International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters by Hermann and Hagan

-the theories up to now have assumed things. Their rationale went: because the systemic
imperatives of anarchy or interdependence are so clear, leaders can choose from only a limited
range of foreign policy strategies. If they are to exercise rational leadership and maximize their
state’s movement toward its goals, only certain actions are feasible. THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

In the bipolar international system during Cold War, such a rationale might have seemed reasonable.
but today there is little consensus on the nature of the ‘new world order’ and more room for
interpretation, innovation, misunderstanding, and miscommunication. Ambiguous environment –
the perspectives of the leaders involved in foreign policy making can have more influence on what
governments do. As international constraints on foreign policy have become more flexible and
indeterminate, the importance of domestic political concerns also increased.

THE ROLE LEADERS PLAY

1. Leaders Perceive and Interpret Constraints

Leaders define states’ international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and
interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on their governments that
conform with their judgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their positions…
Leaders interpretations arise out of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity
to the political context.

2. Leaders often Disagree

What happens if there is no single dominant leader or no set of leaders who share a common
interpretation of the world?

During an international crisis, when the values of the state are threatened and time for decision
making is short, authority tends to concentrate among those persons or groups that bear ultimate
responsibility for maintaining the government in power. How these individuals, cabinets, juntas
interpret the problem will dominate the state’s reactions. Little outside input is sought or tolerated.
The experiences, fears, interests, and expectations of these decision makers remain unfettered, and
affect any action that is chosen.

The nature of the foreign policy problem can also help to dictate whose position count. Economic,
security, environmental, and HR issues may all be handled by different parts of the government

When authority is fragmented and competition for power turns fierce, an unstable situation is
likely to ensue, with each person, group or organization acting on its own in an uncoordinated
fashion

When authority is dispersed but little competition for power exists, the results is an oligarchy like
that of the Soviet Politburo during the 60s.: building consensus among these leaders took time since
no one wanted to concede any authority.

3. Leaders and Domestic Opposition:

In addition to interpreting events in the international arena, leaders must also respond effectively to
domestic pressures.

Putnam+Moravscik –> leaders are the central strategic actors in the two level game that links
domestic politics and int bargaining. In domestic political game, they face the dual challenge of
building a coalition of supporters to retain their authority while contending with opposition forces to
maintain their legitimacy.

Leaders who prefer to avoid controversy at home often seek to accommodate the opposition by
granting concessions on foreign policy. The result is frequently a policy that is largely unresponsive
to international pressures and involves little risk.

Leaders often also seek to consolidate their domestic position by pushing a foreign policy that
mobilizes new support, logrolls with complementary interests, or undercuts the opposition. By this
logic, the political attraction of NATO expansion for the Clinton administration is that it garners
support from two otherwise contentious groups- liberal internationalists, who favor the spread of
democracy, and conservative internationalists, who worry about resurgent threats.

Another strategy is to insulate foreign policy from domestic pressures altogether by co-opting,
suppressing, or ignoring opposition. Leaders of non democracies can more easily insulate their
foreign policies from domestic pressures than their counterparts in democracies.

BRIDGING TOMORROW’S GAPS

Policymakers prefer to work with ‘actor-specific models’ that grasp the different internal structures
and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal. Scholars today
recognize the need to bridge gap between theory and practice in foreign policy decision making and
action.

Issue 1: Which leaders’ interpretations prevail in the formulation of foreign policy depends on the
nature of decision unit and who is ultimately responsible for making a decision. Is an individual, a
group, or a coalition of actors in charge?

When one predominant leader makes the decisions, the focus in on theories of political cognition,
political socialization, and leadership- what the person is like, and how does he view the world and
interact with others?

When the decision unit is a single group –> theories of group dynamics, bureaucratic politics, and
public administration rise

A coalition of contending actors –> theories of bargaining and negotiation, political stability, and
institution building – is one actor more pivotal than others, and compromise is possible?

Determining on the nature of decision unit is not always as obvious as it would seem.

Outliers: Iran and Japan serve as reminders that understanding a government’s formal structure is
less important than understanding whose positions actually count at a particular point in time.

Issue 2: to what extent are leaders the products of their cultures, genders, and domestic political
systems? Huntington, Tickner, and Bruce Russett are favoring this approach in their analyses. Being
female or Christian or democratic endows people with certain predispositions and expectations.

Issue 3: To what extent leaders shape their own preferences in their foreign policy. Thatcher and
Fidel Castro examples à these leaders are interested in persuading others, but not being persuaded
by their own coalitions or decision groups.

Fact: Preferences tend to be more fixed for crusaders and more fluid for pragmatic + strategic
leaders.
Issue 4: Knowledge about the inner workings of decision units can offer clues as to whether their
efforts will be internally or externally oriented. Examples: Scapegoating thesis; domestic conditions
may lead to an isolated role of an individual state (US before WWI)

Overall;

Leaders are said to be as limited now as they were when during the Cold War superpower rivalry
defined their actions.

They key systematic constraints right now are not security issues only; but also economic and
environmental

International constraints only have policy implications when they are perceived as such by the
leaders whose positions count in dealing with a particular problem

Whether or not how such leaders judge themselves constrained depends on the nature of the
domestic challenges to their leadership, how the leaders are organized, and what they are like as
people.