal minded

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tone, had not left him unscathed from being called “a communist,” despite being a son of a

general killed by the left-leaning movement in 1965.121

The ‘April national symposium’ had been the first national forum that was sponsored by

the state for discussing an alternative narrative of 1965. In the words of Ariel Heryanto (2016),

one of the invited speakers of the symposium, it was a historic milestone in Indonesia’s struggle

to come to terms with its darkest history, where elements from extremely diverse parties

exchanged views. Indeed, the symposium had enabled survivors and family members to tell

openly about mass executions, rape and detention they experienced in front of some 200

attendees, and hence they were able to give voice to their pain and their feelings of being

discriminated against for too long after the killings ended. Moreover, all participants were

invited to speak frankly and truthfully. They were encouraged to be prepared to listen to

differences in order to work collaboratively to seek the best possible scenario for the victim’s

families, so it assumed the need for a commitment from each party to listen attentively to

unpleasant views from other parties. Some anti-communist figures did attend the meeting, the

most prominent of whom were the poet Taufiq Ismail who read sloganeering poetry about

communist cruelty, and Leutenant General Sintong Panjaitan, who was involved in the killings

of 1965, and denied the claim of the large number of victims of the massacre (between half to

one million).122 However, partly because of the tenacious legacies of binary opposites of good

versus bad that had characterized the Cold War leading to the 1965 massacre, and partly because

of ‘the unprincipled nature’ of the top government officials and political elites (composing the

‘mainstream secular nationalists’) in dealing with such complicated, subtle and perhaps

politically risky issues, the most fundamental questions of how to move forward toward some

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kind of closure and what to do with the haunting past remained unsatisfactorily answered. Thus,

even though the national symposium “offered some hope for truth and rehabilitation for victims,

it has by no means been universally accepted” (Wahyuningroem 2016).

Despite its limited mandate and achievement, the ‘April national symposium’ sparked a

backlash from sections of the Indonesian military and police. It attracted a rival symposium,

which was called the “National Symposium to Protect Pancasila from the Threat of the Revival

of the Indonesia Communist Party and Other Ideologies” or “the Anti-PKI Symposium” for

short. This later event was organized by retired generals of the Association of Indonesian Army

Retirees (PPAD, Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Darat) and members of the mass

organizations on June 1-2, 2016. 123 The aim, in the words of symposium Coordinator, Kiki

Syahnakri, among others was “to oppose the resurgence of the communist movement in the

country that could jeopardize Pancasila as the country’s tenet.”124 Kiki Syahnakri and some other

Generals had reportedly been invited to the previous ‘April national symposium’ but did not

want to attend.125 According to Kiki Syahnakri, “there are people who don't want Indonesia to be

united and strong’, adding that “they try to make Indonesia unstable by bringing up the issue of

human rights.”126 The use of Pancasila here would need further discussion, yet there was no

question that the ‘anti-PKI symposium’ was particularly aimed “at countering the government

sponsored symposium on the 1965 tragedy in April.”127 Even though it has been touted as the

answer to the ‘April National Symposium’ that was considered only one-sided, the ‘anti-

communist symposium’ was a forum of representing those anti-communists and conservative

groups.128 It received support and facilitation from Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and

Security Affairs, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, as well as Defense Minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu.129

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A moment when the politically oriented nationalist elites and public officials had met and sat

together with the radical Islamic figures reflected in the report by a journalist who covered the

event:

Under the glorious lighting of the lights of Raffles Room, a discussion that took the theme
of “Securing Pancasila from the Threat of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the
Other Ideologies” was being opened. There were old faces that used to grace the TV
screen, when Suharto was still in power. There was Try Sutrisno, a vice president under
Suharto, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Sintong Panjaitan, and Mayjend TNI (Ret.) Kivlan Zein. It was
like being brought back to my elementary school days, when I had to memorize these
names for Pancasila and Citizenship Education (PPKn). There were also new faces that
were known after Suharto’s fall from power. The notorious figures like the ‘Great Imam’
of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Habib Rizieq Shihab, the ‘Expert Body’ of the FPI
Representative Center, Alfian Tanjung, and Ustadz M Khotot of the Islamic Ummah
Forum (FUI, Forum Umat Islam). The characters of these two groups were different but
today they were sitting around on the same table. They mingled and chatted with each
other.130

In the event, the politically oriented nationalists, like Try Sutrisno who was also the father in-law

of the current minister of Security and Defense Coordinator, Ryamizard Ryacudu, talked about

Pancasila as did the Islamic radical figures like Habib Rizieq Shihab, yet they referred to two

different things: the former talked about Soekarno’s Pancasila of June 1, 1945, while the latter

talked about Piagam Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter) which was mandated in Soekarno’s

Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959. Both however argued strongly that Pancasila was in

opposition to Marxism, Leninism and Communism, despite the fact that Soekarno himself never

showed antipathy toward the left’s political legacies. Interestingly, most if not all the nationalist

groups involved in ‘the anti-PKI symposium’ perceived that Marxism and PKI would always be

equal to atheism, an idea that strongly shaped the views and the underlying antipathy of many

Islamic groups towards communism and PKI. Of course equalizing communism with atheism

would be a misleading representation. A historian Robert Cribb once noted that “not all

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communists followed the official atheism of the party, but all rejected religion as a source of

authority over social life, and this put the Communist Party in direct and irreconcilable conflict

with the Islamists.” (Cribb, 2001: 227). Another question is always open with regard to whether

agnosticism and atheism could be considered outside Pancasila after all.

Apart from the fact that communism reflects perfectionism, the risk of communism

becoming repressive is always a possibility. The same thing can be said with regard to

communitarianism, which strongly shapes the Indonesian ‘mainstream compromised secular

nationalist’ views of the Pancasila. This implies that our current concern with the plight of the

family members and victims of 1965 does not necessarily mean support or agreement with

communism or communist perfectionism. Indeed, the post-communist idea as Chantal Mouffe

and others have argued, for the elimination of communism from its repressive elements of

humanity. The point is thus, as Cribb once suggested,

We should not suppose that the communists would necessarily have been less brutal or
that they would have ruled better if they had come to power rather than the army. But the
killing of half a million communists was not merely an intense political conflict, it was
the impoverishment of a national ideal, the extermination of a nation as it has existed in
the minds of millions of Indonesians.131

At the end of the day, however, the answers for future roads and of especially the

questions of how to deal with the victims’ families of the 1965 massacre would partly depend on

the President Jokowi’s leadership. As has been indicated, there was a reason not to be excited

with regard to the current Indonesian development as far as the issue of left politics is concerned.

Jokowi’s latest move has suggested that he would “clobber” or “kick” communism and PKI and

its stooges if it happened to re-emerge,132 while at the same time he designated his ‘threat’ to the

Islamic radical groups that were considered to have equally threatened the stability of the state.

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Many saw that Jokowi’s statement was dangerous given that the stigma against the 1965 victims

remained strong among Indonesian people.133 Jokowi’s statement, however, must be assessed in

the context of a dualism of representation which he may well be compelled to resolve: he saw, on

the one hand, that those who are ‘pro-jokowi’ have been depicted as ‘anti-Islam’ while those that

are anti-Jokowi have been pictured as ‘pro-Islam’. An assessment suggested that for this reason,

Jokowi, unlike President Gus Dur, chose to be close with the military groups, which happened to

remain dominated by the ‘green forces’ of Islamic conservatism that always opposed the politics

of the left. In the words of one observer:

So, does Jokowi [truly] campaign for the sake of pluralism and ‘bhineka tunggal ika’
(unity in diversity)? My guess is that he does not. Jokowi is [merely] battling against
Islamic conservative groups--which of course have radical elements in them, although
they certainly do not accept being called radicals---and [also battling against]
communism because he wants to maintain a political stability, so that he can keep the
status quo. If he does not do this, certain groups that feel threatened by his exercising
power would not hesitate to overthrow him. The “Demo 212” [Protest against Governor
Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, a.k.a. Ahok] wrapped by religious defamation is a case in
point. He was only one step away from being overthrown. But he must decide between
two difficult political options: either combating communism and radicalism, or
sacrificing the settlement for the 1965 massacre victims’ families. But, I doubt that he
will bring a new hope for Indonesia with his political decisions, such as was suggested by
Time magazine when it depicted him as 'The New Hope’. Because how can a leader give
hope if he only takes the side of the majority groups?

President Jokowi’s statement to clobber and kick communism, where in the contemporary

political developments many have doubted if a communist threat still exists and is relevant at all,

may be read from the following perspective: he wanted simply to keep the status-quo politics in

order to safeguard his future grip on power, and win the election in 2019. Such a statement,

however, presents the dangers not only for the further plight of the current ideological minority

group of the 1965 victims’ families, but would also negatively affect the impoverishment of

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Pancasila that needs to be developed to make it continuously relevant by considering the left’s

intellectual legacies.

THE DEFICIT OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

To further understand how the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists’ group

contributed to the persistence of the structural obstacles for a genuine democratization and thus

contributed to the deficit of liberal constitutionalism, I will point at the two most current

developments in Indonesian politics related to “the state defense program” and the “aspiration of

Going Back to the Old 1945 Constitution.”

State Defense program

A controversy arose among the general public when the Indonesian coordinating Minister

of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu,134 announced a government program called “Bela Negara” in

mid-October 2015.135 The criticisms leveled against the proposed program seem not to have to

do with the objectives of the program per se, but with how the program will actually have to be

run and how the goals will be reached. However, this national in-scope program has been

defended by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who himself is known to be a committed

democrat and a supporter of Reformasi, saying that the “Bela Negara” is some kind of “national

service” commonly practiced by other countries.136 According to the President, the program is

not equal to “wajib militer” (conscription), rather it is intended “to change the people’s minds,”

so that the people will become more optimistic, and more patriotic.137 On the same occasion,

Jokowi’s ministers and his aides underline that the end goals of the “Bela Negara” program are

that the government wants to change the minds of the people (sic!), to change their brains so that

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they are proud of their country, and are even willing to die for the country, to sacrifice for the

country (sic!).138 The program of “Bela Negara”, a critic suggests, is irrational and not suitable to

the creation of an ideal citizenship as it contains a plan, for example, that it will recruits 100

million people, in ten years, to join the program.139

Despite the controversies, the program has finally been funded and been running under

Jokowi’s government. It is understood to have been in accordance with the slogan “Revolusi

Mental” (Mental Revolution), one introduced during Jokowi’s Presidential campaign in 2014.

The peculiarity of the program became apparent recently when the District Military Commander

of “Lebak,” West Java, had been reported to not follow the normal procedure of “Tentara

National Indonesia.” The commander provided military training to the members of FPI (Front

Pembela Islam), a notorious Islamic radical organization led by Habib Rizieq, as participants in

the “Bela Negara”Program.140 After being caught in a photo circulated through social media in

which the TNI had been giving a military training, and the news became known to the public, the

military district commander of Lebak, Letkol Ubaidilah, was finally fired by the Commander of

Military Territorial commands (Pangdam Siliwangi).141 The fact is that the FPI had already been

involved in the program for quite some time, and that was in 2014.142 Clearly, since the very

beginning, the defense minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu, has also indicated that radical Islam

members could be included as participants in the program.143 The statement by the minister of

the defense that described the program as intended, among others, to contain terrorism,144 has

certainly been anachronistic given that the FPI145 is widely recognized as an organization that is

radical in its orientation and often openly declared to be a supporter of terrorist organizations

like ISIS. For this reason, perhaps, a critic like Hendardi of Setara Institute, was reported as

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saying, “how is it possible that an organization like FPI which is anti-pluralism and potentially

harmful has become a partner of the TNI in the Bela Negara program.”146 While the district

commander had been fired by the regional commander of TNI, the minister of defense,

Ryamizard Ryacudu, had contradicted the decision of the regional commander, and suggested

that it is no problem to train the FPI and even ISIS within the scheme of the ‘Bela Negara’

program.147 Other civilian politicians, like the vice Spokesman of the DPR, Fadli Zon, was noted

to say that every citizen has the right to participate in Bela negara, and this means, the FPI is

eligible for the program.148 Perhaps, because of the critics and some other reasons such as after

reflecting on its mischief, the program is now undergoing reform, and is no longer being run by

the ministry of defense.149 The fundamental perfectionist principle underpinning the program and

the mind of the Indonesian apparatus in general, as it appears, will remain the same.

The Aspiration of Going Back to the Old 1945 Constitution

A group or element of the mainstream, compromised secular nationalists’ group that

called for returning to the original constitution of 1945 is another phenomena worth considering.

A group called “Forum Bersama Kaji Ulang Perubahan UUD 1945” (Joint Forum For Reviewing

the Amendement of the 1945 Constitution) formulated a draft proposal in 2013, entitled “Pokok-

Pokok Pikiran Kaji Ulang Perubahan UUD 1945” (Main Points of the Review of the Amendement

to the 1945 Constitution) signed by no less than eighty fourhigher ranking military and police

veterans and some civilian supporters.150 The document had apparently been distributed to the

greater public and audiences, one of them was among the participants in a national event known

as ‘Kongres Pancasila’ at Universitas Gadjah Mada on May 2015 where I myself happened to be

informed with the document. It can be drawn from the document that ‘the Forum’ put forward

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the following demands: 1). That the current amendments to the Constitution must be reviewed

because they have changed the state system and the system of government, 2). That the ideas of

‘separation of power’ and ‘checks and balances,’ must be denied, and argued for the distribution

of power instead. This means that the people’s sovereignty must be returned to the MPR (Majelis

Permusyawaratan Rakyat), whose task, among others, is to set up the GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar

Haluan Negara, the State’s General Guidelines). 3). That the existence of various organs that

resulted from the processes of Amendment must be overhauled, including the ‘Komnas HAM’

(The Human Rights National Commission, Komisi Nasional Hak Hak Asasi Manusia). 4). That

the direct electoral system is against the Pancasila, and must be reviewed. The election of the

President, Governor, and Major must be in the hands of MPR, and the parliament at the local

levels. Pancasila, according to this document, only recognizes the ‘representative’ system. 5).

The document maintained the very arguments behind the ‘Presidential Decree’ (Dekrit Presiden)

on 5 Juli 1959, which is said to have justified the return of the 1945 Constitution in 1966 and

suggests that the ‘Penjelasan” (the Addendum) of the 1945 Constitution must be taken as

legitimate and authentic interpretation of the Constitution.

Thus, the aspirations and demands of the Forum basically contradicted the very spirits of

“Reform Movements” (Gerakan Reformasi) started since 1998 and culminated with the end of

the Suharto regime. Not surprisingly the Forum was initiated by the figures mostly with military

veteran backgrounds closely connected with the authoritarianism of the New Order political

system. Despite their arguments in the name of the Pancasila, it is of a peculiar kind.151 The state

institution the Forum envisioned was basically back to the model of an oligarchic system in

which the elites of the MPR understood the supreme “people’s representatives” are the only

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caretakers of the ‘distribution of power,’ while their defense of retaining the “Penjelasan”

(addendum) of UUD 1945 justified the very model of government based on authoritarianism as

has been demonstrated sometimes by scholars like Adnan Buyung Nasution, Marsilam

Simanjuntak, David Bouchier. Fortunately, during the era of Yudhoyono’s presidency, he stood

in a different position from that of the old, conservative generals who argued for the need to

return to the Old, original Indonesian Constitution of 1945, and President SBY remained

supportive of democratization and retaining the constitutional reform efforts despite, as we will

see, a pragmatist and compromised approach when it came to dealing with the issue of radical

Islam.152

However, the discussion and dissemination of the ideas of “kembali ke UUD 1945 yang

asli” (return to the Old 1945 Constitution) has been occurring or being circulated not only among

the elites and military, and the former New Order government operators, but also among the

academics and laymen as well. For instance, under the theme of “Penegakkan Hukum Berbasis

Moral Pancasila” (Law Enforcement Based on the Moral of Pancasila), the Center for Pancasila

Studies (PSP-UGM) organized a group discussion on 28 March 2015 attended among others by

some academics and military general veterans.153 In this meeting, some academics were invited,

and people who were concerned with the development of Pancasila, like Prof. J. T. dan Prof. S.

who lamented about the tendencies of Pancasila to be marginalized and set aside, and that

Indonesia had become so liberal and was conquered by individualism, and free fight liberalism.

These and other such big words and strong claims were often repeated during the meeting, and

have been taken by some participants without further examination. Other speakers like Dr. K.,

General (ret.) T.S. and Prof. S. argued for the need to return to the “UUD 1945 yang asli (the Old

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Constitution of 1945).” General T. had the strongest point in insisting why Indonesia must return

to the “UUD 1945 yang asli,’ despite adding that some changes to the 1945 constitution were

necessary. 154 General T.’s message in this FGD, however, closely resembled and mostly

reflected the voices in the document of “Forum Bersama” discussed above.

However, such voices surrounding to the old Constitution of UUD 1945 are not at such

odds as it may seem.155 The struggle for the aspiration like this one is clearly not new either. This

represented the views of various conservative political groups in Indonesia including those

parties and elements that had mostly supported the candidacy of Prabowo Subianto as President

in the 2014 elections.156 Most recently, now in Jakarta, the “Gerakan Selamatkan Indonesia” (the

Movement to Save Indonesia) circulated similar petitions to return to the ‘UUD 1945 yang

asli’. 157 The “Gerakan Selamatkan Indonesia” was led by Rahmawati Soekarno Putri, the

younger sister of Megawati, who seemed to have not gotten along with her for quite sometime.

Rachmawati was indicted as one of the political actors who was involved in the ‘Makar’ attempt

(‘makar’ means ‘illegal attempt to overthrow the legitimate government’). 158 She with other

political figures had been accused of having used the events of the protest by Islamic groups

against Governor Basuki Cahaya Purnama, a.k.a. Ahok, to topple Jokowi’s government. The

police had taken several actors involved in the early morning before the protest started on

December 2, 2016.159 Many believe that those people who were indicted as being involved in the

treason attempt, and were being taken in by the police that morning, like General (Ret) Kivlan

Zain had been closely connected with Islamic radical groups that had organized the protests,

especially FPI and GNPF-MUI.160 While the radical Islamic groups have targeted the minority

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groups in a different way, it is of special interest to assess the responses and attitudes of the

mainstream, compromised secular nationalists regarding the deficits of liberal constitutionalism.

CONCLUSION

Our discussions regarding the plights of the minority group confirmed the notion that the

State would not hesitate to interfere with the private beliefs, lifestyles, and even the minds of the

people. The State believed in the assumption that there is a conception of the good to be imposed

on citizens and the Pancasila is one of its legitimate sources. Now, even in the “reformasi” era,

which assumes democratization with greater respect for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly

and organization, and so on, the practical political reality is not so different from the previous

understanding of the Pancasila, especially one developed under Suharto’s New Order

Government. The mainstream, compromised secular nationalists, I have argued, contributed to

the persistence of the structural obstacles to a genuine democratization and the deficit of liberal

constitutionalism.

These two on going political developments of the “Bela Negara” program and the

struggle to go back to the old 1945 Constitution among some mainstream, compromised secular

nationalist demonstrate not only the peculiarity of some of the mainstream nationalist groups

views’ regarding the Pancasila, but also showed the tenaciousness of the anti-liberal

constitutionalism that strongly creeps up on some of them. Moreover, the three recent laws, the

law of blasphemy, the laws of pornography, and some sections of the law of Information and

Technology, can also be pointed out to show the practices of such illiberal constitutionalism that

operate within a democratic context.

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In the next section, chapter IV, I will discuss how, an another group, the “enlightened,

principled secular nationalists” attempted to get rid of these three structural obstacles in order to

start genuine democratization. Given the features of the mainstream, compromised secular

nationalists, it is necessary in the current context of Indonesian democratization to ensure that, by

using the lines of a post-structuralist like Chantal Mouffe, they would be able to transform and

this contribute positively to managing “the political” dimensions in the newly Indonesian

democratic experiences while strengthening the quality of the “politics.” In this sense, we are

emphasizing the need to improve the quality of democratic institutions, the rule of law, state

apparatus, and so on. After all, they are a group that most legitimately deals with everything that

is “political” in nature.

ENDNOTES

1
The term ‘a state perfectionism’ refers to beliefs and practices (presumably held by a dominant power)
within a state that claim that “certain ways of life constitute human ‘perfection’ (or ‘excellence’), and that
such ways of life should be promoted, while less worthy ways of life should be penalized.” This
perfectionism is often associated with Marxist and communitarian theories, as opposed to liberal and
libertarian theories. The later aims to not “try to encourage any particular way of life, but rather leave
individuals free to use their resources in whatever ways they themselves find most valuable” (Kymlicka
1990: 196-7).
2
see for instance, Fathiyah Wardah, Amnesty International: Presiden Jokowi Gagal Atasi Pelanggaran
HAM, VOA, 25 Februari 2006. https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/amnesti-nilai-jokowi-gagal-atasi-ham-
/3206741.html; see also Greg Fealy, notes the differences between ‘pro-reform forces’ and ‘the ‘counter
reform forces.’ The former refers to ‘the media, civil society groups, intellectuals, and, to some extent,
the public,’ while the later generally refers to elite interests, such as the executive branch, parliament,
major parties, senior public servants and powerful corporate groups and business people, who have an
interest in reducing public scrutiny and accountability’ (Fealy 2013: 101).
3
In using this definition, I was influenced by a constructivist approach developed by Jeremy Menchik and
others. Menchik discussed the themes that have mainly dominated the constructivist approach to religion
and world politics, and suggested that “what constitutes ‘religion,’ ‘doctrine’ or ‘theology’ is an outcome
of political, legal and religious struggle grounded in the production of knowledge” and thus any definition
of enemies by any group against others, radical Islam included, would be contingent, and intertwined with
power relations. According to Menchik, “having the power to regulate and uphold certain practices while
condemning and excluding other practices is a sign of political struggle and the possession of power, not a

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sign of truth.” In addition, while religious actors may act strategically in order to maximize their utility,
their interest must be defined and understood locally (Menchik 2015: 6-9).
4
Cf: Christopher Mathias, “6 Rules of Islamophobia In America.” Huffpost, January 23, 2017,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/islamophobia-america_us_587cf491e4b0e58057ff98e0
5
It is worth mentioning that under the perfectionism of Pancasila by Suharto, the Marxist and Islamist
political forces were treated as enemies and crushed. Only when these rival powers with perfectionist
tendencies were no longer threatening, or when there was a good reason to use them to enhance his own
power were such rivals given a certain place in politics under Suharto’s rule. This later phenomenon
occurred in the 1980s when Suharto tended to be closer to Islamic politics, and as Martin Van Bruinessen
described, “By the late 1980s the depoliticization of Indonesian society was almost complete, when a
reversal set in. Perhaps because opposition to his rule appeared to be developing within armed forces, that
had been its major prop, perhaps for other reasons, Suharto suddenly adopted a friendlier attitude toward
‘scripturalist’ Islam and began courting those Muslim circles that had been his staunchest critics…” (Van
Bruinessen 2002).
6
Rawls provided a definition of comprehensive doctrines (see Rawls 1993: 13). According to the
standard liberal tenet: the significance of a democracy with liberal constitutionalism is its emphasis not
only on the procedure of elections and the decision making process, but also on providing a substantive
agenda to help the relationship between opposing comprehensive doctrines (which naturally arise within a
society) become less coercive and more meaningful.
7
It was in 1945 that Radjiman Wediodiningkrat, a Chairman of ‘the Investigating Committee for the
Preparation of Indonesian Independence,’ known as BPUPK (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan
Kemerdekaan) set up by the Japanese, raised a question to the members of the investigating committee,
that later became the starting point to the overall and continuing debates of the Indonesia state
philosophy. He asked: ‘Jika kita ingin membentuk sebuah negara, apa dasar dari negara yang akan
dibentuk’ (if we want to establish a state, what is the foundation of the Indonesian state which will be
formed?) (Pranowo 2010: 2, cited in Densmoor 2013: 2). This question was teleological in nature and was
concerned with the moral worth or intrinsic good of the ends of the prospective state. In contrast, the U.S.
Constitution’s formation, for instance, was driven by a question of how to avoid the abuse of political
power, rather than such a question of good. I have argued in my article (see Wahyudi 2010: 73-94), how
this type of question, while it accounted for the birth of Soekarno’s Pancasila, made Indonesian’s politics,
especially under Suharto’s New Order, so peculiar by being dominantly preoccupied with the
controversies around what is the most proper conception of the good for state policies (see Dhont 2010:
87; Densmoor 2013: 37). Later on, Chantal Mouffe would associate this with being all about ‘moralizing
politics.’
8
David Bourchier (1996) studied the “Lineages of organicist political thought in Indonesia” as his
dissertation title suggests. His important contribution was later published under the heading “Illiberal
Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State” (Routledge, 2015). Bourchier saw that
organicist formula was instrumental for some Indonesian elites who used it as a political ideology as they
felt threatened by populist pressure, despite the fact that it was a part of the structural legacy of
colonialism (1996: 8).
9
See: assertion by J.S. Mill, Tocqueville and Madison (in his Federalist Paper) regarding the rights of
minority groups.
10
Nancy Fraser notes that the struggle for recognition represents “the paradigmatic form of political
conflict in the late twentieth century,” and arguably it is still important. Fraser suggests that “demands for
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‘recognition of difference’ fuel struggles of groups mobilized under the banners of nationality, ethnicity,
‘race’, gender and sexuality,” and her piece is an attempt to address the relationship between the questions
of ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’ in the context of social justice (See Nancy Fraser, “From
Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age.” NewLeft Review, I/212
(July-Augustus 1995), https://newleftreview.org/I/212/nancy-fraser-from-redistribution-to-recognition-
dilemmas-of-justice-in-a-post-socialist-age
11
Jusuf Kala is a member of Golkar, a political party created under Suharto, which remains an influential
party in Indonesian politics, later would be appointed by Jokowi as his Vice President (2014-2019). His
roles in contributing to the rise of Islamic politics should be studied separately.
12
According to R. William Liddle (2005: p. 326-8), the three issues were 1). Whether Indonesia should be
a secular state or an Islamic state; 2). The degree of the concentration of governmental authority, whether
it should be with the central government in Jakarta or should be dispersed to the various regions; 3).
Whether Indonesia should adopt the market economic model of the capitalist West or the communist
model of Russia and China. According to Liddle, these three foundational issues have resurfaced since the
fall of Suharto in May 1998. See R William Liddle. “Year one of the Yudhoyono-Kalla duumvirate.”
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol. 41, No. 3 (2005): 328
13
Paige Johnson Tan, “Yudhoyono’s Legacy: Between Politics and Principle.” Current History, Vol. 112,
Issue 755, (September 2013): 234, http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1075
14
Cited in Margaret Scott, “Indonesia: The Battle over Islam.” Op cit.
15
Some of the insightful analyses around MUI can be found in Hasyim (2011; 2015); Gillespie (2007);
Ichwan (2005: 2011); Lindsey (2012); Nasir (2014); Sirry (2013);
16
Ahmad Suaedy, “Religion as a political game: Rising Intolerance in Indonesia.” Open Democracy,
December 1, 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/ahmad-sueady/religion-as-political-
game-rising-intolerance-in-indonesia
17
Some analysis pointed out that MUI fatwas at this time reflected the growing influence of “the Dewan
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia,” an organization closely linked to the radical right, and “the Committee for
International Islamic Solidarity”—a hard-line missionary group founded in the late 1980s during the
Suharto regime, despite the fact that MUI comprises a broad range of Muslim groups including NU dan
Muhammadiyah (Eric Unmacht, “Conservative Islamic leaders are flexing their muscles, putting pressure
on SBY’s largely secular government.” Newsweek International, August 15, 2005, available at:
http://www.thepersecution.org/world/indonesia/05/newsweek.html).
18
This could be either because of “political calculation (that is, as a means of winning support in an
increasingly Islamized society) or from personal piety. Other factors, such as the wider changes of the
political atmosphere after the period of 1998 in which Islam’s status had been an important field of
reference in political debate and negotiation, in addition to the rapid socio-economic changes that have
also been pointed out and had been the causes for the opening up of opportunities for political and
religious authorities to renegotiate their own individual positions as well as the relationship between the
state and belief. See Scott (2016), Saskia Schäfer, In “Renegotiating Indonesian Secularism through
debates on Ahmadiyya and Shia.” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 41 (4-5) (2015): 497-508
19
Bastiaan Scherpen, “Is Hardline Islam Really Rising in Indonesia?.” NewMandala, February, 24 2017,
http://www.newmandala.org/hard-line-islam-really-rising/. According to Bonar Tigor Naipospos, Vice-
Chairmann of the Setara Institute, “the extremist groups have infiltrated at all levels, including Majelis
Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council or MUI)…” (cited in Compass Direct News, “Why is

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Islamic Extremism Growing in Indonesia?.” ChristianPost, October 4, 2011.
http://www.christianpost.com/news/why-is-islamic-extremism-growing-in-indonesia-57170/
20
For some accounts regarding this fatwa and MUI in general see: Piers Gillespie, “Currents Issues in
Indonesia Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No. 7 Opposing Pluralism,
Liberalism and Secularism.” Journal of Islamic Studies 18: 2 (2007): 220-240; see also: Syafiq Hasyim,
“Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in Indonesia,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 41 (4-5),
(2015): 487-495. An alternative view suggests that “the controversial fatwas of MUI” have served as “a
catalyst for fruitful and creative public discourse” (see Mun’im Sirry, “Fatwas and their Controversies:
The Case of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI).” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 44 (1) (2013):
101)
21
For useful discussion about the controversy see Gillespie (2007); Sirry (2013: 117) argues that “the
controversy over the fatwa itself is inherently interesting since it marks one of the dividing lines which
allowed each group to present their position vis-à-vis others in open contestation”
22
Beside Fatwa which is produced by a special commission (Komisi Fatwa dan Hukum), MUI also
produces several non-fatwa discourses that include recommendations (Tausiyah), Admonitions
(Tadzkirah), Instructions/Mandates (Amanah), Position statements (Pernyataan Sikap), Appeals
(Himbaun), or Thought Contributions (Sumbangan Pemikiran), see Ichwan (2005: 51)
23
See: “Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree.” ICG, Asia Briefing No. 78. (July 7, 2008).
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-implications-ahmadiyah-decree
24
Jeremy Menchik, “Illiberal but not Intolerant.” Inside Indonesia, November 23, 2007.
http://www.insideindonesia.org/illiberal-but-not-intolerant; Nasir (2014: 495) discusses how MUI has
accepted, after 1998, some principles that intersect with the Indonesian democratization, even though he
recognizes that the Council is very conservative when it comes to safeguarding Islamic faith and
theology. (see: Mohamad Abdun Nasir, “The ‘Ulama,’ Fatwa, and Challenges to Democracy in
Contemporary Indonesia.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2014): 489-505)
25
ICG (2008) “Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree,” op cit.
26
Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB) 3 menteri No 3/2008 No Kep 033/a/ja/2008 dan No 199 Tahun 2008;
See also Daniel C. Bottomley, “The KTP Quandary: Islam, the Ahmadiyya, and the Reproduction of
Indonesian Nationalism,” Contemporary Islam, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (January 2015): p. 8.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2
27
ICG, “Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree.” Op.cit.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-implications-ahmadiyah-decree
28
CSW. “Indonesia: Pluralism in Peril: The rise of religious intolerance across the archipelago.”
ChristianSolidarityWorldWide, Accessed February 26, 2018. http://stopthepersecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/indonesia-pluralism-in-peril.pdf
29
cited from: “Indonesia: Religious Freedom Report 2016.” ACN International, Accessed December 1,
2016, http://religious-freedom-report.org/
30
Greg Fealy, “Indonesian Politics in 2011: Democratic Regression and Yudhoyono’s regal
incumbency.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol. 47, No. 3 (2011): 346
31
The rejection by the Bogor municipality, in West Java, regarding the construction of a church despite
the ruling of the Supreme Court about the legality of the building permit remained an unresolved issue up
to this time of dissertation writing. The mayor of Bogor had issued a decree to not allow any church to be
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erected in a street bearing an Islamic name, ignoring the court order, and yet, the central government, i.e.
the Minister for Home Affairs during SBY’s presidency, Gamawan Fauzi, had supported the Bogor
administration’s decision in rejecting the proposal to construct places of worship. However, some people
arguably closed to President SBY, such as Denny Indrayana and Rachland Nashidik, seemed to have
been very aware that the problem underlying GKI Yasmin Church was basically about “the rule of law”
in Indonesia. Source: Denny Indrayana, Interview. July 9, 2015; Rachland Nashidik, Interview August 10,
2015.
32
For a brief discussion regarding the violence against Shia, see Greg Fealy, “Indonesian Politics in 2012:
Graft, Intolerance and Hope of Change in the Late Yudhoyono Period.” ISEAS, (2013): 101-120
33
Greg Fealy, “Indonesian Politics in 2012: Graft, Intolerance and Hope of Change in the Late
Yudhoyono Period.” ISEAS (2013): 101-120; See also “Indonesia: Minoritas Agama Sasaran Kekerasan.”
HRW, February 25, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/id/news/2013/02/25/248933
34
Margareth S. Aritonang and Wahyoe Boediwardhana, “Lawmakers insult Shia at House.” Jakarta Post.
November 23, 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/23/lawmakers-insult-shia-house.html
35
For some interesting scholarly and non-scholarly discussion regarding the case see among others:
Saskia Schäfer, “Forming ‘Forbidden’ Identities online: Atheism in Indonesia.” ASEAS-Austrian Journal
of South-East Asian Studies, 9(2), (2016): 253-268; Timo Duile, “Is there a Place for Atheist Citizens in
Indonesia?” OurIndonesia, June 18, 2015. http://ourindonesia.com/law/is-there-a-place-for-atheist-
citizens-in-indonesia/;
36
“Indonesia: Pluralism in Peril: The rise of religious intolerance across the archipelago.”
ChristianSolidarityWorldWide, Accessed February 26, 2017. http://stopthepersecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/indonesia-pluralism-in-peril.pdf;, op cit.
37
Benedict Rogers, and Scott Flipse. “Indonesia: Pluralism in Peril.” Hufftpost (Blog), May 10, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ben/indonesia-pluralism-in-pe_b_4929981.html
38
Behind this marginalization was a combination of various state regulations and laws. Petrik Matanasi.
“Agama-Agama Yang Dipinggirkan (The Marginalized religions).” Tirto, 22 June, 2016.
https://tirto.id/agama-agama-yang-dipinggirkan-bnP3.
39
Ismatu Ropi, “The Politics of Religious Regulation in Indonesia,” Ph.D. Diss., Australian National
University, (2012). See also: Hyung-Jun Kim, “The Changing Interpretation of Religious Freedom in
Indonesia.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Sep., 1998): 357-373
40
Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: Anti-reformist elites and resilient civil society.”
Democratization, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 2012): 209-229.
41
Denny Indrayana and Rachland Nashidik close to SBY’s policies and part of his inner-circle, explained
to me during my interview with them that SBY’s policies on religions and toleration could be different
from his ministers lines of policies like those of Suryadharma Ali or Gamawan Fauzi. (Denny Indrayana,
Interview. July 9, 2015; Rachland Nashidik, Interview August 10, 2015).
42
Examples of the old laws and institutions, created under Soekarno and continued by Suharto’s regimes
among others are: the blasphemy law (1965), the institution of KTP (ID) identification card (in which
there are “kolom agama”—religion column—in the KTP), and the new legislations, which among others,
are: the 2006 Joint regulations on Houses of Worship, the 2008 anti-Ahmadiyya Joint Degree, and the
Sharia-inspired regulations at local and provincial levels in some parts of the country.

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43
The term LGBT is used given its wider uses and its current popularity, despite the fact that it can be
related with other terms that have a different scope and, meaning such as LBT, LGBTQI, MSM, GWL
(GWL-INA) and Waria among others.
44
“Being LGBT in Asia: Indonesia country report (Bahasa Language),” USAID, October 29, 2014.
https://www.usaid.gov/documents/2496/being-lgbt-asia-indonesia-country-report-bahasa-language: p. 27
45
Despite finding that suggest that being LGBT is not a mental illness, and should not be considered
‘abnormal,’ the LGBT people remain discriminated against and sometimes become the target of
violence due to moral reasons (see Martahan Lumban Gaol, “Ulil: Umat Islam Perlu Baca Sains Modern
soal LGBT (The Islamic Ummah needs to read modern sciences regarding the LGBT issue).”
SatuHarapan, Februari 22, 2016. http://www.satuharapan.com/read-detail/read/ulil-umat-islam-perlu-
baca-sains-modern-soal-lgbt; For a call to treat LGBT people as equal members of society see Jamie
Hack, “Denouncing the Classification of LGBT orientations as Mental Illnesses.” British Psychological
Society, March 23, 2016, http://www.bps.org.uk/blog/presidential/denouncing-classification-lgbt-
orientations-mental-illnesses
46
Lauren Farrow, and Heru Rahadi, “Asia: Attacks on Indon LGBT community ‘unusual’.” AAP General
News Wire, February 18, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/attacks-on-indon-lgbt-
community-unusual/news-story/868638f04b1660f3b0a5e26ddf8683aa
47
See: HRW (2016), “These Political Games Ruin Our Lives: Indonesian LGBT community under
threat.” Op.cit: 6. See also: Intan Paramaditha (2016), “The LGBT Debate and the Fear of Gerakan,”
Op.cit
48
HRW’s report described vividly how an Indonesian prominent psychiatrist like Dr. Fidiansjah and the
Indonesian Psychiatrists Association (PDKSJ) issued a statement contrary to international medical
practices such as one promulgated by the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) of which PDKSJ is a
member, and also by the American Psychiatric Association in which both reminded that PDKSJ’s
statement had been “simply not backed up by science and that there is no rational basis, scientific or
otherwise, upon which to punish or discriminate against LGBT people” (HRW, 2016, ibid: 41).
49
Hans-Nicholas Jong, “LGBT community most disliked by Indonesian Muslims: Survey.” Jakarta Post,
August 1, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/01/lgbt-community-most-disliked-by-
indonesian-muslims-survey.html
50
See: “LGBT in Indonesia: The monster in the closet.” Concord Review. July 13, 2016,
http://open.concordreview.com/index.php/2016/07/13/lgbt-in-indonesia-the-monster-in-the-closet/
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid. cf also: Febriana Firdaus, “Déjà Vu Orde Baru: Kasus Kasus Intoleransi di era Jokowi mengulang
Orde Baru, benarkah?” Rappler, March 30, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/indonesia/127298-insiden-
intoleran-orde-baru
53
Cited in HRW (2016), “These Political Games Ruin Our Lives: Indonesian LGBT community under
threat.” Ibid, p. 45.
54
Edo Karensa, “LGBT safety Should be Placed under the Constitution: Activists.” Jakarta Globe,
February 24, 2016, http://jakartaglobe.id/news/lgbt-safety-placed-constitution-activists/
55
“Zulkifli Hasan: LGBT merusak moral bangsa.” Tempo.co, March 9, 2016,
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/03/09/173751997/zulkifli-hasan-lgbt-merusak-moral-bangsa

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56
“’No room' in Indonesia for gay rights, says president's spokesman.” Guardian, August 11, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/no-room-in-indonesia-for-gay-rights-says-president-
spokesman; “Indonesia says there is 'no room' for an LGBT movement in the country.” ABCNews,
August 11, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-11/indonesia-says-no-room-for-lgbt-
movement/7721838; “Johan Budi: Gerakan LGBT Tak Punya 'Ruang' di Publik.” Detiknews, August 11,
2016, https://news.detik.com/berita/3273642/johan-budi-negara-melindungi-hak-warga-negara-tapi-
gerakan-lgbt-dilarang
57
“HRW: Perlindungan Hak-Hak LGBT di Indonesia Belum Pernah Seburuk Saat Ini.” DW, August 11,
2016 http://www.dw.com/id/hrw-perlindungan-hak-hak-lgbt-di-indonesia-belum-pernah-seburuk-saat-
ini/a-19465427
58
Kate Lamb, “Why LGBT hatred suddenly spiked in Indonesia.” Guardian, February 22, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/feb/22/why-lgbt-hatred-
suddenly-spiked-in-indonesia; HRW (2016), “These Political Games Ruin Our Lives,” op cit.;
Hendri Yulius, “The war on homosexuality in Indonesia.” New Mandala, September 30, 2016,
http://www.newmandala.org/war-homosexuality-indonesia/
59
Haeril Halim, Hans Nicholas Jong, and Nurul Fitri Ramadhani, “Govt demands UNDP remove funding
for LGBT programs.” Jakarta Post, February 16, 2016,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/16/govt-demands-undp-remove-funding-lgbt-
programs.html
60
Haeril Halim, Hans Nicholas Jong, and Nurul Fitri Ramadhani, “Govt demands UNDP remove funding
for LGBT programs” Ibid.
61
HRW’s report documented “the crisis in words” taken from the statements of the Indonesian
government officials and political elites, Muhammad Nasir, Zukifli Hasan, Riwan Kamil, Yuddy
Chrisnandi, Nasir Djamil, Reni Marlinawati, Khofifa Indar Parawansa, Aboe Bakar AlHabsy, Ryamizard
Ryacudu, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Mahfud Siddiq, Arief R. Wismansyah, Hidayat Nurwahid, Deding
Ishak, and Luhut Panjaitan that represent rhetorical onslaught toward the LGBT communities (see HRW,
2016, pp. 20-21).
62
The organization actually provided “information about gender and sexuality to students and hosted
academic discussion” for those people who identified as LGBT (see HRW, 2016, op cit, p. 17). It was “ a
university support group that aims to provide counseling to LGBT students who might be depressed or
even suicidal.” (see Nadya Karima Melati and Ferena Debineva. “Peran SGRC UI (Support Group and
Resource Center) for sexuality studies Universitas Indonesia dalam Menyediakan Akses terhadap
Pendidikan Seksual untuk masa di antara remaja Akhir-dewasa Muda.” SGRC (Blog), August 23, 2015,
https://sgrcui.wordpress.com/2015/08/23/peran-sgrc-ui-support-group-and-resource-center-for-sexuality-
studies-universitas-indonesia-dalam-menyediakan-akses-terhadap-pendidikan-seksual-untuk-masa-
diantara-remaja-akhir-dewasa-muda-2/; see also “Minister of Higher Ed offers confusing, contradictory
defense for banning LGBT groups from universities.” Coconuts Jakarta, January 25, 2016.
https://coconuts.co/jakarta/news/minister-higher-ed-offers-confusing-contradictory-defense-banning-lgbt-
groups/)
63
Benjamin Hegarty and Ferdiansyah Thajib, “A Dispensable Threat.” Inside Indonesia, June 13, 2016,
http://www.insideindonesia.org/a-dispensable-threat
64
Ibid. See also HRW, 2016; Benjamin Hegarty and Ferdiansyah Thajib, “A Dispensable Threat.” ibid.

177


65
“Minister of Higher Education offers confusing, contradictory defense for banning LGBT groups from
universities.” Coconuts Jakarta, January 25, 2016. https://coconuts.co/jakarta/news/minister-higher-ed-
offers-confusing-contradictory-defense-banning-lgbt-groups/; see also HRW, 2016: 18
66
“Syarat Mahasiswa Baru Universitas Andalas Bebas LGBT Jadi Viral.” Tempo.co, April 30, 2017,
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2017/04/30/079870811/syarat-mahasiswa-baru-universitas-andalas-bebas-
lgbt-jadi-viral
67
“Organisasi LGBT dilarang masuk kampus.” AntaraNews.com, May 6, 2017,
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/627792/organisasi-lgbt-dilarang-masuk-kampus
68
Two of the best documentations regarding the contemporary plights and problems experienced by
Indonesian LGBT perhaps are “These Political Games Ruin Our Lives.” HRW (2016), op.cit, and “Being
LGBT in Asia: Indonesia,” UNDP (2014), Accessed: February 5, 2018, http://www.asia-
pacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/hiv_aids/rbap-hhd-2014-blia-
indonesia-country-report-english.pdf, see also “Being LGBT in Asia: Indonesia country report (Bahasa
Language),” USAID, October 29, 2014. https://www.usaid.gov/documents/2496/being-lgbt-asia-
indonesia-country-report-bahasa-language
69
“Being LGBT in Asia” (2014): 51
70
ibid, pp. 22-23
71
Davit Setyawan, “Propaganda LGBT Dilarang Masuk Dunia Anak-Anak.” KPAI (Komisi Perlindungan
Anak Indonesia), Februari 1, 2016. http://www.kpai.go.id/berita/propaganda-lgbt-dilarang-masuk-dunia-
anak-anak/
72
cited in HRW (2016): 37
73
HRW (2016), ibid: 37
74
Ahmad Toriq, “KPI Larang Promosi LGBT di TV dan Radio.” DetikNews, February 13, 2016.
http://news.detik.com/berita/3141146/kpi-larang-promosi-lgbt-di-tv-dan-radio; Bayu Galih, “KPI Larang
TV dan Radio Promosikan LGBT.” Kompas.com, February 13, 2016.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/02/13/08060081/KPI.Larang.TV.dan.Radio.Promosikan.LGBT;
75
HRW (2016), op cit, p. 39
76
HRW, ibid, p. 39
77
Ben Westcott, “Jakarta police raid gay sex party amid crackdown on LGBT Indonesians.” Jakarta Post,
May 23, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/22/asia/jakarta-sex-party-lgbt/index.html
78
“Indonesia: ‘Gay Porn’ Arrests Threaten Privacy.” HRW, May 14, 2017.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/04/indonesia-gay-porn-arrests-threaten-privacy
79
“Being LGBT in Asia” (2014): 37
80
Robert Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966,” Journal of Genocide Research, 3(2), (2001): 219.
According to Cribb, the number of people killed and the precise circumstances of most deaths remain
uncertain, as “scholarly consensus has settled on figures of 400-500,000 but the correct figure could be
half or twice as much” (Cribb 2001: 233; Cribb 2002: 559). Marx Woodward defined the 1965 killings as
politicide, that is “an extreme form of state violence in which political groups are targeted for
extermination,” adding that the concept of politicide also shares “modes of brutality with other modes of
communal violence…[which] include de-humanization, demonization, sexual violence, desecration of

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corpses, and the representation of mass killings as what Juergensmeyer (2003) calls Cosmic War” (cited
in Woodward, 2011: 38-39)
81
Mary S. Zurbuchen. “History, Memory, and the ‘1965 Incident’ in Indonesia.” Asian Survey, 42, (4),
(July/August 2002): 564
82
See for instance, Andi Suwirta. “Mengkritisi Peristiwa G30S 1965: Dominasi Wacana Sejarah Orde
Baru dalam Sorotan.” Historia: Jurnal Pendidikan Sejarah, No.1 (2000): 62-71.
83
As it is now widely known that “the names of many of those targeted by the military for capture and
murder after the alleged Untung-PKI putsch, were supplied by the US intelligence and diplomatic
sources” (Hadiz 2006: 555). It was also widely known that “U.K. Ambassador Andrew Gilchrist called
for ‘propaganda’ and ‘psywar activity’ to ensure the ‘destruction and putting to flight of the PKI by the
Indonesian Army.’ The United States aided Suharto’s forces through the ‘direct involvement of the CIA,
the close cooperation of the U.S. Embassy and State Department, and the guidance of the Johnson
administration’s National Security Council” (Suwandi 2015: 15).
84
Budiawan. “When Memory Challenges History: Public Contestation of the Past in Post-Suharto
Indonesia.” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 28, No. 2, Special Focus: A Changing
Indonesia (2000): 35-57
85
Zurbuchen, ibid. p. 527
86
“In early 2000, President Wahid suggested a lifting of the ban on communism and Marxist-leninism
teachings (Ketetapan [Decision] no. 25, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara [People’s
Deliberative Assembly]) that the acting parliament had instituted in 1966 at Suharto’s behest, and still
more remarkably proposed a judicial investigation of the mass killings” (Cribb 2001: 561). See also “PKI:
Opening a new chapter without closing book.” Indopubs, March 29, 2000.
https://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2000/03/29/0043.html
87
This political principle, as I had alluded to earlier, is one that is based on liberal constitutionalism. It
should be added that Gus Dur’s attempt to revoke “the ban on communism and Marxist-leninism
teachings” stipulated by (Ketetapan [Decision] no. 25, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara
[People’s Deliberative Assembly]) was also intended as the first important step to end the long impunity
and to remove the stigma which impacted the families of the victims of 1965 (Roy Murtadho. “Gus Dur
dan Marxism-Leninism.” Indoprogress, September 7, 2015, https://indoprogress.com/2015/09/gus-dur-
dan-marxisme-leninisme/)
88
Founded by Ibu Sulami, a former leader of the left-wing women’s organization, Gerwani, and other
eks-Tapol including Nobel Laureate nominee Pramudya Ananta Toer, on April 1999, the ‘Institute of
study’ was aimed at investigating “the accurate number of victims of the 1965-1966 massacre,” and they
defined the organization’s activity as an effort to ‘brighten the life of the nation’ in line with the preamble
of the 1945 Constitution, arguing ‘that in representation of the past (i.e. the 1965 affairs) the life of the
nation has been fooled by Suharto’s regime” (Budiawan 2000: 38). Other initial accounts regarding
YPKP can be found in texts by Mary S. Zurbechen (2002: 577); Andrian Vickers (2010: 50); Robert
Cribb (2002: 560); and Budiawan (2000: 38-39) among others.
89
See Vickers 2010: 50; Wieringa 2011: 545. For a complete account regarding the Syarikat see:
Katherine McGregor, “Syarikat and the Move to make Amends for the Nahdlatul Ulama’s Violent Past.”
Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 107, University of Melbourne, Australia (September
2008). http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/wps/wps08_107.pdf

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90
Few Syarikat activists, like Imam Aziz, had made personal approaches to communicate with some
important figures within Islamic organizations like Buya Sjafii Maarif of Muhamaddiyah, and Gus Sholah
of NU, and accordingly those two leading and influential figures had shifted their perceptionswith regard
to the idea of reconciliation due to this communication (Source: Budiawan, personal communication, June
27, 2017.)
91
see: “Jejak PKI-Mass Grave.” Youtube, February 4, 2013.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svYdHm5073E
92
“Franz Magnis: Negara Perlu Meminta Maaf Kepada Korban 1965-1966.” Beritasatu.com, August 31,
2015. http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/303051-franz-magnis-negara-perlu-meminta-maaf-kepada-
korban-19651966.html
93
Natalie Sambhi. “Neither Truth nor Reconciliation: Why Indonesia’s Army Wants the Country to
Forget its Darkest Year.” World Policy Journal. Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter 2016/2017): 106 , see also,
Aditya Revianur. “Komnas HAM: Kopkamtib Bertanggung Jawab dalam Peristiwa 1965-1966.”
Kompas.com, July 24, 2012.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/07/24/09000971/Komnas.HAM.Kopkamtib.Bertanggung.Jawab.
dalam.Peristiwa.1965-1965
94
Rangga Prakoso, Ezra Sihite, Bayu Marhaenjati & Firdha Novialita, “AGO Rejects Komnas HAM
Report on 1965 Massacres.” Jakarta Globe, November 10, 2012. http://jakartaglobe.id/archive/ago-
rejects-komnas-ham-report-on-1965-massacres/
95
Solihin GP, “Waspadai Bahaya Komunisme.” AntaraJabar, August 4, 2012
http://www.antarajawabarat.com/lihat/berita/38949/solihin-gp-waspadai-kebangkitan-komunisme; seel
also: “Govt denies 1965 rights abuses happened.” Jakarta Post, October 2, 2012,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/02/govt-denies-1965-rights-abuses-happened.html;
“Indonesia minister rejects human rights report on 1965 killings.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,
Accessed: March 15, 2017, Retrieved from
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1081612889?accountid=13771
96
Aditya Revianur, “Menko Polhukam Lukai Hati Korban Pelanggaran HAM.” Kompas.com, October 2,
2012
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/10/02/02074043/Menko.Polhukam.Lukai.Hati.Korban.Pelanggara
n.HAM.
97
Hendardi “Penyelesaian Kasus HAM.” Kompas, April 4, 2004.
htpp://cetak.kompas.com/read/2012/04/04/02171563/penyelesaian.kasus.ham; also available at:
https://lautanopini.wordpress.com/2012/04/04/penyelesaian-kasus-ham/; “Kekuatan Lama Bercokol,
Tidak ada Pemimpin Kredibel yang Mengawal reformasi.” Kompas, May 22, 2012.
http://cetak.kompas.com/read/2012/05/22/04560789/kekuatan.lama.bercokol; lihat juga “Tidak Ada
Pemimpin Kredibel yang Mengawal .“ IndonesiaCompanyNews (Blog), Accessed, February 8, 2018.
Reformasihttps://indonesiacompanynews.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/tidak-ada-pemimpin-kredibel-yang-
mengawal-reformasi/
98
“Blunder Kejaksaan Agung dan Departemen Pendidikan Nasional.” Tempo.co, March 15, 2007.
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2007/03/15/05595550/blunder-kejaksaan-agung-dan-departemen-
pendidikan-nasional; “Aparat Kejaksaan Bekasi Bakar Buku Sejarah.” Liputan6.com, September 25,
2007. http://news.liputan6.com/read/183467/aparat-kejaksaan-bekasi-bakar-buku-sejarah;

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99
Andreas Harsono, “Jurnalis desak Jaksa Berhenti Bakar Buku.” Andreas Harsono (Blog), August 8,
2007. http://www.andreasharsono.net/2007/08/jurnalis-desak-jaksa-berhenti-bakar.html;
100
Paige Johnson Tan. “Teaching and Remembering.” Inside Indonesia 92. April-June 2008.
http://www.insideindonesia.org/teaching-and-remembering
101
cited in Natalie Sambhi, op cit, p. 105
102
Jon Emont, “The Propaganda Precursor to “The Act of Killing.” New Yorker, October 24, 2015.
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-propaganda-precursor-to-the-act-of-killing; Mette
Bjerregaard, “What Indonesians really think about The Act of Killing.” Guardian, March 5, 2014.
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/mar/05/act-of-killing-screening-in-indonesia
103
For list of records regarding the disruptions of the privates screening see: Grace Leksana, “Silencing
The Look of Silence.” Inside Indonesia, March 17, 2015. http://www.insideindonesia.org/silencing-the-
look-of-silence
104
Natalie Sambhi, op cit, p. 108
105
“President Widodo ‘lying about 1965 mass killings’, says rights chief.” AsiaPacificReport, April 29,
2016. http://asiapacificreport.nz/2016/04/29/president-widodo-lying-about-1965-mass-killings-says-
rights-chief/
106
“Defense minister Ryacudu orders public to surrender leftist books, internet documents.” APSN, May
13, 2016. http://www.asia-pacific-
solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/indoleft/2016/kbr_defenseministerryacuduord_130516.htm
107
Bramantyo. “Jika Minta Maaf ke PKI, Jokowi Akan Dilengserkan.”Okezone.news, June 5, 2016.
http://news.okezone.com/read/2016/06/05/512/1406906/jika-minta-maaf-ke-pki-jokowi-akan-
dilengserkan; Silvanus Alvin, “Di Mabes TNI, Jokowi Tegaskan Tak Akan Minta Maaf ke Eks PKI.”
Liputan6.com, June 27, 2016. http://news.liputan6.com/read/2541310/di-mabes-tni-jokowi-tegaskan-tak-
akan-minta-maaf-ke-eks-pki
108
Mong Palatino, “International Court Revisits Indonesia's 1965 Mass Killings.” Diplomat, November
19, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/international-court-revisits-indonesias-1965-mass-killings/
109
Hengky Sulaksono. “Sentimen Anti-Komunisme, Dagelan yang Kian Tak Lucu.” Geotimes, May 25,
2016. https://geotimes.co.id/sentimen-anti-komunisme-dagelan-yang-kian-tak-lucu/; see also James
Balowski, “Indonesia's anti-communist backlash isn't over.” Socialist Worker.org, July 25, 2016.
http://socialistworker.org.socialistworker.org/2016/07/25/indonesias-anti-communist-backlash
110
Henky Sulaksono, ibid.
111
see http://www.tribunal1965.org; for the best explanation behind the tribunal see Nursyahbani
Kantjasungkana. “Sebuah Catatan Refleksi.” Sinar Dian, Edisi 5, December 2015.
http://stichtingdian.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/SinarDian_Edisi005_Desember2015.pdf
112
Citing the view of Diane Orentlicher about impunity, according to the tribunal’s website:
“Impunity…involves a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take
appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that
those respected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished; to provide victims with
effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the
inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a
recurrence of violations. Key words thus are the rights to truth, to justice, to rehabilitation and the

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guarantee of non-recurrence. ”The price of impunity; the scope of the International People’s Tribunal
1965.” Tribunal1965, Accessed February 8, 2018. http://www.tribunal1965.org/en/tribunal-1965/concept-
note-on-international-peoples-tribunal-on-crimes-against-humanity-in-indonesia-1965/
113
cited in Natalie Sambhi, p. 107
114
in “Tribunal 1965.” Accessed March 15, 2017. http://www.tribunal1965.org/en/tribunal-1965/concept-
note-on-international-peoples-tribunal-on-crimes-against-humanity-in-indonesia-1965/. Ibid.
115
“Jakarta derides The Hague tribunal into 1965-66 purges.“ Todayonline, November 10, 2015.
http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/jakarta-derides-hague-tribunal-1965-66-purges; “Jokowi
Statement.” Tribunal1965, April 21, 2016. http://www.tribunal1965.org/en/jokowi-statement/;
“Government rubbishes independent Hague tribunal on 1965 massacres.” APSN, November 10, 2015.
http://asia-pacific-solidarity.net/news/jg_governmentrubbishesindepe_101115.htm; “Government brushes
off Hague tribunal on 1965 massacre.” Jakarta Post, November 10, 2015.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/11/10/government-brushes-hague-tribunal-1965-
massacre.html
116
APSN, “Government rubbishes independent Hague tribunal on 1965 massacres.” Op.cit.
117
Jakarta Post, “Government brushes off Hague tribunal on 1965 massacre.” Op.cit.
118
Joe Cochrane, “Indonesia Rules Out Criminal Inquiry of Anti-Communist Purges.” New York Times,
April 18, 2016.https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/world/asia/indonesia-anti-communist-purge-
symposium.html?ref=world; Kate Lamb, “Indonesia urged to hold truth and reconciliation process over
massacres.” Guardian, April 13, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/13/indonesia-truth-
and-reconciliation-process-communist-massacres; Anton Hermansyah, “1965 Symposium Indonesia's
way to face its dark past.” Jakarta Post, April 19, 2016.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/19/1965-symposium-indonesias-way-to-face-its-dark-
past.html
119
The current Governor of the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas, Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional)
Agus Wijoyo, was a retired general whose father,the late Sutoyo Siswomihardjo was one of the six
generals of high-ranking army officials who were allegedly killed by the PKI in 1965 as the official
version depicted it. This alone provided him with a unique position in the constellation of the national
debate regarding the event of 1965 and in the state-sponsored Symposium in which he was acting as the
chair of the advisory council for the Symposium. In addition, he was also “co-founder of Forum
Silaturahmi Anak Bangsa, an umbrella organization that seeks to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation
between children of ex-PKI members, the families of army generals killed in 1965 and other victims of
conflicts.” For some information regarding Agus Wijoyo and the symposium see: Anton Hermansyah,
“1965 Symposium Indonesia's way to face its dark past.” Op.cit; Yenni Kwok, “There Were No
Apologies at Indonesia's First Hearing Into the Savage Killings of 1965.” Time, April 19, 2016.
http://time.com/4298769/indonesia-national-symposium-1965-killings/; “Agus Widjojo:Reconciliation of
1965 tragedy for national interest.” Tempo.co, April 27, 2016.
https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/04/27/241766242/Agus-WidjojoReconciliation-of-1965-tragedy-for-
national-interest; Yenni Kwok, “Indonesia Calls a Symposium on the 1965–66 Killings, but May Not Be
Ready for the Findings.” Time, April 15, 2016. http://time.com/4295474/indonesia-1965-1966-killings-
pki-massacre-reconciliation/
120
An assessment however suggested that Agus Wijoyo remained to be marginalized within the section of
“green military” (associated with Islamic forces), and thus even though he emerged as part of the “red
military group” (associated with secular, nationalist forces) during the symposium, he ended up only with
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the recommendation of “reconcialition” and not a more radical option (see Febriana Firdaus. “Perang Ala
Jokowi.” DW, May 17, 2017. http://www.dw.com/id/perang-ala-jokowi/a-39364064)
121
For a brief, but very interesting description of the symposium see: Ariel Heryanto. “Massacre,
Memory and the Wounds of 1965.” New Mandala, May 2, 2016. http://www.newmandala.org/massacre-
memory-and-the-wounds-of-1965/; Ayu Wahyuningroem. “Justice Denied?” Inside Indonesia, July 18,
2016. http://www.insideindonesia.org/justice-denied
122
http://www.cipadh.org/fr/node/769; see also Ariel Heryanto. “Massacre, Memory and the Wounds of
1965.” Op.cit
123
“Retired Generals Hold Anti-Communist Symposium” Jakarta Post, May 31, 2016.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/05/31/retired-generals-hold-anti-communist-symposium.html;
124
“Retired Generals Hold Anti-Communist Symposium.” Jakarta Post, May 31, 2016. Ibid.
125
Kiki Syahnakri and those who opposed reconciliation were reported to have wrongly equated the
reconciliation concept with defense of communism, while ‘the reality is not about the reconciliation of
PKI with other parties. There were crimes against humanity post-1965, and that’s what we want to
reconcile, according to Siti Noor Laila of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) that
supported the government sponsored ‘National Symposium’ on April 2016. See: Arie Firdaus.
“Indonesia: Retired Generals Discuss ‘Communist Threat’.” Benarnews.org, May 1, 2016.
http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-communism-06012016174302.html
126
Arie Firdaus. “Indonesia: Retired Generals Discuss ‘Communist Threat’.” Ibid.
127
“Defense minister Ryacudu orders public to surrender leftist books, internet documents.” APSN, May
13, 2006. http://www.asia-pacific-
solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/indoleft/2016/kbr_defenseministerryacuduord_130516.htm
128
“Anti-Communist Symposium Slammed for Misuse of groups’ Logos.” Jakarta Post, June 3, 2016.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/06/03/anti-communist-symposium-slammed-for-misuse-of-
groups-logos.html
129
Yapto Suryo Soemarno, the leader of Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) funded the symposium, in
addition to Luhut’s office which was read as part of his rebalancing efforts after the April Symposium,
when he and Agus Widjojo were both openly accused of being pro-communist, including by some from
within the military. (cited in Ayu Wahyuningroem. “Justice Denied.” Op cit.). See also: APSN, “Defense
minister Ryacudu orders public to surrender leftist books, internet documents.” Op.cit
130
Febriana Firdaus. “Catatan Simposium Hari 1: Reuni sang Jenderal dan Penjaga Penjaga Khilafah.”
Rappler, June 2, 2016. http://www.rappler.com/indonesia/135030-catatan-simposium-pancasila-hari-
pertama
131
Robert Cribb. “Genocide in Indonesia. 1965-1966.” Journal of Genocide Research, 3:2 (2001): 237
132
“Jokowi: Kalau PKI Nongol, Gebuk & Tendangi Saja!! - Jurus Gebuk Ala Jokowi Dari Pak Suharto.”
Youtube, May 22, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWw-qGQWIcw; Wisnu Nugroho, “Jokowi:
Kalau PKI Nongol, Gebuk Saja.” Kompas, May 17, 2017.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/05/17/16433321/jokowi.kalau.pki.nongol.gebuk.saja
133
Some social activists, journalists, and scholar responded quickly Jokowi’s statement like Dadang
Christanto, Febriana Firdaus and Ariel Heryanto in their facebook pages afterwards.

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134
As has been discussed earlier, while the Jokowi administration, under the coordination of Minister of
Law and Security, Luhut Panjaitan, attempted to deal with the lingering issues of the 1965 massacre
event, by supporting the organization of what is so called: “national symposium” in Jakarta on April 18-
19, 2016, Ryamizard Ryacudu positioned himself as a competitor to this reconciliation effort by
sponsoring an alternative symposium on June 1-2, 2016, that apparently intended to oppose Jokowi’s
policy. Clearly, the former symposium was a reflection of the aspiration of the victims of the1965
massacre, and other progressive elements, while the later was a representative of the ideas of conservative
elements and radical Islamic groups: see Rebecca Henschke dan Heyder Affan, “Menhan Ryamizard:
Saya tak mungkin mengkhianati Jokowi.” BBC Indonesia, June 1, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/05/160531_indonesia_wawancara_menhan;
“Luhut: Menhan Ryamizard belum paham apa yang saya mau.” BBC Indonesia, May 20, 2106,
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/05/160520_indonesia_luhut_simposium_pki;
Isyana Artharini, “Simposium 'anti-PKI': Pensiunan jenderal, kaum radikal dan Haji Lulung.” BBC
Indonesia, June 1, 2016.
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/06/160601_indonesia_simposium_pki_haripertama
; Febriana Firdaus, “Pernyataan-pernyatan kontroversial di Simposium tandingan.” Rappler, June 1,
2016. http://www.rappler.com/indonesia/135034-pernyataan-pernyatan-kontroversial-simposium-
tandingan
135
"Kemhan Bentuk 4500 Kader Pembina Bela Negara Di 45 Kabupaten/Kota Seluruh Indonesia Tahun.”
Kemhan, October 13, 2015, https://www.kemhan.go.id/2015/10/13/kemhan-bentuk-4500-kader-pembina-
bela-negara-di-45-kabupatenkota-seluruh-indonesia-tahun.html; see also: “Pro Kontra Program Bela
Negara.” Kompas, December 29, 2017,
http://lipsus.kompas.com/topikpilihanlist/3777/1/pro.kontra.program.bela.negara; “YSK: 9 Alasan
Menolak Program Bela Negara.” Satu Keadilan, Accessed February 5, 2018.
http://www.satukeadilan.org/ysk-9-alasan-menolak-program-bela-negara.html; Kristian Erdianto,
“Menhan: Saya Heran kalau Konsep Bela Negara Dipertanyakan.” Kompas, March 29, 2016.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/03/29/22182401/Menhan.Saya.Heran.kalau.Konsep.Bela.Negara.D
ipertanyakan
136
“Bela Negara yang Diinginkan Presiden Jokowi.” Tempo.co, October 19, 2015.
http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/19/078711014/bela-negara-yang-diinginkan-presiden-
jokowi-adalah
137
Hery H. Winarno, “Ini penjelasan lengkap pemerintah soal bela negara.” Merdeka, October 20, 2015,
http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/ini-penjelasan-lengkap-pemerintah-soal-bela-negara-splitnews-2.html
138
Sabrina Asril, “Menhan: Bela Negara Bukan Latihan Wajib Militer.” Kompas, October 20, 2015.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/10/20/05470071/Menhan.Bela.Negara.Bukan.Latihan.Wajib.Milite
r
139
Abba Gabrillin, “Sejumlah Kekhawatiran di Balik Program Bela Negara” Kompas, October 16, 2015,
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/10/16/08330601/Sejumlah.Kekhawatiran.di.Balik.Program.Bela.N
egara; Salmah Muslimah, “Hendardi Kritik Keras Program Bela Negara Kemhan.” DetikNews, October
13, 2015. https://news.detik.com/berita/3043443/hendardi-kritik-keras-untuk-program-bela-negara-
kemhan
140
Muhammad Sadri, ”Ini Alasan Pangdam Siliwangi Copot Dandim Lebak yang Latih FPI.” Jawa Post,
January 8, 2017.

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http://www.jawapos.com/read/2017/01/08/100808/ini-alasan-pangdam-siliwangi-copot-dandim-lebak-
yang-latih-fpi
141
“Latih Bela Negara Untuk FPI, Damdim Lebak Dicopot.” Youtube, January 9, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cIJmRK0VK4c
142
Kristian Erdianto, “Ini Penjelasan Panglima TNI Terkait Pencopotan Dandim Lebak.” Kompas,
January 11, 2017,
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/01/11/12525351/ini.penjelasan.panglima.tni.terkait.pencopotan.da
ndim.lebak
143
Nabilla Tashandra, “Menhan Tak Tutup Kemungkinan Ormas Radikal Diajak Bela Negara.” Kompas,
February 12, 2016.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/02/12/23203721/Menhan.Tak.Tutup.Kemungkinan.Ormas.Radikal
.Diajak.Bela.Negara
144
Kristian Erdianto, “Menhan Nilai Program Bela Negara Bisa untuk Atasi Terorisme.” Kompas,
January 12, 2016.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/01/12/22264961/Menhan.Nilai.Program.Bela.Negara.Bisa.untuk.A
tasi.Terorisme
145
For some recent and comprehensive discussions about FPI see: Mark Woodward et. al. “The Islamic
Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia.” Contemporary Islam,Vol. 8, Issue
2 (May 2014): 153-171; see also Mark Woodward, Mariani Yahya, Inayah Rohmaniyah, Diana
Murtaugh, Coleman, Ali Amin, Chris Lundry, “Hate Speech and the Indonesian Islamic Defender Front,”
ASU, Report No. 1203, (September 9, 2012) http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/csc1203-fpi-hate-
speech.pdf. The involvement of the nationalists and FPI has been described briefly by Verena Beittinger-
Lee, (Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia: A Contested Arena. (Routledge. London and
New York. 2010: 190), in which she notes: “there is much evidence that parts of the old elites supported
the founding of the FPI. Former defense ministry and armed forces commander General Wiranto, and
former Jakarta Police Commander Djaya Suparman allegedly are among the initiators. Mochsin Mochdar,
husband of Habibie’s sister Sri Rahayu, was another source of funding, along with Fuad Bawazier, former
General Director of Taxes and Finance Minister under Suharto. Another indicator of the group’s political
affiliation was FPI’s presence and moral support for Wiranto in December 1999 was when his
involvement in human rights violations was investigated by the UN/KPP-HAM. Furthermore, it is
striking that the FPI does not extend its moral fight to apparent evils such as KKN, human rights
violations in Aceh, etc. On the contrary, the FPI entertains strong ties to ‘arch-nationalist cadres’ within
the Indonesian Armed Forces”
146
Raden Trimutia Hatta, “Tanggapan Setara Institute soal Latihan Bela Negara TNI dan FPI.”
Liputan6.com, January 9, 2017. http://news.liputan6.com/read/2821726/tanggapan-setara-institute-soal-
latihan-bela-negara-tni-dan-fpi; “Jokowi urged to evaluate Bela Negara following FPI training.” Jakarta
Post, January 9, 2017. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/09/jokowi-urged-to-evaluate-bela-
negara-following-fpi-training.html
147
Ihsan Dalimunthe, “Menhan: Latihan Bela Negara FPI Tanpa Izin Saya Juga Tidak Apa-Apa."
RMOL.co, January 20, 2017. http://keamanan.rmol.co/read/2017/01/10/275749/Menhan:-Latihan-Bela-
Negara-FPI-Tanpa-Izin-Saya-Juga-Tidak-Apa-Apa-; Imam Solehudin, “Menhan Izinkan FPI dan ISIS
Ikut Latihan Bela Negara” Jawa Post, January 13, 2017.
http://www.jawapos.com/read/2017/01/13/101899/menhan-izinkan-fpi-dan-isis-ikut-latihan-bela-
negaranbsp
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148
Bayu Septianto, “FPI Ikut Bela Negara, Fadli Zon: Setiap WNI Berhak Ikut.” Okezone, January 9,
2017. http://news.okezone.com/read/2017/01/09/337/1586646/fpi-ikut-bela-negara-fadli-zon-setiap-wni-
berhak-ikut; Margareth S. Aritonang, “Protests against military training for FPI exaggerated: Fadli Zon.”
Jakarta Post, January 9, 2017. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/09/protests-against-military-
training-for-fpi-exaggerated-fadli-zon.html
149
Christie Stefanie, “Cegah Tumpang Tindih, Bela Negara Akan Diurus Wantannas.” CNN Indonesia,
January 10, 2017. http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170109182738-12-185098/cegah-tumpang-
tindih-bela-negara-akan-diurus-wantannas/
150
The document was circulated and was arguably intended to influence the public entitled “Pokok-Pokok
Pikiran Kaji Ulang Perubahan UUD 1945,” dated: 28 November 2013. The meeting for preparing the
document has been attended by no less than 84 participants, mostly with military backgrounds. The
“Keputusan” (Decision, No. Kep-01/Fober/XI/2013) regarding the document was signed by several
figures, among others are Try Sutrisno (former VP President under Suharto), and Syaiful Sulun (Mayjen
TNI Purn, The Secretary General of the Forum).
151
One can see the line of connection between the ideas in this document and the views of President
Suharto and the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI)’s view of Pancasila (Chapter IV), in the book of
Douglas Ramage’s Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (Routledge
1995). While Ramage delineated how Pancasila had been expressed by President Suharto as an all-
encompassing philosophy of life, unique to Indonesia and personified by the government of the New
Order, he also highlighted ABRI’s underlying political thinking in the New Order, in which 1). Both held
that Western-style parliamentary democracy with competing political parties was inappropriate for
Indonesia, and 2). Both held that a state formally linked to Islam would endanger national unity (Ramage
1995: 27-8)
152
Thus, there is an ideological gap between Yudhoyono’s administration and the old, conservative
general who defended the need to return to ‘the original 1945 Constitution’ (UUD 1945 yang asli).’ For
some assessment regarding Yudhoyono’s handle of radical Islam see for example (Parameswaran 2011;
Jones 2015).
153
I was invited as a participant to this event. It was held at noon at Gadjah Mada University and was
called “Forum Group Discussion.” The organizer was the ‘Pusat Studi Pancasila’ (the Center for
Pancasila studies) of UGM (PSP-UGM), and the meeting was attended by academics and intellectuals
from around Yogyakarta and Jakarta. Those who attended the meeting included Prof. Dr. S. SH (UGM);
Prof. S.M. (Retired), Prof. J.T. (UII), Dr. K. (UGM), Prof. S. (UGM), H.S. (Lemhannas), Dr. T.N.E
(UGM), Dr. R.T.
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Personal note with recorded-voice on FGD PSP-UGM, March 28, 2015
155
The sentiment was part of the 1959 series of events when Soekarno, supported by the military
announced the Dekrit Presiden on July 5, 1959, see: Nasution (1992).
156
See for example: Johannes Nainggolan, “Jokowi Didesak Keluarkan Dekrit Kembali Ke UUD 1945
Asli.” RMOL, October 7, 2016, http://politik.rmol.co/read/2016/10/07/263564/Jokowi-Didesak-
Keluarkan-Dekrit-Kembali-Ke-UUD-1945-Asli-; “Amandemen UUD 1945, Gerindra Ingin Naskah
Historis Dikembalikan.” Gerindra, May 30, 2012. http://partaigerindra.or.id/2012/05/30/amandemen-
uud-1945-gerindra-ingin-naskah-historis-dikembalikan.html; “Kembali ke UUD 1945 Yang Asli, Jadikan
Pribumi Tuan di Negerinya Sendiri.” Era Muslim, April 18, 2016.
https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/kembali-ke-uud-1945-yang-asli-jadikan-pribumi-tuan-di-
negerinya-sendiri.htm
186


157
“Kembali ke Pancasila & UUD 1945 Asli. Solusi untuk Indonesia.” Change.org, Accessed February 8,
2018. https://www.change.org/p/mpr-kembali-ke-pancasila-uud-1945-asli-solusi-untuk-indonesia
158
“Pengakuan Mengejutkan Tersangka Makar Ratna Sarumpaet Soal Gerakan Selamatkan NKRI.”
Youtube, minutes: 5:52. accessed March 1, 2017
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8AtIo_jIdI: see also “Kembali ke UUD 1945 Yang Asli Adalah
Salah Satu Penyelamatan NKRI.” Era Muslim, December 15, 2015.
https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/kembali-ke-uud-1945-yang-asli-adalah-salah-satu-
penyelamatan-nkri.htm#.WGoLlyN97LE
159
Kate Lamb, “Indonesia police arrest eight for treason before Jakarta Muslim protest.” Guardian,
December 2, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/02/indonesia-police-arrest-eight-
people-before-anti-ahok-jakarta-protest: Martahan Sohutoron, “Polri Konfirmasi 10 Nama Tokoh
Terduga Pelaku Makar.” CNN Indonesia, December 2, 2016.
http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20161202114245-12-176823/polri-konfirmasi-10-nama-tokoh-
terduga-pelaku-makar/; Alifurrahman, “Aksi 212 Damai Karena 10 Orang Pelaku Makar dan Penghina
Presiden Ditangkap.” Seword, accessed February 8, 2018. https://seword.com/umum/aksi-212-damai-
karena-10-orang-pelaku-makar-dan-penghina-presiden-ditangkap/
160
Nanda Perdana Putra, “Kapolri: Pelaku Makar Bukan dari GNPF MUI.” Liputan6, November 27,
2016. http://news.liputan6.com/read/2662999/kapolri-pelaku-makar-bukan-dari-gnpf-mui

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