[G.R. NO.
175510 : July 28, 2008] Respondents further averred that they could not have agreed
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ,
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO
VALDEZ, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA
AND CARIDAD TABISULA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a
January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale1 (the deed) from
respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula
a 200 square meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject property) of
a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in San Fernando, La
Union, which 380 sq.m. parcel of land is more particularly
described in the deed as follows:
A parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on the
North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on
the South, by a Creekand on the West, by Lot No. 223-A,
declared under Tax Decl. No. 52820, with an areaof380
square meters, more or less, and assessed at P17100.00 for
the current year. It is not registered under Act 496 nor under
the Spanish Mortgage Law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
The pertinent portions of the deed read:
x x x That for and in consideration of the sum of SEVENTY
THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currencyp [sic]
paid to us at our entire satisfaction by spouses VICTOR and
JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ, both of legal age, Filipinos and
residents of 148 P. Burgos St., San Fernando, La Union,
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby SELL,
CONVEY and TRANSFER by way of absolute sale unto the said
spouses Victor and Joecelyn Valdez, their heirs and assigns,
the TWO HUNDRED (200) SQUARE METERS, EASTERN
PORTION of the parcel of land above-described, free from all
liens and encumbrances.
x x x That now and hereinafter, said VENDEE-SPOUSES
VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ shall be the absolute
owners of the said 200 sq. meters, eastern portion and that
we shall warrant and forever defend their ownership of the
same against the claims of all persons whomsoever; they
shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way
on the western side of their lot but which is not included in
this sale. x x x.x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the
western side of the subject property.2 Believing that that side
is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed,
petitioners, through their representative, reported the matter
to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Respondents
failed to attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay,
however, drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or more
than six years after the execution of the deed a Complaint
for Specific Performance with Damages3 against respondents
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City,
La Union.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased
the subject property on the strength of respondents'
assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus
prayed that respondents be ordered to provide the subject
property with a 2' -meter wide easement and to remove the
concrete wall blocking the same.4
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
(for damages and attorney's fees),5 averred that the 2 '-
meter easement should be taken from the western portion of
the subject property and not from theirs;6 and petitioners
and their family are also the owners of two properties
adjoining the subject property, which adjoining properties
have access to two public roads or highways - the bigger one
which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one
which abuts an existing barangay road on the north.7
to providing petitioners an easement "on the western side of
their lot" as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their
lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was
erected long before the subject property was sold to
petitioners.8 In support of this claim, respondents submitted
a February 20, 2003 letter from the City Engineer's Office.9
Branch 26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners'
complaint and granted respondents' Counterclaim by
Decision10 of March 18, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the defendants as against the
plaintiffs and hereby orders the Complaint dismissed for
being unmeritorious and plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay
the defendants, the following:
1) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
4) P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
5) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.11 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by Decision
of May 29, 2006,12 affirmed that of the trial court, it holding
that the deed only conveyed ownership of the subject
property to petitioners, and that the reference therein to an
easement in favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis
of a voluntary easement of right of way.13
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are
neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of
way as they failed to present circumstances justifying their
entitlement to it under Article 649 of the Civil Code.14
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration15 having been denied
by the Court of Appeals by Resolution of November 15, 2006,
they filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari faulting the trial [sic] court
I. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT PART OF
THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 11, 1993;
II. . . . IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF THE ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE GRANTING A RIGHT OF WAY IS VAGUE AND
OBSCURE;
III. . . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS.16 (Underscoring supplied)
An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on
another's property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of
which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to
allow somebody else to do something on his property for the
benefit of another thing or person."17The statutory basis of
this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established
is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto,
the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source - by
law or by the will of the owners. So Article 619 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements.
From the allegations in petitioners' complaint, it is clear that
what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by
respondents of an easement reading: "they shall be provided
a 2 - meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of
their lot but which is not included in this sale."
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
writing.18 The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that
they "shall be provided a 2 - meters wide road right-of-way
on the western side of their lot but which is not included in
this sale" is not a disposition of real property. The proviso
that the intended grant of right of wayis "not included in this
sale" could only mean that the parties would have to enter
into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose.19 The
use of the word "shall," which is imperative or mandatory in
its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely
permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or
private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.20
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must
be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to
prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil
Code call for, viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the
inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to the
ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third
persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory
easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind of
easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is
entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
xxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under
Article 649, the following requisites must be complied with:
(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity
must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner
of the dominant estate's own acts; (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.21 The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate,22 herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by
the Sketch23(Exhibit "B"; Exhibit "1") of the location of the
lots of the parties and those adjoining them, a common
evidence of the parties, petitioners and their family are also
the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property
which have access to two public roads or highways.24
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to
two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by
respondents of an easement on the "western side of
[respondents'] lot."
It may not be amiss to note at this juncture that at the time
the deed was executed in 1993, the barangay road-Exhibit
"1-G," by which petitioners could access Burgos Street-
Exhibit "1-F," was not yet in existence; and that the Interior
Street-Exhibit "1-H," which petitioners via this case seek
access to with a right of way, was still a creek,25 as reflected
in the earlier-quoted particular description of respondents'
parcel of land from which the subject property originally
formed part.
Respecting the grant of damages in favor of respondents by
the trial court which was affirmed by the appellate court, the
Court finds the same baseless.chanrobles virtual law library
To merit an award of moral damages, there must be proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. It is not
enough that one suffers sleepless nights, mental anguish,
serious anxiety as a result of the actuation of the other
party.26 Invariably, such actuation must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence27 to have been willfully done in bad
faith or with ill-motive.
In respondents' case, they predicated their Counterclaim for
damages on general allegations of sickness, humiliation and
embarrassment, without establishing bad faith, fraud or ill-
motive on petitioners' part.28
More importantly, respondents are precluded from filing any
counterclaim in light of Article 199 of Rule XXVI of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991 reading:
xxx
ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any Party or
Witness to Appear before the Lupon or Pangkat. - Refusal or
willful failure of any party or witness to appear before the
lupon or pangkat in compliance with summons issued
pursuant to this Rule may be punished by the city or
municipal court as for indirect contempt of court upon
application filed therewith by the lupon chairman, the
pangkat chairman, or by any of the contending parties. Such
refusal or willful failure to appear shall be reflected in the
records of the lupon secretary or in the minutes of the
pangkat secretary and shall bar the complainant who fails to
appear, from seeking judicial recourse for the same course
of action, and the respondent who refuses to appear, from
filing any counterclaim arising out of, or necessarily
connected with the complaint.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
While respondent Caridad Tabisula claimed that she always
appeared, when summoned, before the barangay
lupon,29 the following Certificate to File Action30 belies the
claim.
xxx
This is to certify that respondents failed to appear for (2)
Mediation Proceeding before our Punong Barangay thus the
corresponding complaint may now be filed in court.
Issued this 24th day of November 1998 at the Multi Purpose
Hall, Barangay 1 City of San Fernando (LU).
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The award for moral damages being thus baseless, that for
exemplary damages must too be baseless.
As for the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
respondents have not shown their entitlement thereto in
accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision and November 15,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that
the grant of the Counterclaim of respondents, Spouses
Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed and set
aside. In all other respects, the challenged decision is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996.]
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA
SAJONAS, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF
QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION ACT; ANNOTATION OF
ADVERSE CLAIM; PURPOSE. — Annotation of an adverse
claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the
Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest on the same or a better right than that of the
registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing
a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province
where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the
claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.
The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized
under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.
2. ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION, OPERATIVE ACT WHICH GIVES
VALIDITY TO TRANSFER OR CREATES A LIEN UPON THE
LAND. — Under the Torrens system, registration is the
operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of
the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or certificate of title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSEQUENT SALE CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
ADVERSE CLAIM DULY ANNOTATED ON TITLE. — Although
we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming
before us, the same, however, does not fit in the case at bar.
While it is the act of registration which is the operative act
which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of
property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over
an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the
certificate of title previous to the sale.
4. ID.; P.D. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE);
ALTHOUGH A PURCHASER IS NOT REQUIRED TO EXPLORE
FURTHER THAN WHAT THE TORRENS TITLE INDICATES, HE
IS BOUND BY THE LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES ANNOTATED
THEREON. — While it is true that under the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of
property registered under the system, or any interest therein
only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its
registration, and that a purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in
quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule
is not absolute. Thus, one who buys from the registered
owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he
is, nevertheless, bound by the liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the
vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to
such failure.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN
THAT EVERY PART THEREOF BE GIVEN EFFECT AND
CONSTRUCTION THAT COULD RENDER A PROVISION
INOPERATIVE SHOULD BE AVOIDED. — In construing the
law, care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect and a construction that could render a provision
inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase
might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one
actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated.
6. ID.; STATUTES CLAUSES AND PHRASES MUST NOT BE
TAKEN SEPARATELY BUT IN RELATION TO THE STATUTE’S
TOTALITY. — A statute’s clauses and phrases must not be
taken separately, but in its relation to the statute’s totality.
Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it
with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages
of the published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may
be examined by the courts in their construction.
7. CIVIL LAW; P.D. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION
DECREE); ADVERSE CLAIM; EFFECTIVITY, NOT LIMITED TO
THIRTY DAYS. — In ascertaining the period of effectivity of
an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its
entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D.
1529 provides: "The adverse claim shall be effective for a
period of thirty days from the date of registration." At first
blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the
effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above
provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but
should be read in relation to the sentence following, which
reads: "After the lapse of said period, the annotation of
adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest." If the rationale of
the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and
effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have
been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere
lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in
interest to do a useless act. The law, taken together, simply
means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription
will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the
property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be
effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no
longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a
useless ceremony.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; 15 DAY PERIOD, IMMATERIAL IN
DETERMINING VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF ADVERSE
CLAIM. — It should be noted that the law employs the phrase
"may be cancelled" which obviously indicates, as inherent in
its decision making power, that the court may or may not
order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding
such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse, claim for
thirty days from the date of registration. The court cannot be
bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the
very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the
period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity
or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue
to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend
upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to
determine whether it will order the cancellation of the
adverse claim or not.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING REQUIRED IN DETERMINING
VALIDITY THEREOF OF; REASON. — The reason why the law
provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim
is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the
propriety of his claimed interest can be established or
revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the
existence of any encumbrance on the title arising from such
adverse claim.
10. ID.; ID.; ADVERSE CLAIM; PREVAILS OVER A NOTICE OF
LEVY LATER ANNOTATED ON A TITLE. — The disputed
inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when
Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of
levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with
knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on
execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or
better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice
of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.
This can be deduced from Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.

11. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE
TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. — As to
whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the
subject property, the same should be made to rest on the
findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the
appellate court, "there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees
were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against
Uychocde at the time of the sale of the property by the latter
in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of
Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination
on April 21, 1988."cralaw virtua1aw library
12. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; SALE;
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE, CONSTRUED.
— A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys
property of another without notice that some other person
has right to or interest in such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person in the property. Good faith consists in an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another. Thus, the claim of the private
respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made
in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no
evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of
the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent,
nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes’ properties
or that the same was involved in any litigation between said
spouses and the private Respondent. While it may be stated
that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be
established by competent proof by the party alleging the
same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be
purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject
property must not be disturbed.
13. ID.; LAND REGISTRATION ACT; EVERY PURCHASER OF
REGISTERED LAND IN GOOD FAITH TAKE AND HOLD THE
SAME FREE FROM ANY AND ALL PRIOR CLAIMS, LIENS AND
ENCUMBRANCES EXCEPT THOSE ANNOTATED ON THE TITLE
AND THOSE EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE LAW. — The
Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree)
guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in good
faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and
all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except those set
forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly
mentioned in the ACT as having been preserved against it.
Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the
Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure
would be futile and nugatory.
TORRES, J.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D.
1529); REGISTRATION, THE OPERATIVE ACT WHICH GIVES
VALIDITY TO THE TRANSFER OR CREATES A LIEN UPON THE
LAND. — Under the Torrens system, registration is the
operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of
the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or certificate of title.
2. ID.; ID.; A SUBSEQUENT SALE CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
AN ADVERSE CLAIM WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY ANNOTATED
IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OVER THE PROPERTY. — The
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property,
and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest on
the same or has a better right than the registered owner
thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse
claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title
over the property.
3. ID.; ID.; ADVERSE CLAIM; CANCELLATION THEREOF IS
STILL NECESSARY TO RENDER IT INEFFECTIVE. — The law,
taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the
adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,
otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall
continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim
has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said
period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the
process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony. It
should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be
cancelled," which obviously indicates, as inherent in its
decision making power, that the court may or may not order
the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such
provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty
days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound
by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very
authority vested in it.
4. ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALES; PURCHASER IN GOOD
FAITH AND FOR VALUE; DEFINED. — A purchaser in good
faith and for value is one who buys property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice
of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE GOOD FAITH IS PRESUMED, BAD
FAITH MUST HOWEVER BE ESTABLISHED BY COMPETENT
PROOF. — While it may be stated that good faith is
presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by
competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such
proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchases in good
faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be
disturbed.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES CLAUSES AND
PHRASES MUST NOT BE TAKEN SEPARATELY, BUT IN ITS
RELATION TO THE STATUTE’S TOTALITY. — A statute’s
clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its
relation to the statute’s totality. Each statute must, in fact,
be construed as to harmonize it with pre-existing body of
laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must
be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its
history, origin, and its purposes may be examined by the
courts in their construction. An eminent authority on the
subject matter states the rule candidly: "A statute is passed
as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by
one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or
section should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not
proper confine its intention to the one section construed. It
is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract
to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from
the context, some particular meaning to be attached to any
word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the context."
TORRES, JR., J.:
A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used
truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds conflict.
Thus, it is written — "By thy words shalt thou be justified,
and by thy words shalt thou be condemned." (Matthew,
12:37)
Construing the new word of a statute separately is the raison
d’etre of this appeal.
Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the
inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate
of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was
caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto B.
Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was later carried over to and
annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of
the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo
Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel
of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in
this case.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as
follows:
"On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and
Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located
in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and
Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was
registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT
No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On
August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation
of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the
title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No.
116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in
question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4,
1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year
after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-
appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of sum
of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a
Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in
the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged
his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to
P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years from June
25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his
undertaking in the compromise agreement, Defendant-
Appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise
agreement, which the court granted in its order dated August
3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on
August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil
case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated
August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on
February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff
Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy
on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and
the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as
Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984
was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued
in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on
execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to
the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed
a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the
auction sale of the subject property did not push through as
scheduled.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the
cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer,
Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand, Defendant-
Appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said
annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed this
complaint dated January 11, 1986 on February 5, 1986." 1
The Sajonases filed their complaint 2 in the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the
judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion of
the complaint alleges:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the
defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the defendant,
have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their
title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs and there was no
more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant
could levy upon;
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was
carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid
and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of
the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the
corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the
defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation of
the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable
reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and
embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs’
demand;
10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the
defendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and
engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to protect
their rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay
attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000 and appearance
fees of P500 per day in court." 3
Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim 4 on
March 8, 1986, raising special and affirmative defenses, the
relevant portions of which are follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein
defendants;
11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an
adverse claim against the property covered by TCT No.
79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto
Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any
legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to
Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No.
79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution dated
August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC) of Quezon
proceeding from a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 28859
in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is
undoubtedly proper and appropriate because the property is
registered in the name of the judgment debtor and is not
among those exempted from execution;
13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject
matter of this case was in fact sold by the registered owner
in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null and void
(sic) and without any legal force and effect because it was
done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant Pilares."
5
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a
counterclaim against the Sajonas spouses. The parties
appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21, 1987, 6
after which, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial court rendered its decision on February 15, 1989. 7
It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-109417.
The court a quo stated, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the
court finds that although the title of the subject matter of the
Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name of the
Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on the said
title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated on
the same title by the plaintiffs who earlier bought said
property from the Uychocdes.
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote v.
Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse claim
is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration
of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in any
respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim
annotated on the title of the Uychocdes. x x x
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good
faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even
notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale
executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the
Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any
indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice
beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property
or that the same is involved in a litigation between said
spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of
fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized
be established by competent proof. 8 (Cai v. Henson, 51 Phil under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. *
606) x x x
Noting the changes made in the terminology of the provisions
In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the law, private respondent interpreted this to mean that
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective only for a period
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library of 30 days from its annotation, and does not automatically
lose its force afterwards. Private respondent further
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated maintains that the notice of adverse claim was annotated on
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417. August 27, 1984, hence, it will be effective only up to
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorney’s fees. September 26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant. binding force and effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs."rtua1aw library 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the petitioners by the
Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their creditor
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals 9 , (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to their
assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on
court reversed the lower court’s decision, and upheld the a compromise agreement. 18
annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title,
thus:j The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents’
theory when it ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February
15, 1989 is reversed and set aside and this complaint is "The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based on
dismissed. the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-
appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees." 10 the date of registration. However, under the provisions of
Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective
The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration.
Review on Certiorari11 , praying inter alia to set aside the The provision of this Decree is clear and specific.
Court of Appeals’ decision, and to reinstate that of the x x x
Regional Trial Court.

Private respondent filed his Comment 12 on March 5, 1992, It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section
after which, the parties were ordered to file their respective 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide
Memoranda. Private respondent complied thereto on April for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse
27, 199413 , while petitioners were able to submit their claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically provides for
Memorandum on September 29, 1992. 14 only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse
claim to remain effective until cancelled by petition of the
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate interested party, then the aforecited provision in P.D. No.
court, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not have been
inserted in the law.
I.) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE
ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984,
SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS it was effective only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when
IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on
ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was
INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior
GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE. knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the
Uychocdes’ title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as the
II.) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION
adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice of levy
70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON THE GROUND THAT
on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant
IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS’ SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE
sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution was
PROCESS.
proper and justified."cralaw virtua1aw library
Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the
The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory
parties in suit has a better right over the property in question.
construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous and
The petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership
hence, needs no interpretation nor construction. 19 Perforce,
arising from a perfected contract of absolute sale between
the appellate court stated, the provision was clear enough to
them and the registered owners of the property, such right
warrant immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was
being attested to by the notice of adverse claim 15 annotated
needed to give it force and effect. A fortiori, an adverse claim
on TCT No. N-79073 as early as August 27, 1984. Private
shall be effective only for a period of thirty (30) days from
respondent on the other hand, claims the right to levy on the
the date of its registration, after which it shall be without
property, and have it sold on execution to satisfy his
force and effect. Continuing, the court further stated;
judgment credit, arising from Civil Case No. Q-28850 16
against the Uychocdes, from whose title, petitioners derived
". . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of
their own.
preference — which should be preferred between the notice
of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed
Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of
was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of
real property where the registration of such interest or right
levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the
is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or
registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.
Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree),
and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said
In the case of Landig v. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638 it
property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or
was held that where a sale is recorded later than an
a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. Such
attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the
notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the
sale must give way to the attachment on the ground that the
Register of Deeds of the province where the property is
act of registration is the operative act to affect the land. A
located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together
similar ruling was restated in Campillo v. Court of Appeals
with other dates pertinent thereto. 17
(129 SCRA 513).x x x
The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, which provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered
owner. — An owner of registered land may convey,
mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in
accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as
are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned, and
in all cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made
in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies." (Emphasis supplied by the lower court.)
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act
which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to
go behind the register to determine the condition of the
property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on
the property which are noted on the face of the register or
certificate of title. 20
Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases
coming before us, the same, however, does not fit in the case
at bar. While it is the act of registration which is the operative
act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons
are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of
property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over
an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the
certificate of title previous to the sale. 21 While it is true that
under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree,
deeds of conveyance of property registered under the
system, or any interest therein only take effect as a
conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, and that a
purchaser is not required to explore further than what the
Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus,
one who buys from the registered owner need not have to
look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound
by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who
buys without checking the vendor’s title takes all the risks
and losses consequent to such failure. 22
In PNB v. Court of Appeals, we held that "the subsequent sale
of the property to the De Castro spouses cannot prevail over
the adverse claim of Perez, which was inscribed on the bank’s
certificate of title on October 6, 1958. That should have put
said spouses on notice, and they can claim no better legal
right over and above that of Perez. The TCT issued in the
spouses’ names on July, 1959 also carried the said
annotation of adverse claim. Consequently, they are not
entitled to any interest on the price they paid for the
property." 23
Then again, in Gardner v. Court of Appeals, we said that "the
statement of respondent court in its resolution of reversal
that ‘until the validity of an adverse claim is determined
judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in the vendor’s title’
contradicts the very object of adverse claims. As stated
earlier, the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of
real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest on the same or has a better right than the
registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail
over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the
certificate of title over the property." 24
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed
in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in force
when private respondent caused the notice of levy on
execution to be registered and annotated in the said title,
considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed
since it was annotated? This is a decisive factor in the
resolution of this instant case.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are
charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over the
subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the
cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certificate of
title.
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law
itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
lands adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to
the date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make
a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or
interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference
to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the
right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state
the adverse claimant’s residence, and designate a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. The statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the
court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice
and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid,
the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the court
after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered
was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble the costs in its discretion."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims
has to be reexamined in the light of the changes introduced
by P.D. 1529, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 70 Adverse Claim — Whoever claims any part or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration,
may, if no other provision is made in this decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting
forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state
the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all
notices may be served upon his. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate
of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of
said period the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest
may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the
land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and
the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment
as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is
adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be
ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and
hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was
frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than
one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant
may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of
Deeds a sworn petition to that effect." (Emphasis ours)
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect and a construction that
could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole. 25 For taken in
solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning
quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it
is associated. 26 In ascertaining the period of effectivity of
an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its
entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D.
1529 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration."cralaw virtua1aw library
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict
the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the
above provision cannot and should not be treated separately,
but should be read in relation to the sentence following,
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso
facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then
it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing
caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse
claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically
terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have
required the party in interest to do a useless act.
A statute’s clauses and phrases must not be taken
separately, but in its relation to the statute’s totality. Each
statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with
the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages
of the published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may
be examined by the courts in their construction, 27 An
eminent authority on the subject matter states the rule
candidly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections,
and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently, each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so as to produce
a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine its intention
to the one section construed. It is always an unsafe way of
construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of
etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply
to each, thus separated from the context, some particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase usually to be
ascertained from the context." 28
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such
that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified
petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity
period. The law, taken together, simply means that the
cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render
it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated
and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the
adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the
lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary
and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
29
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be
cancelled", which obviously indicates, as inherent in its
decision making power, that the court may or may not order
the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such
provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty
days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound
by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very
authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period
of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or
invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to
be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon
the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine
whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or
not. 30
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as
absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days
defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for
the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act
496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree),
and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or
a better right than the registered owner thereof. 31
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the
validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford
the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a
venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be
established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at
last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising
from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision
immediately following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim shall be registered by the same
claimant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the
property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from
registering a second adverse claim based on the same
ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may
only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication
as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such
claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the
adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the
interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and
warning to third parties." 32
In sum the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the
Transfer Certificate of Titled No. N-79073 was still in effect
on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto
Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto.
Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the
property sought to be levied upon on execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that
of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot
prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the
certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. This can be
deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court,
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons
— The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the
judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the
judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens or encumbrances then existing." (Emphasis
supplied)
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their
property, who waited a long time to complete payments on
their property, convinced that their interest was amply
protected by the inscribed adverse claim.
As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged
decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim would be futile and nugatory.
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. Does this mean however, that the plaintiffs ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court
thereby lost their right over the property in question? Stated of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and
in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
automatically nullify the contract to sell between the plaintiffs February 15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice
and the Uychocdes thereby depriving the former of their of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
vested right over the property? 109417 is hereby REINSTATED. The inscription of the notice
of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby
It is respectfully submitted that it did not." 33 CANCELLED. Costs against private Respondent. SO
ORDERED.
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith
of the subject property, the same should be made to rest on
the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the [G.R. No. 126996. February 15, 2000.]
appellate court, "there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees
were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ, namely: ANASTACIA
Uychocde at the time of the sale of the property by the latter VELASQUEZ, SOFIA VELASQUEZ, ELISEO VELASQUEZ,
in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of JOSE VELASQUEZ, CORAZON VELASQUEZ, LEONORA
Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross examination VELASQUEZ, and NIEVES VELASQUEZ, Petitioners, v.
on April 21, 1988." 34 THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANATALIA DE
GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES, ANDRES
MENESES, FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO
ATTY. REYES
MENESES, Respondents.
Q Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife offered to you and
your husband the property subject matter of this case, they showed you the DECISION
owner’ s transfer certificate, is it not?
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
A Yes, sir.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
Q That was shown to you the very first time that this lot was offered to you petitioners assailing the December 29, 1995 decision 1 of the
for sale? Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39729 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch
A Yes. 40, Dagupan City 2 in Civil Case No. D-9288 and the
resolution dated November 6, 1996 denying their motion for
Q After you were shown a copy of the title and after you were informed that reconsideration. 3
they are desirous in selling the same, did you and your husband decide to
buy the same? Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died
intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were
A No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of course, we visited. . . childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters
Q No, you just answer my question. You did not immediately decide? Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina
A Yes. de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the
Q When did you finally decide to buy the same? existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to
A After seeing the site and after verifying from the Register of Deeds in acquire the following real
Marikina that it is free from encumbrances, that was the time we decided. properties:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify the exact location
and the genuineness of the title, as soon after this was offered to you? a) A parcel of land (residential) situated in Guiguilonen,
A I think it’s one week after they were offered. Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the S. by Simeon
Meneses; on the E. by Dionisio Muyargas; on the N. by road
to San Jacinto; and on the W. by Juan Magalong; containing
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys an area of 995 sq. m. more or less and assessed for the
property of another without notice that some other person current year;
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or b) A parcel of land (sugar cane) and coconut land situated in
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by
person in the property. 36 Good faith consists in an honest Jose Lopez and Cipriano Serafica; on the E. by road to
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious Mapandan; on the S. by Vicente Doyola and Dalmacio
advantage of another. 37 Thus, the claim of the private Gonzales; and on the W. by Eleuterio Serafica; containing an
respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made area of 27,849 sq. m., more or less;
in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no
evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of c) A parcel of land situated in Malabago, Mangaldan,
the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Fausto Tandingan; on the
nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes’ properties E. by Segundo Toralba, Fausto Tandingan and Jacinta
or that the same was involved in any litigation between said Biasaga; on the S. by Roberto Mamapon; and on the W. by
spouses and the private Respondent. While it may be stated heirs of Estanislao Biasaga and Elena delos Reyes; containing
that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be an area of 2,077 sq. m. more or less;
established by competent proof by the party alleging the
same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be d) A parcel of land (sugarcane), situated in Embarcadero,
purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Basilio Duya
property must not be disturbed. and Bernardo Cano; on the E. by Simeon Manaois; on the S.
by a road; and on the W. by Loreto de Guzman; containing
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration an area of 2,857 sq. m., more or less; It is covered by Tax
Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in Decl. No. 231;
good faith that they can take and hold the same free from
any and all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except e) A parcel of residential land situated in Bari, Mangaldan,
those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Andres Aquino; on the E.
mentioned in the ACT as having been preserved against it. by Arcadio Barromeo; on the S. by National Road; on the W.
Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the by Andres Aquino; containing an area of 595 sq. m., more or
Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure less and covered by Tax Decl. No. 453;

f) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated in Malabago,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Segundo
Tandingan and Jacinto Biasaga; on the E. by Segundo
Toralba, Fausto Tandingan and Jacinto Biasaga; on the S. by
Roberto Mamapon; and on the W. by heirs of Estanislao
Biasaga and Elena delos Reyes; containing an area of 2,077
sq. m., more or less, and covered Tax Decl. No.
1156.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman
represented by Santiago, Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio, 4
all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for annulment,
partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez
(son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters’ refusal to
partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the
Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de
Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs’
mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses
and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in
attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de
Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velasquez that
the documents of donation and partition which she and her
husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was
not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario
Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her
sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez
together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the
properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2)
thereof, that they are entitled to ½ of each of all the
properties in question being the children of Anatalia de
Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs
further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants
forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite
plaintiffs’ repeated demands for partition, defendants
refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents
covering the properties in question since they do not bear the
genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the
partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants
in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an
accounting of the produce of the land in question from the
time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall
have been effected. 5 her husband Cornelio Aquino were in their possession until
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim
alleging among others that during the lifetime of spouses
Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had already
disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the
following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants’
late parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by
virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias dated
February 15, 1919;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants’ late
parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue
of a deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939, for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15129 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan in the names of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose
Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a deed of
conveyance (Donation Inter vivos) dated April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned
and possessed by third parties.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Defendants denied that a conference took place between
Leoncia de Guzman and plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his
mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants’ grandmother)
and Cesario Velasquez (defendants’ father), nor did the latter
promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or
to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take
possession of the subject properties since their possession
thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in
character to the exclusion of all others. By way of affirmative
defenses, defendants claim that the instant case is already
barred by res judicata since there had been three previous
cases involving the same parties, subject matter and cause
of action which were all dismissed, the last of which was
dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs’ action to
annul the documents covering the disposition of the
properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a
property held in common as agreed upon or admitted by the
parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the parties
alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for
a title and recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in
four years. 6
On May 18, 1990, a pre-trial order was issued by the trial
court which defined the issues to be resolved as follows: 7
"x x x
1. Whether or not the properties in question form part of the
estate of Anatalia de Guzman and Sps. Cornelio Aquino and
Leoncia de Guzman;
2. Whether or not plaintiff’s action is already barred by the
statutes of limitation and res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the properties in question can be the
subject of an action for partition." chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
After trial, the decision was rendered on April 8, 1992 which
ruled as follows: 8
"From the evidence, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are
brothers and sisters who are the children of Estanislao
Meneses and Anatalia de Guzman and the defendants are the
children of plaintiffs’ cousin Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman. The defendants’ mother Tranquilina de Guzman and
plaintiffs’ mother Anatalia de Guzman and Leoncia de
Guzman are full blooded sisters. The subject six (6) parcels
of land were conjugal properties of Leoncia de Guzman and
their death in 1945 and 1947, respectively. After the death
of plaintiffs’ mother Anatalia de Guzman on September 14,
1978, plaintiff Santiago Meneses came across an affidavit of
Cesario Velasquez notarized by Atty. Elpidio Barrozo stating
that he is an adopted son of said spouses Cornelio Aquino
and Leoncia de Guzman (Exhibit "A") which, is however, not
supported by evidence (a court order). The said affidavit
mentioned, among other things, a house and a parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 699 located at Guiguilonen,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, (Exhibit "B"). The sugar cane and
coconut land situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
containing an area of 27,849 square meters covered by Tax
Declaration No. 978 (Exhibit "C") which was in the possession
of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman until their
death. Sometime in 1944 Leoncia de Guzman called a
conference among the plaintiffs and spouses Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman and told them that all their
conjugal properties shall be divided equally between Anatalia
de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman and that she did not
sign documents regarding the conveyance of their
properties; and that the property (parcel B) in Malabago,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, which yielding an annual produce
worth P15,000.00 was divided between Anatalia de Guzman
and Tranquilina de Guzman.
Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman who were
childless had Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman
as their legal heirs. The latter succeeded the former over the
subject six (6) parcels of land in equal shares — ½ belongs
to Anatalia de Guzman and the other half, to Tranquilina de
Guzman."cralaw virtua1aw library
This, notwithstanding the claim of defendants that the first
parcel was donated to Jose Velasquez and Anastacia
Velasquez by way of "Donation Intervivos." chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The second parcel, sold to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de (4) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay to
Guzman; plaintiffs P50,000.00, as damages, P5,000.00, as attorney’s
fees and P3,000.00, as litigation expenses."cralaw virtua1aw
The third and 6th parcels, donated to Cesario Velasquez and library
Camila de Guzman; and
Dissatisfied, defendants appealed the decision to the
The 4th and 5th parcels, sold to third parties. respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the same in a
decision dated December 29, 1995.
The claim of Cesario Velasquez that he was adopted by the
Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman is not The Court of Appeals rejected the defense of res judicata
supported by evidence. which was never pleaded nor raised earlier, and for that
reason was deemed waived. The appellate court also
The Court finds plaintiff Santiago Meneses credible; and his dismissed the claim of prescription as an action for partition
testimony, credible by itself. Santiago Meneses who is 80 is imprescriptible. As regards the previous transfers executed
years old testified spontaneously in a clear, straight forward in favor of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court’s
and convincing manner. finding that the transfers were repudiated before the death
of Leoncia. 9
The version of the defendants to the effect that spouses
Cornelio de Guzman and Leoncia de Guzman left no A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but the
properties cannot be given serious consideration. It is same was denied by the respondent court in a resolution
incredible and unbelievable. dated November 6, 1996.

How did the spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman Attributing reversible errors to the appellate court,
support and maintain themselves if they disposed of their petitioners elevated the case to this Court on the following
valuable properties, the six (6) parcels of land in question, main issues: 10
during their lifetime? Did they really leave no properties?
These questions remained unanswered. I. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT CASE IS BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA AND BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The defendants failed to prove their allegations that the
Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman disposed of II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTIES MENTIONED IN THE
their properties during their lifetime. COMPLAINT FORM PART OF THE ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES
CORNELIO AQUINO AND LEONCIA DE GUZMAN.
Defendant Eliseo Velasquez is a lawyer and his co-defendant
brothers are retired government officials. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE ACQUIRED
ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OF THE
On the other hand, the plaintiffs are simple, innocent country PROPERTIES IN QUESTION.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
folks who have not obtained substantial level of education.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEIRS OF
The Court believes and so holds that the defendants ANATALIA DE GUZMAN ARE LEGAL HEIRS OF SPOUSES
manipulated the transfer unto themselves all the properties CORNELIO AQUINO AND LEONCIA DE GUZMAN.
of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman; thus,
depriving the plaintiffs their shares in the inheritance, to their V. WHETHER OR NOT PARTITION IS THE PROPER ACTION IN
prejudice and damage.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red THE INSTANT CASE.

Insofar as the issue of whether or not partition prescribes,
the court believes and so rules that it does not.
x x x grievance and came up with a judicious determination of the
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Declaring Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de
Guzman as the legal heirs of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and
Leoncia de Guzman; and that the former succeeded the latter
over the six (6) parcels of land in question in equal shares —
½ belongs to Anatalia de Guzman or to her heirs; and ½, to
Tranquilina de Guzman or to her heirs;
(2) Declaring the Donation Intervivos in favor of Jose
Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of
land; the Deed of Sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the second parcel; the Deed of Donation to
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the 3rd and
6th parcels; the Deed of Sale to third parties over the 4th
and 5th parcels as null and void insofar as ½ of the six (6)
parcels are concerned which legitimately belong to the
plaintiffs;
(3) Ordering the defendants to reconvey to the plaintiffs ½
each of the six (6) properties in question and if this is not
possible, to reconvey the whole of the sugar cane and
coconut land situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
containing an area of 27,849 square meters, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 978 (Exhibit "C") — parcel B, par. 2 of the
complaint; and
In their Comment, private respondents allege that the issue
of res judicata has been sufficiently discussed and considered
and the trial court opted to inquire into their legitimate
case on the merits; that the present case involves
respondents who are simple, ignorant folks who have not
obtained substantial level of education and are unaware of
the legal intricacies and technicalities in pursuing their valid
claim. They further contend that this action is not yet barred
by the statute of limitation since an action for partition is
imprescriptible and that the court correctly ruled that the
instant action for partition is proper.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners contend that public respondent erred when it held
that the issue of res judicata was never raised either in the
Answer or at the Pre-trial such that it was not under
consideration. We agree with the petitioner. The records
show that the defense of res judicata was raised in the
petitioners’ Amended Answer filed before the trial court more
particularly under paragraph 18, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"18. b. The case at bar is already barred by RES JUDICATA,
there having been three (3) previous cases involving either
the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein or of the
present parties themselves, the same subject matter, and
the same cause of action, which were all dismissed, the last
dismissal having been ordered by this very same Honorable
Court in Civil Case No. D-8811 on October 21, 1988 for
failure to prosecute which dismissal has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits and therefore with prejudice as
this Honorable Court did not provide otherwise (Sec. 3, Rule
17) and the Plaintiffs in said case, who are the same plaintiffs
in the present case did not appeal from said order of
dismissal."cralaw virtua1aw library
Said Amended Answer was admitted by the trial court in its
Order dated March 2, 1990 11 and was one of the issues
stipulated for resolution in its Pre-trial Order dated May 18,
1990. Thus, it was clear error for respondent court to
conclude that res judicata was never raised in the lower
court.chanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary
The next question is whether res judicata is present in the
instant case. We rule in the affirmative. Petitioners in their
Memorandum established that there were three (3) earlier
cases filed by private respondents against petitioners
involving the same subject matter and issues as in the instant
case which were all dismissed, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The first Complaint filed by Anatalia de Guzman, mother of
private respondent Santiago Meneses, against Tranquilina de
Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez, docketed as Civil
Case No. 11378 of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. Said action was dismissed on August 18, 1950.
Thirty four (34) years after, or on October 9, 1984, private
respondent Santiago Meneses filed a second Complaint
similar to the Complaint of his mother (Civil Case No. 11378)
which was docketed as Civil Case No. D-7584, entitled "Heirs
of Anatalia de Guzman, represented by Santiago Meneses v.
Cesario Velasquez, Defendant. In the order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, dated May 28, 1986,
this Complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute without
prejudice (Exh. "16").
Private respondent Santiago Meneses refiled the Complaint
allegedly joined this time by his siblings on October 23, 1987;
which was docketed as Civil Case No. P-8811 and entitled
"Heirs of Anatalia de Guzman, namely: Santiago Meneses,
Apolonio Meneses, Andres Meneses, Luis Meneses, Felicidad
Meneses, Plaintiffs, versus Heirs of Cesario Velasquez,
namely: Anastacia Velasquez, Sofia Velasquez, Eliseo
Velasquez, Jose Velasquez, Leonora Velasquez, Nieves
Velasquez, Defendants." (Exh. "17"). On October 21, 1988,
the Court a quo dismissed this Complaint as follows: "For
failure to prosecute, the case is hereby dismissed without
costs." (Exh. "18")." chanrobles.com : law library
Petitioners’ allegations were never rebutted by private
respondents in their Comment as the only defense raised
therein was that the application of the principle of res
judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is
within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purpose of justice requires it. We have examined the third
complaint filed by private respondents on October 23, 1987
and compared it with the instant case, and we found that the
allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and
that there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. Thus the requisites of res judicata are present,
namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b)
it must be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be
between the first and the second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the dismissal
of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has
the effect of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood
to be with prejudice. 12 On this ground alone, the trial court
should have already dismissed this case. However,
considering that this case had already reached this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari, it would be more in
keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between
the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on
a procedural technicality in the light of the express mandate
of the rules that they be "liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding." 13
Petitioners next contend that private respondent Santiago
Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of
Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of
petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez and their
predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman since he failed to adduce any evidence to support
his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity.
Petitioners claim that they were able to show by
documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their
lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the
complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias
dated February 15, 1919 in favor of then future spouses
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners’
parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel
and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the
complaint; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10,
1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners
Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c) Escritura de
Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another
portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration; (d) Deed of
Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the
remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de
donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa
abovementioned. Petitioners claim that the record is bereft
of any evidence showing the infirmities in these formidable
array of documentary evidence but the courts below declared
their nullity on the basis of the "telltale" story of Santiago
Meneses. They contend that in giving credence to the
testimony of Santiago Meneses that all the deeds of
conveyances executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of the
petitioners were a nullity, Santiago would want to make it
appear that the spouses Aquino, in giving dowry thru
escritura de donation propter nuptias and donation inter
vivos, were only fooling the innocent youngsters and then
future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman,
and the innocent minors donees Jose and Anatascia
Velasquez respectively.chanrobles.com : red
Petitioners’ submission is impressed with merit.
After an examination of the records, we find that there is no
preponderance of evidence adduced during the trial to
support the findings and conclusions of the courts below,
which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a rule,
factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon
this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine
or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by
the parties. 14 However, although this Court is not a trier of
facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual
findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not
conform to the evidence on record, 15 in the instant case, we
are not bound to adhere to the general rule since both courts
clearly failed to consider facts and circumstances which
should have drawn a different conclusion. 16
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court
must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in
an action for partition. 17 Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69
requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint
the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until
and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.
18
We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court
that it has been adequately shown that the alleged transfers
of properties to the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest made
by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncia’s
death; thus private respondents are still entitled to share in
the subject properties. There is no preponderance of
evidence to support the findings and conclusions of both
courts. The trial court declared the nullity of the donation
inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia
Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the
complaint, the deed of sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila
de Guzman over the second parcel and the deed of donation
propter nuptias over the third and sixth parcels and the sale
to third parties of fourth and fifth parcels insofar as the ½ of
these parcels of land are concerned which "legitimately
belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied
solely on the basis of Santiago Meneses’ testimony "that in
1944 when his aunt Leoncia de Guzman was still alive, she
called a conference among them, the plaintiffs and their
mother Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother
Tranquilina, telling them that all their properties which are
conjugal in nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia
and Tranquilina and not to believe the documents
purportedly signed by her because she did not sign them."
19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses’ testimony is to the
effect that Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of
the subject properties in favor of the petitioners. However,
Santiago Meneses’ testimony was never corroborated by any
other evidence despite his testimony that the alleged
conference was also made in the presence of third parties.
Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in 1944,
a year before Leoncia’s death, Leoncia could have executed
another set of documents revoking or repudiating whatever
dispositions she had earlier made to show her alleged
intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her
sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina de Guzman but there was
none. The trial court found the testimony of Santiago
Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and this was
affirmed by the respondent court which stated that the
matter of ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court.
However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of
his life" is not always a guaranty that he would tell the truth.
It is also quite common that advanced age makes a person
mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has
appeared to him, and at times it weakens his resistance to
outside influence. 20
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the
uncontroverted and ancient documentary evidence showing
that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had
already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of
the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was
in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias
dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners’
parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel in
the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;
21 (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939
conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia
Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; 22 (c) Escritura de
Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another
portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration; 23 (d) Deed
of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the
remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de
donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa
abovementioned. 24 It was reversible error for the court to
overlook the probative value of these notarized
documents.chanrobles.com : red
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee 25 and the donation is perfected from the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. 26 And
once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property donated. 27 The donation of the first
parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten
(10) years old respectively was accepted through their father
Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in
the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it,
and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally
speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and
the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation
inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in
Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. 28 The donation
propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion
of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses
Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias
can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and
the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.
29 The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e.,
that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their
properties since Anatalia (Leoncia’s sister) had several
children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation
of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the
donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the
second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14,
1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact
in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses
ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous
deeds of conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses over
the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale
became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the
names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July
25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of the land is the
certificate of title 30 and it requires more than a bare
allegation to defeat the face value of TCT No. 15129 which
enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance. 31
Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered
into contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as
annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly
established that he exercised full ownership and control over
the property. It is quite surprising that it was only after more
than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-
ownership claim over the subject property.
The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land
during their lifetime and the documents were duly notarized
so that these documents enjoy the presumption of validity.
32 Such presumption has not been overcome by private
respondent Santiago Meneses with clear and convincing
evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 33
Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of
land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses
hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties
of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the
fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were
also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any
right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that this action of
partition cannot be maintained. The properties sought to be
partitioned by private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the
hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding
that no co-ownership exists between private respondents
and petitioners, we find no reason to discuss the other
arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals as
well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City are SET ASIDE. The complaint in the trial court against
petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED.chanrobles virtua| |aw
|ibrary
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 187056 : September 20, 2010]
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS,
VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., ALL
SURNAMED G. FERRER, AND MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a
donation mortis causa, which in reality is a donation inter
vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and
acceptance thereof by the donees, and immediately
transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter,
thus precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by one of
the donors.
The Facts and the Case
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe
Gonzales executed a document entitled "Donation Mortis
Causa"[1] in favor of their two children, Asuncion and
Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of
their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses' 126-
square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila[2] in
equal shares. The deed of donation reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be
irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano
Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now occupied
by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall
not in any way affect any other distribution of other
properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or
intestate and where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves
the right, ownership, possession and administration of this
property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition
and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death
of the DONORS.[3]
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in
law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation
clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named
donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation
on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few
months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion.
Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August
27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-
90589.[4] Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father
Leopoldo's assignment of his rights and interests in the
property to her.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20,
2003,[5] finding that the donation was in fact one made inter
vivos, the donors' intention being to transfer title over the
property to the donees during the donors' lifetime, given its
irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldo's
subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the
property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC
thus directed the registration of the property in the name of
the donees in equal shares.[6]
On Asuncion's appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision on December 23, 2008,[7] reversing that
of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her
petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa,
collaterally attack Leopoldo's deed of assignment in
Asuncion's favor. The CA further held that, since no
proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed
was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding
the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the
donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with
the requirements of a notarial will,[8] rendering the same
void. Following the CA's denial of Jarabini's motion for
reconsideration,[9] she filed the present petition with this
Court.
Issue Presented
The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses
Leopoldo and Guadalupe's donation to Asuncion, Emiliano,
and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was
denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
The Court's Ruling
That the document in question in this case was captioned
"Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has
held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles
it mortis causa.[10]
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court held that
"irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the
idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is
precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis
causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.[12] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express
"irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard
that identifies the document as a donation inter
vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that
this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the
donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso
that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the
donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a
donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right,
ownership, possession, and administration of the property"
and made the donation operative upon their death. But this
Court has consistently held that such reservation
(reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived.[13]
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the
donation, which acceptance the deed required.[14] This Court
has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement
only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa,
being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee
during the donor's lifetime.[15]
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v.
Peñaflorida,[16] in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in
order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it
was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such
kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the
donor learned of the donee's acceptance of the
donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute
owner of the property donated.[17]
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one
given inter vivos, Leopoldo's subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be
regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to
assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat
quod non habet.[18]
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a
petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a
donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a
donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donor's
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the
property. The Court has held before that the rule on probate
is not inflexible and absolute.[19] Moreover, in opposing the
petition for probate and in putting the validity of the deed of
assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or those who
substituted her may not now claim that the trial court
improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS
ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March
6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
80549, and REINSTATES in totothe June 20, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc.
98-90589.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112796. March 5, 1998
TITO R. LAGAZO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO CABANLIT, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate
instrument but not formally communicated to the donor, may
the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and
subsisting? Where the deed of donation did not expressly
impose any burden -- the expressed consideration being
purely one of liberality and generosity -- but the recipient
actually paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes
and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed
onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts?
The Case
The Court answers these questions in the negative as it
resolves this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-GR CV No. 38050 promulgated on November
29, 1993. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 30, Manila, in Civil Case No. 87-39133 which
had disposed3 of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner
in the following manner:4
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant, or any person claiming rights
under him, to surrender to plaintiff possession of the
premises known as Lot 8w, Block 6, Psd-135534 of the
Monserrat Estate, and the improvement standing thereon,
located at 3320 2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorneys fees; and
3. Costs against the defendant.
The defendants counterclaims are hereby dismissed.
The Facts
Although the legal conclusions and dispositions of the trial
and the appellate courts are conflicting, the factual
antecedents of the case are not substantially disputed.5 We
reproduce their narration from the assailed Decision:
Civil Case No. 83-39133 involves an action filed by plaintiff-
appellee [herein petitioner] on January 22, 1987 seeking to
recover from defendant-appellant [a] parcel of land which
the former claims to have acquired from his grandmother by
donation. Defendant-appellant [herein private respondent],
on the other hand, put up the defense that when the alleged
donation was executed, he had already acquired the property
by a Deed of Assignment from a transferee of plaintiff-
appellees grandmother.
The evidence for plaintiff-appellee [herein petitioner] is
summarized as follows:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of
Plaintiff-Appellee, was awarded in July 1975 a 60.10-square
meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate, more
particularly described as Lot 8W, Block 6 of Psd-135834,
located at 3320 2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila
and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-
for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a
house on the lot.
On October 3, 1977, or shortly before she left for Canada
where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob
executed a special power of attorney (Exh. A) in favor of her
son-in-law Eduardo B. Espaol authorizing him to execute all
documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim
as awardee of the lot.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Espaol to accomplish the
purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina
Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in
Canada on April 16, 1984 (Exh. D). Simultaneous with the
revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of
attorney of the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.
On January 30, 1985, Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a
Deed of Donation over a Lot 8W in favor of plaintiff-appellee
(Exh. E). Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked
with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property
was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in
arrears and the remaining balance on the lot (Exhs. F, F-1
and F-2) and declared the said property in the name of
Catalina Jacob (Exhs. G, G-1, G-2 and G-3).
On January 29, 1986, plaintiff-appellee sent a demand letter
to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate the premises
(Exh. H). A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellees
counsel to defendant on September 11, 1986 (Exh. I).
However, defendant-appellant refused to vacate the
premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-
appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against defendant-appellant.
Opposing plaintiff-appellees version, defendant-appellant
claimed that the house and lot in controversy were his by
virtue of the following documents:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina Jacob dated
October 7, 1977 in favor of Eduardo B. Espaol covering the
residential house located at the premises (Exh. 4).
2. Deed of Assignment over Lot 8W executed by Catalina
Jacob in favor of Eduardo Espaol dated September 30, 1980
(Exh. 5); and
3. Deed of Assignment executed by Eduardo B. Espaol over
Lot 8W and a residential house thereon in favor of defendant-
appellant dated October 2, 1982 (Exh. 6).
After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-
appellee and against defendant-appellant, rationalizing that
the version of the former is more credible than that of the
latter. According to the lower court:
From the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
parties[,] it appears that the plaintiff- has a better right over
the property, subject matter of the case. The version of the
plaintiff is more credible than that of the defendant. The
theory of the plaintiff is that the house and lot belong to him
by virtue of the Deed of Donation in his favor executed by his
grandmother Mrs. Jacob Vda. de Reyes, the real awardee of
the lot in question. The defendants theory is that he is the
owner thereof because he bought the house and lot from
Eduardo Espaol, after the latter had shown and given to him
Exhibits 1, 4 and 5. He admitted that he signed the Deed of
Assignment in favor of Eduardo Espaol on September 30,
1980, but did not see awardee Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes
signed [sic] it. In fact, the acknowledgement in Exhibit 5
shows that the assignor/awardee did not appear before the
notary public. It may be noted that on said date, the original
awardee of the lot was no longer in the Philippines, as both
parties admitted that she had not come back to the
Philippines since 1977. (Exhs. K, K-1). Defendant, claiming
to be the owner of the lot, unbelievably did not take any
action to have the said house and lot be registered or had
them declared in his own name. Even his Exhibit 7 was not
mailed or served to the addressee. Such attitude and laxity
is very unnatural for a buyer/owner of a property, in stark
contrast of [sic] the interest shown by the plaintiff who saw
to it that the lot was removed from the delinquent list for
non-payment of installments and taxes due thereto [sic].6
Ruling of the Appellate Court
In reversing the trial courts decision,7 Respondent Court of
Appeals anchored its ruling upon the absence of any showing
that petitioner accepted his grandmothers donation of the
subject land. Citing jurisprudence that the donees failure to
accept a donation whether in the same deed of donation or
in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void,
Respondent Court denied petitioners claim of ownership over
the disputed land. The appellate court also struck down
petitioners contention that the formalities for a donation of
real property should not apply to his case since it was an
onerous one -- he paid for the amortizations due on the land
before and after the execution of the deed of donation --
reasoning that the deed showed no burden, charge or
condition imposed upon the donee; thus, the payments made
by petitioner were his voluntary acts.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling, petitioner now seeks a
favorable disposition from this Court.8
Issues
Petitioner anchors his petition on the following grounds:9
[I.] In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals decided a question of substance in a way not in
accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court.
[II.] Even granting the correctness of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, certain fact and circumstances transpired
in the meantime which would render said decision manifestly
unjust, unfair and inequitable to petitioner.
We believe that the resolution of this case hinges on the issue
of whether the donation was simple or onerous.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Main Issue:
Simple or Onerous Donation?
At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation
and an onerous one. A simple or pure donation is one whose
cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an
onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges
or future services equal to or more in value than the thing
donated.10 Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with
an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple
donation are not applicable.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions
imposed upon a donation need not be stated on the deed of
donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically
impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by
him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality
paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining
balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his
acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided
under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with
the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His
payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of
his right of possession against private respondent clearly
indicate his acceptance of the donation.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even
conceding that petitioners full payment of the purchase price
of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment
was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection which
the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality
and generosity and considering further that the DONEE is a
grandson of the DONOR, the DONOR hereby voluntarily and
freely gives, transfer[s] and conveys, by way of donation
unto said DONEE, his heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, all the right, title and interest which the said DONOR
has in the above described real property, together with all
the buildings and improvements found therein, free from all
lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges
whatsoever;11 [underscoring supplied]
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden
or charge petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are
in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent
Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his
voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his
testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a
burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.
ATTY FORONDA:
q After you have received this [sic] documents, the x x x
revocation of power of attorney and the Special Power of
Attorney in your favor, what did you do?
WITNESS:
a I went here in City Hall and verif[ied] the status of the
award of my grandmother.
q When you say the award, are you referring to the award in
particular [of the] lot in favor of your grandmother?
a Yes, Sir.
q What was the result of your verification?
a According to the person in the office, the papers of my
grandmother is [sic] includ[ed] in the dilinquent [sic] list.
q What did you do then when you found out that the lot was
includ[ed] in the dilinquent [sic] list?
a I talked to the person in charged [sic] in the office and I
asked him what to do so that the lot should not [be] included
in the dilinquent [sic] list.
ATTY. FORONDA:
q And what was the anwer [sic] given to you to the inquiry
which you made?
WITNESS:
a According to the person in the office, that I would pay the
at least [sic] one half of the installment in order to take [out]
the document [from] the delinquent list.
q And [were] you able to pay?
a I was able to pay, sir.
q What were you able to pay, one half of the balance or the
entire amounts [sic]?
a First, I paid the [sic] one half of the balance since the time
the lot was awarded to us.
q What about the remaining balance, were you able to pay
it?
a I was able to pay that, sir.
q So, as of now, the amount in the City of Manila of the lot
has already been duly paid, is it not?
a Yes, sir.12
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the
power of attorney13executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of
petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts
necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the
records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in
the donation.
As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the
Civil Code are applicable:
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the
donor and the donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public instrument, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation
and in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.
In the words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,14 Like
any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319,
Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. Furthermore, [i]f the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.15
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore,
indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and
void.16 The perfection and the validity of a donation are well
explained by former Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino in this wise:
x x x Title to immovable property does not pass from the
donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and
unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in
the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does
not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it
shows the intention to accept. But in this case it is necessary
that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact
that due notice has been given must be noted in both
instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that
showing the acceptance). Then and only then is the donation
perfected. If the instrument of donation has been recorded
in the registry of property, the instrument that shows the
acceptance should also be recorded. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal
notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is
either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of
donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null
and void.17
Exhibit E (the deed of donation) does not show any indication
that petitioner-donee accepted the gift. During the trial, he
did not present any instrument evidencing such acceptance
despite the fact that private respondent already raised this
allegation in his supplemental pleading18to which petitioner
raised no objection. It was only after the Court of Appeals
had rendered its decision, when petitioner came before this
Court, that he submitted an affidavit19 dated August 28,
1990, manifesting that he wholeheartedly accepted the lot
given to him by his grandmother, Catalina Reyes. This is too
late, because arguments, evidence, causes of action and
matters not raised in the trial court may no longer be raised
on appeal.20
True, the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time
during the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that
such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal,
there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such
acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the
deed of donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of
annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance
was not fulfilled by petitioner. For this reason, the subject lot
cannot be adjudicated to him.
Secondary Issue:
Supervening Events
Petitioner also contends that certain supervening events
have transpired which render the assailed Decision
manifestly unjust, unfair and inequitable to him. The City of
Manila has granted his request for the transfer to his name
of the lot originally awarded in favor of Catalina Reyes. A
deed of sale21 covering the subject lot has in fact been
executed between the City of Manila, as the vendor, and
petitioner, as the vendee. The corresponding certificate of
title22 has also been issued in petitioners name.
A close perusal of the city governments resolution23 granting
petitioners request reveals that the request for and the grant
of the transfer of the award were premised on the validity
and perfection of the deed of donation executed by the
original awardee, petitioners grandmother. This is the same
document upon which petitioner, as against private
respondent, asserts his right over the lot. But, as earlier
discussed and ruled, this document has no force and effect
and, therefore, passes no title, right or interest.
Furthermore, the same resolution states:
WHEREAS, in a report submitted by Ms. [Menchu C.] Bello [,
Special Investigator,] on February 7, 1990, it is stated that x
x x constructed on the lot is a make-shift structure used for
residential purposes by the proposed transferee Tito Lagazo
and his family; x x x and that constructed at Lot 8, Block 6,
former Monserrat Estate is a make-shift structure used as a
dwelling place by Lagazo and family because the front portion
of their house which was constructed on a road lot was
demolished, and the structure was extended backward
covering a portion of the old temporary road lot. x x x
The above findings of the investigator are, however, directly
contradictory to the testimonies in court of petitioner himself
and of private respondent. Petitioner claimed the following:
that the house constructed on the subject lot was owned by
his grandmother Catalina Jacob; that before the latter left for
Canada in 1977, Eduardo Espaol had already been living in
the same house and continued to do so until 1982; and that
private respondent occupied the premises after Espaol
left.24 On the other hand, private respondent testified that he
bought the subject house and lot from Eduardo Espaol in
1982, after which he and his family occupied the same; but
sometime in 1985, they had to leave the place due to a road-
widening project which reduced the house to about three
meters [in] length and one arm[]s width.25
Between the testimonies under oath of the contending
parties and the report -- not subjected to cross-examination
-- which was prepared by the investigator who recommended
the approval of petitioners request for transfer, it is the
former to which the Court is inclined to give more credence.
The investigators report must have been based on the
misrepresentations of petitioner who arrogated unto himself
the prerogatives of both Espaol and private respondent.
Further, it is on record that petitioner had required private
respondent to vacate the subject premises before he
instituted this complaint. This shows he was not in actual
possession of the property, contrary to the report of the
investigator.
Cabanlits Claim of Ownership
Petitioner also assails Respondent Courts conclusion that it is
unnecessary to pass upon private respondents claim over the
property. Petitioner insists that the principal issue in the
case, as agreed upon by the parties during pretrial, is who
between the parties is the owner of the house and lot in
question.
In disposing of the principal issue of the right of petitioner
over the subject property under the deed of donation, we
arrive at one definite conclusion: on the basis of the alleged
donation, petitioner cannot be considered the lawful owner
of the subject property. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that private respondent is automatically the rightful
owner.
In resolving private respondents claim of ownership, the
examination of the genuineness of the documents (deeds of
assignment over the lot between Catalina Reyes and Eduardo
Espaol and between Espaol and private respondent) upon
which he asserts his right is necessary, especially in light of
petitioners allegations of forgery. However, the respective
assignors in both documents are not parties to the instant
case. Not having been impleaded in the trial court, they had
no participation whatsoever in the proceedings at bar.
Elementary norms of fair play and due process bar us from
making any disposition which may affect their rights. Verily,
there can be no valid judgment for or against them.26
Anyhow, since petitioner, who was the plaintiff below, failed
to prove with clear and convincing evidence his ownership
claim over the subject property, the parties thus resume
their status quo ante. The trial court should have dismissed
his complaint for his failure to prove a right superior to that
of private respondent, but without prejudice to any action
that Catalina Reyes or Eduardo Espaol or both may have
against said private respondent. Stating this point otherwise,
we are not ruling in this case on the rights and obligations
between, on the one hand, Catalina Reyes, her assigns
and/or representatives; and, on the other, Private
Respondent Cabanlit.
Not having proven any right to a valid, just and demandable
claim that compelled him to litigate or to incur expenses in
order to protect his interests by reason of an unjustified act
or omission of private respondent, petitioner cannot be
awarded attorneys fees.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132964. February 18, 2000.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. DAVID
REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of
the 5 March 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which
affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 77,
Malolos, Bulacan, of the petition for escheat filed by the
Government. 2
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the
son of the spouses Simeon Guzman, 3 a naturalized
American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American
citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen
and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land
located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT
Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839 (M), T-146840 (M), T-146841
(M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257
(M).chanrobles.com : red
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman
dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property
belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of
extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due
thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact, Attys.
Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land
were accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers
Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not
to have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela,
Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on
9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as
well as modifying the document to encompass all her other
property in the Philippines. 4
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of
Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner
of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim
executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty.
Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1
February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of
Helen, paid donor’s taxes to facilitate the registry of the
parcels of land in the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote
the Office of the Solicitor General and furnished it with
documents showing that David’s ownership of the one-half
(1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the
basis thereof, the Government filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that
one-half (1/2) of David’s interest in each of the subject
parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994
David Rey Guzman responded with a prayer that the petition
be dismissed.
On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding
that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers
Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership
of the property subject thereof remained with her. 5
The Government appealed 6 the dismissal of the petition but
the appellate court affirmed the court a quo.chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary
Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII of the Constitution
which provides — bloodline of Simeon from where they originated, over and
SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
SECTION 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands
in the Philippines. The only instances when a foreigner can
acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore
contends that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David
does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts that
David being an American citizen could not validly acquire
one-half (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land
by way of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality
donations inter vivos. It also reasons out that the elements
of donation are present in the conveyance made by Helen in
favor of David: first, Helen consented to the execution of the
documents; second, the dispositions were made in public
documents; third, David manifested his acceptance of the
donation in the Special Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were
executed with the intention of benefiting David; and lastly,
there was a resultant decrease in the assets or patrimony of
Helen, being the donor. Petitioner further argues that the
payment of donor’s taxes on the property proved that Helen
intended the transfer to be a gift or donation inter vivos.
David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the
property by right of accretion and not by way of donation,
with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen’s intention
to renounce her share in the property and not an intention to
donate. He further argues that, assuming there was indeed
a donation, it never took effect since the Special Power of
Attorney he executed does not indicate acceptance of the
alleged donation.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the
reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in
the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act
of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation
of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that there should
be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation
or in a separate public document. 7 In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated
that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments. 8 other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property
are present in the instant case. The transfer of the property
by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted
in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helen’s intention to perform an act of liberality in
favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of
the two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to
convey to her son David certain parcels of land located in the
Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she executed in
1981 which likewise declared a waiver and renunciation of
her rights over the parcels of land. The language of the deed
of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver
of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of
David, and not a donation. That a donation was far from
Helen’s mind is further supported by her deposition which
indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels
of land was not possible since Philippine law does not allow
such an arrangement. 9 She reasoned that if she really
intended to donate something to David it would have been
more convenient if she sold the property and gave him the
proceeds therefrom. 10 It appears that foremost in Helen’s
mind was the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the
above the benefit that would accrue to David by reason of
her renunciation. 11 The element of animus donandi
therefore was missing.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen
may have been in the nature of a public document but they
lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form
required by law to make the donation valid. We find no merit
in petitioner’s argument that the Special Power of Attorney
executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela manifests
his implied acceptance of his mother’s alleged donation as a
scrutiny of the document clearly evinces the absence thereof.
The Special Power of Attorney merely acknowledges that
David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes
Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no
intimation, expressly or impliedly, that David’s acquisition of
the parcels of land is by virtue of Helen’s possible donation
to him and we cannot look beyond the language of the
document to make a contrary construction as this would be
inconsistent with the parol evidence rule. 12
Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a
separate public writing the notice of the acceptance must be
noted not only in the document containing the acceptance
but also in the deed of donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of
the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 13 came Manresa said:
"If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it
must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary;
it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept . . . it is
necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor,
and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in
both instruments. Then and only then is the donation
perfected. 14"
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the
deed of donation is recorded in the registry of property the
document that evidences the acceptance — if this has not
been made in the deed of gift — should also be recorded. And
in one or both documents, as the case may be, the
notification of the acceptance as formally made to the donor
or donors should be duly set forth. 15 Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal
notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is
either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of
donation, and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null
and void. 16
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been
complied with, and no proof of compliance appears in the
record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance
of the parcels of land by Helen in favor of David but its
acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the
Special Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no
thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-settled
that if the notification and notation are not complied with,
the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not
having been complied with, there was no effective
conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter
vivos. 17
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the
repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is
no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together
with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing
and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the property
in Simeon’s estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement
the parcels of land were registered in her and her son’s name
in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they
possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of
the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made
is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was
made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when
an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen’s acceptance of her
inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the
causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of
the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus,
pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her
previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon’s estate. Hence, the two (2)
quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after
she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and
effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso
facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius
18 to be escheated in favor of the Government. The
repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land
should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although
being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary
succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
which sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the petition for escheat is
AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001.]
RICKY Q. QUILALA, Petitioner, v. GLICERIA
ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and
JOSE REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over
a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an
area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of
Deeds for Manila.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two
pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself,
and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as
donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental
witnesses. 1 The second page contains the Acknowledgment,
which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the
donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There
appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the
signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and
on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala
and the other witness. 2 The Acknowledgment
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
QUEZON CITY) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon,
Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No.
19055265 issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known
to me and to me known to be the same person who executed
the foregoing instruments and acknowledged to me that the
same is her own free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2)
pages, including the page on which this acknowledgment is
written, has been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her
instrumental witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-
hand margin of page 2 and both pages have been sealed with
my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City
of Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and
TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala
alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be
Catalina’s only surviving relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto
themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against
petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds
of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the
donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No.
143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently, respondents
withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo T. San Pedro
and he was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged
before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation
null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere
in Catalina’s SSS records does it appear that Violeta was
Catalina’s daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein
as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that
the adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court
found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala.
However, since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will,
the trial court ruled that respondents’ deed of extrajudicial
settlement can not be registered. The trial court rendered
judgment as follows:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes
and Juan Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real
property inter vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by
Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as
11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala
and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the
Estate of Catalina Quilala;.
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the
registration of the deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B
and B-1,) and the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila
of a transfer certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs;
and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs. SO ORDERED. 3 virtual
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the
complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the
filing of probate proceedings of Catalina’s alleged last will and
testament. 4 person or persons executing the same in the presence of at
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action
without prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate
proceedings by the interested parties so as not to render
nugatory the right of the lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
of Appeals denied on February 11, 1998. 5 Hence, this
petition for review, raising the following assignment of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
DEED OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS
NOT REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE
LOWER COURT’S RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT
THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA. 6 As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation,
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation
executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of
the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made
in a public instrument in order to be valid, 7 specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring
ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee, 8 and is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee, 9 provided the donee is not
disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation.
Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable, 10 and the donee becomes the absolute owner
of the property. 11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.
12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public
document, 13 and the donor must know the acceptance by
the donee. 14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the
number of the certificate of title as well as the technical
description of the real property donated. It stipulated that
the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love
and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and
as an act of liberality and generosity." 15 This was sufficient
cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as
"an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously
of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it." 16
The donee’s acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which
reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and
donation made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby
expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness
and generosity of the DONOR. 17
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However,
the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page
mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial
court ruled that for Violeta’s failure to acknowledge her
acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth
merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of the
instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:chanrob1es
1aw library
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with
law in the form of public instruments shall be registrable:
Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by
least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall
be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person
or persons executing the same before a notary public or other
public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment.
Where the instrument so acknowledged consists of two or
more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is
written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not
contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary
public, except the page where the signatures already appear
at the foot of the instrument shall be signed on the left
margin thereof by the person or persons executing the
instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages sealed with
the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages
shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where the instrument
acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or
encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number
thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment."
(Emphasis supplied).
on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the
donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the
donee and the other witness on the right hand margin.
Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the
instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely
is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is
authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to
avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a
contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the
instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is
written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature
is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on
the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document.
The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the
requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed
substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the
donee before the notary public does not also render the
donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in
its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in
part and a public document in another part. The fact that it
was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed
of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that
the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second
page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her
acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of
the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public
instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts,
can not make a determination of whether Violeta was the
daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of
Violeta. These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate
probate or settlement proceedings affecting the respective
estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the
donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still be
subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,
18 in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject to collation
after the donor’s death, 19 whether the donation was made
to a compulsory heir or a stranger, 20 unless there is an
express prohibition if that had been the donor’s intention.
21chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals , is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered
dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002]
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and
MERLY S. CABATINGAN, petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF
CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA,
PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M.
YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C.
NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA
NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA
NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND
NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD
and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD,
ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C.
NAVADA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for
review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is the sole issue of whether the donations made by the late
Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis
causa.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in
favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a Deed
of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot
covering one-half () portion of the formers house and lot
located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.[1] Four (4) other deeds of
donation were subsequently executed by Conchita
Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a)
petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one
located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion
of a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner
Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in
Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S.
Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq.
m.).[2] These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to
wit:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by
these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto
the DONEE the above-described property, together with the
buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die
before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and
effect; x x x[3] (Emphasis Ours)
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue,
Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of
Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed as
Civil Case No. MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four
(4) deeds of donation executed on January 14,
1995. Respondents allege, inter alia, that
petitioners,through their sinister machinations and strategies
and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingans fragile
condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation,
and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with
the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills
and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis
causa.[4] Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in
order to preserve the disputed properties, and, that they be
declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares,
together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.[5]
Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents
allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely,
knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the
instruments. [6]
On respondents motion, the court a quo rendered a partial
judgment on the pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of
respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards
(sic) to the four Deeds of Donation Annexes A, A-1, B and
Annex C which is the subject of this partial decision by:
Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio
for being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply
with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New
Civil Code;
b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as
unwilling co-plaintiff as the heirs of the deceased Conchita
Cabatingan and therefore hereditary co-owners of the
properties subject of this partial decision, as mandated under
Art. 777 of the New Civil Code;
SO ORDERED.[7]
The court a quo ruled that the donations are
donations mortis causa and therefore the four (4) deeds in
question executed on January 14, 1995 are null and void for
failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil
Code on solemnities of wills and testaments.[8]
Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a
quos decision to this Court,[9] alleging that:
THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-
AND-WELL-ESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
DONATIONS AS INTER VIVOS OR MORTIS CAUSA AND,
INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE DONATIONS IN
QUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO.[10]
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations
as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan in
consideration of the love and affection of the donor for the
donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that
the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingans
death.[11] In addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation
on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a
resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation
as inter vivos.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.[12] In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.[13]
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis
causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary
rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingans death.[14] The
phrase to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves
expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the
following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly
found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation
mortis causa under the terms and conditions set forth
therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her
profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the
DONOR.
xxx
SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot
of this Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two
(2) pages x x x.[15]
That the donations were made in consideration of the love
and affection of the donor does not qualify the donations
as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be
made for the same reason. [16]
Well in point is National Treasurer of the
Phils. v. Vda. de Meimban. [17] In said case, the questioned
donation contained the provision:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which
the DONOR has for the DONEE, the said Donor by these
presents does hereby give, transfer, and convey unto the
DONEE, her heirs and assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (100,000) SQUARE METERS, on the
southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described
property. (The portion herein donated is within Lot 2-B of the
proposed amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2,
Psu-109393), with all the buildings and improvements
thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR.
(italics supplied.)" [18]
Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained
in the donation executed by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban
case that the donation is a mortis causa donation, and that
the above quoted provision establishes the donors intention
to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated
property to the donee only after the formers death. Further:
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition,
the formalities of a will should have been complied with under
Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void
and would produce no effect. As we have held in Alejandro v.
Geraldez (78 SCRA 245,253), If the donation is made in
contemplation of the donors death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the
donee because of the donors death, then it is at that time
that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis
causa which should be embodied in a last will and
testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil.
481).[19]
We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein
subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita
Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,[20] one of the
decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the
transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive
the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in
her donations. If she really intended that the donation should
take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the
properties donated be transferrred to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would
have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis
causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions[21] and as such, said deeds must be executed in
accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testators name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a
notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents
were not executed in the manner provided for under the
above-quoted provisions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in
declaring the subject deeds of donation null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 123968. April 24, 2003.]
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and
ANTONIO GANUELAS, Petitioners, v. HON. ROBERT T.
CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, La Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA G.
FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G.
SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA
ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA,
Administrator, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails, on a question of law, the February 22, 1996
decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La
Union, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. 3947, an action for
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin
(Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property 2
covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina
Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted
verbatim:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which
the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services
the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said
DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way
of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before
the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded
and of no further force and effect.
x x x. 3
On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document
denominated as Revocation of Donation 4 purporting to set
aside the deed of donation. More than a month later or on
August 18, 1967, Celestina died without issue and any
surviving ascendants and siblings.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
After Celestina’s death, Ursulina had been sharing the
produce of the donated properties with private respondents
Leocadia G. Flores, Et Al., nieces of Celestina.
In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed
of Donation, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax
declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, to
wit: Tax Declarations Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111,
18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she refused to give
private respondents any share in the produce of the
properties despite repeated demands.
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26,
1986 with the RTC of San Fernando, La Union a complaint 5
against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio
Ganuelas who were alleged to be unwilling plaintiffs. The
complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by
Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of
acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto before
notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a
disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the
provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private
respondents thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the possession
and ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed for the
cancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of
Ursulina, the partition of the properties among the intestate
heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina of an
accounting of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and
for her to return or pay the value of their shares.
The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer 6
that the donation in favor of Ursulina was inter vivos as
contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil Code, 7 hence,
the deed did not have to comply with the requirements for
the execution of a valid will; the Revocation of Donation is
null and void as the ground mentioned therein is not among
those provided by law to be the basis thereof; and at any
rate, the revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing
of the appropriate complaint in court within the prescriptive
period provided by law, which period had, at the time the
complaint was filed, already lapsed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that
the provision in the Deed of Donation that in the event that
the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation
shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect"
is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis
causa, 8 found for the plaintiffs-herein private respondents,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and
void the Deed of Donation of Real Property executed by
Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the partition of the estate of
Celestina among the intestate heirs.
SO ORDERED. 9 illuminating:
The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation
clause in the deed implied that Celestina retained complete
dominion over her properties, thus supporting the conclusion
that the donation is mortis causa, 10 and that while the deed
contained an attestation clause and an acknowledgment
showing the intent of the donor to effect a postmortem
disposition, the acknowledgment was defective as only the
donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the deed
before the notary public, thereby rendering the entire
document void. 11
Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by
Celestina of the Revocation of Donation showed that the
donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum,
thus sustaining its finding that the conveyance was mortis
causa. 12
On herein petitioners’ argument that the Revocation of
Donation was void as the ground mentioned therein is not
one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocation, the
trial court held that the legal grounds for such revocation as
provided under the Civil Code arise only in cases of donations
inter vivos, but not in donations mortis causa which are
revocable at will during the lifetime of the donor. The trial
court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the
disposition mortis causa in view of a failure to comply with
the formalities required therefor, the Deed of Revocation was
a superfluity. 13
Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending
that the trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION
EXECUTED BY CELESTINA GANUELAS;
II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;
III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO
PETITIONER URSULINA GANUELAS. 14
Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is
inter vivos as the main consideration for its execution was
the donor’s affection for the donee rather than the donor’s
death; 15 that the provision on the effectivity of the donation
— after the donor’s death — simply meant that absolute
ownership would pertain to the donee on the donor’s death;
16 and that since the donation is inter vivos, it may be
revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 17 764
18 and 765 19 of the Civil Code.
In a letter of March 16, 1998, 20 private respondent Corazon
Sipalay, reacting to this Court’s January 28, 1998 Resolution
requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE why they
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for
failure to submit the name and address of their new counsel,
explains that they are no longer interested in pursuing the
case and are "willing and ready to waive whatever rights"
they have over the properties subject of the donation.
Petitioners, who were required to comment on the letter, by
Comment of October 28, 1998, 21 welcome private
respondents’ gesture but pray that "for the sake of enriching
jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given due course and
resolved."cralaw virtua1aw library
The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa.
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of
whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over
the properties upon the execution of the deed. 22
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in
that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if
the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the
donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired
by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. 23 The
following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is
24
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor’s
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the
donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the
donor’s death, then it is at that time that the donation takes
effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be
embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor’s lifetime or
independently of the donor’s death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donor’s lifetime, not by
reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then
the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis
causa is important as the validity or revocation of the
donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter
vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities
prescribed by Articles 748 25 and 749 26 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts
will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the
form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills,
otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership. 27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa
are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee. 28
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing
therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the
donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to
the death of Celestina.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina
intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to
Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. 29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the
donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be
deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows
that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive
characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer
should be considered void if the donor should survive the
donee. 30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly
confirming the donation as mortis causa:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at
the foot of this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of
two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request
and in her presence and that of each other have in like
manner subscribed our names as witnesses. 31 (Emphasis
supplied)
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is
founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous.
That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor
for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no
particular significance in determining whether the deed
constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy
may have an identical motivation. 32 In other words, love
and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa. 33
In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan, 34 the deeds of
donation contained provisions almost identical to those found
in the deed subject of the present case:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR for the DONEE, . . . the DONOR does hereby, by
these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto
the DONEE the above-described property, together with the
buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die
before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.
(Emphasis supplied)
In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis
causa, for the above-quoted provision conclusively
establishes the donor’s intention to transfer the ownership
and possession of the donated property to the donee only
after the former’s death. Like in the present case, the deeds
therein did not contain any clear provision that purports to
pass proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor’s
death.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa
disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the
Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the
donation is void and produces no effect. 35
As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to
acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating
Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in
declaring the Deed of Donation to be mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, - versus - ASUNCION G.
FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR,
ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER,
MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a
donation mortis causa, which in reality is a donation inter
vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and
acceptance thereof by the donees, and immediately
transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter,
thus precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by one of
the donors.
The Facts and the Case
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe
Gonzales executed a document entitled Donation Mortis
Causa[1] in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano,
and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their
predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses 126-square
meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila[2] in equal
shares. The deed of donation reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be
irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano
Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now occupied
by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall
not in any way affect any other distribution of other
properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or
intestate and where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves
the right, ownership, possession and administration of this
property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition
and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death
of the DONORS.[3]
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in
law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation
clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named
donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation
on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few
months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their
daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the August
27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-
90589.[4] Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father
Leopoldos assignment of his rights and interests in the
property to her.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20,
2003,[5] finding that the donation was in fact one made inter
vivos, the donors intention being to transfer title over the
property to the donees during the donors lifetime, given its
irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldos
subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the
property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC
thus directed the registration of the property in the name of
the donees in equal shares.[6]
On Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision on December 23, 2008,[7] reversing that
of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her
petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa,
collaterally attack Leopoldos deed of assignment
in Asuncions favor. The CA further held that, since no
proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed
was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding
the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the donation,
being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the
requirements of a notarial will,[8] rendering the same
void. Following the CAs denial of Jarabinis motion for
reconsideration,[9] she filed the present petition with this
Court.
Issue Presented
The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses
Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to Asuncion, Emiliano,
and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was
denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
The Courts Ruling
That the document in question in this case was captioned
Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. This Court has held
that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character
is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.[10]
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court held
that irrevocability is a quality absolutely incompatible with
the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where revocability is
precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has
the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.[12] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express
irrevocability of the donation is the distinctive standard that
identifies the document as a donation inter vivos. Here, the
donors plainly said that it is our will that this Donation Mortis
Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse. The intent to make the donation
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the
donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a
donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the right,
ownership, possession, and administration of the property
and made the donation operative upon their death. But this
Court has consistently held that such reservation
(reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived.[13]
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the
donation, which acceptance the deed required.[14] This Court
has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement
only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa,
being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee
during the donors lifetime.[15]
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v.
Peaflorida,[16] in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in
order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it
was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such
kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the
donor learned of the donees acceptance of the donation. The
acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the
property donated.[17]
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one
given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to Asuncionshould be
regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to
assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat
quod non habet.[18]
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a
petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a
donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a
donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donors
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the
property. The Court has held before that the rule on probate
is not inflexible and absolute.[19] Moreover, in opposing the
petition for probate and in putting the validity of the deed of
assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or those who
substituted her may not now claim that the trial court
improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS
ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March
6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
80549, and REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc.
98-90589.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192916 : October 11, 2010
MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. DOZEN
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU
CITY, Respondents.cralaw
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several
lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No.
1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated
the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel)
through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.1cra1aw Manuel
accepted the donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the
same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development
Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they
executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same
properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig,
Vicentes nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of
Vicentes intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a
petition to approve Vicentes donation mortis causa in his
favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente
executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were
jointly heard.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuels petition to
approve the donation and his action for annulment of the
contracts of sale.2cra1aw The RTC found that the execution
of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after
Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act
that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTCs decision.3cra1aw The CA held that since
the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa,
compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should
have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation
did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari
Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on
substantial compliance in the construction of a will to
Vicentes donation mortis causa. He insists that the strict
construction of a will was not warranted in the absence of
any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the
execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He argues
that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed
of donation, which contains the "import and purpose" of the
attestation clause required in the execution of wills. The
Acknowledgment reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985
at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared VICENTE S. Echavez
with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at
[sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who
executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion
Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of
the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument
before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary
Public and all of them acknowledge to me that the same is
their voluntary act and deed. [Emphasis in the original.]
THE COURTS RULING
The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must
comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity
of wills,4cra1aw "otherwise, the donation is void and would
produce no effect." 5cra1aw Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil
Code should have been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause
embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain
the number of pages on which the deed was written.The
exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino6cra1aw and
Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,7cra1aw cannot be applied to the
present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with
those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court
found that although the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages upon which the will was written, the number
of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the
factual situation in the present case.
Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the
attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that
an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged
in one statement.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment
are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code
(Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law
contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes.
An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed,
declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed
or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will
refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves
who certify to the execution of the instrument before them
and to the manner of its
execution.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the
execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the
notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the
instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedents will.
An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph
of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal
by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be
deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa.
Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court
hereby DENIES Manuels petition for review on certiorari.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 159567 : July 31, 2007]
CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN, ZENAIDA
CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA
CATALAN and GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late
FELICIANO CATALAN, Petitioners, v. JOSE BASA,
MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS
BASA and ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late
MERCEDES CATALAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in
Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession
and Ownership, and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was
discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he
was unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic
reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of
flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries,
withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech."1
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.2
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute
Deed of Donation,"3 wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to
his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the
real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa;
on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo
Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa. Containing an area
of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No.
180804 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated
to her. The remaining half of the property remained in
Feliciano's name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.5
On December 11, 1953, People's Bank and Trust Company
filed Special Proceedings No. 45636 before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On
December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for
Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the
Estate and Fixing Allowance7 of Feliciano. The following day,
the trial court appointed People's Bank and Trust Company
as Feliciano's guardian.8 People's Bank and Trust Company
has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son
Eulogio Catalan.9
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in
favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa.10The Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No.
12911 was issued in the name of respondents.11
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot
2 of the aforementioned property registered under OCT No.
18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and
Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and
Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the
same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.12
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano's guardian, filed a
case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership,13 as well as damages against the
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute
Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never
donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred
that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property
to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of
sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid
consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute
Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute
Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for
Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone.
BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale,
saying that its registration long after the death of Mercedes
Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for
incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original
complaint was amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI
as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence
presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome
the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at
the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of
Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption
of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the
presumption of due execution of the donation in question
must be upheld.14 It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiff's complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the
lawful owners of the land in question which is now declared
in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorney's fees
of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the
Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Court.16 The appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible
error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the
insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at
the precise moment when the property in dispute was
donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been
present in the 1951 donation coupled with compliance with
certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation
inter vivos of real property under Article 749, which provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the
property in dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property
is completely subjected to her will in everything not
prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights of others
(Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979
(Exhibit 3, appellees' Folder of Exhibits) of the property by
Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and
Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which
allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less
apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As
correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of
Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio.
Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its due execution (Garrido v. CA
236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the
same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than preponderant (Salame v. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision
dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
69, is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.17
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the
following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT
"THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE
INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO
CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY
IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED";
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR
DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT "S") AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD
OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY
REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE
DONEE MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN
RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND -
4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.18
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Feliciano's
competence to donate property to Mercedes had been
rebutted because they presented more than the requisite
preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the
Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan
issued on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers
of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved
that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an
incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these two
pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had
been suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which
incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter,
until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that
Feliciano's marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28,
1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he
made the questioned donation. They further argue that the
donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors
(Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his
competency because these donations were approved and
confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.19 In addition,
petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus
and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly
borne out by the fact that the document was registered only
on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes
Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa
both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any
contract, they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the
property in question.20 Lastly, petitioners assert that their
case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article
1391 of the New Civil Code because they had filed their case
on April 1, 1997, even before the four year period after
Feliciano's death on August 14, 1997 had begun.21
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts
it.22 Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is
essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following
requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion
of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3)
it should be spontaneous.23 The parties' intention must be
clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable.24
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial
is the donor's capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that
insanity impinges on consent freely given.25 However, the
burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who
alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented,
capacity will be presumed.26
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar
indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact
that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be
suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers
of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the
allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano
could still be presumed capable of attending to his property
rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the
public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German
psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and "catatonia" with
certain paranoid states and called the condition "dementia
praecox." Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified
Kraepelin's conception in the early 1900s to include cases
with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition
"schizophrenia." According to medical references, in persons
with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms,
with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease
progresses.chanrobles virtual law library The condition
improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens
(relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear
relatively normal, while other patients in remission may
appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd
speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are
prone to have "ideas of reference." The latter refers to the
idea that random social behaviors are directed against the
sufferers.27 It has been proven that the administration of the
correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications
help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a
schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations
and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of
relapse.28 Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness
similar in many aspects to Alzheimer's disease. However, the
illness will wax and wane over many years, with only very
slow deterioration of intellect.29
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person
suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to
show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June
16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that
Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced.30 Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to
contracts was only established when the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on
December 22, 1953.31
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned
Feliciano's capacity at the time he donated the property, yet
did not see fit to question his mental competence when he
entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or
when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties
in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained
competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is
bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.
Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to
have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed,
are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.32
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes
had the right to sell the property to whomever she
chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove
the claim that Mercedes' sale of the property to her children
was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that
the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of
Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to
Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its
execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia
and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before this
Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the
present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still
a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding
as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four
years.34
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments
of the petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172804 : January 24, 2011]
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, REPRESENTED BY HIS
HEIRS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FROILAN AND
LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This resolves the petition for review[1]of the ruling[2]of the
Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to recover a
realty.chanrobles : lawlibrary
The Facts
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented
by his heirs,[3]sued respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of
land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect
damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property
through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere),
who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo
(Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in
his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.chanrobles
: lawlibrary
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership
over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from
Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the
Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation
(Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two
witnesses, reads in full:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE
PRESENTS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of
the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool, municipality
of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines,
hereby depose and say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan
Arcillas, we begot children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA,
SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by
reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were
still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as
he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for
Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his
family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one
of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as
she was to all the works in our house, and because of the
love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of
land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax
Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I
give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ,
her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the
improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is more
or less described and bounded as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao;
South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by Public land; 2. It has an
area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to
coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of
P240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner,
but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her
upon my demise.chanrobles : lawlibrary
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above
described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ
since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein
Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted
to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above
described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful
to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will
give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve
during her lifetime.[4]
Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes
afterwards.chanrobles : lawlibrary
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the
Property, and ordered respondents to surrender possession
to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property's
produce since 1982 until petitioner's repossession and the
costs.[5]The trial court rejected respondents' claim of
ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis
causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the
Property to Vere in 1970.[6]Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold
the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to
transfer.chanrobles : lawlibrary
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing
error in the trial court's interpretation of the Deed as a
testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos donation,
passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.chanrobles :
lawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted respondents' appeal and set aside the trial
court's ruling. While conceding that the "language of the
[Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible
different interpretations,"[7]the CA found the following factors
pivotal to its reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1)
Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as owner
since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the
produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed's consideration was not
Rodrigo's death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez,
considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo
waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguez's estate;
and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed itself,
an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not
devises.[8]Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between
Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale
between Rodrigo and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest,
Vere, void for Rodrigo's lack of title.chanrobles : lawlibrary
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial
court's ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over
the Property through acquisitive prescription, having
allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.[9]
Respondents see no reversible error in the CA's ruling and
pray for its affirmance.chanrobles : lawlibrary
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioner's title over the
Property is superior to respondents'. The resolution of this
issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the
parties' predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez,
was a donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold
superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If
the latter, petitioner prevails, having obtained title from
Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly
revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez.chanrobles :
lawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court

We find respondents' title superior, and thus, affirm the
CA.chanrobles : lawlibrary
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a
Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed - whether it
passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective
only upon Rodrigo's death - using principles distilled from
relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically -
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor's] death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.[10]
Further -
[4][T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the
act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation
is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
[5]That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or
a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to
take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling
criteria; such statements are to be construed together with
the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed
donation inter vivosrather than mortis causa, in order to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject
of the deed.[11]
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to
Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,"
signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to
Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title.
This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo
learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition[12]which,
being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the
transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in
futuro, as only donations inter vivosneed acceptance by the
recipient.[13]Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title
over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the
testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer,
sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here
donated x x x"[14]or used words to that effect. Instead,
Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case
Rodriguez predeceases her.chanrobles : lawlibrary
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation's damning
effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it, contending
it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.[15]Petitioner
assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the
Deed's juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is
the crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in
question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode
of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted
is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit
to a second heir the whole or part of the
inheritance,[16]petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will.
Neither the Deed's text nor the import of the contested clause
supports petitioner's theory.chanrobles : lawlibrary
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the
beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's
undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the
land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."[17]Thus, the Deed's
stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-
reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo's beneficial title.
We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaquiv.
Dongso[18]where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding] herself
to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall
question or disturb [the donee's] right," also stipulated that
the donation "does not pass title to [the donee] during my
lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner"
of the donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a
gift inter vivos, the Court
reasoned:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in
the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and
her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus
conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the
right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land
by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right;
otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right.
Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the
appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a
donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title
during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession
and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at
which time the donee would be able to dispose of them
freely.[19](Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the
Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial
usufructuary right over it.[20]
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's
death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee
and the services the latter rendered, while also true of
devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express
irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."[21]Thus, the CA
committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo's statement
of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its
finding.chanrobles : lawlibrary
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick
stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g.
"the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory
stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor's intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds
of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court,
after going over the deeds, eventually considered the
transfers inter vivos,[22]consistent with the principle that "the
designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in
the deed to the effect that the donation is `to take effect at
the death of the donor' are not controlling criteria [but] x x x
are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument,
in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor."[23]Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions
are resolved to favor inter vivostransfers "to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed."[24]
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation
transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds
of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue
property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles,
which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing
ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions
counsels against licensing such practice.[25]
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over
the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another."[26]Thus, Rodrigo's post-
donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As
Vere's successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better
right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the
Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title
which they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.chanrobles : lawlibrary
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over
the Property through his and Vere's combined possession of
the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere's
purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner
initiated his suit in the trial court in February
1986.[27]Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded
legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive period
to acquire title through possession of real property in the
concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession
coupled with just title andgood faith.[28]There is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor
was not the owner or could not transmit any right.[29]Good
faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom the possessor received the thing was
the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[30]
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having
successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was
a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the
Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the
Property "in the concept of an owner" ("comotag-iya"[31])
since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo's
donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought
the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest
binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property
through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner's insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the
Property only in 1982, when she started paying taxes, finds
no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession
of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a
buyer in good faith.chanrobles : lawlibrary
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner's only other
recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription
is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the
Property for 30 years.[32]Undeniably, petitioner is unable to
meet this requirement.chanrobles : lawlibrary
Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant
Petitioner brings to the Court's attention facts which,
according to him, support his theory that Rodrigo never
passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely,
that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the
Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in
1981 a waiver of the latter's "right of ownership" over the
Property. None of these facts detract from our conclusion
that under the text of the Deed and based on the
contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter,
already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo
admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deed's
execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax payment is
required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver
agreement, suffice it to say that Vere had nothing to waive
to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo.
Irrespective of Rodriguez's motivation in obtaining the
waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added
nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under
the Deed.chanrobles : lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we DENYthe petition. We AFFIRMthe Decision
dated 6 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of
the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001
CIRILA ARCABA, Petitioner, v. ERLINDA TABANCURA
VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA,
DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN
C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No.
4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivosexecuted by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor
and its subsequent resolution 3 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak
Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418
square meters. 4 After the death of Zosima on October 3,
1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino
Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share
consisting of one-fourth ( 1 / 4 ) of the property to
Francisco. 5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in
his name with the Registry of Deeds. 6cräläwvirtualibräry
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, 7 the latters
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, 8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba,
then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store
inside. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo
said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the
same room, 10 while Erlinda Tabancura, 11 another niece of
Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was
his mistress. 12 On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere
helper who could enter the masters bedroom only when the
old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too
old for her. She denied they ever had sexual
intercourse. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married,
only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. 14 Cirila testified
that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-
year old widower when she began working for the latter; that
he could still walk with her assistance at that time; 15 and
that his health eventually deteriorated and he became
bedridden. 16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Franciscos sole
source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the
public streets. 17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as
a househelper, though he provided her family with food and
lodging. 18cräläwvirtualibräry
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death,
Francisco executed an instrument denominated Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-
A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house,
to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his
name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had
rendered over the past ten (10) years. The deed was
notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. 19 and later registered
by Cirila as its absolute owner. 20cräläwvirtualibräry
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In
1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a
market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value
of P28,550.00. 21cräläwvirtualibräry
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter
vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents,
who are the decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by
Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family
Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition
shall also apply to persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of respondents, holding the donation void under this
provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this
conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of one Cirila
Comille. The documents were (1) an application for a
business permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated
January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature Cirila
Comille; 22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate
lessor with a health certificate showing the signature Cirila
Comille in black ink; 23 and (3) the death certificate of the
decedent with the signature Cirila A. Comille written in black
ink. 24 The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by
the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No.
3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of
Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null
and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house
and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty
(30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum
of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered
on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As
already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its
conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia,
Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly
showing Cirilas use of Franciscos surname; (3) a pleading in
another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as
Franciscos common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did
not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been
committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was
the common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not
correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of
circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its
findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay
evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or
possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other
cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their
Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of
evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39
SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably
not in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102
Phil. 577, 584.26cräläwvirtualibräry
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we
rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 27 It
appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on
evidence presented by both parties, the general rule should
apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan, 28 we held that the term cohabitation or
living together as husband and wife means not only residing
under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual
intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman
of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and
wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.
Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even
if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation;
they are merely meretricious. 29 In this jurisdiction, this
Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law
relationship the stipulations between the parties, 30 a
conviction of concubinage, 31 or the existence of illegitimate
children. 32cräläwvirtualibräry
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife?
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof
for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated
their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic
massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At
the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was
not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of
exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told
her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications
that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses.
Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently
signed by Cirila using the surname Comille. As previously
stated, these are an application for a business permit to
operate as a real estate lessor, 33 a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, 34 and
the death certificate of Francisco. 35 These documents show
that Cirila saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife,
otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly,
in the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in Erlinda
Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy, RTC
Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of Francisco.
Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a
regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver-employee, but Franciscos common law spouse.
She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the
law. 36 It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco
and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason
would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Franciscos
common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence
that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under
Art. 87 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LEON
SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT, Respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 43840, entitled Leon Silim, Et. Al. v. Wilfredo
Palma, Et Al., which declared null and void the donation made
by respondents of a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of
Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
On 17 December 1971, Respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim
and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter
parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools,
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the
Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that
the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only." 1 This donation was accepted by
Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an
Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of
Donation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-
Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school
building was constructed on the donated land. However, the
Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be
allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay
Kauswagan could not be released since the government
required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land.
To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division
Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur,
Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to
officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2)
hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a
new and suitable location which would fit the specifications
of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor
Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange
whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot
owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan
school buildings were constructed on the new school site and
the school building previously erected on the donated lot was
dismantled and transferred to the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the
donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a
house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor
Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the
said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the
construction of the house on the donated property but Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for
Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation,
Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession
and Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice
Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor
Buendia and the BPS before the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City, Branch 21. In its Decision dated 20 August
1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. 2 The pertinent portion of the decision
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was
no breach or violation of the condition imposed in the subject
Deed of Donation by the donee. The exchange is proper since
it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and for the
expansion and improvement of the school facilities within the
community. The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the
desired purpose of the donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction
of exchange is a (sic) exception to the law invoked by the
plaintiffs (Art. 764, Civil Code). The donee, being the State
had the greater reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and
onerous contract of donation. It would be illogical and selfish
for the donor to technically preclude the donee from
expanding its school site and improvement of its school
facilities, a paramount objective of the donee in promoting
the general welfare and interests of the people of Barangay
Kauswagan. But it is a well-settled rule that if the contract is
onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in question, the doubt
shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests, which in the instant case, is the donee.
x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony and
reconciliation between the parties;
3. With costs against plaintiffs. SO ORDERED. 3
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision
dated 22 October 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and
void on the grounds that the donation was not properly
accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was
violated. 4
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN INVALID
ACCEPTANCE BY THE DONEE.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF A CONDITION IN THE DONATION. 5
The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the
acceptance was not allegedly done in accordance with
Articles 745 6 and 749 7 of the New Civil Code.
We agree. Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may
be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or
compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A
pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is
plain gratuity. 8 This is donation in its truest form. On the
other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one
made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past
services, which services do not amount to a demandable
debt. 9 A conditional or modal donation is one where the
donation is made in consideration of future services or where
the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges
upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the
donation given. 10 Finally, an onerous donation is that which
imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be
more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the
thing donated. 11
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous
type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other
forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and
obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the
law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil
Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards
that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The donation involved in the present controversy is one
which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the
donee to build a school on the donated property. 12
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance
of the donation because:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x Under the law the donation is void if there is
no acceptance. The acceptance may either be in the same
document as the deed of donation or in a separate public
instrument. If the acceptance is in a separate instrument,
"the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
his step shall be noted in both instruments.
"Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor
to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless
it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor
duly noticed thereof. (Abellera v. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85;
Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245). If the acceptance does
not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it
shows the intention to accept, But in this case, it is necessary
that formal notice thereof be given to the donor and the fact
that due notice has been given it must be noted in both
instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that
showing acceptance). Then and only then is the donation
perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II, Civil Code of
the Philippines by Tolentino.)."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as
exhibit "A" and "1" to determine whether there was
acceptance of the donation. This Court found none. We
further examined the record if there is another document
which embodies the acceptance, we found one. Although the
Court found that in the offer of exhibits of the defendants, a
supposed affidavit of acceptance and/or confirmation of the
donation, marked as exhibit "8" appears to have been
offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits
offered by the defendants have been admitted nor such
exhibits appear on record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed
acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as
required under Art. 749 of the Civil Code. And according to
Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the
requirements of perfecting a donation. In other words,
without such a notation, the contract is not perfected
contract. Since the donation is not perfected, the contract is
therefore not valid. 13 x x x
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code
provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 745. The donee must accept the donation
personally, or through an authorized person with a special
power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient
power; otherwise the donation shall be void.
ARTICLE 749. In order that the donation of an immovable
may be laid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charge
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation
or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer
of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as
Exhibit "8," was offered in evidence. However, private
respondents now question this exhibit because, according to
them "there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered
by the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibit
appear on record."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondents’ stance does not persuade. The written
acceptance of the donation having been considered by the
trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption
that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the
court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals.
Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the validity
of the donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the
acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it
take respondents more than ten (10) years from the date of
the donation to question its validity? In the very least, they
are guilty of estoppel. 14
Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid
acceptance of the donation, the acceptance was not noted in
the Deed of Donation as required in Article 749 of the Civil
Code, hence, the donation is void.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a
donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly
communicated to the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 15 the Court held:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a
separate public instrument and that it was duly
communicated to the donors. Even the petitioners cannot
deny this. But what they do contend is that such acceptance
was not "noted in both instruments," meaning the extra-
judicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance, as
required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two
instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the
acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And
while the first instrument contains the statement that "the
donee does hereby accept this donation and does hereby
express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the
donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and
Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the
separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month
later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other
conclusion that the annulment of the donation for being
defective in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be
in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-
quoted provision. However, we find that under the
circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence to the
requirement of the law might result not in justice to the
parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is
also a policy of the Court to avoid such as interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the
acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the
donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana
was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it
later and requested that the donated land be not registered
during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence,
the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation
ineffective because there is no notation in the extra-judicial
settlement of the donee’s acceptance. That would be placing
too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also
disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation
as manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20,
1946, and as later acknowledged by Juan.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately
constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents
had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up
on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-
Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when
the school building was being dismantled and transferred to
the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated property that
respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The
actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and
existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement
that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
communicated to the donor.
On respondents’ claim, which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor
Gregorio Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of
the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic
of the Philippines, it is undisputed that the donation was
made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being
the case, his acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of
the 1987 Administrative Code which states:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 47. Contracts and Conveyances. — Contracts or
conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the
Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or
exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not
prohibited by law.
Finally, it is respondents’ submission that the donee, in
exchanging the donated lot with a bigger lot, violated the
condition in the donation that the lot be exclusively used for
school purposes only.
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes"
convey? "School" is simply an institution or place of
education. 16 "Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets
before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim,
object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends
sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc." 17
"Exclusive" means "excluding or having power to exclude (as
by preventing entrance or debarring from possession,
participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession,
control or use. 18
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation
was not in any way violated when the lot donated was
exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation
remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school.
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In
fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the
donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for
the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
school building which could not be accommodated by the
limited area of the donated lot.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110644 October 30, 1998
THE HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, represented by
Lucio Salamat and Danilo Salamat, VALENTA DIZON
GARCIA, represented by Raymundo D. Garcia, Jr. as
Attorney-in-Fact, THE HEIRS OF ANSELMA REYES
DIZON, represented by Catalina Dizon
Espinosa, Petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD DIZON TAMAYO,
represented by Angela R. Dizon, THE HEIRS OF
GAUDENCIO DIZON, represented by Maria Dizon
Jocson, Respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind
his five children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and
Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the properties left by the
decedentwas a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 10384. 1
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the
sum of P3,000 to his sister Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale
was evidenced by a private document bearing the signatures
of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses. 2
On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary
rights for the sum of P4,000 to his sister Salud. The sale was
evidenced by a notarized document which bore the signature
of Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as
witnesses. 3 Gaudencio died on May 30, 1951 leaving his
daughters Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson as heirs.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for
compulsory judicial partition of real properties registered in
the name of Agustin Dizon with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted by
the refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to
agree to the formal distribution of the properties of deceased
Agustin Dizon among his heirs. Respondent's refusal
stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of
land covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides,
claiming that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936
with the conformity of the other heirs. The subject property
is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
No. 10376 in the name of respondent.
The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was
made orally by the deceased Agustin Dizon to herein
respondent partook of the nature of a donation which
required the observance of certain formalities set by law.
Nevertheless, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the partition of the estate of
Agustin Dizon is in order, let a project of partition be drawn
pursuant to Sec 2, Rule 69, Rules of Court assigning to each
heir the specific share to which he is entitled taking into
consideration the disposition made in favor of Salud Dizon
Salamat and the adjudication of Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre
304-D owned by Natividad Dizon Tamayo, together with the
improvements thereon, in her favor and the house owned by
Valenta Dizon Garcia, executing, if necessary, proper
instruments of conveyance for confirmation and approval by
the Court.
Parties are enjoined to draw the prospect of partition as
equitably and equally as possible with the least
inconvenience and disruption of those in possession or in
actual occupation of the property. Should the parties fail to
come up with an acceptable of partition, the Court will
appoint commissioners as authorized by Sec 3, Rule 69,
Rules of Court, who will be guided by the dispositive portion
hereof.
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the
partition are to be shared equally by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and
covered by OCT 10384 in the name of the heirs of Agustin
Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while respondent claims that
her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the
consent of her co-heirs. In support of her claim, respondent
Natividad presented a private document of conformity which
was allegedly signed and executed by her elder brother,
Eduardo, in 1936.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the
document inasmuch as it is marred by unexplained erasures
and alterations.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the RTC,
stated that notwithstanding the unexplained erasures and
alterations, a cursory reading of the signed statement of
Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed that
there was an oral donation of the litigated land from Agustin
Dizon to Natividad Dizon Tamayo 4 in 1936.
The Court of Appeals further stated that the attestation by
Eduardo, of the oral donation of the subject land made by his
father to respondent Natividad, in 1936, coupled with the tax
declaration and payment of taxes in respondent's name
would show that the trial court did not err in ruling that the
subject land should pertain to Natividad Tamayo as
inheritance from her parents.
We reverse.
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation
or in a separate public document, unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property
from one person to another cannot take effect as a donation
unless embodied in a public document.
The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and
not executed in a public document. Moreover, the document
which was presented by respondent in support of her claim
that her father donated the subject parcel of land to her was
a mere private document of conformity which was executed
by her elder brother, Eduardo in 1956. 5 It may not be amiss
to point out that the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had
already ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner Salud
Dizon Salamat even before 1950.
The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the
said document and made the dubious observation that ". . .
a cursory reading of the signed statement of Eduardo Dizon,
which execution is undisputed, shows that there was an oral
donation . . . ."
Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of
Appeals could hardly satisfy the requirements of the rule on
ancient documents on account of unexplained alterations.
An anciert document refers to a private document which is
more than thirty (30) years old, produced from a custody in
which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 6
To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by
Eduardo was marred by unexplained erasures and
alterations. While the document was originally penned in
black ink, the number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was
superimposed on the number fifty-six (56) to make it appear
that the document was executed in 1936 instead of in 1956.
Moreover, a signature was blotted out with a black pentel pen
and the three other signatures 7 of the alleged witnesses to
the execution of the document at the lower portion of the
document were dated June 1, 1951. This could only mean
that the witnesses attested to the veracity of the document
5 years earlier, if the document was executed in 1956 or 15
years later, if we are to give credence to respondent's claim,
that the document was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of
the signatories, namely, Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D.
Jocson signed the document as witnesses two days after the
death of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned,
had already sold his hereditary rights to his sister Salud in
1949.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation
to respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim
ownership over the property. While it is true that a void
donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into
title by prescription, 8 it is well settled that possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession
of the property. It is undeniable that petitioners and
respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of
the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of
a trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other 9and
possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to
other co-owner but in fact is beneficial to them. Mere actual
possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all,
entitled to possession of the property.
In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 10 we had
occasion to state that a mere silent possession by a co-
owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property,
the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees
thereon and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof
of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession
which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of
the rights of the other co-owners.
The elements in order that a co-owner's possession may be
deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-owner are:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-
owners (2) that such positive acts or repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing. 11
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case
at bar. There are two houses standing on the subject
property. One is the house where respondent presently
resides while the other is a house built by respondent's sister
Valenta. Records show that the house on Lot 227 where the
respondent lives is actually the ancestral house of the Dizons
although respondent has remodelled it, constructed a
piggery and has planted trees thereon. 12 Respondent herself
testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now who is in possession of this particular residential land
in Bo. San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan?
A: I am in possession of that land, Sir.
Q: Do you have your residential house there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said that you have your residential house there,
since when have you stayed there?
A: I was born there, Sir.
Q: And you are staying there up to the present?

A: Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx. 13

It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never

made unequivocal acts of repudiation, she cannot acquire
ownership over said property through acquisitive
prescription. The testimony of her son that she merely
allowed her sister Valenta to build a house on the lot 14 is
pure hearsay as respondent herself could have testified on
the matter but chose not to.

Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for

taxation purposes in the name of respondent who pays realty
taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No. 14376 is of no
moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax
payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 15

As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent

on the questioned lot, the parties should be guided by Article
500 of the Civil Code which states that: "Upon partition, there
shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and
reimbursements for expenses made. . . ."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

REVERSED. Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 10384 is hereby declared to
belong the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.

SO ORDERED.