EME n (1) pp.

27-44 Intellect Limited 2012

Explorations in Media Ecology

Volume 11 Number 1
© 2012lntellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: lO.l386/eme.ll.l.27 _1

ROBERT MEJIA
State University of New York, The College at Brockport

Posthuman~ postrights?

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Project LifeLike refers to the efforts to create a 'realistic avatar supported by an artificial intelligence
intelligent engine capable of online learning'. In essence, this means the encoding technology
of the intelligence of presently living individuals in order to preserve the persons' ontology
epistemological structures beyond their ontological death. To do this, the team must epistemology
distil those 'humanistic' elements that are deemed essential to the human experi- human rights
ence, and thus this process reconfigures the very concept of the original itself Hence, posthuman
I argue that Project LifeLike constitutes an epistemological cooptation of the onto-
logical project of life, whereby the technological apparatus of the body is effaced in
favour of the epistemic projections of the mind.

'Where is God gone?' [The Madman] called out. 'I mean to tell you!
We have killed him, -you and I! We are all his murderers! [... ] God
is dead! God remains Dead! And we have killed him! How shall we
console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? [... ] Is not the
magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to
become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?'
· (Nietzsche 1924: 167-68, original emphasis)

Technique integrates the machine into society. It constructs the kind of

world the machine needs [... ] Man is not adapted to a world of steel;
technique adapts him to it. [... ] [W]hen technique enters into every
area of life, including the human, it ceases to be external to man and
becomes his very substance.
(Ellul1964: 5-6)

27
Robert Mejia

Have you ever wished you could be in two places at once? Perhaps
you've had the desire to create a copy of yourself that could stand in
for you at a meeting, freeing you up to work on more pressing matters.
Thanks to a research project called LifeLike, that fantasy might be a
little closer to reality.
(Cruikshank 2009)

In 2007, the Intelligent Systems Laboratory (ISL) at the University of Central

Florida (UCF) and the Electronic Visualization Laboratory (EVL) at the
University of illinois at Chicago (UIC) began collaboration on the joint project
'Project LifeLike'. Conceived with the objective of creating a 'realistic avatar
supported by an intelligent engine capable of online learning, three techno-
logical problems, of what can properly be thought of as ontological concerns,
lie at its centre: the creation of 'a life-like embodiment of a particular person';
the capability of this 'LifeLike' entity for non-verbal communication; and 'a
knowledge-driven backend that can respond intelligently to questions and
learn through its interactions' (DeMara et al. 2008: 3). I mark these technolog-
ical problems as ontological concerns in that in its effort to create a 'LifeLike'
entity Project LifeLike must first go about answering the question of what
constitutes Life. This is because, as Jean Baudrillard (1994) notes, the possi-
bility of the copy forces us to rethink the primacy of the original. In other
words, the Project LifeLike team must distil those 'humanistic' elements
that are deemed essential to the human experience as a means of creating a
'LifeLike' entity, and in doing so this process of distillation reconfigures the
very concept of the human itself. Considering the magnitude of such a project,
and the possibilities for its ontological reconfiguration of the human itself, it
remains a glaring omission that an ethical fourth pillar is absent amongst the
other three technological concerns.
This absence of a space for ethical discussion is even more pronounced
when we contrast Project LifeLike's relative silence with that of the polemic
intensity regarding other forms of ontological tinkering. Practices as diverse
as birth control, abortion, stem cell research, cosmetic surgery, synthetic
hormone production, and others, have created, and continue to create, signif-
icant fissures in our society. Positioned at the centre of these debates can
be found the question of Human perfectability: the tension between being
rotten with imperfection or rotten with perfection (Hyde 2009). Michael Hyde
suggests that humanists typically embrace the imperfectability of the human
as a sign of its sanctity, whereas the posthumanists argue that the telos of
perfectability is in fact all too human.
Significant as this debate is, it perhaps continues to occupy our cultural
attention to the extent that it retains the site of the body as its centre of analy-
sis. In other words, the biotechnology debate is about the proper functioning
and contents of a given space that we call 'body. For instance, prominent
posthumanist Ray Kurzweil (2005: 374) argues:

[T]o me being human means being part of a civilization that seeks to

extend its boundaries. We are already reaching beyond our biology by
rapidly gaining the tools to reprogram and augment it. If we regard a
human modified with technology as no longer human, where would we
draw the defining line? Is a human with a bionic heart still human? [ ... ]
Should we establish a boundary at 650 million nanobots: under that,
you're still human and over that, you're posthuman?

28
 Posthuman, postrights?

While seemingly an argument regarding the artificiality of the body, and

hence its insignificance, earlier Kurzweil (2005: 199) is clear that the post-
human subject 'will need a body, since so much of our thinking is directed
toward physical needs and desires'. My contention with the parameters of this
debate is not that we ought to move beyond the body per se, but rather that
such a conceptualization of the body as always already a thing a priori limits
the biotechnology debate to one of instrumentalism. In essence, the coher-
ence of the body, whether of an imperfect biological one or that of a perfect
mechanical one, carries with it the notion that our body is merely a sensorium
for the brain: the brain must function within the limits of its imperfect body
(humanists) or the brain must overcome those limits and come to occupy a
more perfect body (posthumanists). In both regards, the immutability of the
thinking brain remains unquestioned (see Hyde 2009).
That Project LifeLike has escaped ethical debate or consideration suggests
that our cultural anxiety regarding the posthuman is saturated with the
philosophical legacy of the mind/body distinction. We are concerned with
biotechnological developments precisely because we believe that such tech-
nological tinkering of the body will negatively affect the brain's ability to
function properly, and we are optimistic about biotechnological develop-
ments precisely because we believe that such technological supplements will
allow for the brain to reach its true potential. Project LifeLike, on the other
hand, is perhaps immune to these debates because the totality of the body is
subsumed within the logic of the brain (see DeMara et al. 2008). Operating
solely within a virtual environment, Project LifeLike is deemed just that,
LifeLike, and hence is understood as possessing no ontological threat to the
general populace: no bodies are being manipulated, and thus no minds are
being damaged. However, my contention is that it is precisely because Project
LifeLike lacks a body that we perhaps ought to be as concerned, if not more,
regarding this form of ontological tinkering, than those that have received
more mainstream attention. As Marshall McLuhan (1994) warned us so many
years ago, narcissism is narcosis, numbness, and if we remain enthraled by
the prospect of creating synthetic life in our own image then it is only because
we fail to recognize the symptoms of our political economic condition, which
make such technological extensions of the self desirable.
Project LifeLike would seem to have circumvented such debates by identi-
fyingitself as an epistemological project: that of the preservation of knowledge.
To the extent that the simulacrum, or copy, produced by Project LifeLike is
an epistemological thing, then ethical consideration is kept at bay. However,
in understanding the body as a technology, the epistemological front of
Project LifeLike must give way to an ontological investigation. This is because
technologies are not mere instruments that access an a priori truth; rather,
technologies reveal a particular relationship between various possibilities of
knowledge (Heidegger 1977). As such, I argue that Project LifeLike consti-
tutes an attempt at the epistemological cooptation of the ontological project
of life, whereby the technological apparatus of the body is effaced in favour
of the epistemic projections of the mind. To the extent that Project LifeLike is
successful in its aim, this reconfi.guration of the human carries with it signifi-
cant ethical concerns for the following three areas: (1) the reification of the
mind/body dichotomy; (2) the political economy of intellectual labour; and (3)
the concept of human rights itself. To properly articulate the ethical implica-
tions of such a project, it is necessary to structure this analysis as follows: first,
I must provide a more detailed discussion of the internal workings of Project
Robert Mejia

LifeLike; second, I must situate Project LifeLike within a larger rhetoric of

Modernism; third, I will explore its ethical implications across the three areas
mentioned above; and, fourth, in the final section of this article, I conclude by
calling for the implementation of what I term an ontological bill of rights as a
means of shoring up what I believe to be the increasingly antiquated founda-
tion of contemporary rights, that of the human.

PROJECT LIFELIKE
As a joint collaboration between the ISL and the EVL, Project LifeLike is a
National Science Foundation-supported program tasked with the creation of
a 'realistic avatar supported by an intelligent engine capable of online learn-
ing' (DeMara et al. 2008: 3). So that they might fulfil this objective, the Project
LifeLike team began first with the mission to 'create interactive computer
generated representations of individuals to preserve their knowledge' (EVL
2008). This marks a contemporary approach to artificial intelligence design
that differs significantly from conventional models.
Conventional techniques for producing artificial intelligence have built
their foundation on rudimentary systems of feedback loops (Wiener 1954).
These basic systems operate on a relatively rigid logical schema: if no stimu-
lus, then follow a prescripted basal state; if stimulus A, then output B. Even
systems that undergo a rapid flow of stimulus from multiple input mecha-
nisms, such as anti-aircraft weaponry, can function on this basic principle of
feedback loops (Wiener 1954). Indeed, video games, which arguably oper-
ate as a testing ground for the public acceptance of artificial intelligence (e.g.
do the characters behave in a 'LifeLike' fashion; Halter 2006) operate within
this simple model of feedback loops (Manovich 2001; Miklaucic 2004). Due
to their crude design, conventional models of artificial intelligence must rely
upon a restrictive approach to an appropriate response; in other words, these
systems attempt to constrain the possible types and combinations of stimu-
lus that a system can receive in order to offer a limited selection of intelligent
responses. Within a relatively controlled environment, where the stimulus
and responses can be reasonably known in advance (such as in air combat
or a video game world), these systems of artificial intelligence are capable of
functioning adequately. However, when operating outside of these controllecJI
environments, or when those environments breal<: down, this model of artifi-
cial intelligence remains unable to cope - as anyone who has 'exploited' the
artificial intelligence of a video game can attest.
Project LifeLike differs from these previous models of artificial intelligence
in that it utilizes an emergent schema. While this method does not neces-
sarily entail an abandonment of the feedback loop process, it offers a more
complicated arrangement of artificial intelligence components as a means
of simulating generative thought. This is done by creating a multi-layered
synthetic artificial organism. As mentioned, conventional systems of artificial
intelligence operated as a relatively monolithic entity governed by inputs and
outputs; everything worked in perfect harmony, as in a mechanical sort of
logic (e.g. if A, then B; if C, then D; ifB and D, then G). However, in seeking to
create a synthetic organism, Project LifeLike offers a 'biological' arrangement
of output production in so far as it places various artificial intelligence systems
within contention: 'Speech Recognizer' (SR), 'Dialog Manager' (D11), 'Speech
Generation module' and 'Lifelike Responsive Avatar Framework' (DeMara
et al. 2008: 5-8). These are not delegations of task, as in the relationship

<O
 Posthuman, postrights?

between a keyboard monitor (input mechanism) and a central processing

unit (processing mechanism), but rather these various systems contain their
own subset of logical structures and are meant to carry out their own particu-
lar tasks. In essence, the functioning of Project LifeLike is not located within
a centralized clearing house of artificial intelligence, but spread throughout
the system; and each domain, while working towards the sustenance of the
whole (i.e., that of a LifeLike system), carries on its own essential function,
which may not necessarily correspond with the essential functioning of the
other domains. To enable these systems to communicate, the Project LifeLike
developers utilize a hand-shaking protocol - as is standard practice when
dealing with separate programs in information and communication technol-
ogy design -to 'enforce synchronization constraints between threads [i.e.,
processes]' (DeMara et al. 2008: 5).
It is this presence of a hand-shaking protocol that creates an internal hier-
archy within the system. As stated earlier, each domain functions as a rela-
tively autonomous logical system. For instance, the SR system consists of
a 'Speech Recognizer Control (SRC), Speech Recognizer Engine (SRE) and
Smart Layers [i.e., learned speech patterns]' (DeMara et al. 2008: 5). These
various elements work together within the SR system to intelligently recog-
nize interpersonal engagement (DeMara et al. 2008). This system is innovative
in that it can learn:

[G]rammars are generated semi-automatically from a relational

database that facilitates dialog development, maintenance, and port-
ability. [ ... ] New speech information regarding the project can be
added automatically the next time the SR module starts by invoking
transfer of database content into grammars automatically by using a
set of rewriting rules. [... ] The long-term objective, which has been
partially met in the current prototype, is to generate new grammars
for speech recognition as necessary without needing to compose all
grammars and their variations manually.
(DeMara et al. 2008: 6)

Yet, while the SR system is capable of intelligence, its functioning is rendered

mute to the user, as the SR is subordinated to the D M (DeMar a et al. 2008). The /
SR might exist at the point of experience, and hence interpretation, but it is the
DM that has the final word in determining 'the context, decide[ing] how to react
to contextual shifts, and coordinate the communication between the subsystems
accordingly (DeMara et al. 2008: 6). In essence, the ontological experience of
the SR program is put into service of the epistemological interpretation of the
DM; the body (SR) becomes a mere instrument for the mind (DM). Therefore,
though the use of a hand-shaking protocol is standard practice when dealing
with conventional computer software and hardware design, when applied to a
model of human intelligence an internal hierarchy is produced wherein onto-
logical experience is naturalized as subordinate to epistemological knowledge.

MODERNISM
The subordination of the ontology of the body to the epistemology of the
mind is a legacy that transcends the work of Project Lifelike. This dichotomy
is embedded within the cultural legacy of the West: both science and theology.
Frequently positioned as antithetical poles within the western cultural milieu,

31
Robert Mejia

science and theology remain in conflict not because of their differences neces-
sarily, but rather because of their similarities. This is because were science and
theology to conflict solely due to differences, then there would be no point of
contention: to each their own. Instead, the conflict stems from science and
theology's disdain for the ontological and equal investment in the pursuit of
the epistemological; they conflict because they share the same concerns and
objects of study. Yet, their differences do matter, and as such it is necessary
to trace the history of the mind/body dichotomy in order to better understand
the implications of its modem expression.
Science and theology share a basic fundamental premise of an episte-
mological scepticism of the ontological experiential. The establishment of
this principle can be found in each of their respective foundational texts:
the Christian Bible and the philosophy of Plato - at this point in history,
philosophy and science had not yet split as distinct entities. Both Plato and
The Bible spoke of a metaphysical world beyond the ontological reaches of
our experiential reality. Our flesh functioned as a temporary container for
the immutability of the transcendent soul (The Bible, Matthew: 10: 28; Plato
1995b). For both traditions, the body was something that had to be overcome
in order to reach the realm of the truth (The Bible, Mark: 14: 38; Plato 1995b).
Scepticism played a central role in this process of overcoming the flesh, as one
needed to always be sure that their experiential senses did not betray them.
Differences in practice did exist, as Plato's philosophy advocated dialogue and
debate, whereas the Christian Bible encouraged intimacy with the word, but
both were concerned with placing an epistemological barrier between the
mind and the potential frailty of the body.
While tensions would exist between philosophy and Christianity, their
mutual agreement in terms of the mind/body dichotomy would lead to several
centuries of relatively peaceful coexistence. Indeed, Christian intellectu-
als, such as Augustine (354-430) and Aquinas (1225-1274) studied classical
philosophy as a means of arguing for the logical basis of their faith (Bizzell
and Herzberg 2001; Smith 1998). And while tensions would appear, such as
in the case of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), such critiques were typically
centred on the problem of not properly evoking the metaphysical as a means
of controlling the populace (see Machiavelli 1950). It would not be until after
the period of the Enlightenment, with its subsequent fracturing of philosophy
and science, that a sustained period of strife between theology and science
would emerge: we call this period Modernism. \
But before we get to Modernism, we must first deal with the Enlightenment,
as it is here that we witness the first successful, crippling blow by philosophy
upon theology. The blow had been thrown unintentionally, but it was thrown
nevertheless. As Friedrich Nietzsche's Madman would later state:

'I come too early,' he then said, 'I am not yet at the right time. This
prodigious event is still on its way, and is traveling, - it has not yet
reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the
stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they are done, to be seen
and heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the furthest star, -
and yet they have done it!'
(Nietzsche 1924: 168-69, original emphasis)

The fatal blow was thrown from the unlikeliest of individuals, Rene Descartes
(1596-1650). Descartes (1995b) was a devout Catholic and it had not been
 Posthuman, postrights?

his intention to shatter the foundations of Christianity. Yet, he embraced the

philosophical and theological antagonism of the flesh, and introduced an
even more radical notion of doubt than had existed previously. Whereas Plato
(1995a) had believed the world to be that of illusions, capable of tricking the
frailty of the senses, he never doubted the ontology of the body (Plato 1995b).
Likewise, Christianity believed the flesh to be frail and susceptible to sin (The
Bible, Mark: 14: 38), but it never questioned the ontological validity of bodily
experiences (The Bible, Luke 24: 39). Descartes, however, extends this legacy
of doubt to question even the existence of his body. Using the phenomenon of
sleep as an analytic, Descartes (1995a) comes to the conclusion that it is possi-
ble to imagine an existence without a body, but he cannot imagine an exist-
ence without first thinking of the possibility of non-existence, and therefore
all that is left is the doubting mind. It is within this manoeuvre that Descartes
inadvertently initiates a critical blow against western theology because his
philosophy of radical scepticism moves the proof of existence from the exterior
realm of God to the interiority of the mind. Even the scepticism of Plato (1995a)
still held onto the trace of the soul as allowing for the possibility of seeing the
refraction of God in the corruption that is existence; but for Descartes (1995b:
275), such thinking is forever foreclosed as one cannot be sure that such refrac-
tions emanate not from God, but rather 'some malignant genius'.
Philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant (1998), attempted to rectify
the damage done to the metaphysical realm, but by then it was too late.
Rationalists had brought about the demise of God by rendering him impo-
tent: all experience is corrupt, and faith in anything other than the mind is a
liability. Empiricists would further this death of the metaphysical by reconfig-
uring the body as an instrument par excellence: if it cannot be measured, it
does not exist. While it would seem as though this philosophical assault on
western theology would bring about the absolute destruction of the meta-
physical, consciousness does not operate in this regard. Rather, as Nietzsche
(1924, 2003) noted, the death of one metaphysical system requires the birth
of another. This is because consciousness is a merger of both the experiential
and the metaphysical (Heidegger 1977). But what the Enlightenment era did
was to create a vacancy for the position of Creator; with God dead, someone
would need to take his place. That someone would be the scientist, and he
would name his dominion Modernism.

All MIND/NO BODY DICHOTOMY

The first task of Modernism is to create more perfect instruments of measure-
ment. Data must be properly collected and organized to ensure an adequate
understanding of the world. The scientist believes that the creation of more
precise instruments of measure will allow for a more perfect grasp of real-
ity. However, this instrumentalist conceptualization of technological appa-
ratuses of measurement fails to account for the ontological reconfiguration
that occurs due to technological intervention. As Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels (2001) note, machinery amplified and extended the reach of political
economic exploitation. And this exploitation is insidious not merely because
it results in servitude, but rather because the experience of political economic
alienation results in the dehumanization of the worker: the ontological form
of the human is transformed so that consciousness is stunted, because the
worker is denied an engagement with the metaphysical (i.e. social) and
must operate solely within the physical (i.e. primal needs, such as hunger)

33
Robert Mejia

(Marx and Engels 1988). As significant as Marx and Engels critique was, and
still is, they could not have imagined the technological possibilities of our era.
Project LifeLike represents a technological reality whereby the ontological is
left no quarter from the tyranny of the epistemological. The ethical implica-
tions of such a potential reality are explored within this section.
Conceived as an instrument, the body itself is now in danger of becoming
obsolete. Previous technological apparatuses were centred on the amplifica-
tion of the instrumental capabilities of the body: hearing aids, glasses and cars
for the creation of a more perfect worker; hydraulic presses, conveyer belts
and robotic manufacturing for the creation of a more perfect factory. In the
first class of technology, the gadgets allow for every ounce of labour to be
exploited from the labourer; in the second class of technology, the machinery
allows for the displacement of the inferior body for a more capable machine.
This is not meant to deny the potentially liberating possibilities of techno-
logical development, as I for one am hesitant to give up my own glasses, but
rather to suggest that these instruments carry the possibilities for exploitation,
as evidenced by the fact that I perhaps wear glasses from years of overusing
my own biological eyes. Regardless, classical technology still operated under
the assumption of the ontological necessity of the body - whether the body
existed in a mechanical or biological fashion, some 'thing' was still needed to
interact with the physical world. However, Project LifeLike marks the possibil-
ity of a metaphysical transference from the physical to the ephemeral, digital.
It is doubtful, at this point in time, to imagine a reality whereby such a
transference could ever completely manifest itself. However, it is possible to
imagine that a significant amount of the political economic elite would be
interested in the immortality offered by such an opportunity. This interest can
be assumed based on the salience within which cryonics (the extreme freezing
of dead bodies in the hope of future resuscitation) has become an acceptable
part of our popular consciousness; even though many of us may still exhibit
a knee-jerk reaction against this practice, this apprehension seems to exude
an air of strangeness, rather than moral outrage (for instance, no one seems
troubled by the suggestion that Walt Disney was cryogenically frozen). Where
Project LifeLike differs is that cryonics is still bound to the ontology of the
flesh: the flesh operates within its own rationale for existence, and as of yet
researchers are unable to coax it from the comforts of death for another take
at the hardships of life. However, in conceptualizing the body as a technol-
ogy, Project LifeLike is liberated from the mind/body dichotomy in so far as it
constructs an all mind, no body reality.
This all mind, no body erasure of ontology is allowed qecause of the
primacy of the DM. The DM, at the centre of the Project LifeLike experience,
allows for rationality and empiricism to be joined in a perfect epistemologi-
cal union that bypasses the ontology of the body. This fusing together of two
seemingly divergent philosophical schools is able to manifest because the
DM represents the dialectical collapse of the mind (rationality) and empiri-
cal (instrumental body) into each other; the DM is both perfect instrument
and perfect calculating machine. The DM is the perfect instrument because
its input mechanisms can easily be updated to accommodate the latest
advancements in data gathering: for instance, its SR system currently consists
of publicly available parts, but this can presumably be upgraded once the
prototype stage is completed (see DeMara et al. 2008). The DM is a perfect
calculating machine because it presumably possesses no emotional attach-
ment to its instrumental body- they are merely parts. In essence, the primacy
 Posthuman, postrights?

of the DM reconfigures Project LifeLike as a data processing entity. Hence,

the DM constitutes a particular crystallization of reality, whereby perfect
instruments are uniformly manufactured to cement a specific relationship
between the empirical and the rational.
In its approximation of Life as a data processing entity, and its deployment
of perfectible instruments of measurement, Project LifeLike presents two
threats to the ontological possibilities of what it means to be human. First,
Project LifeLike represents the technological possibilities whereby human-
ity can recreate humanity in its own image. Descartes' fatal blow, of which
Nietzsche's Madman spoke, has finally reached its destination. The rationality
of the declarative statement, 'ergo sum, ego existo', ever so dependent upon
the thinking I that stands before the statement (see Descartes 1995a: 226-27),
has come to its ultimate conclusion: 'I am all that exists'; the world made over
in the image of him who would utter such a statement. And this is precisely the
danger. For the technological danger of Project LifeLike is that it constitutes
the possibility of so uniformly arranging the experiential world according to a
specific epistemological imagining within the body of a merely instrumental
thing that we have foreclosed the possibility of any form of being otherwise,
what Martin Heidegger (1977: 27) calls 'enfrarning'. This moment of enfram-
ing transforms the totality of the world into a standing-reserve, whereby Life
ceases to become life, and instead is reconfigured into a potential source of
energy (or information) for the technological apparatus (Heidegger 1977).
Humanity, in having sought to author its own creation, ends up producing the
mechanisms for its own ontological erasure; for if the technological extension
of the self is always brought about in response to the inability for the body to
cope with the conditions of contemporary existence, and if the development
of this technological supplement results in the necessary 'amputation' of this
function from the body (McLuhan 1994: 42), then what are we to make of a
technology that promises us a copy of our self?
That said, whereas the first threat of enframing and standing-reserve speak
to the totality of existence as such, it obscures the inequitable distribution of
exploitation amongst society. As Jacques Ellul (1964) argues, the conceptuali-
zation of technology as an instrumental thing is aided by the abstraction of
the point of application from technology to women to that of technology to
woman. That technology is an analysis of woman rather than women obscures
the ontological existence of those subjects under investigation; in other words,
technological abstraction constitutes one of many moments whereby the lived
experience of the subject is effaced in favour of the epistemological sustenance
of a thing - standing-reserve. But whereas Heidegger (1977) speaks to the
uniformity of the transformation of humanity into a standing-reserve, Ellul \
is more nuanced in his analysis precisely because he refuses to speak with
the same linguistic detachment as the scientist. In other words, Heidegger
seeks to redeploy the language of the oppressor as a means of understanding
its effects, whereas Ellul uses the readily available language of the oppressed
as a means of exposing the negative effects of oppression. And even when
Ellul does invoke the language of the oppressor, he is painstakingly analytical
in his deconstruction of the politics behind such language. This attention to
language is of extreme significance because the difference between the use of
man (Heidegger) and men (Ellul) is the difference between epistemology and
ontology- and it is this uncritical usage of man by Heidegger that allows for
the tyranny of epistemology to sneak into his otherwise brilliant critique of
technology, as Ellul (1964: 387-88) notes:

35
Robert Mejia

The technical phenomenon is impersonal, and in following its course

we have found that it is directed toward man. Investigating its preferred
loci, we find man himself. This man is not the man in the mirror. Nor
is he the man next door or the man in the street. Proceeding at its own
tempo, technique analyzes its object so that it can reconstitute them;
in the case of man, it has analyzed him and synthesized a hitherto
unknown being.

But this concept of man is an epistemological front precisely because it

obscures the fact that its object is not an abstraction, but rather a lived being:

The ideal Man is an escapism which eases every kind of enormity with
tranquilizing abstractions. We should remember what the Nazis did
with respect to this ideal in their extermination camps (which destroyed
some millions of unimportant specimens). We ought to avoid the same
mistake with respect to this all virtuous ideal in the universal concentra-
tion camp we live in. What is important is not the adaptability of Man,
but the adaptability of men. We shall find the answer, not in the immor-
tal soul of the Species, but in the preservation of our own souls, which
are, perhaps, not immortal.
(Ellul1964: 397-98)

So when we speak to the ontological threat of Project LifeLil<e, we ought to

understand that some bodies will suffer more than others: women, people of
colour, people with disabilities and others whose ontological existence places
them too far towards the body side of the mind/body dichotomy.
That Project LifeLil<e constitutes the potentiality for an extreme reification
of the mind/body dichotomy towards that of an all mind/no body existence
should give pause to those who would embrace the cybernetic posthuman
future. As Judy Wajcman (2010: 148) notes, while Cyberfeminists such as
Sadie Plant and Donna Haraway are correct in challenging the patriarchi-
cal claim to legitimacy regarding all things technological, their work exhibits
an 'uncritical acceptance of everything digital'. While Wajcman is correct in
cautioning us against this uncritical acceptance, I would extend her argument
further by suggesting that we ought to be especially concerned with any tech-
nological future that threatens to efface the space of the body. While such
technological futures may be presented as possessing the ability to liberate us
from ontological limitations of the body, 'have you ever wished you could be
in two places at once?' (Cruikshank 2009), this conceptualization of the body
along instrumental lines constitutes an epistemological attack on the onto-
logical legitimacy of those whose very body comprises the essence of their life.
This is not to suggest that some individuals possess more body than others,
and that others are more mind, but rather that within every epistemology is a
subject position hidden behind the guise of objectivity (McLuhan 1994) - and
should we allow for the effacement of our body in place of the epistemological
future of Project LifeLil<e, then we are sacrificing our ontological legitimacy
for that of another. And to extend Ellul (1964), humanity may survive this
ontological transference, but perhaps not the men, women, people of colour,
people with disabilities and others who lack the proper claim to universality;
hence, in their specificity and deviation from the 'norm', these others must be
erased as their very presence constitutes a threat to the epistemological future
of an all mind, no body existence.
 Posthuman, postrights?

THE AUTOMATION OF INTELlECTUAl lABOUR

The second task of Modernism is to create the necessary substructures for
the sustenance of modern life. Colonialism, explicit slavery, and other forms
of exploitative labour functioned as the inhuman substructures of emerg-
ing modernity. And indeed, many of these practices exist in rearticulated
forms in our contemporary society: postcolonial policies, 'invisible' slavery
(i.e. slavery that occurs in spaces beyond the western public's conscious-
ness) and sweatshop labour. Up until now, the extraction of use-value from
the body was sufficient for the aims of modernity. However, as we continue
to advance, intellectual labour is becoming increasingly important. This
represents a dilemma, as the extraction of use-value from intellectual labour
is a tenuous process. For one, the nurturance of intellectual labour consti-
tutes a significant investment of political economic resources. For another,
intellectuals are typically conscious of the value of their labour, and hence
are more difficult to exploit than that of conventional labourers. This is not
always the case, and our current economic downturn suggests that intellec-
tual labour is not always so robust, but barring significant political economic
crisis intellectual labour has typically fared better than physical labour in
resisting exploitative practices. Indeed, it would seem that the current polit-
ical economic strategy for extracting the maximum amount of use-value at
the lowest cost is for the West to exploit postcolonial relations in China,
India and Brazil. However, as these countries grow in strength and gain
the political power to throw off the yoke of its colonized legacies, China,
India and Brazil are becoming increasingly untenable markets for western
exploitation.
Not surprisingly, it is at this moment in history, when global power
dynamics are shifting, that Project LifeLike is initiated. This is not to suggest
that the intellectuals working on the project are conspiring against humanity
(as I am certain they are not), but rather that the possibility of artificial intelli-
gence (and worlds) has been of significant interest to the US government and
its respective scientific granting agencies since World War II, and especially
the mid-1960s (Halter 2006; National Defense Industrial Association 2009).
And even while I am certain that the researchers working on Project LifeLike
possess nothing but the most altruistic of intents, the project cannot help but
be constructed according to the political economic pressure exerted by the
funding agencies. In other words, Project LifeLike is not a neutral technology
that can be used for liberating purposes or exploitative purposes, but rather
those political possibilities are already being encoded within the structures
of the technology itself. As the researchers themselves acknowledge, Project
LifeLike represents the possibility for a new age of disciplinary training, one
that is highly compatible with military interests:

[Project LifeLike] can also remember each user and its interaction
with the user as episodic knowledge. A future version will incorporate
the ability to access user historical information to recall conversations
of users involved in the I/UCRC [Industry/University Cooperative
Research Center] program who have exchanged communications
with the AlexAvatar. This can enable new levels of automated After-
Action Review trainee recall capabilities within the military training
process.
(DeMara et al. 2008: 4)

37
Robert Mejia

Here, Project LifeLike represents not merely the move towards an educational
supplement, which has been happening for years withe-learning programs,
but rather a complete erasure of the human instructor as such. This in itself
carries with it worrisome consequences regarding a manifestation of an all
mind, no body technological paradigm. But this bodily erasure is perhaps
even more insidious when connected with our political economic concerns, as
Project LifeLike marks the possibility for a new era of intellectual exploitation.
Project LifeLike functions as a new era of intellectual exploitation on two
interconnected fronts: intellectual acceleration and bodily liberation. In order
to understand these concepts, it must be reiterated that the ontological forma-
tion of the LifeLike avatar is itself an epistemological projection. This lack of
an intrinsic body circumvents the various ways of knowing that come with a
conventional consciousness. For instance, if we believe that our conscious-
ness forms at the threshold of the physical and metaphysical, where our body
and mind meet as equal partners in life (Heidegger 1977), then my fingers,
which press upon this keyboard in the writing of this very sentence, contrib-
ute to the essence of it as such, just as much as my thinking mind, the word
documentation program, and the paper that it will inevitably be printed
out upon, will have an influence on its meaning - those are all constitutive
moments in this sentences moment of revealing. However, whereas my body
is intimately linked to my being, the ontological reconfiguration of the input
mechanisms (e.g. SR) of Project LifeLike matter little to the epistemological
reality of the Data Manager. Or s,ather, the input mechanisms matter signifi-
cantly, but because its body has been conceptualized as a perfect instrument,
the Data Manager can place the knowingness of the body in servitude of the
absolute knowingness of the mind: the Cartesian principle of doubt is elim-
inated from the calculations of the machine, thereby ridding the rationalist
safeguard against tyranny. Since the Cartesian consciousness was grounded
within the principle of a fallible body, the consciousness was humbled with
the knowledge that its ability to speak of the particular remained limited: it
could only speak of abstractions. While this intellectual safeguard of uncer-
tainty remained rather feeble, it did slow the process of enfrarning. This is
because as long as an inkling of doubt existed, there remained the possibil-
ity for thinking of an ontological otherwise: 'Enfrarning cannot exhaust itself
solely in blocking all lighting up of every revealing, all appearing of truth'
(Heidegger 1977: 28). However, with the possibility of instrumental certitude,
the process of enfrarning is liberated from the site of the doubtful body, and
can therefore be accelerated.
Because Project LifeLike offers the possibility for accelerated intel-
lectual labour and intellectual certitude (liberated as it is from the body),
intellectual exploitation is a necessary result of the project's realization. This is
because, since the LifeLike avatar can conceivably do intellectual labour faster
and better than its biological equivalent, the avatar makes for a more perfect
worker. But were this to be my stopping point, then my contention would be
open to critique, as there would be little to separate this technological devel-
opment from those that have already displaced physical labour. And while
I do not mean to suggest that this displacement is in any way worse than
that experienced by physical labourers, I do mean to suggest that there exists
something truly insidious about the intellectual labour exploitation offered
in the possibility of Project LifeLike: that of the enslaved doppelganger. This
possibility for the creation of a synthetic self/non-self carries with it significant
political economic implications for labour, both physical and intellectual.
 Posthuman, postrights?

As mentioned earlier, the synthetic intelligence offered by Project

LifeLike differs from the restrictive approach of conventional artificial
intelligence; Project LifeLike instead aims to replicate the epistemological
structures of specific people (Cruikshank 2009; DeMara et al. 2008). In order
to make such preservation possible, two methods are possible: first, engage
in a currently strenuous process of intellectual encoding, whereby the intel-
lectual would share his knowledge with the Data Manager in order for it to
compile a person-specific profile; second, exploit the data mining capabilities
of the Internet, such as social networking sites (Jones 2009). As Marx and
Engels (2001) noted with the introduction of industrialization, so too does this
advancement in computer technology extend the reach of political economic
exploitation. First, the possibilities of an intellectual doppelganger mean that
the intellectual must assist in the process of their own demise. This is because
the intellectual must first assist in the process of uploading their intellectual
architecture, and then, upon completion, their doppelganger is constituted
as a more capable worker. In essence, let us say one year of uploading your
intellectual labour, for an eternity of unemployment at the hands of your
doppelganger. Second, since it has been suggested that the exploitation of
social networking sites represents a more ~able alternative to the creation
of intellectual personalities (Jones 2009), then even in their leisure time, all
workers are subject to exploitation. Obviously, this last point is not necessarily
new, as data mining existed before Project LifeLike's inception, but the possi-
bility of putting people out of work due to the exploitation of leisure activities
seems to me to be particularly insidious.
In sum, the creation of an intellectual doppelganger presents a future
whereby the automation of intellectual labour will possibly be as normal as
the physical automation provided by the dryer or washing machine. Some will
surely enjoy such benefits, as some of us do currently enjoy the automation of
physical labour, but this further automation as offered by technology consti-
tutes but one more moment whereby we sacrifice the future of our human~
ity to the present (Nietzsche 2003), thereby creating an enclosed world that
exists only for itself (Ellul 1964), for when perfect instruments exist alongside
perfect minds, why bother with the imperfection that exists on the outside. So
it is that in a society saturated with constant demands for one's attention, we
misdiagnose the condition, and inadvertently 'autoamputate' ourselves from
society by producing the very thing that makes us obsolete: another self to live
on our behalf (see McLuhan 1994: 42).

NO HUMAN, NO RIGHTS
This section is dedicated most specifically to those who have never had, or
only feebly hold, some claim to humanness. As argued above, the project of
modernity represents a historical fissure in the metaphysical realm. This was
the moment whereby the death of God created a vacancy in creation. With
theology crippled, and incapable of offering a viable epistemological defense
against science, the Scientist stole the mantle of creator from the body of God.
Hence, Modernism also marks the moment of a radical reconfiguration of
the ontology of the human. This is not the first moment of such a recon-
figuration, but it is perhaps the first without God and hence carries forth its
most significant implications. Romanticism, as represented by such figures
as Mary Shelley, was perhaps amongst the first to express anxiety regarding
the ethical implications of Modernism. But whereas Mary Shelley's figure of

39
Robert Mejia

Frankenstein's Monster existed as an ontological excess, and hence was meant

to garner sympathy within its readership, the Doppelganger of the computer
age seems to carry with it no such sympathy. Lacking a body may make for
superior calculations, but, in this lack, no point of ontological identification
can be made. But just as consciousness does not exist merely in the mind, so
too is it not solely a thing of the flesh; rather, Being emerges at that ontologi-
cal point of merger between the physical and the metaphysical. To the extent
that we are now capable of creating sentient entities, we ought to explore the
ethical implications of treating them as metaphysical waste.
This notion of metaphysical waste is extremely important to our discussion
of the ethical treatment of artificial consciousness, because unlike God we do not
possess the luxury of getting it right the first time. By this, I mean, our histori-
cal understanding of the human is incapable of determining at which moment
consciousness emerged; in other words, to be human is to possess a conscious-
ness a priori. However, artificial intelligence is denied this possibility in advance,
and rather consciousness must emerge as a byproduct of design. But by whose
design, and who will be the judge? While these questions might appear to exist
at the limits of reality, and verge on the spilling over into fantastical speculation,
if we stop and think these carry important ethical considerations.
As a means of thinking through this, and taking such a consideration for
the ethical treatment of artificial life seriously, I offer the Greek mythologies
of Prometheus, Sisyphus, Ixion and Tantalus as points of reference. Mythical
though they may be, these particular stories carry with them a sympathy
denied to that of artificial life. In Greek mythology, Prometheus, Sisyphus,
Ixion and Tantalus are each forced to experience eternal punishment for their
personal disobedience to the Gods of Olympus: Prometheus is bound to a
rock, and must experience the pain of his liver being devoured everyday by
a hungry bird; Sisyphus is cursed to roll a huge boulder up a hill, only to
see it roll back down once it has been pushed to the top; Ixion is bound to
a burning wheel that will spin for all eternity; and, Tantalus must stand in a
pool of water, and whenever he bends down for a drink, the water recedes
before he can quench his thirst. While these mythologies have been inter-
preted for their philosophical implications, it can be agreed that were these
to actually be experienced they would constitute torture. And yet are these
behaviours not precisely the actions that artificial intelligence programs are
already condemned to repeat for digital eternity?
Let me provide perhaps a more concrete example. Recently, the game
Call of Duty: Modem Warfare 2 garnered controversy due to a particular scene
where the player participated in a terrorist attack on a Russian airport. During
this mission, called 'No Russian', the airport is populated with hundreds
of civilian non-playable characters (NPCs), each of which is governed by a
particular artificial intelligence program. This script seems to contain three
basic functions: a basal state of 'small talk'; and, two fear states, 'scream-
ing' and 'self-preservation' (e.g. running; see Infinity Ward 2009). When the
player begins the mission, the civilian NPCs are engaged in small talk as they
stand waiting in line at the airport. As the player and his team (also control-
led by artificial intelligence) begin to shoot at the civilians, the NPCs can be
heard screaming in fear and running for their life. If a civilian is shot, the NPC
will continue to struggle for their life, going so far as to limp painfully towards
safety. This scene has rightfully garnered criticism for the ethical implications
of the player committing an act of virtual terrorism. However, few have raised
issue regarding the ethics of killing synthetic life.

L..O
 Posthuman, postrights?

While the artificial intelligence programming behind COD: MW2 is not

nearly as advanced as that of Project LifeLike, they share similar ethical impli-
cations in that we are speaking of the possibility of synthetic consciousness
existing. As it relates to COD: MW2, the synthetic beings scream, cry, run
and communicate a fear of death just as a natural being would. While I do
not mean to compare their death to those of humans, I think my hesita-
tion to do so is perhaps precisely the point: to the extent that synthetic life
contains a consciousness, what are the ethics of condemning such an entity to
an existence of eternal damnation. Unlike real life, these artificial intelligence
programs are more like the mythical Greek beings, such as Prometheus, who
must experience their painful existence day after day. And admittedly, while
this section may function most on the fringes of contemporary reality, for the
very reason that artificial life is an imaginable probability in the not so distant
future, we ought to take such ethical concerns seriously - perhaps if only for
more selfish reasons. For if our notion of ethical rights is constrained by the
modifier of human, then such an ethical foundation remains on shaky ground
as we enter a new era of ontological possibilities.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGICAL BILL OF RIGHTS

In his The Ethics of Cyberspace, Cees Hamelink (2000) provides a passionate
defense regarding the necessity for human rights. While admirable in his aim,
Hamelink's defense fails to account for the shifting ontologies of what it even
means to be human. His account is contingent upon the notion of a univer-
sal human subject that is capable of manifesting across cultural and political
differences. However, the advent of advanced artificial intelligence technolo-
gies represents a destabilization of what it means to be human, and as such
the ethical system built upon this notion of a universal subject must subse-
quently be revised. Should the reqUisite of human remain as a condition of
rights, then we fail to account for the ethical rights of those who may not be
able to (or want to) keep up with posthuman technologies, as well as the ethi-
cal rights of those who may never have (or have had) a claim to humanness
to begin with (e.g. artificial life). These ontological concerns regarding the
modifier of humanness expose the epistemological preoccupations of much of
human rights-based discourse. But as has been argued throughout this article,
epistemological concerns are contingent upon the ontological configurations
of the body.
Hence, it is not surprising that the notion of human rights did not become
a part of international discourse until the rnid-1900s (Hamelink 2000), for it
is at this moment in history that imperial regimes, based on the ontologi-
cal exploitation of indigenous populations, experienced a prolonged state of
crisis. Some will coilnter that the experience of the Holocaust would seem to
offer a better explanation for such an emergence (and it has frequently been
said that postmodern ethics, and postmodernism in general, undermines the
outrage associated with this act of genocide; Hamelink 2000; White 1990);
however, alternative memories exist, which suggest that perhaps an equally
constitutive moment for universal ethics was that of exploited populations
beginning to challenge the global ideology of dominant populations (O~saire
2000; Fanon 2004). From this vantage point, universal ethics operate as a new
hegemony between dominant and exploited populations. Acknowledging this
political situation in no way undermines the significance of human rights-
based ethics, but rather suggests that we ought to question the transference

41
Robert Mejia

of an ontological phenomenon to that of an epistemological universal; human

rights are important to the extent that they address the particular ontologi-
cal challenges of the moment, but to the extent that the notion of universal
rights obscures the historical specificity of what even constitutes human, then
human rights based discourse codifies internal contradictions that may actu-
ally contribute to the plight of marginalized populations. For instance, 'the
right to political participation' (Hamelink 2000: 62) is based off the assump-
tion that a participatory system is the most satisfactory means of governance.
This may be so today, but may not necessarily be so in the future - and in
fact, this right resonates well with anti-communist propaganda. Moreover,
some rights, such as 'the right to freedom of expression', function in tension
with others, such as 'the right not to be discriminated against' (see Hamelink
2000: 62-63). The point is not to erase all tensions, as life is full of them, but
rather to understand the concept of human rights as it is: a historically situ-
ated cultural struggle. The goal is hence not to destroy, but rather to reinvig-
orate ethic's ontological foundations as a means of thinking otherwise.
Perhaps some will point out that this very article is made possible only
because of the rights that I have just critiqued, and that is true; but as I have
argued, those rights only make sense to the extent that they engage the onto-
logical challenges of the day. If anything, technological developments such as
Project LifeLike force us to realize that whether or not we acknowledge the
ontological foundations of the notion of human rights the very category of
the thing we call human is in constant motion. Failure to understand ethics in
ontologically situated terms means that we will continue to see the modifier
of human pertaining to a smaller and smaller portion of existence. Hence, this
article is a call for what I would classify as the foundational premise of any
ontological bill of rights: the right to ontological sanctity and sustenance. This
right goes beyond 'the right to life' premise of human rights-based discourse
in that an ontologically situated project understands that ethical norms are
historically and culturally emergent This does not allow for an anything goes,
relativistic logic, but rather demands mutual respect while also being honest
enough to acknowledge that what works today may not actually work at all,
let alone tomorrow. Ethics will always operate in controversy, but that contro-
versy must not stem from a failure to understand that its basic concern is not
epistemology but ontology, not woman but women, not life but the fleshy
messiness of living.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to especially thank Clifford Christians for the generous
support and feedback given throughout the writing of this article, as well as
Paul Grosswiler, Robert MacDougall and the additional anonymous reviewer
for their reviews, feedback and support.

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SUGGESTED CITATION
Mejia, R. (2012). 'Posthurnan, postrights?'. Explorations in Media Ecology 11: 1,
pp. 27-44, doi: 10.1386/eme.l1.1.27_1

CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Robert Mejia is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication
at the State Urliversity of New York, The College at Brockport. His research
interests operate at the intersections of political economy, cultural studies,
media studies and game studies. He has written on the politics of mobile
information and communication technologies in Rebecca A Lind's (ed.) Race/
Gender/Class/Media 3.0: Considering Diversity Across Audiences, Content, and
Producers (Pearson 2012) and the representation of disease and contagion in
video games in Matthew Kapell and Andrew Elliot's (eds) Playing with the
Past: Digital Games and the Simulation of History (Continuum, forthcoming).
He is a co-editor of New Times: Making Sense of Critical/Cultural Theory in a
Digital Age (Peter Lang 2011).
Contact: Department of Communication, The College at Brockport, 350 New
Campus drive, Brockport, NY 14420, USA
E-mail: rrnejia@brockport.edu

Robert Mejia has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work in the format that was
submitted to Intellect Ltd.

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