Case Title HEIRS OF TAPPA versus HEIRS OF BACUD

GR No. 187633
Date April 4, 2016

FACTS
Delfin and Maria Tappa filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession
and Damages (Complaint) against respondents Bacud, Calabarzon and Malupeng over
a piece of land in Cagayan.

Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been
issued an Original Certificate of Title in 1992, by virtue of Free Patent. Delfin allegedly
inherited the lot from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that
both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of
the lot since time immemorial.

In their Answer, respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the
original owner of the lot was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo
and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by
operation of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. Upon the death
of Irene, her share in tum passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose
Bacud.

Bacud claims ownership in his own right as an heir. Calabazaron claimed that he
became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of two Deeds of Sale
executed in his favor by Demetria and Juanita. He remains in possession up to this date.
Malupeng, on the other hand, claims he became the owner of a portion by a sale made
to him by Pantaleon.

Respondents presented a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 signed by Delfin, his
sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta. The affidavit stated that
Genaro originally owned the lot. It further stated that one-half of the property was
owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as his, only for taxation
purposes.

Spouses Tappa argued the Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners but the same was reversed by CA.
 ISSUE
WON the complaint for quieting of title should be granted.
RULING
NO. In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil
Code, which state:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession
of said property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of legal title over Lot by virtue of the free patent and the
certificate of title issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title indicates that
it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree with the CA that at the
time of the application for free patent, Lot had already become private land by virtue
of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence,
Lot had been removed from the coverage of the Public Land Act, which governs public
patent applications.

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects. whatsoever. Private ownership of land-as when there is
a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or
previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land,
because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director
of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in
character and have passed to private ownership.

In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has
been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed.
After the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective
portions of the property and paid real taxes thereon.

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated
from the public domain. At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued
in 1992, Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession,
at least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were also in possession of the
other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated
from the public domain.

Further, records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession
of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since
1963) by respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were
able to obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of
some of its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103
are void not only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently
included respondents' portion of the property.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that
although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on
Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against
Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.

The 1963 Affidavit appears to be valid. It is dated and appears to be executed and
signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary. It states
that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half (l/2) of which is
actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's
claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was
"unsubstantiated."
Case SPOUSES CRISPIN GALANG and CARlOAD GALANG
Title vs.
SPOUSES CONRADO S. REYES AND FE DE KASTRO REYES
G.R. No. G.R. No. 184746
Date August 8, 2012

FACTS:
On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the
Reyeses) filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928
against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (the Galangs) with the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo, Rizal (RTC),docketed as Civil Case No. 97-4560.

In their Complaint,3 the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties that were
separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed
its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by employing
manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek
bed from DENR.

Reyes filed of for the annulment of the OCT against Galang.

RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT No.
P-928 and the reconveyance of the land to the Reyeses.

ISSUE:
WON Reyes was the true owner of the land.
HELD:
Reyes was not able to show evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment
and the new course to claim their right pursuant to Art 461 of the Civil Code. In the
face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been
regularly issued, the evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting.

They admitted that the plan survey was prepared by the geodetic engineer without
conducting an actual survey on the ground and at some point, Reyes admitted
that he was not sure that the property even existed.
The Court decided in favor of the Galangs who had valid and subsisting title to the
property albeit the unsubstantiated testimony of the Reyes. Fraud was not proved.

Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old
course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its
course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the
Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are:
(1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of
course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.

Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course
in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed
shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall
not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
Case Title: GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS INC VS CABRAL
G.R. No. 175542 and 183205
Date: June 5, 2013

FACTS:
Victoria Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in Meycauyan Bulacan
covered by a TCT Certificate. The land was placed under the coverage of PD 27 and
Emancipation Patents were issued to spouses Moraga. Cabral file a complaint before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to cancel the emancipation
patents on the ground that they were obtained through fraud and the properties were
not agricultural lands but were classified as residential, commercial and industrial
ands by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). PARAD denied the
petition. Pending appeal, spouses Moraga subdivided the lot into 3 smaller lots each
with a TCT and sold the properties to Filcon Ready Mixed Inc., which the latter sold
to Green Acres where a new TCT was issued. Thereafter, DARAB rendered judgment
on the appeal of Cabral, ordering the cancellation of the titles in the name of Sps.
Moraga and Filcon for having been illegally acquired. Upon knowledge of the
DARAB decision, Green Acres sent a letter to Filcon reminding the latter of its
warranties under the deed of sale. To which, Filcon claimed a purchaser in good
faith, not knowing any infirmities on the title. Green Acres filed a Petition for
Quieting the Title against Cabral, Sps. Moraga, Filcon, DARAB and the Register of
Deeds of Meycauyan Bulacan. DARAB decision casts a cloud on the titles. The trial
court ruled in favor of Green Acres, dismissed the case and denied the Motion for
Consideration. Pending appeal, DARAB decision became final and executory. Cabral
then filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the DARAB decision but
PARAD denied it, stating that the DARAB decision orders only the cancellation of the
patent and transfer certificate titles issued in favor of the Moragas and Filcon. The
decision did not state anything about directing the cancellation of titles issued in
favor of Green Acres.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DARAB decision may be enforced against Green Acres?
2. Whether or not the DARAB decision in favor of Cabral constitutes a cloud on
Green Acres’ title over the subject properties?

RULING:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may also be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.

1. No, DARAB decision cannot be enforced against Green Acres. The principle
that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. Also, a void title may be a the source of a
valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Green Acres was
considered an innocent purchaser having relied on the certificates of title of
Filcon which were free from any liens and encumbrances. Moreover, Cabral
herself was to blame for her failure to recover the properties. Due to her own
negligence, she failed to annotate a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the
Moragas and Filcon to give notice to future transferees.

2. Yes, DARAB decision constitutes a cloud on the title. The DARAB decision is
apparently valid and effective. However, it is ineffective and unenforceable
against Green Acres because the latter was not properly impleaded in the
DARAB proceedings nor was there any notice of lis pendens annotated on the
title of Filcon so as to serve notice to Green Acres that the subject properties
were under litigation. As such, Green Acres is an innocent purchaser for
value.

Petition granted. TCTs in favor of Green Acres are declared VALID and any cloud
over such titles which may have been created by the Decision dated January 17, 2001
of the DARAB is hereby REMOVED.
Case Title HEIRS OF POCDO V. AVILA
G.R. no. 199146
Date: March 19, 2014

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the CA decision which affirmed the RTC
decision dismissing the petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction declaring that
the disputed property as public land, can only be disposed by the DENR.
Pacifico Pocdo who was later substituted by his heirs upon his death, filed a
complaint to quiet title over the disputed property. The disputed property was not
included in the Certificate of Ancestral Land Claims due to a memorandum which
was issued by the DENR for the adjoining lots of the said property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have no title to the property that would support an
action for quieting of title. Yes.
HELD:
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a
claim of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him
from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land
where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477 of
the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that
the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument,
record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.

In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that
respondents are unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void documents,
namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of Rights. However, the records
reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property,
which forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It
is clear from the facts of the case that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of
Pocdo Pool, were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43,
which remains public land. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse but to dismiss
the case.
Case Title Del Blanco v. IAC
G.R. no. G.R. No. 7269
Date: December 1, 1987

FACTS:

The Pansacola brothers purchased the Island in 1859 as common property and agreed
on how they would share in the benefits to be derived from the Island. On April 11,
1868, they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement so as to include in the
co-ownership of the island the children of their deceased brothers Eustaquio and the
other children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who were committed in the
agreement of February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing
proportion and distribution of the Island among the co-owners.

On January 20, 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of
Cagbalite Island entered into an agreement to partition the Island, supplemented by
another agreement dated April 18, 1908.

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a
special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the
provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract
of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants,
petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive
ownership, estoppel and laches.

Trial Court Denied the Petition of the herein respondent, which was eventually
reversed by the appellate court and thereafter denied the MR of the herein petitioner.
ISSUE:

1)Whether or not there is already a partition of land by the several agreements by the
co-owners.

2) Whether or not an action for partition prescribes

HELD:
1. No. It must be admitted that the word "partition" is not infrequently used both
in popular and technical parlance For purposes of the aforementioned case,
evidently the Court used the word "partition" to refer to the distribution of the
 Cagbalite Island agreed upon by the original owners and in the later
agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent successors-in-interest. There
need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of
indiviso or was sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion
of the co-owned property. The sale of part of a particular lot thus co-owned by
one co-owner was within his right pro-indiviso is valid in its entirety
(Pamplona vs. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775 [1980]) but he may not convey a physical
portion with boundaries of the land owned in common (Mercado vs. Liwanag,
5 SCRA 472 [1962]). Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in
1859. Neither could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of
subdividing the Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered
into by the heirs in 1907 and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in
1868 as agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11,
1868. Any agreement entered into by the parties in 1894 could be no more than
another agreement as to the distribution of the Island among the heirs of the
original co-owners and the preparation of a tentative plan by a practical
surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first paragraph of the 1907
agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to be prepared by
the surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April 18, 1908..

It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must
have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and
exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to
each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The
mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69
of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).

2. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-

heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code,
now Article 497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in
the partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now
Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by lache
Case Title Heirs of Dela Rosa vs. Batongbacal
G.R. no. 179205
Date: July 30, 2014

FACTS:

Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal and Mario
Batongbacal.
Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo received an advance payment from Guillermo
and Mario. As show in the document entitled resibo, the parties agreed that the
amount of Php20,000 as part of the advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery
of the Special Power of Attorney, which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the
subject property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings. Mario and Guillermo made
several demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed upon, but such
demands all went unheeded.

Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for Specific Performance or

Rescission and Damages before the RTC seeking to enforce their Contract to Sell.
They asserted that they have a better right over the subject property and alleged that
the subsequent sale thereof effected by Reynaldo to third parties is void as it was
done in bad faith. In refuting the allegation of Mario and Guillermo in their
complaint, Reynaldo, in his answer, countered that the purported Contract to Sell is
void, because he never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made
to understand that the contract between them was merely an equitable mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether the contract entered into by parties was a Contract to Sell or an Equitable
Mortgage.

HELD:

The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that the instrument was
executed with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property to
the buyer in exchange for the price. Nowhere in the deed is it indicated that the
transfer was merely intended to secure a debt obligation. On the contrary, the
document clearly indicates the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share in the property.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention
of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of
the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the
express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties. That the parties intended some other acts or contracts apart from
the express terms of the agreement, was not proven by Reynaldo during the trial or
by his heirs herein. Beyond the bare and uncorroborated asseverations that the
contract failed to express the true intention of the parties, the record is bereft of any
evidence indicative that there was an equitable mortgate.

Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of the price carry the day for the
petitioners. It must be understood at this point that the subject of the Contract to Sell
was limited only to 14 pro-indiviso share of Reynaldo consisting an area of 3750 sq.
mater and not the entire 15,001 sq. meter parcel of land. As a co-owner of the subject
property, Reynaldo’s right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideas share in the property
held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law is Article 493 of the New
Civil Code, which spells out the rights of the co-owners over a co-owned property.
Case Title: Arambulo vs. Nolasco
G.R. no. G.R. No. 189420
Date: March 26, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita
Vda. De Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria
V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo
Nolasco are co-owners of a 233 sq.m. land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died,
she was succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.

On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners,
except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties,
saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to
the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature. They averred
that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties they co–
owned because they were not called to participate in any negotiations regarding the
disposition of the property. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered
respondents to give their consent to sale. Respondents filed a notice of appeal to the
CA. CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUES:
WON respondents, as co–owners, can be compelled by the court to give their consent
to the sale of their shares in the co–owned properties?
HELD:
No. Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full
ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of
their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs
to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned
to them in the division upon the termination of the co–ownership. With the full
ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their parts,
the nature of the property, as co–owned, likewise stays.

Since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co–owner of the property. To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that
one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his
right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for
the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.

Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring a suit for
partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co–ownership. Article 494 of the
Civil Code provides that no co–owner shall be obliged to remain in the co–ownership,
and that each co–owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co–owners cannot
agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the co–owners but because of the nature of
the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests
of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement as to who among them
shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co–
owners. This is the result obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already
shown, this cannot be done while the co–ownership exists.
TITLE QUINTOS V NICHOLAS
GR NO 210252
DATE June 16, 2014

FACTS
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents
wherein they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their
real and personal properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution,
petitioners alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed
thereon as their share. They had been in adverse, open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly entitled
to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds was
denied.
Trial Court: dismissed petitioners’ complaint, as it did not find merit in
petitioners’ asseverations that they have acquired title over the property through
acquisitive prescription and noted there was no document evidencing that their
parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer of the siblings’ interest in favor
of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.

Court of Appeals: upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is co-
owned by the plaintiffs- appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-
appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided interest) and considering that
plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the back portion
of the property, partition is in order, in accord with the subdivision plan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property
HELD:
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
 appearance of validity or efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not

petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is
substantially a factual issue that is generally improper for Us to delve into.In any
event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed
by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open,
continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied
by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the
Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the
petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido
and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably,
petitioners failed to discharge the said burden. There is no reason to disturb the
finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido
and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the
spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses became co-owners of the
same.
Case Title APIQUE vs. FAHNENSTICH

G.R. no. G.R. No. 205705

Date: August 05, 2015

FACTS:

Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents at Babak, Island
Garden City of Samal, Davao, until Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979.
On August 2, 1995, Evangeline executed General and Special Powers of Attorney
constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property for her, and to
manage or supervise her business affairs in the Philippines.

As Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings account on January 18,
1999 with Dominador at the Claveria Branch of the Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCI Bank) in Davao City, now Bancode Oro, under Savings Account No. 1189-02819-
5 (subject account). On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00
from the subject account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account
with the same bank, under Savings Account No. 1189-00781-3. When Evangeline learned
of such withdrawal from the manager of EPCIB, Evangeline then had the passbook
updated, which reflected the said withdrawal. She likewise discovered that Dominador
had deposited the amount withdrawn to his own account with the same bank and that he
had withdrawn various amounts from the said account.

Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to
no avail. She therefore filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO) against Dominador before the RTC. Evangeline claimed to be the
sole owner of the money deposited in the subject account, and that Dominador has no
authority to withdraw the same. The court granted said TRO.

Dominador asserted, among others, that he was authorized to withdraw funds from the
subject account to answer for the expenses of Evangeline's projects, considering: (a) that it
was a joint account, and (b) the general and special powers of attorney executed by
Evangeline in his favor. EPCIB, for its part, denied having violated its own banking rules
and regulations, contending that the account in question was an "OR" account such that
any of the account holders may transact without the signature of the other. It also pointed
out that "no passbook" transactions were allowed if the following could be verified,
namely: (a) technicalities of documents, (b) identity of payee, (c) authenticity of signature/s,
and (d) sufficiency of funds. During the trial, Dominador claimed that the money
withdrawn from the subject account belonged to him, explaining that he had contributed
an initial deposit of P100,000.00 and that Evangeline's common-law husband, Holgar
Schwarzfeller (Holgar), had also deposited a total amount of P900,000.00[19] pursuant to
the latter's verbal promise to compensate him for his services as administrator/manager of
the couple's business and properties in the amount of P1,000,000.00.

RTC- Ruled in favor of Dominador and dismissed the complaint.

CA- the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling and, instead, ordered Dominador to
return to Evangeline the amount of P980,000.00, plus interest at six percent (6%) p.a.
reckoned from the filing of the complaint up to the finality of the decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Evangeline and Dominador are co-owners of the savings account.
2. Whether or not Dominador is authorized to withdraw from said account.

HELD:

1. Yes. A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two
or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners
or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges,
shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract
to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-
ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.

The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account,
each of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of
them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or
consent of the other, during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders,
their right against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose
for which the account was opened and how it will be operated.

In this case, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador with
EPCIB was a joint "OR" account. It is also admitted that: (a) the account was opened for a
specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate the transfer of needed funds for Evangeline's business
projects; and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom "if” there is a need to meet
Evangeline's financial obligations arising from said projects.

2. No. While Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is
concerned — and may, thus, validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the
consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him and Evangeline, his authority
to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose
for which the subject account was opened.

Under the foregoing circumstances, Dominador's right to obtain funds from the subject
account was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects.
Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account,
there was no project being undertaken for Evangeline. Moreover, his claim that the said
amount belonged to him, as part of the compensation promised by Holgar for his services
as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline, was correctly rejected by the CA,
considering the lack of competent evidence showing that Holgar: (a) undertook to pay
Dominador the amount of P1,000,000.00 for his services as administrator of Evangeline's
various projects; and (b) remitted such amount to the subject account for the benefit of
Dominador. Corollarily, the Court cannot subscribe to Dominador's claim for payment of
compensation as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline based on the principle
of quantum meruit, which was not raised as an affirmative defense or counterclaim in his
answer to the complaint.

Petition is denied and petitioner Dominador is ordered to return to respondent Evangeline

the amount of P880,000.00 (Dominador is entitled to the said amount which should be,
therefore, deducted from amount to be returned.), plus legal interest at six percent (6%) per
annum, reckoned from the filing of the complaint on May 7, 2002, until full payment.
Case Title Catedrilla v Lauron
G.R. no. 179011
Date: April 15, 2013

FACTS:
On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Lamunao,
Iloilo MTC a complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron
alleging as follows:
a. that Lorenza Lizada is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 183); she died and was
succeeded by her sole heir Jesusa Lizada Losañes, who was married to Hilarion
Castigador (Castigador);
b. that the spouses Jesusa and Hilarion Castigador had a number of children,
which included Lilia Castigador (Lilia), who was married to Maximo Catedrilla
c. that after the death of the spouses Castigador, their heirs agreed among
themselves to subdivide Lot 183 and, pursuant to a consolidation subdivision
plan, the parcel of lot denominated as Lot No. 5 therein was to be apportioned
to the heirs of Lilia since the latter already died;
d. that Lilia was succeeded by her heirs, her husband Maximo and their children,
one of whom is herein petitioner;
e. that petitioner filed the complaint as a co-owner of Lot No. 5;
f. that sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the
tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong
materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5 covering an area of 100sqm;
g. that the heirs of Lilia made various demands for respondents to vacate the
premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them but the
same was unavailing;
h. and that petitioner reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate the subject
lot on 15 Jan 2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such
possession.

On November 14, 2003, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering
the respondents to vacate the lot in question, which the RTC affirmed. However, the
CA reversed the decision, dismissing the complaint for respondent’s ejectment.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s co-heirs to the subject lot should have been impleaded as co-
plaintiffs in the ejectment case against respondents, since without their presence, the
trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of petitioner.

HELD:
No. Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners.

The SC, speaking through J. Peralta, held that Art. 487 NCC is explicit on this point:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry
and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).

As explained by the renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A co-owner may

bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself
and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.

In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he
stated in the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother,
who inherited the subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive
ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering
its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner
recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.

Petition is GRANTED.

The decision and resolution of CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of RTC
is REINSTATED.
Case Title Pardell vs. Bartolome
G.R. no. G.R. No. L-4656
Date: November 18, 1912

FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882,
respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative
will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta,
and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property.
Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs. In
1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly
or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of
the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the
serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the
properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps. Gaspar and Matilde had been
delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt
promises and other excuses.

Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC. The RTC absolved
Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses were
compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or
damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those
aforementioned. The counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved
for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the
judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned
property.
HELD:
No. Article 394 of the Civil Code provides that, “Each co-owner may use the things
owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such
manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from
utilizing them according to their rights.”

Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a
dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so
doing, that Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community
property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story
according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented
and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.

Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall
not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the reason that, until a division be made,
the respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every one of the co-owners
exercises together with his other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time
between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that
delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and
proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter,
especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a
turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of
the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property
of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, the latter are not
obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been
derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because
one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some
belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants.

The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of
the said house, did not injure the interests of her co-owner, nor did she prevent the
latter from living therein. As a co-owner of the property, she merely exercised her
legitimate right.
Case Title Caro vs CA
G.R. no. L-46001
Date: March 25, 1982

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 promulgated on February 11, 1977, in
CA-G.R. No. 52570-R entitled "Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito, as Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Mario Benito vs. Luz Caro", as well as the resolution of the
respondent Court, dated May 13, 1977, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 of the
Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving
wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint
administrators of Mario's estate.

On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute
sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein
petitioner, Luz Caro, for the sum of P10,000.00. This was registered on September 29,
1959. Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown
in their affidavits both dated September 15, 1960, Exhibits G and F respectively, a
subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C, under T.C.T. No. T-
4978.

Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito
learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding
No. 508 that the latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-
third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. After further verification, she
sent to petitioner thru her counsel, a written offer to redeem the said one-third
undivided share dated August 25, 1966. Inasmuch as petitioner ignored said offer,
private respondent sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa Amador
Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of
the annotation of the sale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land, but did not
succeed as the principal case was dismissed on a technicality, that is, for failure to
prosecute and the proposed intervenor failed to pay the docketing fees. Private
respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one and in the trial sought
to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been
notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.

On the other hand, petitioner presented during the hearing of the case secondary
evidence of the service of written notice of the intended sale to possible redemptioners
in as much as the best thereof, the written notices itself sent to and Saturnino Benito,
could not be presented for the reason that said notices were sent to persons who were
already dead when the complaint for legal redemption was brought. Instead, the
affidavit of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litem motam, attesting to the fact that the
possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his intention to sell his
undivided share, was presented in evidence. The deposition of Saturnino's widow was
likewise taken and introduced in evidence, wherein she testified that she received and
gave to her husband the written notice of the intended sale but that the latter expressed
disinterest in buying the property.

After hearing the evidence, the trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that:
(a) private respondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does
not have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito
substantially complied with his obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his
one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners.
ISSUE:
WON the right of redemption could still be exercised.
HELD:
No.

In Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315, a case squarely in point, this
Court held:

Inasmuch as the purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal redemption
between co-owners is to reduce the number of participants until the community is done
away with (Viola vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 808), once the property is subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason
to sustain any right of legal redemption.
Although the foregoing pronouncement has reference to the sale made after partition,
this Court therein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance which took place
before the partition agreement and approval by the court. Thus, it held:

Nevertheless, the result is the same, because We held in Saturnino vs. Paulino, 97 Phil.
50, that the right of redemption under Article 1067 may be exercised only before
partition. In this case the right was asserted not only after partition but after the
property inherited had actually been subdivided into several parcels which were
assigned by lot to the several heirs.

In the case at bar, private respondent alleged in her complaint that she learned of the
sale sometime in May, 1966 upon receipt of a pleading in Special Proceeding No. 508
of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. She likewise alleged that she gave a letter
informing petitioner of her desire to redeem the land on August 25, 1966. Clearly, three
months have elapsed since the notice of the sale. Hence, petitioner claims that the
thirty-day period of redemption has already expired. In addition, petitioner makes
capital of the admission of private respondent that she already knew of the said
transaction even before receipt of the said pleading (t.s.n., p. 16) as well as of the
evidence presented that Saturnino Benito, the admittedly active administrator until
1966, duly received a written notice of the intended sale of Benjamin Benito's share.
Said evidence consists of the affidavit of the vendor stating that the required notice had
been duly given to possible redemptioners, the statement in the deed of sale itself and
the deposition of Saturnino Benito's widow with respect to her receipt of the written
notice. Finally, petitioner points to the records which disclose that private respondent
knew of the subdivision (t.s.n., p. 25) and hence, rationalized that private respondent
should have known also of the previous sale.

Since We have ruled that the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this
case because admittedly a subdivision title (T.C.T. No. T-4978) has already been issued
in the name of the petitioner on Lot I-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic, if
not unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the notice
requirements for the exercise of the right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.
Case Title Bailon-Casilao v. CA
G.R. no. G.R. No. 78178
Date: April 15, 1988

FACTS:
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice
of lis pendens against Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case is
covered by OCT No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio,
Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6
share. Various sale transactions were made by Rosalia Bailon over the property to third
persons without the consent of the other co-owners ultimately to Celestino Afable. In
his answer, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through
prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches.
ISSUE:
Are petitioners chargeable with such prescription or laches as may effectively bar their
present action?
HELD:
No. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, 'no co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.' [Emphasis supplied.] In Budiong
v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 241], this Court has
interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible
or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares:
"No prescription shall lie in favor of a coowner or co- heir so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." It must be noted that while there was delay in
asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the
sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice
of the sale made by their eldest sister.
Case Title ROQUE vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75886
Date August 30, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner Concepcion Roque seeks for partition of a parcel of land sold unto
her by her half brother Ernesto and Victor Roque which is ¾ share of Lot 1549
evidenced by a “Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan.”

However, respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque
refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No.
1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.

Undaunted, petitioner Concepcion Roque filed a Complaint for Partition

with Specific Performance at CFI Malolos claiming the legal ownership of ¾
portion of Lot 1549. She alleged that, as co-owner of Lot 1549, she had a right to seek
partition of the property and that she could not be compelled to remain in the co-
ownership of the same.

The CFI ruled in favor of Concepcion Roque. However, the IAC reversed the
judgment of the CFI and denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The IAC stated in its decision that an action for partition will not prosper as
such from the moment an alleged co-owner asserts an adverse title. The action that
may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion reivindicatoria or action for
recovery of title and possession.

ISSUES:

I. Whether petitioner Concepcion Roque is a co-owner of Lot 1549 and thus

entitled to partition – YES

II. Whether the action for partition has already prescribed – NO

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Concepcion Roque is a co-owner of

Lot 1549 and therefore entitled to the ¾ portion of the said land.
 It is sometimes said that "the action for partition of the thing owned in
common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not
prescribe." However, the Court ruled that this statement bears some refinement. In
the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned." No matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner can
always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-
heirs have theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they
cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition. But if the
defendants show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to
the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to require
recognition of his status as a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and
the court cannot issue an order requiring partition.

An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at bar. First of all,
petitioner Concepcion Roque — the co-owner seeking partition — has been and is
presently in open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the
property owned in common. The Court notes in this respect the finding of the
trial court that petitioner, following execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan"
on 27 November 1961, had been in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot
. . . up to the present, and whereon plaintiffs house and that of her son are
erected." Respondents do not dispute this finding of fact, although they would
claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated by them. Second, prior to filing
in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties involved had
asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No.
1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co-ownership of the
property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the
action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed
at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action below.|||
CASETI
TLE DELIMA VSCA
G.
R.NO. 201SCRA641
DATE Sept
ember24,1991

FACTS

Linoboughtalotfrom t
hefri
arlands
.Hedi e
dandwass ur
vivedbyhi sbrot
her
sand
si
sters
.Ga li
leowast
hec aret
ake
rofthepropert
y.Hewasabletoexecut
eana-davi t
adjudicat
ingtohimsel
ftheparce
loflandandwasabletose
curetheiss
uanc eofaTCTin
hisname .Thispr
omptedt hehei
rsofhiss
ibl
ingsto0l
eforr
econveyance.

I
SSUE

Whe t
herornotpetit
ione
rs'act
ionforpar
tit
ionisal
readybarr
edbyt hest
atutor
y
peri
odprovide
dbyl aw whichshallenabl
eGalil
e oDel
imatoperfe
cthiscl
aim of
ownershi
pbyac qui
sit
ivepresc
ript
iontotheexclusi
onofpeti
ti
onersf
rom the
irsharesi
n
thedis
putedproper
ty

HELD

Whent heco-
owne rofthepr opert
ye xe
cutedade edofpar t
iti
onandont hestr
ength
there
of,obtai
nedac ancel
lati
onoft heti
tlei
nthenameoft heirpredecessorandt he
iss
uanceofane wt i
tleinhisnameasowne r,t
hes t
atuteofli
mi t
ationsstart
e dtorunforthe
purposesoftheacti
oni ns
tit
utedbyt helatt
erseeki
ngade c l
arati
onoft hee xi
s t
enceofthe
co-ownershipandthe i
rri
ghtsthe r
eaft
er.Theis
suanc eofane wtitleconsti
tutedac l
earact
ofrepudiati
onofthet r
ustandc o-ownershi
p.
Case Title VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
G.R No. 76351
Date October 29, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers. On 28 October 1969, the
two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque. Initially, the brothers agreed that
Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third
but later they agreed that their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with
Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the
Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father. The brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed
and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. After their father died in
1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and
that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the respondent
refused. Petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that they
could divide the proceeds between them.

In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on
the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner
also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father
died. Respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling
price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should
be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the property.

On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court
found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the
basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of
his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and
lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to
delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand
partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person
and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. The trial court likewise ordered
defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals2 from January
1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the action was filed.
 Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals saying that the trial court erred in declaring respondents in default; the case
was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against
respondent.
RULING:
YES. The Court holds that petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject
house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and
lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of
the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. We uphold the
trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of
monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only
after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July
1979.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition
of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule,
Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-
owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the
right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the
nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of
the co-owners. However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house
and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property
owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial
court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership
was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the
interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided
equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held
liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
Case Title TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC.,
PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 124262
Date October 12, 1999

FACTS:
Private respondents alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died
intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged
that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio
San Juan, Morong, Rizal, and in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot
was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when
Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of
private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share
to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths
(4/5) of the property.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of

jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not special defense of prescription is valid.
HELD:
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or
other disposition affects only the seller’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only
what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner/ seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the
recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but
for division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.

In the light of the foregoing, petitioner’s defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, “no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.” In
Budlong vs. Bondoc, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the
action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: “No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-
owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

Case Title ROBLES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. no. G.R. No. 123509
Date: March 14, 2000

FACTS:
There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively owned the land situated in
Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied
the same openly and adversely. He also declared the same in his name for taxation
purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration No. 17865 and paid the
corresponding taxes thereon. When Leon Robles died, his son Silvino Robles
inherited the land, who took possession of the land, declared it in his name for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon.

Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his
children inherited the property. They took adverse possession of said property and
paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio
Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the land. The
plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother,
Hilario Robles.

In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the, name of
Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea
Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena
secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security.
Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo Rural Bank
and later on, was transferred [to] the name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife.

In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the
tax declaration as security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that
somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because
Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter.

For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and
defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in
October 1968.

The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration
was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987,
defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.

In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the
property, but was unsuccessful. On May 10, 1988, defendant spouses Santos took
possession of the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-
010021 in their names.

As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the above-described parcel
from Leon Robles, the siblings Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed
Robles, commenced the instant suit with the filing of their March 14, 1988 complaint
against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc.
Contending that they had been in possession of the land since 1942, the plaintiff
alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of 1987 that they came to
know of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-
brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of defendant Rural Bank; and that they likewise
learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had already sold the self-same parcel in
favor of the Santos spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hilario Robles mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of
Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof.
HELD:
No.

Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario effected no clear and
evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any
clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of
a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owner; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider irregularities in the transactions

involving the disputed property. First, while it was declared in the name of Exequiel
in 1962, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer from
the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that the petitioners are
alleging continued possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law
of Hilario, to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment of the land taxes. Third,
considering that the subject property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural
Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed and in fact declared in the bank's name
in 1965, why was he able to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly,
inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc.,
did not observe due diligence in determining Hilario's title thereto.

The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is vital
to the resolution of the present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly
derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to
mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession thereof
by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed, and
Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the
deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession
from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of
that transfer. No such document was presented, however.

In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither
did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had
indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract
with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. As
absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his
share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as
agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership.
The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was
belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the
petitioners as owners.
Case Title Leviste Management System vs. Legaspi Towers
G.R. no. 199353
Date: April 4, 2018

FACTS:
Respondent owns a condominium building in Makati City. It consists of seven (7)
floors, with a unit on the roof deck and two levels above said unit called Concession 2
and Concession 3. The use and occupancy of the condominium building is governed
by a Master Deed. Concession 3 was bought by petitioner. The latter sought to build
another unit, Concession 4, on the roof deck of Concession 3 and was able to secure a
permit for its construction. Despite respondent’s notice that the construction of
Concession 4 was illegal, petitioner refused to stop its construction. Petitioner prayed
for a writ of mandatory injunction to allow the completion of the construction of
Concession 4. The RTC found that the “air space” above Concession 3 actually
belongs to the respondent as it is air space not on top of petitioner’s unit but on top of
the condominium itself. However, since construction of Concession 4 was already
done, the RTC applied Art. 448 of the NCC ordering respondent to exercise its option
to either: (1) appropriate the additional structure on top of Concession 3; or (2) agree
upon the terms of lease for its use by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON Art. 448 of the NCC is applicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act.
HELD:
No. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a
special law, the special law prevails. The provisions of the Civil Code, a general law,
should therefore give way to the Condominium Act, a special law. Special laws cover
distinct situations, such as the necessary co-ownership between unit owners in
condominiums and the need to preserve the structural integrity of condominium
buildings; and these special situations deserve, for practicality, a separate set of rules.

Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property
(the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the Bylaws of the
condominium corporation). This Court has ruled that upon acquisition of a
condominium unit, the purchaser not only affixes his conformity to the sale; he also
binds himself to a contract with other unit owners.
Case Title Lim vs. Moldex Land, Inc.
G.R. no. 206038
Date: January 25, 2017

FACTS:
Lim is a registered unit owner of 1322 Golden Empire Tower (Golden Empire Tower),
a condominium project of Moldex Land, Inc. (Moldex), a real estate company
engaged in the construction and development of high-end condominium projects and
in the marketing and sale of the units thereof to the general public. Condocor, a non-
stock, non-profit corporation, is the registered condominium corporation for the
Golden Empire Tower. Lim, as a unit owner of Golden Empire Tower, is a member of
Condocor.

On July 21, 2012 Condocor held its annual general membership meeting. Moldex
became a member of Condocor on the basis of its ownership of the 220 unsold units in
the Golden Empire Tower. The individual respondents acted as its representatives.

During the meeting, an existence of a quorum was declared even though only 29 of
the 108 unit buyers were present. The declaration was based on the presence of the
majority of the voting rights, including those pertaining to the 220 unsold units held
by Moldex through its representatives. Lim, through her attorney-in-fact, objected to
the validity of the meeting. The objection was denied. Thus, Lim and all the other unit
owners present, except for one, walked out and left the meeting.

Despite the walkout, the individual respondents and the other unit owner proceeded
with the meeting and elected the new members of the Board of Directors for 2012-
2013. All four (4) individual respondents (JAMINOLA, MACALINTAL, MILANES,
and ROMAN) were voted as members of the board, together with other 3 members.

Consequently, Lim filed an election protest before the RTC. Lim claimed that herein
respondents are not entitled to be members of the Board of Directors because they are
non-unit buyers. However, said court ruled in favor for the respondents. Not in
conformity, Lim filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Moldex can be deemed a member of Condocor
HELD:
Yes. Moldex can be deemed a member of Condocor.
Lim asserted that only unit buyers are entitled to become members of Condocor.
Respondents, for their part, countered that a registered owner of a unit in a
condominium project or the holders of duly issued condominium certificate of title
(CCT), automatically becomes a member of the condominium corporation, relying on
Sections 2 and 10 of the Condominium Act, the Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions, as well as the By-Laws of Condocor. For said reason, respondents
averred that as Moldex is the owner of 220 unsold units and the parking slots and
storage areas attached thereto, it automatically became a member of Condocor upon
the latter's creation.

On this point, respondents are correct. Section 2 of the Condominium Act states:

Sec. 2. A condominium is an interest in real property consisting of separate interest in

a unit in a residential, industrial or commercial building and an undivided interest in
common, directly or indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other
common areas of the building. A condominium may include, in addition, a separate
interest in other portions of such real property. Title to the common areas, including
the land, or the appurtenant interests in such areas, may be held by a corporation
specially formed for the purpose (hereinafter known as the "condominium
corporation") in which the holders of separate interest shall automatically be
members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant
interest of their respective units in the common areas

Thus, law and jurisprudence dictate that ownership of a unit entitles one to become a
member of a condominium corporation. The Condominium Act does not provide a
specific mode of acquiring ownership. Thus, whether one becomes an owner of a
condominium unit by virtue of sale or donation is of no moment.

It is erroneous to argue that the ownership must result from a sale transaction
between the owner-developer and the purchaser. Such interpretation would mean
that persons who inherited a unit, or have been donated one, and properly
transferred title in their names cannot become members of a condominium
corporation.

However, said meeting was declared null and void for not meeting the quorum, since
quorum does not necessarily equate to voting rights. The quorum during the July 21,
2012 meeting should have been majority of Condocor's members in good standing.
Accordingly, there was no quorum during the July 21, 2012 meeting considering that
only 29 of the 108 unit buyers were present.
Case Title Poole-Blunden vs Union Bank of the Philippines
G.R. no. 205838
Date: November 29, 2017

FACTS:
The petitioner, Poole-Blunden, participated in a public auction conducted by the
respondent, UnionBank, for the sale of a condominium unit. The said unit was
advertised as 95 m2. A week before the auction, the petitioner visited the unit for
inspection. Aside from noticing that the unit had an irregular shape, he did not doubt
the unit’s area as advertised. On the day of the auction, the petitioner won after
placing his bid amounting to P2,650,000. He then entered into a contract to sell with
the respondent.

A few years later, the petitioner noticed apparent problems with the dimensions.
After engaging the services of a geodetic engineer, he found out that the floor area of
the unit was actually only 74.4 m2. Thereafter, Poole-Blunden brought the issue to
UnionBank’s attention. The respondent explained that the 95-square meter area
provided was inclusive of the terrace and the common areas surrounding it.
Dissatisfied with the latter’s answer, the petitioner filed a complaint for Rescission of
Contract and Damages with the RTC of Makati. The said complaint was dismissed for
lack of merit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision noting that the sale
was made on an “as-is-where-is” basis. As such, Poole-Blunden waived any errors in
the descriptions of the unit.
ISSUE:
WON common spaces should be included in reckoning a condominium unit’s total
area
HELD:
NO. Respondent's insistence on how common spaces should be included in reckoning
the Unit's total area runs afoul of how Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the
Condominium Act, reckons what forms part of a condominium unit.

Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifies the reckoning of a condominium unit's
bounds. It also specifies that areas of common use "are not part of the unit":

Section 6. Unless otherwise expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or

the declaration of restrictions, the incidents of a condominium grant are as
follows:
(a) The boundary of the unit granted are the interior surfaces of the perimeter
walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. The following are not part of the
unit bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations and other common structural
elements of the building; lobbies, stairways, hallways, and other areas of common
use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central
air-conditioning equipment, reservoirs, tanks, pumps and other central services and
facilities, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations,
wherever located, except the outlets thereof when located within the unit.

Thus, the unit sold to petitioner was deficient in relation to its advertised area. This
advertisement having been made by respondent, it is equally settled there was a
falsity in the declarations made by respondent prior to, and with the intention of
enticing buyers to the sale.
Case Title Spouses Ermino v. Golden Village Homeowners Assoc.,
Inc. (GVHAI)
G.R. no. 180808
Date: August 15, 2018

FACTS:
The spouses are residents of Alco Homes (AH) located beside Golden Village
Subdivision. Sometime, there was continuous heavy rainfall which caused the water
to fall from the Hilltop City Subdivision (HCS) to other subdivisions below, such
runoff directly hit and damaged the house and car of the spouses.

They then filed a complaint against E.B. Villarosa, developer of HCS and the
GVHAI. They contend that Villarosa failed to observe the DENR rules and
regulations to provide retaining walls and flood control devices, while they blamed
the GVHAI for the act of constructing concrete fence which diverted the flow of water
to their subdivision.

Villarosa rebutted this by stating that the house of the spouses is located at Dagong
Creek which is being easily flooded and in addition, the GVHAI aggravated the
flooding by constructing the said fence. While GVHAI claims that they are merely
exercising their proprietary rights in order to prevent outsiders from entering their
subdivision and that Villarosa should be the sole liable for the damage.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that GVHAI was not responsible for the damages to
Spouses Ermino’s properties.
HELD:
The spouses relied on Articles 20 and 21 which provides that Every person who
willfully or negligently causes damage to another in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy shall indemnify the latter.

In the case at bar, the act of constructing was not intended to cause damage but to
ward off undesirable elements in their subdivision. Any person could not envisage
such outcome of the act, GVHAI is merely exercising its proprietary rights in
pursuant to Article 430 which states “Every owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitude constituted thereon.”

Thus, such act of GVHAI does not come under the purview of Articles 20 and 21.
Case Title CITY OF BATANGAS, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION and SHELL PHILIPPINES
EXPLORATION B.V., respondents
G.R. no. 195003
Date: June 7, 2017

FACTS:
PD 87 mandates to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum
while the Department of Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38) with
Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX) under which the latter was tasked to explore
and develop possible petroleum sources in North Western Palawan leading to the
discovery of an abundant source of natural gas in the Malampaya field off the shores
of Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya Project. The project required
the construction of an offshore pipeline for the transportation of natural gas from
Malampaya field to Batangas.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance which requires heavy
industries operation along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial
jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of
seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities.
ISSUE:
Whether the control and regulation of the use of water may be made subject of a city
ordinance under the regime of the Water Code – a national statute governing the same
subject matter.
HELD:
No.

The assailed ordinance contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates
unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water which,
by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting
the assailed ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an
LGU, rendering the assailed ordinance ultra vires.

While the assailed ordinance has been struck down as invalid, the pronouncements
hereunder should not be misconstrued by heavy industries to be carte blanche to abuse
their respective water rights at the expense of the health and safety of the inhabitants
of Batangas City, the environment whithin which these inhabitants live, and the
resources upon which these inhabitants rely. The court recognizes the fresh ground
water as an invaluable natural resource, and deems it necessary to emphasize that
Batangas City is not precluded from exercising its right to protect its inhabitants from
injurious effects which may result from the misuse of natural water resources within
its territorial jurisdiction, should these effects later arise, provided that such exercise is
done within the framework of applicable national law, particularly, the Water Code.
Case Title First Mega Holdings Corp. v. Guiguinto Water District
G.R. no. 208383
Date: June 08, 2016

FACTS:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated March 20, 2013
and the Resolution dated July 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
122971, which denied petitioner First Mega Holdings Corp.'s (petitioner) petition for
review of the Resolutions dated September 2, 2010 and December 2, 2011 of the
National Water Resources Board (NWRB) in Water Use Conflict Case No. 2009-045
denying petitioner's application for a water permit.

On February 26, 2009, petitioner filed with the NWRB a Water Permit Application for
the installation of a deep well that would supply the water resource requirements of its
gasoline station and commercial complex in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto, Bulacan.

On May 19, 2009, respondent filed its protest against petitioner’s WPA, with the
following averments among others:
(a) The water level in Guiguinto, Bulacan is at a critical level and the water exploration
to be conducted by petitioner would hamper the water requirements of the said
municipality and be detrimental to its water service; and
(b) Respondent has the capacity to supply the petitioner’s water requirements.

Petitioner filed its answer, praying for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that
the same was belatedly filed, and that respondent failed to substantiate its claim that
the water level in Guiguinto is at a critical level.
It averred that:
(a) Its water requirements would only be minimal, which could not possibly affect the
water level in Guiguinto; and
(b) It would not be cost-effective to source water from respondent since there is no
existing water pipeline available within a one-kilometer radius where petitioner could
connect.

The NRWB Ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed. Hence, iyak si petitioner.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not CA correctly upheld the NWRB’s denial of petitioner’s WPA.

HELD:

Yes, the denial is correct.

Where extraction of ground water is sought, as in this case, a permit to drill must first
be secured from the NWRB. However, before a permit to drill is issued, the NWRB
shall conduct a field investigation to determine any adverse effect that may be caused
to public or private interests. Only after it has determined that the application meets
the requirements and is not prejudicial to any public or private interests shall it issue
the permit to drill which shall be regarded as a temporary permit, until the rate of water
withdrawal/yield of the well has been determined and assessed, and the application is
finally (a) approved and a water permit is issued subject to such conditions as the
NWRB may impose, or ( b) disapproved and returned to the applicant, stating the
reasons therefor. It should be emphasized that it is only through a duly issued water
permit that any person acquires the right to appropriate water, or to take or divert
waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by law.

Records show that petitioner drilled a deep well and installed a water pump without
having first secured the necessary permit to drill. Moreover, despite the NWRB's
November 3, 2009 CDO refraining it from operating the water pump, petitioner
extracted water from the deep well.

More importantly, the NWRB, in Resolution No. 001-0904 had already identified
Guiguinto as one of the critical areas in need of urgent attention based on its water
resources assessment which, thus, impelled it to take the necessary measures to prevent
further ground water level decline and water quality deterioration in Guiguinto. In fact,
the NWRB had imposed a total ban on deep water drilling in Metro Manila, as well as
Guiguinto, Bocaue, Marilao, and Meycauayan in Bulacan, and Dasmarifias .in Cavite
to prevent over-extraction of ground water.

Petition is DENIED and the resolution of the Court of Appeals insofar as it upheld the
denial of petitioner’s WPA is AFFIRMED.
CASE TITLE INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS,
INC.) vs POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)
G.R. NO. G. R. No. 192088
DATE H. Oct 9, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)
is a GOCC created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the
“Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). Said law mandated PSALM
to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets,
real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP)
contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and
stranded contract costs in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed
within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.

In August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)

Angat Hydro-electric Power Plant (AHEPP), forming part of the Angat Complex,
which includes the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.
This is partly owned by respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS). The Angat Dam and AHEPP are utilized for power generation,
irrigation, water supply and flood control purposes. Because of its multi-functional
design, the operation of the Angat Complex involves various government agencies,
namely: (1) NPC; (2) National Water Resources Board (NWRB); (3) MWSS; (4)
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA); and (5) Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAG-ASA).

On December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding

Procedures for the privatization of the AHEPP. The two auxiliary units owned by
MWSS were excluded from the bid. Pertinent portions of the Bidding Package
include: “The priority of water usage under Philippine Law would have to be
observed by the Buyer/Operator. The Winning Bidder/Buyer shall be requested to
enter into an operations and maintenance agreement with PSALM for the
Non-Power Components…the Buyer will be required to enter into the said water
protocol agreement as a condition to the award of the Asset.”

Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) had the winning bid and was
consequently given the Notice of Award.

The present petition was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment
Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS), Freedom from Debt Coalition
(FDC), AKBAYAN Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN) and Alliance of Progressive
Labor, seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the AHEPP to K-Water. SC issued
Status Quo Ante Order.
 ISSUE:
WON it violated Water Code provisions on the grant of water rights?

RULING
The Water Code limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and
juridical entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources,
including private corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by
Filipinos. In the case of Angat River, the NWRB has issued separate water permits
to MWSS, NPC and NIA.

Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business affected with public
interest, was opened to private sector. Power generation shall not be considered a
public utility operation, and hence no franchise is necessary. Foreign investors are
likewise allowed entry into the electric power industry. However, there is no
mention of water rights in the privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities.

Operation of a Hydroelectric Power Plant

Hydroelectric energy is produced by the force of falling water. The capacity
to produce this energy is dependent on both the available flow and the
height from which it falls. Building up behind a high dam, water
accumulates potential energy. This is transformed into mechanical energy
when the water rushes down the sluice and strikes the rotary blades of
turbine. The turbine's rotation spins electromagnets which generate current
in stationary coils of wire. Finally, the current is put through a transformer
where the voltage is increased for long distance transmission over power
lines.

Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be
said to be “appropriating” our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in
the dam and converts the same into electricity through artificial devices. Since the
NPC remains in control of the operation of the dam by virtue of water rights
granted to it, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking
the generation of electric power using waters already appropriated by NPC, the
holder of water permit.

There is no provision in the EPIRA itself authorizing the NPC to assign or transfer
its water rights in case of transfer of operation and possession of multi-purpose
hydropower facilities. Since only the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the
operation of the non-power components such as the dam and reservoir, including
the maintenance of the surrounding watershed, should remain under the
jurisdiction and control of NPC which continue to be a government corporation.
There is therefore no necessity for NPC to transfer its permit over the water rights to
K-Water. Pursuant to its purchase and operation/management contracts with
K-Water, NPC may authorize the latter to use water in the dam to generate
electricity.
NPC shall continue to be the holder of the water permit even as the operational
control and day-to-day management of the AHEPP is turned over to K-Water under
the terms and conditions of their APA and O & M Agreement, whereby NPC grants
authority to K-Water to utilize the waters diverted or collected in the Angat Dam
for hydropower generation. Further, NPC and K-Water shall faithfully comply with
the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Agreement on Water Protocol, as
well as with such other regulations and issuances of the NWRB governing water
rights and water usage.
Case Title PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORP. v DUMADAG
G.R. no. 194336
Date: March 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner, Pilar Development Corp. filed a complaint for Accion Publiciana against the
respondent because they had occupied and built their shanties on strip of land which
was intended for recreational facilities and amenities of the subdivision. Petitioner
claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name. The disputed
portion of land is a sloping area going down leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek.

The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot,
since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the local
government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession or
ownership. On appeal, the CA sustained the ruling of the trial court. Unlike the trial
court, however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of
possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Piñas, but the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Section 101
of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 (otherwise known as The Public Land Act).
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to possess and right to recover the possession
HELD:
The petitioner’s right of ownership and possession with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek has been limited by P.D. 1067 or
The Water Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas,
twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along
their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.

Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is

public land. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is
immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the
nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character
throughout their occupancy

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to
the 3meter strip/zone, both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the
local government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose
sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion
under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant
provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992)