G.R. No.
148338 June 6, 2002 property is not covered by any public land application or
ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XV, Naic, Cavite and denying the application of
petitioner Angel del Rosario for registration of title over a large
tract of land in Maragondon, Cavite.
On October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application 3 for
registration of a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad-
457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting of
772,329 square meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon,
Cavite. In his application, petitioner stated that he is a Filipino,
married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion,
Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question, which was
alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was
being occupied and cultivated by him and his family. Petitioner
further alleged that there was no mortgage or encumbrance on
the land; that the same was not bound by any public or private
road or by any river or creek; and that there was no person having
any interest therein, legal or equitable, or having possession
thereof other than himself. Petitioner indicated the
owners/claimants/occupants of the adjoining properties [(a) the
Municipal Engineer (northern boundary), Ternate, Cavite; (b) Juan
Angeles (or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1890), Brgy. Sapang,
Ternate, Cavite; (c) Madiano Villanueva (or his heirs/successors;
for Lots 1286 & 1291), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (d)
Agripino Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1290), Brgy.
Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (e) Lucas Arcival (or his
heirs/successors; for Lot 1482), Maragondon, Cavite; (f) Danilo
Sisayan (for Lot 1287), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; and (g)
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
for the Republic of the Philippines (Lot 1692), Plaza Cervantes,
Binondo, Manila], and annexed to his application the following
documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for
with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601;4 (b)
Technical Description of Lot No. 1891;5 (c) Certification in lieu of
Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes,
attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; 6 (d) Certification,
dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and
disposable;7 (e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the
whom he recognized as the owner of the lot. Telia stated that
patent;8 (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the
parcel of land;9 and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated
September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty
taxes on the said lot up to 1997.10
On the same day he filed his application, petitioner also submitted
to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell M. Resus, the
original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891. 11 On October 15,
1997, the clerk of court transmitted to the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner's application for
registration of title of Lot No. 1891, the original tracing cloth plan,
and the other documents submitted by petitioner in support of his
application.12
During the initial hearing on February 24, 1998, no oppositor
appeared except for the provincial prosecutor of Maragondon,
Cavite, who appeared on behalf of the Solicitor General in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines through the
Bureau of Lands. Accordingly, the trial court issued an order of
general default against the whole world, with the exception of the
Bureau of Lands, after which petitioner submitted documentary
evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, the case
was referred to a trial commissioner for the reception of further
evidence.13
Aside from himself, petitioner presented Raymundo Telia before
the trial commissioner to prove his claim of ownership and title
over the parcel of land applied for registration. Both of them were
subjected to cross-examination by the provincial prosecutor.
In his testimony, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his
application and identified the annexed documents. He claimed he
and his family planted in the subject lot mango and bamboo trees
and raised animals on it. Petitioner testified that he inherited the
land from his grandfather, who caused the survey of the said lot to
be made in his name as the original claimant. He said that he
possessed the subject property from 1984, the time the cadastral
survey was made thereon, but also claimed that the first survey
on the land was made in 1930. Petitioner also stated that his
predecessors-in-interest started cultivating the property in 1940,
planting kakawati trees along its boundaries. He claimed that he
and his family alone were the ones who gathered the fruits and
forest products of the land and that no one had ever disturbed his
possession over the lot or questioned his ownership of the
same.14
To corroborate petitioner's testimony, Raymundo Telia, then 59
years old, testified that he personally knew the real property
subject of the application since he went there with petitioner,
when he was still young, the property was already planted
with kakawati trees along its boundaries. According to him, when
he came of age, he already knew that petitioner owned the
property and that anybody who needed to get bamboo, gather
firewood, or do kaingin farming could do so only upon petitioner's
permission. Furthermore, Telia stated that he and his parents
stayed in the property during the Japanese occupation and settled
there until the 1950s with leave from petitioner. Telia said he
stayed on the land for about three years more engaging in kaingin
farming. He further claimed that, although he did not personally
know Madiano Villanueva, Lucas Arcival, and Danilo Sisayan,
who allegedly were the owners of the adjoining lots, it was public
knowledge that they were indeed such.15
On August 25, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting
the application of petitioner. The dispositive portion thereof reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court
confirming its previous Order of General Default hereby
decrees and adjudge[s] that certain parcel of land as
herein above identified, described, and bounded,
consisting of 772,329 square meters, described as Lot
No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-
0011601 situated in Barangay Pinagsanhan,
Maragondon, Cavite and its technical description,
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 496, as
amended by P.D. No. 1529, in the name of the applicant,
Angel del Rosario, Filipino, married to Agustina
Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued by the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
SO ORDERED.16
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, putting in issue the
failure of petitioner to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth
plan for Lot No. 1891 and to establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
notorious possession of the land applied for registration for the
period required by law.17
On January 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision18 reversing the decision of the trial court on the ground
that petitioner indeed failed to submit in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for registration. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.19
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
1. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION WAS UNJUSTIFIED.
2. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN REOPENED
TO ADMIT THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN IN
EVIDENCE, TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE SAME
PROCEEDINGS ALREADY HAD IN THIS
APPLICATION.20
The petition is without merit.
First. Petitioner argues that the denial of his application because
of his failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of
Lot No. 1891 was unjustified. He claims that he should not be
faulted for such failure since he turned over the same to the trial
court on the day he filed his application, but it was submitted to
the LRA by the branch clerk of court and could not be produced
during the trial.
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of
original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. 21 The
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent
registration of any adjoining land.22 The failure to comply with this
requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original
tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter
submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit.
Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the
LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. 23 The Court of
Appeals appropriately quoted from our decision in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,24 in which it was similarly
claimed that applicant failed to present the tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for because it had been forwarded to the Land
Registration Authority. Rejecting the contention, this Court,
through Justice Nocon, held:
It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the
land applied for was not submitted in evidence by
respondent, which omission is fatal to his application.
The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character.
Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that
he submitted the original tracing cloth plan, together with
other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he filed the
application. The application and supporting documents
were then elevated to the Land Registration Commission
(now the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration) for approval of the survey plan by the
Director of Lands. Respondent argues the fact that the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of
Initial Hearing would indicate that respondent had
submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his
application.
This argument had already been disposed of in Director
of Lands vs. Reyes [68 SCRA 177, 189 (1975)], wherein
this Court held ---
Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the
non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan
by claiming that the same must be with the
Land Registration Commission which checked
or verified the survey plan and the technical
description thereof. It is not the function of the
LRC to check the original survey plan as it had
no authority to approve original survey plans. If,
for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan
was forwarded there, the applicant may easily
retrieve the same therefrom and submit the
same in evidence. This was not done.
Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to
object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when the
same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the
objection to said evidence.
We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of
Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient.25
Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to
petitioner's application and marked in evidence, suffice to comply
with the requirement of the law. Although in one case 26 it was
ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with
the lot's technical description, was sufficient to identify the land
applied for registration, both the blueprint copy and the technical
description were certified as to their correctness by the Director of
Lands. In this case, what was marked in evidence, the advance
survey plan and the technical description, lacked the necessary
certification from the Bureau of Lands.
Second. Petitioner prays that the trial court proceedings be
reopened in order for him to be able to present in evidence either
the original tracing cloth plan27 or the "sepia copy" (Diazo
Polyester Film) in lieu thereof28 pursuant to the NALDTRA (LRC)
Circular No. 66 dated May 2, 1985.29 Petitioner contends that the
original tracing cloth plan or the "sepia copy" thereof may be
considered as newly discovered evidence which, when admitted
in evidence, may alter the result of the case.
The argument is without merit. For evidence to be admitted under
Rule 53, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same must
comply with the following requisites: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence;
and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment.30 In the present case, the original tracing
cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence
since it was already available upon the filing of the application for
registration. Although it could not be produced during the trial
because it was still in the custody of the LRA at that time, it was
petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing
the same that accounts for its non-presentation in
evidence.31 With regard to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, it is
apparent that the prayer to allow its presentation is a mere
afterthought because it was never offered in evidence during the
trial and petitioner had already turned over his original tracing
cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission to the
LRA.32 Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia
copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original
tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not now as
he belatedly offers it on appeal.
Third. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had met the legal requirements as to the nature and
length of possession leading to a registrable title over the land.
Petitioner claims that he and his family cultivated the subject land,
without the help of tenants, in order to plant bamboo and mango
trees thereon. His witness also testified that the land was for a
time planted with coconut trees and palay. However, from the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appears that petitioner
is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, has
actually been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from
childhood until the present. Moreover, it appears that the land was
only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much
tending to. There is also doubt as to how many mango trees, if
any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from
these trees, since there was no testimony to that effect and the
tax declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements
found on the land were only bamboo trees.33
Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on
the land some coconut trees, but these were no longer there at
the time of his testimony. He also testified that the land was
planted with palay, but not by petitioner or his predecessors or his
family but by kaingeros, including himself, who only asked
permission from petitioner to use the land. Assuming that
petitioner had planted the bamboo and mango trees thereon, this
fact would hardly suffice to prove possession as it would
constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. A
mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant
does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the
state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation
of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years.34
Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by
himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s,
his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. It is
noteworthy that the land subject of the application was declared
for taxation purposes only on September 8, 1997 and the taxes
due thereon covered only a period of 10 years beginning 1988
and was paid only on September 9, 1997, or a little more than a
month prior to the filing of the application. There is no other tax
declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts
are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely indicia of
a claim of ownership.35
It is also noteworthy that the certification submitted by petitioner
shows that the land became alienable and disposable only on
certain dates
. . . the area shaded in orange color is within the
Alienable or Disposable (sic), Project No. 15 of
Maragondon, Cavite per Lc Map No. 2720; cert. on
November 12, 1971.
2. the remaining portion of the area is within the
Alienable or Disposable (sic), Block-1, Project No. 15-A,
of Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No. 3091; cert. on
June 21, 1983.36
Thus, one portion of the land was certified on November 12, 1971,
while the remaining portion was certified on June 21, 1983. As
petitioner's application was filed only on October 13, 1997, almost
26 years from the time one portion was certified as alienable and
disposable and 14 years from the time the remaining portion was
certified, the property was still unclassified at the time petitioner
and his predecessors-in-interest allegedly began their possession
of the same. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals:37
A person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple
act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The
Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the
year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect
title.
Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the 30-year
open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept of an
owner, as required by C.A. No. 141, §48 (b), as amended,
petitioner's application for original registration of Lot No. 1891
cannot be granted.38
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
application of petitioner Angel del Rosario for original registration
of Lot No. 1891, Cadastral 457-D, Maragondon, Cavite, Ap-04-
0011601, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108558 June 21, 2001
ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD
represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad
Paghubasan, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is settled that great weight, and even finality, is accorded to the
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of
the trial courts. Only when it is clearly shown that such findings
are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned.
"On the other hand, evidence for the defendants tends to
establish the following:
Statement of the Case
Before us is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the July 29, 1992 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 26047 and its
January 14, 1993 Resolution 3 denying reconsideration.
The CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, which had found abundant proof of appellees'
ownership of the land, as opposed to the scanty
evidence offered by appellants. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [there being] no reversible error in the
decision appealed from[,] the same is hereby affirmed in
toto. Costs against appellants." 4
The Facts
The undisputed facts of the case are summarized by the Court of
Appeals as follows:
"This case involves declaration of ownership filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, [in] Biliran,
Leyte, of an unregistered parcel of land at Antipolo,
Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square meters.
"The plaintiffs' evidence consists of the following:
"a) A tax declaration No. 3705 (Exh. A) in the
name of Ignacio Montes for the year 1912.
However, the land taxes thereon for the years
1944 to 1947 were paid only in 1981 (Exh. F
and series).
"b) Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claims to be the
owner as successor in interest (granddaughter)
of one Andrea Elaba, daughter of Maria Montes
and Borja Elaba, Maria Montes appears to be a
sister of Ignacio Montes, in whose name the tax
declaration for the property in question was
issued for the year 1912 (Exh. A).
"c) The property in question has been in the
possession of the defendants (heirs of Esteban
Abad), although the house standing thereon
appears to have been constructed by Marcelo
Tabuso, father of plaintiff Andrea Tabuso.
"a) The land in question originally owned by
Maria Montes was donated to Isabel Elaba
through an ancient document executed on
September 24, 1923 (Exh. F). Isabel in turn sold
the land to Esteban Abad on May 5, 1948 (Exh.
4).
"b) The original tax declaration in the name of
Ignacio Montes (Exh. A) was superseded by
Tax Declaration Nos. 6422 and 1450 both in the
name of Isabel Elaba (Exh. 6-D; 6-E)[;]
Declaration No. 1450 for the year 1948 was
superseded by Tax Declaration No. 6959 for
1960 (Exh. 6-C) in the name of Esteban Abad;
and the latter was superseded in 1969 by Tax
Declaration No. 1661 (Exh. 6-B) in the name of
Esteban Abad. In 1974 a new tax declaration
No. 19 (Exh. 6-A) was issued in the name of
Esteban Abad with Nemesio Abad and his co-
heirs as administrators. The last tax declaration
No. 22 (Exh. 6) for 1982 was in the name of
Esteban Abad. The land taxes due thereon for
the years 1947 to 1982 were paid by Isabel
Elaba[,] Esteban Abad and Nemesio Abad
(Exhs. 7 to 7-W).
"c) The land in question is tenanted by one
Valentin Poblete in accordance with a lease
contract executed by defendant Nemesio
[Abad], one of the heirs and co-owners of the
land.
"On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the court
dismissed the complaint and declared the defendant the
lawful owners of the land in question." 5
The trial court 6 concluded that there was abundant proof of
private respondents' ownership of the lot in question as against
the scanty evidence offered by petitioners. And even if the latter
had built a house thereon, such action was only tolerated by
private respondents, who had originally allowed one Marcelo
Tabuso (father of Petitioner Andrea Tabuso), to construct a house
on the same lot. Besides, Petitioner Tabuso is not a compulsory
heir of Ignacio Montes, from whom she claims to have inherited
the lot, subject of this litigation. In addition, the tax declaration in
his name has long been revised.
The trial court likewise gave credit to the testimony of Atty. Jose
Gonzales, private respondents' counsel who had been presented
by petitioners as their own witness. He testified that the land in
question, which was adjacent to the land he himself possessed,
had been in the possession of Esteban Abad's heirs, herein
private respondents. The trial court also took note of the various
tax declarations covering the property, indicating that it was
owned by private respondents.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the trial court. It ruled
as follows:
"The only issue presented to [u]s for resolution is the
question of ownership. After a careful review of the
records, [w]e agree with the trial court that the
preponderance of evidence supports the claim of
ownership of defendants-appellees.
"As regards the first assigned error, [the] trial court
cannot be faulted for giving weight to the testimony of
Atty. Jose Gonzales. He testified that the land in
question had been in he possession of appellees; that he
personally [knew] this as he own[ed] the land adjacent to
the land in question at the northern point; that he
inherited said land from his late father; and that he
frequently visit[ed] his land and passe[d] by the land in
question. Thus, he testified of his own personal
knowledge regarding the fact of possession. Moreover,
Atty. Gonzales, although a counsel for appellees, was
presented by appellants ad their own witness; hence,
they are bound by his testimony.
 "As to the validity of the document of donation executed
by appellants' predecessor in interest, Maria Montes in
1923, or more than sixty (60) years ago, it is too late in
the day to raise the question of the validity of said
document. Appellants are barred by laches to raise the
same. Moreover, the issue is being raised for the first
time on appeal, which is not allowed.
"It also appears that since 1923 to the present, or for
more than 60 years, appellees have been able to
establish by the tax declarations in their name and that of
their predecessors in interest that they have been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession
of the land in question.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Finally, the area of the land appears to be immaterial.
Whether it is only 3,267 square meters as contained in
the tax declaration, or 11,927 square meters, as found
by the court-appointed commissioner, the important thing
to consider is that appellants have not substantiated their
claim by a preponderance of evidence adverse to the
claim of ownership and possession of appellees." 7
Issues
In their Memorandum,8 petitioners raise the following issues:
"I
The findings and conclusion of the Honorable Court of
Appeals that private respondents are in possession and
owners of the land in dispute are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
"II
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
upheld the validity of the Deed of Donation dated
September 23, 1923 which is [a] spurious document as it
was executed by Maria Montes who was already dead
as early as 1919.
"III
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding Both the trial and the appellate courts were likewise correct in
private respondents as owners of the land giving weight to the testimony of Atty. Jose Gonzales. He testified
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that they (private that being, the owner of the adjacent land, he had personal
respondents) admitted the facts set forth by appellants[,] knowledge of the simple fact that the land in question was owned
now petitioners in their appellants brief[,] as the former by private respondents, who were in actual, open and continuous
(private respondents[)] did not file their appellees brief[.] possession thereof. Significantly, while he was private
respondents' counsel, he was presented by petitioners
"IV themselves. Having done so, they are bound by his testimony,
even if it is hostile.
The Order of the respondent Court of Appeals to deliver
the entire 11,927 sq. meters to private respondent is The only substantial argument of petitioners supporting their claim
illegal and unsupported by evidence. of ownership is their construction of a small house (barong-
barong) on the property, as acknowledged in private respondents'
letter, which reads:
"V
"Notice to Vacate
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that
private respondents are the owners of the land merely on
the basis of their tax declarations without evidence of Naval, Leyte
actual physical possession." 9 September 24, 1981
In sum, the main issue that needs to be resolved in the case at To: Mr. & Mrs. Renato Bismorte
bar is the ownership of the land in question. The other issues Barangay Calumpang
presented by petitioners are merely ancillary and will be Naval, Leyte
discussed in conjunction with this main issue.
Greetings:
The Court's Ruling</P>
You are advised to vacate the area/lot where your
The Petition is devoid of merit.10 'Barong-Barong House' [was] temporarily constructed for
we, the lawful owners, shall have to use it. You are given
Main Issue: three (3) months grace period upon receipt thereof within
Ownership of the Property which to transfer or completely vacate the area/lot.
[Should there be f]ailure to comply [with] this notice or
After a careful examination of the issues involved, the evidence
adduced, and the arguments or issues raised by both parties, this advise [,] an ejectment proceeding shall be instituted or
Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented leans filed against you before the proper court. Hence,
heavily in favor of herein private respondents. compliance is hereby desired.
"It is settled that great weight, and even finality, is given to the
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of
the trial courts. Only where it is shown that such findings are (Signed) Mr. NEMESIO E. ABAD
whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned." 11 Co-Owner
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that for a (Signed) ANA A. PAGHUBASAN
period of more than 60 years, private respondents have been able Co-Owner
to establish that they are the owners of the lot; and that for said
period, they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the same. (Signed) NESTORA DELA CUALA" 12
Obviously, the claim of private respondents that they are the
owners of the land is supported by the above letter, in which they
were asking petitioners to vacate the property. Moreover,
considering its size, which is 11,927 square meters as found by
the court-appointed commissioner, the fact that petitioners' house
is only a barong-barong or make-shift shanty lends support to
private respondents' claim that the former's presence on the
property was merely tolerated.
It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct
legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the
right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other
hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be
had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner
and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners
may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On
the other hand, those who possess as mere holders acknowledge
in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong." 13
In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the
property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because
their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact
that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso,
who was merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to
construct a small house on the lot. As held in Caniza v. Court of
Appeals, 14 "an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his
house, rent-free[,] does not create a permanent and indefeasible
right of possession in the latter's favor." 15
Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in
actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not
necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to
prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the
appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by
private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due
thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract
over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with
ownership.
Deed of Donation Not Proven to Be Invalid
Petitioners point out that the Deed of Donation executed by Maria
Montes to Isabel Elaba, who in turn sold the lot to private
respondents, is spurious since the Deed was executed on
September 23, 1923; whereas the death certificate issued by the
Holy Rosary Cathedral Parish of Naval, Leyte, shows that Maria
Montes was buried on February 21, 1919.
However, the Court of Appeals was correct in stating that
petitioners were barred by laches from questioning the validity of
the Deed. "Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting [the] presumption that the party
entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." 16 It is
too late for private respondents to raise this issue now,
considering that the Deed of Donation was executed more than
60 years ago. Moreover, they are precluded from raising this
argument, because it is being raised for the first time on appeal. 17
In addition, private respondents have not proven that the Maria
Montes mentioned in the Death Certificate is the same Maria
Montes who executed the Deed of Donation. The two have been
shown to have different sets of parents, thus raising serious
doubts on the identity of the person mentioned in the Death
Certificate. Lastly, the Death Certificate was not marked in
evidence, nor was it subjected to cross-examination. It is thus
inadmissible in evidence.
Size of Lot Immaterial To Private Respondents' Claim of
Ownership
Lastly, petitioners argue that private respondents own only 3,267
square meters of the questioned lot. This is the area that appears
on their Tax Declarations. On the other hand, the entire lot that
was adjudicated measures 11,927 square meters. Petitioners'
contention deserves scant consideration, because they have not
substantiated, by any means whatsoever, their claim to any part
of the disputed land. Hence, they are not entitled to ownership
thereof. Besides, what defines a piece of land is not the numerical
data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or "metes and
bounds" specified in its description as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155012 April 14, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ;
CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.;
and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M.
LAZARO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987
Constitution, the State promotes an equitable distribution of
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to deserving
citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court
must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care in
deciding an application for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title over such lands so that the public domain may not be raided
by unscrupulous land speculators.1
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to set aside the decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323, which
affirmed the decision3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Cabuyao, Laguna,4 of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No.
06 ordering the registration in favor of the respondents of parcels
of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna, designated
as Lot 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the
MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an application5 for registration
of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of
5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala,
Cabuyao, Laguna. In their application, they stated,
among other things, that they are the sole heirs of
Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones
Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, with
an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in
possession of the said property since 1949, more or less.
After the death of their mother and father on 19 February
1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the
property among themselves and subdivided it into five
lots, namely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and
2111-E. Since then they have been in actual possession
of the property in the concept of owners and in a public
and peaceful manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the following
grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-
interest possess sufficient title to the property or have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b)
the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts,
presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide right to registration of the land
under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as The Public Land Act,6 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073; (c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.7
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr.,
and Carmencita M. Alconaba testified to establish their claim over
the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he and his co-respondents
acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot 2111 of
Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in
possession of the said land since 1949 and had been religiously
paying the taxes due thereon. When their parents died, he and his
siblings immediately took possession of said property in the
concept of an owner, paid taxes, and continued to plant rice
thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and
subdivided it into five lots.8
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had
been in the possession of their parents since 1940 and that after
the death of their parents she and her siblings immediately took
possession of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The land is
being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that no
improvements have been introduced by their family on the lot. On
cross examination, she admitted that plans to sell the property
were at hand.9
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the
respondents have sufficiently established their family's actual,
continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the subject
property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the
possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that
such possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise,
it found that the land in question is alienable and disposable and
is not within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it confirmed the
title of the respondents over the said lots; directed the Register of
Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cause the registration of
said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon payment
of fees; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration
once the decision becomes final and executory.
Upon appeal10 by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in (a) giving weight to the self-serving testimonies of
Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents'
tax declaration is sufficient proof that they and their parents have
been in possession of the property for at least thirty years, despite
the fact that the said tax declaration was only for the year 1994
and the property tax receipts presented by the respondents were
all of recent dates, i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997.
Finally, the OSG states that even granting for the sake of
argument that the respondents have been in possession of the
property since 1940, their adverse possession should be
reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the property was
declared to be within alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of appellate
courts are conclusive upon us,11 there are recognized exceptions
thereto, among which is where the findings of fact are not
supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion.12 This exception is
present in this case.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942,13 reads as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
…
 (b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 14 by
substituting the phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since June
12, 1945"; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section
48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
The date "12 June 1945" was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P. D.
No. 1529,15 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. (Emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove
the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain.
But it is not clear as to when it was classified as alienable and
disposable by proper authorities.
We do not find merit in OSG's claim that the subject property was
classified as within the alienable and disposable zone only on 28
September 1981, and hence, possession by respondents'
predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be considered. In
support of this claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in
the survey plan marked as Exhibit "Q," which reads:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as
per Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 certified on
September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or military
reservation.
As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certified on
September 28, 1981" could not have meant that Lot 2111 became
alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981. That date
obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No.
004 was certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents
that since Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111
forms part was approved on 31 December 1925 by the then
Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and
alienable as early as of that date. There is nothing to support their
claim that 31 December 1925 is the date of the approval of such
project or the date of the classification of the subject property as
disposable and alienable public land. It is settled that a person
who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove his
claim by clear and convincing evidence.16 The respondents have
failed to discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since 12 June 1945.1awphil.net
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-
seven years of possession by the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of Carmencita and
Mauricio. The two were aged 6217 and 60,18respectively, when
they testified in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in 1935
and 1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted for a
period of fifty-seven years at the time they testified, the same
must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time that
Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 years old.
It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to
the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of
land and testify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their
testimonies could not be relied upon to prove the adverse
possession of the subject parcel of land by their parents.
In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and
occupation by their predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as
testified to by Carmencita19) or since 1949 (as testified to by
Mauricio20 and declared in respondents' application for
registration) are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim. They
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
of law than factual evidence of possession.21 Even granting that
the possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940,
still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the
law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction.22 Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.23
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz
Melendez cultivated, had control over, or used the whole or even
a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural
purposes.24 Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and
there is no evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by
the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the
Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation
purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and declarations are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the
least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property.25 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties
with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the
government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323
and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao, Laguna, of 1
September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The land registration case
MTC LRC Case No. 06 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of Costs de oficio.
the subject land upon the death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz
Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976 and 19 February 1967, SO ORDERED.
respectively, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes
thereon. If that were so, why had they not themselves introduced
any improvement on the land?27 We even find unsubstantiated the
claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant on the land. They did
not present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one tenant
could have cultivated such a vast tract of land with an area of 2.6
hectares.

The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for
taxation purposes by the respondents only for the year 1994.
They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990, 1991, 1992,
1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot trust the
assertion of the respondents that they immediately took
possession of the property in the concept of an owner after the
death of their parents. While belated declaration of a property for
taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of
possession,28 tax declarations or realty tax payments of property
are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession.29

Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on

the subject property. Carmencita even admitted that plans of
selling the property were at hand. Thus, it would be rational to
conclude that this move for registration is just but a camouflage by
smart land speculators who saw in the land applied for expected
profits from its existence.

In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an

imperfect title over the land subject of the application at the time
MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court. They failed to
prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June
1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
G.R. No. 168222 April 18, 2006
SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA
RUMARATE; deceased TEODULO RUMARATE is represented
herein by his Heirs/Substitutes, namely, ANASTACIA
RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA RUMARATE,
ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO RUMARATE, FIDEL
RUMARATE, MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE,
CLEMENCIA RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA
RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs.
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR
HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, LEONORA
HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO,
RODRIGOHERNANDEZ, BERNARDO HERNANDEZ,
LOURDES HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO SALVATIERRA,
ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053,
which reversed and set aside the March 31, 1997 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case
No. C-964, declaring petitioners as owners of Lot No. 379 with an
area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio
Catimo,3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses
Teodulo Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action
for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title with
damages against respondent heirs of the late spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.4 Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379
was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather,
Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with
the Rumarate family in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924,
Santiago and the Rumarate family transferred residence to avail
of the land distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan, Quezon. From
1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five
hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon in
1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April 21, 1925 recognizing
his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379.5 Since Teodulo was only
14 years old then, his father helped him cultivate the land.6 Their
family thereafter cleared the land, built a house 7 and planted
coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon.8 In 1960,
Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)"9ratifying the transfer
of his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo. Between 1960 and
1970, three conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of
coconut trees growing therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo
testified in 1992, the remaining portions of the land was almost
entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts, coffee, jackfruits,
mangoes and vegetables.10 From 1929, Teodulo and later, his
wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners and declared
the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961.11
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta, respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were able
to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a
case against respondents because he was advised to just remain
on the land and pay the corresponding taxes thereon.12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11,
1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for
P9,000.00.13 Respondents alleged that on April 21, 1925, the CFI
of Tayabas rendered a Decision written in Spanish, declaring Lot
No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant
thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was
issued to Santiago because he failed to file an Answer. Spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open
Cadastral Proceeding No. 12, alleging that though no title was
issued in the name of Santiago, the same decision is,
nevertheless, proof that Santiago was in possession of Lot No.
379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having succeeded in
the rights of Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral
Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened and that the corresponding title
over Lot No. 379 be issued in their name. On September 13,
1965, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a decision adjudicating Lot
No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1184414 was issued on the same
date.15 Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land
through the help of a certain Fredo16 who was instituted as
caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez that he
will no longer stay on the land because there are people
instructing him to discontinue tilling the same.17
After the death of the spouses,18 respondents executed a deed of
partition over the subject lot and were issued TCT No. T- 237330
on June 28, 1988 in lieu of OCT No. O-11844.19
Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964,
he accompanied his father in inspecting the lot which was then
planted with coconut trees.20 Thereafter, he visited the land twice,
once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he
testified, his family declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes
due thereon.21Joaquin explained that after the death of his father
in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only when the
complaint was filed against them when he learned that petitioners
are in actual possession of the property.22 He added that his
siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for
cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations
then of the New People’s Army between the years 1965-
1970.23 1avvphil.net
On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners. It held that since the latter possessed the land in the
concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners thereof
by acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to
the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to
respondents’ parents in 1964, the former no longer had the right
over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said
respondents. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision,
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, to wit:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the
Cadastral Survey of Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No.
12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557), situated in Brgy.
Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently,
deceitfully and mistakenly registered in the names of the
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta;
2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta have no better
rights than their parents/predecessors-in-interest, they
having stepped only on (sic) their shoes;
3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and
substitute plaintiffs-[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo
Rumarate are the true, real and legal owners/or the
owners in fee simple absolute of the above described
parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-
described parcel of land to plaintiff Rosita Victor
Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the
deceased Teodulo Rumarate;
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province
in Lucena City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-237330 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of
 title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and the
substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff
Teodulo Rumarate, in accordance with law and settled
jurisprudence; and
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the
suit.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.24
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26,
2005, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled
that Teodulo did not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by
donation or acquisitive prescription; that Teodulo’s bare allegation
that Santiago orally bequeathed to him the litigated lot is
insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and that even
assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to
Teodulo in 1929, or in the 1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void
for not complying with the formalities of a valid donation which
require the donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to
be embodied in a public instrument. Both requirements, however,
are absent in this case because in 1929, the alleged donation was
not reduced to writing while the purported 1960 donation was
never accepted in a public document by Teodulo. The appellate
court thus surmised that since it was not established that Santiago
donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also
failed to prove that he possessed the land adversely, exclusively
and in the concept of an owner, a vital requisite before one may
acquire title by acquisitive prescription. In conclusion, the Court of
Appeals ruled that even assuming further that Teodulo had a right
over the property, his cause of action is now barred by laches
because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding
knowledge as early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. The decretal
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. The assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-
964 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25
Hence, the instant appeal.
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be
awarded? To petitioners who possessed and cultivated the lot
since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of title
over the property, or to respondents who have a certificate of title
but are not in possession of the controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine
the respective rights of the parties so that the complainant and
those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of
hostile claim.26 Under Article 47627 of the Civil Code, the remedy
may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is
thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any
interest therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the suit.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.28
In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real property
refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of
the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means
he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulo’s open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years vested him and
his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable at the time
Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of
Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, effective June 22, 1957 30 which
provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now
Property Registration Decree), to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of
title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the public
domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such conversion already effected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession became
complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to
the testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulo’s)
possession of the land since 1929 was open, continuous,
adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is a settled
rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that in the matter of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are given
great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that
Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of
an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted land,
built his home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In 1957, he
filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but failed to
pursue the same.33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the
youngest being 28 years old,34 continued to till the land. From
1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged Teodulo’s possession of
Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said land.
For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act of ownership over
Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer
interested in asserting any right over the land by executing in
favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the
land as owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929
as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are
void for non-compliance with the formalities of donation, they
nevertheless explain Teodulo and his family’s long years of
occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of their
possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of a
parcel of land in the name of the successors-in-interest of the
donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation inasmuch as
said donee possessed the property in the concept of an owner.
Thus –
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid
because it involves an immovable property and the donation was
not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the
old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code
(concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said
donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when
on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the
property adversely and in the concept of owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30
years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of an owner, earned
him title over the lot in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private
property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell
the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in
1964. Consequently, the latter and herein respondents did not
acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their
name are void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago
acquired title over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925
Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his rights
over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of possession since
1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to their (respondents)
predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an
action for, and successfully obtained, confirmation of imperfect
title over Lot No. 379, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents
that Santiago’s alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379
is in the nature contemplated by the Public Land Act which
requires more than constructive possession and casual
cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and
occupation." Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid
section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As
this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
"x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by
us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also
Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be
observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive
possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and
this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications
is ‘one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy
with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant.’ While, therefore, ‘possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession’,
possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not
gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or
symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not
a mere fiction x x x."
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:
"x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation
purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was done by
him, does not constitute acts of possession."
In the instant case, Santiago’s short-lived possession and
cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not vest him title. While he tilled
the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the same
since 1928. He abandoned the property and allowed Teodulo to
exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession of Lot No. 379
could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium
transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to
another than he himself has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not acquire any right
over the questioned lot and the title issued in their names are
void, because of the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher
than the source.37
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta
cannot be considered as purchasers in good faith because they
had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.38 The Court notes
that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379 at the time of the
sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and
maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have
prompted the spouses to further inquire who was actually tilling
the land. Had they done so, they would have found that Teodulo
and his family are the ones possessing and cultivating the land as
owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third
persons or purchasers in good faith and for value or those who
buy the property and pay a full and fair price for the
same39 because they merely inherited Lot No. 379 from spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by
virtue of the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and
not on account of his alleged 30-year possession thereof, we will
still arrive at the same conclusion. This is so because the
declaration of this Court that petitioners are the rightful owners of
the controverted lot is based on Teodulo’s own possession and
occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, regardless of the manner by which Santiago acquired
ownership over same lot.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for
quieting of title is imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the
person seeking relief is in possession of the disputed property. A
person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of
ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his
undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the
aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
title.40Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed
Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present, their right to institute a
suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred by the
statute of limitations.
Neither could petitioners’ action be barred by laches because they
continuously enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested
the fruits thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and without
any interference from respondents. They cannot therefore be said
to have slept on their rights as they in fact exercised the same by
continuously possessing Lot No. 379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually
guilty of laches. Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can
properly address the issue of laches based on petitioners’
allegation in the complaint that "[n]either spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor [herein respondents] had
taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel of land
from the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to
the present."41Such averment is sufficient to impute abandonment
of right on the part of respondents. At any rate, laches need not
be specifically pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider
it in determining the rights of the parties.42
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or
declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law that no
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is
likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches.43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a
party allows the following number of years to lapse from the
emergence of his cause of action without enforcing his claim,
laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37 years;
32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19
years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years. 44
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of
which the other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting one’s
rights, despite having had knowledge or notice of the other party’s
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of a party that the
person against whom laches is imputed would assert the right;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the
event the suit is allowed to prosper.45
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners’
continuous possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 should
have prompted the respondents to file an action against
petitioners, but they chose not to. Respondents cannot deny
knowledge of said possession by petitioners as they even
asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant
they (respondents) instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is
of petitioners’ complaint in 1992, or after 22 years, respondents enough to defeat the certificate of title issued to respondents. 50
never bothered to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent
Joaquin Hernandez testified that he and his siblings had a plan to WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005
convert the land into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR. CV No. 57053,
off for fear of the rampant operations of the New People’s Army is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 31, 1997 Decision of
between the years 1965-1970. However, even after said years, the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil
respondents took no step to implement their plan. Worse, among Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No. 379 in favor petitioners and
the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta who ordering the cancellation of respondents’ Transfer Certificate of
are all living in the Philippines,46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited Title No. T- 237330, is REINSTATED with
the land and only thrice, i.e., once in each years of 1964, 1966 the MODIFICATION deleting the trial court’s order directing the
and 1970. Thereafter, not one of them paid visit to Lot No. 379, up Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the
to the time Joaquin Hernandez testified in 1996,47 despite the fact name of petitioners.
that two of them are living only in Calauag, Quezon; one in
Agdangan, Quezon;48 and two in Lucena City.49 Neither did they
send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their right SO ORDERED.
over the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta as well respondents, have neglected
Lot No. 379. Were it not for this action instituted by petitioners in
1992, their conflicting claims over the property could not have
been settled. It goes without saying that to lose a property that
has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77 years
will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to
petitioners, especially so if the same ancestral land will be lost
under most unfair circumstances in favor of respondents who
appear to have no real interest in cultivating the same.
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for
respondents. Only a positive and categorical assertion of their
supposed rights against petitioners would rule out the application
of laches. It means taking the offensive by instituting legal means
to wrest possession of the property which, however, is absent in
this case. Respondents’ payment of taxes alone, without
possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of
ownership. What stands out is their overwhelming passivity by
allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy the
fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in
favor of petitioners.
One last point. Notwithstanding this Court’s declaration that Lot
No. 379 should be awarded in favor of petitioners, their title over
the same is imperfect and is still subject to the filing of the proper
application for confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, where the State and other oppositors may be
given the chance to be heard. It was therefore premature for the
trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to issue a
certificate of title in the name of petitioners.
G.R. No. 160421 October 4, 2004
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented
by their Attorney-in-fact,
GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the January
16, 2003 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65407 which reversed the September 7, 1998 decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
Registration Case No. T-320. Likewise assailed is the appellate
court’s October 17, 2003 resolution3 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester
C. Recto, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6, an application for registration of title over a
23,209 square meter lot,4 designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485, situated in Barangay San
Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. They also prayed in the alternative
that their petition for registration be granted pursuant to
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.5
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806
from sisters Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres
for the amount of P6,943,534.40.6 The two, in turn, inherited the
lot from their deceased parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana.
Maria, born on October 22, 1917, declared that since 1945, her
father was already the owner of Lot 806. She became aware of
her father’s possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner
in 1930 when she was 13 years of age. The possession of the
subject lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated
by Rosita,7 who testified that in 1935 when she was 13 years of
age, she first came to know that her father was the owner of Lot
806. The sisters added that during the lifetime of Vicente, he
planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their tenant. After
his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through hired
farmers.8
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidences –
(1) Blue Print Copy of the Plan9 and Technical
Description10 of Lot 806, both certified by Land
Management Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands), of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR);
(2) Tax Declarations11 of the lot for the years 1948, 1955,
1968, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1994 (in the name of
Vicente Medrana); 1996 (in the name of Rosita Guevarra
and Maria Torres); and 1998 (in the name of Philip and
Ester Recto).
(3) Certification of Non-Delinquency for the year 1998
from the Municipal Treasurer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;12
(4) Report13 from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) stating, among others,
that –
(a) the entire area is within the alienable and
disposable zone as classified under Project
No. 30 L.C. Map No. 582 and released and
certified as such on December 31,
1925; (Emphasis, supplied)
(b) the lot is not within a reservation area nor
within the forest zone;
(c) the lot is not within a previously issued
patent, decree or title.
(d) there is no public land application filed for
the same land by the applicant or any other
person;
(e) the land is covered by Tax Declaration No.
021-02166-A in the name of the predecessor-in-
interest and that there is no difference in area;
(f) the lot is agricultural in nature; and
(g) the lot does not encroach upon an
established watershed, riverbed and river bank
protection.
(5) Report from the Land Management Bureau that the
land involved is not covered by any land patent or by
land application pending issuance of patent.14
(6) Report from the Forest Management Service, DENR
that the subject lot falls within Alienable and Disposable
lands, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, per BFD
LC Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925.15
(7) Report from the Land Management Sector, DENR
that Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael,
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not
a portion of nor identical to any previously approved
isolated survey.16
There being no opposition to the petition from any private
individual, an Order of General Default was issued by the
trial court.17
On September 7, 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision
granting the petition for registration. The dispositive portion
thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the
Order of General Default, this Court hereby adjudicates
and decrees Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre on
plan Ap-04-010485, situated in San Rafael, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, with an area of 23,209 square meters, in favor
of and in the names of Spouses Philip Recto and Ester
C. Recto, Filipino citizens and residents of 1322 Palm
Avenue, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.18
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to
the Court of Appeals contending that petitioners failed to – (1)
offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2)
prove possession of the lot for the period required by law; and (3)
overthrow the presumption that subject property forms part of the
public domain.19
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court on the sole ground of failure to offer in evidence
the original tracing cloth plan of the land.20
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that in view
of their compliance with all the substantive and procedural
requirements for registration, save for the submission of the
tracing cloth plan, the case be remanded to the trial court for the
presentation of the said tracing cloth plan. The Solicitor General,
on the other hand, interposed no objection to petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.21
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.22 Hence, the instant petition praying
for the remand of the case before the trial court.
In its Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that in the
interest of justice, he will not to oppose the petition.23
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance [now the
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073,
provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of
land, the applicant must show that – (a) he, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the
land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.24
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest
of petitioners, categorically testified that they, and prior to them
their father, had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the
concept of owners. Maria, having been born on October 22, 1917,
and Rosita on October 29, 1922, were 13 years of age when they
became aware of their family’s possession of Lot 806 in 1930 and
1935, respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly capable and
competent to perceive their father’s possession of Lot 806 in the
concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies
to be worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge
below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue, having
personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, her findings deserve the
highest respect.25
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the subject lot was for
the year 1948 will not militate against petitioners. Note that said
1948 Tax Declaration cancels a previous Tax Declaration (No.
26472),26 thus substantiating petitioners’ possession of Lot 806
through their predecessor-in-interest even prior to said date. At
any rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held that the
belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not
necessarily mean that possession by the previous owners thereof
did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony
supporting possession for the required period is credible, the court
will grant the petition for registration. Pertinent portion of the
decision, reads –
Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor
who testified on the possession of Marcial Listana for the
period required by law. The issue of credibility is
unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better
position to pass judgment on the issue having personally
heard the witnesses testify and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a better
position to observe the witnesses, the trial court’s
appreciation of the witness’ testimony, truthfulness,
honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect.
xxx xxx xxx
… [A] person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is
capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the
fact and (b) he can make his perception known. True, in
1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was
four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where
the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and
Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually
passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was
only a child at the required inception of possession does
not render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is
well-established that any child regardless of age, can be
a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving
can make known his perception to others and that he is
capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is
examined. The requirements of a child’s competence as
a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of
recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There is
no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the
foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a
witness’ knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was
obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired
knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at the age
of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the
years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is
reason to reject petitioner’s claim that Divinaflor is
incompetent to testify regarding Listana’s possession
since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in
Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana
possessing the land.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated
declaration of the property for tax purposes does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the predecessors were not in
possession of the land as required by law since 1945. Petitioner
capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration presented
took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is
dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that
tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated
declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of
possession, especially in the instant case where there are no
other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the
public domain having been released and certified as such
on December 31, 1925. As further certified by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, the
entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land; within an alienable
and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor within a
forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbed, and riverbank protection. 28 Petitioners were
thus able to successfully meet the requisite for original registration
of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court granting the petition for registration on the ground of
petitioners’ failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth
plan of Lot 806. Indeed, the submission of the tracing cloth is a
mandatory requirement for registration.29 However, it was held
that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the
Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence could also
provide sufficient identification.30 In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,31 the Court ruled that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan
together with the lot’s technical description duly certified as to
their correctness by the Bureau of Lands (Now the Land
Management Bureau of the DENR)32 are sufficient to identify the
land applied for registration, thus –
On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of
Director of Lands v. Reyes, where it was held that "the
original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which
must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a
statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the
identification of the land sought to be registered. As what
was submitted in the case at bar to identify the subject
property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the
blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court
should have rejected the same as insufficient.
We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was
correct when it observed that in that case the applicant in effect
"had not submitted anything at all to identify the subject property"
because the blueprint presented lacked the approval of the
Director of Lands. By contrast —
In the present case, there was considerable compliance
with the requirement of the law as the subject property
was sufficiently identified with the presentation of
blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v.
Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28,
1981). It should be noted in this connection that the
Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of
the blueprint copy of the plan including the technical
description that go with it. Hence, we cannot ignore
the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant has
provided ample evidence to establish the identity of
the subject property. (Emphasis supplied)
Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where we held that
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration Having met all the requirements for registration of title including
purposes was the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of the presentation of sufficient evidence to identify the land sought
Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide to be registered, there is no more need to remand the case before
sufficient identification. This rule was bolstered only recently in the the trial court for the presentation of the tracing cloth plan.
case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan: WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17,
2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407
We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the are reversed and set aside. the September 7, 1998 decision of
appellate court in ruling that Exhibit "O," the true certified the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the Registration Case No. T-320, ordering the issuance of a decree of
purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan
was found by the appellate court to reflect the land as Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is REINSTATED.
surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of
the Land Registration Commission, and was re-verified No pronouncement as to costs.
and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974
pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing
from the Land Registration Commission the authority to SO ORDERED.
approve original survey plans. It contained the following
material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality
(Amadeo) and province (Cavite) where the subject land
is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as
plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the
Technical Descriptions signed by a geodetic surveyor
and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In
fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information
necessary for a proper and definite identification of the
land sought to be registered, thereby serving the
purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is
required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan
was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth
should not detract from the probative value thereof. x x x.
In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified by the blue
print copy of the plan (Exhibit "R")33 and the technical description
(Exhibit "S")34 thereof both approved by Land Management
Services, DENR. Also, per report of the Land Management
Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael, Municipality of
Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a portion of, nor
identical to any previously approved isolated survey. 35 Petitioners
also submitted before the Court of Appeals a certified true
copy36of the original tracing cloth plan as well as a
certification37 from the Land Registration Authority attesting to the
fact that the original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester
film is on file with their office. Under the circumstances, therefore,
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court solely on the ground that petitioners failed to present the
original tracing cloth plan.
G.R. No. 146341 August 7, 2003
AQUILA LARENA joined by her husband, CANDIDO
MERCADERA, Petitioners,
vs.
FRUCTUOSA MAPILI, JOSE MAPILI and ROSELA
VENELES, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In denying this appeal, the Court reiterates the well-known rule
that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of
the trial court, are entitled to respect and even finality. Petitioners
have not convinced this Court that their case constitutes one of
the exceptions to this doctrine.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the July 21, 2000 Decision2 and the November
8, 2000 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No.
44927. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal,
devoid of merit in fact and in law is hereby ordered DISMISSED,
and the judgment of the Trial Court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with
costs against [petitioners]."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The appellate court, quoting the Decision5 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City (Branch 30), summarized the
facts of the case as follows:
"‘The record shows that Hipolito Mapili during his lifetime owned a
parcel of unregistered land situated at Balabag, Valencia, Negros
Oriental which was declared for taxation purposes in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 1419 described as follows:
‘A parcel of unregistered land situated at Balabag, Valencia,
Negros Oriental. Bounded on the North by Apolonia Mapili 37.00;
on the South by the Provincial Road 41.00; on the East by
Perfecto Ozoa 11.00; on the West by Emeliana 16.40. Containing
an area of Five Hundred Thirty Four (534) square meters more or
less.’
‘Hipolito Mapili died and was buried on July 14, 1934. He was
survived by his only son, Magno Mapili and daughters Julia,
Azucena, Anatolia and Abundia. These daughters have since died
without issue. Magno Mapili died in 1944 survived by his widow,
Rosela Veneles, and children Fructuosa, Jose, Generosa and
Pantaleona.
‘Under date of October 28, 1949, Filomena6 Larena executed an
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property involving the property
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1419, alleging that she bought
the property from Hipolito Mapili. After the death of Filomena,
Aquila Larena, her niece[,] took possession of the property[,]
claiming that she bought the same from her said aunt.
‘Plaintiffs Fructuosa Mapili, Jose Mapili and Rosela Veneles are
suing Aquila Larena, the successor in interest of Filomena
Larena[,] impleading Candido Mercadera, Aquila’s husband, [as]
co-defendant. Defendants Generosa Mapili-Bahandi and
Pantaleona Mapili, sisters of [p]laintiffs[,] were impleaded as co-
defendants for being unwilling co-plaintiffs. Defendant Rural Bank
of Valencia, Inc.7 was also sued as the banking institution from
[which] defendant Aquila Larena obtained a loan using OCT No.
FV-30714 of the property in question as collateral.
‘Plaintiffs’ [C]omplaint alleged that Filomena Larena falsely stated
in her Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Exh. ‘B’) that Hipolito
Mapili sold the property to her on October 28, 1949[,] which
Hipolito Mapili could not have done because he was already dead
at that time (Exhibit ‘C’).
‘Defendants’ Answer contends that Filomena Larena lawfully
acquired the said property from Hipolito Mapili in a private
document of sale which got lost during the last World War. By
reason of the sale, Magno Mapili and his family had to move out
of the land [allowing]8 Filomena Larena to take possession thereof
as owner. Filomena Larena then sold the property to defendant
Aquila Larena on February 17, 1968. Defendant Aquila Larena
[attributed the statement in Filomena’s affidavit] 9 that she
purchased the land from Hipolito Mapili on October 28, 1949 to a
mistake committed by the one who assisted her in executing said
transferor’s affidavit.’"10 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing petitioners’ appeal, the CA declared that
respondents had never lost their right to the land in question, as
they were the heirs to whom the property had descended upon
the death of the original claimant and possessor. It also found no
legal justification for the application of prescription and laches.
Hence this Petition.11
The Issues
"1 - Did Felomina Larena, the predecessor of petitioner Aquila
Larena, buy the property in question from its original owner
Hipolito Mapili?
"2 - Is the lot in question now owned by Petitioner Aquila Larena
by virtue of the joint operation of the principles of acquisitive
prescription and laches?"12
There is really only one issue: Did Filomena (or Felomina) Larena
acquire the subject property by means of sale, prescription and/or
laches?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious. The short answer to the above
question is "No."
Sole Issue:
The Alleged Acquisition of Property
At the outset, we must emphasize that only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Well-entrenched, indeed, is the doctrine that
questions of fact are not proper subjects in this mode of
appeal.13 The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial
court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal, except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.14 Since none of these exceptions is present in this case,
the CA’s findings of fact remain final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal.
Indeed, as found by both lower courts, the property had
descended by succession from Hipolito Mapili to his only son,
Magno -- the former’s daughters having died without issue -- and
on to the latter’s own widow and children. These heirs took
possession of the property up to the outbreak of the Second
World War when they evacuated to the hinterlands, where they
remained until the war was over.
It was in the 1970s when Petitioner Aquila Larena took
possession of the property, alleging that she had purchased it
from her aunt, who in turn claimed to have bought it from Hipolito.
Aquila’s allegations were never substantiated,15and the Affidavit of
Transfer on which she had hinged her claim was even declared
by the RTC to be spurious.16Hipolito was already dead17 when the
alleged transfer was made to her aunt. Not having acquired the
property, the latter had nothing to sell.
Even the unwilling co-plaintiffs’ testimonies before the RTC are
hearsay. Their probative value is not based on personal
knowledge,18 but on the knowledge of some other person who
was never presented on the witness stand. 19Thus, they must be
excluded, because the party against whom they were presented
was deprived of the opportunity for cross-examination.20
The hearsay rule bars the admission of evidence that has not
been given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more important,
has not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel. Cross-examination is required to test the perception, the
veracity and the articulateness of the out-of-court declarant, upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.21
Of no moment in the instant case is the issuance of a Torrens
certificate pertaining to the disputed property.22 It "does not create
or vest title,"23 but is merely an "evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein."24 Land registration under the Torrens
system was never intended to be a means of acquiring
ownership.25 Moreover, the Original Certificate of Title was never
formally offered by petitioners. In its Order dated October 1,
1993,26 the RTC considered their prolonged failure to offer it in
evidence27 as a waiver of their right to offer exhibits.28 In so ruling,
the court a quo followed the rule that evidence not formally offered
should not be considered.29
Neither does the existence of tax declarations change our mind. It Gratia argumenti that the Tax Declarations indicate the date of
is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, but a "proof that the actual or constructive possession, petitioners still cannot benefit
holder has a claim of title over the property." 30 Tax Declaration No. therefrom. Tax Declaration No. 9839, on the one hand, was
1419 for the year 1949 was registered in the name of the original registered in 1950 in Filomena’s name, not Aquila’s. For lack of a
owner, Hipolito Mapili.31 A year later, Tax Declaration No. 9839 just title,49 the ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten
was registered in the name of Petitioner Aquila’s aunt. 32 The RTC years50 cannot be applied. Moreover, only twenty-seven years had
noted in its Decision33 that beginning 1968, the property had lapsed at the time the Complaint was filed -- a period that was
already been registered in the name of Petitioner Aquila, as can short of three years for extraordinary acquisitive prescription 51 to
be seen from Tax Declaration Nos. 18899,34 402735and 03-640-C. apply. Tax Declaration No. 18899, on the other hand, was
registered in Aquila’s name in 1968. At the time the Complaint
Normally, one will not pay taxes on a property not in one’s actual was filed, the elapsed period was still short of one year for
or constructive possession.36 Hence, being good indicia of ordinary acquisitive prescription52 to apply. The same can be said
possession in the concept of owner, the Tax Declarations in the of Tax Declaration No. 4027, filed for the year 1974, which fell
name of Petitioner Aquila may strengthen her bona fide claim of short of seven years.
acquisition of ownership.37 Petitioners, however, have not been
able to present the evidence needed to tack 38 the date of Laches is likewise unavailing. Defined, it is the "failure or neglect,
possession on the property in question. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which could or should have been done earlier through the
Supposedly, there were testimonies favorable to petitioners. They exercise of due diligence."53 It is an "omission to assert a right
allegedly indicate that after the war, the Mapilis returned to a within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
different house that was built, not on the property in question, but entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it." 54
on another.39 They also showed that when the Larenas took
possession of the property, there was no opposition. 40 The RTC Assuming that petitioners took possession of the property in the
did not consider these testimonies, however, but held that the early 1970s, the filing by respondents of the Complaint in 1977
preponderance of evidence was with respondents.41 1âwphi1 completely negates the assertion that the latter were negligent in
asserting their claim.
Contrary to the findings of the CA,42 petitioners raise prescription
and laches as special defenses. They contend: "[A]ssuming WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
arguendo that [respondents] have a cause of action regarding the Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
land in question, the same has been long barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription[.]"43 They further argue that even if the SO ORDERED.
rules44 provide that defenses not pleaded in the Answer are
deemed waived, the court shall dismiss the claim if the pleadings
or the pieces of evidence on record show that the action is barred
by prescription.45
Unfortunately for petitioners, prescription cannot be taken in their
favor because, as we mentioned earlier, there is no evidence on
record that tacks on the property Petitioner Aquila’s date of
possession. "Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring
ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In
order to ripen into ownership, possession must be en concepto de
dueño, public, peaceful and uninterrupted." 46 Coupled with the
court a quo’s finding that the claims of purchase were
unsubstantiated, petitioners’ acts of a possessory character --
acts that might have been merely tolerated by the owner -- did not
constitute possession.47 No matter how long tolerated possession
is continued, it does not start the running of the prescriptive
period.48
G.R. No. 109111 June 28, 2000
CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, MONTSERRAT M. SANTIAGO,
NILDA M. IBOLEON, BELINDA MANAHAN AND JOSEFINA M.
CAPINPIN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
On appeal1 before the Court is the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals declaring respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System ("MWSS") the owner of eleven (11) parcels of
land situated in San Mateo, Rizal, and allowing registration of title
to the land in its name. The Court of Appeals reversed the "partial
decision"3 of the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal.
The issue raised is factual, which we do not review. 4 However,
since the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at different
factual conclusions, we depart from the general rule.
On July 22, 1980, the MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court,
San Mateo, Rizal an application for registration of title under the
torrens system of eleven (11) parcels of land, situated in San
Mateo, Rizal.5
Long before World War II, MWSS buried a 42-inch diameter steel
aqueduct pipeline under the subject parcels of land. The pipeline
drew water from the Wawa Dam in Montalban, Rizal to the Balara
Filters in Quezon City. Fifteen (15) kilometers long, it ran through
the municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo and Marikina. 6
On August 21, 1987, MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court,
San Mateo, Rizal a second amended petition alleging ownership
of the subject parcels of land. It alleged that by itself and through
its predecessors-in-interest, the National Waterworks and
Sewerage System ("NAWASA") and the Metropolitan Water
District ("MWD"), it has been in "'open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the said parcels of land,"
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
On January 27, 1988, petitioners Nilda Manahan Iboleon, Belinda
Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin, as heirs of Modesto
Manahan, filed an opposition to the application. They alleged
ownership of a portion of the land subject of the application. They
presented transfer certificates of title, related papers and
documents to support their claim. They stated that neither they
nor their predecessors-in-interest ever ceded ownership or
possession of the property to any person, and even assuming that
MWSS possessed the land, it did not acquire ownership by
prescription.
On October 24, 1988, petitioner Montserrat M. Santiago as heir of
Vicente Manahan, likewise filed an opposition. She claimed
ownership of a portion of the land included in the application and
presented Original Certificate of Title No. 1153 of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
On October 24, 1988, petitioner Carmelino M. Santiago also filed
an opposition, alleging ownership of a portion of the land. He
presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-39258 of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
After due hearings, on November 26, 1990, the trial court decided
the case in favor of petitioners. It reasoned: First, the tax
declarations presented by MWSS did not prove ownership and
merely constituted prima facie evidence of possession. Second,
the transfer certificates of title presented by petitioners proved
ownership and cannot be attacked collaterally. Third, the pipelines
installed by respondent MWSS were buried and hidden under the
ground, hence, MWSS' possession was not "open". Further,
respondent admittedly discontinued use of the pipelines after
1968, hence, possession was not "continuous". Last, respondents'
use and possession of the land was merely tolerated by
petitioners and could not ripen into ownership. Thus, the decretal
portion of the trial court's partial decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the oppositors Montserrat
Santiago, Carmelino Santiago, Nilda Manahan Iboleon,
Belinda Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin and
against the petitioner, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the petition insofar as the
opposition of the said oppositors are concerned;
2) Declaring the aforesaid oppositors the owners of the
strips of land applied for and are located inside the
oppositors' properties described in OCT 1153; TCT No.
N-39258 and TCT Nos. 178148 and 178149; and
3) Sentencing the petitioner to pay the oppositors the
sum of P10,000.00 as and attorney's fee and
4) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Given at San Mateo, Rizal this 26th day of November,
1990.
(t/s) CIPRIANO D. ROMA
Judge 7
On January 21, 1991, respondent MWSS appealed to the Court of
Appeals.8
Resolving the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled differently.
Reasoning: First, the property covered by the original and transfer
certificates of title presented by petitioners merely adjoins and are
adjacent to the property claimed by MWSS.9 Such is shown by the
technical descriptions in the certificates of title presented. The
parcels of land covered by the certificates of title do not overlap or
encroach on the property claimed by MWSS. In fact, the strips of
land where the pipes were laid were deliberately excluded in the
survey plans of petitioners' property. The survey served as basis
for issuance of petitioners' certificates of title. Second, the
aqueducts were installed and buried long before World War II,
under untitled land, giving rise to the presumption that such land
was "public land". Third, petitioners did not present compelling
proof that the land under which the pipelines were buried were
owned by their predecessors-in-interest. There was no proof that
use of the land by MWSS was merely tolerated by petitioners'
predecessors. The testimonies presented by petitioners on the
matter are hearsay. Last, MWSS acquired ownership by
prescription. True, the pipes were "hidden" under the land.
However, it is a matter of public knowledge and judicial notice that
the pipes existed and were buried there before World War II. The
existence of the pipelines was indicated above the ground by
"pilapils" constructed by the adjoining landowners themselves,
since they planted rice alongside the strips of land. Further, the
fact that use of the pipes was discontinued was not relevant since
the pipes had remained buried under the land up to the
present.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the partial decision appealed from herein
is REVERSED and in lieu thereof, another partial
decision is entered herein declaring applicant MWSS
owner of the parcels of land applied for by them in this
case and granting and allowing their registration in its
name.
Costs against oppositor-appellees.
 SO ORDERED. 10
On February 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals acting on a motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners, clarified its decision as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby clarified herein that the titled
property of appellee Carmelino Santiago adjoining a
portion of the strips of land applied for registration by
appellant MWSS in this case is excluded from the new
partial decision rendered by this Court in favor of
appellant in LRC Case No. 18-SM in lieu of that of the
lower court appealed from in this case.
As to the other matters raised in appellees' motion for
reconsideration, we find the same without merit and said
motion is denied with respect thereto.
SO ORDERED. 11
12
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners raise three issues 13 essentially revolving around the
question of whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are correct.
The appeal is not meritorious. The findings of the Court of
Appeals are supported by substantial evidence and are binding on
this Court. 14
Documents proving ownership such as transfer and original
certificates of title are the legs on which petitioners' case stands.
Premised on the relevance of these documents, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the proverbial legs of
evidence are broken. While the titles presented by petitioners
show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed, but
over the adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in
the titles presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and
adjoining owners of the land claimed by MWSS for
registration.1avvphil The titles presented are:
(1) OCT No. ON-1153 — the property is bounded on "the
NW., from point 10-1, by the property of Metropolitan
Water District, Lot 21, Psu-73270."
(2) TCT No. 39258 — a portion of Lot C, Psd 68750 is
adjacent or adjoining the MWSS property on the
southeast side from corner 28 to 29.
(3) TCT No. 178148 — ". . . Lot 4, Psu-133565, LRC # prescription. 20 If the owner proves that the possession is
N-4438 . . . is bounded on the SE by property of the clandestine, it will not affect his possession. 21
Metropolitan Water District; . . . Lot 5, Psu-133565, LRC
# N-4438 . . . is bounded on the NE by property of the Petitioners also cannot claim that MWSS abandoned its
Metropolitan Water District." possession. There is no showing that by discontinuing the use of
the pipes, MWSS voluntarily renounced its claim over the land.
(4) TCT No. 178149 — "Lot 6, Plan Psu-133565, LRC Petitioners did not prove that the spes recuperendi was gone and
Case No. 4438 . . . is bounded on the E by the properties the animus revertendi was given up.
of Maria Valero and Metropolitan Water District; . . . Lot
7, Plan Psu-133565, LRC Case No. N-4438 . . . is WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
bounded on the NW by property of the Metropolitan Court of Appeals, 22 we AFFIRM the same in toto. No costs.
Water District, Lot 23, Psu-73270."
SO ORDERED.
A torrens certificate of title covers only the land described therein
together with improvements existing thereon, if any, nothing
more. 15 The titles presented by petitioners covering as they do
land adjacent to that claimed in MWSS' application for
registration, do not support their claim, but even defeat it.
Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest being members of the bar and learned in
the law merely allowed and tolerated MWD or NAWASA's use of
the land, they would have reduced the agreement into writing for
use in the registration of their property which at that time was still
unregistered. 16
We hold that if petitioners' predecessors were truly the owners of
the subject parcels of land, they would have taken steps to have
the land properly titled long ago. The land was possessed by
MWSS long before World War II. That was over sixty (60) years
ago! Petitioners "slept on the rights" they claim to possess. Relief
is denied to a claimant whose right has become "stale" by reason
of negligence or inattention for a long period of time. 17
MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its ownership of the
land. True, tax declarations do not prove ownership. However, tax
declarations can be strong evidence of ownership when
accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription. 18 Since MWSS possessed the land in the concept of
owner for more than thirty (30) years preceding the application,
MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. By placing the
pipelines under the land, there was material occupation of the
land by MWSS, subjecting the land to its will and
control. 19 Petitioners cannot argue that MWSS' possession was
not "open". The existence of the pipes was indicated above the
ground by "pilapils".
Even assuming arguendo that the pipes were "hidden" from sight,
petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the existence of the pipes.
The possession must be public in order to be the basis for
G.R. No. 123417 June 10, 1999
JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners,
vs.
JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and
DANIEL CORRAL, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
What is before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals and the resolution, 2denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion
for reconsideration. In its decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for review filed before it, ruling that the cases below
fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On January 10 and 21, 1994, 3 petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and
Purificacion Padilla filed two (2) cases 4 for damages with
preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan,
Albay, against respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano
Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral, which were consolidated pursuant
to Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the complaints,
petitioners alleged that respondents through the instigation of
Atty. Baranda, gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts
from their respective land, delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano
Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. In
Civil Case No. 481, petitioners claimed damages amounting to
P8,930.00, plus costs of suit; in Civil Case No. 482, petitioners
claimed P9,950.00, as damages. The court considered the cases
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and ordered
respondents to file their answer.
In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the
owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens titles
of the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the registered owner.
Gil Opiana was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who
inherited the lots upon the former's death. Respondent Jaime
Occidental contended that he was a bona fide tenant of Josefina
Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was no
annotation on the titles establishing petitioners' right over the land.
They denied harvesting the anahaw leaves and coconuts, as well
as delivering the produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr.
Thereafter, the Municipal Trial Court ordered the parties to submit
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual
issues, together with their respective position papers. After
respondents' failure to file their position papers within the
prescribed period, the trial court considered the case submitted
for decision.
On March 29, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court rendered
decision5 in favor of petitioners. It held that petitioners had been in
actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the land in
question for forty-five (45) years. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants in both
cases as follows:
1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and
disturb the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs
in the lands in question situated at San Rafael,
Guinobatan;
2) Condemning the defendants in Civil Cases
No. 481 to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs
the total amount of P8,130.00 representing the
value of the coconuts, pilinuts and anahaw
leaves and for the destroyed plants;
3) Ordering the defendants in Civil Cases No.
481 jointly and severally to reimburse the
plaintiffs the amount of P202.00 as legal
expenses incurred filing this suit;
4) Condemning the defendants in Civil Case
No. 482 jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs
the total amount of P9,950.00 representing the
value of the coconuts and anahaw leaves;
5) Ordering the said defendants in Civil Case
No. 482 to jointly and severally reimburse the
plaintiffs the sum of P202.00 as legal expenses
in filing this suit.
Guinobatan, Albay, March 29, 1994.
(si
gn
ed
) We resolve to grant the petition.
JAIME R.
REMONTE
Ju
dg
e6
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Ligao, Albay.
They questioned the trial court's jurisdiction contending that the
case was cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). They alleged that petitioners
engaged in forum shopping and that the trial court erred in
granting the reliefs prayed for.
On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision
reversing that of the Municipal Trial Court and dismissing the
above cases,7 ruling that these cases for damages are tenancy-
related problems which fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB. The court also declared that the filing of
Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, while a case involving the same
issue was pending before the DARAB, amounted to forum
shopping.
On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a petition for review8 with
the Court of Appeals, contesting the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. On May 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals9 rendered decision
affirming the lower's court ruling that the cases fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. However, it ruled
that petitioners did not engage in forum shopping.
On June 6, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. 10 On June 13, 1995, they filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration, 11 stressing that there was no tenancy
relationship between the parties, as certified by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). 12
On December 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the
motions. 13
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime
Occidental or Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO
certification. They argue that the civil actions for damages are not
tenancy-related, and, hence, are properly cognizable by the trial
court, not the DARAB.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well
as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. 14 "Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made
in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon a claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only
after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the
defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the
rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely
upon the defendant." 15 The complaint filed by petitioners before
the Municipal Trial Court is an action for damages for illegal
gathering of anahaw leaves, pilinuts and coconuts, and the
destruction of their banana and pineapple plantations. The
respondents did not question the municipal trial court's jurisdiction
in their answer. The issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time on appeal.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a
tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. 16 In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held that
the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to
the following:
a) adjudication of all matters
involving implementation of
agrarian reform;
b) resolution of agrarian
conflicts and land-tenure
related problems; and
c) approval and disapproval
of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment
of agricultural lands into
residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.
The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy- DARAB. It had, in fact, been determined in DARAB Case No.
related that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It 2413 that respondent Jaime Occidental — a defendant in one of
relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina the MTC cases — is the tenant of Josefina Opiniana-Baraclan
Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and (1st par., p. 7 of ponencia). There is at all no showing that this
Jaime Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner determination by DARAB has been set aside by some higher
Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even authorities. The claim of petitioner Morta that he is the owner of
a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina the land is of no moment, for whether it is Josefina or Morta who
Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership is the owner does not affect Occidental's right as tenancy.
cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its Tenancy attaches to the land.
jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The As I see it, the cases filed by petitioners Morta and Padilla were a
issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding clever way to defeat the agrarian law. While the cases were
before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof. ostensibly for damages, they were, at bottom, a fight on issues
incident to or arising from an agrarian relationship. The first relief
At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the granted by the MTC, to wit:
land, the case can not be considered as tenancy-related for it still
fails to comply with the other requirements. 1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and
Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, disturb the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs
then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, in the lands in question situated at San Rafael,
however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental can not claim that Guinobatan;
there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him
and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites,
we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related mirrors the true nature of the controversy.
cognizable by the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the instant petition since no
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35300 and that of the Regional challenged decision.
Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Municipal Trial Court,
Guinobatan, Albay, in Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, for
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., pls. see dissenting opinion.
Melo, J., I join Chief Justice Davide in his dissent.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting opinion;
I beg to dissent. I agree with both the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals that the cases before the Municipal Trial Court
involved an agrarian dispute exclusively cognizable by the
G.R. No. 123951 January 10, 2000
ROMEO RANOLA AND NELSON RANOLA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FERMIN B. ALFORQUE, MARCELINA
A. LALUNA, MARIA B. ALFORQUE, ALBERTO ALFORQUE,
BERNARDO ALFORQUE, JR., MARCELO ALFORQUE,
NICOLAS ALFORQUE, MARINA ALFORQUE and CESARIO
ALFORQUE,* respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ROMEO RANOLA and NELSON RANOLA, petitioners, seek a
review and to reverse and/or nullify the 10 October 1995 Decision
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 23, Cebu City, declaring respondents as
the true owners of the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 029785 with an area of 495 square meters, more or less, as
well as its Resolution of 8 February 1996 denying a
reconsideration.
Respondents Fermin B Alforque, Marcelina A. Luluna, Maria B.
Alforque, Alberto Alforque, Bernardo Alforque Jr., Marcelo
Alforque, Nicolas Alforque, Marina Alforque and Cesario Alforque
are the descendants and heirs of one Cesario Alforque, a resident
of Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, who owned several parcels of land
in his barrio. In December 1960 his children herein named
executed a document known as "Affidavit (Declaration of Heirs)"
where they agreed for sentimental reasons and convenience to
hold pro indiviso as their community property the following two (2)
parcels of land belonging to their father, the deceased Cesario
Alforque, located in Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, and described as
— counterclaim stating that the property he bought from the Rural
(a) A parcel of cocoland declared in the name of the
deceased Cesario Alforque covered by Tax Declaration
No. 10829, covering an area of 285 square meters, with
seven (7) fruit-bearing coconut tress as permanent
improvement and a two (2) storey house with G.I. roofing
and lumber walling and flooring, bounded on the North
by land of Gregorio Repolido, on the East by land of
Gregorio Repolido, on the south by national road, and on
the West by land of Eulogio Alforo and in the possession
of private respondents, with an assessed value of
P120.00 at least as of December 1960; and (b) A parcel
of cocoland declared in the name of the deceased
Cesario Alforque, covered by Tax Declaration No.
11023, with an area of 4,090 square meters with twenty
(20) fruit-bearing coconut trees as permanent
improvement, bounded on the North by land of Florencio
Lapayag, on the East by seashore, on the south by land
of Gregorio Navales, and on the West by the national
road, with an assessed value of P440.00, which is
presently in the possession of private respondents.
In 1967 respondents as heirs of Cesario Alforque mortgaged the
two (2) parcels of land above-described to the Rural Bank of
Talisay to secure a loan, and upon their failure to pay the loan the
bank foreclosed the mortgaged property. On 29 December 1979
the Rural Bank of Talisay sold the foreclosed property to
defendant Nelson Ranola for P5,000.00.
Nelson Ranola however could not take possession of the 285-
square meter cocoland, the first parcel of land herein above-
described in par (a), in view of the claim of Fermin B. Alforque,
one of the heirs of Cesario Alforque, that the wooden house
situated on the land as well as part of the rear portion was not
among the property sold by the Rural Bank of Talisay to Nelson
Ranola.1âwphi1.nêt
In December 1982 Nelson Ranola filed a complaint for ejectment
against Angeles Alforque, occupant of the house and said to be a
sister-in-law of the Alforques, with the Municipal Trial Court of
Naga, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. R-164. In his amended
complaint dated 22 December 1982 Nelson Ranola alleged that
he was the absolute and registered owner of a 285-square meter
lot in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration No.
17354.1Subsequently, Nelson Ranola and Angeles Alforque
entered into a compromise agreement now embodied in the 28
February 1984 decision of the lower court declaring that the latter
should vacate the premises and that the residential house found
on the land should be given to her.
Thereupon the house was transferred to a site not far from its
former location, on a lot claimed by the heirs of Cesario Alforque
as among their inherited properties and which was separate and
distinct from the lot bought by Nelson Ranola from the rural bank.
The latter thereafter filed a motion to declare Angeles Alforque
and six (6) of the heirs of Cesario Alforque in contempt of court.
The trial court however denied the motion but declared that there
should be no contempt until the ownership or identity of the
specific site on which the constructions were built was
conclusively determined.
During the pendency of the ejectment case, the lands in Naga,
Cebu, were cadastrally surveyed. The heirs of Cesario Alforque
received a survey notification card dated 16 December 1982
showing at the back thereof a sketch of the property being
claimed, denominated as Lot No. 2015, marked "Heirs of Cesario
Alforque," and declaring as one of the adjoining property owners
Nelson Ranola for that 285-square meter parcel of land which he
bought from the Rural Bank of Talisay.2 Later, a survey notification
card dated 28 April 1983 was issued to petitioner Nelson Ranola
by another member of the survey team.3 However, the sketch of
the property found at the back thereof included the property being
claimed by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque. At his instance, a sketch
plan of the land, denominated as Lot No. 1102, was prepared
patterned after the sketch found at the back of the card and
describing his property as containing 531 square meters. 4
Consequently, on 4 September 1984 an action for quieting of title
and damages was filed by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque led by
Fermin Alforque against Romeo Ranola5 praying that they be
declared the true and legal owners of Lot No. 2015 situated in
Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, containing an area of approximately 495
square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 029785, and
bounded on the north by the property of Catalino Repolido, on the
east by the property of Cesario Alforque, on the south by the
property of Pio Navales, and on the west by the property of Rufo
Navales. The Heirs of Cesario Alforque further claimed that the lot
was among several parcels inherited by them from Cesario
Alforque, separate and distinct from the 285-square meter
property purchased by petitioner Nelson Ranola from the Rural
Bank of Talisay but which petitioners had been trying to usurp
through threats and intimidation. The Heirs likewise claimed that
their predecessor-in-interest was in continuous possession of Lot
No. 2015 in the concept of owner since 1946 and had declared it
in his name under Tax Declaration No. 00578,6 and that they
continued such possession from the death of Cesario Alforque
and had it declared in their names under Tax Declarations Nos.
016107 in 1967,7 008605 in 19748 and 029785 in 1980.9
On 13 March 1985 Nelson Ranola filed his answer with
Bank of Talisay and covered by Tax Declaration No. 17354 had a
total area of 531 square meters which included the portion being
claimed by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque and identified as Lot No.
1102, Cadastral Survey No. 747-FD, Case No. 7, and that his
ownership over the property had already been fully established in
the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. R-164, hence
barred by res judicata. Nelson Ranola likewise contended that the
Heirs of Cesario Alforque perjured themselves when they claimed
ownership over Lot No. 2015 of Cadastral Survey No. 747-D since
the property actually belonged to one Porferio Sasan, situated in
Inayagan, Naga, Cebu, with an area of 4,780 square meters, with
different boundaries.
On 16 November 1989 private respondents herein filed a second
amended complaint alleging that Lot No. 2015 of Cadastral
Survey No. 747-D had been mysteriously erased from the tracing
cloth plan, merged with the lot of Nelson Ranola and then
designated as Lot 1102 in his name. Fortunately, the error was
discovered and recorded at the Bureau of Lands as "Nelson
Ranola v. Hrs. of Cesario Alforque," as evidenced by Bureau of
Lands Form No. 70 C V-4, Exh. "00-2."
On 18 June 1991 the trial court ruled in favor of respondents
finding that there were noticeable erasures of the line separating
the property of Nelson Ranola from the property of the Heirs of
Cesario Alforque on the original tracing cloth plan, which resulted
in the considerable increase of the area of Nelson Ranola's
property from 285 square meters to 531 square meters. Hence,
the trial court declared respondents as the true owners of the
disputed property; directed the Bureau of Lands to revise the
survey of Lot No. 1102 by segregating therefrom, from points 5 to
9, the portion belonging to the latter, and to assign a new lot
number to the portion adjudicated to respondents. The claim of
Nelson Ranola over the disputed land was declared invalid and
petitioners were ordered to pay jointly and severally to
respondents P20,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and to pay costs.
On 10 October 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the trial court,11 and on 8 February 1996 the motion to
reconsider the Decision was denied.
Petitioners now pray this Court to determine who has a better
right over the disputed property. Petitioners insist that the
appellate court erred in relying on the survey notification card
presented by respondents as basis for its adjudication as the
same is fake and does not exist in the records of the Bureau of
Lands. Petitioners invite our attention to the certification of 11
February 1990 issued by Surveyor Enrique G. Fuentes, allegedly
a signatory on the card, that the same was null and void, 12 and the
admission of Pilar Cabahug, Chief of the Survey Section, Bureau
of Lands, that the card was not issued by the Bureau of Lands. 13
Petitioners furthermore assert that Lot No. 2015, per existing
cadastral survey of Naga, Cebu, on file with the Bureau of Lands,
actually belongs to Porfirio Sasan with an area of 4,780 square
meters and situated in Inayagan, Naga, Cebu, two (2) kilometers
away from Lot. No. 1102, contrary to the representations made by
respondents. Hence, it should be concluded that the survey
notification card held by respondents showing them as owners of
Lot No. 2015, with an area of 495 square meters, is fake and
cannot be the basis of the division of the genuine survey of Lot
No. 1102 into two (2) lots.
In sustaining the claim of respondents over subject property, the
appellate court did not commit any reversible error. That the lot
claimed by respondents is separate and distinct from the parcel of
land bought by Nelson Ranola from the Rural Bank of Talisay is
clearly shown by the series of Tax Declarations covering the lot,
from year 1950 and by subsequent revisions thereof in 1967,
1974 and 1980. Cesario Alforque had been in continuous
possession in the concept of owner of the property since 1950
and declared it in his name in the same year under Tax
Declaration No. 00578. Upon his death, his heirs took possession
of the property and declared the land in their names under Tax
Declarations Nos. 016107, 008605 and 029785. All these tax
declarations consistently show that a parcel of land situated in
Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, with an area of 495 square meters, bounded
on the north by Catalina Repolido, on the south by Pio Navales,
on the east by Cesario Alforque or his heirs, and on the west by
Rufo Navales or his heirs, was formerly owned by Cesario
Alforque and later by his heirs. While it is true that tax receipts
and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute credible proof of a claim of title over the
property.14 Coupled with the Alforques' actual possession of the
property since 1946, the tax declarations become strong evidence
of ownership.15
On the other hand, it remains indisputable that one of the
properties mortgaged by the Alforques in favor of the Rural link of
Talisay was the lot containing an area of 285 square meters and it
was the same parcel of land which that bank ultimately foreclosed
and sold at public auction to petitioner Nelson Ranola. The 29
December 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the bank to
Nelson Ranola also shows that the property subject of the sale
contained an area of 285 square meters only. This lot was
originally declared in the name of Cesario Alforque under Tax
Declaration No. 10829 in 1958.16 It was later cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 12271 in 1961,17 then by Tax Declaration No.
016086 in 196718 and by Tax Declaration No. 008598 in 1974,19 all
declared in the names of respondents Bernardo, Marcelina, Maria
and Fermin Alforque. When the property was transferred to the
Rural Bank of Talisay in 1975 it was covered by Tax Declaration
No. 013732,20 and was thereafter transferred anew to petitioner
Nelson Ranola under Tax Declaration No. 17354.21 In all these tax
declarations, the property was invariably described as containing
an area of 285 square meters, situated in Barrio Tuyan, Naga,
Cebu, and bounded on the north and east by property of Gregorio
Repolido, on the south by the highway, and on the west by
Eulogio Alforo.
Moreover, Nelson Ranola acknowledged the expanse of the
property which he bought from the Rural Bank of Talisay as only
285 square meters in the ejectment case which he filed against
Angeles Alforque. Such judicial admission is conclusive upon him;
he is precluded from denying it.
With the series of tax declarations and the deed of absolute sale,
combined with the judicial admission of petitioner Nelson Ranola
in this regard, it becomes certain that the area of Lot No. 1102 is
confined only to 285 square meters. That the cadastral survey
notification card of Lot No. 1102 issued to Nelson Ranola
allegedly reflected an actual area of 531 square meters is of no
moment as the deed of sale reveals that the subject of the sale is
limited only to 285 square meters, no more no less. It was that
expanse which was sold; it was the same expanse that was
bought.
Furthermore, an examination by the trial court of the sketch plan
of Lot No. 1102 revealed an alteration in its preparation. There
was a noticeable erasure of the line separating the property of
petitioner Nelson Ranola from the property claimed by the Heirs of
Cesario Alforque, particularly referring to the line connecting
points 5 and 9, as was discerned from an analysis of the original
tracing cloth plan, thereby resulting in the increase in the area of
Nelson Ranola's property and his encroachment on the 495-
square meter property of respondents. The findings of the lower
court being conclusive unless arbitrarily arrived at, we see no
reason to disturb them in the case before us.
Petitioners assail the authenticity and due execution of the survey
notification card presented by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque as an
inaccurate basis to subdivide Lot No. 1102 into two (2) lots. But
we are not persuaded. Surveyor Enrique G. Fuentes was not
presented during the trial to substantiate his claim; hence, his
certification is of little weight. However we are convinced by the
declaration of Survey Chief Pilar Cabahug that the survey card
was not issued by the Bureau of Lands. The trial court therefore
should not have relied on the survey card in ordering the
segregation of the portion marked Exhibit "T-1" in favor of
respondents, and assigning the portion marked Exhibit "T-2" to
petitioner Nelson Ranola. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the sketch
plan indicated the area of Lot No. 1102 to be 531 square meters,
instead of only 285 square meters, we shall order its revision.
Concerning the other argument of petitioners that per records of
the Bureau of Lands Lot No. 2015 refers to a different property
which is claimed by another, this circumstance should not be
taken against respondents since they merely relied on the sketch
plan of the disputed property designating it as such.
However, the trial court erred in awarding P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees without making a
finding thereon. Whenever granted, the court must explicitly state
in the body of its decision, and not only in the dispositive portion
thereof, the legal reason for the award.22 The power of the courts
to grant damages and attorney's fees demands factual, legal and
equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or
conjecture.23

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 10 October 1995
affirming the Decision of the trial court, as well as its Resolution of
8 February 1996 denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED
subject to the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages
and attorney's fees is DELETED.

Private respondents FERMIN B. ALFORQUE, MARCELINA A.

LALUNA, MARIA B. ALFORQUE, ALBERTO ALFORQUE,
BERNARDO ALFORQUE JR., MARCELO ALFORQUE,
NICOLAS ALFORQUE, MARINA ALFORQUE and CESARIO
ALFORQUE, are declared the owners pro-indiviso of the 495-
square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Cebu.

The Bureau of Lands is ordered to revise the survey of Lot No.

1102 as shown in the sketch plan to conform to its area of 285
square meters and thereafter to submit the revised sketch plan to
the trial court of origin. The Bureau of Lands is directed to assign
a new lot number to the portion adjudicated to respondents to be
reflected in the revised sketch plan.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioners Romeo and Nelson Ranola are directed henceforth to

cease and desist from further disturbing the ownership and
possession of respondents over the property in litigation.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124605 June 18, 1999 respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced by a notarized deed of
absolute sale, signed by Rosa. The instrument was not registered.
ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners,
vs. In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials
COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and on the lot in question, which was completed in 1957.
RAFAELA RASING, respondents.
On December 16, 1957, Rosa's heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his
two (2) children, Fructoso and Paciencia, executed another deed
of absolute sale over the same land in favor of respondent
PARDO, J.: Santiago Fontanilla.
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (herein
respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing,
decreeing:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and
legal owners of the land in question particularly
described and bounded and stated in paragraph
two (2) of the complaint;

The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals,1 which affirmed that of the
Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan,2 declaring
respondents as the absolute and lawful owners of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio,
Jose and Lorenza, all surnamed Fontanilla. Rosa married
Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and
Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a
daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna).
Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to
Rafaela Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are first cousins.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a
parcel of land, containing an area of twelve thousand five hundred
eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap,
Alaminos, Pangasinan. 3
In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation
purposes. In the same year, Turner Land Surveying Company
surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement that
the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the
Bureau of Lands. On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands
approved the survey plan.
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent
foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter,
Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate
property tax thereon.
On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven
hundred pesos (P1,700.00), Rosa sold the land to her nephew,
In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their (b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and
daughter Mila Fontanilla Borillo. They stayed there until 1981. Recover [sic] Original Certificate of Title No.
139 to the plaintiffs;
On December 20, 1978, talking advantage of respondents'
absence from the country, petitioners Enriquito and Amparo (c) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the
Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan for amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
registration4 of the said parcel of land in their name.
(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs
In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary
pursuant to Decree N-176768, the Register of Deeds of damages;
Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to
petitioners. On January 10, 1980, the title was transcribed in the (e) And to pay the costs, without
registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. pronouncement as to moral damages.
On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of
Instance, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, an action for August, 1992
reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T.
No. 139.5
In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla
originally owned the land in dispute. However, they claimed that in
1978 they bought the property for three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00) from Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in turn,
traced her title from her husband, Alberto Rasca.
Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey
costs in 1921, Turner Land Surveying Company took the property
in question as payment for services. Her father, Alberto Rasca,
redeemed the property from Turner evidenced by a deed of sale,
which, however, Amparo could not produce in court. When her
father died, Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the
deed covering the transfer of the property, which Santiago did not
return. She said that the property was first declared in Alberto's
name for taxation purposes in 1951. Later, the property was
ceded to her.
After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before
the trial court and in the land registration case, on June 5, 1992,

From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Respondents questioned the
court a quo's failure to grant their claim for moral damages. On
the other hand, petitioners claimed that the trial court committed
serious error in the appreciation of facts and application of law
and jurisprudence.
On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
affirming that of the trial court.
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996,7 the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not
the appealed decision is supported by evidence; (2) whether or
not the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.8
The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on
appeal.9 However, petitioners make an issue of the fact that the
judge who penned the decision was not the one who presided
over the proceedings.
"We have ruled in People vs. Rayray,10 that the fact that the judge
who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared,
signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling
reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per
se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial judge who
conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain
the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was
not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.
Such reliance does not violate tsubstantive and procedural due
process."11 u review.
g
a of the Court of Appeals are
As a general rule, findings of fact
binding and conclusive upon us, nand we will not normally disturb
such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by certiorari to
this Court, only questions of law J may be raised.12 And "for a
question to be one of law it must u involve no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented
d by the litigants or any
of them."13 "To reiterate the distinction
g between the two types of
questions: there is a question ofe law in a given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to 6what the law is pertaining to a
certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 14
Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale
executed by Turner Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca,
which, however, they failed to present in court. The truth or falsity
of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not
reviewable in this appeal.
On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying
open, continuous and adverse possession of the property for
more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their
predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As
early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and
paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first
time in 1939,15 while respondents began paying taxes in
1967.16 They had their residential house built in 1955, which was
completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a tenancy
agreement17with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid the
taxes together with his tenant Sixto.1âwphi1.nêt
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the
property of the declarant,18 tax declarations and receipts can be
strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by
possession for a period sufficient for prescription.19
Going to the second issue that the appellate court's decision is not
supported by law and jurisprudence, we find this to be vague and
without merit as well.
At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was
pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, Presidential Decree
1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and codified
laws relative to registration of property. "Adjudication of land in a
registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry
of the final decree."20 After the lapse of said period, the decree
becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud is recognized by law21 as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud,
which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law.
For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or
collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently
deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration
case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. 22
"An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
(10) years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the
trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the
alleged fraudulent registration of the property."23 Discovery of the
fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of
the certificate of title "because registration of real property is
considered a "constructive notice to all persons" and it shall be
counted "from the time of such registering, filing or entering."24
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in
securing title to the land sometime after its registration, however,
an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property.
Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the land registration. It
was filed when respondents were out of the country and they had
no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their
name.
Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as
it was filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the torrens
title over the property.25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for
lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922.
No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 156888 November 20, 2006
PEDRO R. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
the 3 December 20021 and 7 January 20032Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch
74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002 entitled Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo versus Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the
application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint3 for Recovery of
Possession of Property, filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando
G. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against
respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on 12
March 2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch
74. Included in said complaint was a prayer for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order.
In their Complaint filed before the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, alleged that:
Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator
of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order,
dated February, 1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, "In the Matter
of the Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y
Reyes, etc.", (sic) of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court at Iriga
City x x x.
xxxx
In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the
owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that (sic)
certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol x x x.
xxxx
On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her
capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes
Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo,
for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land of Hermogenes
Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x.
xxxx
By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro R.
Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land
consisting of 2.5 hectares, more particularly the improvements
located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.
Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two
aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo,
defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over
them. More particularly, defendant is using these two parcels of
land for its (sic) own commercial and other purposes.
It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover
possession of the property from the defendant so that she could
comply with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.
xxxx
[D]efendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over
the parcels of land described in paragraph 7 hereof. Lately,
plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago was informed by purported agents or
employees of the defendant that he should vacate the premises
he and his family are occupying since defendant would be
needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to
do this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner,
Victoria Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to
plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo.4
Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,5 contends
that sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner
Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent
SBMA, availed herself of the housing privilege accorded to the
latter’s employees; that due to said privilege, she was allowed to
lease a housing unit6 inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the
lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated if the lessees are
no longer employed with SBMA;"7 that on 31 January 2002,
Liwanag Santiago’s employment contract concluded; that since
said contract was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be
an employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence
thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her
family were asked8 to vacate and return possession of the subject
housing unit.
On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining
Order[9] against respondent SBMA from ousting petitioner
Santiago and his family from the premises of the subject housing
unit within seventy two (72) hours from receipt. Further, it was
likewise restrained and enjoined from committing any other acts
that would prevent the latter and his family from occupying the
premises they have allegedly leased from Victoria Rodriguez.
Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent SBMA
filed a Motion to Dismiss10 the abovementioned complaint on the
argument, inter alia,11 that the latter failed to state a valid cause of
action.
On 3 December 2002, the RTC issued its first assailed order. In
denying and dismissing the application for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and complaint respectively, the RTC
stated that since the alleged right of complainant Rodriguez
stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de
Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in
esse. The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No.
892,12 which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to
apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,13 within six months
from effectivity of the decree, or until 16 August 1976. After such
time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as evidence
of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens System. Significant parts of the assailed Order of the
RTC read:
Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they
claim is still a valid, subsisting and enforceable title. Despite the
fact that said title was never registered under Act 496, the land
Registration Act (later PD 1529), plaintiffs still claim that they have
a cause of action.
The court is not convinced.
The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based
on the ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the disputed property
evidenced by a Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law
particularly the enabling clauses of PD 892, said type of title can
no longer be utilized as evidence of ownership. Verily, Spanish
titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of
land ownership. (Citation omitted.)
As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a
cause of action simply because the court can take judicial notice
of the applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent decisions of the
Supreme Court to the case at bench.14
Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in the second assailed Order dated 7 January 2003.
The Issues
Hence, petitioner Santiago’s immediate resort to this Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, raising the following issues:15
I.
WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF
LANDS;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN VIEW OF THE FACT
THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR
CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN
THE SPANISH TITLE; and
III.
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A
MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN ANSWER,
WAS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED
HYPOTHETICALLY PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP.
In essence, the present petition poses as fundamental issue for
resolution by the Court the question of whether or not the RTC
committed reversible error in denying the application for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as well as dismissing
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The Court’s Ruling
As the appeal of respondent Santiago involves only questions of
law, the Court took cognizance of the instant petition.16
Petitioner Santiago maintains that "x x x P.D. No. 892 merely
disallowed the use of Spanish titles as evidence of land ownership
in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. In other
words, Spanish titles can still be used as evidence of land
ownership in any other proceedings except registration under the
Torrens system. Since the instant case is not one for registration
under the Torrens system, but x x x who should be entitled to the
possession thereof, then the presentation as evidence of land
ownership of the Spanish title in question is permissible." As to
the non-presentation of the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos,
petitioner Santiago had this to say:
As the trial court stated, "(F)undamental is the rule that a
defendant moving to dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of
action is regarded as having admitted all the allegations thereof,
at least hypothetically". (sic) The Complaint specifically alleged
that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great-great-great
granddaughter of and the sole heir and administrator of the late
spouses Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in
his lifetime Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of
land registered in his name under that certificate of title
denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891
Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant was, therefore,
deemed to have admitted these allegations. And, with such
admissions, then there would be no more need, at least at this
stage of the case, for the plaintiffs to present the Spanish title. In
other words, the inadmissibility of the title, as argued by the
defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no more need to
present this title in view of the admissions."
Citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17]respondent SBMA,
however, stresses that "Spanish titles can no longer be
countenance as indubitable evidence of land ownership by sheer
force of law, particularly, the enabling clause of P.D. 892 in
expressly providing that, if not accompanied by actual possession
of the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be utilized as
proof or evidence of ownership x x x."
A priori, before the Court goes into the resolution of the
fundamental issue raised by the instant petition, a critical matter
must be dealt with – the fact that the assailed orders of dismissal
of the complaint and denial of the motion for reconsideration,
respectively, of the RTC had already become final and executory
against Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the
case. It must be remembered that petitioner Santiago is merely
the alleged lessee of part of the claimed parcel of land. In the
scheme of things, so to speak, his right to recover possession is
anchored on the alleged ownership of Victoria M. Rodriguez,
which right to the claimed parcel of land is not in esse. As such,
petitioner Santiago is equally bound by the final and executory
order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action.
Nevertheless, even if we were to overlook the foregoing grievous
error, we would be hard pressed to find fault in the assailed orders
of the RTC. The present petition is substantially infirm as this
Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C.
Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,18 that the Spanish
title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de
Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to
establish ownership over real property.
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago anchor their right to recover possession of the subject
real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez
being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes
Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.
Promulgated on 29 April 2005, in the aforementioned Evangelista
Case, we categorically stated that:
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14
August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the
Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners’
Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest complied with
P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so.
Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined
from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the
Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create
or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and
vested. (Citation omitted.) By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in
registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded
from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason
therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from
accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some
other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on
or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or
registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of
land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never
be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would
definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and
instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to
eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as
proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the
fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject
to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless
accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of
the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish title
as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation
omitted.)
This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of
possession only becomes necessary because, as the same
whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to
prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his
ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. (Citation
omitted.) Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the
applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens
system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of
the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone
else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of
prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular
provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended
and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those
with which it is associated. An apparently general provision may
have a limited application if read together with other provisions of
the statute. (Citation omitted.)
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted
and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute.
(Citation omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole presidential
decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them
of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set
a deadline for the filing of applications for registration
of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months
from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish
titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for
registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land
registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court
his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real
property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed
and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer
present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of
the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in
his actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of
the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial
court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application
of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as
evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a
land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on
or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles
from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis,
such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree
(Citation omitted.) or the Public Land Act.42 Petitioners though
failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint
aside from possession of the Subject Property from time
immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the
Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over
the Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property,
the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal
of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly
dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the
dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for
this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action. 19
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be
denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the
legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same
as those passed upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista
Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the
testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a
ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
With the above provision of law and preceding discussions, in
tandem with the Court’s pronouncements in numerous cases,
i.e., Director of Forestry v. Muñoz;20 Antonio v.
Barroga; Republic v. Court of Appeals.;22National Power
21
Corporation v. Court of Appeals;23 Carabot v. Court of
Appeals;24 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court;25 Widows
and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;26 Director of
Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona;27 and Intestate Estate of Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,28 it is quite
evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in taking heed
of our final, and executory, decisions – those decisions
considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so
far as the use of Spanish titles to evidence ownership are
concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where
the facts are substantially the same.291âwphi1
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a
principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision
of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases
involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity of or privity of parties.30 This is unmistakable from the
wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even said that such
decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also
of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto."31 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in the stability
of the solemn pronouncements diminished.32
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
892 which took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and
all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands
covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the
said Decree or until 16 August 1976.33 If not, non-compliance
therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling 200338 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City,
that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002, are hereby
evidence of land ownership.34 And, without legal or equitable title AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioner.
to the subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo
and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim SO ORDERED.
entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers
to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the
right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he
can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.35

Therefore, the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of

cause of action.

Anent the argument of petitioner Santiago that by filing the Motion

to Dismiss, respondent SBMA already admitted all the allegations
of the complaint such that the question of whether or not the
subject Spanish Title was inadmissible or not had become
immaterial.

We do not agree.

Basic is the rule that in a motion to dismiss complaint based on

lack of cause of action, the question posed to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegation of facts made in
the complaint to constitute a cause of action. It is beside the point
whether or not the allegations in the complaint are true, for with
said motion, the movant only hypothetically admits the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint, that is, assuming arguendo that the
facts alleged are true, the facts alleged are insufficient for the
court to render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint.

Consequently, by anchoring their right to recover possession of

property on the subject Spanish title that has been divested of any
legal force and effect in establishing ownership over the subject
real property, the complaint filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago was
correctly dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action.

In fine, there is nothing more left to be argued as regards the

Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The issue has been
settled and this Court’s final decision in the said cases must be
respected.36 This Court’s hands are now tied by the finality of the
abovementioned decisions. The Court has no alternative but to
deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED. The assailed 3 December 200237 and 7 January
G.R. No. 132803 August 31, 1999
JESSIE V. PISUEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR
Represented by Salvador Upod and Dolores
Bautista, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
conjugal. Such prima facie presumption, however, can be
overturned by a cadastral courts' specific finding, which has long
become final, that the lot in question was paraphernal in
character. The title to the entire property shall pass by operation
of law to the buyer once the seller acquires title over it by
hereditary succession, even if at the time of the execution of the
deed of sale, the seller owned only a portion of the property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set
aside the February 26, 1997 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39955,2 as well as its February
12, 1998 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed
Decision affirmed in toto the ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-5462, which disposed as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court
renders judgment:
1. Declaring the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" by Felix
Villar and Catalina Villar in favor of Agustin Navarra,
defendant's predecessor-in-interest, as valid with respect
to the one-half share of the whole Lot. No. 1201,
Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located
at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of
Capiz, which is registered in the name of Petra Unating
married to Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-6316 (18422) while the other half belongs
to the plaintiffs as Heirs of Aquilino Villar;
2. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merits;
3. Dismissing parties' claim for damages and attorney's
fees.
No costs.
The Facts
The present case is rooted in an action for recovery of (1)
possession and ownership of a parcel of land, as well as (2) a
sum of money and damages. Before the RTC of Roxas City on
May 15, 1989, this case was originally filed against herein
petitioner, Jessie Pisueña, by herein respondents, the heirs of
Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar represented by Salvador Upod
and Dolores Bautista.4
The CA adopted the trial court's summation of the facts as
follows:5
The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of
the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located at Barangay
Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a
registered land in the name of Petra Unating married to
Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of Title No.
18422, containing an area of 83,536 square meters,
more or less. Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948
while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The
spouses had two [legitimate] children, namely Felix Villar
and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962,
while Catalina Villar died on February 21,
1967.1âwphi1.nêt
For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is represented
by Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children
while Catalina Villar is represented by Salvador Villar
Upod, the eldest of her three (3) children, all as plaintiffs
[herein respondents].
Defendant [herein petitioner], Jessie Pisueña, is the son-
in-law of Agustin Navarra who was once a [m]unicipal
[m]ayor of the Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin Navarra
died on October 30, 1958.
The land in question was a subject of court litigations
between Dolores Bautista and Salvador Upod on one
hand, and defendant Jessie Pisueña on the other. Thus,
when Salvador Upod filed a petition for reconstitution of
its title in Reconstitution Case No. 1408 before Branch I,
then Court of First Instance of Capiz, defendant Jessie
Pisueña filed his opposition. Nevertheless, the title was
reconstituted in the name of the registered owners
pursuant to the resolution of the court dated August 6,
1980 and it now has a reconstituted title under OCT No.
RO-6316 (18422) in the name of the original registered
owners.
Defendant Jessie Pisueña filed a petition for the
surrender of withheld owner's duplicate certificate of title
under Special Case No. 4610 against Salvador
Upod, et. al. for [Quieting] of Title and Damages with Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before this court
then presided by Hon. Odon C. Yrad, Jr. who dismissed
said complaint on August 27, 1984.
Plaintiffs' evidence further show[s] that Salvador Upod
and Dolores Bautista filed a complaint for ejectment with
damages against defendant Jessie, Pisueña and
Norberto Tugna before, the Municipal Court of Ivisan as
Civil Case No. 94.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs [respondents herein] contend that during the
lifetime of the registered owners, Petra Unating and
Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and
possession of Lot No. 1201. However, sometime in 1950
(after the death of Petra Unating on October 1, 1948)
Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement
for ten (10) years with Agustin Navarra involving the
swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of
around four (4) hectares. It was agreed that the area of
around three (3) hectares shall further be developed into
a fishpond while about one (1) hectare shall be
converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of
Agustin Navarra. Whatever excess there was in the
capital so invested shall be used to make the fishpond
productive. Parties agreed that the net income after
deducting expenses shall be divided equally between
Aquilino Villar and his co-heirs on one hand and Agustin
Navarra on the other. The upland portion of the land was
not included in the transaction, hence it remained in the
possession of the plaintiffs. While alive, Agustin Navarra,
who managed the partnership, religiously gave Aquilino
Villar and his co-heirs their share. This arrangement
continued until Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953.
Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership
was delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix Villar and
Catalina Villar.
Since Agustin Navarra died in 1958, Felix and Catalina
Villar repossessed the land in question. They maintained
their possession up to the time Felix and Catalina Villar
died. Thereafter, the children of Felix and Catalina Villar
 continued the possession of their predecessor-in-interest
until the defendant disturbed their possession sometime
in 1974. However, in 1975, they regained physical
possession of the disputed area. From 1975, there were
intermittent disturbances and intrusions of their physical
possession of the land in dispute by the defendant
particularly the fishpond portion consisting of about four
(4) hectares more or less which resulted [in] the filing of
cases against one and the other as earlier stated.
Sometime in 1982, the defendant in the company of
several men including policemen, wrested physical
possession from the plaintiffs which possession of the
defendant continued up to the present. Hence, this
complaint for its recovery particularly the fishpond
portion.
On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole
land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar
to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in
Spanish captioned "ESCRITURA DE VENTA
ABSOLUTA" to evidence such sale was duly notarized
by Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered in
his Notarial Register as Document No. 517; Page 7;
Book IV; Series of 1949.
On December 31, 1968, which [was] more than ten (10)
years after the death of Agustin Navarra on October 30,
1958, his heirs executed a Deed of Extra Judicial
Partition and Deed of Sale of the land in question in favor
of the Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra.
The document was notarized by Jose P. Brotarly, Notary
Public, and docketed in his notarial register as Document
No. 409; Page 83; Book No. VI; Series of 1968. From the
time of the sale up to the present, the fishpond portion
was in the possession of the spouses Jessie Pisueña
and Rosalie Navarra. However, the upland portion is in
the possession of Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista
by mere tolerance of the defendant. The latter denies
any partnership agreement o[n] the fishpond portion by
Agustin Navarra, their predecessor-in-interest, and the
plaintiffs.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 24, 1992, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot
was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino
Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin
Navarra could be considered valid. The court, however, ruled that
its validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating,
considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar was still
alive. It likewise held that the respondents, as heirs of Aquilino
Villar, were entitled to his one-half share in the disputed lot.
Before the Court of Appeals, Dolores Bautista, and Salvador
Upod assailed the trial court's ruling upholding the validity of
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Jessie Pisueña, on the other
hand, questioned the court's conclusion that the subject lot was
conjugal. He claimed that it was paraphernal, and that the Deed of
Sale transferred the whole lot to Agustin Navarra, his
predecessor-in-interest.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling in toto, holding
that the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal partnership of Petra
Unating and Aquilino Villar, viz.:
Anent the first issue, defendant argues that Lot. 1201
was a paraphernal property of Petra Unating. In support
of his argument, he mentions the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz in Reconstitution Case No. 1408,
where in the dispositive portion thereof, said court
ordered the reconstitution of the Original and Owner's
copy of the Original Certificate of Title covering Lot 1201
"in the name of Petra Unating, 40 years old, married to
Aquilino Villar, Filipino and residents of Ivisan, Capiz,
having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita
Argamaso." He further argues that the mention of the
name Aquilino Villar in the certificate of title is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Petra Unating and the
same could not convert the property into a conjugal one.
We are not persuaded. The lower court rejected the
statement of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in
Reconstitution Case No. 1408 that Lot 1201 was
inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. We agree
with the lower court when it found the phrase "having
inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso"
as a mere obiter, a finding of fact which we find no
justifiable reason to set aside. It must be considered that
the authority of the Court of First Instance of Capiz to
declare Lot 1201 as having been inherited by Petra
Unating from her mother is doubtful. We quote the
pertinent ruling of the lower court, thus:
Reconstitution of a certificate of title [denotes]
restoration of the instrument which is supposed
to have been lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. It is limited to the
reconstitution of the certificate as it stood at the
time of its loss or destruction and should not be
stretched to include later changes which alter or
affect the title of the registered owner. The
original registered owner of Lot 1201 being
Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. [That
t]he title should be reconstituted in the same
names and findings of said court as to the
ownership of the land as paraphernal property
of Petra Unating is an obiter. It therefore did not
decide whether Lot 1201 is a paraphernal or a
conjugal property of the registered owners.
We further agree with the lower court when it held that
"in the absence [o]f any evidence o[f] any system [o]f
property relation between Petra Unating and Aquilino
Villar, it is presumed that it is one of conjugal
partnership." Besides, it appears that Lot 1201 was
acquired during the marriage of the Spouses Petra
Unating and Aquilino Villar, since the Original Certificate
of Title indicates that Lot 1201 was registered in the
name of Petra Unating, married to Aquilino Villar. Thus,
the property is presumed conjugal.
In resolving the question of presumption of conjugality,
the Supreme Court had occasion to rule that:
The presumption is a strong one. As stated
in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de Ilano (63 Phil.
629, 639), "it is sufficient to prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage in
order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 Phil
494, 504), we stated, "proof of acquisition of the
property in dispute during the marriage suffices
to render the statutory presumption operative."
(Mendoza vs. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154; emphasis
supplied).
Additionally, defendant Pisueña, who brought up the
question of Lot 1201 being the paraphernal property of
Petra Unating failed to adduce convincing and concrete
evidence that would rebut the presumption of conjugality
of the subject lot. Moreover, it is settled that registration
alone of the property in the name of one of the spouses
does not destroy the conjugal nature of the property.
(Mendoza vs. Reyes, supra and Bucoy vs. Paulino, 23
SCRA 248).
The Court of Appeals also rejected Salvador Upod's attack on
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta, reasoning that the Deed of Sale
was duly notarized and that no evidence was presented to rebut
its due execution, validity and admissibility as evidence.
Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the respondents were
aware of the nature and the content of the assailed Deed, and
that they did not object to its translation given in the trial court.
Likewise, the CA debunked Upod's contention that Pisueña's
cause of action had prescribed. It ruled:
On the fourth issue, plaintiff Salvador Upod contends
that defendant Pisueña could no longer enforce his right
since Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that an
action based upon a written contract must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
The contention is not meritorious. It is obvious that the
above-mentioned article does not apply in the case at
bench since defendant Pisueñas [was] not the one who
filed the complaint. Furthermore, defendant is in
possession of the fishpond portion of the property in
dispute. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
aforementioned article is applicable, the claim of
defendant Pisueña has not yet prescribed. Defendant
Pisueña obtained his right over Lot 1201 by virtue of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale dated
December 31, 1968. In 1974, within the ten year
prescriptive period, he filed his Answer to the complaint
for ejectment filed by plaintiffs[,] (Exh. "G") raising therein
his ownership over Lot 1201. Also, he filed his
Opposition (Exh. "U") to the petition for reconstitution
filed by plaintiff Salvador Upod. To our minds, this action
and [the] leadings filed by defendant Pisueña interrupted
the prescriptive period.
Anent the fifth issue, plaintiff Salvador Upod posits that
the trial court failed to consider the decision of this court
dated January 31, 1985 in AC-UDK Sp. No. 2273 which
passed upon the defendant-appellant's rights over the
subject property.
A perusal of this Court's decision in said case (Exh. "P")
shows that, contrary to plaintiffs['] allegation, this Court
thru Mr. Justice Purisima did not pass upon the rights of
defendant Pisueña over Lot 1201. We take note that
while the "petition for Review" of the defendant was
dismissed by this Court, the dismissal was anchored on
the ground that 1) Petition for Review was not the
appropriate remedy; 2) the summary proceedings for the
surrender of the owner's duplicate provided for under
Section 107 of P.D. 1529 or Section 112 of Act 496 is
unavailing as there [exist] serious conflicting claims of
ownership; and 3) the ordinary civil action for quieting of
title to Lot 1201 is not the proper remedy, since it is only
the registered owner of the property affected who can
sue as plaintiff. Clearly, the dismissal of said petition did
not have any effect on the present case.
xxx xxx xxx
However, we agree with the plaintiffs' statement that the
law applicable is the Old Civil Code, considering that
Petra Unating died in 1948 before the effectivity in 1950
of the New Civil Code. Suffice it to say that we agree
with the lower court when it ruled citing Prades
vs. Tecson (49 Phil 479) and Rodriguez v. Borromeo (43
Phil 479) that "when a spouse dies and the conjugal
assets are not liquidated, a co-ownership over said
assets may be formed among the surviving spouse and
the heirs of the decedent." Absent any showing that
there are debts and charges against the conjugal assets,
we therefore declare Aquilino Villar, the surviving spouse
of Petra Unating, as the owner of the undivided one-half
of their conjugal property, while their children, Felix and
Catalina Villar, are the owners of the other undivided
half, pursuant to Article 1426 of the Old Civil Code. . . .
In all, the CA agreed with the trial court that the disputed lot
should be divided equally between the heirs of Petra Unating on
the one hand, and Jessie Pisueña on the other.
Asserting full ownership over the disputed property and claiming
that the CA erred in ruling that Felix and Catalina could have sold
only their one-half share in the property, Petitioner Pisueña filed
this Petition for Review.6
Issues
Petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following specific
errors:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
ruling of the lower court that the phrase "having inherited
said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso" [i]s a mere
obiter.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Lot 1201 belongs to the conjugal [partnership] of Petra
Unating and Aquilino Villar.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
Both the CA and the RTC held that the disputed lot was conjugal
and dismissed, as obiter, the phrase "having inherited said lot
from her [Petra Unating's] mother, Margarita Argamaso" found in
the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of First
Insurance (CFI) of Capiz in Reconstitution Case No. 1408. They
explained that the CFI had no authority to include the phrase,
because the only objective of reconstitution was to "restore the
certificate covering the property as it stood at the time of its loss
or destruction, and should not be stretched to include later
changes which alter of affect the title of the registered owner." 7
We do not agree. It must be emphasized that the dispositive
portion of the 1930 Decision, which was rendered by the same
CFI of Capiz acting as a cadastral court, already contained the
questioned phrase. Therefore, it cannot be said that the CFI in
1980 exceeded its authority when it ordered the reconstitution, in
Petra Unating's name, of the original certificate of title covering
the disputed lot or in stating therein that she had inherited it from
her mother. After all, such disposition was copied from the same
court's 1930 Decision, as evidenced by an authentic copy of it on
file with the Bureau of Lands in Capiz.
Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like ordinary
registration proceedings, they are governed by the usual rules of
practice, procedure and evidence.8 A cadastral decree and a
certificate of title are issued only after the applicants prove that
they are entitled to the claimed lots, all parties are heard, and
evidence is considered.
Thus, the finding of the cadastral court that Petra Unating
inherited the lot in question from her mother cannot be dismissed
as an obiter, which is "an observation by the court not necessary
to the decision rendered."9 The conclusion of the cadastral court
was found in the dispositive portion of its Decision, and it was
material to the nature of Petra Unating's ownership of the lot.
Furthermore, it was based on the evidence presented by the
parties and considered by the said court. In any event, it must be
pointed out that the Decision became final a long time ago, and a
final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or any other in
rem proceeding for that matter, is binding and conclusive upon the
whole world.10 Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be
considered as a paraphernal property of Petra Unating.11
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima faciepresumption
cannot prevail over the cadastral court's specific finding, reached
in adversarial proceedings, that the lot was inherited by Petra
Unating from her mother. Noteworthy is the fact that the parties do
not assail the validity of the cadastral court's Decision. The 1980
reconstitution of the title to the lot in the name of "Petra Unating,
40 years old, married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and resident of
Ivisan, Capiz, having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita
Argamaso . . ." was notice to the world, including her heirs and
successors-in-interest, that it belonged to Petra as her
paraphernal property. Thus, the words "married to" were merely
descriptive of Petra Unating's status at the time the lot was
awarded and registered in her name.12
Second Issue:
Efficacy of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta
Petitioner Jessie Pisueña traces his claim over the disputed lot to
his father-in-law, Agustin Navarra, who in turn acquired it on
February 4, 1949 from Felix and Catalina Villar, Petra Unating's
children. His claim is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale
written in Spanish, captioned Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Private
Respondent Salvador Upod, on the other hand, asserts that both
the trial and the appellate courts erred in admitting the Deed,
citing Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption
of the proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed
to have such translation prepared before trial.
We do not agree. Instead, we uphold the Court of Appeals'
disquisition, which we quote:
The assertion is without merit. The aforementioned rule
is not always taken literally so long as there was no
prejudice caused to the opposing party (People v.
Salison, G.R. No. 115690, February 20, 1996). The
records show that there was no prejudice caused to the
plaintiffs who appear to be familiar with the contents or
the nature of Exhibit "1". As proof thereof, they even
questioned the defendant on the subject document.
Importantly, when required by the court to comment on
the English translation of Exhibit "1" (p. 316, records)
plaintiffs did not bother to comment giving rise to the
presumption that the translation submitted was correct
(p. 340, records). Hence, the court a quo did not err in
admitting the Escritura de Venta Absoluta.13
Furthermore, the respondents were not able to impugn the due
execution and validity of the notarized Deed.
Neither are we persuaded by Upod's argument that the
petitioner's right has prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil
Code.14 It is undisputed that he was already in possession of the
fishpond when the present case was filed.
Petitioner and His Wife Are Owners of the Disputed Lot
As already shown, the disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra
Unating did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her
demise in 1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her
children, Felix and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino
Villar.15 The two children were entitled to the two-thirds of their
mother's estate,16 while the husband was entitled to the remaining
one-third.17
By virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina
effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949,
their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However,
they could not have disposed of their father's share in the same
property at the time, as they were not yet its owners. At the most,
being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their
father's share.
When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-
third share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalina's inchoate
interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in them
the title to their father's share and, consequently, to the entire lot.
Thus, that title passed to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article
1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force at the
time of Aquilino's death in 1953. This provision reads:
When a person who is not the owner of the thing sells or
alienates or delivers it, and later, the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of
law to the buyer or grantee.
The aforequoted article was applied in Llacer v. Muñoz,18 Estoque
v. Pajimula,19 Bucton v. Gabar20 and Quijada v.Court of
21
Appeal. In each of these cases, the Court upheld the validity of
the sale by one who previously did not have, but who
subsequently acquired, title to the property sold.
Thus, although Felix and Catalina Villar were not yet the owners
of the remaining one third of the disputed lot when they sold to
Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, they became its owners
upon their father's death on January 14, 1953. Pursuant to Article
1434, the title to the lot passed to Agustin Navarra. 22 It must be
noted that at the time Felix and Catalina executed the Deed of
Sale covering the disputed lot, they intended to sell the entire lot,
not just their interest therein, as can be gleaned from a pertinent
portion of the Deed, the English translation of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
DESCRIPTION
A piece of mangrove and coconut grove land (Lot. No.
1201 of Cadastre of Ivisan), and its improvements,
situated in the Municipality of Ivisan, Capiz; that is
bounded N to Dapdap Creek; E. to Lot No. 1196,
Sunsunan Creek; and S to Lots Nos. 1239 and 1151;
and W to Dapdap Creek YB B.M. No. 21; and containing
an area of Eighty Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty
Six square meters (83,536 sq. mts.) more or less;
declared under Tax No. 609 and valued/appraised at
P490.00.
xxx xxx xxx
And finally, we make known, that from/on this date we
hand over the said property, its possession/holding and
absolute dominion of the aforesaid piece of land to the
buyer, namely Mr. Agustin Navarra, his heirs and
assignees, free from liens and liabilities/obligations, and
of such title we promise and assure to defend now and
always against all possible just claims/demands and
claimants or those that may present them.
xxx xxx x x x23
Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of
the whole of Lot No. 1201 became vested in Jessie Pisueña and
his wife.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jessie Pisueña and his wife,
Rosalie Navarra, are hereby declared the owners of Lot. No.
1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz. The
Register of Deeds of Capiz is AUTHORIZED to cancel the
Original Certificate of Title in the name of Petra Unating and to
issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Spouses
Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO
VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, F
ELIX ABANDULA, FAUSTOGABAISEN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, R
AYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLON, EUSTAQUIO
MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAURA,
MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO
RENOBLAS, SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS,
FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME,
VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO ITAOC,
TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC,
FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA
OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS,
FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO
HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA
MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA
MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA
CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD
OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE
COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS
MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON
CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V.
GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and
PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees.
G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO
ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON,
GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO
GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA,
SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX
ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING,
TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR
ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et.
al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO
ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON,
GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO
GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA,
SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX
ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING,
TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR
ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province
of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners.
Roque R. Luspo for respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of
these three cases, considering that they involve the same parties
and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional
Trial Court)1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of
the plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965
denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare
the defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---this is
a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order
dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R.
No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol
dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the
petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting
these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render
these cases moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect
the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex
parte manifestation that they are still very much interested in the
just prosecution of these cases.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an
application for registration of the parcels of land allegedly
inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case
No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951,
administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended
application for registration. After hearing, the land was registered
under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real
properties with damages and preliminary injunction, Civil Case
No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record •n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by
plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It
was alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective
parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by
purchase or inheritance and have been in possession publicly,
continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept of
owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession
of their predecessors-in-interest. However, those parcels of land
were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the
heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the
intention of depriving them of their rights of ownership and
possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960
when the defendants-appellees, through their agents, attempted
to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the
heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees
moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on Appeal;
p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the
cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying
defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp. 29-30, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside
such order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12,
1964, the same court issued another order reversing itself partially
(p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs
Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian
Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc,
Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa
Haganas, Fermin Haganas, Victorians
Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto
Matela, Procopio Cabañas and Vicente
Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground
of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying
proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of
the costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of
the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were The appeal is not impressed with merit. fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis
dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940, Nov.
on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res
whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the the defendants-appellees that they (plaintiffs-appellants) were judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by
defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar
the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the an action for reconveyance.
complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or
likewise dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo). when notified he does not want to participate and only after the
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the
defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellants were notified of the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor title has been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due
connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) were they given copies of the decision of the trial court are new course to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and
denying all motions. issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on defeat the purpose of the law.
jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a
errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit: the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, quo meticulously discussed the presence of all the elements
July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7;
I judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance is not Rollo):
plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and
proceedings, including land registration and cadastral There is no question that in that Registration
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September
THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS- Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251, Land
11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First
APPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).
ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE Instance of the province of Bohol had
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES jurisdiction of the subject matter, that said court
ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, had rendered a judgment on the merit that was
RES ADJUDICATA. rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of terminated in the Court of Appeals since
the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same December, 1958, and that decision is now final
parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the same with a decree of registration over the parcels of
II thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order, land described in the application issued to the
therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites applicants.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it
MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the The subject matter (the parcels of land) now
WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar are
DECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second the same, or at least part of the parcels already
IN DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of adjudicated registration in that registration case
THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, to the persons, some of them are made
PRESCRIBED BY LAW. G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24). defendants in this case before us. The cause of
action between the two cases are the same,
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that ownership of these parcels of land, though the
dismissing the appeal as regards the second issue because the parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more forms of action are different, one is an ordinary
order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and Land Registration and the other is
appealable (pp. 35-38, Rollo). determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it reconveyance.
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of 'It is settled that
Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame, Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The notwithstanding the difference
Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom in the form of two actions, the
Rollon filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it doctrine of res adjudicata will
they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to apply where it appears that
respective parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533. litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once the parties in effect were
 litigating for the same thing. A
party can not, by varying the
form of action, escape the
effects of res
adjudicata (Aguirre vs.
Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30,
1958; Geronimo vs. Nava No.
L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959;
Labarro vs. Labateria et al.,
28 O.G. 4479).
'Well settled is the rule that a
party can not by varying the
form of action, or adopting a
different method of presenting
his case, escape the
operation of the principle that
one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice
litigated between the same
parties or their privies.
(Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No.
L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs.
Cruz, et al., No. L-1 2663,
Aug. 21, 1959).
'Accordingly, a final judgment
in an ordinary civil action,
determining the ownership of
certain lands is res
adjudicata in a registration
proceeding where the parties
and property are the same as
in the former case (Paz vs.
Inandan 75 Phil. 608;
Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil.
303).'
xxx xxx xxx
But are there identities of parties in this case
before us and the former registration
proceedings? Identity of parties means that the
parties in the second case must be the same
parties in the first case, or at least, must be
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the former action or
proceeding, or when the parties in the
subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del
Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51
Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744;
Valdez, et a]. vs. Penida No. L- 3467, July 30,
1951).
xxx xxx xxx
Returning our attention to the case at bar, and
with in mind the principles of res
adjudicata above-quoted, we noticed that many
of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the
former registration case, but many are children
of the former oppositors. In such a case we
have to determine the case of every plaintiff, if
the former decision in the land registration case
is conclusive and binding upon him.
xxx xxx xxx
The defendants had proven that the adjoining
owners and claimants of the parcels of land
object of registration proceeding had been
notified when the land was surveyed. These
persons notified according to the surveyor's
certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano
Samoya, Fausto Baguisin, Silveria Pahado,
Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of
Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc,
Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina
Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas
Omosura, Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin
Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio
Asolan, Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina
Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano,
Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici
Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and
Mun. of Calape.
The following persons were notified by the Chief
of the Land Registration Office of the initial
hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration
proceedings enjoining them to appear on June
16,1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Court of First
Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer
of said application should not be granted: the
Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the
Director of Public Works and the Director of
Forestry, Manila; the Provincial Governor, the
Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer,
Tagbilaran, Bohol; the Municipal Mayor,
Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan,
Catalino Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel
Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del
Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz,
Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of Gregorio
Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano
Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom,
Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosura, Simon
Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol;
the heirs of Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin,
Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario,
Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio
Barbarona, Antequera Bohol.
And after the application had been filed and
published in accordance with law the following
persons represented by Atty. Conrado D.
Marapao filed opposition to that registration
proceeding: Felipe Cubido, Simon Lagrimas,
Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura,
Germana Gahil, Anastacio Orillosa, Enerio
Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya,
Pablo Dumadag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman
Reimbuncia, Celedonio Cabanas, Moises
Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla,
Pedro Omosura, Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura,
Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, Calixto
Sevilla, Teodora Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio
Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes Sevilla,
Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia
Sevilla, Marcos Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas,
Pablo Omosura, Fabian Villame, Teodoro
Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela,
Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosura, and
Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V.
Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau of
Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in
representation of the Municipality of Calape.
Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio
Renoblas are children of plaintiff Alejandro
Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-
law of Alejandro, being the husband of Juliana
Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff
Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the
oppositors in the registration proceedings, but
he was notified of the initial healing of that
registration case and by the surveyor that
surveyed the land object of registration (Exhibit
J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land
registration proceeding is binding upon him and
his case is dismissed on the ground of res
adjudicata with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the
surveyor and that notice of the initial hearing.
And though he was not an oppositor, the former
land registration proceeding is binding on him.
Therefore, this case is dismissed in so far as
Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc,
Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are
children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors
in the registration proceedings. They claim
parcel No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land
was inherited by said plaintiffs' mother from her
father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record
(Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic), shows
that the land is declared in the name of Daniel
Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration
case. Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-
interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are
bound by the decision in that registration case.
Their case, therefore, is dismissed, with costs.
"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas,
Fermin Haganas and Victoriano Haganas are
children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor
in the registration case. Marcos testified that his
claim before was only two hectares, while the
claim of his children is seven hectares, which
come from his wife, not from him. These
plaintiffs claim two parcels, one under Tax
Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration
No. R-8456. It appears that Tax Declaration No.
R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of Marcos
Haganas and the land described under Tax
Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the
spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla
from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3),
who was an oppositor in the registration
proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto
Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas,
and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-
interest to properties in which the decision in
the registration case is conclusive and binding
to their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their
case here is dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo
Matela, who was the oppositor in the
registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman
Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and
Roberta Matela are their children. She has no
son by the name of Pelagic. Julia testified that
the land now claimed by her children came from
her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was
claimed by Mauricio Matela as oppositor was in
his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. This
is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia
Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin
Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4).
These plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of
Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision
in that land proceeding wherein he was the
oppositor. Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs
are dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of
Andres Reambonancia, oppositor in the land
registration proceedings. She claims parcel No.
20 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint
bearing Tax Declaration No. R-8121. It appears
that this land is declared in the name of Andres
Reambonancia (Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor
in the land registration case, is bound by the
decision of that case. Therefore, the case of
plaintiff Procopia Cabanas as successor-in-
interest to Andres Reambonancia, is hereby
dismissed, with costs.
Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio
Amosora and Florencia Gahil both oppositors in
the former registration case. The land claimed
by plaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as
parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 of the complaint
under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the
name of his father Enerio Amosora. Since
Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the former
land registration of which this land was a part,
the decision of that land registration case is
conclusive and binding not only to Enerio
Amosora, but also to his successor-in-interest,
plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case
therefore, is dismissed with costs.
G.R. No. L-32065
Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was issued in the name of
Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was
issued in the name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).
A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of
possession dated January 6, 1961, and a second alias writ of
possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court
against the petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and
seek tactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the official
report of the deputy sheriff dated January 21 1960. Another
evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate was a
certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated
October 25, 1966.
On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano
Ogilve, who is one of the registered owners of the parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the
petitioners for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and
for refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.
On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 47, Rollo):
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATION, make it of record that
Procopia Reambonansa voluntarily left the land
and dropped out from the case; the charge of
contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who
died) is dismissed and each of the remaining 22
respondents are hereby found guilty of
contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are
hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of One
Hundred Pesos, authorizing the Constabulary
Detachment at or near Candungao Calape
Bohol to collect the same and to transmit the
money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day,
the said Constabulary Detachment to effect the
commitment if any of them is unable to pay the
fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22
respondents shall also be taken by the
constabulary and filed with the record of this
case.
It is so ordered.
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforestated resolution whereas Ogilve filed an opposition
thereto.
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
On March 18, 1970, another motion for reconsideration was filed
by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for
reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No.
L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper
officers to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I
THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A
WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN
COURT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE
PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE
REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT
DEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor
defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their
names do not appear in the amended application for registration;
that they have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than
thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the
application for registration; and that after the hearing of the
registration case, they continued in possession of the said land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the
applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily
carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent
element of the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of
possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this
jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which
the administration of justice rests (Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon,
34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil.
554 [1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against
the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also
against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to
the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs. Ibañez, et al., 97
Phil 72 [1955]).
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of
the said land for more than thirty (30) years which began long
before the filing of the application for registration and continued in
possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked
against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense.
Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them.
However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that
petitioners are guilty of contempt. Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19,
Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the
possession of real property, the writ of execution must require the
sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the
possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled
thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the
losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof
to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or
ejectment the losing party enters or attempts to enter into or upon
the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may
the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs.
Philippine National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this
section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to
carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it
was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the trial judge
who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in
possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing to
do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their
refusal to effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious
and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less
prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to
comply with his duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not
to the disobedience of the petitioners' that the judgment was not
duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have
availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort
thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183).
G.R. No. L-33677
On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of
Demolition which was granted by the trial court on April 5, 1971
(pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of
contempt. On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion
for reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court
issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48,
Rollo):
WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of
preliminary injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers
with him but also carpenters to effect the
demolition, the carpenters being at the expense
of the Luspo.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use
and enjoyment of their right to which they are entitled when he
(respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971
and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo).
On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
(p. 51, Rollo).
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a
writ of demolition pending the resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the
issuance of the writ of demolition. It is significant to note that the
subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order
dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior order
dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not
the writs of possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge
correctly issued the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias,
107 Phil 1071, We held:
[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land
registration proceeding implies the delivery of
possession of the land to the successful litigant
therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay
Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil.
391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ
 of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a
complement of the former which, without said
writ of demolition, would be ineffective.

xxx xxx xxx

[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is

reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner
who is being deprived of the possession of the
lots in question, by reason of the continued
refusal of respondent ...... to remove his house
thereon and restore possession of the promises
to petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of

the Court of First Instance dated May 12, 1964 and August 25,
1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some
of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;

2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the

resolution of the Court of First Instance dated May 14, 1970 is
SET ASIDE; and

3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order

of the Court of First Instance dated June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120066 September 9, 1999
OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and
SUSANA BRAULIO, RODOLFO, LOURDES and BEATRIZ all
surnamed ALBA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 1992 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in
Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K. 15104,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-
161277 and the improvements thereon situated
in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines, with an area of
4,845 square meters is brought under the
operation of the property registration decree
(PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered
and confirmed in the name of applicant Jose
Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan,
Philippines;
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the
national road mentioned in the application be
segregated for future road widening program
upon payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title;
3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the
spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio, Octabela
Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba
and Beatriz Alba are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 1
The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court
and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for
title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that
the land applied for was purchased by him and
his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz.
The documents attached to the application are:
technical description, surveyor's certificate,
certification by the chief deputy assessor of
Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October
31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the
Official Gazette was issued on September 23,
1958. The certification of posting of the notice of
initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in
the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of
4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast
by the property of the Municipality of Banga
(Sketch, Exh. "F").
The initial hearing was held on October 31,
1958. An order of general default was issued
but those who presented their opposition,
namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel
and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing
Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the
Municipality of Banga represented by the
Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to
file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed
their opposition on October 31, 1958. They
opposed the registration of the southeastern
portion of the 240 square meters of the land
applied for alleging that they are the owners in
fee simple and possessors of said portion and
all the improvements thereon for not less than
70 years together with their predecessor-in-
interest deriving their title by purchase from the
original owners. They prayed for the Court to
declare them the true and absolute owners of
the disputed portion of the same in their names.
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz
filed her opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29,
1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of
Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of
attorney was attached. He opposed the
registration of the northeastern portion of the
land applied for, with an area of 43.83 square
meters. He alleged that his principal is the
owner by right of succession and is in the
possession of said portion with all its
improvements for more than 80 years together
with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously,
peacefully and openly under claim of
ownership. He prayed that his principal be
declared the true and absolute owner of the
disputed portion of 43.83 square
meters.1âwphi1.nêt
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order
allowing the applicant to hire another surveyor
to segregate the non-controversial portion of the
land applied for and to notify the oppositors and
their counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order
of general default and to admit the attached
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion to admit the
attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de
Raz were filed. The Court in its order dated
March 21, 1970 admitted said opposition and
set aside the order of default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela
Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-
owners of a portion of the land applied for with
an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the
north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor,
Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the
south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the
public market of Banga. They claimed to have
inherited the above-mentioned portion from
their late father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who
purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in
1918. Hence, they have been in possession
continuously, openly and peacefully under claim
of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for
not less 70 years. They prayed that the
disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be
registered as their pro-indiviso property.
In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda.
de Raz opposed the registration of the
southeastern portion of the land applied for with
an area of 331.44 square meters. She claimed
to have been in peaceful, continuous and open
possession together with her deceased
husband, Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership
of the above-mentioned portion for not less than
70 years, by purchase from its owners. She
likewise opposed the registration of the western
portion of the land applied for, with an area of
676 square meters, having purchased the same
from its original owners on (sic) her
predecessor-in-interest has been open,
peaceful and continuous under claim of
ownership for a period of not less than 70
years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44
square meters be registered in her name and
that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso.,
and the other portion of 676 square meters be
registered solely in her name.
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose
Lachica filed his consolidated opposition and
reply to the motion to lift order of default stating
that there is no reason to do so under the Rules
of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo
Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as
the amended opposition of Octabela Alba Vda.
de Raz are without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order
of general default was granted and the
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant
offered for admission exhibits "A" to "I" and the
testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose
Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica
(July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court
admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order
appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as
Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed
by the three sets of oppositors and submit an
amended approved plan together with the
technical description for each portion.
The Commissioner's report and sketch was
submitted on December 4, 1974. The applicant
filed his opposition to the Commissioner's report
on December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of
December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner
to submit an amended report and amended
sketch.
The Commissioner's corrected report and
sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975
which the Court approved on February 25, 1975
there being no objection from the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order
whereby the testimony of oppositor Octabela
Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for
her failure to appear in the scheduled hearing
on March 15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the
testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was
stricken off record because the latter was
bedridden and can not possibly appear for
cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of
exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his
comments thereto on August 29, 1988. The
Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony
of their witness on March 1, 1989.
In this application for title to land filed by
applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were
filed by the following:
1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia
Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed
Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de
Raz; and
4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for
oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he would
file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and
Jose Rago himself declared his conformity
(Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal
motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor
Rago has not presented evidence on his behalf;
hence, his opposition must be disregarded.
As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans
Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly
executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba
Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by Felimon
Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept.
29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said deed
cannot be found in the records. Even so, the
Braulios have not presented evidence to show
that by the time this application was filed, they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous
possession of the land claimed, in concept of
owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire
title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code
of the Philippines). As such, the opposition of
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must be
dismissed. 2
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the applicant and the oppositor Raz, the court a
quorendered judgment in favor of the applicant as stated at the
outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors
Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have
never offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty
taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from 1941
to 1958 while the respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes
under Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said property from
1945-1958 when the case was filed per certification issued by the
Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga. 3 In rendering judgment in
favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that while it
is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that —
1. The Civil law provisions on the basic In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of
prescription are inapplicable. rules Appeals reasoned, inter alia, as follows:
governing
2. The applicable law is the On the basis of the testimonial and
Section 48 [a] of the Public introduction documentary evidence presented by the
Land Law or Act 141, as of applicant, the trial court did not err in confirming
amended. secondary that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee
evidence. simple of the property subject of the application
3. Private respondent has not for registration entitling him to register the same
acquired ownership in fee 3.5. The in his name under the operation of PD 1529.
simple, much less has he met applicant/re
the conditions for judicial spondent's It is of no moment that the applicant failed to
confirmation of imperfect title Tax produce the originals of those other
under Section 48 [a] of Act Declaration deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was
141, as amended, except No. 14181 able to present sufficient substantial secondary
perhaps for a 620 square is a evidence, in accordance with the requirements
meter portion of the land "doctored" of Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
applied for because: tax Court, now Section 5, same Rule of the Revised
declaration. Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines in point.
3.1. There
is 3.6. Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817,
absolutely Applicant/re explained that when the original writing is not
no proof of spondent's available for one reason or another which is the
the alleged tax best or primary evidence, to prove its contents
sales made declaration is the testimony of some one who has read or
by Raz and s have no known about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
Alba. probative 73 SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before
value. secondary evidence is introduced, that the due
3.2. There execution, delivery and reason for non-
is 3.7. production of the original writing must first be
absolutely Applicant/re produced. Raylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247,
no reliable spondent ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss of
proof of the has not the original document beyond all possibility of
alleged satisfied mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is
theft of the the sufficient and this may be shown by
deeds of required a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly
sale. quantum of made, for it in places where it is likely to be
evidence in found. After proving the due execution and
land delivery of the document, together with the fact
3.3. The registration that the same has been lost or destroyed, its
identity of cases. contents may be proved, among others, by the
the land recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing,
has not 7 ala. 126; and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4
been 3.8.
Petitioners- Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639, are of the view that that
established where the lost documents are more than thirty
. oppositors
have (30) years old and would thus prove themselves
proven their if produced, secondary evidence of their
3.4. The right over contents is admissible without proof of their
Court of the subject execution.
Appeals property.
misapplied
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the thence, S. Indeed, to borrow the apt words of
property in 1940-1941. He presented the Deed 33 deg. 46' the ponente in the Delima case, such proof of
(Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino E., 87.66 ownership of, and the adverse, continuous
Martirez. While he failed to present the other m. to point possession of the applicant since 1940, strongly
deeds of sale covering the other portions of the "2" ". . . militate against any judicial cognizance of a
property, he has sufficiently established that matter that could have been withheld in its ken,"
they were notarized documents and were taken thence, S. hence, whatever right oppositors may have had
by his mother-in-law sometime in 1956. He 56 deg. 42' over the property or any portion thereof was
reported the loss to the authorities and even W., 63.81 thereby also lost through extinctive prescription
filed a case of theft. He further exerted efforts m. to point in favor of the applicant who had been in actual,
and made a diligent search of those documents "3" open, adverse and continuous possession of
from the notary public but in vain. He presented the land applied for in the concept of owner for
the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer's Office of over 10 years when the application for
Banga, who testified having seen those deeds thence, N. registration was filed in court. 4
as they were presented to him by the applicant 37 deg. 22'
and which were used as basis for the W., 59.26
m. to point It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial
preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration court and the Court of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on
No. 14181 in the name of the tax declarant. Tax "4"
the parties and upon this Court, 5 which will not be reviewed 6 or
Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported by
in Court, proving that the land was declared for thence, N. evidence 7 or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate
tax purposes in the name of the applicant and 33 deg. 42' otherwise. 8
his wife. The applicant has been paying the E., 73.08
realty tax covering the property since 1945 and m. to the
beyond 1958, when the application for point of More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which
registration was filed in court, per certification of are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this
the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1). Court in the following instances:
beginning, . . . All points
referred to are indicated on
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial the plan and are marked on 1.] When the factual findings
court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the absolute the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. of the Court of Appeals and
owner in fee simple of the land described in his Conc. Mons. Bearings true the trial court are
application for its original registration in his date of the survey, January contradictory; 9
name. The land contains an area of 4,845 25, 1957, and that of the
square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, approval, October 3, 1957. 2.] When the conclusion is a
Aklan, and finding grounded entirely on
The applicant has been in public, open, speculation, surmises and
Bounded on the NE., along continuous and adverse possession of the conjectures; 10
line 1-2, by property of property since 1940-41 up to the present to the
Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the 3.] When the inference made
along line 2-3, by National property by acquisitive prescription, in by the Court of Appeals from
road; on the SW., along line accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, its findings of fact is
3-4, by property of the Mpl. otherwise known as the "Code of Civil manifestly mistaken,
Government of Banga (Public Procedure", having been in actual and adverse absurd 11 or impossible;
Market); and on the NW., possession under claim of ownership for over
along line 4-1, by property of ten (10) years, and thus in whatever way his 4.] Where there is a grave
the Municipal Government of occupancy might have commenced or abuse of discretion in the
Banga (Public Market). continued under a claim of title exclusive of any appreciation of
Beginning at a point marked 1 other right and adverse to all other claimants, facts; 12
on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by
E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. acquisitive prescription (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio,
1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan; 32 SCRA 516). 5.] When the appellate court
in making its findings went
 beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are
contrary to the submission of
both appellant and appellee;
6.] When the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is premised
on a misapprehension of
facts; 13
7.] When the Court of
Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the
parties which, if property
considered, would justify a
different conclusion; 14
8.] When the findings of fact
are themselves conflicting;
9.] When the findings of fact
are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; and
10.] When the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings
are contradicted by the
evidence on record. 15
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private
respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his
ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land
he applied for.
In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated
confirmed private respondent/applicant's title to the land on the
basis of the findings that: 1.] the private respondent/applicant
purchased the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private
respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land from
1945 up to the filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private
respondent/applicant has been in actual, open and continuous
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since
1945, and 5.] the private respondent/applicant has acquired the
land by prescription.
As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals is not a function that this Court normally
undertakes 6 unless the appellate court's findings are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment
itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 17 A thorough review
of the record convinces this Court that the general rule with regard
to the conclusiveness of the trial court's and appellate tribunal's
factual findings should not be applied because there are material
circumstances which, when properly considered, would have
altered the result of the case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record
reveals that with the exception of 620 square meters, there has
been no satisfactory showing of how private respondent/applicant
acquired the remainder of the subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as
well as the arguments proffered by private respondent, he
acquired the land in question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A
Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by
Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b] 300 square
meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in-
law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent
allegedly bought in 1940 from Eugrocino Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square
meters, was not questioned by petitioners as its technical
description delineated in the Escritura De Venta Absoluta dated
August 13, 1941, 18 to wit:
Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero
regado, actuado en el casco central del
municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna
mejora, de una extension superficial de
ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840
mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por
otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos
por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y
con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con
la carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por
Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con
terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al
Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de
Banga y con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al
terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en
todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro
limite visible de linderia mas que dichos
mojones y esta amillarado a mi nombre en una
sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No.
12374 en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial de
Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte
pesos (P20.00) . . .
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of
840 square meters as well as its dimensions of 40
meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How this
parcel was further reduced to 620 square meters is
explained by the fact that the Municipal Government of
Banga appropriated 220 square meters thereof for the
Banga Public Market Road.
What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases
of the other two parcels from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square
meters and from Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters
owing to the questionable circumstances surrounding their
acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by
Dionisia Regado under Tax Declaration No. 802. 19 The records
further reveal that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters
of the land to the Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish
document denominated as a deed of sale dated April 29,
1914; 20 [2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced by a
document entitled Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated September
6, 1918, 21 and [3.] 2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba
evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated September 6, 1918
written in Spanish. 22
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from
Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933. 23 Raz retained 480 square
meters, however, he and his wife Octabela Alba conveyed a 240
square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on November 5,
1956. 24 Subsequently on May 29, 1969, the heirs of Eufrocino
Alba sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel purchased by
Eufrocino to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz. 25 The deed of
conveyance was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 1969 26 and is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her
husband. 27
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land
which are borne out by the documentary evidence on record,
private respondent/applicant did not produce the alleged deeds of
conveyances evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio
Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on
secondary evidence to prove the existence thereof which was
sustained by both the trial and the appellate courts. Such reliance
on secondary evidence vis-a-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in
this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of
the overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed
against it because —
. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be
proven by means of witnesses, but must
necessarily be evidenced by a written
instrument, duly subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent, or by secondary
evidence of their contents. No other evidence,
therefore, can be received except the
documentary evidence referred to, in so far as
regards such contracts, and these are valueless
as evidence unless they are drawn up in writing
in the manner aforesaid. 28
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies
on a document evidencing his title thereto, must
prove not only the genuineness of his title but
the identity of the land therein referred to. The
document in such a case is either a basis of his
claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this
case, he only claims a portion of what is
included in his title, he must clearly prove that
the property sought to be registered is included
in that title. 29
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical
descriptions of the land applied for by private
respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly purchased from
Eufrocino Alba.
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the
remainder of the subject land measuring 3,725 square meters
from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring that this parcel is
listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit "I" which is denominated as an
"Inventory And Appraisal Of The Properties Of The Spouses
Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica." Item
No. 5 30 of the said inventory described the parcel of land
mentioned therein as follows:
5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano,
amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo el
Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en
el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda el
Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al
Este con la carretera provincial Banga-Libacao;
al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con
Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension
aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y
(35) centiareas poco mas o menos. (Note: Said
property was purchased by the spouses Jose
Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino
M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as evidenced
by a Escritura de Compraventa executed on
November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado
Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII,
Serie 1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically
per Psu 161277 as —
A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-
161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of
Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate;
on the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on
the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
Government of Banga (Public Market); and on
the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public
Market). Beginning at a point marked "1" on
plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from
B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence S. 33 deg. 46' E.
87.66 m. to point "2"
thence S. 56 deg. 42" W.,
63.81 m. to point "3"
thence N. 37 deg. 22' W.,
59.26 m. to point "4"
thence N. 33 deg. 42' E.,
73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY
FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc.
Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January 25,
1957, and that of the approval, October 3,
1957. 31
It will be readily noted vis-a-vis the foregoing that: a.] the land
applied for is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the
parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero
whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino Alba is cocal
secano. Palay is unhusked rice, 32 thus, the term palayero refers
to land devoted to the planting rice; cocal, on the other hand,
means coconut tree plantation 33 while secano denotes unwatered
land or a dry sand bank; 34 c.] the land applied for has an area of
4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly sold by
Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land
applied for is bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on
the SE by Apolinia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo
National Road; and on the NW by the Banga Public market
whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is
bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E
by the Banga-Libaco Carreta Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido
Alba and on the W by the Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be
stressed in this regard that a person who claims that he has better
right to real property must prove not only his ownership of the
same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. 35
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on
Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering that there is no
satisfactory explanation of how the area of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a modest
620 square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,845 square
meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was
preceded by 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578 in the name of
private respondent/applicant and his spouse which shows that the
land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620
square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953
Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private
respondent's wife. The land declared for taxation purposes therein
also has an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No.
134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the
name of private respondent's wife, Adela Raz. The land declared
therein for taxation purposes likewise measures 620 square
meters.
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947
to 4,845 square meters in 1956 came about on account of an
affidavit dated November 17, 1956 wherein private
respondent/applicant requested 36 the Municipal Assessor of
Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square
meters on the bare claim that "the area has been decreased" to
only 620 square meters. The timing of the revision and its
proximity to the date of filing of the application can not but
engender serious doubts on the application more so considering
that prior thereto realty tax payments covering the period 1945 to
1956 covered an area measuring 620 square meters and private
respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to claim
possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely
larger area of 4,845 square meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of
ownership. 37 Tax declarations for a certain number of years,
although constituting proof of claim of title to land, 38 is not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported
by other effective proof. 39 It was, thus, held in one case 40 that
where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a
few months prior to the filing of an application, such payment does
not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona
fide claim of ownership prior to the filing of the application. Still in
another case, 41 the claim that the applicant had been
incontinuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land
was not given credence because it was negated by the fact that
he declared the land for taxation purposes in October 1959 when
he filed his application for registration although he could have
done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A belated
declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no
real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the
declaration 42 and where there are serious discrepancies in the
tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied. 43 If
at all, the foregoing facts only serves to underscore private
respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to cloak with judicial color
his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining parcels of land
and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is not well-taken
given the peculiar facts prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the
proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. 44 Basic
is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule, regulation or
policy shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated
so. 45 Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction depends on the
law existing at the time an action is filed 46 and a law continues to
be in force with regard to all rights which accrued prior to the
amendment thereof. 47
In this case, the controlling statute when the private
respondent/applicant filed his application for registration on April
28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claim and
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States
have applied for the purchase, composition or
other form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously
since the filing of their applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that
in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in relation to
the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the assumption that
the subject land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the
appellate court's postulate. The application for registration of
private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title
considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian
Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable
lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-
disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral
lands. 53 For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands
of the public domain classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are
further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential,
commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.]
Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.]
Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
purposes. 54
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be
defined as those alienable portions of the public domain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus the term includes
residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that
these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands. 55
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended,
permits the registration of private lands claimed to be owned by
the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles
from the government during the Spanish
Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown
namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
b.] Concession especial or special grant;
c] Composicion con el estado title or adjustment
title; d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase
and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory
information title, which could become a Titulo
gratuito or a gratuitous title; 56
2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by
accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation of
islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for
in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code;
and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any
other manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private
respondent hardly falls under any of the latter classifications of
land referred to by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing
facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both courts can not
be pleaded to bolster private respondent/applicant's claim
because —
. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied
from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of title from the state . . . . 57
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural
land, however, long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor. 58 The reason, to reiterate our ruling,
is because the statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the
State. 59
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that prescription can be
applied in the manner invoked by the trial court and the appellate
court, it must be pointed out that —
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides
that "(o)wnership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years,"
this provision of law must be read in conjunction
with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article
states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive
prescription of things requires possession in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is
not acquired by mere possession thereof under
claim of ownership for a period of ten years
unless such possession was acquired con justo
titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith). 60 The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 61 For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when
the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the recognized
modes of acquisition of ownership or other real
rights but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any
right. 62
It can not be said that private respondent's possession was con
justo titulo y buena fe. On the contrary, private
respondent/applicant's act of appropriating for himself the entire
area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who
have been occupying portions of the disputed land constituted
acts of deprivation tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has
ruled that the —
. . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the
application that no other persons had any claim
or interest in the said land, constitute specific
allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by
competent proof. Failure and intentional
omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of
actual physical possession by another person
constitutes an allegation of actual
fraud. 63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit
or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is
obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 64
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private
respondent/applicant to benefit from his own wrong would run
counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio — no man can
be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. 65
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive
prescription can not similarly vest ownership over the property
upon private respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the
Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that —
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of good faith.
Needless to state, private respondent/applicant's possession of
thirteen (13) years falls way below the thirty-year requirement
mandated by Article 1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the
secondary proof of private respondent, adduced overwhelming
evidence to prove their ownership of the portions they claim in the
subject land. The evidence on record clearly points to the fact that
private respondent/applicant's right, if at all, is confined to only
620 square meters or what has been left of the 840 square meters
he purchased from Faustino Martirez after 220 square meters
thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of Banga for the
Public Market Road. 66
The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole
area was one Dionisia Regado who executed three (3) deeds of
sale covering certain portions of the disputed lands, namely: 1.]
the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering 1,850 square
meters executed in favor of the Municipality of Banga; 67 2.] the
Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering 1,320 square meters
executed in favor of Eulalio Raz; 68 and, 3.] the Deed of Sale
dated September 6, 1918 covering the balance with an area of
2,938 square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba. 69
Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of
the land by purchase Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as
confirmed in paragraph 2 of the Escritura De Venta
Absoluta executed by him on August 13, 1941. 70 After selling 840
square meters to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480
square meters to Susana Braulio 71 leaving a balance of 240
square meters which remained undiposed.
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba,
children of the deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter
portion of the 2,938 square meter lot purchased by their father
from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor Octabela alba Vda.
De Raz. 72 This Deeds was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Aklan in accordance with Act No. 3344 on June 17,
1969. 73 The land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the
name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's husband. 74
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's ownership of
the remaining 240 square meter portion which she and her
husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia Regado 75 and the 676
square meter portion which they bought from the heirs of
Eufrocino Alba 76 is fully substantiated by documentary
proof. 77 Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba's ownership
of a portion measuring 1,335 square meters 78 and another
portion measuring 2,262 square meters 79 is likewise backed by
documentary evidence. Susana Braulio's ownership of a 240
square meter portion 80 which she acquired from Octabela Alba
Vda. De Raz on November 11, 1956 81 is also documented, her
predecessor-in-interest having acquired the same from Dionisia
Regado on September 6, 1918. 82
The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof
of private respondent/applicant to support his claim of ownership
over the entire 4,845 square meter area. He has not adduced
evidence to show how and when he was able to acquire, with the
exception of 840 square meters further reduced to 620 square
meters on account of 220 square meters appropriated for the
market road, the bigger area of 3, 755 square meters from
anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia Regado.

His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No.

14181 which he was able to procure from the Municipal Assessor
of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving affidavit which
proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the statement of
the area of the land which he claimed to be 4,845 square meters
instead of 620 square meters — which was the area reflected in
earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578;
1953 Tax Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No.
6528.

Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of

adjudicating to petitioners the contested portions of the subject
land, in view of their failure to present the technical descriptions of
these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence showing
that petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful
and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner,
considering that the testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was
stricken off the record.

WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18,
1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-
15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent

Jose N. Lachica's house is situated, clearly delineating its metes
and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the parcel of
land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area
of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and confirmed in the
name of private respondent;

2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned
in the application be segregated for future road widening
programs upon the payment of just compensation to be annotated
at the back of the title.

3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is

concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin
for the reception of further evidence for the petitioners to establish
the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in
their names of the areas they respectively claim.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152016 April 13, 2010
NARCISO TUMIBAY,* RUPERTO TUMIBAY, ELENA TUMIBAY,
EDUARDO TUMIBAY, CORAZON TUMIBAY, MANUELA
SEVERINO VDA. DE PERIDA and GREGORIA DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. YOLANDA T. SORO and HONORIO SORO, SPS. JULITA
T. STA. ANA and FELICISIMO STA. ANA,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by
petitioners Narciso Tumibay (Narciso), Ruperto Tumibay, Elena
Tumibay, Eduardo Tumibay, Corazon Tumibay, Manuela
Severino Vda. De Perida and Gregoria Dela Cruz (petitioners), to
reverse and set aside the decision2 dated August 24, 2001 and
resolution3 dated January 29, 2002 of the Former Special Tenth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56489.
The assailed CA decision nullified, for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, the order dated September 6, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City in
Civil Case No. 8269. The assailed CA Resolution denied the
petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
The petitioners, including the respondent Julita T. Sta. Ana
(Julita), were the defendants in Civil Case No. 8269, an action for
annulment and recovery of ownership with damages, filed on
January 17, 1984 by the respondent Yolanda T. Soro (Yolanda)
and her husband, respondent Honorio Soro. The subject of the
case was a 1,083 square meter parcel of land in Cabanatuan City
(subject property) originally titled in the name of Francisca Sacdal,
the grandmother of Yolanda and Julita, under Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 1738 of the Registry of Deeds of Cabanatuan
City. Thru a "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" dated February 2 and 13,
1967, OCT No.1738 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-11574 was issued in Narciso’s name. Narciso
subsequently sold the subject property to the other petitioners in
this case, thereby causing the issuance of TCT Nos. T-23150,
27151 and 42467 in their names.
On December 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision, whose
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby
rendered, as follows:
1. Declaring the "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" dated
February 2 & 13, 1967 and all sales executed
subsequent thereto as null and void ab initio;
2. Ordering the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-11574, issued in the name of Narciso Tumibay
and all subsequent titles issued thereafter, such as TCT
Nos. T-23150, 27151 and 42467 of the Register of
Deeds of Cabanatuan City, in the name of the other
defendants;
3. Declaring the plaintiff Yolanda T. Soro and defendant
Julita T. Sta. Ana, as the sole heirs of Estela Perida and
owners of the land covered originally by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1738;
4. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the said property
to the said Yolanda T. Soro and Julita T. Sta. Ana, and in
default thereof, the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is
hereby authorized to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance in favor of said Yolanda T. Soro and Julita
T. Sta. Ana; and
5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiff ₱5,000.00 as actual and moral damages, and
attorney’s fee of ₱5,000.00 and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC decision was affirmed, successively, by the CA and by
this Court. After finality, the RTC – on Yolanda’s motion – issued
a writ of execution. In obedience to the writ, the Register of Deeds
of Cabanatuan City issued TCT No.T-986494 and TCT No. T-
986505 in the names of Yolanda and Perlita.
On March 3, 1999, Yolanda and Perlita, with their respective
spouses, filed with the RTC a motion to be restored to the
possession of the subject property and to demolish the
improvements thereon, in accordance with paragraphs (c) and (d)
of Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.6
The petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was
nothing in the RTC decision that ordered the demolition of existing
improvements.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC issued an Order (dated September 6, 1999) denying the
respondents’ motion. In sustaining the petitioners’ views, the RTC
noted that a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision sought to be executed; it cannot go beyond
the terms of the judgment.7
When the RTC denied8 their motion for reconsideration,9 the
respondents elevated their case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They insisted that
the removal or demolition of the improvements was the logical
consequence of the RTC decision.
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the petition on August 24, 2001. The appellate
court, applying Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the Rules of
Court, noted that since the RTC ordered the petitioners to
reconvey to the respondents the subject property that contains
improvements the petitioners introduced, the demolition of the
improvements can be done only after a special order of the RTC,
issued upon the respondents’ motion, after due hearing, and after
the petitioners failed to remove the improvements within the time
fixed by the RTC. Thus, the CA declared void the September 6,
1999 RTC Order and directed the RTC to fix the time within which
the petitioners should remove the improvements from the subject
property.
After the CA’s denial10 of their motion for reconsideration,11 the
petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The petitioners argue that the writ of execution should conform to
the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed and
the demolition of the existing improvements was not expressly
ordained in the decision. They submit that to effect the demolition,
the respondents must file an ejectment case. They cite Nazareno
v. Court of Appeals,12which held that "being declared owner of the
subject lot does not also mean that [the winning party] is
automatically entitled to possession of all improvements thereon."
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that the petitioners’ argument runs
counter to the express provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the
Rules of Court that a judgment is conclusive on all matters that
the parties could have raised; to further require them to file an
ejectment suit to oust the petitioners would amount to
encouraging multiplicity of suits.
THE ISSUE
The core issue is whether the CA erred when it declared void the
September 6, 1999 RTC Order denying the respondents’ motion
to be restored to possession of the subject property and to
demolish the improvements thereon.
OUR RULING
We find no merit in the petition.
A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the
decision
We are not persuaded by the petitioners’ argument that, since the
RTC decision to reconvey to respondents the subject property did
not expressly order the removal of improvements thereon, the
RTC cannot, by order, reach these improvements and accordingly
act to enforce its decision.
As a general rule, the writ of execution should conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is
void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution
must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment
promulgated,13 and may not vary the terms of the judgment it
seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment
sought to be executed.14
Nonetheless, we have held that a judgment is not confined to
what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.15 Thus, in
Perez v. Evite,16 where the ownership of a parcel of land was
decreed in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land
was considered included in the decision where the defeated
party's claim to possession was based solely on his claim of
ownership.
In Baluyut v. Guiao,17 we stressed that this rule fully conforms with
Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court that
provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of
a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.) 18
Petitioners misread Nazareno v. Court of Appeals
We find that the petitioners misread the ruling in Nazareno v.
Court of Appeals19 when they understood the ruling to mean that
in all cases, a declaration of ownership does not include a
declaration of the right to possession. What Nazareno actually
holds is that adjudication of ownership would include the delivery
of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to
possess the land independently of his rejected claim of
ownership. This ruling, as understood in its correct sense, fully
applies to the present case, as there is no allegation, much less
any proof, that the petitioners have any right to possess the
improvements on the land independently of their claim of
ownership of the subject property. Thus, the respondents have full
right to possession of the subject property.
We remind the petitioners that we do not allow the piecemeal
interpretation of our Decision as a means to advance one’s case.
To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context; the
decision must be considered in its entirety.20 Read in this manner,
the respondents’ right to possession of the subject property fully
follows.
Rule 39, Section 10 sets the procedure for execution of
judgment for specific acts
In addition, Rule 39, Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), of the
Rules of Court provides the procedure for execution of judgments
for specific acts, as follows:
SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.-
xxxx
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The officer shall
demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery
or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming
rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three
(3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment
obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace
officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably
necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee
in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or
profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same
manner as a judgment for money.
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. -
When the property subject of execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements,
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of
the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has
failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
In Buñag v. Court of Appeals,21 we explained that a judgment for
the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to
place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the
defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the
prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him.
No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision;
nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such
event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to
remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to
do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the
improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed
read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special
order by the court for the removal of the improvements. 22
In light of the foregoing, we find that the CA committed no
reversible error in declaring void the September 6, 1999 RTC
Order.
Treble costs against petitioners
We lament that the petitioners, by instituting the present petition,
has effectively delayed the full execution of the final and
executory RTC judgment. In doing so, they deprived the winning
respondents of the fruits of the judgment, and made a mockery of
the RTC judgment that has stood scrutiny all the way to our level.
We have always frowned upon any scheme to prolong litigations
and we view the present dispute as an unwarranted effort to avoid
the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at. We
cannot countenance, and in fact, condemn this kind of abuse of
judicial process. Thus, we deem it fit to impose treble costs
against the petitioners.

We note that the petitioners filed a Manifestation dated August 28,

200823 informing us that Julita sold her pro indiviso share in the
subject property to one Corazon T. Logramente thru a "Bilihang
Lubusan ng Lupa" dated July 17, 2003, and the latter caused the
annotation of her adverse claim in the TCT Nos. T-98649 and T-
98650. However, this supervening event has no bearing to the
present case where the only issue involved is the propriety of the
September 6, 1999 RTC Order that denied the respondents’
motion to be restored in possession. Besides, whatever right
Corazon T. Logramente, a third party to the present dispute, may
have on the subject property is adequately protected by the
inscription of her adverse claim in the land titles. Any right she
may have can only be raised or brought by her as the affected
party, or the real party-in-interest, in a proper forum.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the

petition and AFFIRM the decision dated August 24, 2001 and
resolution dated January 29, 2002 of the Former Special Tenth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56489
insofar as it declared void the Order dated September 6, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City in Civil
Case No. 8269. The Court is directed to conduct a hearing with
dispatch, in accordance with Section 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with due notice to the parties involved.

Treble costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55854 February 23, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. OTILIO G. ABAYA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of
Agusan del Sur, RENATO N. AQUINO, LENY G. AQUINO,
NELDA LEE, RODOLFO N. AQUINO, LORNA AQUINO,
ROSALINDA N. AQUINO, LUCINA G. AQUINO, RAUL N.
AQUINO, RAFAEL C. AQUINO, REFUGIO N. AQUINO,
Spouses JOAQUIN C. AQUINO and LUCENA G. AQUINO,
REBECCA A. BANTUG, ROSITA A. RAMOS and ROWENA N.
AQUINO, respondents.
Nazareno, Azada, Sabado & Dizon Law Offices and Tranquilino
O. Calo, Jr. for respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
For purposes of an appeal from a decision of the trial court in a
land registration case, should the period of appeal be reckoned
from the time of notice to the fiscal or notice to the Solicitor
General? This is the issue posed in this case.
In 1977 and 1978, private respondents filed with the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Sur separate applications for registration
of several parcels of land located in Bahbah, now Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur with a total area of 7,880,418 square meters more
or less. The applications were docketed as LRC Nos. N-160 to N-
170. On subsequent dates, some of these applications were
amended.
The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development
through the Solicitor General filed separate oppositions to the
applications for registration. Along with said oppositions the
Solicitor General also filed separate notices of appearance
addressed to the Clerk of Court and copies furnished the
applicants. The notices of appearance read as follows:
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
CFI Agusan del Sur
The Clerk of Court
Greetings:
Please enter the appearance of the Solicitor
General as counsel for the Government in the
above-entitled case, and cause all notices of
hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and
other processes to be served upon him at the
Office of the Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Manila.
The Provincial Fiscal of Prosperidad, Agusan
del Sur has been authorized to appear in this
case and therefore should also be furnished
notices of hearings, orders, resolutions,
decisions and processes. However, as the
Solicitor General retains supervision and control
of the representation in this case and has to
approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or
other actions which appear to compromise the
interest of the Government, only notices of
orders, resolutions, and decisions served on
him will bind the party represented.
Adverse parties are likewise requested to
furnish both the Solicitor General and the Fiscal
with copies of their pleadings and motions.
(Emphasis supplied) 1
After a joint trial of all the cases the trial court rendered a decision
dated June 6, 1980 adjudicating the land applied for in the
proposal indicated therein to the applicants, private respondents
herein. A copy of the decision was received by the Solicitor
General on July 8, 1980.
On July 29, 1980, oppositors, the Director of Land and the
Director of Forest Development, through the Solicitor General,
filed separate notices of appeal from the decision to the Court of
Appeals. On the same date said oppositors filed separate motions
for extension of time within which to file the records on appeal. On
September 3, 1980, or within the extended period first requested,
the same oppositors filed separate motions for further extension
of time to file record on appeal.
On September 19, 1980 the trial court issued an order denying
the government's appeal as follows:
The Court rendered a joint judgment in all these
cases on June 6, 1980. First Assistant Fiscal
Conrado R. Fabular, one of the counsels of the
Republic of the Philippines was furnished a
copy of said decision on June 17, 1980. The
Solicitor General was also furnished copy of
said decision which the latter claims to have
received on July 8, 1980.
The counsels for Republic of the Philippines are
First Assistant Fiscal Conrado R. Fabular,
District Land Officer Jose Roasol and the
Solicitor General.
It is a rule that when a party is represented by
several counsels, notice to one of them is
sufficient and such notice binds such party. In
this case, Fiscal Fabular was notified of the
decision on June 17, 1980 and during the thirty
(30) day period allowed him to appeal which
expired on July 17, 1980, he failed to do so.
The contention of the Solicitor General that he
received notice of said judgment on July 8,
1980 and that he filed his notice of appeal on
July 25, 1980, does not resurrect the right of
Republic of the Philippines to appeal said
judgment which was already lost when Fiscal
Fabular or any of Republic's counsels failed to
do so within thirty (30) days from June 17,
1980, the date of receipt of said decision by
Fiscal Fabular which expired on July 17, 1980.
After the latter date the Republic of the
Philippines foreclosed its right to appeal. 2
Hence, this petition wherein petitioners allege that the aforesaid
order of said respondent judge should be set aside because it
was issued in excess of jurisdiction, in grave abuse of discretion,
and in violation of applicable jurisprudence.
Pending consideration of this petition, on March 23, 1981, this
Court issued a restraining order as prayed for in the petition to
restrain said respondent judge, any officers or agents
representing any person or persons acting upon his orders, place
or stead from taking any further proceedings in LRC Nos. N- 60
and N-170.
The petition is impressed with merit. By express provision of law,
the Solicitor General is the counsel of the government in all land
registration cases and related proceedings. 3 He formally entered
his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forest Development. In his notice of appearance, he
made it clear that he is the counsel for the government of the
aforesaid land registration cases and only notices, orders,
resolutions and decisions served on him will bind the government.
He also made it clear that while the provincial fiscal acknowledged
that he was authorized to appear in this case and should
therefore, be served with notices, orders, resolutions, decisions
and processes, the Solicitor General retained the supervision and
control over him such that it is he alone who can approve the
withdrawal of the decision, non-appearance and other actions to
protect the interest of the government.
In Republic vs. Polo 4 where the issue is Identical to the issue
presented in this case, this Court held as follows:
We hold that the thirty-day period should be
counted from the date when the Solicitor
General received a copy of the decision
because the service of the decision upon the
city fiscal did not operate as a service upon the
Solicitor General.
It should be clarified that, although the Solicitor
General requested the city fiscal to represent
him in the trial court, he nevertheless, made his
own separate appearance as counsel for the
State. In that "notice of appearance," he
expressly requested that he should be served in
Manila with "all notices of hearings, orders,
resolutions, decisions and other processes" and
that such service is distinct from the service of
notices and other papers on the city fiscal.
The Solicitor General also indicated in his
"notice of appearance" that he retains
supervision and control of the representation in
this case and has to approve withdrawal of the
case, non-appeal, or other actions which
appear to compromise the interest of the
Government and that "only notices of orders,
resolutions and decisions served on him will
bind" the Government.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, it is obvious that, strictly speaking,
the city fiscal did not directly represent the
Government. He was merely a surrogate of the
Solicitor General whose office, as the law office
of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, is the entity that is empowered to
represent the Government in all land
registration and related proceedings. 5
The notices of appeal in the eleven (11) registration cases appear
to have been filed within the original reglementary period while the
corresponding records on appeal were filed within the period of
the extension requested to file record on appeal. Thus, as the
Solicitor General related, he received a copy of the decision on
July 8, 1980. He filed the notices of appeal on July 29, 1980. On
the same date, he filed a motion requesting for thirty (30) days
extension of time to file record on appeal from August 8, 1980, or
up to September 7, 1980 within which to file the record on appeal.
On September 5, 1980, or within the first extension requested, the
Solicitor General filed another motion dated September 3, 1980
for further extension of time to file record on appeal for thirty (30)
days from September 7, 1980 within which to submit the said
record on appeal. Before the expiration of the second extension or
on September 26, and 29, 1980, the corresponding records on
appeal were filed with the court in said cases.
The reglementary period cannot be counted from receipt of the
copy of the decision by the Asst. Fiscal Conrado R. Fabular in
June 7, 1980 since, as above-stated, Fiscal Fabular was not the
counsel of record but only a surrogate of the Solicitor General in
the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of
the respondent judge dated September 19, 1980 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent judge or his
successor is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of
petitioners. The restraining order issued on March 23, 1981 is
hereby lifted. The Court makes no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151068 May 21, 2004
BENITO C. SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS R. ROMAQUIN, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Br. 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by AKLAN
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR HON. LOURDES QUIMPO-
MAYOR, HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, and JODEL B.
RENTILLO,respondents.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67252 denying due course and
dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Benito Cortez
Salazar, on the ground that he served a copy of his petition on the
respondent People of the Philippines, through the Provincial
Prosecutor, and not through the Office of the Solicitor General;
and, the resolution of the appellate court denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
The Antecedents
On May 12, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan filed an
Information in the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, charging
the petitioner with murder. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 8:30 o’clock in the morning of April 26,
2001, in Barangay Dumaguit, Municipality of New
Washington, Province of Aklan, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun,
with treachery and use of superior strength, with intent to
kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one RAYMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, hitting the latter
on the different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death. Xeroxed copy of the Post-Mortem
Examination is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made
an integral part of this information.
By reason of the unlawful acts of the accused, the family
of the victim suffered P100,000.00 actual damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The Provincial Prosecutor recommended no bail in this case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 6002.
Barely three hours after filing the Information, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest in the said case alleging, inter alia, that:
There is an urgent need for the issuance of Warrant of
Arrest against the accused as the lives of some people
are in danger considering that the motive is political and
with the election day on May 14, 2001, there is an urgent
need to protect the public from anymore bloodshed and
as wrongly or intentionally design by the accused, if the
motive is infidelity, to protect the life of her wife, Noli
Marie Salazar, who is residing on the same address in
Dumaguit, New Washington, Aklan.3
On May 12, 2001, Executive Judge Sheila Martelino-Cortes
issued an Order granting the motion.4 On the same day, the trial
court issued a warrant for the petitioner’s arrest.5 However, the
petitioner was nowhere to be found, and as such, the police
officers failed to serve the warrant on him. The case was later
raffled to Branch 2 of the court, presided by Judge Tomas R.
Romaquin.
On May 15, 2001, the petitioner received a copy of the Joint
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor finding probable cause
for murder against him which formed the basis for the filing of the
Information.
On May 16, 2001, the petitioner filed in the RTC an Urgent Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and to Lift Warrant of Arrest. The
petitioner alleged, inter alia, that he had filed a petition for review
of the Joint Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor finding
probable cause for murder against him in the Office of the
Secretary of Justice. The petitioner cited Rule 112, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court and the ruling of this Court in Roberts, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals,6 to support his plea for the suspension of the
proceedings. To justify his motion for the lifting of the warrant of
arrest issued against him, the petitioner alleged, thus:
... He further submits that this motion is in consonance with his
constitutional presumption of innocence and will not prejudice
anyone. Accused is a person of good moral standing, a member
of the bar and an officer of the court, a noted businessman, and
had served the Philippine government until April 2001, as
President of the Food Terminal, Inc. He is innocent of the charges
in this case and has no intention whatsoever to avoid the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court and the proceedings in this
case.7
The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion, contending that
the filing of a petition for review of the investigating prosecutor’s
resolution in the Office of the Secretary of Justice was not a
justification for the suspension of the enforcement of the warrant
of arrest issued by the court. The petitioner, the Provincial
Prosecutor averred, cannot rely on the ruling in Roberts, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals8 because the facts therein are different from
those in the case before the court. Moreover, the Provincial
Prosecutor averred, the petitioner had not yet been arrested;
hence, the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
The prosecution asserted that the petitioner’s filing of a motion for
the lifting of the warrant of arrest against him did not constitute a
voluntary appearance before the court.
The petitioner filed on May 29, 2001 a supplement to his motion,
alleging that since Executive Judge Martelino-Cortes was the aunt
of the wife of the deceased, it was illegal for her to have acted on
the provincial prosecutor’s motion for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him, and to thereafter grant the motion and issue
the said warrant. Hence, according to the petitioner, the Executive
Judge was disqualified to act on the motion, viz:
4. Finally, the Honorable Executive Judge is related
within the fifth degree of consanguinity to Vivien Y.
Bontogon-Rodriguez, wife of the deceased, Raymundo
Rodriguez. Vivien is the daughter of her first cousin
Angela Yap-Bontogon, and therefore, a niece of the
Honorable Executive Judge. In view of this relationship,
the Honorable Executive Judge is disqualified to sit in
any case or in any proceedings involving the death of
Raymundo Rodriguez. She should have refused to act
on Prosecutor Mayor’s motion for issuance of the
warrants of arrest.9
The provincial prosecutor disagreed with the petitioner and
averred in his reply to the supplement to the petition that the
petitioner failed to prove the relationship of the Executive Judge to
the wife of the deceased. He asserted that the matter of the
inhibition of the judge should have been addressed to her, and
that even with her disqualification, the warrant of arrest and the
order she issued were valid.
On August 10, 2001, Judge Tomas R. Romaquin, who presided
over Branch 2 of the court, issued an Order granting the
petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings. However, the
petitioner’s motion to lift warrant of arrest was denied. The
petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the order, but
the court denied the same. The trial court declared that the issues
raised by the petitioner had become moot and academic since the
Secretary of Justice had denied his petition for review and
affirmed the joint resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding
probable cause against him.
The petitioner forthwith filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals on November 5, 2001, assailing the orders of the RTC.
However, the petitioner failed to submit proof of service of copies
of his petition on the respondent RTC, the People of the
Philippines and Jodel Rentillo.
On November 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
denying due course and dismissing the petition, on the ground
that the petitioner failed to show proof of service of the petition on
the respondents, as mandated by Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to
Rules 65 and 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended.
On November 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals received a
Manifestation and Submission which the petitioner filed through
registered mail on November 5, 2001 alleging that, on the latter
date, copies of the petition were served on the respondents
through registered mail, as evidenced by the affidavit of service
executed by Danilo B. Elardo, the messenger in the law office of
the petitioner’s counsel. The petitioner also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that he had substantially complied with the requirements
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On December 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
denying the said motion, on the ground that the petitioner failed to
serve a copy of his petition on the Solicitor General, the counsel
of the respondent People of the Philippines.
The Issues
In his petition at bar, the petitioner contends that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED
FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
SECTION 1 OF RULE 6, AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 46,
OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS WELL AS SECTION
35(1), CHAPTER 12, TITLE III OF BOOK IV OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHEN IT
IGNORED THE IMPORTANT AND SUBSTANTIVE
LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER, AND
REFUSED TO SET ASIDE ITS DISMISSAL OF THE
"PETITION FOR CERTIORARI" PETITIONER FILED
EVEN AFTER IT FOUND THAT A COPY OF THAT
SERVICE OF THE "PETITION FOR CERTIORARI" HAD
BEEN MADE UPON THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
WHO HAD REPRESENTED THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN THE PROCEEDINGS WHICH GAVE
RISE TO THE PETITION.10
The petitioner avers that the exclusive authority of the Solicitor
General to represent the People of the Philippines in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court under Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code,
comes into being only when the appellate court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the case which, in turn, takes place only
upon the service on the State of the order or resolution of the
appellate court indicating its initial action on the petition, or by the
respondent’s voluntary submission to such jurisdiction as provided
for in Rule 46, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how
acquired.— The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its
order or resolution indicating its initial action on the
petition or by his voluntary submission to such
jurisdiction.
Before then, the petitioner submits, service of a copy of his
petition on the respondent People of the Philippines may be
effected through the Provincial Prosecutor who appeared as its
counsel in the trial court, conformably to Rule 13, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
The Court’s Ruling
The contention of the petitioner is devoid of merit.
The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and
represent the respondent People of the Philippines is confined
only to the proceedings before the trial court. This is based on
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides, viz:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial
Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the
prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not
available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon
actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of
the case to the Regional Trial Court.
The pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or
resolutions of the trial court are served on the People of the
Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor. However, in
appeals before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c) on
automatic appeal; or, (d) in special civil actions where the People
of the Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the Office of
the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of
the Philippines. This is provided for in Section 35 (1) Chapter 12,
Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, viz:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.
A copy of the petition in such action must be served on the People
of the Philippines as mandated by Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court, through the Office of the Solicitor General. 11 The service
of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through
the Provincial Prosecutor would be inefficacious. The petitioner’s
failure to have a copy of his petition served on the respondent,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in the last
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Unless and
until copies of the petition are duly served on the respondent, the
appellate court has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
The purpose of the service of a copy of the petition on the
respondent in an original action in the appellate court prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent is to
apprise the latter of the filing of the petition and the averments
contained therein and, thus, enable the respondent to file any
appropriate pleading thereon even before the appellate court can
act on the said petition, or to file his comment thereon if so
ordered by the appellate court. But if a copy of the petition is
served on the Provincial Prosecutor who is not authorized to
represent the People of the Philippines in the appellate court, any
pleading filed by the said Prosecutor for and in behalf of the
People of the Philippines is unauthorized, and may be expunged
from the records.
On the petitioner’s plea that we brush aside his procedural lapse
and order the appellate court to take cognizance of and act on his
petition for certiorari, we are not persuaded. As gleaned from his
petitions in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, the petitioner
contends that the assailed order of Executive Judge Martelino-
Cortes dated May 12, 2001 and the warrant of arrest issued by
her are null and void, considering that she was the aunt of Vivien
Bontogon-Rodriguez, the wife of the deceased Raymundo
Rodriguez, as Angela (Urgino) Yap-Bontogon, Vivien Rodriguez’
mother, is her first cousin. Thus, the Executive Judge was
disqualified to take cognizance of Criminal Case No. 6002 and to
grant the motion of the provincial prosecutor. However, we have
reviewed the pleadings of the parties in the Court of Appeals and
in this Court, and find that the petitioner failed to adduce
preponderant evidence in the trial court to prove the said
relationship of the Executive Judge to the deceased and the
latter’s wife, let alone append in his petition in the Court of
Appeals and in this Court, documents to prove such relationship.
The barefaced fact that the provincial prosecutor or the private
prosecutor did not specifically and categorically deny the
petitioner’s allegations in his supplement to his motion for
reconsideration, that the Executive Judge and the deceased and
his wife are related, did not relieve the petitioner of his burden to
prove the same with the requisite quantum of evidence. Such
allegation should have been proven during the hearing of the
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and to lift the warrant
of arrest, and of his supplement to the said motion for
reconsideration.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED due

course for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA,
ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS,
REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA
GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA
GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S.
GOMEZ (now deceased) represented by his wife, LETICIA Y.
GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB,
JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN
Y. GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN
Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan)
Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G.
PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land
Registration Commission, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30
August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for
registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11
and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were among those
involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abran,1 wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of
Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez,
inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died
intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y.
Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by
virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The
lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan
Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lots—Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved
by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed
to allocate the lots among themselves.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2
On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 expressly
stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and
directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated
in the decision of 5 August 1981.
On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the
Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
(now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that
Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by
homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under
the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5
August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside.
Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition
was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration
proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be
implemented because it had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25
March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and
the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of
decrees.4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion
was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of
merit. 5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this
Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6
On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered
judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and stating, among others,
thus—
In resumé, prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the respondent Judge has still the
power and control over the decision he
rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land
in a registration or cadastral case takes place
only after the expiration of the one-year period
after entry of the final decree of registration
(Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs.
Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil.
113). When the respondent Judge amended his
decision after the report of the respondent
officials of the Land Registration office had
shown that homestead patents had already
been issued on some of the lots, respondents
cannot be faulted because land already granted
by homestead patent can no longer be the
subject of another registration (Manalo vs.
Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We
resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March 1987. 8Hence, this
recourse.
Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more
important issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not
respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25
March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5
August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether or not
the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and
Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land
Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issue the
decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981
and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their
duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law
of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Abran, supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to
Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they
could not have been acquired by holders of homestead titles as
against petitioners herein.
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had
become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that
said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened,
reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section
30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which
provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the
court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and
certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be
read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the
decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being
the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in
his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981
and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without
jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions,
the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the
entry of the final decree of registration.9 This Court, in several
decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.10
Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez
should have been submitted to the court a quobefore its decision
became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be
pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report
or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the
reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision. As said
by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees
of registration must be stated in convenient
form for transcription upon the certificate of title
and must contain an accurate technical
description of the land. This requires technical
men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only
portions of a parcel of land included in an
application are ordered registered and that the
limits of such portions can only be roughly
indicated in the decision of the court. In such
cases amendments of the plans and sometimes
additional surveys become necessary before
the final decree can be entered. That can hardly
be done by the court itself; the law very wisely
charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office with such duties
(Administrative Code, section 177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render
reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision
becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not
beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in
the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and
with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in
the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation
to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to
refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials
of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the
act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not
proceedings ." 13 "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private
lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were
The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show
by petitioners. that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way
back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and
"D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16
Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found
in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra,
where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of
M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over the the lower court is sustained, the homestead title holders may still
lots in question, were not public lands. A reading of the pertinent vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for
and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary
however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may be resorted
not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have
Gomez. The decision states: the ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the
allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of
land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and
With respect to the portions of land covered by that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in
homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion
possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his
that such certificates are sufficient to prevent predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be
the title to such portion from going to appellants
established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
aforesaid, for they carry with them without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon
preponderating evidence that the respective
the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to
homesteaders held adverse possession of such reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to
portions, dating back to 1919 or
be the true owner thereof." 17
1920, accordingly to the evidence, and the said
appellants failed to object to that possession in
time. (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-
appellants.
Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed
from, it is hereby ordered that the lots
respectively claimed by Agustin V. SO ORDERED.
Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and Julian
Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with the
exclusion of the portions covered by the
homestead certificates ... . (Emphasis
supplied.) 14
The report of respondent land registration officials states that the
holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in
the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December
1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from those
adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under
the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the
subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in
cadastral proceeding. 15
G.R. No. 160657 June 30, 2004
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
NIMFA P. ASENSI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Respondent Nimfa Asensi was ordered dismissed by petitioner
Civil Service Commission ("CSC") from her position as Revenue
District Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Lucena City.
Her dismissal came after an investigation revealed that she had
falsified entries in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) relative to her
educational background.1 Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the CSC
Resolution ordering her dismissal.
On 9 July 2003, the Court of Appeals’ Fourth Division
promulgated a D E C I S I O N2 holding that the dismissal of
respondent was not warranted, and setting aside the assailed
resolution of the CSC.3 Acting upon the CSC’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied it in a R E S O L U T
I O N dated 29 October 2003.
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") received a copy of the
29 October 2003 Resolution on 7 November 2003. Having until 22
November 2003 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court, on 21 November 2003, the OSG filed a motion for
extension until 22 December 2003 to file the petition for
review.4 This Court granted the OSG’s motion in
a Resolution dated 9 December 2003.5
Apparently, the CSC remained in the dark as to the legal moves
made by its counsel, the OSG. On 25 November 2003, the CSC,
filed a Manifestation To File Its Own Petition for
Review.6 This Manifestation was signed by three lawyers from the
Office of Legal Affairs of the CSC.7
On 27 November 2003, the CSC, through its Office of Legal
Affairs, filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65,
assailing the 9 July 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which
it received on 30 July 2003.8 In a Resolution dated 13 January
2004, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, directed
the respondent to file her comment thereon.9
The OSG was surprised by the twin legal moves taken by the
CSC without their consent and participation. On 22 December
2003, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that
considering the CSC’s manifested intention to file its own petition,
the OSG had no recourse but to withdraw its 21 November
2003 Motion for Extension and allow the CSC to actively pursue
its own case.10 We required the CSC to comment on the OSG’s
Manifestation and Motion.11 In their Comment filed on 27 April
2004, the CSC asserted that Under Section 16 (3), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, its
Office for Legal Affairs was authorized to represent the CSC
"before any Court or tribunal".12
In the meantime, respondent filed her Comment on the Petition for
Certiorari.13 She prayed for the immediate dismissal of the
petition, as the proper remedy for the CSC was not the special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, but a petition for review
under Rule 45. Moreover, since the period for filing a petition for
review had already elapsed, according to the respondent, the
CSC had deliberately resorted to the special civil action.
We agree with the respondent. So, we dismiss the petition. There
is little need to elaborate on the reasons, which are after all,
elementary in procedural law. The special civil action for certiorari
lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.14 The grave abuse
of discretion imputed to the Court of Appeals was its finding that
respondent was not guilty of the charges against her, a charge
that if true, would only constitute an error in law. Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure
or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As
long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely
appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari. 15 Neither is
certiorari warranted if there is another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 The remedy to the
adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is a petition
for review under Rule 45.17
The OSG, counsel of record for the CSC, well understood the
proper procedure for appeal, and undertook the initiatory step for
a petition for review by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to file
such petition.18 It is unclear if the CSC had known about the
OSG’s Motion, though the answer to that question does not really
matter to the disposition of this case. The Court granted the
OSG’s Motion, allowing the OSG to file its Petition until 22
December 2003. The OSG, being the designated legal
representative of the Government and its instrumentalities, has a
long history of association with this Court and acquired in the
process an awesome wealth of experience in appellate practice.
Had the CSC relied on its counsel’s expertise, it would have been
spared of the needless burden of salvaging its petition from
outright dismissal and, of course, the inevitable ignominy which
such dismissal entails.
Instead, the CSC, using its own lawyers, filed the wrong mode of
review. The CSC’s assertion as to the capacity of its Office of
Legal Affairs to appear before this Court is of dubious legal basis.
A similar issue was raised, albeit pertaining to the legal officers of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the Court’s R E S O L U T I O
N in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory.19 The BIR therein asserted that on the basis of
Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, its legal officers were
allowed to institute civil and criminal actions and proceedings in
behalf of the government. The Court disagreed, saying that it is
the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear
for the government in appellate proceedings,20 it being the
principal law officer and legal defender of the government.21 The
Court also cited with approval, the exception enunciated in Orbos
v. Civil Service Commission22 which is that the government office
may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or
representative only if it is adversely affected by the contrary
position taken by the OSG. Herein, there is no indication that the
OSG has adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC; hence,
appearance by the CSC on its own behalf would not be
warranted.
Yet, even if the CSC Office of Legal Affairs were allowed to
represent the CSC in this petition, still the dismissal of the case
would still be warranted in view of the erroneous mode by which
the assailed Court of Appeals D E C I S I O N was elevated.
Moreover, the OSG, which had been given until 22 December
2003 to file the petition for review, did not file any such petition,
interposing instead the Manifestation and
Motion.23 This Manifestation, of course, did not stay the period for
filing the petition for review. Thus, such period has already
elapsed for good. On account of the lapse of the period, there is
no need for us to pass upon the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion.
We are hardly sympathetic to the CSC’s predicament. Not only
did it supply the noose by which it was hung, it also tied the knot.
Had the CSC been in consultation with its counsel of record, the
petition could have been taken without incident. Instead, without
seeking the heed of sager minds, it went off by its lonesome into
high noon, ill-equipped. There is nothing left to do but pronounce
the demise of the case.
The Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123780 December 17, 1999
In Re: Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and
Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting
Decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court
Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group,
Philippine Army, under the incumbency of COLONEL PEDRO
R. CABUAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
DR. POTENCIANO MALVAR, PRIMEX CORPORATION,
MARCELINO LOPEZ, as representative of the Heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez, respondents, HEIRS OF ELINO ADIA,
represented by JULIANA ADIA, intervernors.
PURISIMA, J.:
Originally filed on February 27, 1996 by Colonel Pedro R.
Cabuay, Jr., Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group
of the Philippine Army, was the petition at bar "seeking for
clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final
and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Honorable
Supreme Court" in G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. No. 110900.
On January 20, 1997, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition
for lack of any justiciable issue raised.
Confident in the righteousness and merits of their cause, the
petitioners and intervenors sent in a motion for reconsideration
inviting this Court's attention to the injustice that may result from
the two (2) conflicting decisions, especially due to the impending
enforcement of a writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial
Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City) in Civil Case No. 463-
A, implementing the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The
said writ was directed against the buildings and structures of the
Intelligence and Security Group (ISG) of the Philippine Army, the
Group Commander of which initiated the present recourse. The
ISG derived the right to occupy a portion of a subject parcel of
land and to erect thereon extensive military structures, from the
Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia, the Intervenors,
whose right to subject property was duly recognized in G.R. No.
110900.
On the other hand, the respondents insist on the validity of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 196256, registered in the names
of respondents' predecessors-in-interest (Lopezes), placing
reliance on the pronouncements of this Court in G.R. No. 90380.
Acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, this Court
reconsidered its Resolution of January 20, 1997, after finding the
existence of a real and existing conflict of interest between the
respondents, whose claim to the title of subject property is
anchored on the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380, and the
petitioner and intervenors, whose claim is based on the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27602 and this Court's
Resolution in G.R. No. 110900. Thus, in the interest of justice, this
Court resolved to give due course to the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner and intervenors and ordered the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda within thirty (30)
days from notice.
G.R. No. 90380
Records on hand disclose that, on April 15, 1981 in Civil Case No.
24873, entitled "Ambrosio Aguilar vs. Heirs of Fernando
Gorospe, et al.", the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Rizal, Branch
161, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Ambrosio Aguilar,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
1. Declaring the plaintiff as
the true and rightful owner of
the land in question;
2. Declaring null and void ab
initio Original Certificate of
Title No. 637 and all
subsequent transfer
certificates of title emanating
therefrom;
3. Dismissing the intervention
of the Director of Lands; and
4. Ordering defendants to pay
to plaintiff, jointly and
severally: (a) P20,000.00 as
moral damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, and (c) the
costs of suit.
The counterclaims are hereby dismissed.
The said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the
appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07475, but on August 1,
1989, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed in its entirety the said
decision in Civil Case 24873. After the motion for reconsideration
of Eduardo V. Santos' (one of the defendants) was denied in the
Order dated October 5, 1989, he elevated the case to this Court
on a petition for review, under G.R. No. 90380, entitled "Eduardo
V. Santos, petitioner versus The Hon. Court of Appeals and
Ambrocio Aguilar, Respondents."
On September 13, 1990, this Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, which decision became final and executory per
entry of judgment dated November 29, 1990. In the said Decision,
the Court2 resolved the conflicting claims between the petitioner,
Eduardo V. Santos, and the private respondent, Ambrocio Aguilar,
thus:
Petitioner's arguments hinge on whether or not
the parcel of land in dispute was brought within
the operation of the Land Registration Act. We
rule that to never did. Accordingly, finding the
assigned errors to be without merit, the petition
must fail.
In reaffirming the declaration of nullity of OCT
No. 537 we rely on the Director of Lands
vs. Basilio Abache, et al. where it was ruled that
land is not affected by operations under the
torrens system unless there has been an
application to register it, and registration has
been made pursuant to such application. In that
case, while the lot in question was awarded in a
cadastral proceeding to movant therein, it was
registered and a certificate of title was issued in
the names of persons who never established
their right over the same, i.e., they neither
claimed the lot nor appeared at the trial. We
affirmed the lower court's declaration of nullity
of the certificate of title and the order for the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name
of movant.
In the case at bar, not only do the records
indicate that Gorospe, petitioner's predecessor-
in-interest, had not filed any application for the
parcel of land in question; also, no evidence
was submitted that the registration in Gorospe's
name was made pursuant to a satisfactory
showing of his compliance with the application
requirements for homestead under the Public
Land Act, i.e., that he introduced improvements
thereon and cultivated the same, etc.
Compare Gorospe's record with the mountain of
evidence in favor of private respondent. To
support his predecessor-in-interest's claim of
ownership, private respondent presented the
following documents:
1) The original tracing cloth of
Plan H-138612 [Exhibits "A-
3"] which was surveyed for
Hermogenes Lopez;
2) The microfilm of Plan H-
138612 also bearing the
corresponding Accession No.
103378 [Exhibit "D-1"];
3) The Whiteprint of Plan H-
138612 also bearing the
same Accession No. 103378
[Exhibit "D"1];
4) The inventory Book
prepared in the year 1951 by
the Bureau of Lands [Exhibit
"XX"] containing a list of
salvaged plans [among]
which [was] . . . Plan H-
138612 as surveyed by
Hermogenes Lopez;
5) The Index Card of the
Bureau of Lands [Exhibit "XX-
2"] showing the Plan H-
138612 is one of the
salvaged plans and the same
is in the name of
Hermogenes Lopez;
6) The consolidated Plan AP-
6450 [Exhibit "X"] prepared by
the Bureau of Lands which
shows that Hermogenes
Lopez is the owner of the
parcel of land covered by
Plan H-138612;
7) Plans H-147383, Psu-
146727 and F-1543 which all
show that Hermogenes Lopez
is one of the boundary
owners.
In addition to the foregoing public documents,
also presented were persons connected with
the Bureau of Lands whose testimonies proved
that Hermogenes Lopez filed a homestead
application bearing No. H-138612 covering the
land in question and that the same was duly
processed by the Bureau of Lands after he had
complied with all the requirements of the law.
Said patent was duly approved and a
corresponding homestead patent was issued in
his favor.
What irretrievably turns the tide against the
petitioner is the finding that there exist in the
records of the Register of Deeds of Pasig two
original certificates of title bearing No. 537
based on a free patent and covering two
different lots situated in two different
municipalities of Rizal, and registered in the
names of two different persons. The first was
for a parcel of land in Pililla, Rizal, registered in
the name of a certain Simeon Alejar on
December 23, 1993, the validity and regularity
of which has never been questioned. The
second is the questionable document registered
on August 31, 1944 in the name of Fernando
Gorospe. The petition is silent on this aspect;
petitioner does not even attempt to refute this.
On the contrary, while petitioner avers that OCT
No. 537 proceeds from a homestead
application, the spurious title on its face
indicates that it was based on a free patent.
It is thus only proper, based on the foregoing,
that We reaffirm the declaration that OCT No.
537 is null and void ab initio and the land
covered thereby has never having been brought
under the operation of the torrens system. This
being the case, Sec. 38 of the Land
Registration Act cannot be invoked in this
instance. Parenthetically, it may be stated that
Our rulings in Baranda v. Baranda and Albienda
v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner to
support his contention do not apply to the facts
of the case at bar because both involve
situations where the original registration was
valid and Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act
was squarely applicable.
G.R. No. 110900
It appears that during the pendency of the case aforementioned,
or on September 10, 1985, to be exact, the Heirs of Elino Adia
(herein intervenors) lodged a protest against Plan H-138612 of
Hermogenes Lopez involving the same property in dispute, before
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB), which land protest was
decided by the LMB in favor of the protestants, Heirs of Elino
Adia. In its Decision of December 10, 1990, the LMB summarized
the antecedents facts and circumstances leading to the institution
of the present case as follows:
The Heirs of Elino Adia filed a protest against
Plan H-138162 of Hermogenes Lopez covering
a piece of land (equivalent to Lot 7546, Cad. 29,
Extension, Antipolo Cadastre), situated at
Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal.
On the September 10 and October 28, 1985
hearing in the case, only protestants appeared.
Upon request of counsel, an ex-
parte investigation was conducted with
protestants submitting testimonial and
documentary evidence. After protestants rested
their case, one Francisco R. Cruz filed an
intervention alleging that he has been deprived
of his chance to be heard and present his
evidence.
In the interest of justice, another investigation
was conducted on April 10 and September 29,
1989. This time, Francisco Cruz was required to
present the original or certified copy of the
Quitclaim or Transfer of Rights dated May 18,
1981, allegedly executed by Hermogenes
Lopez in his favor. To obviate lengthy
investigation, the parties agreed to submit their
respective memorandum in support of their
claims.
Apart from testimonial and documentary
evidence presented during the hearing of
October 28, 1985, the Heirs of Elino Adia
submitted their memorandum contending that
from 1929 up to July 1943, Elino Adia occupied
and cultivated continuously, adversely, publicly
and peacefully the disputed land; that he
introduced considerable improvements thereon;
that after Elino's death, possession of the land
was taken over by Emiliano and Juliana Adia;
that the land was declared for taxation purposes
and the taxes thereon paid; and that they
therefore prayed for the approval of the final
proof on the homestead application of the Heirs
of Elino Adia. In support thereof, they submitted
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "C-1", "H-1", "N", "O" and
"Q".
Upon the other hand, applicants-respondents
Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez averred that
ownership of the land contested by protestant
had been the subject of exhaustive judicial
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal; that ownership of the land in question by
deceased Hermogenes Lopez had already
been duly established and hence, protestants
claim has no legal and factual bases, as it had
been finally settled judicially; and that the
assignment of rights in favor of Francisco Cruz
is only a simulation, because at the time of the
alleged sale Hermogenes Lopez was no longer
the owner of the disputed land having been
previously conveyed to Ambrocio Aguilar in
1959. Respondent prayed that the protest be
denied and the intervention, dismissed.
Intervenor Francisco Cruz, for his part, asserted
that on May 18, 1991, the land in question and
all its improvements were transferred to him in
"Quitclaim and assignment of Rights"; that he
tried to locate the records of the homestead
application of Hermogenes Lopez but to no
avail; that after a fruitless search for the said
application, he finally requested on November
27, 1982 for inclusion of Hermogenes Lopez,
now Francisco Cruz in the list of survey
claimants in the Antipolo Cadastre; that as
successor-in-interest of the deceased
Hermogenes Lopez, he has a valid and better
claim to the land in controversy; that all the
unpleasant incidents attendant to the case
hindered him in constructing his house on the
land; and, that he prayed for the award to him of
the land in question.
On July 7, 1989, the Overlooking Storeowners
and Planters Association, Inc. also intervened
and interposed their protest against the Plan H-
138612 of Hermogenes Lopez. It averred that
respondent Hermogenes Lopez is not entitled to
a homestead patent because neither he nor his
legal heirs resided or occupied that land in
question.
As things are, there are four (4) parties claiming
to be entitled to acquire the land in question.
The issue, therefore, here is who among them
deserves to be given the preference rights to
apply for the controverted land.
After examining and evaluating the respective position and
evidence of the parties, the LMB found for and decided in favor of
the Adias, in its Order dated December 10, 1990, the decretal
portion of which ratiocinated and ruled:
WHEREFORE, Plan H-138612 appearing in the
records of this Office in the name of the heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez is hereby as it is, corrected
and amended, in that it shall thereafter be
considered to be recorded in the name of Elino
Adia, now his heirs represented by Emiliano
and Juliana Adia. The claims of Hermogenes
Lopez and all those claiming under him,
Francisco R. Cruz and the Overlooking
Storeowners and Planters Association, Inc., are
hereby dismissed and this case dropped from
the records. The homestead application of Elino
Adia, covering plan H-138612 shall be
reconstituted or in lieu thereof, a new
application may be filed by the Heirs of Elino
Adia, which shall thereafter be given due
course. Within a period of sixty (60) days from
the receipt of this order, the O.S. & P.A. shall
vacate and remove whatever improvements
they have in the premises.
What is decisively clear and of utmost significance to note, is that
in its said decision, the LMB found that subject land was still a
public land, at the time; concluding and ruling thus:
The land in dispute is definitely a PUBLIC
LAND and as such, the authority to administer
and dispose of it is entrusted to Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The
authority to administer public land carries with it
such powers as GRANTING, APPROVING,
REJECTING and REINSTATING public land
applications, which are all administrative and
executive in nature.
Their motion of reconsideration having been denied by the LMB
on January 29, 1992, the Lopezes brought a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 27602; which petition was, however,
dismissed in the Decision, dated February 26, 1993, of the Court
of Appeals, with the following findings of facts, disquisition and
conclusion, to wit:
In the investigation, the Heirs of Elino Adia
presented six (6) witnesses, namely, Bartolome
Sierra, Maria Sierra, Francisco Tandoc,
Fortunato Suarez, Juliana Adia and Emiliano
Adia. Their testimony substantially consist of
the following:
Bartolome Sierra declared that he was among
the first settlers in Barrio Macatubang in 1922
followed by Elino Adia; his house was more or
less 200 meters away from Adia's house; he is
a son of Luciana Sierra whose land adjoins the
land of Elino Adia, which was (Sierras) (sic)
surveyed under Plan F-46231; Adia's (sic)
planted palay and fruit trees on his land and
used portions thereof for carabao fattening;
some of the trees planted by Adia are still
existing; Juliana and Emiliano are the children
of spouses Elino Adia and Lucia San Gabriel;
and no other person claimed Adia" land and he
does not know Hermogenes Lopez.
Mariano Suarez declared that he was born in
barangay dela Paz and was the Barangay
Captain thereof in 1972 and 1981; he knows
Emiliano and Juliana whose father (Elino) died
during the Japanese occupation; after Elino's
death, Emiliano and Juliana continued with the
occupation and cultivation of the land; he does
not know Hermogenes Lopez; and different
kinds of trees, such as mango, duhat and
bamboo, some of which are still visible, were
planted by them but most of the trees were
used for firewood by the people.
Juliana Adia said that her parents Elino Adia
and Lucia Adia are now both dead; they
occupied the land in question, cleared the same
and planted fruit trees thereon; her father Elino
Adia applied for homestead and the survey of null and void ab-initio. The land was also in (sic) defendants
the land was approved in 1939; after the death the subject of a protest filed with the Bureau of (Aguilar)
of her parents, her uncle Ambrocio Narvasa Lands which was dismissed. Further, the land dated July
helped in the cultivation of the land; and her was involved in Tanodbayan Case No. 830220 31, 1959
possession up to the present has been entitled "Juliana Adia versus Rodolfo Paelmo", null and
peaceful, unmolested by anybody, including which was resolved in favor of Paelmo, the void.
Fermin Lopez and Hermogenes Lopez. This Regional Land Director in region IV of the
testimony was corroborated by Francisco defunct Bureau of Lands, as follows: 2. Ordering
Tandoc, Fortunata Suarez and Emiliano Adia. the
In support of their claim, protestants submitted The document presented by defendants
Exhibits "A" to "Q" inclusive; Among these is a respondent Rodolfo Paelmo to vacate
certified Tracing Cloth of Plan-H-138612 consisting of the approved the land in
SURVEYED FOR ELINO ADIA with accession plan in the name of question or
No. 103378 issued by Engineer Felipe R. Hermogenes Lopez, described
Valenzuela, Chief Technical Services Section, predecessor-in-interest of in the
Bureau of Lands dated July 31, 1981, Ambrocio Aguilar, plaintiff in claim.
containing an area of 19.48888 (sic) hectares Civil Case No. 24873,
situated at de la Paz, Antipolo, Rizal, with the strongly belies complainants
certification stating, to wit: 3.
father in the amended survey Declaring
plan. the plaintiff
This is to certify that this the true
tracing cloth plan is true copy All the foregoing considered, and
of Homestead Application No. there exists no probable absolute
138612 which was approved cause to justify further owners of
on February 7, 1939, as inquiring into the charge. said parcel
verified from the microfilm on of land.
file in this office. This certified
plan is issued upon request of WHEREFORE, let this
Engr. Ricardo O. Vasquez complaint be as the same Pending appeal of the aforementioned decision,
who paid the verification fee hereby DISMISSED. a writ of demolition was issued against the
of P5.00 under O.R. No. squatters on the land. The Heirs of Elino Adia in
9915364 dated July 31, 1981. The ownership of the land in question appears behalf of all squatters filed a petition
(Exhibit A) also to have been clearly established in Civil for certiorari with the appellate court to nullify
Case No. 463-3 filed by Hermogenes Lopez the judgment and the order of demolition and a
and the title and possession over the said restraining order was issued. The Heirs of
Plan H-138612 was subject of Civil Case No. Hermogenes Lopez filed their comment and on
5957 in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal parcel of land were ordered reconveyed to the
heirs of Hermogenes Lopez in the February 3, July 15, 1985 the petition for certiorari was
entitled, "Hermogenes Lopez versus Fernando denied and the restraining order was dissolved.
Gorospe" wherein former Director of Lands 1985 decision whose dispositove portions
reads: For said reason, the Heirs of Hermogenes
Nicanor Jorge testified in court. The Heirs of Lopez pray for the dismissal of the protest and
Hermogenes Lopez maintain that the ownership the intervention.
of the land in question had already been settled In view of the foregoing
in judicial proceedings before the Court of First consideration Judgment is
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 24873 hereby rendered: It will be noted that except for the instant
entitled "Ambrosio Aguilar versus Beatriz de investigation, the case has never been formally
Zuzuarregui, et al., for declaration of investigated by this Office in order to determine
1. the issue of who has the right to the land in
inexistence and/or nullity of Free Patent, Declaring
Original Certificate of Title and Transfer dispute. The protest filed by the Heirs of Elino
the Deed of Adia with the Region IV was never formally
Certificate of Title. Here, Ambrosio Aguilar, Absolute
plaintiff, was declared as the true and rightful investigated The case ended in a Tanodbayan
Sale Exhibit case filed against Director Paelmo, who in his
owner of the land in question and OCT No. 573 "C" in favor
it the name of Fernando Gorospe was declared answer to the complaint of Adia solely relied on
of
the decision of the court in Civil Case No.
24873, portion of which is quoted hereunder.
The document presented by
the respondent Rodolfo
Paelmo consisting of the
approved plan in the name of
Hermogenes Lopez,
predecessor-in-interest of
Ambrocio Aguilar, plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 24873,
strongly belies complainants
ascertion that respondent
Rodolfo Paelmo used the
approved plan of
complainant's father in the
amended survey.
It is worth mentioning also that Plan H-13812
(sic) was also involved in Civil Case No. 5957,
entitled "Hermogenes Lopez versus Fernando
Gorospe" wherein Director of Lands Nicanor
Jorge testified to the effect that the applicant in
the application covering Plan H-138612 was
Elino Adia for whom it was surveyed. Portions
of his direct testimony are quoted as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q — Mr. Jorge, I see that this
particular area involved is
bounded on the East by Elino
Adia with a reading
underneath which may be
quoted as Homestead
Application No. 13812 (sic).
Will you please tell us, Mr.
Director what that mean?
A — It shows that Elino Adia
is a homesteader and his
homestead is numbered as
Homestead Application No.
13812 (sic).
Q — As far as your office is
concerned, who is the
homestead applicant per
Homestead Application No.
13812 (sic) as appearing in
the eastern boundary of the
document Exhibit "8".
A — On the basis of this plan
it shows that Elino Adia is a
homesteader whose
homestead is Homestead
Application No. 13812 (sic). .
..
Q — Exhibit "39" what would
you say? Would you say that
Hermogenes Lopez is the
person for whom this survey
Plan H-13812 (sic) was
made?
A — It appears that when this
plan Exhibit "39" was certified
to, the name appearing on
the original plan was not
HERMOGENES LOPEZ that
is why there appeared here
AS PREPARED FOR.
Q — Now, you would like to
convey to the effect that per
document Exhibit "39",
Hermogenes Lopez was NOT
THE PERSON for whom it
was originally survey.
A — That is true.
Q — You said that is true,
what do you mean?
A — I mean that when this
was certified by our Chief
Records Division that plan
appearing here was not
surveyed in the name of
Hermogenes Lopez.
On July 24, 1990, the Chief of Surveys Division
issued a memorandum involving Plan H-13816
(sic) addressed to the Chief, Legal Division
which read:
Please be informed that the
only records that we have of
the Plan H-13812 (sic) in the
name of Hermogenes Lopez
containing an area of 19.4888
hectares situated in Dela Paz,
Antipolo as surveyed on
November 10, 1938 by
surveyor Benito Guevarra
under the supervision of
Public Lands Surveyor
Conrado Santillan.
The then Chief of Technical
Services of the National
Capital Region Engr. Felipe
R. Venezuela issued a
certified copy of H-13812 (sic)
allegedly as verified in the
microfilm. We had however
changed the survey, claimant
from Hermogenes Lopez as
appearing in our record of
survey plan to Elino Adia.. . . .
As records are now three responsible Bureau of
Lands Officials certified and testified in court in
connection with Plan H-13812 (sic). Nicanor
Jorge, in Civil Case No. 5957, declared that
Elino Adia is a Homesteader and his
homestead is numbered as Homestead
Application No. 13812 (sic). On the other hand,
the Chief, Technical Services Section, Surveys
Division, Region IV, certified that the tracing
cloth plan marked as Exhibit "A" was a Plan H-
13812 (sic) surveyed for Elino Adia with
Accession No. 103378. This was contradicted
by Engr. Privadi Dalire, Chief, Bureau who
certified that Plan H-13812 (sic) is in the name
of Hermogenes Lopez and that Engr. Felipe
Venezuela changed the survey claimant from
Hermogenes Lopez as appearing in our records
of survey plan to Elino Adia.
From all the foregoing, it is obvious that crucial
and vital point to be established is the real and
true owner of Plan H-13812 (sic). Portions of
the testimony of Director Nicanor Jorge is
quoted hereunder:
Q — Now, advance Planters Association, Inc. opted to submit their
there any opinion respective memorandum or position paper in
seems to why they support of their respective claims.
be an have such
incompatibil incompatibil On July 22, 1993, the Lopezes filed with this Court a petition for
ity between ity in the review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 110900. The Court
Exhibit "D" preparation resolved to "DENY" the petition for failure to comply with legal
and "39" of this plan. requirements. In the pertinent Resolution, dated August 11, 1993,
with the Unless, this Court further stated:
original there has
plan been
pertaining some mane Besides, even if the petitioners complied with
to Psu- uvering, the aforesaid requirement, the petition would
106705, well could still be denied as no reversible error was
which was not tell committed by the appellate court. (emphasis
surveyed what had supplied)
for Pablo happened.
and Luz Petitioner's motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 110900 was
Ventura Clearly, the authenticity of the survey records of denied with finality on November 3, 1993. On December 6, 1993,
claim who this Office is at issue as to the real owner of the denial became final and executory.
appears to Plan H-13812 (sic) that is, whether it is Elino
be in the Adia or Hermogenes Lopez. The Heirs of Elino On November 25, 1994 and in accordance with the LMB decision
western Adia submitted Exhibit "B", copy of Psu-106705 dated 10 December 1990 (as affirmed by this Court) which,
boundary of in the name of Pablo and Luz Ventura involving among others, directed that "the homestead application of Elino
the area parcels of land in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Adia, covering plan H-138612 shall be reconstituted or
involved Rizal, surveyed on October 26, 1938 and in lieu thereof a new application may be filed by the Heirs of Elino
under approved on May 10, 1939 showing that Elino Adia," the heirs of Elino Adia filed eight (8) new applications
Exhibit "39" Adia is the boundary owner at the eastern covering the 19.4888 hectares earlier declared as public land.
and "D". In portion of the land covered thereby, Exhibit "G"
this is a copy of TCT No. 44541 of Robert Philipps
document it On December 14, 1994, eight (8) land patents in the name of
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on "Heirs of Elino Adia", represented by Juliana Adia, were issued by
shows that May 26, 1956 and originally registered on
Elino Adia the DENR's OIC-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
August 2, 1939 as OCT No. 1254 in the name Officer of Rizal (under the authority of the President) and on
Homestead of Pablo Ventura showing that Elino Adia is the
Application January 26, 1995, Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819 to P-
boundary owner at the eastern portion thereof 826 were issued in the name of the Heirs of Elino Adia,
No. 13812 as of August 2, 1939. Exhibit "E" is a copy of
(sic). So represented by Juliana Adia.
TCT No. 8362 of the La Colina Development
there are Corporation issued by the Register of Deeds of
three Rizal and originally registered on August 2, Other incidents/cases
seemingly 1939 as OCT No. 1254 in the name of Pablo
incompatibl Ventura showing that the property covered During the pendency of both cases, several incidents/cases were
e sheets. thereby is bounded on the eastern portion by H- initiated by the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, tending to further
Will you 13812 (sic) of Elino Adia as of August 2, 1939. muddle the situation.
please tell
us, if you
know how Of all the parties thereto, only the heirs of Elino While Civil Case No. 24873 (Aguilar vs. Gorospe, et al. for
can this Adia was able to submit substantial and annulment of OCT No. 536 — which was later elevated as G.R.
happened? material testimonial and documentary evidence No. 90380) was pending before the Court of Appeals, the
in substantiation of their claims. Instead of Lopezes brought an action for cancellation executed by
availing of a formal proceedings, the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar. The case was
A — Well, I Hermogenes Lopez and Intervenors Francisco docketed as Civil Case No. 463-A before Branch 71 of the Rizal
could not Cruz and the Overlooking Storeowners and Regional Trial Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City). 3 On
February 5, 1985, the said Regional Trial Court came out with a
decision declaring the deed of absolute sale in litigation null and
void, and disposing thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations
Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale Exhibit "C" in
favor of defendants dated
July 31, 1959 null and
void ab-initio;
2. Ordering defendants to
vacate the land in question or
described in the complaint
(par. 4 thereof) and
immediately restore the
possession thereof to the
plaintiffs;
3. Declaring the plaintiffs the
true and Absolute owners of
the said parcel of land; and
4. To pay the attorney's fees
to plaintiffs in the sum of
P5,000.00 and the costs of
this action.
Aguilar's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court
on March 14, 1985 and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals on August 18,
1987 in CA G.R. No. 06242. 4
In view of the aforecited judgment of Branch 71 of the Regional
Trial Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City), the Lopezes
presented an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion" before the same court,
praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 72439 (in the name of
Eduardo V. Santos) and for the issuance of a new certificate of
title in their favor. The said motion was granted by the same
Regional Trial Court on April 19, 1985 and TCT No. N-104422
was then issued in favor of the Lopezes.
On May 8, 1995, Eduardo V. Santos filed with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06096, a petition for
nullification of the portion of the aforesaid decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 463-A adjudging the Lopezes as "true
and absolute" owners of the land in question. Santos also sought
the nullification of TCT No. N-104422 issued in the name of the
Lopezes.
On December 23, 1985, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision in CA G.R. SP No. 06096,5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that portion of
the decision of 5 February
1985 adjudging defendants
Lopezes as the true and
absolute owners of the land in
question as null and void;
2. Declaring the order of 19
April 1985 to be null and void;
3. Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Marikina
Branch, to cancel TCT No. N-
10442 issued in the names of
defendants Lopezes and
restoring TCT No. 72439 in
the name of plaintiff and the
notice of lis pendens thereon;
4. Ordering defendants
Lopezes to surrender to the
Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Marikina Branch, within five
(5) days from entry of
judgment, TCT No. N-10442
for cancellation. Should they
fail to do so, the Register of
Deeds, Marikina Branch, may
proceed to cancel the original
and owner's duplicate of the
title without further notice;
5. Denying plaintiff's prayer to
be placed in possession of
the property in question; and,
6. Dismissing the complaint
as against defendants
spouses Aguilar.
Their set-back notwithstanding, the Lopezes once again
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo,
Rizal6 (now Antipolo City) a Motion to Order Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72439 (in the name of
Eduardo Santos) and Issuance of New Certificate of
Title, in lieu thereof. On January 28, 1991, the said
Regional Trial Court issued an order granting subject
motion and, on February 8, 1991 the Register of Deeds
in Marikina issued TCT No. 196256 in the name of the
Lopezes.
On June 18, 1991, the Lopezes filed another petition purportedly
under Section 108, PD 1529, with Branch 71 of the Regional Trial
Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City). This time, they
(Lopezes) prayed for, among others, for the cancellation of OCT
No. 5377 "and all Transfer Certificates of Title originating
therefrom" and that TCT No. 196256, which was previously issued
to them, be "indicated as an Original Certificate of Title with a
corresponding number assigned therefor."
On June 24, 1991, Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, (now Antipolo City) granted the said petition and
ordered the Register of Deeds in Marikina, Rizal to cancel OCT
No. 537 and to indicate TCT No. 196256 as OCT and to further:
. . . indicate that it was, as herein quoted:
"issued by virtue of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 90380 on September 13,
1990 (in relation to the Decision in Civil Case
No. 463-A as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 06242 and the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 81092) which declared that
Hermogenes Lopez, now his heirs, as the true
and rightful owner by virtue of Homestead
Patent Application No. 138612 and the
corresponding homestead patent issued in his
favor in June, 1939, after complying with the
requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act.
On July 31, 1991, the same Register of Deeds inscribed the said
Order on TCT No. 196256 and on October 10, 1991, it cancelled
TCT No. 196256 and in its place, issued thirteen (13) transfer
certificates of title, TCT No. 207990 — 208000, 208002 and
208358, all in the names of Marcelino Lopez, Felisa Lopez, Zoilo
Lopez and Leonardo Lopez.
On September 10, 1992, the Lopezes and Primex Corporation,
which firm had bought a portion of the property in dispute,8 filed
anew with Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo, Rizal
(now Antipolo City) a "Petition for Entry/Amendment of Certificate
of Title", praying that the same Register of Deeds be ordered,
among others, to "transcribe Homestead Patent No. 54072 and
issue the corresponding Original Certificate of Title in the name of
Hermogenes Lopez, assigning to it the certification number,
volume, page and such other numbers as he may deem
appropriate, and to consider the same registered as of August 31,
1944, the date when Free Patent No. 54072 covering the same
property was originally registered."
The said petition was granted by the same Regional Trial Court in
its Order dated October 8, 1992.
Then on January 4, 1994, even after the Resolution in G.R. No.
110900 (upholding the LMB decision in favor of the Adias) had
become final and executory, the Lopezes interposed an appeal
from the same LMB decision to the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources but their appeal was dismissed on January 5,
1995. Their (Lopezes) motion for reconsideration was denied in
the Order, dated December 4, 1995, but at the same time, the
parties were advised "to pursue their respective claims before the
courts and under pertinent laws."
On February 21, 1995, Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court in
Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City) issued a writ of execution
against the structures/properties of the ISG, Philippine Army,
represented by the group commander, the herein petitioner,
standing on a portion of the land in question. In the meantime, or
on April 20, 1995, Marcelino Lopez sold a portion of the land
under controversy to the herein co-respondent, Dr. Potenciano
Malvar.
On October 6, 1995, the Lopezes presented a motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution to demolish the structures
belonging to the Philippine Army. The said incident prompted the
Group Commander of the ISG to file a Comment with the same
Regional Trial Court, drawing the attention of the Presiding Judge
of the said court to the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 110900.
Despite such step taken by the Group Commander of ISG,
however, an aliaswrit of execution issued on December 11, 1995,
just the same.
It was the persistent threat of demolition of their communications
facilities which prompted the Group Commander of the
Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army, purchaser of a
portion of 1,650 square meters, more or less, of subject tract of
land, from the heirs of Elino Adia, to bring the present petition
which, as heretofore mentioned, the Court resolved to consider
and treat as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In resolving the petition under consideration, this Court is thus,
called upon to resolve the respective claims of the parties, over
subject parcel of land, in light of the decision and disposition of
this Court in G.R. Nos. 90380 and 110900.
It is beyond cavil that subject property was a disposable and
alienable public land at the time the principal parties asserted their
respective claim thereover. In the initial determination of who has
a better and superior right to acquire the said public land,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, governs. Thereunder, the Director of Lands, subject to the
authority of the Secretary of Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources) is vested with direct control
of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of
concession or disposition and management of lands of the public
domain, and his decision as to questions of fact is conclusive,
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources) (Section 4, C.A. 141; De los Santos vs. Rodriguez, 22
SCRA 451). It is decisively not proper for the courts to interfere
with the administration of public lands by the Director of Lands
(now the Lands Management Bureau (LMB).
In De Buyser vs. Director of Lands, 121 SCRA 13 (1983), this
Court held:
Since the land is admittedly property of public
dominions, its disposition falls under the
exclusive supervision and control of the Bureau
of Lands.
And in Francisco vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 121 SCRA 380, it was reiterated that the law has
vested in the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately in the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources) the administration and
disposition of public lands. Consequently, the decision of finding
by the Director of Lands, as approved by the now Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, upon a question of fact is
conclusive and not subject to review by the courts in the absence
of any showing that such decision or finding is tainted with fraud
or mistake. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals and this
Court, in G.R. No. 110900, had passed upon the nature of subject
parcel of land and upheld the disposition by the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of the Adias; ratiocinating
and finding as follows:
To begin with, there is the presumption juris
tantum that all the lands form part of the public
domain. The land subject of H-138612 is public
land not only because no certificate of title has
yet been issued to petitioners but also because
they have presented no positive and convincing
evidence of private ownership over the same
except the claim that they are the heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez.
Now, while it is true that Hermogenes Lopez
had filed an application for a Homestead Patent
over the subject land, and his application was
determined as superior to the claims of other
persons by the court, such determination in the
cases that finally reached the Supreme Court
did not bind the government, particularly the
Lands Management Bureau. (sic) The cases
cited by petitioners as having declared the
subject land as private property because the
homestead patent thereon was confirmed by
the Supreme Court did not LMB for two
reasons: (1) it was not, and was not impleaded
as, a party to said cases, and (2) the cases
were in personam in nature, in which while the
subject thereof was a right over a piece of land,
the controversy was in essence between
different persons asserting conflicting claims.
The subject property being part of the public
domain is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Lands Management Bureau. (sic) It is not only
mandated by the Public Land Act but the
Supreme Court itself has declared it to be so in
Cerdon vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 198,
200, to wit:
The function of administering
and disposing of lands of the
public domain in the manner
authorized by law, is not
entrusted to the courts but to
executive officials. Originally,
it was the Director of the
Bureau of Lands primarily,
and ultimately, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who had this
function. Section 4 of the
Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141)
declared that subject to the
control of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce,
 the Director of Lands shall
have direct executive control
of the survey, classification,
lease, sale or any other form
of concession or disposition
and management of the lands
of the public domain, and his
decisions as to questions of
fact shall be conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and
Commerce. Thus, initially
within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands were such questions
as the adjudication of the
conflicting claims of rival
claimants to public land, or
cases involving disposition
and alienation of public
lands. (184 SCRA, pp. 200-
201)
As above adverted to, in its decision of January 5, 1995, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
found that the actual occupants of the land under controversy
were the spouses Elino and Lucia Adia, who possessed the same
from 1929 to 1943. Thereafter, their heirs took over and continued
possession thereof. Such a factual finding arrived at by the DENR
is conclusive upon the courts. Conformably, in G.R. No. 110900
(Marcelino Lopez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) this Court
affirmed the ruling of the Lands Management Bureau in favor of
the Adias.
In Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Dans, 4 SCRA 1035
(1962), the Court held:
It should be remembered that the disposition of
public lands is lodged exclusively in the Director
of Lands subject only to the control of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
. . . Consequent to the power and discretion
granted the Director of Lands as set forth
above, the courts have no power to review,
reverse or modify his decisions, as approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources . . .
So also, in Vda. De Calibo vs. Ballesteros, 15 SCRA 37, it was
ruled that the Director of Lands, who is the officer charged with
carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Law, has control
over the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of
concession or disposition and management of the public lands,
and his finding and decision as to questions of fact, when
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), is
conclusive.
In view of the foregoing ratiocination, disquisition and findings, this
Court is of the irresistible conclusion, and so holds, that the ruling
in G.R. No. 110900 prevails over the disposition in G.R. No.
90380. It bears stressing that under Public Land Act, the
disposition of public lands is exclusively vested in the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) subject only to the control of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Since
what has been litigated upon is a disposable public land, under
the power of administration and disposition of the Bureau of
Lands (now the Lands Management Bureau), subject only to the
control of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources; it is not proper to deprive the Lands
Management Bureau which "absorbed the functions and powers
of the Bureau of Lands, abolished by Executive Order No. 131,
except those line functions and powers thereof which are
transmitted to the regional field offices", of its direct executive
control over the disposition and management of the public
domain, any more that it can divest the State of its title and confer
it to another (Espinosa vs. Makalintal, 79 Phil 134).
In Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. DAT, G.R. No. L-29534, February
28, 1977, this Court, citing Pinero vs. Director of Lands [57 SCRA
386], ruled:
. . . even a torrens title is not a bar to the power
of the Director of Lands to investigate an
allegation of fraud that could have led to the
issuance of a free patent. As stated by him: "It
is to the public interest that one who succeeds
in fraudulently acquiring a title to a public land
should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and
the State should, therefore, have an ever
existing authority, thru its duly authorized
officers, to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of any such title . . ..
Although G.R. No. 90380 (Eduardo Santos vs. CA, et al.) was
decided ahead of G.R. No 110900, the Court holds that the latter
case was not barred by the doctrine of "law of the case."
The doctrine of "law of the case" means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the Court
[Mangoma vs. CA, 241 SCRA 21]. In short, the doctrine applies
only when a case is before a Court a second time after a ruling by
an appellate court (Kilosbayan, Inc., vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540).
In the two cases (G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. No. 110900) under
consideration, the subject matter is the same but there a no
identity of parties and causes of action. As found by the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP 27602, the Adias and the Lands
Management Bureau were not parties in what eventually became
G.R. No. 90380. What is more, the said case merely involved the
issue of possession, on which the claim of the Lopezes was
anchored or based on their alleged homestead application over
subject public land. On the other hand, the case of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) which became G.R. 110900, squarely
put in issue the validity of the alleged homestead patent of the
Lopezes, on the ground that its issuance was tainted with fraud. It
is thus succinctly clear that the ruling in G.R. No. 90380 cannot be
the "law of the case" as to bar G.R. No. 110900.
The Orders issued on June 24, 1991 and October 8, 1992,
respectively, by Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo,
Rizal (now Antipolo City) are void for lack of any legal basis.
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective,
the Court upholds the disposition of subject public land, now
covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819, P-820, P-821,
P-822, P-823, P-824, P-825 and P-826, in favor of the Heirs of
Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia, by the Lands
Management Bureau and approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and the President.
WHEREFORE,
1. The validity of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819, P-820,
P-821, P-822, P-823, P-824, P-825 and P-826, registered in the
name of Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia, is
UPHELD;
2. All certificates of title issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez
and succesors-in-interest, and all titles originating from any of the
certificates of title so issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez,
including Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 207990, 207991,
207992, 207993, 207994, 207995, 207996, 207997, 207998,
207999, 208000, 208001, 208002, 208358, over subject tract of
land, as well as TCT No. 216876 issued to Primex Corporation,
and any other title derived therefrom are declared null and void.
3. The Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez and all persons claiming any
right under them, including but not limited to Primex Corporation,
and Dr. Potenciano Malvar, as well as all members of the
Overlooking Storeowners and Planters' Association, Inc., their
assignees and successors-in-interest, are ordered to remove all
their improvements on the areas covered by the Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. P-819 to P-826 aforementioned and to
surrender possession thereof to their Heirs of Elino Adia,
represented by Juliana Adia; and

5. The writ of demolition, issued by Branch 71 of the Regional

Trial Court, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 463-A, is SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION
ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her husband,
JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted by her
husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO
ALBANO, and PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees.
RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as Judge of Sala I,
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court
in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., 1 ruling that: (1) a party
in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral
court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his
successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of the
land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under
Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any
"party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and
personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been
served with process therein but had not appeared nor
answered); 2 and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not
subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
execution of judgments, 3since the decree "is to exist forever."
These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years
later, 4 "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against
the original oppositors in a land registration case and their
representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time
before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed
out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a
decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et
al. 5 to the following effect:
We fail to understand the arguments of the
appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration
case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except
by another proceeding to enforce the judgment.
... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules
refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose
is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceedings to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land
Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the
winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration
case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal. ...
... There is nothing in the law that limits the
period within which the court may order or issue
a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not
need to be asserted or enforced against the
adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge
and of the Land Registration Commission;
failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefor
has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or
the person in whom the land is ordered to be
registered.
The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot 6 some
months later and took occasion to stress that in Marcelo v.
Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so far as to hold
that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration
proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the
successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise,
issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a
complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective."
The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of
these established jurisprudential precepts to the undisputed facts.
In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a decision was rendered
on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No.
9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. 7One of the oppositors was
Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. 8 However, for
reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or
prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants, the decree of
registration did not issue except until after the lapse of fourteen
(14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after
twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that
an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina
Aquino's name. 9
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been
handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the
children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants Eufemia
Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same Court of
First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino —
appellees Angel Albano, et al. 10 Said appellants alleged that they,
and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of Lot
9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they
prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the
defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that
a new title be made out in their names. 11
It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached
upon a 4-square-meter portion of an adjoining lot, No. 9822,
belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court,
a complaint in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery
thereof.
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the
Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring intervenor
Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina
Aquino's title. 12
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the
recorded facts. The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to
blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for
recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by
the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina
Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding
the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken
part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment
of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and
therefore "conclusive upon the title to the thing." 13 It was a
judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world,
inclusive of persons not parties thereto, 14 and particularly upon
those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the
appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had intervened
therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity. 15
July 31, 1941, marked Exh. A for
petitioners-claimants;
2. That movants-oppositors Eufemia Villanueva
de Barroga and Saturnina Vda. de Pacada are
the children-heirs and successors of Ruperta
Pascual, who was an oppositor in Lot No. 9821,
Cad. Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and
who was defaulted in said cadastral case, and
decided on July 31, 1941 as follows:
the Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta
Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which
resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of
the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ
of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right
thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who
were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-
interest. 20 The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in
prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer
be allowed to continue doing so.

The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken
therefrom to the Court of appeals by Barroga and Padaca having
been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and this Court
having thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal
on certiorari. Thereafter, at the instance of defendants Angel
Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the
judgment on December 6, 1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca -
moved to quash the writ of execution, on December 22, 1973.
They argued that there was nothing to execute since the verdict
was simply one of dismiss of the complaint; they moreover
invoked Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. 16 But here the
matter apparently ended. No further development anent this case
appears in the record.
What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the
Cadastral Court promulgated an Order in Case No. 44, LRC Rec.
No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of
possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ
of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga
and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel
Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of
Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued" under
date of September 23, 1975. 17 Their argument was that as
possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected
therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.
The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the
parties and their counsel stipulated upon the following facts, to
wit:
1. That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano,
Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion Albano, Rosalia
Albano, Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr.,
Charito Albano, Federico Albano, Jr. and
Pedrito Albano are the children-heirs and
successors of Delfina Aquino, who is the
registered owner of Lot No. 9821 covered by
O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree was issued on
Lote No. 9821 — Por WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia
incomparecencia injustificada Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and Saturnina Villanueva Vda. de
de la opositora Ruperta Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo dated
Pascual, se desestima su August 8, 1975, September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are
contestacion. Se adjudica AFFIRMED, as being in accord with the facts and the law. This
este lote No. 9821, con las decision is immediately executory, and no motion for extension of
mejoras en el existentes, en time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
nombre de Delfina Q. Aquino,
filipina, major de edad, viuda
y residents del municipio de
Lauag de la provincia de
Ilocos Norte.
3. That the heirs of Ruperta Pascual, namely,
Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina
Vda. de Padaca , are in possession of the lot in
question since 1941 up to the present time. 18
The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order
dated September 22, 1975. The Court stated that the writ of
possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable
period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration
decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to
the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero
v. Loot, 19 It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square
meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of
Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ
of possession, which was the appropriate process for the
enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and
Padaca moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing,
they appealed to this Court.
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably
with the established axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of
this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared
to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in
enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the
title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q.
Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants,
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D.
VALISNO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO
CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in
Land Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of
First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for
Registration of Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs. Flordeliza
Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July
2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the
ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio
Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco,
namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all
surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as
follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim
Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan,
Province of Isabela, having an area of Five
Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50)
meters facing the Provincial Road by one
hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the
North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by
Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the
Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno
del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of
Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area
of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250)
square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east
side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at
the North and South; bounded on the north by
Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto
Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and
on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road and
Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-
42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of
land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive
possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as
caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba,
claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a
deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's
favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano,
ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He
subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court
of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent
for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time
resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof.
On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of
Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the
appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978,
reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the
complaint of petitioners on a finding that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the
complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr.
Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from
the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of
the appelles appellant, their respective area and
boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence
of the appellees showing that their property
encroaches, much less covers that of the
property presently occupied by the appellant,
except the self-serving sketch prepared by the
appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse
to give any weight to this piece of evidence
because it was prepared by someone who' has
an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to
his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth
or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona
Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the
appellant has not been successfully Identified
with that described in the complaint, the instant
action should have been dismissed outright, in
view of the provision of Article 434 of the New
Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property
must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness
of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine
enunciated in a long line of decision [sic]
starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil.
343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is
the present occupant of the land since he
purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano
on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-
door apartment in the premises which he lets to
both transients and residents of the locality.
Being the actual possessor of the property, he,
therefore, possesses it with a just title and he
need not show or prove why he is possessing
the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil
Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees
and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly
choose the latter in the matter of Identifying the
property in question because it is a vicinity plan
[Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in
relation not only to the properties adjoining the
same but also with known boundaries and
landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the
appellees' evidence, particularly the description
in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable,
since the area and boundaries of the property
are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-
work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands,
50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment,
one noted authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular
piece of land its boundaries and not the area
 are the main factors to be considered holds true
only when the boundaries given are sufficiently
certain and the Identity of the land proved by
the boundaries clearly indicates that an
erroneous statement concerning the area can
be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial
Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws,
Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts
(1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620,
September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition,
pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by
petitioners before this Court was denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed
before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for
registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing
his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well
as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R,
[Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the
application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent,
however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the
ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the
appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the
opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court
issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's
opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p.
83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the
following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS
HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT
OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES
JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND
REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES
JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO
DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A
LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND
THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN
SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF
THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE
FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY
IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT
CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE
TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF
THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY,
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"]
AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp.
18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August
26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his
brief within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981.
Thus, the case was consider submitted for decision without the
brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to
amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru
counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be
included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe
that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i.e., a motion to
dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly,
granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so,
it is not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a
pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules
contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory
character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the
expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court
in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the
application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to
dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably
shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res
as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had
previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To
have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course
would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same
consideration applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an
answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the
counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the
original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who
becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer
the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to
dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba
opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely,
if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that
petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of
a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it
being unauthorize.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by
petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo,
speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res
judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged
rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not
be set up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were
then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and
Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule
132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of
prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration
or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the
ground of res judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of
petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean
adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will
certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to
be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main
purpose of said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the
application of sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In
support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v.
Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425
and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably
ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining
the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case
when the parties and the property are the same as in the former
case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the
case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment
must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first
and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The
decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the
merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case
under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of
property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner,
Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does
not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One
right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-
ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol.
II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing
so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that
one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the
deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his
and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that
the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same
parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and
Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of
possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise
the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion
reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title.
Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes
of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought
on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration
cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership.
In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other
persons from ownership of the land in question. The only
difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed
against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the
exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the
cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais
v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers
in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as
real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which
is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action,
does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated."
[Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason
Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz
v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v.
Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil.
68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v.
Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of
general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one
of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough
that the court which decided the first case on the merits had
validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a
requisite of res judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up
by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what
useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present
evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when
the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who
had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land
registration court finds that the party against whom the principle
of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the
land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court
sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment
of another court of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and
convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for
registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably
shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a
prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore
be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition,
respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to
remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case
No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their
claim over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in
behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under
consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said
decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the
case between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in
dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be
affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26348 March 30, 1988
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, ANDREA GABRIEL, ISABEL GABRIEL,
ESTER GABRIEL, BENJAMIM GABRIEL, SALUD GABRIEL,
VICTORIA GABRIEL, RIZALINA GABRIEL AND ANDRES
GABRIEL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PETRITA PASCUAL and
RUDYARDO SANTIAGO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse: (a) the
Decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May
31, 1966 in CA-G.R. No. 25418-R affirming the Decision 2 of the
then Court of First Instance of Bataan in Civil Case No. 2283
which dismissed the complaint for recovery of land clue to, laches
and prescription and required complainants herein petitioners) to
surrender their certificates of title, and b) the Resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals dated July 7, 1966 denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court.. the factual
background of this case is as follows:
On April 12, 1909, a survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a
parcel of land located in Barrio Totopiac, Orani, Bataan,
containing an area of 687,360 square meters, more or less, the
survey plan being designated as 1-1 054. This parcel of land was
registered on September 18, 1909, and Original Certificate of Title
No, 46 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan was issued in favor of
Quimson. Subsequently, a cadastral survey was made from
February, 1919 to March, 1920 which resulted in the increase of
the area of the land by 17,053 square meters and the designation
of the land as Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre with an area of
704,413 square meters. After hearing, the Cadastral Court
confirmed the title of Quimson and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
723 was issued in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 46. The
lot was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A with an area of 209,250
square meters for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 760 was
issued, and Lot No. 363-B with an area of 495,163 square meters
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 759 was issued. Lot No.
363-B was subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 787 was issued in his name on July 6,1926.
In December, 1916, a parcel of land located in Barrio
Bagumbayan, Hermoso, Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano
Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742 was prepared and approved by
the Director of Lands, with an area of 2,729,712 square meters.
This plan was subsequently amended because it was found that
certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the name of
Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The
undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so
Plan Psu- 9742 was amended (Plan Psu-9742-Amd) with an area
of 2,436,280 or a reduction of 293,432 square meters. The
Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 issued in the name of
Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained the reduced
area.
A cadastral survey was also made of the Municipality of Hermosa,
Bataan and the land of Potenciano Gabriel, covered by Plan Psu-
9742 Amd. became Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433
square meters, or a further reduction by 339,847 square meters.
No new certificate of title was issued for Cadastral Lot No. 557
showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate of Title No.
1264 subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under
Plan Psu-9742 Amd. Accordingly the partition of the estate of
Potenciano Gabriel by his heirs on August 28, 1947 was based on
plan Psu-9742 Amd. under Original Certificate of Title No. 1264
with an area of 2,436,280 square meters, instead of Lot No. 557
with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square meters.
Petitioners who are the heirs of the late Potenciano Gabriel and
alleged joint co-owners of 1,196 square meters of a fishpond
situated in Hermoso, Bataan by virtue of an agreement of partition
of the estate of Don Potenciano, flied a complaint, Civil Case No.
2283 at the Court of First Instance of Bataan against Petrita
Pascual and Rudyardo Santiago, joint administratrix and
administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-law of Don
Potenciano.
They claim that said land was usurped by the late Eligio Naval
who was also an adjoining owner; that said land was only loaned
to the latter for dike and water control purposes of the latter's
fishpond and that after the death of Don Potenciano on February
17, 1943, private respondents continued to possess, occupy and
use said property and notwithstanding repeated demands refused
to vacate and to return the possession thereof, to the petitioners.
Hence, it was prayed that the defendants, private respondents
herein, be ordered to vacate the premises described in the
complaint and to pay damages (Rollo, pp. 18-20; Record on
Appeal, p. 96). The records show that the portion of 1,196 square
meters sought to be recovered by petitioners is included in Lot
No. 363-B of the Orani Cadastre and in amended plan Psu-9742,
mentioned above, which shall hereafter be referred to as Psu-
9742 Amd. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said portion
always remained in the possession of the late Eligio Naval
because as above stated, it was included in Lot 363, which was
subdivided into Lot 363-A and Lot 363-B. The latter, acquired by
Naval with TCT No. 787 in his name, embraces the portion in
question (Rollo, pp, 22-23).
There appears to be no controversy that aforesaid lot had always
been in the possession of Naval in the concept of owner, as
petitioners' claim that the same was merely loaned to Naval, was
not properly supported by evidence, as found both by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
After trial, the court rendered its decision on August 29, 1958
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the right of the
plaintiffs to the land in question, if any, was lost by prescription,
and that the plaintiff are also guilty of laches in failing to prosecute
their claim within a reasonable time.
Specifically, the dispositive portion of said judgment reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders
judgment:
(1) Dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs;
(2) Ordering the plaintiffs to surrender the
owners' copies of the certificates of title issued
pursuant to the subdivision of Plan Psu-9742-
Amd. to the Register of Deeds for safekeeping
until the plaintiffs could submit a new
subdivision plan based on the technical
description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermoso
Cadastre; and
(3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Balanga, Bataan, August 29, 1958.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 127 -1 28; Rollo, p. 11
3)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in its
Decision promulgated on May 31, 1966, the dispositive portion of
which states:
 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed
with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, pp. 18-
31).
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 7,
1966.
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of December 19, 1966, the petition for review on
certiorari was given due course (Rollo, p. 166). In the notice of
January 5, 1967 (Rollo, p. 169) petitioners were required to file
brief Meanwhile, private respondent Petrita Pascual in a
manifestation and motion dated January 10, 1967 (Rollo, p. 170)
informed this Court that the property in litigation was transferred
by absolute sale to the spouses Morencio Lucio and Conchita
Gandan and she prayed that said spouses be substituted in this
action in her capacity of Petrita Pascual in her capacity as co-
administratrix.
In the resolution of January 23, 1967 (Rollo, p. 1 72), petitioners
were required to comment on aforesaid motion for substitution of
parties. Said comment was filed by the petitioners on February 8,
1967 (Rollo, p. 176) opposing said motion as improper and
praying instead that said parties be joined as additional
respondents. Thus in the resolution of March 7, 1967 (Rollo, p.
184), this court authorized the inclusion of new parties, Florencio
Lucio and Constancio Lucio. Petitioners submitted their Brief
(Rollo, p. 177) on February 9, 1967 while respondents Petrita
Pascual, Florencio Lucio and Constancio Lucio submitted their
Brief on May 2,1967 (Reno, p. 195). For failure to file petitioner's
Reply Brief, the court considered the case submitted for decision
without the Reply Brief on November 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 211).
The grounds relied upon for the petition are as follows:
1. PLAN PSU-9742-AMD. COVERED BY ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1264 WITH AN AREA OF
2,436,280 SQUARE METERS, WHICH AREA WAS REDUCED
BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF ORANI AND FURTHER
REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA OR A
LOSS OF 336,901 SQUARE METERS TO CONFORM WITH
LOT 557 OF THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA
IMPAIRS GRAVELY THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE
REGISTERED OWNER AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH AND
CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, NOTABLY THE
DECISIONS IN THE CASES ENTITLED P.I. VS. ARIAS,
CABALLERO, 34 PHIL. 541.
2. THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE LOWER COURT, AN
ACTION PUBLICIANA OR TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF A
CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND WITHHELD FROM PLAINTIFFS'
POSSESSION, IS IT NOT A GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE TO HAVE THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE REGISTERED PROPERTY
CORRECTED SO AS TO CONFORM TO CADASTRAL LOT
AND, THEREFORE, A COMPOUNDED GRAVE ERROR FOR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO SUSTAIN SUCH
CORRECTION?
3. IS IT NOT THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POSSESSION OF
A REGISTERED OWNER UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE
LAND REGISTRATION ACT ARE IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46 OF ACT NO. 496 AS
AMENDED? (Rollo pp. 8-9).
The main issue in this case is whether or not courts have the
authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous
technical description and make it conform to the correct area.
Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 be made
to conform with the land covered by Cadastral Lot No. 557 which
contains an area very much less than that covered by said title,
the trial court and later the Court of Appeals deprived them of their
property as registered owners. Such act, petitioners insist, would
amount to a reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the
one-year statutory period, or the granting of an entirely new
decree to a land already registered under act 496, now P.D. 1529.
Furthermore, such procedure is tantamount to a collateral attack
on the title.
This contention is untenable.
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of
the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands,
provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of
the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to
deprive a registered owner of his title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin,
43 Phil. 561 [1922]).
In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and
amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude
from the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the
priority of over-lapping or over- lying registered titles. There is
nothing in this proposition which militates against allowing the
court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several
conflicting registered titles shall prevail. This power is necessary
for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the
express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be
considered as within the jurisdiction of the courts in such
proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed that in such
proceedings no final decree or registration was reopened or set
aside (Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 589-590 [1932]).
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court
did not order the reopening of the decree of registration for the
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 in the name
of Potenciano Gabriel. Neither did the lower court decree a new
registration in favor of the estate of Eligio Naval because said
estate has a title that embraces actually the portion in dispute,
although it is also included in the Original Certificate of Title No.
1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower court did was merely
to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan
Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and
technical description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermoso Cadastre and
Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct
technical description thereof. Thus, the respondent appellate court
stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree of registration
for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel
because that title stands and its existence remains unaffected.
The action therefore of the trial court is well within its jurisdiction
(Reno, pp. 40-41).
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the
property of the late Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by
the Hermoso and Orani Cadastre but by the behavior of
Potenciano Gabriel himself, who is the original owner. He did not
take the necessary action to recover said lot during his lifetime but
after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the late
Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued use and
occupation of the same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio
Naval and his successors-in-interest have always been in
possession of said property since that date. As previously stated,
petitioners' claim that such occupation was by virtue of a loan or
accommodation, was not supported by evidence. As held by this
court, title and possession of registered owners, cannot be
defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and
contradicted Sinoan v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both parties
were in occupation of their respective properties within the correct
areas and boundaries sought to be adjusted in this case. More
than that, it was also found that there is no impairment of
substantial right or the deprivation of the title of a registered
owner, sought to be guarded against. The heirs of Potenciano
Gabriel are not deprived of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1264, nor are they unjustly deprived of the
portion in question because on the basis of the correct technical
description, that portion is not a part of their property but a part of
the property of the late Eligio Naval under TCT No. 797. Hence, SO ORDERED.
this Court has held that the Land Registration Act and the
Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions
thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has. More
specifically the decision reads:

... The Land Registration Act as well as the

Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title
in good faith and does not permit its provisions
to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48
Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil.
838). The above- stated Acts do not give
anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof,
a better title than he really and lawfully has. If
he happened to obtain it by mistake or to
secure, to the prejudice of Ms neighbor, more
land than he really owns, with or without bad
faith on his part, the certificate of title, which
may have been issued to him under the
circumstances, may and should be cancelled or
corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31
Phil. 590). This is permitted by section 112 of
Act. No. 496, which is applicable to the
Cadastral Act because it is so provided
expressly by the provisions of Section 11 of the
latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as
stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos,
Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil 361), errors in the
plans of lands sought to be registered in the
registry and reproduced in the certificate of title
issued later, do not annul the decree of
registration on the ground that it is not the plan
but the land itself which is registered in the
registry. ... (Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. pp.
449450 [1938]).

Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for

failing to prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by
laches their right to recover their property. In a similar case, this
Court ruled that failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-
interest to take steps to assert any rights over the disputed land
for 20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause
of action ground of laches (Layno v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
718 [1984]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-66242 August 31, 1984
HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD
L. DIOCTON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SINFORIANO A. MONSANTO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar, and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA,
represented by Tito V. Tizon, respondents.
Mateo Leanda for petitioner.
Tito V. Tizon for private respondent.
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.:
The procedural issue at bar is whether an appeal by a conflicting
claimant to a specific lot of cadastral survey proceedings from the
adverse decision of the regional trial court in favor of another
conflicting claimant may be taken by filing a simple notice of
appeal within the reglementary 15-day period, as provided in the
Interim Rules and Guidelines relative to the implementation of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129),
adopted by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983. Or does
such appeal fall within the exception provided by the same interim
rules for special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, in which
case an appeal must still be filed by the filing of a record on
appeal within a period of 30 days provided for the purpose. The
Court rules that appeals in cadastral proceedings may be taken
by a simple notice of appeal.
The lot involved is Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral
Survey. It is contested by the claimants, petitioners-heirs of
Cornelio Labrada, on one hand, and by respondents-heirs of
Isabel Yboa on the other. Said predecessors-in-interest had filed
their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in June,
1932.
Petitioners thus state their claim to the lot, as follows: "Cornelio
Labrada who had previously deforested the area which is now the
disputed Lot No. 1910, had already been in continuous
possession of said lot for more than forty-three (43) years when
he filed his answer in 1932, or at least from 1894; and that he
continued his possession until 1943 when he died. His son,
Meliton, succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his
demise, Meliton Labrada was succeeded in the possession of
said land until he himself died sometime in 1976; and that
subsequent thereto, possession of the property in issue passed to
Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present are still in possession
thereof, (Decision, p.1 ). None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in
possession of any portion of the questioned lot." 1 Petitioners had
moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct Court
of First Instance of Samar. The conflicting parties presented both
their oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective
claims over the lot. On July 11, 1983, the respondent regional trial
court rendered its decision in favor of respondents-claimants.
Within 2 days from receipt of the adverse decision, petitioners
filed their appeal on August 6, 1983 by filing a notice of appeal
with a prayer that the records be elevated to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, pursuant to the new Interim Rules of Court. Over
a month later, on September 14, 1983, respondents-claimants
filed their motion for the issuance of a decree contending that
petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to
file a record on appeal. Respondent court granted respondents'
motion for the issuance of a decree on the theory that an appeal
taken in a cadastral case involves "multiple appeals," for which
the filing of the record on appeal was required. The decree for the
registration was accordingly ordered by respondent court.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having failed, they have
now filed the petition at bar for the setting aside of respondent
court's questioned orders denying due course to their appeal and
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration on the lot in
question in favor of respondents.
The pertinent provisions of Appellate Procedure on appeals are
contained in sections 18 and 19 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, as follows:
18. Elimination of record on appeal and appeal
bond. — The filing of a record on appeal shall
be dispensed with, except in the cases referred
to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 19 hereof.
No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.
19. Period of Appeal. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases
and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b)
hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or
award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30)
days, a record of appeal being required.
These rules were issued pursuant to the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, particularly section 39 thereof which provides
for a 15-day period within which to take an appeal and expressly
abolished the need of a record on appeal, as follows:
SEC. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take
an appeal. In lieu therefor, the entire original
record shall be transmitted with all the pages
prominently numbered consecutively, together
with an index of the contents thereof.
The appeal sought to be taken in the petition at bar concerning
conflicting claims of the parties to a specific lot clearly falls under
this general rule. Therefore, petitioners' appeal must be given due
course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title were prematurely and baselessly
ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. All that
respondent trial court had to do was to transmit the original record
consisting of the pleadings of the parties and its decision and
orders, which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their
petition at bar as per Annexes "A" to "I" of their petition, 2 together
with the transcripts and exhibits. 3
It must not be lost sight of that the basic objective of this
innovative Rule which dispenses with the filing of a record on
appeal and the filing of an appeal bond was and is to simplify
appellate court procedure by doing away with the tedious and
expensive requirement of reproducing practically the entire
original record of the case in the record on appeal in the trial
court. This old requirement of a record on appeal by itself laid the
appellate procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing
questions of clerical errors and claims of omitted pleadings and
orders which in tum required the filing of an amended record on
appeal. Such record on appeal under the Rules still had to be
printed, mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting many times
in typographical errors 4 and adding needless expense and
additional burden on litigants. Thus, have the legislators and the
Court sought to simplify the rules to assist the parties in obtaining
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every court
case, as well as decongesting judicial dockets.
The exceptions must be strictly construed. The Court provided for
specific exceptions with respect to "appeals in special
proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court,"
wherein multiple appeals at different stages of the case are
allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal refers to:
(a) the allowance or disallowance of a will, (b) determination of the
lawful heirs of a deceased person or their distributive shares in
the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole or in part,
of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf
of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) the settlement of the
accounts of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing in proceedings relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person or the administration of a trustee or guardian;
and (f) the final order or judgment rendered in the case. In these
cases, therefore, since the original record has to remain with the
probate court in connection with the other various pending
matters, a party appealing from a specific order is required to file
the corresponding record on appeal.

This is not the case in cadastral proceedings. Cadastral

proceedings involve contest over specific lots which may be
claimed by parties who have timely filed their respective answers,
failing which the land is declared to belong to the State. In all such
cases of contested lots, records may readily be kept of each lot or
lots so contested by the same parties and the State, and given a
separate sub-number corresponding to each contested lot. Upon
the trial court's rendering of its judgment as to such specific lot(s),
then the original records pertaining to such lot(s) may be readily
elevated, leaving with the lower court the records or pleadings
referring to disputed lots not covered by said court's adjudication.
In this particular cadastral proceeding, as stated by respondent
court itself in its questioned order, there remain only "around 8
contested ones [lots] which have not yet been adjudicated not
counting the 180 lots which were 'archived' by a predecessor of
the presiding judge." 5 This readily shows the lack of any difficulty
to keep separate records for specific lots claimed by conflicting
parties, and elevating only the particular record for the specific lot,
subject of judgment and appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. Dispensing with briefs or

memoranda, judgment is hereby rendered (a) setting aside the
questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal
and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration; (b) annulling
any certificate of title which may have been issued to respondents
pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent court to give due
course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of July 11, 1983 and
to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the records of the
case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan
Cadastral survey, together with the oral and documentary
evidence as hereinabove indicated. No costs.
G.R. No. L-23973 April 29, 1969
CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN VERDAGUER, EMILIO
VILLASIN, ET AL., respondents.
De Mesa and De Mesa for petitioners.
Manuel L. Villamayor for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
A point of jurisdiction as to the power of a court of first instance
sitting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession was
raised and an issue of due process invoked in this petition for the
review of a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a special
civil action for mandamus and certiorari. As will hereafter be made
apparent, neither is sufficiently persuasive to call for a reversal.
We affirm.
The principal question raised in the Court of Appeals according to
the decision sought to be reviewed "is whether as claimed by the
petitioners, 'the respondent Court has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in trying the oft-stated cadastral case for
re-opening and review, on account of its special and limited
jurisdiction, because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 211-G
before it, between the same parties and over the same land,
where the issue of ownership and possession is involved.'" 1
The question was disposed of in the Court of Appeals decision
thus: "Upon careful consideration, we arrived at the conclusion
that said question should be answered in the negative. Inasmuch
as it was the respondent Court, sitting as Cadastral Court, that
handed down the decision sought to be reviewed in the Petition
for Review abovementioned, it is unquestionable that said Court
did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it
entertained said petition for review based upon the ground that
said Court did not have legal authority to award and adjudicate
privately owned lands already covered by Torrens Title. We are
satisfied, under the facts hereinabove mentioned, that the
respondent Court was right in reconsidering and setting aside its
said decision and declaring null and void the decrees as well as
the certificates of title issued in accordance therewith, it appearing
that although given a chance to do so, the herein petitioners had
not presented evidence to show, or had not succeeded in
showing, that Certificate of Title No. 75 issued in favor of Andres
Villasin of Parafina on September 15, 1914 did not include Lot No.
5387. In view hereof, it would appear that the appeal sought to be
taken by the herein petitioners from the aforementioned orders of
the Cadastral Court, even granting that the steps towards that end
were taken within the reglementary period, would not serve any
benefit." 2
Petitioners thus disputed the right of respondents to the
aforementioned lot, but without success. They ought to have
taken the proper steps to appeal; they failed to do so within the
reglementary period. They would then rely on the special civil
action for mandamus and certiorari as a substitute measure,
having lost the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals saw through
their scheme and dismissed their petition.
More specifically, insofar as the issue of the writ of possession is
concerned, the version in the brief of petitioners t follows: "After
the appeal was dismissed the private respondents moved for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession to place them in possession of
the land in controversy. The said Motion was heard on 27 March,
1961 and was, with, undue haste, granted on the same day but a
copy thereof was received by the undersigned only on 28 March
1961, or the following day after it had heard and granted. After
their Motion to reconsider the Order of 27 March 1961, granting
the issuance of a Writ of Possession, was denied in the Order of
27 September 1961, the Trial Court issued such writ. (Actually the
herein petitioners, however, still remain in possession of the land.)
Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was
dismissed by the principal respondent." 3
It is in the light of the above facts thus presented that they would
raise the aforementioned jurisdictional and due process
questions. Their contention, as set forth in their lone assignment
of error is that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring null and
void the aforesaid orders with particular emphasis on the writ of
possession thereafter issued. In their effort to lend substance to
the above allegation, petitioners stressed the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the court of first instance acting as a cadastral court
to issue a writ of possession and the alleged denial of procedural
due process.
As already indicated, their plea is futile and unavailing, running
counter as it does to controlling decisions of this Court. The court
of first instance sitting as a cadastral court was empowered to
issue a writ of possession. Nor was there a failure to accord
petitioners procedural due process.lawphi1.nêt
1. In Abellera v. De Guzman, 4 we left no doubt about the power of
the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession. Thus: "After
hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of
the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ
directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot
award damages to the plaintiff." As a matter of fact, the Abellera
doctrine has its roots in our opinion rendered 22 years earlier in
1928 in Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac. 5 The
language used by Justice Laurel in Corders v. Court of First
Instance of Laguna, 6 a 1939 decision, would, if carefully
analyzed, likewise yield an affirmative answer to the question of
whether or not a cadastral court may issue a writ of possession.
In a recent decision, less than three years ago, where the party
adversely affected did not even bother to assail the legality of an
order of a writ of possession coming from a cadastral court, we
pointed out, in an opinion through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, how
broad and extensive is the scope of such an authority. Thus:
"Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the
order of the cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in
favor of petitioners as well as its enforcement. Under these
circumstances, we hold that the Order, dated March 20, 1962, of
the cadastral court, granting petitioners' motion to compel
respondents to remove their respective houses from the disputed
lot, is valid and enforceable against respondents. In the case
of Marcelo v. Mencias, etc., et al., L-15609, April 29, 1960, 58
O.G. 3349, this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or
authority of the court of first instance, sitting as a land registration
court, to order, as a consequence of the writ of possession issued
by it, the demolition of improvements introduced by the
successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land
registration case." 7 The confidence with which therefore
petitioners asserted such lack of jurisdiction in a cadastral court to
issue a writ of possession is clearly unjustified.
2. The due process question is just as easily disposed of.
Petitioners in their brief would argue thus: "The herein petitioners
had no chance to object to the private respondents' Motion for
Writ of Possession because, as hereinbefore discussed, they
received a copy thereof only on 28 March 1961, or on the
following day that it was heard and granted by the Court on 27
March 1961." 8
In an earlier page of their brief, they did admit, that they had a
motion to reconsider such order of March 27, 1961 which was
denied in an order of September 27 of the same year. Only then,
as admitted by them likewise, did the lower court issue such a writ
of possession. Where then is the denial of due process?
Our ruling in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
Cadiao 9 would dispel any doubt that the answer to the above due
process question must be in the negative. Thus: "While it is true
then that the order of November 2, 1967 was issued ex parte, it is
equally true that whatever objections could have been raised by
petitioner were in fact set forth in its petition to set aside and to
reconsider and were inquired into in a hearing held on January
24, 1968. As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled
doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not
lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing
was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had
the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.'
There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property
without due process where the adverse party was heard on a
motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient
opportunity' for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of
the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision, what 'due
process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it
requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form
being paramount', the conclusion being that the hearing on a
motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due
process."

3. The third point raised by petitioners to the effect that a writ of

possession cannot affect parties who enter the land after the
issuance of a decree of registration is equally devoid of merit. This
is a factual matter, the determination of which was properly within
the cognizance of the Court of Appeals. It should there have been
raised. Apparently, petitioners did not do so. The invocation of this
particular issue at this stage cannot be characterized as other
than a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to impute an aspect of
vulnerability to the decision now on appeal, when in reality there is
none.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of August 28,

1964, dismissing the petition for mandamus and certiorari, is
affirmed. With costs against petitioners.