De Benedictis, Raffaele (2009) - de Vulgari Eloquentia - Dante's Semiotic Workshop

De vulgati eloquentia; Dante's Semiotic Workshop
Author(s): Raffaele de Benedictis

Source: Italica, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Summer, 2009), pp. 189-211
Published by: American Association of Teachers of Italian
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De vulgari eloquentia: Dante's
Semiotic Workshop
Hoc equidem signum est ipsum subjectum

Nobile de quo loquimur: nam sensuale
Quid est, in quantum sonus est; rationale
Vero, in quantum aliquid significare videtur
ad placitum (De Vulgari Eloquentia 1.3.3).
[This sign is precisely the noble subject

of my treatise: for it is sensory in that it is
sound and rational in that it can be seen to
signify anything, according to man's will.]1
The De vulgari eloquentia, Dante's treatise on the eminent vernacular,

is a major source of Dante's semiotics applied to language. He begins
this work by making a distinction between natural and artificial lan-
guages. On the one hand he defines the vernacular as a natural lan-
guage insofar as it is learned by humans from a very young age, specif-
ically from the time in which they begin to articulate words. On the
other hand, there is the artificial language or grammatical language,
the one which is learned through education, such as Latin and Greek.
Dante considers the vernacular nobler than the grammatical language
because it is the very first language human beings use as their means
of communication due to the fact that it is learned naturally, although
natural languages are existent in a variety of types and forms in all
parts of the world.
The passage cited above addresses key elements regarding Dante's
theory of language. It is important from the beginning to keep in mind
that Dante, like St. Augustine, fuses a theory of sign with a theory of
language;2 although in the D.V.E. Dante, unlike St. Augustine, is
merely dealing with verbal signs. He defines language as "rational and
sensory sign" ("rationale signum et sensibile"). The first distinction the
reader should make here is that Dante views words as signs, and
the sensory and rational traits of words are tied together by means of
a signic relationship. For Dante the "sensory sign" ("signum sensibile")
corresponds to the material aspect of words which is made up of the
Italica Volume 86 Number 2 (2009)
190 Raffaele De Benedictis
phonic component. The phonic component is different from language

to language because languages are formed arbitrarily; they are formed
according to ways in which a community of speakers decides to or-
ganize its linguistic paradigm. As a result of the sound, each language
subdivides the sound continuum in different ways. Therefore we may
have many sound continua to refer to the same object of signification,
or, said differently, we may have many utterances from different lan-
guages to refer to the same "designated" {"designatimi") or what is des-
ignated by the sound-sign.
Further, on the issue of sound, Dante clearly states the difference
between sound as "true language" ("vera locutio") which is proper to
humans, from sound as "imitation of our [human] sound" ("imitatio
soni nostre voeis") which is proper to animals. He uses the example of
the magpies and says that they "imitate us insofar as we emit sounds
and not because we speak" ("imitari nos in quantum sonamus, sea non in
quantum loquimur" , D.V.E. 1.2.7). Such a distinction presents a parallel
with Aristotle's De interpretatione 16a, 26-30,3 in which the philosopher
distinguishes on the one hand articulate sounds that are proper to lan-
guage and, therefore, conventional; on the other hand, the inarticulate
ones, those of animals, for example, which are considered natural.
Further in De interpretatione 16a, 27-29 and in Poetics 1456b, 22-24,
Aristotle describes the notions of divisibility and combinability of
sounds regarding names which are proper to human speech because
dominated by convention. The function of convention in human
speech is to combine the smallest meaningless sounds (letters) into
meaningful utterances (articulate names). Instead animal sounds are
indivisible and non-combinable and as such cannot be called lettered
sounds. They are "unlettered" ("agmmmatoi") as he calls them in the De
interpretatione 16a, 27-29. They are sounds that cannot be broken down
into letters because not governed by convention. Notwithstanding, the
shortcomings of combinability and divisibility of animal sounds are
nonetheless "significant noise" ("semantikos psophos"). Hence, Dante,
consistent with Aristotle's notion of animal utterance, affirms that it is
primarily a sensory act. For Dante animals produce sounds by means
of natural instinct and not as a result of a rational process. Therefore,
"all animals of the same species have the same actions and passions,
so that they may know others through themselves" ("omnibus eiusdem
speciei sunt iidem actus et passions, et sic possunt per próprios alíenos
cognoscere", D.V.E. 1.2.5).
St. Augustine, on the other hand, includes animal sounds in the cat-
egory of human linguistic signs. He uses the example of the sounds
emitted by the cock to inform the hen that he has found food, ("Nam et
gallus gallinaceus reperto cibo dat signum vocis gallinae"). According to
him, animals too, have certain signs among themselves by which they
make known the desires in their mind ("Habent etiam bestiae quaedam
Dante's Semiotic Workshop 191
inter se signa, quibus produnt adpetitum animi sui").4 Here Dante moves
away from St. Augustine and follows both the Aristotelian and the
Modist binary distinction between natural signs and conventional
signs. Even though certain animal sounds may contain intentionality
or the desire to communicate, there is, however, a noticeable difference
between intentionality and rationality. This is the crucial point that
distinguishes human verbal signs from other signs, including those of
animals.
Following the distinction between articulate and inarticulate utter-
ances, and having recognized as a premise that for Dante "among all
creatures only man received the gift of speech since only man needed
it" ("soli homini datum est loqui" , D.V.E. 1.2.8), the linguistic notion of
how humans and animals produce significant sounds brings into dis-
cussion the signic function of said sounds. The first step toward the ex-
position of signs in relation to sound is Aristotle's De intepretatione.
Here the articulate sounds or those which are generated by words
are called "symbols" (Gr. "cnjfißoXa", Lat. "symbola") and not "signs"
(Gr. "crriiJieia", Lat. "semeia"), regardless of the fact that this last term
is also used by Aristotle. At first sight the reader might think that he
uses both terms interchangeably and in the same sense, yet looking at
his work on rhetoric, we come to realize that he calls "signs" ("semeia")
the signs that are necessary or what he also calls (Gr. "tsk/jltjplov", Lat.
"tekmërion"):
. . . Necessary signs are called tekmëria; those which are not necessary
have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary signs from which a
logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called
tekmërion; for when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they
think that they are bringing forward a tekmërion, something as it were
proved and concluded; for in the old language tekmar and peras have the
same meaning (limit, conclusion).
Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for
instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because Socrates was
both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though the particular
statement is true, it can be refuted, because it cannot be reduced to
syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill,
because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has
milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a tekmërion) for only
in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument irrefutable. Other signs are
related as the universal to the particular, for instance, if one were to say that
it is a sign that this man has a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if
the fact be true, this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for a man
to breathe hard without having a fever.
We have now explained the meaning of a probability, of sign, and
necessary sign, and the difference between them; in the Analytics we have
defined them more clearly and stated why some of them can be converted
into logical syllogisms, while others cannot.5
In the strict logical sense, as of course Aristotle expressed the notion of

sign in the specificity of [it] being "necessary" ("tekmêrion"), that is, as
an existing condition of a relation between cause and effect, sign must
be taken as symptom. The notion of sign Aristotle expounds in De in-
tepretatione if cross-referenced by Rhetorica and Analytica priora, we
are able to recognize the distinction he makes between "symbola" and
"sêmeïa". It is quite comprehensible that from the passage quoted
above and the citation provided in the note from Analytica one may
realize that he uses the term "semeia" to refer to those signs which are
endowed with a necessary condition {"tekmêrion"), they are sorts of
natural signs or symptoms dominated by a syllogistic relation of cause
and effect. It is what, later on, Peirce calls "indices" , that is, signs whose
relation to their object does not lie in the mental association but "signi-
fies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with it. Of this
nature are all natural signs and physical symptoms."6
"Symbola" ', on the other hand, are those signs that intrinsically do
not require a necessary condition ("tekmêrion") or the quality of being
de facto connected with the object. They are instead referred to as signs
correlated with a meaning by means of convention "Kara ovvOrJKrjv"
("kata synthêkên"). For such signs that are correlated with a meaning
conventionally, Aristotle chose "symbola" over "semeia" or "tekmêria"
because the type of correlation set up by the symbol is a rather com-
plex one. "For Aristotle, the symbolic nature of language with respect
to the real world is a symbolism at two removes, since the name stands
for an image which is itself an image of a thing; therefore (according to
the rules of logical organization followed in De interpretatione), the item
at the left corner of the triangle must be interchangeable with what
stands at the apex/'7
1 . affections of the soul (pathëmata en têi psychêi)

2. thoughts ( noëmata)
/ ' motivated
conventional / / ' relationship
relationship / '
spoken sounds things

(ta en têi phonci) (prágmata)
Figure 2.1
In fact, the relationship between the two terms, that is, the spoken
sounds and affections of the soul is not causally motivated but con-
ventionally correlated, thus both terms are reciprocal and logically in-
terchangeable. Different, on the other hand, is the relationship between
the affections of the soul and things because the mental experience
manifested in the form of thoughts or concepts, for the simple fact that
such an experience takes place, is pointing something out. It is:
... a proof or a symptom that there exist concepts in the soul of the utterer.
Such a statement may seem trivial; certainly the fact that someone speaks is
a symptom of the fact that one has something to say. Nevertheless, the
statement is of a higher semiotic interest because it appears that not only
natural facts (such as smoke, milk, or a scar) can be signs (or symptoms),
but that also "sounds" (in this framework: the sounds emitted intentionally
by human beings as words) can assume two functions. Vocal sounds are
symbols when they are correlated with meaning which they conventionally
display, but are signs (or symptoms or indexes) when they reveal the
presence of a meaning, a concept, an idea.8
As we can see from Eco' s explanation, the dynamic function of the

vocal sound is dual. On the one hand it provides us with the notion of
being sign in relation to a process, and insofar as it is correlated with
meaning conventionally significant. On the other hand, it is sign in re-
lation to a natural cause insofar as it manifests {"deloüsi") something,
'just as a symptom manifests its own cause.' This to say that a mani-
fested meaning is self-evident, it cannot be detached from its cause,
and, therefore, it constitutes a motivated relationship between what
it is (mental experience) and that which it manifests (something).
Following Eco's explanation we come to realize that even the symbolic
sign is not entirely conventional but it shares, to some extent, an in-
dexical value. However, remaining within the Aristotelian description,
we must say that the Stagirite did not quite make such a distinction; he
keeps the motivated sign ("tekmêrion") distinct from the conventional
one d'symbolon"). The conjoint conventional and motivated character-
istic that Eco attributes to the symbolic sign is in part prompted by
Aristotle's notion of nouns9 and more so by Peirce's notion of signs. It
is, however, in Peirce's work that Eco finds a convincing account of
sign and the quality of being simultaneously conventional and moti-
vated. Peirce emphasizes such an idea regarding indexical signs:
Indices, on the other hand, furnish positive assurance of the reality and
the nearness of their Objects. But with the assurance there goes no insight
into the nature of those Objects. The same perceptible may, however,
function doubly as a Sign. That footprint that Robinson Crusoe found in the
sand, and which has been stamped in the granite of fame, was an Index to
him that some creature was on his island, and at the same time, as a Symbol,
called up the idea of man.
(CP. 4.531)
Not only the indexical but equally the iconic sign contains what Peirce
calls "Symbolide Features" for the fact that icons too are primarily
signs of the object for which they stand. Being Peirce' s definition of
sign triadic, that is, "three things are concerned in the functioning of a
Sign; the Sign itself, its Object, and its Interprétant" (CP. 4.532), Eco,
from a purely logical stand point, was able to draw the conclusion that
even symbolic signs must share indexical characteristics or, to some
extent, a motivated relation with the object of signification for the fact
that, as it is the case for indexical signs, they too (the symbolic ones)
point out "a meaning, a concept, an idea" (Eco 6) about said object of
signification. Therefore, contemporary semioticians, especially those
who follow Peirce and concur with Eco's further elaboration of the the-
ory of sign, consider the symbolic, the indexical, and the iconic signs
neither entirely conventional nor entirely motivated; even though
symbolic signs are primarily conventional and the indexical and iconic
ones primarily motivated.
The other material aspect Dante implies in the expression "signum
sensibile" is the written form of language: "I say 'form' with reference
both to the words used for things, and to the construction of words,
and to the arrangement of the construction ("Dico autem 'formam' et
quantum ad reum vocabula et quantum ad vocabulorum constructionem et
quantum ad constructionis prolationem" , D.V.E. 1.6.4). Although Dante in
the first book focuses primarily on the spoken aspect of language, the
other, the written aspect is nonetheless implicitly contained in the
"signum sensibile". It is understandable that he speaks of "sound"
("sonus") to refer to the sensory part of the eminent vernacular because
the model for which he is searching does not exist, it is an illustrious,
cardinal, courtly, and curial Italian vernacular, which belongs to every
city but seems to belong to none ("dicimus illustre, cardinale, aulicum et
curiale vulgäre in latió, quod omnis latie civilitatis est et nullius esse vide-
tur" , D.V.E. 1.16.6). It only appears in bits and pieces traceable in
works of major poets. It is in a state of undeveloped formation lacking
those specific rules governing its grammatical principles. Hence, Dante
knows very well that it would be untimely and inappropriate to speak
of the written form regarding such an eminent vernacular. Moreover,
those dialects among which Dante attempts to find the eminent one do
not claim to have a written tradition. Their tradition is fundamentally
oral, the primary condition of what he calls "natural" ("naturalis"). At
this point let us try to recreate a possible hypothesis by which Dante
formed his notion of language semiotically.
As Maria Corti reminds us of the "witty remark" once made by
Carlo Dionisotti regarding the undisputable difference between
Petrarch's library and Dante's, which consists in the fact that "while
we know the first, and in part we possess it, the second is unknown."10
It is with such a view in mind that we also attempt to trace Aristotelian
intertextual influences, as well as other influences, that may have con-

tributed in the shaping of Dante's notion of language semiotically.
Dante's knowledge of Aristotle's De interpretatione is certain, and was
available in translation through the commentary tradition. Important
to remember is Ammonius' commentary (ca. 435/445-517/526), which
in addition to serving as a source for other commentators and as a
method of exegesis, through the translation by William of Moerbeke
(ca. 1215-1286), became influential on Aquinas and on medieval
Aristotelian philosophy and semantics. Severinus Boethius' (480-524/
525) translation and commentaries of the De interpretatione were the
other primary source for the transmission of Aristotle's works on logic
before the rise of the universities. Boethius works probably survived
because they were included in Alcuin's plan of revival of scholarship
at the schools of writing of Charlemagne. Augustine's theory of signs
and theory of language deriving from his De dialéctica, De magistro,
and the De doctrina Christiana also serve as a valuable source of under-
standing Dante's semiotics and his explicit aim to create a junction
between a theory of language and a theory of signs.
It is with the second half of the 13th century that takes place an elab-
oration of a theory of signs as a result of the interplay of Aristotelian
and Augustinian influences. Ideas on the subject of signs not only were
a matter of discussions among theologians but rapidly began to invade
the faculties of arts. It is at the University of Paris that between 1260-
1280 developed the Modist movement. During this time, the sign is in-
creasingly taken as the basic concept of the linguistic science (scientia
sermocinalis)}1 The Modist movement adopted a type of Aristotelism
which was not the canonical one supported by Albert the Great and
Thomas Aquinas, but rather the one whose precursor was Ibn-Rushd
(Averroes, 1126-1198) and which provided no intentional convergence
with the Christian belief. This new model of Averroistic Aristotelism,
also known as radical Aristotelism, found its most important follow-
ers, among others, in Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. They,
with the whole group of the Parisian avanguard (Simon, Martin, John,
and later culminating in Thomas of Erfurt with his Grammatica specula-
tiva), put forward a theory of signs that sometimes would be in agree-
ment and others in disagreement with that of the canonical model.
For our purpose it is important to recognize that both models
formed the auctoritates of Dante's semiotic theory (Corti, "La teoria"
70). The appellative of Modist refers to the central role that the modes
of signifying (modi significando acquired in the formulation of their
theory of speculative grammar. For these thinkers grammar acquired
the stature of a true science, and all facts had to be explained by means
of reason and not simply by limiting the argument to their description.
More specifically, and as Corti clearly illustrates, the Modists' notion
of verbal sign involves three parts: there is the res extra, a sort of entity
independent from our knowledge that exists in nature, and to which

belong the modes of being (modi essendi). Next, there are the modes of
understanding (modi intelligendi) that pertain to human beings and are
the same for all humankind. It is from the modes of understanding that
humans are able to produce that which is known (res intellecta) or
meaning (significatum). However, it is only through the modes of signi-
fying (modi significando that the meaning is correlated to a signifier
(vox). It is by means of such a correlation that the vox becomes sign
(signum) and the thing (res) becomes the thing signified (res significata,
Corti, "La teoria" 72). One further aspect of the sign which the Modists
share unaltered with Aristotle is the arbitrary relation between the sig-
nifier and the signified. Such a relation takes place in historical reality
(ex institutione) and is conventional (ad placitum).
The Modist influence on Dante was significant and left an indelible
mark particularly in his treatise on the vernacular. Indications which
emphasize the modes of signification in the D.V.E. can be discerned
from the very beginning of Book One. In defining the eminent vernac-
ular Dante states:
. . . vulgärem locutionem appellamus earn qua infants assuefiunt ab

assistentibus, cum primitus distinguere voces incipient, vel, quod brevius
dici potest, vulgärem locutionem asserimus, quam sine omni regula
nutricem imitantes accipimus" (1.1.2).
[. . . I define the vernacular as the language which children gather from

those around them when they first begin to articulate words; or more briefly,
that which we learn without any rules at all by imitating our nurses.]
The other language, the one of secondary formation, is the one which
. . . Romani gramaticam vocaverunt. Hanc quidem secundariam Greci
habent et alii, sed non omnes; ad habitum vero huius pauci perveniunt,
quia no nisi per spatium temporis et studii assiduitatem, regulamur et
doctrinamur in illa. (D. V.E.I. 1.3)
[. . . the Romans called grammar. This secondary language is also

possessed by the Greeks and others, but not by all; and indeed few attain it
because it is only in the course of time and by assiduous study that we
become schooled in its rules and art.]
Between the two, Dante holds the vernacular to be the nobler language
Harum quoque duarum nobilior est vulgaris: turn quia prima fuit hu-
mano generi usitata; turn quia totus orbis ipsa perfruitur, licet in diversas
prolationes et vocabula sit divisa; turn quia naturalis est nobis, cum illa
potius artificialis existât. (D. V.E. 1.1 A)
[Now of the two the nobler is the vernacular: first because it is the first
language ever spoken by mankind; second because the whole world uses it
though in diverse pronunciations and forms; finally because it is natural to
us while the other is more the product of art.]
Noteworthy characteristics contained particularly in the last pas-

sage are the ones pointing toward the modes of signifying of both
the eminent vernacular and the grammatical language. In order to ad-
equately grasp Dante's theory of language in the D.V.E. the reader is
compelled to use semiotic resources. It is merely through an in-depth
reflection on signs that due attention can be turned to and provide
answers for his depiction of the eminent vernacular as the language
which was first spoken by mankind {"prima fuit humano generi usiïaïa"),
and that the whole world uses it though in different pronunciations
and forms ("totus orbis ipsa perfruitur, licet in diversas prolationes et vocab-
ula sit divisa"). The central questions the reader has to answer are:
What does Dante mean by calling the vernacular the language that was
first spoken by mankind? And according to what reason does he state
that the whole world uses it though in diverse pronunciations and
forms? We may begin to answer the first question by putting at the
center of our attention the kind of relation Dante finds between names
(nomina) and the object (res). But, before we do so we must yield con-
cern to the condition of such a relation and determine whether all
names are the result of things (nomina sunt consequentia rerum)u or
rather, as Isidore of Seville maintained, that some names are imposed
not according to nature but arbitrarily and can be called conventional
("Non omnia nomina a veteribus secundum naturam imposita sunt, sed
quaedam et secundum placitu").13 On this point too, the answer Dante
provides in the D.V.E. is based on the modi significandi of the specula-
tive grammarians. There are two categories of modes of signification:
1) innate or motivated modes of signification (modi significandi sub-
stantiates) which consist of linguistic rules that are the same for all hu-
mans and which contain linguistic universais; 2) arbitrary modes of
signification (modi significandi accidentals) which correspond to actual
languages. Their modes of signifying are based on the arbitrary/
conventional relationship between a signifier and a signified (Corti,
"La teoria", 72).
In the D.V.E. Dante endeavors to draw such a dichotomous condi-
tion in order to clarify the role of both languages, namely the one the
"Romans called grammar" ("Romani gramaticam vocaverunt") and the
"vernacular" ("vulgärem locutionem"). For him both languages contain
important elements which allow humans to re-discover the relation of
necessity there once was between Adam's language ("La lingua ch'io
parlai" Paradiso 26.124) and God, between the names (nomina) and
essence (res extra or res per se).u On the one hand grammar provides an
awareness that permits humans to extrapolate those intrinsic rules that
function as universais for the modes of signifying and for the specific
purpose to rehabilitate such a relation of necessity. Through such rules,
which are the same in all languages, and also a view that was shared
by both the speculative grammarians and Dante, one is able to come to
grips with the type of organization and the order that governs the
modes of signifying based precisely on the rapport of necessity be-
tween the nomina and the res extra. For Dante there is no doubt that the
linguistic faculty is permanent and immutable among all members of
the human species and grammar represents such a concept since "the
art of grammar [. . .] is nothing but a certain unalterable identity of
speech unchanged by time and place" {"gramática nichil aliud est quam
quedam inalterabilis locutionis idemptitas diversis temporibus atque locis" ,
D.V.E. 1.9.11). On the other hand, Dante attempts to find the eminent
vernacular by searching among all the Italian dialects and he does not
come up with a suitable one. For Dante there is no dialect that could be
actualized in this or that vernacular and having the stature of the emi-
nent one. It is certainly so, considering that the eminent vernacular for
him is the instrument of poetic expression. As such, "language signs"
{"signa locutionis"), especially those upon which rests the substantiales
modes of signifying, cannot be actualized in a well defined model, but
in the model that is not a model. The eminent vernacular is "illustri-
ous, cardinal, courtly, curial" {"illustre, cardinale, aulicum, curiale"). It is
an instrument of expression beyond all models, the true medium capa-
ble of immortalizing truth. That which, along with grammar, offers the
possibility to find the lost relation of necessity between the nomina and
the res extra, between the nomina and God, as we will see in the speci-
ficity of the Divine Comedy.
How does Dante bring together the "vernacular" {"vulgaris locutio")
and "grammar" {"locutio secundaria") in order to find the eminent ver-
nacular? Although both forms of language are subject to changes in
time and space, since they are created by man, and "man is a most
unstable and changeable animal" {"homo sit instabilissimum atque vari-
abilissimum animal"), therefore every language "cannot be durable or
lasting but must vary according to time and place like other human
things such as manners and customs" {"nee durabilis nee continua esse
potest, sed sicut alia que nostra sunt, puta mores et habitus, per locorum tem-
porumque distantias variari oportet" , D.V.E. 1.9.6). Nonetheless, grammar
provides an understanding for that innate linguistic faculty which is
proper to humans,15 and the vernacular is able to craft the concrete ac-
tualization of said linguistic faculty which grammar provides only as
a form of meta-linguistic awareness. Thus, vernacular and grammar
together are repositories of those essential attributes that the eminent
vernacular should contain, that which he calls illustrious, cardinal,
courtly, and curial.
An aspect worth noting in the D.V.E. is the use Dante makes of
"ydioma", "lingua", "loquela", and "locutio", for which Dante's lexical
choices are not accidental according to Eco.16 He suggests that when
Dante uses "ydioma", "lingua" , and "loquela" he is referring to the
Saussurrian notion of langue. Instead when he uses "locuïio" he refers

to a wider linguistic range which must be understood as parole, since
Dante often uses it in contexts which suggest the human linguistic fac-
ulty and the entire activity of parole (La ricerca 46). This is a striking
point for the on-going critical debate, especially after Pier Vincenzo
Mengaldo's view of the D.V.E. as a treatise containing noticeable "con-
traddizioni teoriche".17 In addition to the views expressed by other
Dante scholars who maintain logical conciliatory positions in reply to
Mengaldo's opposite view of "theoretical contradictions", I suggest
that Dante's theoretical framework of the D.V.E. contains all the char-
acteristics for an elaboration of a modern theory of language which is
essentially dealt with as a theory of verbal signs.
By defining the human language as "rational and sensory sign"
("rationale signum et sensuale" , D.V.E. 1.3.3), Dante gives no indication
that such a sign has any real connections with its object. As it would be,
for example, for the iconic sign (the sign perceived as resembling or
possessing some characteristics or qualities of the signified, such as a
picture, onomatopoeia, gesture imitations, etc.). Or the indexical sign
(the sign which is somehow directly connected physically or causally
to the signified. Examples of this type would be natural signs, medical
symptoms, measuring instruments, signals, pointers, etc.). The linguis-
tic sign for Dante is basically arbitrary, yet not entirely arbitrary as it
appears in the aforementioned citation. For it is somewhat comparable
to what six centuries later Ferdinand de Saussure' s general definition
of the linguistic sign is and what Charles Senders Peirce referred to as
symbolic sign. Such a comparison, however, requires some explana-
tory remarks. Although Dante speaks of arbitrariness regarding the
linguistic sign, the central point of his treatise is to find the vanished
relation between the signa and the res in order to create a model for the
eminent vernacular. Dante's notion of sign, although arbitrary in its
great part, contains nonetheless traces of the Aristotelian signic neces-
sity ("tekmërion"). Yet Dante's traces of necessity contained in the lin-
guistic sign are different from Aristotle's. While for Aristotle the notion
of necessity has a purely logical connection with its object, and the
signs he discusses are essentially non-linguistic signs ("semeia" or
"tekmëria" which are explainable syllogistically, such as symptoms), for
Dante even the linguistic signs or what Aristotle calls "symbols"
("symbola") acquire in part the function of necessity in relation to their
object (res extra). On this precise aspect, Dante was influenced by the
Modist ideas circulating not only in Paris but also in Bologna and var-
ious parts of Tuscany (Corti, Dante 15, 30) and became a sort of theo-
retical debate in places of intellectual gatherings. By sharing the
Modist view of a universal grammar, which is essentially based on the
modi significanti, Dante added novelty to his theory of the eminent
vernacular. The verbal sign is certainly arbitrary since it signifies "ad

placitum" ' , and according to the Modists it is the accidental form of
language {forma accidentals locutionis). Nonetheless, the same verbal
sign contains also the substantial form of language (forma substantiales
locutionis) which corresponds to those innate linguistic universais that
function as the formal principles of language itself. This is possible be-
cause humans, by nature, are endowed with linguistic ability, and God
created them upon the creation of the human soul ("dicimus certam for-
mam locutionis a Deo cum anima prima concreatam fuisse" f D.V.E. 1.6 .4).
The idea of a human innate predisposition for "certam formam locutio-
nis" is irrefutable in the D.V.E. to the point that man "[eagerly] spoke
at once as soon as he had received breath from life-giving Power", and
for Dante "it is more human in man to make himself heard than to hear}*
provided that he is heard and hears as a man" ("loquentem primum, mox
post afflatus est ab animante Virtute, incunctanter fuisse locutum. Nam in
homine sentiri humanius credimus quam sentire, dummodo sentiatur et sen-
tiat taquam homo" , 1.5.1).
In the attempt to reconcile arbitrariness and necessity in the correla-
tion between the signa and the res, Dante has no other choice but to use
an original theory of signs, whereby both modes of signifying, that is,
accidental and substantial must be embedded in the form of under-
standing of humans, which is in itself a semiotic process. This condi-
tion makes Dante's theory of signs a very contemporary one in that the
linguistic ability of humans is co-created with the modi essendi, and the
latter are contained in the res extra, in the Object which provides a rap-
port of causality between the modi signiflcandi substantiales and the res
extra. Further, all modes of signifying are an outcome of our ways of
understanding things (modi intellingendi) , and which produce images
of the Object. As a result of this process of knowing, images are in-
evitably removed from the essence of the Object. Therefore, the rela-
tion between the nomina and the res takes place by means of our mode
of knowing the res (modi intelligendi) for the reason that any mental
phenomenon, any intellectual act foresees a content pointing in the di-
rection of the intentional object. Not coincidentally, a similar idea can
be found in Siger of Brabant.19 The following illustration may clarify
this notion. You will notice that the modi signiflcandi substantiales main-
tain two placement values: 1) a direct one with the res through the in-
nate speech ability of humans; 2) an indirect one which is mediated by
the speech identity (locutionis ydemptitas) and is immanent in the signa.
Dante's idea of object does not simply refer to any object, but to the
Object, to the res extra or to the Divine Object which is God. The lin-
guistic sign of the eminent vernacular, therefore, while being arbitrary
for the fact that between the signifier and the signified there is not a re-
lation of necessity, and this is the reason for the proliferation of lan-
guages, it nonetheless upholds, by means of its rigorously semiotic
- modi intelligendi
- res significata
- modi significandi substantiales
locutionis / '
ydemptitas / n.
n^ - modi essendi
- res extra
- Signum
- vox
- modi significandi accidentales Figure 2.2
nature, traces of correlation with the Divine Object. The human lin-
guistic aptitude, as a result of combinable elements residing in the in-
tellectual faculties of creating signs and in the natural ability to pre-
serve the signic, even if faint, value of the Divine Object because it is
innate in the modi essendi, allows Dante to assert that such attributes
can be found only in the eminent vernacular. A model this latter one
that does not exist and neither is Dante able to find it among the four-
teen Italian dialects. The only true model for Dante is the one that is
not a model; that is, the poetic language, which manifests itself unpre-
dictably between a state of presence and of evanesce. The twofold
theoretical process which grounds the eminent vernacular between the
existential condition of presence of the signa and the evanescence of
the res points out the crucial role of discourse and its semiotic implica-
tions which also clarifies the Dantean unpredictability of the poetic
language as the interplay between presence and evanescence.
The expression "simple speech signs" {"simplicíssima signa
locutionis", D.V.E. 1.16.3) Dante uses to refer to the eminent vernacular
are the simple speech signs that make up the linguistic rules common
to all Italian dialects, yet proper to none. This is a textual condition
pointing in the direction of the discursive relevance of the treatise,
since Dante here endeavors to find an inimitable model for poetic ex-
pression. Dante's attempt, as we all know, is only ideal because no lan-
guage is fully endowed with such faculties. Nonetheless, all languages
may become the verbal medium for poetic expression as a result of
their semiotic nature and provided that they conform to the character-
istics of being illustrious, cardinal, courtly, and curial. The semiotic
nature of language, being dialogic in its true sense, constantly recalls a
collaborative engagement between language (which contains signs
that are confirmed and conventionalized by the system through their
internal functioning dialogism and a community of speakers) and that

which has the potential capability and dynamism to produce new
signs that may be identified as discourse.
In trying to describe how a semiotics of discourse works in Dante,
we must attempt to elucidate first its characteristics from a theoretical
point of view and on the level of its meta-linguistic functioning. The
first theoretical obstacle we need to overcome is how the signifying
process, which engages both the modi significant accidentales and the
modi significandi substantiates, is achievable and applicable to the emi-
nent vernacular. In other words, to overcome such an obstacle how
does Dante actualize the eminent vernacular since he cannot find a
model for it? And the answer resides exactly in the discourse of the
eminent vernacular because discourse is like a semiotic grammar
which regulates reasonable signifying paths and makes them realize in
action through the signa and in the form of lived experience. In order
to actualize simultaneously modes of signifying that are accidentals and
substantiales, discourse must be viewed as a dynamic mechanism of
structuring speech acts mediating between the Saussurian langue and
parole and ruling over the entire process of formation of such speech
acts. It is first of all a form of human presence which engages unfore-
seen responses on the part of the actant. It is from the preliminary step
of presence that conditions develop for a generative trajectory of dis-
course able to produce signs, and by means of signs discourse is actu-
alized. The actualization of discourse is made possible because from a
content-based beginning, discourse must move in the direction of a
grammar of expression which is fundamentally a semiotic production.
Also, discourse formation entails challenging and pushing in the back-
ground other existing discourses. The content-based beginning is not
empty beginning but a point of departure linked with already-existing
categories of signification whereby discourse, observed as the moment
of enunciation in action, becomes sign only when it reaches the end of
its course; it is a series of speech acts semiotized a posteriori. Yet it is
exactly this undefined aspect of language that interests us the most
because it is the dynamism of the utterance in its process of becoming
that allows us to grasp the poetic instant of language, the instant in
which the modi significandi accidentales and substantiales converge and
become actualized, even if for a short-lived instant, in what Dante calls
the eminent vernacular.
Discourse is a complex mode of signifying and the way Dante theo-
rizes it in the D.V.E. is indicative of such a complexity. The only possi-
ble actualization of the eminent vernacular is through poetry and in
the poetic type of the song. The song is "the most excellent construc-
tion" ("supremam constructionem" , 2.6.7), and the "action of composing
words that are set to a metric form" {"actio completa dictantis verba mod-
ulationi armonizata" , 2.8.6). This "actio completa dictantis verba", or the
poet's specific task of 'binding words' of Conv. 4.6.3, requires intuition

which lives only through discourse as an instant of semiotic abduction.
Here abduction is taken in the Peircian sense, that is, as "the process of
forming explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which
introduces any new idea" (CP 5.171). It is basically the linguistic intu-
ition that brings about added value to the moment in which it happens
and actively partakes in the making of discourse. The starting point of
this moment is not semiotically empty but semiotically flowing in the
universe of related possibilities of signification, and the unique combi-
nation of such related possibilities orients the poet toward the forma-
tion of new meaning which lives in the newly combined form of the
signa. It can be compared somehow to what Lotman called semios-
phere or "the semiotic space necessary for the existence and function-
ing of languages, not the sum total of different languages; in a sense
the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant interaction
with languages" (Lotman, Universe 123). Moreover, the act that pro-
duces abduction is an all-encompassing one in that it spontaneously
takes into account and activates all fields of presence which leads the
reader to look at what happens to discourse seen as a form of improv-
isation in action. From a logical point of view, the linguistic intuition
deriving from the act of abduction is not predetermined or rehearsed.
Thus it qualifies as improvisation in action, as an extemporal act rely-
ing on the shared availability of all external signs impacting the inner
world of the poet and manifesting itself in a responsive mode, which
ultimately leaves behind the poetic creation in the linguistic signs.
Dante's greatest challenge in the D.V.E. is that of finding a way to make
the eminent vernacular live verbally because it is therein he finds the
greatest model of the "primordial language" {"primiloquium") used by
Adam. From the beginning of Book One to the end of Book Two (al-
though Dante could have told us more about the eminent vernacular
had he completed the treatise) the only possible way to make it con-
crete is through poetry. Theoretically, Dante can explain the possibility
of such a concretization only by means of a semiotics of discourse.
But let us proceed in order and try first to eliminate the apparent
"theoretical contradictions" emerging from the treatise. Dante begins
by saying that between the eminent vernacular and the grammatical
language, nobler among the two is the vernacular. It is so because the
eminent vernacular is natural (but also unstable) whereas the "gram-
matical language" {"gramática") is artificial ("vulgaris . . . naturalis est
nobis . . . [gramática] artificialis existât" , 1.1.4). Dante also tells us that the
grammatical language, such as Latin and/or Greek, is indispensable
because it contains a speech identity which is inalterable through
times and places {"gramática nichil aliud est quam quedam inalterabilis
locutionis ydemptitas diversis temporibus atque loci" , 1.9.11). It is governed
by the consensus of many nations, and it is not subject to individual
arbitrariness ("de comuni consensus multarum gentium fuerit regulate,

nulli singulari arbitrio videtur obnoxia" , 1.9.11). These two apparently
contradictory statements constitute the stumbling block of the on-
going critical debate of Dante scholarship because on the one hand
Dante describes the vernacular as the model to follow, but it is also
subject to changes and without rules; on the other hand the grammati-
cal language, which is artificial and that he does not recommended as
the model to follow, happens to have continuity and commonality
among various nations of the world. In reality Dante is very coherent
with his theoretical approach and the alleged contradictions can be
easily overcome if we reply by saying that the vernacular, which is nat-
ural but unstable and without rules, is not what Dante calls the eminent
vernacular. And neither does Dante attempt to compare any type of
vernacular (Sicilian, Florentine, etc.) with the eminent one. The emi-
nent vernacular claims no model among the vernaculars. The only
characteristic it shares with them is that of being natural, and further
down we will discuss how it is so. In regards to gramática, Dante makes
reference to "linguistic universais" (" 'gramática facultatif' ' , 1.9.11) which
are intrinsically present in languages that are governed by rules and
that are not subject to noticeable changes, as would be the case for
Latin and /or Greek. What does all this mean and how can a semiotics
of discourse prove to land usefulness to the on-going critical debate?
Again, Dante's preoccupation in the D.V.E. is that of making the in-
nate naturalness of the vernacular and the artificialness of the gram-
matical language coexist in a tangible manner. In order to achieve such
a goal he has to move on the meta-linguistic plane of his exposition
and introduce the notion of language in movement. That is, the emi-
nent vernacular can only be actualized at the moment of utterance,
when various factors come into play, such as presence, as the concrete
manifestation of utterance connected with the "body proper, a sensing
body that is the first form that the actant of enunciation takes";20 ab-
duction, as "the process of forming explanatory hypothesis" (Peirce,
CP 5.171) grounded in previous existing cultural codes and able to val-
idate the existence of possible-new worlds; improvisation, as the way
in which the actant is synchronized with the external world and the re-
sponsive inner impact it produces on the individual; and finally per-
formance, which must be taken as the distinctive linguistic action hav-
ing the purpose to accomplish something. It is exactly within this
moment of poetic intuition, a moment of discourse formation that the
eminent vernacular can be actualized in the form of verbal signs.
The semiotics of discourse Dante attempts to draw in the D.V.E. is a
complex one in that the entire process is articulated on a sort of diffi-
cult correlation (ratio difficttis). He is essentially engaged with the semi-
otic theorization of the eminent vernacular as an outcome of the poetic
creation. As such, the poetic creation entails using and discarding at

the same time previously formed linguistic codes. The poet must use
existent linguistic codes in order to test and create new codes.
Semiotically, discourse in the D.V.E. constitutes the crucial act whereby
Adam's "primiloquium" emerges for a short-lived instant within the
contingent reality of the postlapsarian language. Hence, the act itself is
what Dante calls the eminent vernacular, because the Edenic natural-
ness of the vernacular, as natural as the first cry of a new born infant,
connects with the rational process of the artificial language and ulti-
mately produces the experience of truth. The crucial point of the semi-
otics of discourse in the D.V.E. is therefore the perception of the
sensible and intelligible linked with already-existing categories of sig-
nification whereby the enunciation in action becomes sign only when
it reaches the end of its course; it is semiotized a posteriori. Yet it is ex-
actly this undefined aspect of language that interests Dante the most
because it is the dynamism of the utterance in its process of becoming
that allows him to grasp the poetical dimension of language, that
which is-not-yet-sign in order to offer something new. Once this is suc-
cessfully achieved, those codes which were previously available to the
poet are not important any longer, they are simply the expression of a
linguistic conventionality. The actualization of the poetic creation, as
much as the actualization of the eminent vernacular, may have succes-
sive recourses provided that discourse is engaged in its polyhedric
complexity as illustrated above. Therefore, the apparent contradictions
that in one way the eminent vernacular can exist only on "ideally ra-
tional grounds" (Ascoli 138) and, at the same time, the possibility of
making it actual through the poetic creation are abolished. The elimi-
nation of such contradictions is possible because in order to make the
eminent vernacular live poetically it has to acquire a written form. The
eminent vernacular is the outcome of an expression of the soul. The ex-
pression of the soul is an intrinsic faculty of the soul itself, since it was
created by God together with the soul {"cerium formam locutionis a Deo
cum anima prima concreatam fuisse" ,1.6 A). It has to acquire a sensory
form, not only as vox but also as signum, in addition to its rational one
("Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandas inter se conceptions suas
aliquod rationale signum et sensuale habere" , 1.3.2) in order to provide the
condition to be apprehended by humans and to guarantee a sort of en-
during stability. The enduring stability of the eminent vernacular here
does not mean acquiring the form of any grammatical language, but
rather producing the condition for apprehensible-sensory vestiges con-
tained in the historicized signa. Dante, however, does not put it quite
this way but such a conclusion is the only legitimate one in order to
actualize it meta-linguistically in the D.V.E. and, later on, poetically in
the Divine Comedy.
In his theoretical attempt, Dante is faced with the fundamental

problem of finding an adequate way to turn the eminent vernacular
into a system of signification. Semiotically a system of signification
necessitates syntactic rules (rules governing the combination of signs);
semantic rules (rules for the signification of signs); behavioral rules
(rules for the organization of syntactic and semantic rules entailing
human responsive actions). All of these put together form what Eco
calls an "s-code" or "system-code" (A Theory, 38). From the correlation
of various s-codes, ordinary codes are formed for the specific purpose
of producing signification. This is what generally happens for the pro-
duction of codes. The fundamental part of the code is its sign. It is
through the correlation of an expression-level and a content-level that
the code can be formed, replicated, or even changed. Consequently, the
other difficulty with which Dante is faced is the way in which to pro-
duce signs (modi faciendi signa, A Theory 217).
The problematic aspect of sign production emerges from Dante's
survey of the fourteen Italian dialects, among which he is looking for a
suitable model having all the adequate characteristics of the eminent
vernacular. He singles out the ones that have no useful attributes what-
soever such as the Romanesque, the dialects in the region of Ancona
and Friuli, Sardinian, Aquileians and Istrians, Milanese and Berga-
masques, dialects from Casentino and Fratta, those from Perugia,
Orvieto, Viterbo, Civita Castellana, and the Genoese. He then moves
on to discuss the ones that do present positive attributes. Among them
Dante mentions the Sicilian dialect from the court of Frederic II (not
the ordinary one spoken by Sicilians) which is the model used by all
Italians for poetry ("eo quod quicquid poetantur Ytali sicilianum vocatur" ,
1.11.2). Tuscan dialects have many useful attributes but the people
from Tuscany, both plebeians and learned, are foolish to believe they
are the ones to possess the eminent vernacular (". . . Túseos, qui, propter
amentiam suam infroniti titulum sibi vulgaris illustris arrogare videntur" ,
1.13.1). Finally the Bolognese, having the consistency of estimable
gentleness, Dante finds it to be a good model {"Bononienses [. . .] eorum
locution [. . .1 laudabilem suavitatem remaneat temperate: quod procul dubio
nostro iudicio sic esse censemus" , 1.15.5). However, regarding the
Bolognese, Dante calls it a good model in comparison with the munic-
ipal dialects, and not inevitably as a good model for the eminent ver-
nacular ("Itaque si preponentes eos in vulgari sermone sola municipalia
Latinorum vulgaria comparando considérant, allubescentes cocordamus cum
Ulis, si vero simpliciter vulgäre bononiense preferendum existimant, dis-
sentients discordamus ab eis" , 1.15. 6). The linguistic picture drawn above
is indicative of Dante's problematic condition regarding sign produc-
tion on two levels. On the one hand a model based on an actual dialect
does not exist and as a result of it he must create one. On the other
hand, after his failed attempt of finding a suitable model among the
municipal dialects, he dwells on the Sicilian, Tuscan, and Bolognese di-

alects which contain useful attributes. Nonetheless, the examples he
provides are poetic examples, and Dante's model for his eminent ver-
nacular will be a poetic model having the elusive traits "common to
all" dialects and "proper to none" (1.16. 4, 6; 1.18. 2). Dante's endeavor
on these two levels of sign production is dominated by a difficult cor-
relation (ratio diffidlis) because "the expression-type" (or the abstract
model for a concrete signic occurrence, which is the law or rule that
makes signs be recognized as such conventionally or as what Peirce
calls "legisign") is the same as the content-type. This means that the
abstract model correlates an undefined abstract content lacking the
power of denotativeness, since Dante's model claims no unitary and
conventionalized model. The difficult correlation is also due to the fact
that Dante's eminent vernacular is an unprecedented mode of signify-
ing. Thus, in absence of an expression-type, the expression-token (the
actual, concrete signic occurrence or what Peirce recognizes as an actu-
ally existing thing or event which is sign) "is directly accorded to its
content" (Eco, A theory 183).
One last point which in my view captures clearly Dante's semiotic
value of language is his definition of poetry. He defines poetry as "a
fiction that is composed according to the rules of poetic and musical
art" ("fictio rethorica musicaque poita" ', 2.4.2-3). A similar view emerges
from Convivio 2.1.3 where he gives instructions to the reader regarding
the proper way of interpreting poetry. "The first is called the literal,
[and this is the sense that does not go beyond the fictitious words, as in
the fables of poets]" ("L'uno si chiama littérale, [e questo è quello che non si
stende più oltre che la lettera de le parole fittizie, sì come sono le favole de li
poeti"]). "[The next is called allegorical], and this is the one that is hid-
den beneath the cloak of these fables, and is truth hidden beneath a
beautiful lie" (["L'altro si chiama allegorico,] e questo è quello che si
nasconde sotto 7 manto di queste favole, ed è una veritade ascosa sotto bella
menzogna"). True is also that at this specific point of the Conv. there is a
lacuna in the text, and specifically at the point in which Dante provides
the definition for the literal and the allegorical senses, as noted above
for the parts in brackets. However, as pointed out by Charles
Singleton, "no one who knows the general argument of the whole
work will, I think, make serious objection to the way the editors of the
accepted critical text have filled the lacuna."21 The importance of these
citations contained in the D.V.E. and in the Conv. are clearly indications
of Dante's semiotic treatment of the verbal medium. For Dante the
semiotic process is a true functioning system of language. It is a
process which entails the substitution and postponement of its refer-
ent. He calls words "parole fittizie" knowing clearly that their true
functioning system is based on the condition of substitution and post-
ponement of their referent. This is possible because the verbal sign is
bi-planar, it possesses an expression level that needs to be correlated to

a content level. The sign stands for something or an idea which is the
signified object. The signified object is not an actual object but the idea
that develops in the mind of the person who makes such a correlation.
To produce further references about the signified object more corre-
lated signs are required and for these ones others and so on ad infini-
tum. This is what Peirce calls "unlimited semiosis". Dante did not put
it quite this way overtly, nevertheless the "fictio rethorica" of the
D.V.E. and the "parole fittizie", and the "veritade ascosa sotto bella
menzogna" of the Conv. are undoubtedly Dante's meta-semiotic at-
tempts aiming at explaining language as a functioning system of signs.
It is due to these semiotic characteristics of the verbal signs, that is,
substitution and postponement of the object that humans can lie will-
ingly because they have a reason to lie; and unwillingly because the
characteristics of substitution and postponement of the object are con-
tained in the signs and, therefore, the semiotic system is intrinsically a
form of lie itself. Poetry, therefore, which is the creation of possible
worlds by means of words, is primarily a manifestation of lie and only
referentially a manifestation of truth. We will have the opportunity to
return on this issue in further depth elsewhere.
As we can see, the central aspect dominating the D.V.E. is a semiotic
one which entails the formation of discourse as the only signifying
medium able to actualize, although ephemerally, the eminent vernacu-
lar. Discourse is a fluid signifying condition and its mode of significa-
tion relies on the difficult correlation between signs and their content.
If the D.V.E. is Dante's theoretical treatise dealing with the eminent
vernacular in a meta-semio-linguistic manner, the Divine Comedy is the
work in which Dante de facto crafts it.
RAFFAELE DE BENEDICTIS
Wayne State University
NOTES
1 This and all English citations from the De vulgari eloquentia are taken from
Marianne Shapiro's trans.: De vulgari eloquentia, Dante's Book of Exile (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1990) 49. For all the Latin citations from the De
vulgari eloquentia I used Dante Alighieri, opere minori, ed. Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo
(Milano, Napoli: Ricciardi, 1979). Henceforth, the De vulgari eloquentia will be
abbreviated as D.V.E..
2 Dante, like St. Augustine, divides the verbal sign into (i) sensory manifesta-
tion insofar as it is articulated sound ("vox articulata or sonus"); (ii) what is
apprehended by the mind or the signified, which corresponds to Augustine's
"dicibile", "significano". In chapter V of De dialéctica Augustine defines "dictio"
as "a word, but a word which signifies simultaneously both the preceding
units, the word (verbum) itself and that which is produced in the mind by
means of the word ('dicibile')". "Dictio" is "what is spoken not for its own sake,
but for the sake of signifying something else." Augustine's notion of "dicibile" ,
as noted by Giovanni Manetti, Theories of Sign in Classical Antiquity (Blooming-
ton: Indiana UP, 1993) 158, "corresponds, even from the point of view of the lin-
guistic transposition, to the stoic lektón". It is the concept of dictio which accord-
ing to Baratin (quoted in Manetti 158) constitutes "the element of conjunction
between the theory of language and the theory of the sign."
3 The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924).
4S. Aur. Augustini, De doctrina Christiana (Urbe Sacti Ludovici: Officina
Synodi Missouriensi Lutheranae, 1927) 2.2.
5 Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1. 2, 1357b, trans. John H. Freese (Cambridge: Harvard
UP, 1926) 27-29. Analytica priora 2. 27, 70a, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, ed. W. D. Ross
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928): "A probability and a sign are not identical,
but a probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to hap-
pen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a
probability, e.g. 'the envious hate', 'the beloved show affection'. A sign means
a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally approved: for anything
such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other
has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other's being or having
come into being. Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities
or signs, and a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the position
of the middle term in the figures. For it may be taken as in the first figure or the
second or the third. For example the proof that a woman is with child because
she has milk is in the first figure: for to have milk is the middle term. Let A rep-
resent to be with child, B to have milk, C woman. The proof that wise men are
good, since Pittacus is good, comes through the last figure. Let A stand for
good, B for wise men, C for Pittacus. It is true then to affirm both A and B of C:
only men do not say the latter, because they know it, though they state the for-
mer. The proof that a woman is with child because she is pale is meant to come
through the middle figure: for since paleness follows women with child and is
a concomitant of this woman, people suppose it has been proved that she is
with child. Let A stand for paleness, B for being with child, C for woman. Now
if the one proposition is stated, we have only a sign, but if the other is stated as
well, a syllogism, e.g. 'Pittacus is generous, since ambitious men are generous
and Pittacus is ambitious.' Or again 'Wise men are good, since Pittacus is not
only good but wise.' In this way then syllogisms are formed, only that which
proceeds through the first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal),
that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the conclusion
is true, since the syllogism is not universal nor correlative to the matter in
question: for though Pittacus is good, it is not therefore necessary that all other
wise men should be good. But the syllogism which proceeds through the mid-
dle figure is always refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed
when the terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is pale,
and this woman also is pale, it is not necessary that she should be with child.
Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind, but they have the dif-
ferences we have stated."
6 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, 3.361 (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1933) 211.
7 Fig. 2.1 is a reproduction of Manetti's illustration on page 72, fig. 5.1.
8 Umberto Eco, Costantino Marmo, On the Medieval Theory of Signs
(Amsterdam /Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1989) 6.
9 See De interpretatione 1.5, 16a, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). Here Aristotle states: "Just as all men have
not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the
mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also
are those things of which our experiences are the images/' This means that
even if exist various languages to express that which reality evokes in human
beings, the affections of the soul, sensations, and ideas are nonetheless the
same in all humans. According to this Aristotelian view, the noun is not
completely lacking a universal foundation inhabiting thought and reality.
10 Dante a un nuovo crocevia (Firenze: Libreria Commissionaria Sansoni,
1981) 9.
11 For a comprehensive discussion of the Modist influences on Dante,
specifically the ones from Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia, see Maria
Corti, "La teoria del segno nei logici modisti e in Dante", Quaderni del Circolo
Semiológico Siciliano 15-16 (1981): 69-84. From the same author see also Dante a
un nuovo crocevia.
12 "[. . .] con ciò sia cosa che li nomi seguitino le nominate cose, sì come è
scritto: 'Nomina sunt consequentia rerum' " (since it is known that names de-
rive from the things named, as it is written: 'Nomina sunt consequentia rerum' ,
Vita nuova, 13:4).
13 Isidore of Seville is quoted by Ernest Robert Curtius, European Literature
and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton UP,
1973) 497. The following quotation is taken from Dino S. Cervigni, "Beatrice's
Act of Naming," Dino Cervignï s Homepage, 14 may 2008, endnote 25. http://
www.unc.edu/~cervgn/Syllabi%20and%20Docs/B%27s%20Act%20of%20Na
ming.pdf : "On the issue of names imposed ad placitum, see for instance: 'Et
nota, sicut apud logicum discernitur, alium esse sonum non vocem, alium esse
sonum vocem; aliam vocem significativam, aliam non significativam; aliam
significativam naturaliter, aliam ad placitum' (Alan of Lille, Sententiae 243D;
qtd. Ziolkowski 84); '[...] voces significantes sunt ad placitum et ex beneplac-
ito imponentis' (Alan of Lille, Summa 'Quoniam homines' 142; qtd. Ziolkowski
106, with the foil, quotation by Boethius in note: 'Nomen ergo est vox signi-
ficativa secundum placitum'). On the issue of the conventionality of words see
Bloch 44-53".
14 This is a case comparable to the modern notion of Noam Chomsky's gen-

erative grammar.
15 "That man should speak at all is nature's act" ("Opera naturale è ch'uom
favella", Paradiso 26.130).
16 See La ricerca della lingua perfetta (Roma, Bari: Laterza, 1993) 45-6. On this
issue Eco explains that Dante uses "ydioma" to refer to the Hebrew language
(D.V.E. 1.4, 1.6, and 1.7) and to the proliferation of languages, in particular to
that of the romance languages. He uses "loquela" when he speaks of Babel and
of the confusion of languages (confusio linguarum, D.V.E. 1.6). Yet in the same
context, Dante uses also "ydioma" for both the Hebrew and the confused lan-
guages. A similar thing Dante does with "loquela" which he employs in order
to examine the Genovese and the Tuscan dialects and also to refer to other
Italian dialects and to Hebrew.
17 Linguistica e retorica di Dante (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1978) 11. See also

Gustavo Vinay, "Ricerche sul De vulgari eloquentia" Giornale Storico della
Letteratura Italiana 136 ( 1959): 272-3. More recently some critics have embraced
some views which attempt to provide answers to Mengaldo' s position and
which ultimately looked at finding a logical coherence in the D.V.E.. For an in-
depth and detailed discussion on this matter see Albert Rüssel Ascoli, Dante
and the Making of a Modern Author (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2008) 139, and
particularly n. 19.
18 The emphasis on "to make himself heard" and "to hear" is mine.
19 Questions sur la Métaphisique, ed. C. A. Graiff, in Philosophes Médiévaux I
(1948) 220, 20-21. Siger maintains that indeed names are "signs of things"
("signa rerum"), but not insofar as they signify things for what they are, but for
their mode of knowning {"voces non habent tantum significare res modo quo sunt,
sed etiam modo quo intelliguntur"). See also Corti, Dante 17, note 19.
20 Fontanille, 56. In the making of discourse, the actant of enunciation is the
author and /or the reader of the poetic text insofar as they are both engaged in
the actualization of language.
21 "Dante's Allegory", Speculum 25.1 (1950) 78. Reprinted in Charles Single-
ton, Commedia: Elements of Structure (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1954); further
reprinted in Charles Singleton, Dante's Commedia: Elements of Structure (1977;
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1980).

De Benedictis, Raffaele (2009) - de Vulgari Eloquentia - Dante's Semiotic Workshop

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De vulgati eloquentia; Dante's Semiotic Workshop

Author(s): Raffaele de Benedictis

Hoc equidem signum est ipsum subjectum

[This sign is precisely the noble subject

The De vulgari eloquentia, Dante's treatise on the eminent vernacular,

Italica Volume 86 Number 2 (2009)

phonic component. The phonic component is different from language

In the strict logical sense, as of course Aristotle expressed the notion of

1 . affections of the soul (pathëmata en têi psychêi)

spoken sounds things

As we can see from Eco' s explanation, the dynamic function of the

intertextual influences, as well as other influences, that may have con-

independent from our knowledge that exists in nature, and to which

. . . vulgärem locutionem appellamus earn qua infants assuefiunt ab

[. . . I define the vernacular as the language which children gather from

[. . . the Romans called grammar. This secondary language is also

Noteworthy characteristics contained particularly in the last pas-

Saussurrian notion of langue. Instead when he uses "locuïio" he refers

vernacular. The verbal sign is certainly arbitrary since it signifies "ad

- modi significandi accidentales Figure 2.2

internal functioning dialogism and a community of speakers) and that

poet's specific task of 'binding words' of Conv. 4.6.3, requires intuition

arbitrariness ("de comuni consensus multarum gentium fuerit regulate,

creation. As such, the poetic creation entails using and discarding at

In his theoretical attempt, Dante is faced with the fundamental

municipal dialects, he dwells on the Sicilian, Tuscan, and Bolognese di-

bi-planar, it possesses an expression level that needs to be correlated to

6 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, 3.361 (Cambridge: Harvard

14 This is a case comparable to the modern notion of Noam Chomsky's gen-

17 Linguistica e retorica di Dante (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1978) 11. See also

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