EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The aim of this report is to document the experiences and lessons learned during the
food crisis as a result of adopting the NGO Consortium model. The report describes
NGO Consortium Model itself, how it emerged, how it performed and analyses the
key success factors. It goes on to outline the major lessons of this experience for
NGOs, donors, and the Government in Malawi as well as in other countries.

The main methodologies used were 31 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders

including NGO Consortium members, sub-contracted local NGOs; international NGO
non-Consortium members; donors, and Government officials. Field visits were also
undertaken to 3 districts. Interviews and telephone discussions were held with CARE
& WFP staff in Zimbabwe and Zambia to compare the experiences in these countries
with those of Malawi.

The Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme (JEFAP) emerged against a difficult
context of a worsening food crisis, with a declaration of emergency on February 27th
2002. There was little initial agreement between donors, NGOs and the GOM on the
extent of the food crisis, and little record of NGOs co-operating together on
humanitarian issues. The GOM, however, realised it had insufficient capacity to
tackle the Emergency on its own and was open to new ways of working. USAID
pushed for an NGO Consortium approach at an early stage, and WFP gave
consistent support to the concept from its national and regional office. NGOs in
Malawi were familiar with the concept in working in coalitions, particularly for
advocacy purposes.

The design of the Consortium was that one NGO, CARE, was elected as a ‘lead
NGO’, rather than having a separate institutional secretariat. WFP had individual
funding contracts with each NGO member, not with the NGO Consortium as a whole.
This meant that the lead NGO did not channel funds, but was a co-signatory to
individual contracts between the NGOs and WFP.

The review makes brief comparisons with how aid was co-ordinated in Zimbabwe
and Zambia, and finds that Malawi was not as unique as is sometimes thought. In
Zambia CARE co-ordinates a more informal Forum of 17 NGOs & Donors, with
Government representation, aimed at information sharing and advocacy. There has
been limited involvement by local NGOs and overall the numbers attending meetings
are far smaller than those involved in Malawi. In Zimbabwe WFP co-ordinates two
types of meetings – meetings for its implementing partners, focussing on operational
issues, and monthly Food Aid Co-ordination meetings with a broader agenda and
wider donor representation.

Achievements & Benefits of the Consortium

The NGO Consortium achieved its prime objective, which was to reach almost the
whole country with over 200,000MT of emergency supplies. It also largely eliminated
duplication between NGO’s, and ensured that a consistent approach was followed
throughout the whole country. It was also largely successful in reducing outside
interference in targeting and distribution, and helped build mutual trust and dialogue
between NGO Consortium members and WFP.

For beneficiaries the most important benefits of JEFAP were the transparent
beneficiary selection process and the standardization of the food basket they
received across the country. NGO Members were able to access the resources they
needed for the relief operation, and also benefited from different capacity building
initiatives, including training workshops. Some, but not all of the local NGOs sub-
contracted by Consortium members also benefited from some capacity building, and
even those NGOs, mainly International NGOs who were not members of the
consortium, also benefited by being able to attend the JEFAP meetings.

Consortium members also felt they had a greater voice and power in policy
discussions than they would have had as individual agencies, and through CARE as
lead agency they could be represented at government and donor meetings (such as
the Humanitarian Response Sub-Committee (HRSC) of the Joint Task Force).

For WFP a major benefit of the NGO Consortium was that it was able to distribute
over 200,000 tonnes of food aid and maintain a lead role in the co-ordination of the
whole emergency operation, but with a reduced management burden. For Donors
the main benefit of the NGO Consortium was that it provided an effective and
accountable way of responding to the food crisis. In general the Government found it
useful to have a single point of contact rather than have to take up issues with
individual NGOs. Its District level structures (especially the District Relief Committees
and the Village Relief Committees) were temporarily revitalized by the relief
programme.

Against these considerable benefits there were some major constraints. The first of
these was the programme’s limited scope and rigidity. The predominant response
of the JEFAP NGO Consortium focus was on food aid. The targeting system, by
which households got the same ration regardless of the number of family members,
was possibly justified by the need to keep logistics simple and follow common
guidelines, but it was discriminatory against larger families (including families that
had expanded to take in orphans or dependent relatives)

A second constraint was the exclusion of most local NGOs, and other local NGO
networks, from the Consortium. This was not a deliberate decision, but was a
consequence of how the Consortium emerged. Only one non-US INGO (SC-UK)
and the Malawi Red Cross were involved in the initial meetings to set up the
Consortium. Although a few local NGOs were able to work well as sub-contractors in
the Consortium, the majority did not participate as implementing agencies in the way
envisaged in the original guidelines for JEFAP. To many Malawians in local NGOs
the Consortium appeared an expatriate-run ‘cartel’, with many more expatriates than
local staff attending most meetings. Much of this expatriate capacity has now
evaporated from the country.

A third constraint was the uneven involvement by some parts of Government.

The NGO Consortium had support from government at a very senior level with
regular meetings with the Vice President, and was represented in the Humanitarian
Response Steering Committee. But relations were less positive at Ministry level and
the Government was not formally represented at Consortium meetings. After an initial
period during which District officials did not feel fully informed about the Consortium,
however, relations were normally very positive at District level, and were assisted by
the Government’s appointment of 27 field monitors through UNDP.

A fourth constraint was the time required by Consortium members, especially

WFP and CARE as lead agency. While in this case the individuals concerned were
prepared to put in the time to make the Consortium work, this was unusual and the
report suggests a different design may be needed in any similar Consortium in the
future.
Key Success Factors and their Replicablity

The success factors in the NGO Consortium are reviewed in order to establish the
extent to which they are replicable. The conclusions are given in this table:

Feature Whether Comment

Single, focused task
Direct and Adequate funding
Shared Leadership
Committed and Able
NGO members
Strong Individual Relationships
Joint decision taking
Overall Government support
replicable or not
Yes Heavy focus on food distribution was
also seen as a constraint and might be
more difficult to justify in complex,
political emergencies
Yes Helped by strong co-operation between
donors
Possibly Model of a contracting agency (WFP) &
lead NGO appears replicable, though
the particular individuals involved were
crucial
Yes Most international NGOs are also
involved in other emergencies
Possibly Agencies like WFP can help by
deploying staff with strong NGO
experience and commitment
Possibly Requires excellent facilitation
Possibly More consultation with Government at
every stage would be helpful

The Lessons for the Design of Future NGO Consortia

Both donors and the INGOs need to increase their support for capacity building
of local NGOs involved in emergency work. Emergencies in Malawi are likely to
recur and NGO Capacity building needs to be a central part of a disaster
preparedness strategy. Emergency assessments should in future include a quick
survey of the capacity of local NGOs to assist in the implementation of any future
emergency programme. In any future consortium sub-contracting and capacity
building with local NGOs should be made an explicit part of their contracts and the
extra costs covered.

There is also a need to encourage increased government engagement. This may

require in part a shift in attitude by international NGO staff. Even in a relief situation,
NGOs need a greater sense of accountability to government structures, especially at
the District level. Any future Consortium should give more support to the GOM’s
wider Decentralisation Strategy and that Coordinating Agencies should focus not just
on food distribution but also provide broader support to District-level Co-ordination.

The leadership of an NGO Consortium could be improved by separating the lead

NGO’s own programme from the Consortium programmes in terms of staffing. There
are also a number of programmatic improvements, involving better allocation of
district responsibilities, more community sensitisation, more flexible targeting,
simplified monitoring and reporting, and lengthened and consistent contracts with
WFP.

Concluding Thoughts

Many INGOs and donors are already reviewing how they approach the whole
Southern African ‘food crisis’, and the chronic nature of the problems are now widely
appreciated. There is a need for agencies to develop a strategic approach to this
crisis, rather than an ad hoc approach with stop/start food distributions and
inadequate support for long term livelihoods in an integrated way.

The report warns that though the JEFAP NGO Consortium worked well as an
emergency intervention, consortia focusing on recovery and development
programmes have a far more mixed record. Donors should avoid concluding that
NGO consortia are the appropriate response in all situations.