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Plan Inclusive Counterplans:

We should increase the number of civilans into the schools for national service but China also a threat

China also a threat

Pics Good

1. Research encouragement. PICs force both sides to do nuanced topic-specific research


instead of vague and generic research. Specifically, the negative has an incentive to
research what effects a minor adjustment would have on the resolution, while the
affirmative needs to do research to counter—balance the PIC. Higher level research is
key to education because it is from our research that we derive our arguments and have
meaningful and substantive debate on a given policy.

2. Real world decision making. Real World Decision makers are always faced with the
decision of how to go about doing something, or to what degree to do it. Policy makers
have actual discussions about which parts of the plan are good. If part of a bill is
undesirable, a congressman doesn’t throw out the entire bill. Rather, they adjust the bill
to avoid whatever undesirable effect the plan may cause to maximize its utility. Real
world decision-making is key to education because knowledge is only as useful as it is
applicable and it consistnetly influences us every day of our lives. It is also key to
fairness because it is the source of all predictable pragmatic concerns, since most topical
arguments are based on advantages and disadvantages that policymakers debate, giving
both sides a more equal way to access prominent arguments rather than obscure ones.

3. Predictability. PICs force the affirmative to defend the entirety of the resolution when
they are writing their positions. This is good for both pre-round predictability, as the text
of the resolution is the only predictable and static thing debaters share before the
round, and in-round predictability, as the affirmative cannot delink from disadvantages
that discuss only part of the resolution. Predictability is key to clash, because if don’t
know what the arguments are, we cannot properly address them. And clash is key to
education because debates are more educational when in-depth discussion forces
debaters to address internal links are specific arguments.

4. Ground. PICs are essential negative ground. The negative must criticize the affirmative
and explain why its wrong. One of the necessary arguments I need to make is why the
entire plan isn’t beneficial or would be more beneficial without a certain part. Thus, plan
inclusive counterplans are necessary negative ground as a reason why the affirmative
plan is harmful.
The US needs to be more powerful than China or bad things happen

A: Rapid US decline means power vacuums—international chaos exacerbates every


impact
FERGUSON 2004 (Niall, Prof of History at NYU, Foreign Policy, July/August)
So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction

between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology
has upgraded destruction so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. , too, For more than two decades,

The reversal of
globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war.

globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and
even depression As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11
. devastates, say, Houston or Chicago,

it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim
enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that
undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the
global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making
their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastro phically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported
by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?

For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global
hegemony —its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you

The alternative
wish for. to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity— a global vacuum of power . And far more dangerous forces
would benefit from
than rival great powers such a not-so-new world disorder.

B: The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable – Any alternative to US primacy results in


Nuclear Prolif and Global Instability
Tooley, 3-19 – [Mark Tooley, Graduate from Georgetown University, Work at the CIA, 3-19-2015,
Christianity and Nukes American nuclear disarmament will not leave the world safer or holier, The
American Spectator, http://spectator.org/articles/62090/christianity-and-nukes] Jeong
Much of the security of the world relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella , which continues to deter, protect, and intimidate. Doubtless China would vastly expand its
own relatively minimal nuclear arsenal and seek parity at least with Russia absent overwhelming U.S. power. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is engorged far beyond its strategic needs, and that arsenal has in fact been blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which evidently also falls outside the

the U.S., will inspire and motivate the world to follow suit Such
“ecumenical consensus.” Some religious idealists imagine that disarming the West, mainly .

expectation is based on a fundamentally and dangerously false view of global statecraft and human
nature The power vacuum that
. disarmament would create would lead to a far more American inexorably

dangerous and unstable world where nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would
exponentially proliferate There is
. American military and nuclear hegemony for the last 70 years has sustained an historically unprecedented approximate global peace and facilitated an even more unprecedented global prosperity.

indeed a moral and strategic imperative for America today, which is to deploy its power against
further nuclear proliferation and to deter aggression by current nuclear actors , while also developing technologies and defensive weapons that
neutralize nuclear armaments. If Iran’s genocidally ambitious regime is in the end prevented from nuclearizing, it will only be thanks to American power. And if it does nuclearize, only American and Israeli nukes, perhaps joined by Saudi nukes, will deter its murderous designs. Christian
teaching and humanity should demand no less.

Empirics prove that competitiveness creates economic hegemony which solves global
conflict. Hubbard 10 writes
Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenb erry focuses primarily on questions of
related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governa nce in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To
research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that
hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index

of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. I matched this data with data cataloging all
then
conflicts since 1815
in the international system . I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. Regression analysis of the data revealed that there was a
statistically significant negative correlation between relative heg emonic power and conflict levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added

analysis
complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further

revealed military power was a less accurate predictor of conflict than economic power
that in both cases, military . There are several

weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged


possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition,

militarily most important


than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the implication of this research

is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power than through the exercise of
military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the
international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a
wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states . Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are
endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed
political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to th e international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the
purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the

Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the heg acted as a
emon

stabilizing force by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is
probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This
method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international
relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be

It avoids the pitfalls


shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. also with the case study method, such as
some of associated

selection bias and the inherently subjective qualitative analysis.


nature of
Heg decline causes massive transition wars, US lashout, and global arms races. We’ll
never make it to multipolarity alive. Brzezinski 12 ( Multipolarity is two powers
sharing heg)

The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may
be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will
almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter
European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern

No countries
Hemisphere, and so forth. ne of these , however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, tech nological, and military power to even consider

inherit America's role.


ing leading China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly

successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual
redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the w orld. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing
and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At
some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is
ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China . The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies
among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to
major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus,
Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much
more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic
dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national

identity, more paranoid about its homeland security , and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally

American
troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of

decline could corro[de] be a sion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space,
cyberspace, the environment and and
, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy geopolitical stability.
the continuation of basic In almost every case, the

potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

Heg solves every impact. Decline causes extinction. Barnett 11

As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever
Let me be more blunt: military

known. Had America been removed mass murder never would have ended.
from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the Indeed, it's entirely conceivable

there would now be no civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered


identifiable human the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war.

America
Instead, changed everything by ushering in
stepped up and great-power peace. We introduced our now-perpetual the international liberal trade order known

globalization
as What resulted was democracy
and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. human rights the collapse of empires, an explosion of , the persistent spread of , the liberation of women, the

increase in GDP and a profound


doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold reduction in conflict
adjusted global and persistent battle deaths from state-based s. That is what American "hubris" actually
delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but.
Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's
examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million
deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these

calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in death due to war. s We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-
birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical
survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over
the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.
Military Leaders(US) say we need more men to stay the World Power confidently and
it is shrinking now (Cox 2016)
http://www. military.com/daily-news/2 016/ 04/07 /army -nee ds-220k-mor e-s oldiers -to-deal -with-major -foes-milley.ht ml

The U.S. Army's chief of staff told lawmakers Thursday that the service would need another 220,000
soldiers before it could confidently handle major operations with emerging military foes around the
world. Gen. Mark Milley told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Army is operating at "high military risk"
if it continues to operate at the proposed total Army troop strength of 980,000 soldiers. By fiscal 2018, the Army's active force is
slated to have 450,000 soldiers in its ranks. The National Guard will have 335,000 and the Army Reserve will have 195,000 soldiers. Sen. Joe Manchin, D-

West Virginia, has been one of several lawmakers who's been very vocal about his concern that the Army is too small. "Everything that I
have heard from your generals is there is no way we can meet the imminent threats that we have around the world
with 980,000 soldiers,"

The US won’t have enough men to protect themselves with the volunteer force we
have now
Emily Bali 16’
http://w ww.az ce ntral.com/story/new s/l ocal /phoenix/2016 /11 /30 /ariz ona -us-army-challe nged-recr uit-80000 -new-sol diers /94 62100 0/

The U.S. Army is having trouble recruiting the 80,000 new soldiers it needs this fiscal year because most people don't meet the
requirements to join or are misinformed about the military, according to its chief recruiter. "We talk about it in terms of the cognitive, the physical and the moral requirements to join the
military, and it's tough. We have a very good Army; there's a desire to recruit quality into the Army." Snow spoke about the issues Tuesday while in the Phoenix area to meet with recruiters
and to address a gathering of local community and business leaders about their roles in helping to develop the nation's soldiers. Snow's command is charged with signing 62,500 recruits for
the U.S. Army and 15,400 for the U.S. Army Reserve in fiscal 2017, which runs Oct. 1, 2016, through Sept. 30, 2017. Although there are many requirements that must be met in order for an

changing or adjusting them wouldn’t be beneficial because it would ultimately


individual to join, Snow said he believes

reduce the quality of the military. "We don't want to sacrifice quality," Snow said. "If we lower the quality, yes we might be able to make our mission - but that's
not good for the organization. The American public has come to expect a qualified Army that can defend the nation. I don't think the American public would like us to lower the quality of those

Rising obesity rates in the U.S. have


joining the Army if they knew it's going to impact our ability to perform the very functions or nation expects us to do."

made recruiting people especially challenging, but Snow said it's a societal issue that the entire
country needs to address early on in order for it to improve. "It really starts with something as simple as what our kids are fed in schools,"
he said. "Changing meals, I think, is one of the ways to address that, eating healthier food earlier. I think a second aspect to that is really working with those who work with the education
department to emphasize the importance of not doing away with physical education programs in elementary school and high school, because that's important. Yes it's a challenge for us, but
it's a challenge for our country." In January, the Armed Forces will implement a five-part test to measure physical fitness, called the occupational physical assessment, to make sure male and
female recruits will meet the physical requirements for the job.

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