Professional Documents
Culture Documents
*
TIM INGOLD
University of Manchester
There can surely be little doubt that human society differs quite markedly
from the societies of other animals, including even those species of primates
most closely related to us. Yet the clarification of these differences has been
continually impeded by conceptual ambiguities surrounding the very notions
of ’society’ and ’sociality’. Many biologists, working within a framework of
modem evolutionary ecology, have posited a basic continuity from non-human
to human sociality, taking social organization in both instances to comprise
observable patterns of interaction, co-operation and communication among
individuals of the same species. These patterns of behaviour are understood to
be the phenotypic expression of genetically coded, heritable dispositions
established in the course of evolutionary phylogeny through the mechanism of
variation under natural selection. Thus sociality, in this view, is regarded as an
inbuilt property of individuals, though one that is ’brought out’ only in the
presence of conspecifics. As Mary Maxwell has written, in a characteristically
forthright statement, ’society is not really external to the animal. It is not an
abstract form, superimposed on its members. Rather, it is carried around
biologically (i.e. genetically) in each individual’ (1984: 135). Note the confla-
tion of biology with genetics; this is a matter to which I shall return.
Social anthropologists, by and large, categorically reject such appeal to
biological imperatives - at least when it comes to humans. They have jealously
guarded the study of ’society’ as their special preserve, even doubting whether
the organization of non-human populations deserves to be called ’social’ at all.
Social relations, they say, presuppose the emergence of rules, embodied within
a framework of institutions. Moreover such rules depend upon a distinctively
human mode of reflexive self-awareness, which is also taken to be a precon-
dition for ’culture’ in its widest ethnographic sense. No-one has put this point
more forcefully than Meyer Fortes, in his posthumously published Rules and
the emergence of society:
356 BECOMING PERSONS
Society could not, I suggest, have emerged or have continued to exist without
the agency of rules, simply because without rules there can be no ongoing
social relations or language-kind forms of communication; but neither could
society have emerged without the cultural equipment that distinguishes man
from the rest of the animal world (1983: 34).
And yet to pursue the point to its logical conclusion is to collapse the very
distinction between society and culture, which appear to merge into a single
domain of ’sociocultural’ phenomena that have in common, as Sahlins insists,
that they are ’composed and organized by [symbolic] meaning’ (1976a: 117).
It follows that the essence of sociality lies not in patterned interaction but in
its constitution within a matrix of significant symbols.
I shall begin by pursuing the implications of this latter view, as a prelude to
showing why I believe it to be untenable. That does not mean, however, that I
intend to endorse the sociobiological alternative. To the contrary, my criticisms
are levelled at the very logic that sets up these biological and anthropological
views as alternatives in the first place. This is the logic of a discourse,
commonly known as ’Western’, whose ontological foundation is a separation
between subjective and objective domains, the first an inner world of mind and
meaning, the second an outer world of matter and substance. It is of course this
separation that underwrites the conventional academic division of labour
between the ’humanities’ and ’natural science’ and, within the discipline of
anthropology, between its ’sociocultural’ and ’biological’ wings. When social
or cultural anthropologists accuse their biological counterparts of such sins as
hunter-gatherer and the scientist into one of kind. Whereas the social or cultural
anthropologist extends spectators’ privileges to all humans, and seeks to
investigate the variety of resulting worldviews (of which the ’Western scien-
tific’ is but one), the biologist is inclined to restrict them to those humans who
are ’culturally’ - as opposed to ’anatomically’ - modem, and equipped by
rational science to investigate the variety of organic forms in nature (of which
the human is but one). Against the anthropocentrism of the former is ranged
the ethnocentrism of the latter, but the underlying logic, which holds up a
continuous nature to the discriminating gaze of a disembodied reason, is just
the same.
A second implication of the split between the organism and the person is that
the development of the latter comes to be regarded as a process of socialization
or enculturation. Whereas the organism ’just grows’, undergoing its own
autonomous development, the person is ’made’ - very much as we might say
an artefact is made - through the imposition of a specific cultural form upon a
There is one further implication of the split between the organism and the
substance: his semen, for example, may be thought to bind with the mother’s
blood to form the infant’s body (e.g. Strathem 1972: 9-10, on the Melpa of
Highland New Guinea). The social father (pater), by contrast, contributes to
the child’s identity as a moral person, positioned within the categorical frame-
work of the society in question, and bound by its prevailing code of conduct.
Let us consider further the proposition ’biological kinship is culturally
constructed’. Some terms are missing from this compact formulation, and by
adding them we arrive at the following, expanded version: ’biological kinship
(as well as social kinship) is culturally constructed (rather than given in
nature)’. But if both biological and social kinship are framed within a body of
cultural ideas, then so also must be the distinction between them - if any such
distinction is made at all. The proposition can thus be rewritten, still more
explicitly, as follows: ’The distinction between biological and social kinship
is constituted within those systems of cultural meaning that human beings
impose on the physical world’. As will be evident, the very thesis of cultural
construction implies that behind the facade of ’folk conceptions’ there does
indeed lurk such a physical world, i.e. ’nature’, within which human beings
figure as ’mere organisms’. In other words, there must exist a domain of ’really
biological’, biological relations (to be studied by biologists) as distinct from
that of ’culturally perceived’, biological relations (to be studied by social
anthropologists). Challenged to reveal the nature of real biology, most anthro-
BECOMING PERSONS 361
pologists remain remarkably coy. As students of society and culture, they say,
it is not their concern. But if pushed, they will tell you that biological biology
(as opposed to culturally constructed, folk biology) has to do, purely and
simply, with the mechanics of procreation.
To return to the problem of fatherhood, the logic of the argument as outlined
above would force us to distinguish between the culturally perceived, ’biologi-
cal’ father, who is supposed, in the folk conception, to have contributed
substance to the child, and the ’really biological’, biological father, who is the
actual source of the child’s paternal genes according to the modern scientific
account of how reproduction works. Long ago, Barnes (1961) proposed just
such a distinction, denoting the former as the genitor and the latter as the
genetic father (these may, of course, be one and the same individual; Barnes’s
point is that the identity of the genetic father is irrelevant for social anthropo-
logical analysis). Likewise, logically, a distinction should be made on the
maternal side between the genetrix and the genetic mother. But at this point,
doubts begin to arise. Surely no relationship could be more primordially
’biological’ than that between mother and infant. It is a relationship that begins
while the infant is still in the womb, and is carried on after birth in the normal
course of maternal nurturance. Disregarding rare applications of modem
How, then, are we to understand the relationship between mother and infant
(as distinct from the fact of their genetic relatedness)? Do we conclude that
since the maternal contribution of nurturance is not, in itself, a genetic con-
tribution, it must therefore fall outside the purview of ’really biological’
motherhood, and therefore that - insofar as our intuition nevertheless leads us
to regard it as biological - it can only be so in a specific, culturally perceived
sense? Such a conclusion would be tantamount to denying the biological reality
not only of the relationship between the human mother and her infant but also
of all comparable mother-infant bonds in the animal kingdom! Of what other
animal than the human would we venture to claim that the contribution of
nurture is social or cultural rather than biological? No-one would surely doubt
that the relationship between the human mother and infant is indeed social, but
is it any less ’real’, or any less ’biological’ for that? Would it not make more
sense to argue that it is both ’really social’ and ’really biological’, and as a
with nothing but a component of its material substance whilst the second acts
as the agent of society in imposing its ideal form. Native thought, however,
erects no such hard and fast distinction between these respective contributions.
Both are delivered within a context of social relationships, both are organically
embodied (the one anatomically, the other in bodily structures of perception
and action), and both furnish the child with the lineaments of a specific personal
identity - an identity constituted in toto as the enfoldment of the entire history
of his or her relationships. In this view, then, personhood is not impressed upon
the organism as form on substance; rather, the organism-person comes into
being as the crystallization of a total process of social life.
In arguing that we should take this view seriously, I am not trying to claim
that it is ’scientifically correct’ to maintain, as the Melpa do (Strathem 1972:
9), that the form of the foetus is fixed through the binding function of semen
in repeated acts of intercourse. At issue, however, is not whether this is true or
false, but whether it is conceivable. We may assert, on the grounds of a
professed knowledge of ’the facts (sic) of life’, that semen cannot possibly
have this binding function, but how many of us could back up the claim with
authoritative embryological evidence? The impossibility is rather assumed as
a ’fact’ that does not need to be demonstrated, for to question the assumption
would be to play havoc with the tidy separation of ’physical’ from ’social’
aspects of paternity - a separation which, as we have seen, is crucial to the
Western account of the genesis of the moral person. The logic of the account
requires that the physical contribution be socially invisible, that it be placed
beyond the bounds of social relationships, and hence that it be expressible in
a decontextualised, ’purely genetic’ idiom. Moreover, the notion of seminal
Social kinship
Culture I
Culture
[
Nature
Biological kinship (culturally perceived)
on trust the distinction between biological and social kinship. It follows that
where people make this kind of distinction, whatever the particular terms or
metaphors they use to talk about human procreation, they will appear to have
’got it right’ as far as their basic ontology goes. People who fail to recognize
BECOMING PERSONS 365
or who
repudiate the distinction, on the other hand, will appear to have ’got it
wrong’, since their ideas flatly contradict the logic by which they are ap-
prehended by Western anthropological science as constituting a contrasting,
’non-Western’ worldview. It is thus an illusion to suppose that Western and
non-Western accounts can be compared on level terms, as alternative construc-
tions of reality, since the ontological primacy of the Western account - the
’givenness’ of nature and culture - is implicit in the very project that sets these
up as objects for comparison in the first place.
This conclusion applies not only to the comparative study of kinship rela-
tions but also, and with equal force, to that of the constitution of persons.
Indeed, ever since Mauss placed the ’problem of the person’ on the anthropo-
logical agenda, as one of investigating ’not the sense of &dquo;self ’ (moi) - but the
notion or concept that men in different ages have formed of it’ (Mauss 1985
[ 193 8] : 3), the issue has become mired in exactly the same difficulties that have
bogged down the discussion of kinship, except that the ambiguous status of
psychology rather than biology is now the source of the trouble. The raw
experience of self-awareness is assumed as a universal fact of human nature,
given for every individual - like its biological constitution as a member of the
human species - independently of its involvement in any forms of relationship.
But this level of ’really psychological’ psychology (studied by psychologists)
is said to be of no concern to the social anthropologist, whose professed
objective is to document the variety of ways in which the experiential substance
of selfhood is given form and meaning within the categories of culture. These
different cultural constructs correspond, in Mauss’s account, to the range of
alternative notions of the person, of which ’self’ is both the most recent
historically and of specifically Western provenance.
It is indeed the case that Western thought has arrived at a notion of the self
as a locus of individual experience, through its counterposition to the person
as a being formed within the moral framework of society and its relationships.
Yet this very distinction, between the individual self and the social being,
between the substance of experience and the cultural form that is imprinted
upon it, furnishes the ontological foundation for the anthropological project of
comparing alternative (Western and non-Western) cultural constructions of
psychological reality. Once again, the supposed product of a cultural construc-
tion reappears as its precondition, as shown below:
366 BECOMING PERSONS
Social kinship
Person (1) -
[Person (1) {
Self (really psychological)
Biological kinship (culturally perceived)
For what non-Western peoples are telling us, in their thought and practice,
is that neither as organisms nor as selves do humans come into being in advance
of their entry into social relationships. Like organisms, selves become, and they
do so within a matrix of relations with others. The unfolding of these relations
in the process of social life is also their enfolding within the selves that are
constituted within this process, in their specific structures of awareness and
response - structures which are, at the same time, embodiments of personal
identity (Ingold 1990: 222, cf. 1986: 207). Thus, personhood is no more
inscribed upon the self than it is upon the organism; rather, the person is the
self, not however in the Western sense of the private, closed-in subject
confronting the external, public world of society and its relationships, but in
the sense of its positioning as a focus of agency and experience within a social
relational field. In this sense, the self (as indeed the organism, for the self is
but the organism regarded as such a focus) is equivalent to what Lave (1988:
180) calls the person-acting, as distinct from the ’person’ of conventional
social theory. The latter, as we have seen, forms part of a comprehensive
system of mental representations for constructing the social world. And whilst
people may indeed consult such internalized representations both in authoring
their own actions and in interpreting the actions of others, they do so not as
self-contained individuals but as beings whose powers of agency are already
constituted through their direct engagement in a world of real persons and
relationships, that is as persons-acting.
With the person-acting, we can no longer leave the biology of the human
organism the biologists or the psychology of the self to the psychologists.
to
For the person, in this sense, is both organism and self. In other words, it is not
possible to reconcile the anthropological insight that persons are constituted
within social relationships with a biology or a psychology that treats human
bodies and minds as preformed entities, on the excuse that as anthropologists,
our concern is with manifold, culturally perceived realities rather than with the
sion of the world quite other than that conveyed by the notion of construction.
In the following sections, I shall touch on the implications of this suggestion,
first for developmental biology, and secondly for the psychology of learning
and perception.
opmental process that cuts across it; hence the development of the organism is
also the development of an environment for that organism (Costall 1985: 39).
Now what goes for organisms in general also applies to human organisms
in particular. The Melpa may be wrong when they attribute to semen the
property of binding the form of the foetus. But they are certainly right, where
’scientific’ genetics is wrong, in recognizing that the human organism does not
initially receive its form as an injection, but rather that such form is generated
and conserved only within the total relational context of embryological devel-
opment. Moreover for human organisms, as indeed for organisms of many
other animal species, the presence and contribution of other individuals of the
same species is vital for normal ontogenetic development, in both pre- and
postnatal periods of the life cycle. Hence the social process of becoming a
person, the development of those powers of consciousness, self-awareness and
intentionality by means of which each one of us is able to play an active and
responsive role in shaping the lives of ourselves and others, is part of the
biological process of becoming an organism (Ingold 1990: 220). Furthermore,
this process does not stop at some arbitrary point when we are deemed to have
reached maturity. It rather carries on throughout the whole course of life -
indeed it is life.
If, contrary to the foregoing argument, we were to continue to uphold the
distinction between that part of the human being residing in the organism, and
that part contributed by society, whilst recognizing that the human organism
nevertheless undergoes development, it would be logically necessary to distin-
guish also between the field of relationships implicated in the development of
the organism and the field of relationships in terms of which the individual is
’placed’ as a member of certain wider social groupings. Yet in practice, such
a distinction cannot possibly be sustained. For example, the capacity for speech
is said to be innate, an intrinsic property of the human organism, whereas the
particular language a person speaks comes to him or her from the community,
having its source in society. The child’s acquisition of a mother-tongue,
however, is inseparable from the development of its powers of speech, and
takes place within the same relational matrix. A similar argument could be
made for the acquisition of craft skills, or what have more generally been called
’techniques of the body’ (following the classic work of Mauss 1979 [1934]:
97-123). There are different ways of walking, just as there are different
languages. But learning to walk is, in itself, learning to walk in one way rather
than another. Thus it is absurd to claim that the relationships that form the
context for the child’s learning to speak or to walk are either biological or
social. They are obviously both.
370 BECOMING PERSONS
from Japanese speakers, not because they have different genes, but because
they have undergone different processes of development and consequently
embody different skills.
persons of certain kinds, with distinguishable roles, and towards whom certain
forms of action are appropriate. This view rests on a theory of indirect
perception, long dominant in cognitive psychology, according to which the
perceiver cannot access the world directly, but has to figure it out, or to
’construct’ the world (including the world of other persons) from data received
through the senses. These senses, for example of vision, hearing and touch,
along with their associated neural pathways, are said to belong to the organism,
given in advance as part of its biological nature. But the classificatory schemata
by which received sense data are cognitively organized into meaningful pat-
terns are supposed to come from society. Learning - the acquisition of these
schemata - is thus separated from social life, which requires that they are
already ’in place’ as a precondition for meaningful engagement with others.
The unsocialized infant is an asocial individual, locked in a private world of
meaningless sensation.
I believe that learning is better comprehended in terms of a theory of direct
perception. Such a theory, pioneered by J. J. Gibson in his so-called ’ecological
psychology’ (Gibson 1979), regards seeing, hearing and touching not as
passive reactions of the organism to stimuli bombarding its sensory receptors,
yielding bodily sensations as the raw material for a mental constructional act
of perception; they are rather to be understood as processes of actively and
intentionally attending to the world, of seeking out what it affords for the
pursuit of current action. Learning to perceive, then, depends not on the
acquisition of a schema for constructing others, but on the acquisition of skills
for direct perceptual engagement with them (Ingold 1991 a). In other words,
learning - as Gibson puts it ( 1979: 254) - isan education of attention’, a matter
notof enculturation but of enskillment. That we learn to see, hear and touch
must be obvious to any craftsman, musician or lover. And just as the acquisition
of language is inseparable from the development of powers of speech, so it is
through the development of perceptual skills that we learn to know others in
the particular ways that we do - not indirectly, by constructing them as such,
372 BECOMING PERSONS
but directly by attending to those subtle cues that reveal the nuances of our
relationships towards them. Thus the pattern of a person’s social relationships
becomes incorporated into the very structure of his or her perceptual system:
ways of perceiving are a sedimentation of a past history of direct, mutual or
inter-agentive involvement.
In short, both the skills of action (walking, speaking, craftsmanship) and
those of perception (seeing, hearing, touching) emerge within the process of
development of the organism-person. And far from furnishing the particular
individual - initially closed to the world - with a set of relationships based on
membership of more and more inclusive collectivities, this process has as its
precondition the individual’s immersion, right from birth (if not before) in a
social relational field. Every normal human infant comes into being already
situated within such a field, and as it grows older, developing its own structures
of awareness and patterns of response, so it emerges as an autonomous agent
with the capacity to initiate further relationships. Becoming a person is thus a
matter of gathering social relations into the structures of consciousness: the
movement in development, as Vygotsky put it, is ’not from the individual to
the socialized, but from the social to the individual’ ( 1962: 20, see Ingold 1990:
221 ).
Darwinian theory does not concern humans as persons, but humans as orga-
nisms and... can [therefore] coexist with very different notions of the human
...
case, with persons in the other; and both depend on the fine-tuning of percep-
tual skills.
The craftsman monitors his movement so as to bring the result into line with
a preconceived image of form. But his role is not, simply and mechanically, to
execute the form, to translate a cultural image into physical reality. The
movement issues from himself as agent, not from the image, and the form of
the resulting object, however much it may resemble the image, arises out of
the movement itself. Thus there is not just one process going on, of transcrip-
tion from image to object; rather there are two going on at once: on the one
hand the craftsman’s direct, skilful engagement with the material; on the other
hand his monitoring of that engagement against an ideal standard. Likewise in
social life, only persons act. Notional collectivities such as cultures and
societies do not act, though it is sometimes a convenient shorthand to speak as
though they do (a shorthand used both by anthropologists and, often enough,
by the people they study). Thus social life, as craft activity, is not a simple
process of transcribing the ideal form of relationships into behavioural reality.
Again, two things are going on - the intentional action and the intentional
monitoring of that action (cf. Giddens 1979: 39-40) - and whilst they may take
place concurrently or interchangeably, they must always be distinguished. In
summary we have:
(i) the direct engagement of persons with one another as intentional agents in
contexts of action wherein real social relationships are generated and repro-
duced ; and
(ii) the discursive representation and interpretation of the experience of that
engagement to oneself and others (who may or may not be the same as the
ones you were immediately involved with in the action being interpreted).
This is also the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge, and between
direct and indirect perception.
Conclusion
by drawing attention to four points. First, we can learn nothing about the
evolution of sociality from sociobiological approaches which purport to be as
applicable to insects as to humans, for these have nothing to say about agency
and intentionality, viewing behaviour only in terms of its reproductive conse-
quences. Granted that intentional agency is as much a feature of non-human
primate as of human life, such approaches are surely as irrelevant to primato-
logy as they are to social anthropology. They cannot therefore throw any light
on the evolution of the peculiar sociality of our own species. Secondly, the
BECOMING PERSONS 375
agents, but my guess would be that the most significant evolutionary division
is between vertebrates and invertebrates. There is no doubt that this is much
more important than the division between humans and apes.
Thirdly, language and related human capacities that are said to depend on
language actually evolved within a context of intense sociality. By showing
how sociality can exist before language and collective representations, we can
also show how the latter emerged in a social context. Thus sociality in this view
provides the bridge between non-human primate and human worlds which is
necessary if we are to construct a plausible evolutionary account. Finally, we
have to think again about the validity of orthodox distinctions in biology
between ontogeny and phylogeny, development and evolution. This distinction
prevents us from being able to ask questions about the relation between agency
and structure, questions that are unavoidable once we think of evolution in
terms of the transformative potentials of the relational field within which
NOTE
*
An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the symposium ’Mind, brain and society’
atthe annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, University
of Swansea, August 1990. A revised version was subsequently presented to the Anthropo-
logy Seminar at the London School of Economics. I am grateful to participants on both
occasions for their helpful discussion and comments.
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