The Last Bringer of Victory: Nikephoros III Botaneiates AD1078-1081

By Daniel R.F. Maynard

Introduction

Nikephoros III Botaneiates, AD1002-1081 played a prominent role in the conflict between the military

and bureaucratic Dynatoi that struggled for the empire after the passing of the Macedonian dynasty in

AD1056. He was considered a great commander, to such an extent that he was considered a candidate

for the throne in AD1068. As emperor, Nikephoros III was responsible for the rise of Alexios I

Komnenos because Alexios proved to be Nikephoros' most trusted and capable general. This

monograph will explore the life of Nikephoros Botaneiates, whose exploits have been overshadowed

completely by the infamous Michael VII Minus-a-Quarter and Alexios I Komnenos. First I will

elaborate on the sources for Nikephoros III and the issues with them. Then I will recount the life of

Nikephoros before he became emperor. Afterwards, I shall cover his short reign as emperor, from

AD1078-1081. Then I will detail his fall from power and finally assess his reign. Hitherto, there does

not seem to be much, if any literature specifically written about Nikephoros III and therefore this essay

seeks to rectify that state of affairs with this extensive but by no means exhaustive account. For this

reason I have largely relied on primary sources to direct the thread of my narrative.

One of the reasons for studying this particular emperor is that it was during his reign that the empire

looked close to death. Alexios Komnenos sacked Constantinople; the Normans had invaded Greece; the

Seljuk Turks had practically captured all of Anatolia and multiple rebels had risen up to take the throne.

However, it could be said that Nikephoros III's reign was one of recovery rather than simply another

contributor to the eleventh century decline. A first step towards the 'Komnenian Restoration' rather than

1 Daniel R.F. Maynard

another on the list of inept eleventh century emperors. Nikephoros was the last in a serious of soldier-

emperors who finally triumphed over the bureaucratic faction which the military aristocracy had been

in conflict with during the eleventh century. The soldier emperor's: Isaac I Komnenos and Romanos IV

Diogenes had been competent emperors, curbed the abuses that afflicted the Roman Empire and pushed

back the enemies that plundered its borders. Their relatively short reigns, however, meant that their

greatly needed reforms and competent statecraft were only temporary and were squandered by their

incompetent successors. Isaac I and Romanos IV, similar to Nikephoros III, came from the Anatolian

landed aristocracy and had risen to power in imperial circles through a career in the military. The

Dynatoi, literally meaning the powerful, often refers to the Anatolian military aristocracy, the type of

family that Botaneiates came from.1 In contrast, Romanos III Argyros, Constantine IX Monomachos,

Michael VI the Old, Constantine X Doukas and Michael VII Doukas, were from an administrative

background and pursued polices that strengthened the bureaucracy, at the expense of all others. The

emperors of the bureaucratic faction were notorious for their mismanagement of the empire by ruining

its finances and allowing the frontiers to be left unchecked and crumble. In addition to this, they

contributed greatly to the abuse of power by the great landowners of Anatolia and bureaucrats of

Constantinople. Corruption was a serious concern that affected the internal cohesion of the empire and

helped cause internal problems. These issues were not truly solved until the reign of Alexios I.

Nikephoros III's reign was, from the very beginning, marred by the failures of his predecessors and

thus it is perhaps understandable that the almost eighty-year-old emperor was not able to completely

restore the empire in the short time that he was emperor. Nevertheless, Nikephoros started to see to the

issues of the empire, just as Isaac I and Romanos IV had done. Nikephoros had to deal with the crisis at

its very worst and the fact that he did accomplish even a few reforms is somewhat miraculous

considering his age and the myriad problems with which he had to contend. This might be why Michael

1 Gregory 2010: 257, 423.

2 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Attaleiates might have not only been writing panegyric for the deeds of Nikephoros but out of a

genuine sense of gratitude as well. Finally, understanding Nikephoros’ reign also helps illustrate the

importance of Alexios Komnenos and his restoration of the empire from the very brink of collapse.

Sources

The most detailed account of the life and reign of Nikephoros III is by Michael Attaleiates, a Byzantine

lawyer and historian, who wrote his history in the 1070s and dedicated it to Nikephoros III. He is the

main contemporary source for the reign of Nikephoros III and provides a counter narrative to the

Chronicle of Michael Psellos. Attaleiates emphasises Nikephoros' great achievements, for instance, the

eleven-day rearguard action that Nikephoros accomplished after the Battle of Zygos Pass are only

recorded in Attaleiates and several pages are devoted to it. This praiseworthy attitude comes from the

fact that Attaleiates was richly rewarded and promoted by Nikephoros III. Attaleiates scorned Michael

VII most likely because his property at Rhaedestus had been ransacked by Nikephoros Bryennios and

after warning Nikephoritzes of the impending danger and state of his property, was totally ignored.2

The famous Battle of Manizikert (1071), which fills a whole chapter in Attaleiates, is relegated to a

paragraph in Psellos, who mainly says that Romanos should have better studied the books of strategy.

Attaleiates in contrast, retells what happened, how it happened and the events that preceded and

followed this decisive battle, while giving his own commentaries and anecdotes regarding the actions

taken and the opportunities which were lost. Attaleiates is invaluable in understanding what a

contemporary outside of the Constantinopolitan clique thought about the Turkish invasions during this

time. These opinions of Attaleiates help us understand why he is so damning of Michael VII and so

positive towards Nikephoros because, after Manzikert, the emperor Michael may have seemed to

2 Treadgold 2013:315.

3 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Attaleiates chiefly responsible for the destruction of Byzantine Anatolia (Michael Attaleiates'

homeland), whereas Nikephoros, a fellow Anatolian, took measures to check the disintegration of the

empire. Attaleiates was also promoted to the position of Magistros and Proedros in 1079, which further

explains his praise of Nikephoros III.3 Magistros was a high-ranking judicial official in the imperial

court and Proedros was a high honourary title which was extensively distributed in the eleventh

century. Generally the history is very favourable to Nikephoros but Attaleiates does mention some of

Nikephoros' failings, such as the defeat of Nikephoros at the Battle of the Danube against the Uzes in

1063. Psellos in comparison in his panegyrical chapter on Michael VII does not even mention the loss

of Anatolia or the debasement of the currency which took place during his reign.

Michael Psellos' Chronicle is of little use for the life of Nikephoros III. As the only other contemporary

source, he provides the Constantinoplitan view of events but the sections on the Doukas emperors,

added in 1074, are devoid of objectivity and often content as well.4 He was the tutor to Michael VII and

his godfather, which he took great pride in and likely clouded his judgement.5 It is entirely possible

these flattering pieces on the Doukas were made to help Psellos remain on friendly terms with Michael

VII. A desperate attempt to cling onto power as Nikephoritzes steadily increased his stranglehold over

the imperial court.6 He is useful in retelling the letter that Michael sent to Botaneiates after he had

rebelled because it shares Michael's and Psellos' thoughts on this matter. Psellos was of a key part of

the administration and a rival to Nikephoritzes if Michael of Nikomedia and Michael Psellos were the

same person.7 It should be remembered that Psellos was, 'a skilful courtier under a series of insecure

absolute monarchs, Psellus could afford neither complete candour nor a reputation for deception; thus

3 Attaleiates, 2.1, 33.3.

4 Treadgold 2013:296-297.
5 Psellos, Eudokia, 7.4; Treadgold 2013:278.
6 Attaleiates, 22.4.
7 Attaleiates, 22.2; Treadgold 2013:272-273.

4 Daniel R.F. Maynard

we should neither take everything he says at face value nor reject it without a good reason.'8

The other main source is Anna Komnene's The Alexiad, although she was not contemporary to the

events she describes and the early sections of her book are generally derived from the history of her

husband Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger. She was the eldest daughter of Alexios Komnenos, who

usurped the throne from Nikephoros and it is from the point of view of Alexios' rise to power that we

learn of Nikephoros' actions. She is vital for the end of Nikephoros' reign and his subsequent exile to

monastic life. Her narrative largely focuses on Alexios but also informs us of the actions of Nikephoros

in the last year of his reign.

There are also scant or brief mentions in the Synoptic History of John Skylitzes before 1056, but

Nikephoros III is mentioned more in the continued Chronicle by the same Skylitzes. Since he lived

through these events he is also a contemporary source but wrote under Alexios I and he is known to

have been very favourable to the Komnenoi.9 However, Skylitzes generally follows the more objective

views of Attaleiates, which was one of his sources for the continuation.

Nikephoros Bryennios' history is derived from contemporary testimonies, such as his father and

Alexios himself but is also reliant on the histories of Attaleiates, Psellos and Skylitzes. Being married

to the Komnenoi as well as his father having been blinded by Nikephoros III, it is no wonder that his

narrative is very favourable to the Komnenoi and critical of Nikephoros. Much of what these authors

wrote covers the career of Nikephoros from his first appearance in the Battle of the Zygos Pass in 1053,

when he was in his forties to his death.

8 Treadgold 2013: 272.

9 Wortley, 2010: 350.

5 Daniel R.F. Maynard

William of Apulia, a Norman source who wrote in the 1090s, refers to Nikephoros III because of

Robert Guiscard's invasion of the Eastern Roman Empire in 1081. He was a contemporary of the

Norman invasion and probably a layman. Being a foreigner, William was removed from the politics of

the Byzantine court and gives a fairly objective, fresh, and contemporary view of the emperor.

Matthew of Edessa and Michael the Syrian wrote Chronicles some centuries after the events they

describe and are thus detached from the events in both space and time. Michael is brief in his mention

of the emperor, but provides a balanced view of Nikephoros; Michael is incompetent and corrupt, but

Nikephoros is not praised as he is in the history of Attaleiates. The main limitation for the usefulness of

Michael is the brevity of the work, but it is likely that one of his sources for this was Attaleiates based

on his Chronicle's content. Matthew's Chronicle of Edessa is longer in his treatment of Nikephoros

compared to Michael’s but clearly derived his history from Psellos because of his unmitigated praise

for Michael VII and ridicule of Nikephoros, who is described as a pleasure-seeking womaniser, which

is exactly what Michael is accused of being by Michael the Syrian.

Nikephoros the General

Nikephoros was born in AD1002 and was descended from a successful military family from the

Anatolikon Thema. He was reportedly very wealthy, a capable general and his immediate ancestors had

won fame during the time of Basil II.10 His grandfather Nikephoros Botaneiates the Elder was a relation

of Nikephoros II Phokas, giving his family an illustrious lineage. This information is only found in

Attaleiates. Used as a means to help legitimise himself later on, this relation might be true since Psellos

calls Nikephoros III 'Phokas' in his reproduction of Michael VII's letter to him. The Botaneiatoi

survived the elimination of the Phokas family after the murder of Nikephoros II and the subsequent

10 Attaleiates, 27.2.

6 Daniel R.F. Maynard

revolt of Bardas Phokas.

Nikephoros the Elder was a general in the ranks of Basil II's retinue and served on his Bulgarian

campaigns. He obtained the rank of Doux and Vestes. He was killed in the battle of Kleidion, AD1014.

According to Attaleiates, he was one of the Roman commanders at Kleidion and played a major role in

swinging the battle in the Bulgar-Slayer's favour.11 It is impossible to tell if Attaleiates' account of

Nikephoros being solely responsible for winning the day is true, considering the context of when and to

whom Attaleiates wrote his history. However, I will detail what occurred here and let you decide for

yourself. 'For after routing the Bulgarians and pursuing them in the narrow pass known as Kleidion, he

did not let up in his slaughter and killing of the enemy until he reached a summit, where he saw some

other Bulgarians who had fled there. At that point his horsemanship failed him and his horse slipped on

the stone slabs, bringing him down with it, so that the enemy, amazed at the man's irrepressible charge,

no longer dared to engage the Romans in hand-to-hand combat.'12

Nikephoros III's father, Michael Botaneiates, was also involved in the Bulgarian and Georgian Wars of

Basil II. He was in command of Thessalonica during its siege by the Bulgarians and may have broken

the siege with a sally.13 However, the tale of his single-handed defeat of the entire Bulgarian besieging

force seems to verge on the fanciful. It might be more plausible to assume that he led the garrison in a

cavalry charge against the besiegers. Michael is also reported to have been a very noble and well

respected man by the common people and the emperor.14

The Battle of Zygos Pass in 1053 is where Nikephoros first caught the attention of his contemporaries
11 Attaleiates, 29.2.
12 Attaleiates, 29.2.
13 Attaleiates, 29.3.
14 Attaleiates, 29.8.

7 Daniel R.F. Maynard

and historians with a heroic feat that made him famous. Nothing much else is known about the early

life of Nikephoros before 1053 other than the fact that he embarked upon a military career. It is known

that he married a women called Bebdene at an unknown date but she appears to have died by 1068.

This I deduce from Eudokia Makrembolitissa's consideration of Nikephoros as a husband, he is

mentioned as being still married in 1067 but seems to have been a widower after this as he did not need

to divorce his wife to marry Maria of Alania a decade later. Although, this is speculation and nobles

have been known to put aside their wives following an invitation to take the throne as happened with

Romanos III. To connect this into a single narrative, I will detail what he did during each emperor's

reign from when he first appeared to his involvement in the Battle of Zompos Bridge in 1074.

The earliest mention of Nikephoros Botaneiates, from the available sources, is during the Pecheneg

Wars of Constantine IX Monomachos, AD1042-1055.15 At this point the future emperor would have

been in his forties. It can be assumed that Nikephoros followed a military career to enter into the

position he filled prior to circa AD1047. The Doux of Bulgaria, the eunuch Basil the Synkellos and

Nikephoros Botaneiates were assigned by the emperor Constantine IX Monomachos to protect the

Danube.16 At the Battle of the Zygos Pass, circa AD1053 Botaneiates was able to lead his calvary in a

fighting retreat.17 The day had already been lost due to the cunning of the Pechenegs. They had placed

ambushes in the passes and the inept Doux of Bulgaria had foolishly fallen into the Pecheneg's trap,

which resulted in the annihilation of his army.18 Attaleiates reports that Botaneiates was able to keep

command over his mounted troops and extricated his men from the Pecheneg horde. He did this by

keeping his men in a close formation so that the horse-archers of the Pechenegs inflicted minimal

casualties. He then proceeded along a nearby river bank, deploying scouts so that he might not be
15 Attaleiates, 7.13-14.
16 Skylitzes, 21.28; Attaleiates, 7.9-10.
17 Attaleiates, 7.13.
18 Attaleiates, 7.11-12.

8 Daniel R.F. Maynard

surprised. Multiple times the Pechenegs attempted to break the formation of Botaneiates but every

attempt was unsuccessful. The Roman general was able to hold his company together until nightfall

and longer. It is also reported that the Pechenegs tried to persuade them to surrender but were

unsuccessful. Nikephoros was able to maintain the morale of his formation throughout the day despite

being under a near constant barrage of arrows. The Pechenegs then shot the horses from under the

Romans. The Roman cavalrymen then resorted to continuing on foot. Each time the Pechenegs attacked

them again and again and each time the formation held. The Roman soldier's iron will was made

possible by the competence of their commander, all the while knowing that they had no reinforcements

coming to relieve them. Nikephoros remained with his men the entire time, even when he was offered a

horse to escape. This he turned to his advantage and rallied his men by proclaiming death before the

dishonour of cowardice and refused the horse, ensuring the morale and resolve of his troops.

Nikephoros was able to keep together this tight formation for eleven days without his troops breaking

under the near constant Pecheneg attack. On the twelfth day Nikephoros' company reached Adrianople,

at which point the Pechenegs retreated.19 The emperor subsequently awarded Nikephoros the title of

Magistros.20

Despite this heroic action, the loss at Zygos Pass was a crushing defeat for the Romans and Constantine

IX quickly sued for peace.21 Whether, Nikephoros' story is exactly true or not is unknown. The invasion

is mentioned by Skylitzes but Nikephoros' involvement is omitted but that might be due to the synoptic

nature of the work.22 Krallis and Kaldellis note that this section is far more rhetorical and may have

been inserted later to exemplify the heroics of Nikephoros.23 Despite the possible exaggeration of

19 Attaleiates, 7.13-16.
20 Attaleiates, 11.6.
21 Attaleiates, 7.17.
22 Skylitzes, 21.28.
23 Kaldellis, Krallis, Note on the Text, 2012: 597.

9 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Attaleiates, it seems certain that Nikephoros accomplished this feat, as this is in keeping with his later

reputation as a good commander. Had Nikephoros been lacking in military skill or renown, it is

doubtful that Isaac Komnenos would have placed him in command of one of his wings during the

Battle of Petroe four years later.24

Nikephoros Botnaeiates is not mentioned again until the revolt of Isaac Komnenos against Michael VI

the Old in AD1057. This revolt occurred largely due to the one-sided favouritism Michael VI had

bestowed on the Constantinopolitan civil service compared to the scorn and humiliation he showed

towards the military aristocracy, including Isaac Komnenos himself who had come to reconcile with

the emperor for a prior insult. Botaneiates must have been part of Isaac's inner-circle because he is

mentioned as being one of the commanders for Isaac's side during the Battle of Petroe. AD1056.

Though Skylitzes mentions his involvement in the battle.25 He was approached by a mercenary named

Randolf the Frank who was eager to challenge anyone of rank. This may be further proof for

Botaneiates heroic involvement at the battle of Zygos Pass because a mercenary knew about his

reputation and was able spot him in battle. The outcome of their encounter was the capture of Randolf

by Komnenians who came to Botaneiates' aid. The Battle of Petroe in 1057, reportedly one of the

bloodiest battles the Byzantines had fought in a civil conflict, was a decisive victory for Isaac and

resulted in placing the military aristocracy back in control. Isaac I Komnenos was the first man from

military stock to hold the title of emperor since the death of Basil II in 1025.

Isaac subsequently placed Botaneiates in command of the Danube frontier from 1059-1064. He was

likely made the Doux of Thessalonica. During this time, he saved the future emperor Romanos IV

24 Skylitzes, 23.10.
25 Skylitzes, 23.10.

10 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Diogenes during Isaac Komnenos' campaign against the Hungarians.26

The narrative of Nikephoros III's life picks up again during the reign of Constantine X Doukas. In 1061

as Doux of Thessalonika, Nikephoros was commanded by Constantine X to investigate a complaint

from Iveron Monastery, situated on Mount Athos. The complaint was that some of the monastery's

property and Paroikoi (Byzantine equivalent of serfs) had been unlawfully confiscated. After sending

Michael Spatharokandidatos to enquire further, Nikephoros asserted that the Chyrosbull that had been

issued to the monastery by Basil II had made the monastery's property and Paroikoi exempt from taxes

and therefore they could not be confiscated.27

The following year, Nikephoros had to settle another legal dispute between the Monastery of Lavra and

a local landowner called Theodoros of Aichmalotou over some monastic property. Nikephoros ruled in

favour of the monastery.28 Following this, there was another land dispute between the Bishop of Ezoba

and the monastery of Iveron. Botanieates sent his agents to inquire from the locals where the land

boundaries were and from this fix with proper marks the land of the monastery and the land of the

bishop.29 Nikephoros' last known Thessalonikan legal dispute was between the monastery of Iveron and

the Metochion of Melissourgeion, who appears to have disregarded the decision previously made by

the Empress Theodora on the same issue. Nikepohoros reasserted the ruling of the empress.30

In the Autumn of AD1064, Magistroi Basil Apokapes and Nikephoros Botaneiates were governors of

Bulgaria.31 The army of Bulgarians that they commanded were defeated by an invasion of the Uzes or

26 Attaleiates, 16.8.
27 Acts of Iveron, 2.91.22-24.
28 Acts of Lavra, 228.1-229.35.
29 Acts of Iveron, 2.97-104.
30 Acts of Iveron, 2.107-110.
31 Attaleiates, 14.6.

11 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Ouzoi. These were a faction of Oghuz Turks that settled around the Western Black Sea along with the

Pechenegs. Botaneiates and Apokapes fought a battle against the Uzes, which I shall name Battle of the

Danube, AD1064 for the sake of clarity. Despite a brave fight, the forces under Botaneiates and

Apokapes were defeated and both Magistroi were taken captive. It is noticeable that there is no

panegyric-like rhetoric used by Attaleiates, other than Botaneiates fought bravely. This must have been

a very embarrassing occurrence in the career of Botaneiates, possibly suggesting that this loss was his

responsibility.32 Botaneiates and Apokapes escaped after the horde was decimated by a combination of

famine, an epidemic and constant attacks by the Pechenegs and Bulgarians. The commanders told the

emperor’s messengers of what had happened, 'the leaders of the Uzes had, at the instigation of the

Roman authorities in the cities along the Danubian shores, embarked on ships and crossed the Danube,

returning to their own lands.'33

Constantine X Doukas then reassigned Botaneiates to the east as Doux of Antioch from circa 1065-

1067.34 This was in response to the incompetent mismanagement of the province by Nikephoritzes,

who would eventually become Michael VII's Logothetes. It was likely hoped that Botaneiates could

rectify the situation in Syria.35 At the time the area was being raided by both Turks and Arabs from the

Emirate of Aleppo.36 However, Nikephoros needed troops to work with and Attaleiates makes plain that

Botaneiates had none, 'The emperor's men then assembled a band of youths, at little expense and put

them under the command of the governor of Antioch. But they were unable to do anything

noteworthy.'37 These troops had almost no experience, not even knowing how to ride a horse and were

under-equipped. With this 'army' sent by the emperor, local conscripts and his own retinue, Botaneiates

32 Attaleiates, 14.6.
33 Attaleiates, 14.9.
34 Attaleiates, 16.6.
35 Attaleiates, 22.2.
36 Attaleiates, 16.5.
37 Attaleiates, 16.6.

12 Daniel R.F. Maynard

was able to repulse the raids against Antioch. This was accomplished, in Attaleiates' words 'through his

own virtue, bravery and intelligence.'38 The troops sent by the emperor were quickly exhausted and

were disbanded for what use they had been, they had lost too many casualties to be of any more worth

to Botaneiates. However, Botaneiates seems to have been relieved of his command by Constantine X.39

The reason for this is likely due to the machinations of jealous court officials that wanted to see the

elimination of the military aristocracy and assert the supremacy of Constantinople's officials. This wish

to undermine the military had been built-up in the decades prior, when there was a succession of

variably incompetent and lacklustre emperors from the bureaucratic elite in Constantinople, such as

Romanos III and Michael VI. However, during their misrule the civil servants around them had become

increasingly powerful and manipulated these emperors to strengthen their positions. The sharp shock of

Isaac I and his much-needed reforms, which helped to curb the worst of their abuses, left an impression

on the civil elite so that when Isaac abdicated and the weak Constantine X was placed on the throne,

they manipulated him so that another like Isaac could not seize power as he had. They accomplished

this by undermining their own military capabilities just as the Turks began to penetrate into Armenia.

Nikephoros, one of these military strongmen that the bureaucratic elite feared, was one of their targets

and his re-assignment after Antioch can be seen as an example of this desire to keep the military

aristocracy weak. Corruption and a rapid growth in the power of the bureaucratic faction has been

noted by Norwich as common at this time and active steps had been taken to weaken the military

faction.40 As a result of his removal, Syria was once again plundered by the invading Muslims and

whatever gains had been accomplished by Botaneiates were lost.

Upon the death of emperor Constantine in AD1067, the Empress Eudokia considered Botaneiates as a

38 Attaleiates, 16.6.
39 Attaleiates, 16.6.
40 Norwich, 1991:339-343.

13 Daniel R.F. Maynard

husband but set her heart on Romanos Diogenes.41 This decision was made because the Byzantine

Empire in 1067 was being attacked by constant raids from the Turks devastating the regions of Antioch,

Cilicia and Armenia.42 What seems to be the situation for Nikephoros in 1067 was that he was recalled

by Constantine X shortly before the emperor died. This explains why he was still in Antioch when

Eudokia became empress. During the interregnum, despite being relieved, Nikephoros may have

remained in Antioch to ensure that it was properly defended, while waiting for orders from

Constantinople.

The empress Eudokia, the Patriarch and the Senate all agreed that defence of the empire was their top

priority and that an emperor was needed to lead their armies against the Turks. Botaneiates seems to

have been the first choice of the Senate but unfortunately for him, he was away defending Antioch and

was still married. This is indicative of the martial reputation of Botaneiates, which must have been

greatly boosted by his command over Antioch, that the Senate wanted Nikephoros to become emperor

above anyone else. Attaleiates' invective against the choice of Michael VII being chosen to succeed

Constantine makes plain his disappointment that a military candidate, specifically Nikephoros III was

not immediately chosen after Constantine's death. Romanos Diogenes was already in Constantinople

and unmarried making him a much more convenient candidate, Matthew of Edessa also implies that

Eudokia had already set her sights on Romanos instead of Nikephoros.43

Romanos exiled Botaneiates to his estates in the Anatolic Thema.44 Similarly, Psellos reports that

Romanos excluded Nikephoros from the Manzikert campaign because of his questionable loyalty to the

imperial government.45 This was likely because he had been Eudokia's other candidate for the throne

41 Attaleiates, 16.7; Matthew of Edessa, 2.66.

42 Attaleiates, 16.12; Norwich, 344.
43 Attaleiates, 16.7, 13; Matthew of Edessa, 2.66.
44 Skylitzes, Continuatus, 143.17-18; Norwich, 1991:360-361.
45 Psellos, Michael VII 7.18.

14 Daniel R.F. Maynard

and as such could not be trusted by Romanos. After Manzikert, Botaneiates seems to have remained out

of the civil war that followed and did not return to action until the revolt of the mercenary general

Roussel de Bailleul or Rouselios.46

Nikephoros Botaneiates, now in his early seventies, was brought out of retirement and given the title of

Kouropalates by Michael VII Doukas Parapinakes, AD1071-1078, Specifically as Strategos of the

Anatolikon Thema.47 Although the sources do not mention specifically why Nikephoros was granted

military command again, it is possible to assume why based on inference. Firstly Nikephoros was a

renowned and proven commander who had already served with distinction under the Doukas emperors.

The court may have wished to rely on a man with no loyalty to Romanos IV. Lastly, since the major

theatre of war was in the east it seems to make sense that the emperor would want someone who knew

the terrain and since Nikephoros was from the Anatolikon Thema, this might be why he gained the

military governorship over this province. He was sent with Caesar John Doukas to defeat Roussel.48

Despite warning the Caesar not to cross the Cappadocian bridge, called Zompos, to attack Roussel's

army, John did anyway and he was defeated at the Battle of the Zompos Bridge in 1074.49 Nikephoros,

who led the rear-guard did not allow his troops to engage in the fight and modern historians have

debated why he chose to withhold his troops and whether his contribution could have won them the

battle.50 They generally focus on Caesar John rather than Nikephoros.51 Firstly, Botaneiates may have

resented Caesar John for not following his advice of waiting until more reinforcements arrived, which

can be implied from Attaleiates. He may have also done this to purposely help John Doukas loose the

battle so as to make his point, assuming that the battle was winnable. Alternatively, Botaneiates might

46 Attaleiates, 23.1.
47 Bryennios, 55.3.
48 Attaleiates, 23.4.
49 Attaleiates, 23.4.
50 Bryennios, 169.15-18, 171.3-7.
51 Finley 1854: 52; Angold 1997: 117.

15 Daniel R.F. Maynard

have concluded that the battle was unwinnable and purposefully did not engage to preserve his forces

for another day. It is impossible to say whether the Battle of Zompos Bridge could have been won had

he engaged. It is entirely possible that all of these factors were at work in making the future-emperor

come to his decision. Following the defeat Nikephoros successfully extricated his troops from the battle

and returned to his estates in Anatolikon with what remained of the army.52 Botaneiates then falls out of

the narrative again until finally, in AD1078 he revolted against the useless and inept emperor Michael

Minus-a-Quarter.

Nikephoros the Emperor

In 1078, Nikephoros rebelled, Norwich concluding that this was for 'the highest of motives', against

Michael VII.53 Botaneiates wrote to the emperor many times before his revolt, begging him to do

something to relieve the suffering of the empire following the Battle of Manzikert.54 The emperor

turned against Botaneiates, insulted by this frank appraisal insult, that an old man might advise an

emperor trained by the renowned Psellos. Nikephoros likely rebelled because he was fed- up with the

corrupt government of Michael and the creature Nikephoros the Logothetes.55 Forced into action,

Nikephoros proclaimed himself emperor and rebelled on 2nd July 1078 with an army of Turkish

mercenaries and native troops with the goal of seizing the throne for himself.56 Attaleiates opens his

chapter on the revolt with a panegyric to the character of Nikephoros, explaining that he was the

virtuous saviour of the Roman Empire and the answer to their prayers.57 Psellos essentially skips over

the reign of Michael to the end of his student's reign to the revolt of 'Phocas'. This perhaps

demonstrates the noble reputation the Botaneiatoi because the Constantinopolitan Psellos knew of the

52 Attaleiates, 23.4; Skylitzes, 158.12-17.

53 Attaleiates, 27.1; Psellos, Michael VII, 7.18; Michael the Syrian, 166; Norwich 1991:361.
54 Attaleiates, 27.4.
55 Attealeiates, 22.1-4.
56 Attaleiates, 27.4.
57 Attaleiates, 27.1.

16 Daniel R.F. Maynard

linage of Nikephoros Botaneiates.58 Michael subsequently sent him a letter to remind Nikephoros of the

generosity he had shown him and debt he owed for bringing Nikephoros out of retirement.59 Michael

attempted to placate Nikephoros with money and titles once Nikephoros began to march against

Michael, setting out from his estates, which he seems to have remained at since 1074. In many ways

the revolt of Botaneiates was a tale of two narratives. The first, which I agree with, is of the corrupt

Michael being cast out by a frustrated and deeply concerned Botaneiates hoping that he, even at the age

of seventy-six, might do better than Michael Minus-a-Quarter. This is championed by Attaleiates,

Skylitzes and Michael the Syrian, 'Michael was weak and a womaniser and had no interest in war. He

was afraid of the Turks. He sat around eating and drinking. Then there arose against him Nicephorus

who came to Constantinople with his troops, took the city, and began to destroy it.'60 On the other hand,

Psellos describes Michael as 'one that far surpasses all others that we have ever known.'61 This view is

also held by Matthew of Edessa, 'being a good, pious man, adorned with all virtue and radiant holiness,

in every way resembling the first emperors, glowing with orthodox faith in Jesus Christ.'62 Both

chroniclers wrote over a hundred years after the events, which makes it likely that they may have been

using Psellos and Attaleiates as sources. Michael the Syrian seems the fairest, condemning Michael but

not praising Nikephoros either. However, the account is very brief and any further opinions or

explanations are omitted due to its brevity. The Roman sources themselves are divided because Psellos

wrote for Michael VII and Attaleiates wrote for Nikephoros III. Bryennios, Skylitzes, Komnene and

Zonaras wrote under Alexios I. The narrative of Psellos' Chronographia, after the letter to 'Phocas',

comes to an abrupt end. This means that the sole contemporary historian for Nikephoros' reign was

Attaleiates.63

58 Psellos, Michael VII, 7.18.

59 Psellos, Michael VII, 7.18-20.
60 Michael the Syrian, 166.
61 Psellos, Michael VII, 7.1.
62 Matthew of Edessa, 2.74.
63 Psellos, Michael VII, 7.20.

17 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Botaneiates recruited the invading Seljuk Turks to help him take the throne.64 A move that might seem

odd since they had been fighting each other. However, it is clear that Nikephotros III may not have had

any alternative due to the dire state of Roman forces in 1078. Previous mentions of the Roman army

during this period demonstrate their utter demoralisation and under-equipped status to the point of

uselessness.65 Nikephoros III used his relation to Nikephoros II to help legitimise his claim, stating that

his line was descended from Constantine the Great, the Fabii, Scipio Africanus and Aemilius Paulus

Macedonicus.66 Clearly a propaganda of his military prowess, his noble lineage and the tyranny of

Michael VII helped to solidify his basis of support, even encouraging Constantinopolitans to join

Nikephoros' side. There was universal acclaim for the elevation of Botaneiates during a service in the

Hagia Sophia, while the Senate was in session.67 Upon hearing of the revolt, hundreds of

Constantinopolitans defected to Nikephoros III as he marched on the capital. Something Attaleiates

notes as being very rare because generally people defected from the usurper to the emperor.68 It was

even more astonishing because the paths to Nikephoros in Anatolia were not safe due to Turkish raids,

which by 1078 had reached deep into Asia Minor.69 The Turks allowed the peasants to join Nikephoros

because the usurper had been fostering good relations with the Turks, possibly a reason why he was

able to hire some of them. Clearly the influence of Nikephoros III went a long way to strike even into

the hearts of his foreign enemies.70 Michael desperately tried to get the Turks to defect from

Nikephoros but to no avail.71 Nikephoros was victorious in the skirmishes between the Romano-

Turkish forces of Michael who he had sent to try and defeat Michael. On the 3rd of October 1078,

64 Attaleiates, 27.5.
65 Attaleiates, 27.3.
66 Attaleiates, 27.7.
67 Attaleiates, 32.2.
68 Attaleiates, 30.3.
69 Attaleiates, 30.3-4.
70 Attaleiates, 30,4.
71 Attaleiates, 30.5.

18 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Nikephoros III received an omen that he would soon enter the city as if he were fire, a good sign of

things to come.72

In October 1078, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder also rebelled against Michael VII his corrupt

minister, Nikephoros the Logothetes.73 Michael VII seems to have resorted to every manner of device to

defeat Botaneiates but nothing came of it and he was soon deposed.74 The emperor Michael's last days

demonstrate a man that was deluded into thinking that he could survive the revolt of two of his most

popular and able generals.75 Matthew blames the affections of Maria of Alania, Michael VII's wife, for

the revolt of Botaneiates.76 It is plausible that Maria, seeing that her own position was untenable or for

the highest motives wanted a more able man to become the sovereign of the Romans. Therefore she

looked to Nikephoros III for a solution. By the time Nikephoros reached Nicaea the emperor had

abdicated. Michael was exiled by Nikephoros to a monastery and became a monk. Later he was raised

to the rank of archbishop by Patriarch Kosmas and sent to the Diocese of Ephesus.77 Michael the Syrian

reports Michael Doukas saying to Nikephoros III, '"Take this [crown] which you are seeking and stop

using your sword against the Christians."'78 Although probably an invention, perhaps in his last hours as

emperor, Michael wanted nothing more than to cease the bloodshed between fellow Christians in the

face of the advance of Muslim Turks. Once Nikephoros Botaneiates arrived in Constantinople, he

castrated the sons of Michael Doukas, tortured Nikephoritzes to death and took Maria of Alania as his

wife.79 He married Maria because she was foreign and thus had no ties to the court, making her both

loyal and the puppet of no-one.80 Michael the Syrian reports that this first action was poorly received by
72 Attaleiates, 30.6.
73 Attaleiates, 31.1.
74 Attaleiates, 32.3.
75 Attaleiates, 32.3-4.
76 Matthew of Edessa, 2.74.
77 Attaleiates, 36.1.
78 Michael the Syrian, 166.
79 Matthew of Edessa, 2.75.
80 Komnene, 3.2.

19 Daniel R.F. Maynard

the nobility, possibly because of the brutal treatment of Michael's sons once Nikephoros had seized the

throne, but Michael the Syrian does not give a deep explanation due to the nature of his Chronicle.81

Nikephoros, having come to the throne via usurpation, distributed money that had been hoarded by

Michael to his native and foreign supporters, which seriously sapped the resources of the imperial

treasury. Michael of Nikomedia, who was appointed Hypertimos by Nikephoros III on his ascension,

fiercely opposed the emperor's largess. This man might have been Michael Psellos.82 If these Michael's

were the same person, his appointment makes sense as he was a sidelined member of the previous

regime, having been Nikephoritzes' greatest opponent and a very experienced member of the

administration. Michael of Nikomedia died a few months after the ascension of Nikephoros III.

Nikephoros III gave out many titles and elevated people, such as Attaleiates several ranks above their

next office. This was equal if not surpassing the number that Michael VI the Old distributed at the

beginning of his reign.83 This resulted in the treasury being utterly emptied. This later forced Alexios I

to resort to desperate measures to pay his troops in the 1080's.84 Nikephoros gave money to the beggars

or emboloi of Constantinople. To expand his support amongst the city's mob, which had been an

important factor in his own rise to power and had threatened the reign of Constantine IX and deposed

Michael V.85 Nikephoros III also returned to the churches the gold and silver ornaments that Michael

VII had confiscated to fund his defence against him.86 These actions were largely to win Nikephoros

support as he had no legitimacy to the throne other than his relation to Nikephoros II. It is difficult to

assess whether this was a success or not since Nikephoros' reign was abundant with rebellions and

political uncertainty. What can be assumed was that Nikephoros was determined not to be betrayed by

81 Michael the Syrian, 166.

82 Attaleiates, 35.3.
83 Attaleiates, 33.2.
84 Komnene, 5.1.
85 Attaleiates, 33.4.
86 Attaleiates, 33.6.

20 Daniel R.F. Maynard

his subjects as so many emperors had in the previous decades and freely handed out these titles and

gifts. Most of Nikephoros' reforms were probably enacted not for the security of the empire but to re-

enforce his own tenuous grip on power.

As well as giving money to beggars Nikephoros restored to the owners of the small jetties around

Constantinople their right to use these small ports or skalai.87 Nikephoros may have revoked the edicts

of the hated Michael VII to secure for himself a legitimacy through popularity and reward the citizens

of Constantinople who had so openly supported him in his rise to power. This possible strategy is

further evidenced by the words of Attaleiates: 'He diligently attended the festivals of the capital and

frequently bestowed gifts to his subjects.'88 This implies that he threw himself into the role of emperor

to make himself seen and heard to establish himself as the true ruler of empire rather than just an

Anatolian usurper.

Nikephoros III issued a Chrysobull that wrote-off all debt that was in arrears to garner further

popularity for himself and try and remedy the debt issues that had occurred during the rule of the

Doukas emperors. Creditors could no longer ask for their debt sooner than expected. This measure was

likely to create financial stability by preventing people from suddenly being impoverished by having to

repay their debts much sooner than they were able. This law additionally forbade creditors from

confiscating their debtors’ property to pay for the debts that they were owed after the debt cancellation.

These laws, in Attaleiates' words, 'put an end to the fear of debt', which he said had been the bane of

Byzantine citizens during the reign of the Doukas emperors.89 He appears to have sought a unity

amongst his subjects to face the many enemies that now faced the empire.90
87 Attaleiates, 33.7-8.
88 Attaleiates, 36.18.
89 Attaleiates, 33.11.
90 Attaleiates, 33.9.

21 Daniel R.F. Maynard

Nikephoros brought Eudokia Makrembolitissa, Michael VII Doukas' mother, out of monastic exile and

permitted her to live with her family.91 He even tried to gain the support of Constantine Doukas, who

had been exiled by Michael. These actions show that Nikephoros tried to reconcile and associate

himself with the Doukas family. However, after Constantine betrayed Nikephoros by organising a

rebellion against him, the emperor returned him to exile.92

The emperor presided over court cases and devoted his pass-times to reading books to further his

knowledge.93 In 1079, Nikephoros settled several legal issues that were ambiguous and needed

clarification. The first was a law regarding spousal insanity. He remedied it by claiming to have found a

previous law by Leo VI and built upon that to make the matter clearer.94 The second concerned

extending the time between the passing of sentence and execution to thirty days to allow time for any

new evidence to exonerate the accused, prevent rash or summary executions, or allow for a judge to

review whether the crime warranted the death penalty.95 This, he claimed, was a revision of a law

created by Theodosius the Great. Attaleiates tells us, '[this law] had caused the deaths of many people

to die in a sudden and irrevocable way.'96 He also addressed a recent abuse of imperial servants and

officials. What had been occurring was the workers of imperial lands were no-longer being rewarded

for hard work or their devotion of loyalty to their emperor and were instead threatened with

confiscations of land, property and even exile.97 This led these servants to abandon any motivation to

complete their work, retarding the proper operations of the state. Nikephoros issued a law providing the

91 Attaleiates, 36.2.
92 Attaleiates, 36.3-6.
93 Attaleiates, 36.10.
94 Attaleiates, 36.11.
95 Attaleiates, 36.12-13.
96 Attaleiates, 36.12-13.
97 Attaleiates, 36.14.

22 Daniel R.F. Maynard

same rights and protection under the law to imperial servants as to private ones.98 Although these may

be considered minor reforms, they nonetheless show Nikephoros' desire to rectify some of the issues

that blighted the Byzantine state and his own initiative in wanting to master statecraft. These reforms

are generally quite small, but that is unsurprising considering that Nikephoros was nearly eighty and

had to deal with multiple revolts and the Turkish threat in Asia Minor. The need for clarity on judicial

matters reflects the rampant corruption that seriously affected the courts and can been seen as genuine

attempts to solve the empire's internal problems.99

There were a number of revolts and plots against Nikephoros III. The immediate threat was Nikephoros

Bryennios, who had rebelled against the emperor Michael and was still at large, having set up his base

in Adrianople and controlled all of Macedonia. Bryennios refused to concede his claim to the throne to

Nikephoros III because both had as much legitimacy as the other.100 Attempting to placate his rival,

Nikephoros III sent emissaries to Bryennios offering him the rank of Caesar and affirm the decisions

that Bryennios had made in his capacity as emperor. Bryennios refused. After another embassy from

Nikephoros III, Bryennios marched from Adrianople towards Constantinople. Nikephoros the emperor,

dispatched a third embassy, led by Romanos Straboromanos the Protoproedros and megas

Hetaireiarches, to treat with Bryennios. The pretender, Nikephoros, unceremoniously threw out the

embassy.101 Nikephoros III assembled an army of Romans and Turkish mercenaries. He placed Alexios

Komnenos, the future emperor, in charge of this army and granted him the rank of domestikos. It is

very likely that Nikephoros was far too old to conduct a major campaign.102 Alexios soundly defeated

Bryennios at the Battle of Halmyros River. This was the first of many victories that Alexios would

98 Attaleiates, 36.14-15.
99 Attaleiates, 22.4.
100Attaleiates, 34.1.
101Attaleiates, 34.2.
102Attaleiates, 34.4.

23 Daniel R.F. Maynard

inflict against the enemies of Nikephoros III. This led to his eventual rise to become supreme

commander of the western armies. Nikephoros III had his rival blinded for this rebellion and also

castigated Nikephoros Bryennios for his revolt.103 After this, Bryennios was allowed to retire to

Adrianople and received no further punishment.104 He gave an amnesty to the followers of Bryennios

because Nikephoros III did not want to slaughter great numbers of Roman subjects.105 After this victory,

Michael Attaleiates gave an oration in thanks of the emperor's accomplishment and his clemency.106

Doux Basilakes the protoproedros and a supporter of Bryennios subsequently rebelled in Dyrrakhion in

1078 following the defeat of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder.107 He assembled an army from Italy as

well as native troops: Romans, Bulgarians and Albanians. After hearing of the defeat of Bryennios, he

secretly sent the emperor his terms of surrender but could not publicly admit defeat. He had also

instigated the Pechenegs to march on Constantinople and could hardly call it off.108 Nikephoros III,

dispatched an emissary with a chrysoboullon, which gave amnesty to him and his followers as well as

granting him the title of nobellisimos. However, Basilakes dithered and refused to give a response to

the emperor.109 Nikephoros, needed to put an end to this revolt and sent against Basilakes, Alexios

Komnenos, recently bestowed with the title of sebastos.110 Alexios defeated Basilakes who was blinded

for his insurrection.111 Meanwhile, the Pechenegs that Basilakes had called raided Adrianople. Alexios

led his army from Thessalonica to Andrianople and drove off the Pechenegs.112

103Attaleiates, 34.9.
104Attaleiates, 34.4-6; Komnene, 1.4-6.
105Attaleiates, 34.7, 10.
106Attaleiates, 34.8.
107Attaleiates, 35.4.
108Attaleiates, 35.5.
109Attaleiates, 35.6.
110Attaleiates, 35.7.
111Attaleiates, 35.7-8; Komnene, 1.7-9.
112Attaleiates, 35.9.

24 Daniel R.F. Maynard

At roughly the same time as the rebellion of Basilakes, in 1078, the Varangian Guard attempted to

murder the emperor during an evening inspection.113 ext came a plot by the Varangian Guard,

attempting to murder the emperor during an evening inspection.114 It is reported that they were drunk,

though this might be a trope for barbarians.115 They failed because the emperor, thanks to his

background as a soldier, was able to protect himself along with his retinue until his imperial guards

arrived to defeat the Varangians. The lead conspirators were cast out of the imperial bodyguard and sent

to guard remote forts on the frontier. The remainder were given amnesty after begging forgiveness from

Nikephoros.116 After this, Michael of Nikomedia the hypertimos, head of the imperial administration

'ended his life' possibly meaning that he committed suicide, which would give no doubt that he was the

mastermind behind the plot.117 Though it is more likely that, Attaleiates is referring to natural causes. It

seems unlikely that the Varangrian Guard would try to murder the emperor, simply because they were

drunk and so a plot still seems likely. If Michael of Nikomedia was the same as Michael Psellos and he

had been behind the plot, what was his motive? The obvious answer would be that he wanted to take

revenge on the man that would not listened to his advice and had deposed his Godson. Alternatively,

Michael of Nikomedia might have had nothing to do with the Varangian plot and died coincidently

shortly after the event.

In 1078, Leka the Paulican agitated against the emperor and tried to get the Pechenegs to invade

Byzantine territory. It seems that Alexios Komnenos was sent with an army to defeat the Pechenegs

that raided the Balkans at this time, possibly brought on by Leka's embassies.118 At the same time,

Dobromir the Paulican stirred up rebellion in Mesembria in co-operation with the activities of Leka. He

113Attaleiates, 35.1.
114Attaleiates, 35.1.
115Attaleiates, 35.1.
116Attaleiates, 35.2.
117Attaleiates, 35.2.
118Bryennios, 299.11-25.

25 Daniel R.F. Maynard

assembled some militia and started pillaging the area. Skylitzes reports that Dobromir murdered the

loyalist Michael, Bishop of Serdika.119 Leka and Dobromir abandoned their rebellion after learning that

Nikephoros III was rapidly assembling an army to destroy them.120 They submitted to the emperor and

begged for forgiveness because their few followers were insufficient to confront the Byzantine army.

They also feared sharing the fate of Bryennios and Basilakes and they both begged for forgiveness

from the emperor. Nikephoros placated them by granting them amnesty and bestowed gifts and titles on

them.121 It seems likely that the Paulicans were using the chaos of the rebellions of Bryennios and

Basilakes to try and rally support against Nikephoros and use the Pechenegs that Basilakes had tried to

utilise. The Paulicans themselves were a Christian sect that was starting to see a revival in the Balkan

regions of the empire and this rebellion may have been a result of its growing popularity.

In 1079, Constantine Doukas plotted against the emperor. Attempting to improve relations with the

Doukas family, Nikephoros took Constantine under his wing. However, Constantine repaid this

kindness with vengeance.122 At the time, Nikephoros was dealing with the problems emerging in the

east and had assembled an army at Chrysopolis. Anatolia had been practically overrun by Turks who

raided Roman territory. The Roman troops proved inadequate because they were terrified of fighting

the Turks and lacked the supplies needed to advance into Cappadocia. Nikephoros thus employed

mercenaries to strengthen his forces but they were disloyal and chaotic and proved more a hindrance

than a help. The emperor had to personally address them to try and make them co-operate.123 However,

Constantine Doukas rebelled with his troops against the emperor. Nikephoros was popular enough that

no-one outside of the immediate army of Constantine joined him. Nikephoros was able to easily

119Skylitzes, 184.19-20.
120Attaleiates, 36.11.
121Attaleiates, 35.11-12.
122Attaleiates, 36.3.
123Attaleiates, 36.4.

26 Daniel R.F. Maynard

assemble an army of levies and Imperial Guards to deal with Constantine.124 Nikephoros sent

emissaries to Constantine to ascertain why they had rebelled. The hearts of the soldiers under

Constantine's command were easily assuaged by the offer of amnesty by Nikephoros and they

surrendered their pretender to the emperor but this also brought a halt to any military campaign against

the Turks. Constantine Doukas was forced into monastic exile as a monk.125

In 1078 Philaretos Brachamios, an Armenian who had organised an army to defend his territory,

submitted his fief to the emperor Nikephoros III and was granted the title of Doux of Antioch to

legitimise his rule over the region. Philaretos had been attacking some Byzantine towns to bring them

under his personal control. The immediate effect of his being granted legitimate authority was that he

was no longer dividing the Byzantines’ resistance against the Turks in that region. This also would have

granted him the proper authority to command the local Tagmata.126 This perhaps demonstrates the

influence, diplomacy and prestige of Botaneiates because Michael Doukas had failed to get Philaretos

to submit to him because of Philaretos' dislike of the corrupt Nikephoros the Logothetes, whereas

Philaretos submitted willingly to Nikephoros III.127 A diplomatic success, it is doubtful that this

achievement really meant anything to either Philaretos or Nikephoros since the former was practically

independent anyway and the latter had no means of benefiting from reasserting control over this

exclave. The success may be more related to Nikephoros himself. The fact that he achieved something

that his despised predecessor could not may have lent itself to Nikephoros' promotion of his legitimacy.

That Attaleiates bothers to mention it as one of Nikephoros' successes compared to Michael VII lends

further weight to this argument.

124Attaleiates, 36.5.
125Attaleiates, 36.6.
126Treadgold 1997: 610.
127Attaleiates, 35.10.

27 Daniel R.F. Maynard

 Fall

In AD1081, Robert Guiscard, the Norman adventurer and conqueror of Southern Italy prepared to

invade the Eastern Roman Empire to place a man, claiming to be Michael Doukas on the throne,128 'The

Duke's heart was much grieved by the outrage done to his son-in-law and daughter who had been

driven from the imperial throne. Many felt this to be a grave injury done to the duke, and he wished to

take vengeance for it.'129 The Normans landed at Dyrrachium and besieged it.130 At the same time

Nikephoros was searching for someone to succeed him, he wanted to pass the throne to Synadenos

Botaneiates, his nephew.131 He had previously considered giving the throne to Constantine Doukas

probably changing his mind because of his rebellion. At any rate, Alexios Komnenos was once again

placed in charge of the western armies and marched against Robert.132 In the east, things were

continuing to worsen with Cyzicus being captured by the Seljuk Turks.133 Alexios and his kin plotted

against the emperor along with the empress Maria.134 In the east a pretender called Nikephoros

Melissenos rose in rebellion.135

With the capital under siege by Alexios and his followers as well as barbarians tightening the noose

around his empire, Nikephoros III decided that his only option was to abdicate in favour of Nikephoros

Melissenos. Melissenos was at that time encamped at Damalis in Anatolia, having rebelled in the

autumn of 1080. So emperor Nikephoros had to send a messenger across the Bospheros to reach him.136

However, the messengers never even left Constantinople because George Palaiologos intercepted the

messengers and persuade them to allow Alexios to become emperor. As this happened Alexios' army
128Komnene, 1.12.
129William of Apulia, 4.5.
130Komnene, 1.16.
131Komnene, 2.2.
132William of Apulia, 4.5.
133Komnene, 2.3.
134Komnene, 2.3-7.
135Komnene, 2.10; Matthew of Edessa, 2.75.
136Komnene, 2.11.

28 Daniel R.F. Maynard

broke into Constantinople and sacked the city on the 1st April AD1081, 'Thus the whole army,

composed of foreign and native troops collected from the countryside round Constantinople and the

neighbouring districts, rapidly poured into the city through the Kharsian Gate. They knew the capital

had been stocking up with all kinds of provisions for a long time, constantly being replenished by land

and sea. Once inside they scattered in all directions, in the main streets, at crossroads and in alleyways,

in their cruelty sparing neither houses nor churches nor even the most sacred sanctuaries; in fact they

gathered from them heaps of booty. They did refrain from murder, but all other crimes were committed

with complete disregard for decency. What was worse was the fact that even the native-born soldiers

did not abstain from such excesses; they seemed to forget themselves, debasing their normal habits and

shamelessly following the example of the barbarians.'137 Patriarch Kosmas, persuaded Nikephoros to

step down rather than try and prolong the civil war. The emperor fled in disgrace to the Hagia Sophia

and sought sanctuary within its walls.138 Michael, Alexios I's Logothetes, escorted Nikephoros III to the

monastery of Peribleptos, where the emperor abdicated and became a monk. He lived out the rest of his

life in this monastery. He died that same year, on the 10th December 1081. Alexios would link his

family to the Botaneiatoi by marrying Nikephoros' nephew to his niece.139

Assessment

'Botaneiates had been a competent general, but he knew nothing of politics or statesmanship; besides,

he was getting old... and his bid for the throne, successful as it had been used up much of his remaining

strength.'140 A fair assessment by Norwich and despite the glowing history of Attaleiates, Nikephoros III

was very much a footnote between the disastrous reign of Michael VII and the recovery under Alexios

I. However, it would be wrong to write him off as a useless or evil emperor for he was not.
137Komnene, 2.9.
138Komnene, 2.12.
139Komnene, 2.5.
140Norwich, 1991:361.

29 Daniel R.F. Maynard

In his earlier life he had proved himself to be a capable general and great warrior and in his elder days,

a man devoted to defending the empire. The life of Botaneiates before he became emperor

demonstrates that this man did everything within his power to protect his homeland even in dire

circumstances. He always remained loyal despite his circumstances and did his best in often

unfavourable situations. Only becoming disenchanted after the utter uselessness of the Doukas and his

exile by Romanos IV, did Nikephoros decide to take action and place himself as the master of Rome's

destiny. He used the second chance that Michael VII gave him to remove the men that had been

destroying the empire and attempted to remedy what he could.

He was the last of the Anatolian, military aristocracy that fought with the bureaucracy for the

prominent position in the empire after the decline and dying out of the Macedonian dynasty. It was

Nikephoros that finally crushed the power of the bureaucratic faction and began the process of

restoring the empire, if haphazard and piecemeal. This elimination of this powerful faction, which had

essentially held sway over the empire since Basil II's death was an essential part in reducing the

opponents that Alexios I had to contend with once he took the throne. It is impressive that even in

Nikephoros' old age, he was seventy-six when he took the throne, that he was still able to administer

the empire. Although, it is obvious that the problems that faced Nikephoros required the youth of

Alexios Komnenos to solve, these problems were not of Botaneiates' making. He could not stop the

Turks from raiding and steadily capturing the east and it would take time to rebuild the Roman army

and regain Anatolia. However, his good relations with the Turks may have helped prevent the process

of conquest from happening more rapidly. He succeeded in maintaining contact with the pockets of

resistance that still held onto parts of Anatolia. These lands certainly made the process of reconquest

under Alexios easier because they were still in contact with the Byzantine court making them look far

more like allies rather than foreign enemies when the Komnenoi reconquered these areas.

Nikephoros III reversed the abuses of the previous regime and expanded on a number of judicial

30 Daniel R.F. Maynard

problems of the time. However, he emptied the treasury by placating everyone with gifts and titles.

This could only go so far into pacifying the commoners and Dynatoi and did not prevent five rebellions

occurring during his reign. The number of plots and revolts during his reign demonstrates his flimsy

hold on the throne. In addition, the political stability of the empire was collapsing into chaos and only

steadily improved under the reign of Alexios Komnenos, which was also filled with revolts and plots

against him. To fight these rebellions, Botaneiates had to continuously hire mercenaries from the Turks

and others to supplement the Roman armies. This was because the Roman army had essentially fallen

into obsolescence due a prolonged period of neglect in the previous decades. This neglect reached its

peak under Constantine Doukas, who actively reduced the size and funding of the armies so that by

1081, they were little more than a ill-equipped militia. Nikephoros did nothing to rectify this situation

except rely more heavily on foreigners as a short term solution to his immediate problems. He had no

plan for succession other than distant family members which, had it succeeded may have led to further

civil wars. Finally, it was because of the deposition of Michael VII that Robert Guiscard, was given a

pretext to attack the Roman Empire. This led to the commander of the western army to rebel against

Nikephoros. When Alexios rebelled Nikephoros had no means of defeating him because Alexios had

been Nikephoros' main pillar of support. With the sack of Constantinople and the abdication of

Nikephoros III Botaneiates in 1081 an epoch had ended.

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