Sec 14 p1

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.]

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE
TANODBAYAN, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; DELAY OF THREE YEARS IN
THE TERMINATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, A VIOLATION THEREOF. — We
find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused
to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner's constitutional rights.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LONG DELAY IN FILING OF INFORMATIONS
AGAINST ACCUSED WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF CASES. — We are constrained to hold that
the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503 should be dismissed.
DECISION
YAP, J p:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October
16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of
April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August
12, 1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan from continuing with trial or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, all entitled "People of the Philippines
versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los
Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information
(DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report
with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was
then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had
submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on
December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP
Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices
in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint
repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the
Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los
Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June
16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC,
submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence
gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD had violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019,
respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of
RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from
prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his
motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982,
all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On
July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by
Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the following informations be
filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: LLphil
"1. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith;
"2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973;
"3. Violation of Section 7 of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978."
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for
printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of January,
1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the
release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accused FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the
Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and sources
of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every
public officer.
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with

Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
That on the about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now
Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give
Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his
brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and
ownership of South East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private
corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973,
but whose organization and operating expenses came from the confidential funds of
the Department of Public Information as it was organized to undertake research,
projects for the government, without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced
by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of
December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1976), as required of every public officer.
CONTRARY TO LAW."

That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as a December 31, 1978, including a statement of the amounts and sources
of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every
public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of the
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to
quash the information on the following grounds: LLjur
"1. The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to
a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to
file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500,
10502 and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199
for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501
(for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended."
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated
motion to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said
motion that needed refutation, namely:
1. The offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501, have already
prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For failure to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the
fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases
were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were
committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although
the charges were actually filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still
the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period
has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal
prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets
and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any
natural or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more . . ." to submit a
statement of assets and liabilities ". . . regardless of the networth," the mandate in the
latter law is for ALL government employees and officials to submit a statement of assets
and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and distinct
from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it
render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law
which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period
of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation. prcd
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's
"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured
by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information to
change the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged from
January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED."
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8,

1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500,
changing the date of the commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22,
1985, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require the
respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective
immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said
resolution, the respondents, through Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their
comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, The Court required the parties to move in the premises considering
the supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and
the provisions for Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court insofar as the public respondents
were concerned, which required the successor official to state whether or not he
maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986,
the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and
they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the
cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the position; that in any
event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the
law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan.
The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he
concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan. LexLib
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a
motion for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying
that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court
is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan.
However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the
Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the
issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and
the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the
Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised
by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non-existence of
prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the
questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of
"due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of
the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after
more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which
amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent
Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the
authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature
for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the
proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify
acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any
alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or
administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse"
committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such
facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process
and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully
threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
"That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the
proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on
April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do not appear on record
and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could
even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to painstaking and grueling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official. In this respect, We are of the considered opinion that the provision of Pres.
Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint by the
Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary investigation is
merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in
said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise
language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other
grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch
as it would be itself remiss in the performance of its official functions and subject to
the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances
which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of
the prosecution to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed
rights may be presented during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue
involved may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein
attempts to have the Court grant such as radical relief during this stage of the
proceedings which precludes a precocious or summary evaluation of insufficient
evidence in support thereof."
This bring us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich-like, bury its head
in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the
issue only after the trial? prcd
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused
from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the has been deprived of due process of
law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely
undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October
1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary
(then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07.
The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 — which was around two
months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by
referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and
report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former
Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavit and counter-
affidavits were in and the case was ready for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused
Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on
June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report. cdphil
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but
revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution
was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should
not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used
or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established
procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be
enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not
be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-
day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him
from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by
law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has
included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be
treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused
to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double
standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the
five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did
not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took
the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of
a a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation.
But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected,
for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time. LexLib
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to
hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on
the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the
same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10502 and 10503, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
||| (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL 563-577)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 72670. September 12, 1986.]
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS,
O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO,
JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, **
ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K.
MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA, JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE
B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J.
ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP,
ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS,
VICENTE JAYME,*** , petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION
(represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto
Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO
FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A.
OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL.
VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA,
CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ,
SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT.
FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M.
MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO
TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO
MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO
ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, respondents.
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FINDINGS OF COMMISSION THAT
PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN VITIATED BY LACK OF DUE PROCESS, UPHELD; CASE AT BAR.
— The Commission submitted the following recommendation: "Considering the
existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and
which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all
the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the
final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief,
subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable court, that the
proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby
respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in
Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,'
be granted." The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on
the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and
duly supported by the facts of public record set that the then President (codenamed
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino Galman murder case;"
and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of
the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. The Court finds that
the Commission's Report and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the
evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of proven
integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55
years) and in the prosecutorial and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate
courts), experts at sifting, the chaff from the grain, the Commission properly appraised
the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents.
2. ID.; ID.; MOCKERY OF JUDICIAL PROCESS; A CASE OF. — The record shows
suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely,
misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers
to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, and borned out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitur), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases
against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the
streets and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy
scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the
Malacañang conference, would accomplish the two principal clamor for the suspected
killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield
of double jeopardy. Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the
authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan
Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close
monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final
outcome are without parallel and precedent in out annals and jurisprudence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECRET CONFERENCE AT MALACAÑANG AND THE ENTIRE PROSECUTION
PANEL REGARDING IMMINENT FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST THE
ACCUSED; VITIATED ALL PROCEEDINGS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN. — The fact of the
secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President
discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution
panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six
accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him
to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not
denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under out penal laws. This illegality
vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by
the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of
being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. .
. . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to
presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacañang Palace on January 10, 1985."
4. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW COLLUSION AS TO HANDLING AND
TREATMENT OF CASES. — No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or
suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree made it possible to
refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very
essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and
not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a
means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondent at the secret Malacañang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This
renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused,
particularly General Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has
been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions
of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these
arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered
before a neutral and impartial court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL; DECLARED UNLAWFUL AND VOID AB INITIO; CASE AT BAR. —
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice
to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice
and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render
impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures
of politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial -
the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE PROSECUTION IS
DENIED DUE PROCESS.- No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double
jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar, "Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOID WHERE DENIAL OF RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS APPARENT. — "The
cardinal present is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-
30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-
30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb.
27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
8. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN APPLICABLE. — "Respondent Judge's dismissal
order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. "In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the
remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy." Respondents-accused's contention that the
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or
reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court
in People Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general
rule and pre-supposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent
Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect,
no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained.
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. . . .
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE INVOKED IN A SHAM AND MOCK TRIAL. — More so does the
rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have
held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the
entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total
absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused. Fully aware of the prosecution's
difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to
appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the
proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6
months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution
complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their
being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the
nil situation for the defense.
10. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID WHERE VERDICT WAS DICTATED, COERCED AND
SCRIPTED. — A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the
case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. Such judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw." It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people.
11. ID.; ID.; COURTS; CALLED UPON TO RENDER JUSTICE WHERE IT IS DUE. — "Private
respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail, the scales must be
balance. It is not to be dispensed for he accused alone. The interests of the society,
which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a
triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean
injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is
due.
12. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN DURING
PENDENCY OF FINAL ACTION OF SUPREME COURT; CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. — Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all
the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs.
Aquilzan, wherein the Court is setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence
dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to
hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But
prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by
deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
13. ID.; ID.; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; OPINION IN LUZON BROKERAGE
CO., INC. vs. MARITIME BLDG., CO., INC. (36 SCRA 305 [1978], NOT APPLICABLE. —
Respondent invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime
Bldg. Co., is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only
one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership
for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand
that litigation be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration
reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years
and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration). This opinion
cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date
of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per
the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is not being resolved within five months of its
filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by
the Court only last August 26th. Then the second motion for reconsideration is based on
an entirely new material ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the
petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e., the secret Malacañang
conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March,
1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the
merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and
predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court
(without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for
reconsideration.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
GRANTING THEREOF JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF THE CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED TO THE COURT. — Considering that
certain significant facts and circumstances not previously disclosed to the Court were
found by the Commission constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain
the veracity of the same, to be duly established by sufficient evidence and are indicative
of "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case . . .;" and that there exists "adequate credible evidence showing
that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided
the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate
its position and to offer all the evidences it could have otherwise presented, but also
predetermined the outcome of the case; . . ." I join in granting petitioner's second
motion for reconsideration.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RULE OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. — As it is, the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and
to lay out before respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped that
Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task. "A public prosecutor is
'the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but
that justice and every definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." (Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil. 556 [1940]).
"He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent may not suffer, and the guilty
may not escape unpunished" (People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453 [1948]).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURTS AND COURT PERSONNEL;
SANDIGANBAYAN; EQUALLY CULPABLE FOR MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE; CASE AT BAR. —
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to end, from the
raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment, which absolved the
accused, en masse, from any and all liability, is equally culpable for miscarriage of
justice. Due process of law, which "requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal" and the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs.
Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; NULL AND VOID AB INITIO;

VITIATED BY LACK OF DUE PROCESS. — The proceedings below, having been vitiated by
lack of due process, to the detriment of the State and the People, were invalid and the
judgment rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of double jeopardy
may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the proceedings
must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W. 757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The
lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would make
ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W.
1047).
4. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; ATTACHES EVEN IF COLLUSION TAKES PLACE AND THE
ACCUSED WERE NOT A PARTY TO THE SAME; PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even assuming
without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place, they were not a party to
the same; and, for those who were charged only either as accomplices or accessories,
they contend that their alleged offense involved only a cover-up in the investigation of
the crime so that, whatever pressure was exerted could only have benefited the
principals, consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in jeopardy. It
is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction cannot be
avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that
exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution and the Trial
Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said that the accused
were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder charge in Court so that, after
being acquitted as planned, the accused could no longer be prosecuted under the
doctrine of double jeopardy; the "categorization" of the accused into principals,
accomplices and accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail during the
trial, were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of protecting
them for subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense (Coumas vs.Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A verdict
of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put
him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense
(State vs. Lee, 30A, 1110, 65 Conn. 265, 48 Am. S.R. 202, 27 L. RA. 498).
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J p:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the
third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former
Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since the
imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he
was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses
alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose
jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts he
repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts
but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him
under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by
the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971
when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming." 1
This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of
the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971 elections (when eight
persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator
Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971.
The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has never been
known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil
courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to
undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's
refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine
national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while
under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet
fired point-blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding
that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers — and "from a
military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot
Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo
Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later
filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously
replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President
instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press
conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in
order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose
was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free
world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national
mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for
Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth,
justice and freedom. LibLex
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the
treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on
August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national
shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and
local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth
through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22,
1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings
in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194
witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority
and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark
another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day
ahead by the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially
by the then President who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of
a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final
resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was
better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other members was
submitted on the following day to the then President who coldly received them and
could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that
"I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando
Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary]
that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the
military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWAT troopers
who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service
stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn,
of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that
the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title
of the case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons
who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General
Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and
implemented without his intervention." Cdpr
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue
to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of
the President may thereafter direct to be taken." The four-member majority report (also
prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien
and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit
our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the
first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing"
They wrote: cdphil
"The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to determine
the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late former Senator. Of
greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold
righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality,
humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable result
of which will restore our country's honored place among the sovereign nations of the
free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
"More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the late
former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine
society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been haunting this country for
decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic
instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive
elements in what are otherwise noble institutions in our country — the military and
law enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large, the great
majority of the officers and men of these institutions have remained decent and
honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our country and people.
"The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what
unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba
Eban observes. 'Nobody who has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its
proper limits.' Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have spawned in
secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving
people.
"To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public officials
should regard public service as a reflection of human ideals in which the highest sense
of moral values and integrity are strictly required.
"A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that followed,
would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a
country where public office is viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the
moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all other considerations."
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and
statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings
and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this
view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he
told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief) in a Radio-TV interview on September
9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I
would have known somehow . . . Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know
how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in
May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
"CBS: 'But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict earlier
reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of the guards may
have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy)."
"MARCOS: 'Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are the
newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence still proves
that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there were intelligence
reports connecting the communist party to the killing.'" 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave
of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that
"(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has
chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of
opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called
evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and extended
"My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of your case," 9
even as he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if
he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma
Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that
"as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured
witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and
Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and
twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five
incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present
action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present
vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that
the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused,
and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find
out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan
from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had
scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial
and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before
an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file
a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day
period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as
Annex 5 of his comment. cdll
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio
in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order
issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the
question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply
thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to three vote, with Justice
Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be
set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the
respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due
process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material
evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the
entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan
be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2,
1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion
for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as
scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect
convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of
Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In
opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal,
the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer
and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for
reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times
entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed
by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and
produce a verdict of acquittal. cdrep
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April

11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he
was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in
his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any
alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully
resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary
investigation and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases
below against herein private-party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his
memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure.
That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15a
He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect
complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases
below, . . . should this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and
retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that
had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein
respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that
the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April
14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in
fact, he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its
course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of
April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and
decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that
"if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the
Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would
probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any
objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course."
Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment,
asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his
handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any
kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested
for an investigation by this Court to settle the note-passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
"1. AB INITIO, A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate of
the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman on
August 21, 1983 was dooned to an ignominous end. Malacañang wanted dismissal —
to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel
(composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution charging all the
respondents as principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL.
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former President)
summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the Tanodbayan),
Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and all the members of
the Panel.
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former President had
a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently
furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof. LLjur
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at
the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent
was the more discreet posture when the former President became emotional (he was
quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino and
the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to
the military he rumbled on such statements as: 'It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos,
though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to do' .
. . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is
becoming ambitious;' . . . 'the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be
charged in court, and will be detained at city jail.'
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach.
The former President more or less conceded that for political and legal reasons all the
respondents should be charged in court. Politically, as it will become evident that the
government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and
thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that
after (not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered to
get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly
Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their respective institutions. The
existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of members of AFP
charged in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle the
trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in four to six months,
pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly
mapped out, the former President uttered: 'Magmoro-moro na lang kayo.'
The parting words of the former President were: 'Thank you for your cooperation. I
know how to reciprocate.'
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his
desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well as
other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient
evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial
would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in
accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to say on."
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding
of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the
Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of the
media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacañang; the installation
of a "war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the
prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men
about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the
bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should
not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion
for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court
finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost
twenty years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding
Justice this is the only occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of
acquittal." He "associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and likewise
prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and
void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a
declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of
petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this
would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner
or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316,Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No.
61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners'
claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a
miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a
double jeopardy claim. prLL
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its
denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was to
file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its
evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked
that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-accused on December 2,
1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct
action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to
establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
After petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of retired
Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate
Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive
evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and
relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this
Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting
on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986. On the said last day, respondents
announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected
deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative
of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July
31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it discussed fully the
evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as
follows:
"1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special
Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special
Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be charged as
principals of the crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacañang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft
Resolution recommending such course of action, President Marcos summoned Justice
Fernandez, the three members of the Special Investigating Panel, and Justice Pamaran
to a conference in Malacañang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the
recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the
Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the

advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted as
planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double
jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail
during the trial, considering that they would be charged with capital offenses,
President Marcos directed that the several accused be 'categorized' so that some of
them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled
personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacañang conference were followed to the letter;
and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in the course
of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution of the special investigating
panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice
Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of
witnesses who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense
counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the very decision
rendered in the case.
8. That expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-
Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those
involved in said task to comply with the same in the subsequent course of the
proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion against
complying with the Malacañang directive, Justice Herrera played his role with
manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and predetermined
manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-
managed from Malacañang and performed by willing dramatis personnae as well as by
recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omni-present influence of an authoritarian
ruler."
The Commission submitted the following recommendation. prcd

"Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the
same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but
also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the
considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this
Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of
due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a
declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled
'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted."
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the
Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the
parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis
thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly
supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter,
that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of
the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case
and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences
which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of
the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and
civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and
findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public
record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total
of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and
judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff
from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and
denials made by public respondents, thus:
"The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a
manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be
expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide international
attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate Senator
Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that
President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
"The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish thus purpose . . .
"President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the
start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the
investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the
crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and
that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence that could
stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in
the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the charge in court
would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further street
demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted,
they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid
another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is
no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx

"After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but
with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and the
question of preventive custody of the accused having thereby received satisfactory
solution, President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and how
long it would take to be finished.
"According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to
personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was
voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day testimony. Justice
Pamaran explained that such order could not have been given inasmuch as it was not
yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein
are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice thereof.
"It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such
presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that
the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the division headed by
him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that
he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the Malacañang conference
wherein the said directive was given . . .
"The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his
admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to
how long it would take him to finish the case.
"The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an agreement
was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the accused, President
Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out
of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know
how to reciprocate,' did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part of
Justice Fernandez or Justice Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was
presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of
their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was
abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.).
"The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind of
the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that pressure
from Malacañang had indeed been made to bear on both the court and the
prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity
of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his
moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his instructions were directed, the
motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at
that time which enabled the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers. That
the conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the
Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should be kept
away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those
directly involved were called to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the
Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room
where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. Actually, no public mention was ever made
of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months later
when the former President was no longer around.
"President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted to
take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and
not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or determination on the part of
Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite
their realization of its unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated
murder case may be easily inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No
effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on
the lame excuses that they went there out of 'curiosity,' or 'out of respect to the
Office of the President,' or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from
the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential
pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to
Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. Their abject
deference to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that,
not having been given seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it
was not that long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking
most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory
from the very moment they stepped inside Malacañang Palace on January 10, 1985."
18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry
is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed
to such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective
handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos
in the conference held on January 10, 1985pervaded the entire proceedings of the
Aquino-Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and instances
it enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and
Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts: —
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six
accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals,
Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and
recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be
completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no
sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The
majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that
all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding,
it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard
practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or
in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the
evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical
and practical course of action should have been, as originally recommended by the
Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez
readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with the
Malacañang instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual
categorization came only after the then President's instruction at Malacañang when
Gen. Ver's counsel Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez
since November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time,
[the Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with
that of the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as
principals of the crime of double murder. 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice
Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January
10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the
subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through
due to the summons for them to go to Malacañang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses: "Realizing, no doubt, that
a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent
efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and
thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable
evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being
ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to
refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies
before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before
at the trial. Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board
"disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission
narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya, eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on
his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and
display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila
on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was
deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The
Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese
police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that
the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine
Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave
"although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the original transcription
which was in Nippon-go. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of
Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen
running away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by
surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by
Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he could
testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca
Quijano, the Commission reported that Cdpr
". . . Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed testimony
and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to suppress
the same was as much as, if not more than those in the case of Wakamiya . . . She
recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by armed
men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed by the
foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the local Rural Bank, and ejected
therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk with her about her
proposed testimony; that a certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip
abroad; that Mayor Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United
States to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Fariñas offered her two
million pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio,
the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons
responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from testifying.
"It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or
perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the Sandiganbayan.
Justice Herrera was told by Justice Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus
at Justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his
refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1,
1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous
attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did not end with her taking the
witness stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which
suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected
of having coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit 'D'); and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted for about
twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and making most of those
present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum
so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited
to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila
City Hall and the Finance Building Justice Herrera declared that the main switchboard
of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room occupied by
Malacañang people who were keeping track of the proceedings."
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing
that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on
September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the
name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took
them away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the
Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together
with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc. They have been missing since then, despite his
attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five
persons because they said Marcos was in power [despite his appeal to the Minister of
National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And
he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen: "While it is true that the U.S.
airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to
divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would not
necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator
Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately
pointed out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider
range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to
accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even
assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully
contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard
the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its
introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it
would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to
suppress the same would have been totally uncalled for. LLjur
"4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the
Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the
testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing
a motion for the reconsideration of said denial, for the reason that it would be futile to
do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same . . . His posture . . . is, in
the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the
case as soon as possible, if not of something else.
"6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified
that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-
forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of
such directive having been complied with to the letter . . .
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President
Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan
are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The
evidence before the Commission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice
Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or
regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular
raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran . . . Despite an
announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify
on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was
given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to testify.Neither was any one of
the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran,
were present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice
Pamaran as regards the said raffle.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were
filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the
Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of
the two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be
categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may
be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited
time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of
media people would ring with truth.
"What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually
conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by
any one of the two other members of his division . . ."
7. The custody of the accused; their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a

civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in
the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by
the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said
jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At
that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes
the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding
Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even
to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice
Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after
sometime . . .
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by
Malacañang personnel. "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the
Court had been monitored by Malacañang presumably for it to know what was
happening and to take remedial measures as may be necessary, Justice Pamaran had
candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the
President of the Philippines'" were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There
was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously called 'war room', wherein military and
Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings," the close monitoring by
Malacañang showed its results oh several occasions specified in the Report.
Malacañang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence in
Justice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by
having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise,
Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly appearedat the National
Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought
there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is
likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel
pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in
the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding: "It is
abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case
should be handled. He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied
with.
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of
the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed
to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but
favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of
the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and
[2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same
offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. . . . It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on the standard
ground that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most
logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total
absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had
to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see
a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. . . .
"Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who
concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice
Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being prepared,
Justice Augusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the accused
should be convicted, he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he
confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera
Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN, July
17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this
statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion
for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony of
Justice Herrera remained unrebutted." (Emphasis supplied).
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or
more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne
out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitura 22 ), since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the
Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would
summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable
to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacañang conference, would accomplish the
two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to
be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double
jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the
entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to
handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings
to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and
precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14,
1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-man
rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address
any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for
"the boys'" acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable: —
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that
he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino" and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators.
"2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the
four majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution
through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked
the four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report calling
for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the
lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he
totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly
insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and
sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any
security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin
Galman and sealing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando
Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim
according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who
wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and
pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence
on the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers'
version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in
conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges
against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have
been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the
preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal
laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the
Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified . . . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of
independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very
moment they stepped inside Malacañang Palace on January 10, 1985." LLphil
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-
Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men
26a ) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial
court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining
the outcome of individual cases." 26b This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and
irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly
Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no
evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas
as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and
the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and
considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral
and impartial court. LLphil
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice
to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice
and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render
impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures
of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as
an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he
was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous
and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock
trial — the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal
was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked

against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
"Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated. 27a
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-
30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head'
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
"Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted
of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
"In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy."
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end
"deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was
already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the
overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses,
secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and
reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in
about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards
(it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as
compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being
"cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a
certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a
reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before
respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying
tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial
court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case
at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To
paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the
lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto
himself, he invites anarchy. prLL
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends
the case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy
was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully
applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment.
As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under
it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail, the scales
must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the
society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily
spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also
mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where
justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. — The private
prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of
the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising
from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had
been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion
and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that
respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without first
making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange
between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of
Malacañang" —
"PJ PAMARAN
"Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal later on
with that. After all the most important thing here is, shall we say, the decision of the
case."
"J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the capacity of the
Justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than anything else." (p. 13 TSN,
June 25, 1985) (Italics supplied by Herrera)." 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in
the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the
facts above-stated, as follows:
". . . the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the contempt
proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution neither joined that
petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to the
submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but is
also a confession of official insouciance." (Page 22, Decision).32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969
case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might
result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor
appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overriding and
transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due process to
the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete
evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required
the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining
order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued
its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court.
This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan 35 , wherein the court in setting aside the
hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from
deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his
decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the
respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this
Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced
the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents. — The other related objections of respondents'

counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock
trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment,
instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to
enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such
judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent
proof heard by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings
were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the
collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a
predetermined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused. cdll
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of
the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the
judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people
are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles
and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure
applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was
suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now
exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should
be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the
Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound
practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for
reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for
over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration). This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the
denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same
was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved
within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the
parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. Then, the second motion for
reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was not known at
the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration,
i.e, the secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only
fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per-adventure (as proved in
the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president
had dictated and predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten
members of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the
second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. — There has been the long dark night of
authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to trigger
the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of
Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the
new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy
attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers
both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality.
In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly
and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public
faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the
sword nor of the purse. Its strength has mainly in public confidence, based on the truth
and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of
objectivity and impartiality, integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the
Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as
by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this
Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal
and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming
instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of
one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another. This simply
means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against
them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What
the past regime had denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must
now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will
assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has
failed. cdrep
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe
their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone
and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the
appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government,
is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the
opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes
functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the
Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To
paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority
nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their
oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation. — The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the
invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros
German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough, competent and dedicated
service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the
same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled period
and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The
resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan
and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to
all.
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, Fernan and Narvasa, JJ., took no part.
Feliciano, J., I join Gutierrez, Jr., J., in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior to
the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.
||| (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 42-102)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR.,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998.]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO,
JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN,
respondents.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner Bayani M. Alonte.
Ramon C. Casano for petitioner in 131728.
The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for respondent Judge.
SYNOPSIS
Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna and Buenaventura
Concepcion were charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn Punongbayan.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. The petition for change of
venue was granted and the case was raffled to respondent judge who issued warrants
of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her "decision to abide by her Affidavit of
Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty when arraigned and waived pre-trial.
Immediately following arraignment the prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to
the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance and that she has no interest
in further prosecuting the action. The Prosecution then manifested that the State had
no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She then
moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both accused-petitioners. The two accused
did not present any countervailing evidence, did not take the witness stand nor
admitted the act charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge said that
"the case was submitted for decision." On December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered
convicting petitioners of rape. IEaCDH
Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment
is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system,
are mandatory and indispensable.
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of
the Rules of Court which should be strictly adhered to. There can be no short-cut to the
legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of
Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most
undeserving.
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-
called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the
action has been instituted.
Prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been
exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few
occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow. TEDaAc
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS; REQUISITES. — Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused
is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary
and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the
oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a
"law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial."
2. ID.; ID.; THERE CAN BE NO SHORT-CUT TO THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THERE
CAN BE NO EXCUSE FOR NOT AFFORDING AN ACCUSED HIS FULL DAY IN COURT. — The
existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and
the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The Solicitor
General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have
been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process,
rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN PROBATIVE
VALUE. — In the case of People vs. Junio, the Court held that: Thus, we have declared
that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given value. It would
be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at
the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the
Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs.
People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA
128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]
4. ID.; COURTS; WITH INHERENT POWER TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ANY
PERSON TO TESTIFY. — Courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of
any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not precluded from
invoking that authority.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; THOUGH CONSTRUED AS PARDON
IN "PRIVATE CRIMES," IT IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION. —
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action
has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly
constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence,
would be up to the court for proper evaluation. EaSCAH
6. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT A COURT IS
IMPARTIAL, IT MUST ALSO BE PERCEIVED TO BE IMPARTIAL. — Relative to the prayer
for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, be best excused from
the case. Possible animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that
unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan could
again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty
of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. It is not enough that a court is
impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
7. ID.; ATTORNEYS; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE AND UNKIND ASCRIPTIONS
CAN HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED. — While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or
defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done
within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial
forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must
at no time be lost to it. DHEcCT
8. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTORS; EXPECTED TO ACT WITH UTMOST
DEVOTION AND DEDICATION TO DUTY. — Finally, it may be opportune to say, once
again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has
been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few
occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RECANTATION; CONSTRUED. — A recantation
usually applies to a repudiation by a complainant or a witness, either for the prosecution
or the defense, who has previously given an extrajudicial statement or testimony in
court. Repudiation may be made in writing, i.e., by sworn statement, or by testifying on
the witness stand.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY LOOKED UPON WITH DISFAVOR. — Mere retraction by
a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is that courts look with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. This rule applies to
crimes, offenses as well as to administrative offenses. The reason is because affidavits
of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability
that they will later be repudiated and there would never be an end to criminal litigation.
It would also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed
their minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a mockery and
place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — The general rule notwithstanding, the affidavit
should not be peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. There are instances
when a recantation may create serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. A retracted
statement or testimony must be subject to scrupulous examination. The previous
statement or testimony and the subsequent one must be carefully compared and the
circumstances under which each was given and the reasons and motives for the change
carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each statement or testimony must be tested by the
credibility of the witness which is left for the judge to decide. In short, only where there
exists special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise
doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can a retraction be
considered and upheld.
4. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE, GENERALLY WITH NO PERSUASIVE EFFECT.
— An affidavit of desistance is understood to be a sworn statement executed by a
complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he or she is discontinuing the
action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. The court
attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when executed as an
afterthought. However, as in retractions, an affidavit of desistance calls for a
reexamination of the records of the case. cAHDES
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WEIGHT IN PRIVATE CRIMES. — In private crimes, an affidavit of
desistance filed by a private complainant is also frowned upon by the courts. Although
such affidavit may deserve a second look at the case, there is hardly an instance when
this Court upheld it in private crimes and dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof.
Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where there exist special circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability
of the affidavit.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRIVATE CRIMES; CANNOT BE PROSECUTED
EXCEPT UPON COMPLAINT OF OFFENDED PARTY. — Private crimes cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended party. In adultery and
concubinage, the offended party must implead both the guilty parties and must not
have consented or pardoned the offenders. In seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents or guardian. The complainant must not have expressly pardoned the
offender. The filing of a complaint in private crimes is merely a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. It is
the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding without which the fiscal and the
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case. Once the complaint is filed, the action
proceeds just as in any other crime.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY; MODES. — Article 344
also provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It mentions two
modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly and timely made, result in the total
extinction of criminal liability of the offender. The pardon in private crimes must be
made before the institution of the criminal action. In adultery and concubinage, the
pardon may be express or implied while in seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, the pardon must be express. In all cases, the pardon must come prior to
the institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed in court, any pardon
made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand,
cannot extinguish criminal liability. The only act that extinguishes the penal action and
the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender and the
offended party.
8. ID.; ID.; PARDON IN PRIVATE CRIMES; MUST COME BEFORE INSTITUTION OF
CRIMINAL ACTION. — Pardon by the offended party extinguishes criminal liability when
made while the crime is still "private" and within the control of the offended party. But
once the case is filed in court, the pardon cannot ipso facto operate to dismiss the case.
After the institution of the criminal action, any pardon given by the complainant to the
offender would be unavailing, except of course when the offender validly marries the
offended party. The offended party's pardon of the offender in a seduction case after
the criminal action had been instituted constitutes no bar to said action. A pardon given
in a rape case after the filing of the action in court "comes too late to hide the shameful
occurrence from public notice."
9. ID.; ID.; DESISTANCE, NOT A GROUND. — Article 344 does not include
desistance of the offended party from prosecuting the case as a ground for extinction
of criminal liability whether total or partial. Hence, only when the desistance is
grounded on forgiveness and pardon and is made before the institution of the criminal
action, can it extinguish criminal liability. Desistance, per se, is not equivalent to pardon.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance"
of Juvielyn is not an express pardon of the accused and the crime committed. Private
complainant desisted from prosecuting the case against the petitioners because she
wished "to start life anew and live normally again." She reiterated this reason on the
witness stand. She complained that members of the media were bothering and
harassing her and that she wanted to go back to her normal life. She never said that she
forgave the petitioners. She did not absolve them from their culpability. She did not give
any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her rape. She did not say that she
consented to petitioner Alonte's acts. Moreover, the rape case is already in court and it
is no longer her right to decide whether or not the charge should be continued.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; ACCUSED DENIED
THEREOF WHERE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS RENDERED WITHOUT TRIAL. —
Justice Puno agrees with the majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings could not
have been a trial on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not conform with the
procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the case at
bar, petitioners were never instructed to present evidence to prove their defenses. The
parties were never given the opportunity to present their respective evidence rebutting
the testimony of private complainant. There was no admission by petitioners of the
charge in the information as to justify a change in the order of trial. Second, the
admission of private complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in
response to respondent judge's own questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent
judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was
it formally offered before the court. Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature of
the criminal proceedings before the court, this doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused who must be given the widest latitude of action to prove his innocence. It is in
petitioners' favor that the proceedings of November 7, 1997 be treated as a hearing on
the motion to dismiss, not a trial on the merits. To rule otherwise will effectively deny
petitioners due process and all the other rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights
and our Rules in Criminal Procedure. AHacIS
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RULES STRICTLY ADHERED TO. —
Our criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure to be
followed by courts in cases punishable by death. This rule also applies to all other
criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking life and liberty
except that of the guilty.
13. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED, NOT TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION. — Evidence not formally offered in court will not be taken into
consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by
him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. Indeed, following respondent judge's finding
and assuming that the November 7, 1997 hearing was already a trial on the merits,
petitioners were never afforded their right to confront and cross-examine the witness.
The court did not, at the very least, inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to
cross-examine private complainant with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No
opportunity to cross-examine was afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they
cannot be deemed to have waived said right by inaction.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner
Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura
Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of respondent Judge
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila
finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two
petitions were consolidated. llcd
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners
Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion
predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information contained
the following averments; thus:
"That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused, who is the incumbent
mayor of Biñan, Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water which made her
dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion without having participated as

principal or accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by bringing said
complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte at Sto. Tomas,
Biñan, Laguna and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani
Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law." 1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch
25 of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr.,
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue
(docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and
tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997,
Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of
desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
"I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus
Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal
counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and
say:
"1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte
of Biñan, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Biñan, Laguna;
"2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically, (a)
change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court
of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the President, on
the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor's
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Biñan
Court;
"3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost two
(2) semesters of my college residence. And when the actual trial is held after all the
preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my
schooling to attend the hearings;
"4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most
abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my younger brother, who
is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
"5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and
live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, and live normally once
again;
"6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other charge
for child abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the State
Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information has not been filed, and
that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases, whether
criminal, civil, and or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;
"7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my
credibility as a witness-complainant;
"8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a
corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in whatever form, against
members of the police force or any other official of officer, my relatives and friends who
extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer" 2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have

the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in
view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his
comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the
desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would
not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and
control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion
to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No.
97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by
coercion or corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect
for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her
private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the
probability that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor,
may have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible
miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of
Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Biñan, Laguna to the City of
Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No.
9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled
shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC
of Biñan, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance
in light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to
personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case
No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution." 3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955
by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted
to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her
Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without
prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of
facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the
light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director
Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion,. in
his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty"
to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings
forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of
the case on the merits. 4 According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the
prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and
validity of the affidavit of desistance. 5
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution
presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During
this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of
desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support
of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action.
Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the
harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence
were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor
her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence:
(i) Punongbayan's parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance
and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance
was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied
that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested
that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the
case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the
accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and
Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to
Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date,
stated that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice
and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion
for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and
in accord with justice and fair play to Join the aforestated motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December
1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second,
Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his
application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for
petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila Branch 53, notifying him of the
schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The
counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled
promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty.
Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the
decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI
clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would
appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless,
of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani
Alonte and Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which
each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years; and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
"In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion
for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered without any further force
and effect.
"SO ORDERED." 7
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for
reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam" for certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of
respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge." Petitioner
Concepcion later filed his own petition for certiorariandmandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have
the decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without
affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, §1,
Constitution).
excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in violation of the
mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct
and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex
A).
excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and
existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on
the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayan's and Balbin's) which were neither marked
nor offered into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioner's right
to due process (Article III, §1, Constitution).

excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting
a trial on the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule
119, Article III, §1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous
offenses can result in conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler
offenses could end up with the same result)." 8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his
own petition; thus:
"1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the
prosecution's motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having been rendered
without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total violation of the
petitioner's right to due process of law.
"2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is
concerned.
"3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a
fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the case had
been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of media hype that surrounded
this case and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.
"4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts
the petitioner as a principal even though he has been charged only as an accomplice in
the information." 9
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case
milieu, the prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i e., even before the trial court could
resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case
has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-
trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that —
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They
did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of
the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and
confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and
submitted the case for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so
called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left
everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the private complainant." 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was
conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was
merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative
Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of
desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct
of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the
basic procedures been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this shortcoming,
looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in

particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. 12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.
The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted
statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of
the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court,
in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision
unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint
or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina, 14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to
the above rules. It reminds that —
". . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases,
the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an
accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution
as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or
defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law
but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who
has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness. 15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —

"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997
with their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention
to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer
to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two
affidavits — one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her
desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is
that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and may be
waived."' (emphasis supplied) —
It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but
must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere silence of the holder of the right
should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a
few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor
have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been
given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by
respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act
charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20 There
can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording
an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost
place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case
would have to be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided
making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as
pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise
deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail,
should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court. LLpr
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of
desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore
quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint
against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to
discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case of People
vs. Junio, 21 should be instructive. The Court has there explained:
"The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by
complainant who was assisted by her mother supported the 'inherent incredibility of
prosecution's evidence' is specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that
after going through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open
court by recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare
that '[a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not
merit or warrant criminal prosecution.'
"Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not
be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed
his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and
place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People
vs. Ballabare, 23 a murder case, the Court has ruled:
"The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness
Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is to renounce and
withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State,
41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had
said during the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her
father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against
accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
"3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein,
was no longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in the Sworn
Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with my father's desire;
"It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court
and the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently
presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public
trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the
witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband,
Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear on
the substance of Tessie's affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not involved
in the perpetration of the crime.
"In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn
trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De
Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales,
113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this
circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229
SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a
situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude
the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine
which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs.
Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial court correctly ruled." 24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the
attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not
precluded from invoking that authority. 25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in
the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once
the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated,
possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of
evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on
to hold —
"While '[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above named persons, as the case may be,' [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised
Penal Code,] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made
prior to the institution of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by
People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA
647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was
filed after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be serious
in 'signifying (her) intention to refrain from testifying' since she still completed her
testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is
suspect considering that while it was dated 'April 1992,' it was only submitted sometime
in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo
on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of the case." 26
In People vs. Miranda, 27 applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
mentioned crimes."
the Court said:

"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction,
abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may
be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution in the offended party pardons
the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said
cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the
penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender and the
offended party." 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the
Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf
of the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he
pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper
for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which
is in question reads: 'The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.' This provision means that the pardon afforded
the offenders must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means,
further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate
further, article 435 of the old Penal Code provided: 'The husband may at any time remit
the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's
paramour shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old Penal Code
became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect
of repealing the same. The Revised Penal Codethereafter expressly repealed the old
Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of its provisions which
were not in force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article 344,
the pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for
adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come
before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to be
effective — circumstances which do not concur in this case." 30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than
what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further
hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the
personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this
Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan 31 could again be said: All suitors are entitled
to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of
doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of
the Judge. 32 It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as
impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of
proper language before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client
or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done
within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial
forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must
at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected
not merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and dedication
to duty. 33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many times in
the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting
in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that —
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y.
Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution of
Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said
criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December
1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET
ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No.
97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle
among the other branches of that court for proper disposition .
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., took no part: related to one of counsel.
(Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. Nos. 131652 & 131728, [March 9, 1998], 350 PHIL 700-
|||
770)
Presumption of innocence
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21325. October 29, 1971.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO,
PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA, MODESTO
RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERENO SAVANDAL, defendants;
PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Arturo G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellee.
Arturo E. Balbastro for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE; ACCUSATION NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. — Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon
then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed.
There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both
oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only
if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime
had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should
the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience
must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. — By reasonable doubt is not meant that
which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any
criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit
a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than
to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL JUDGE; GENERALLY RESPECTED ON
APPEAL. — With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the
perpetration of the killing by appellants, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected
from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended
with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably
respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise
the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case, circumstances of
weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made by counsel de oficio
in this appeal of the accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced
to life imprisonment for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed
that because the information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with
only the two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and
the other three having been acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to
their culpability, the judgment of conviction against the appellants cannot stand, there
being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. To bolster such a contention, certain alleged
deficiencies in the proof offered by the prosecution were noted. A careful study of the
evidence of record would leave no other rational conclusion but that the deceased met
his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as found by the lower court. Hence
the appeal cannot prosper. We affirm.
The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the morning of January 9,
1964. The two accused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the
company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality
of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a
robbery committed in the house of the deceased five days before by being available as
witnesses. The response was decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime
suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals who had confessed. At about
7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo
Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused
Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking
session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo
brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery
case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from
Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. 1
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for
a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head
near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short
pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who
warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened.
His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the house
of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the
cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The
latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The
answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. 2
The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the right
lumbar region, and another in the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court
reached its decision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now appellants. Pableo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty "beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder],
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the
circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon
each of the said accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the penalty of [reclusion
perpetua]." 3 Reference was likewise made in such decision as to why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of
them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco
Billona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted.
Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From
the beginning the accused Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with the group
but that he was fishing in the sea during the night in question. These facts that is, that
none of the prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these three accused actually
helped in the killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were
included in the case only much later after the filing of this case against Pableo Dramayo
and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent Contention of the accused Modesto Ronquilla that he
was out in the sea fishing during the night in question; and the testimonies of the accused
Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa-Billona,
Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner, without
hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that the testimonies of these
witnesses have not been refuted by the PC soldiers [whom they accused of maltreatment]
when they were available to the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very serious
doubt as to the guilt of the said accused." 4
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now
appellants Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character
that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing
the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be
implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of the seven accused
were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding
of the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged, thus calling for the affirmance of
the decision.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must
be, according to the Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of
the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for
the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. 6 United States v. Lasada, 7
decided in 1910, yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty
is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense." 8 To the same
effect is an excerpt form the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v. Esquivel. 9 Thus; "In this connection it may not be
out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent
facts as their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in
their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty
not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." 10
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to

establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed
hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the credible and
competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by
the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling
doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three accused be acquitted precisely
because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite quantum of proof to show guilt
beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two who
testified for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The
reference then to an opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to
the fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable
doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief
of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Upon the other hand,
there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of
the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding of the
two gold teeth of the deceased in the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave that hat . . . to
Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our minds as be the guilt of the appellant, but also seems to sustain the theory
of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely
ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man
upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest
of his natural life a person who may be innocent. . . . " 12 The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above
mold. Reliance on the part of appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the
two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had
been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to
their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by
the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as
established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been
acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated,
were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It
must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been
cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted,
the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties
responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as
to their culpability. 13
2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilty not having
been sufficiently de monstrated with the contention that the lower court over looked or
did not properly consider material and significant facts of record that ought to have
substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such
brief, however, with due recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is pressed,
would not destroy the credibility of the facts as testified to concerning the manner in
which the deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants to put an end to
his life. That such a version could not have been concocted is shown by the undeniable
fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the
offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away with the
principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to
have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no other
conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while
to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should
not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this
Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position
to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this
case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him. 14
WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 is affirmed with the modification that
the indemnification to the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum of P12,000.00.
With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
||| (People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, [October 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 107-116)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980.]
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M . Gonzales for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed
by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to
enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a
qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. cdasia
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of theConstitution. Said Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. — In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of
the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1
hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following
statutory provisions:
"Sec. 7. Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years. which shall
commence on the first Monday of March 1980."
. . ." Batas Pambansa Blg. 51
"Sec. 4. . . .
"Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and.
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
". . . (Batas Pambansa Blg. 52) (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied).
"Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials. — . . . The election shall be held on January
30, 1980." (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52).
"Section 6. Election and Campaign Period. — The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution.
The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on
January 28, 1980." (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also
question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as
authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1),
Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et
als., vs. COMELEC et als. (G.R. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised. cdasia
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null
and void for being violative of the Constitution.
I. The procedural aspect.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural
infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a
misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of
petitioners Igot and Salapantan. Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and
Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They,
respectively, contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has
joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead time
constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum
more of effort for petitioner Dumlao, on one hand, and petitioners Igot and Salapantan,
on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function
of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that
the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the
parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases
and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by theConstitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which
this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a
hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be
"rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record." Petitioner Dumlao's case is
clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice
Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as
provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which
reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions.
1) . . .
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials."
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which
provides:
"Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt
of a copy thereof."
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied
that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has
been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions
they assail as unconstitutional. Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal
nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no
locus standi in seeking judicial redress. LibLex
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit,
and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual
vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
". . . it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
In the same vein, it has been held:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing
to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys." (Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als. 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds.
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication
of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110
Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15
SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of
judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking
through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or
not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a well-settled ruled that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that question is properly raised an presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is
not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and
Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require
that his suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the
Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict
procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35
SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the
Tinio and Gonzales cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons
which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of
the elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed
with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. LexLib
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not
be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable
to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just
like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present,
and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality
will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision
does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to
the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong, etc.,
et al. vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies: (Chief Justice
Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of
the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair, 4
Dall. 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the
competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become
a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged,
may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of
the presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and
that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear
case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear case.
Cdphil
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against
him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to
run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office
during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
"SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C)
of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby
declared as disqualifications for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1
hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks
to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which
he has retired."
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52

providing that ". . . the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ ., concur.
De Castro, J ., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.
(Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52245, [January 22, 1980], 184 PHIL
|||
369-395)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 112889. April 18, 1995.]
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Villareal Law Offices for petitioner.
Balgos and Perez for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
POLITICAL LAW; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN
FOR ANY ELECTIVE LOCAL POSITION; FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE, DEFINED. — The Oversight
Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: "Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The
following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: "(a) . .
. "(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from
justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. " Private respondent
reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when
there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor
constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds,
albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court’s en
banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice"
to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; SEC. 40; R.A. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991); ART. 73,
RULES AND REGULATIONS; UNREASONABLY EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF DISQUALIFICATION.
— Section 40 ofR.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
enumerates those who are disqualified from running for any elective local position,
among whom is a: (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to it by the Oversight
Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,
as inordinate and an undue circumscription of the law. Justice Davide agrees and further
submits that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991
Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final
judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have
served or are serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail
or leaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted
meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the
legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves
no room for a reexamination of the meaning of the term.
2. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATIONS, JUSTIFIED. — There are certain fundamental
considerations which do not support the application of the presumption of innocence
under the Bill of Rights which support disqualification. Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified from
exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a
public office is that he must be a qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the
plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek election for a public office.
Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution expressly
so provides. A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993
ed., 101; JOAQUIN BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, 1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 [1920]). Accordingly,
stricter qualifications for public office may thus be required by law. Thirdly, the
disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of
innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the
filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified because he is
a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court
because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of
the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded arrest; or if he was
brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has
successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The
disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine
that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged
disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the
disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95
SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to case doubt on the validity of the challenged
disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that
"the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact." It is
clear that the law challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the
mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of the constitutional right
to presumption of innocence.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice" as that phrase
is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic
Act No. 7160). That law states:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
"xxx xxx xxx

"(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor

in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari
praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein
private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. prLL
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy,
a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial
District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court
for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his
alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of
respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification
under Section 40(e) ofthe Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the
COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th
May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the
filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private
respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
"Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since
the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of
the Province of Quezon, the petitioner below for disqualification has ceased to be a pre-
proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63
and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29
March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no
longer viable at this point of time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy of the
petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in a separate proceeding. llcd
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the
filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten (10)
days from notice." 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.

Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993,
denied a reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected,
focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and
evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice"
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an
elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates,

needs no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No.
7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or
non-political cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor
General, taking the side of petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the
phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third
Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs.
Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980;
Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the
Oversight Committee which, conformably with Section 5332 of RA. 7160, was convened
by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of
the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy." cdll
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
"'CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
'So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
'REP. CUENCO. What does he want?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung kuwestiyunin
ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
'REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
'Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad."
'Mabigat 'yung abroad.' One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest
pending, unserved. . .
'HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, and — what is a fugitive? It
is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong 'fugitive.'
'Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a fugitive
from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for a long time
ago. So can. . .
"MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
"MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very
important. Manny, can you come up?
"MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.
Okay, Fugitive means a person convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after
the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN, Oversight Committee,
07 May 1991).
"xxx xxx xxx
"THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang
gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, 'fugitive from justice.' What 'fugitive?'
Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the word
— what is meant by the word 'fugitive.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. 'Fugitive from justice means a person' ba ito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person. . .

"THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
"HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or
means one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one who has been
convicted by final judgment.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?

"THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by final
judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the
case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final judgment." 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the

possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the
disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely
were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R.A.V.
Saguisag who during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, made this reservation:
". . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive.
Medyo bothered ako doon, a." 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
"Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
"(a) . . .
"(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment." 5 (Italics
supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court
certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent
to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the
ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the
extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the
fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or
not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter. prLL
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which
is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the
foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Bellosillo and Mendoza, JJ., join J. Davide in his separate opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., see separate opinion.
(Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112889, [April 18, 1995], 313 PHIL
|||
417-433)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74259. February 14, 1991.]
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27,
1986, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva
Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the
costs of this suit. Further, the accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva

Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In
this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and
withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. llcd
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on
April 22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and
his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of
P72,823.08. 1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing
amount but he was able to pay only P10,159.50. The balance was demanded in another
letter dated October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through
the payment to the petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from
his salary before his dismissal from the service. 2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07
was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for
malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the respondent court on
October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3 He insists, however, that he is not
guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other
persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the
unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four
separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of
absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting
Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to comply
although he had not actually received the said amount. cdll
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding
vouchers dated are described as follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount
of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December 22, 1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. SN958525 dated December 23,
1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount
of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956639J dated December 22, 1980.
4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29, 1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the
amounts thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding
withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all submitted as
exhibits). 4 He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question
as alleged but was in fact the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before
attending to his sick wife in the hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said
that the payroll payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on
December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the hospital. 5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the
petitioner was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that although
Check No. 958525 had already been encashed on December 23, 1980, the encashment
was not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of
temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage." It was only in March 1981 that the
shortage was discovered and, when confronted with it, the petitioner had no
explanation to offer. 6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the
petitioner's cash book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement from the
PNB for December 1980, he discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00
appeared to have been already encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the
petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he required the petitioner to make the proper
entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was already part of the latter's
accountability. 7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice
Amante Q. Alconcel, made the following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the
amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable for the
misappropriation of the said amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim
that same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the
same purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of
provincial officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the
period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December
23, 1980, and in fact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the
same day. The two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were issued and
encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively. Except for Check No. 958525,
which was only entered in accused's Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3)
months after its issuance and encashment, all the other three (3) were duly entered.
Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued and encashed on the
same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the
latter check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its money
equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks, Nos. 956639 and 958525,
could not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds
to pay salary differentials of government officials and employees of the province of
Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he
duly liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
q. If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?

a. I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the vouchers
paid by me or disbursed by me.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. So that your cash advances will be liquidated?

a. Yes, Your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
q. In the absence of the cashier, to whom do you give these documents?
a. I give them to the cashier only, no other person.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO
q. In his absence, do you keep these documents?
a. Yes, Your Honor.
q. For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these
payrolls to the cashier?
a. On December 29, sir.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. Duly accomplished?
a. Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
a. At the office, Your Honor.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
q. At what time?
a. In the afternoon, sir.
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
a. He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was supposedly
having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29,
1985, pp. 16-18)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His
Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated, shows that
during the month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25
days sick leave, which is the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he
earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that
he was absent on December 23, 1980, the day when Check No. 958525 was issued and
encashed, yet, the other check which was issued and encashed on the same day was
duly liquidated.
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no
reason to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify
their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as
established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated
by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not
make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make
any certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he
did not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is
not a preliminary requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as
the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. 8 And what determines
whether the crime of malversation has been committed is the presence of the following
requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible
for a crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the
blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who
is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the
"untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not
impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the petitioner would be
abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an arrant
presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of
the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here.
The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed
innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum
of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His
conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
||| (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259, [February 14, 1991], 271 PHIL 901-910)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94262. May 31, 1991.]
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., but its agent FEEDER
INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourteenth
Division, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
respondents.
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for
petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; FINAL JUDGMENTS OR DECREES OF THE COURT
OF TAX APPEALS, WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS. — Final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 180 SCRA 609 [1989]).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; FORFEITURE PROCEEDING, NOT
PENAL IN NATURE. — A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal
in nature. (People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., 101 SCRA 86 [1980]).
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT REQUIRED IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. — Considering,
therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not
criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the
imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in
order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is
merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT; NOT
AVAILABLE TO JURIDICAL PERSONS. — A corporate entity, has no personality to invoke
the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an
accused in a criminal case.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; RULE THEREON NOT
APPLICABLE TO FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. — Forfeiture proceedings are not criminal
in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves such circumstantial evidence
as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; WHEN IMPORTATION BEGINS.
— Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when
the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to
unload therein.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT; ORDINARILY INFERRED FROM THE FACTS. — It is clear from the
provision of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an
importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but
must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore can only be proved by
unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. — The
findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with both the
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals.
We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon
this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; NOT INDISPENSABLE IN
NON-CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. — "In non-criminal proceedings, the need for the
assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is
nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound
by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary
citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at
his side." (Nera v. The Auditor General, 164 SCRA 1)
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS;
PRESUMPTION THAT DUTY WAS PERFORMED; CASE AT BAR. — If ever there was any
doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres, they should
have been presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny
the statements they made. This was not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption
that official duty was regularly performed stands.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated May 8, 1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals
which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its
cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable under Section
2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel
and its cargo. 1
The facts as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20470 are
as follows:
"The M/T 'ULU WAI' a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by
Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986
carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far
East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
"On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo
without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came
to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the
area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a
Customs team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report.
"The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship
and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore
clearing the vessel for 'Zamboan.'
"In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed
its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the
District Collector denied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.
"In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective
counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts, to wit:
'1. That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI" subject of S1-2-86,
herein identified as Exh. "A", is admitted.
'2. That the existence and identity of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil,
subject of S1-2-86-A, herein identified as Exh. "B", is admitted;
'3. That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil,
subject of S1-2-86 herein identified as Exh. "B-1", is admitted;
'4. That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 and was cleared by
Singapore customs authorities for Zamboanga, Philippines;
'5. That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island, Municipality of Nueva
Valencia, sub-province of Guimaras, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about
1120HRS, May 14, 1986;
'6. That subject vessel was boarded by Customs and Immigration
authorities for the first time in the afternoon of May 19, 1986, at about
1600HRS;
'7. That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986, submitted by the
Team Leader of the Customs and Immigration Team, Roberto Intrepido,
marked and identified as Exh. "C", is admitted;
'8. That at the time of boarding, the Master of subject vessel could not
produce any ship and/or shipping documents regarding her cargo except the
Port Clearance Certificate No. 179999 issued by the Port of Singapore authority
dated May 4, 1986, marked as Exh. "D", which is hereby admitted;
'9. That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULU WAI", Capt. Romeo
E. Deposa filed a Marine Protest dated same date, which Marine Protest,
marked and identified as Exh. "E", is hereby admitted;
'10. That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E. Deposa, marked
and identified as Exh. "F", given on May 26, 1986 before Atty. Hernando
Hinojales, Customs Legal Officer, is admitted;
'11. That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres, Owner's
representative of M/T "ULU WAI", marked and identified as Exh. "G" given
before Atty. Hernando Hinojales on May 28, 1986, is admitted;
'12. That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas, Master of M/T
"CATHEAD" given before Lt. Dennis Asarraga on June 4, 1986, marked and
identified as Exh. "H", is admitted;
'13. That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41 entered into
by and between the National Stevedoring & Lighterage Corporation and the
Far East Synergy Corporation, marked and identified as Exh. "I", is admitted;
and
'14. That the Preliminary Report of Survey Sounding Report dated June
17, 1986, signed by J.P. Piad, Surveyor of Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and
duly attested by Ernesto Cutay, Chief Officer of the M/T "ULU WAI" marked
and identified as Exh. "J", is also admitted.'" 2
On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, with the following
disposition:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T 'ULU WAI' is hereby found guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464),
as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are hereby
found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are
hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
"SO ORDERED." 3
Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated

May 13, 1987, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 19, 1987 of the District
Collector of Customs of Iloilo, ordering the forfeiture of M/T 'ULU WAI' and its cargo of
2,100 metric tons of gas and fuel oil is hereby affirmed in toto.
"SO ORDERED." 4
On June 25, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector
and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the
Commissioner from implementing his decision.
On December 14, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision, with this dispositive
portion:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs dated May 13,
1987, ordering the forfeiture of the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' for violation of Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Custom Codes (sic), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100
metric tons of Gas Oil and 1,000 metric tons of Fuel Oil for violation of Section 2530 *
(a) and (f), and (1-1) of the same Code, is hereby affirmed. With costs.
"SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals'
decision with this Court. On March 21, 1990, we issued a resolution 6 referring the
disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of our decision in Development
Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 7 holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court
of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. LibLex
On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having
been denied on July 4, 1990, it interposed this instant petition contending that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence that an
illegal importation had been committed;
2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be
presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt; and
3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel
in violation of their constitutional right thereto. 8
We find no merit in the Petition.
1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs
laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by herein petitioner. In
the case of People vs.Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., 9 this Court made an
exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal
proceedings, as follows:
". . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and
customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the
offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code.
As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those
instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main
purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to
unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure
cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against
the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
"In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure
proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on
contraband or illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue law
of the country, and as such, have been prevented. From being assimilated in lawful
commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and
satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will
dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or possessor is treated
differently. The fact that the administrative penalty befalls on him is an
inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt
cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The
Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not
detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in respondents' car and
seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on
the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the
information can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents'
exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven
not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt."
Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported
are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer
nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 10
In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established
that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the
use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its
cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. LLjur
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it
bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke
the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an
accused in a criminal case.
2. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation
committed, or at least an attempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the
subject vessel and its cargo.
Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had
been committed on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section
5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture
proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves
such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
does not apply. prLL
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the
carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to
unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload is
sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely
susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11 and therefore
can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally. 12
In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an
intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by
this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision:
"It is undisputed that the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' entered the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. The issue that calls for Our resolution is whether or not there was an
intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borne by the evidence convince Us
that there was intent to unload. The following circumstances unmistakably point to
this conclusion.
"1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga was
shorter and Iloilo lies further north. It is not logical for the sailing vessel to travel a
longer distance to get the necessary repairs.
"2. When the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it
did not notify the Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. The master of the
vessel did not file a marine protest until 12 days after it had anchored, despite the
supposed urgency of the repairs needed and notwithstanding the provision (Sec.
1016) of the Code requiring the master to file protest within 24 hours.
"3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and shipping
documents were not on board except the clearance from Singaporean port officials
clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner claims that these were turned over to
the shipping agent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986. However, this claim is
belied by the sworn marine protest (Exhibit 'E') of the master of M/T 'ULU WAI.' Mr.
Romeo Deposa.
'It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the
crew to: get down of (sic) the vessel and find means and ways to contact the
vessel's representative.'
Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit 'G'), ship agent, Antonio Torres, stated
that he did not know the buyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the Local
Purchase Order of the alleged buyer, Pogun Construction SDN. Torres also swore that
his knowledge came from the vessel's owner, without mentioning the shipping
documents which indicate such data. He also said that he did not know the consignee
of the oil which would have been patent from the documents. Lastly, as also pointed
out by the court a quo, the captain of the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI,' Romeo Deposa, in his
sworn statement to custom authorities on May 26, 1986, enumerated the documents
he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio Torres, but did not mention as among them the Local
Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and the Bill of Lading.
"4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T 'CATHEAD,' and the large M/T
'SEMIRANO NO. 819' were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge and the
tugboat were contracted by Consignee Far East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel
into the awaiting barge and to discharge the same to Manila (Exhibits '1' and '1-1').
It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T 'ULU
WAI.' Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was the vessel's
cargo which was to be unloaded and brought to Manila by them." 13
The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with
the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the
Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the
elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and
are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Cdpr
3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance
of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their constitutional right to be
assisted by counsel. As explained in the case of Nera vs. The Auditor General: 14
"The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the
custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right
to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the trial of the
accused, who has the right 'to be heard by himself and counsel,' either retained by
him or provided for him by the government at its expense. These guarantees are
embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing criminal
prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty (and
before even his life) against the awesome authority of the State.
"In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent
nor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that
says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and
that without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was
not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that
helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side."
Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of
Deposa and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage of
the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was not done by
petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly performed stands. In
addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally, petitioner
simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the assistance of
counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken under
anomalous circumstances which would render them inadmissible as evidence against
petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the
said sworn statements.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ ., concur.
Sarmiento, J ., is on leave.
(Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94262, [May 31,
|||
1991], 274 PHIL 1143-1156)

Right to be heard by himself and counsel
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2809. March 22, 1950.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO,
defendant-appellant.
Mauricio Carlos for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for
appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; QUALIFIED PLEA OF GUILTY; AMBIGUOUS
INFORMATION; ACCUSED WITHOUT COUNSEL; IMPOSITION OF HEAVY PENALTY. —
When an accused unaided by counsel qualifiedly admits his guilt to an ambiguous or
vague information from which a serious crime can be deduced, it is not prudent for
the trial court to render a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense without absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the
case.
2. ID.; DUTIES OF COURT WHEN DEFENDANT APPEARS WITHOUT ATTORNEY. —
Under the provision of section 3 of rule 112 of the rules of Court, when a defendant
appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It
must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
(2) after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney; (3) if he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him; and 94) if the accused desires to procure an attorney
of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
3. ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL IS CONSTITUTIONAL. — One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by
our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law," and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused
be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to
be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for
the court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own.
DECISION
MORAN, C.J p:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon
with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private
person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one
Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving
said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty."
On May 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:
"Court:
"Is this case ready for trial?
"Fiscal:
"I am ready, your honor.

"Court: — to the accused.
"Q. Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. I have no lawyer
and I will plead guilty.
"Court:
Arraign the accused.
"Note:
"Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after
which he was asked this question.
"Q. What do you plead? — A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
"Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? — A. Mr. Numeriano
Ocampo.
"The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
"Fiscal:
"I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to
do with this case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.
"Court:
"Sentence reserved."
Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following
judgment:
"[Criminal Case No. V-118]
"THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-
appellant.
"SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

"SENTENCE.
"The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention in the following.
"INFORMATION
"That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of
Concepcion, Province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused being a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
"Contrary to Law.
"This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused
pleaded guilty to the information above described.
"The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2
of Republic Act No. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in its minimum period to
death. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its
maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree, as minimum, or ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of his
preventive imprisonment."
It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment
above quoted, the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the
body of the judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the information filed by the provincial fiscal
it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The
facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense charged is
merely "slight illegal detention" as the offense is named therein or the capital offense
of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment.
Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from
the facts pleaded in the information.
Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused,
who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to
render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and
imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to
twenty years, without absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of
the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly
provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:.
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court
that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the Court
must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has
four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his
right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information
the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is
unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and
4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him
a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record
discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor
did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not
the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or
to assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do
you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail
to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but,
what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the
accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And
this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our
Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid
of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he
so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by
counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one
Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification.
The record does not show whether the supposed instruction was real and whether it
had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea of guilty.
No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused
and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good
defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became
satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found
that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong
for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome
a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and
the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court
below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to
have and to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, [March 22, 1950], 85 PHIL 752-757)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122770. January 16, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI y
MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Froilan V. Siobal for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of
Quezon City for raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The conviction was based on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Dr. Florante Baltazar, the victim and SPO1 Salvador
Buenviaje.
The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi, and one of the
evidence presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim. However, it was
retracted by the victim during the presentation of the rebuttal evidence claiming that she
was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign it.
Hence, in this appeal the appellant questioned the credibility of the testimony of the
victim in view of her execution of the affidavit of desistance.
The Court ruled that affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to
the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of recantation have been invariably
regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. cIHCST
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR
PERFORMANCE OFFICIAL DUTY; TRIAL COURT PRESUMED TO HAVE COMPLIED WITH ITS
DUTY TO INFORM ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. — The trial court's order of 22
December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with
the consent of the accused." Since appellant miserably failed to show that he was not
informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and
official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the
trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule
116 of the Rules of Court; namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have
his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused
whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of
counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to
have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to
defend him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE RECORD TO DISCLOSE AFFIRMATIVELY THAT TRIAL
JUDGE ADVISED ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NOT SUFFICIENT TO REVERSE
CONVICTION. — It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that
the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that
such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus
it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; RIGHT TO QUESTION
FAILURE OF TRIAL COURT TO INFORM ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL DEEMED WAIVED
BY HIS CONSENT TO BE ASSISTED BY TWO (2) COUNSEL DE OFICIO. — In the instant case,
the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his
arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the
prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised
the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time
did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent
to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-
examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the
alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; TRIAL COURTS' COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT DUTIES MUST APPEAR ON RECORD. — We take this opportunity to
admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties
to inform the accused of his right to counsel to ask him if he desires to have one, and to
inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his
choice, a de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must appear on record.
5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TWO (2) DAYS TIME TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL MUST BE
EXPRESSLY DEMANDED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED. — Turning to the alleged
violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial Section 9 of Rule 116
of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 9. Time to prepare for trial — After a plea of not guilty,
the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause
grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly
demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and
a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the
instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively
waived such right.
6. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; THIS COURT WILL NOT GENERALLY INTERFERE WITH THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN PASSING UPON CREDIBILITY OF OPPOSING
WITNESSES. — The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of
the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine
jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in
the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical and
empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question
of credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness
was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, she often
hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tried the case.
To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor
or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which generally does not
reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining
innocence or guilt
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVE OF 14-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER IN CHARGING HER OWN FATHER OF
RAPE. —If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the
examination of her private parts, she did so inspired by no other motive than to obtain
justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the painful experience
had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration
and falsely charged her own father with a heinous crime.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; MAY BE COMMITTED WHERE PEOPLE CONGREGATE. — What
appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than
real. The presence of her sisters in the small room did not at all make impossible the
commission of rape. The evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect
for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere — even in places where people
congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a
house where there are other occupants. In People v. Opena, rape was committed in a
room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN's other companions in the
room when she was molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep. DHSaCA
9. ID.; ID.; FORCE OR INTIMIDATION; SUBSTITUTED BY MORAL ASCENDANCY OR
INFLUENCE BY THE FATHER OVER HIS DAUGHTER. — That EDEN was unable to resist or
shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that appellant threatened to kill her.
Whether or not he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming from her
father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable
of resisting or asking for help. In any event, in a rape committed, by a father against his
own daughter, as in this case, the former's moral ascendancy or influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation. Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her
tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition
and with nerves of steel or to act like a mature and experienced woman who would know
what to do under the circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat. Even in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and
unpredictable reactions. Some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked
into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion.
10. ID.; ID.; INTIMIDATION; SUFFICIENT IF IT PRODUCED FEAR FOR VICTIM'S LIFE;
RESISTANCE, UNNECESSARY. — Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed
by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the victim and is therefore subjective, it
must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear — fear that if
the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would
happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was
cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would
be the height of unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and
strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering
none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim' s submission
to the sexual act voluntary.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF; DESISTANCE; CONSIDERED INFERIOR TO
THE TESTIMONY GIVEN IN OPEN COURT. — Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that
EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have necessarily contradicted her previous
testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere
therein did she retract her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father.
In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she
was pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex
parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; and
affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since
they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous
rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness
who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make
a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; P50,000.00 INDEMNITY FOR RAPE. — To take appellant who
inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust,
thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his human nature and reducing
himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the law must be weighed
against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we concede to him is a
modification of the award of "P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to
P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:
Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent persons who
recognize that a woman's cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free
will. Whoever violates that will descends to the level of the odious beast. The act
becomes doubly repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on one's own flesh and
blood for the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The latter yields only to
biological impulses and is unfettered by social inhibitions when it mates with its own
kin, but the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust
but also the mores of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal
greed on her in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a
human being and is justly spurned by all, not least of all by the fruit of his own loins
whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and shameless lechery. 1
At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden Agbayani who charged
her own father with rape committed in the sanctity of their rented room on 19 July 1994,
this Court finds itself repeating this declaration. 2
Before this Court on automatic review is the decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in view of the death penalty imposed by it for the crime of rape,
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659. 4
On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the National
Capital Regional Command, Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City the complaint of Eden Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for
rape against her father, herein accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza. 5
After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint 6 for rape signed by EDEN,
assisted by her sister Fedelina Agbayani, and subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City
Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales, was filed against appellant with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City on 27 October 1994. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-
59149, then set for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on 22 December 1994. 7
At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys. Samuel Baldado
and Edwin de la Cruz as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. 8 Upon agreement
of the parties, trial on the merits immediately followed, with the prosecution presenting
the first witness, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, 9 who was cross-examined by Atty. Baldado. 10 On the succeeding dates of
trial, the prosecution presented EDEN 11 and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. 12 During these
hearings, however, appellant was represented by Atty. Arturo Temanil of the Public
Attorney's Office. 13
On its part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina Agbayani, as
well as EDEN who identified her and Fedelina's affidavit of desistance, 14 which was
subscribed and sworn to before notary public Eranio Cedillo on 6 February 1995. Said
affidavit reads as follows:
We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina Agbayani, 19 years old,
sister of Eden Agbayani, and presently residing at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta,
Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law
do hereby depose and states [sic]: dctai
That we are the complainant [sic] against our father, Eduardo Agbayani pending before
this honorable Court docketed as Criminal Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic] to the filing of the instant case I
formally realize that the incident between us and my father is purely family problem
that arise from the disciplinarian attitude of our father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided to formally forego this
case and withdraw the same:
That I am executing this affidavit for purposes of finally withdrawing the instant case
and therefrom requesting this Honorable Court to dismiss the case against our father.
That this affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.
As EDEN declared in open court that what she said in her previous testimony and sworn
statement were not true, the trial court held her in direct contempt of court, reasoning
that her "intentional falsehood" was "offensive to its dignity and a blatant disrespect to
the Court, and actually degrading [to] the administration of justice." Accordingly, the trial
court ordered her "committed to incarceration and imprisonment within the period
provided by law," 15 which penalty, however, was modified to a fine of P200.00 upon
EDEN's motion for reconsideration. 1 6
On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted her
affidavit of desistance and claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her mother
and elder sister.
The trial court's summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the references to the
pages of the stenographic notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:
The evidence adduced on record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos,
Bulacan, the accused was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA
AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape which case was raffled to the sala of Judge Danilo
Manalastas of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan. The case was, however,
provisionally dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted from pursuing the
same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus consequently released from jail on July
13, 1994. Three (3) days thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his six (6) daughters,
Fedelina, Eden, Diana and Edima, in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero,
Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant
Eden Agbayani, Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador
Buenviaje, shows that at the above-mentioned address, the complainant, Eden
Agbayani, on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with
her father, the accused Eduardo Agbayani and her youngest sister, Edima, while her
sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a bed. At the time, complainant's mother was
outside the country, working in Saudi Arabia. At about 9:00 p.m. of July 19, Complainant
Eden Agbayani was awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her breasts and vagina.
She turned to discover that it was her father who was then molesting her. Frightened,
she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito, gayong kalalabas mo lang sa
kulungan?" and threatened to kill her [sic]. The accused then proceeded to undress her.
Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter felt blood
dripping from her vagina and felt pain.
The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina,
of what had been done to her by her father. She was told not to worry as they would
go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year
before, handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were
made by her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it was only on
September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan
reported the complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened tile previously
provisionally dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the
accused was arrested on the same day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy.
Obrero, Quezon City and was later brought to Malolos, Bulacan where he is currently
detained. After the accused's arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned to Station 10 where
they made individual statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje narrating the events
leading to and occurring after the incident of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the
corresponding Medico-Legal Report. 17
Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have
raped his daughter EDEN, because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria in Sual,
Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter. 18 He declared that EDEN charged him with rape
because he had hit her with a belt after he caught her lying about her whereabouts one
night. Then on 24 July 1994, she left their rented apartment and did not return anymore.
19
Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellant's alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994,
appellant requested her to take care of his children because he was going to Pangasinan
to visit his sick father, returning home only on 21 July 1994. 20
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who "appeared, during her
entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive;"
further, it commended her "for her courage and her unwavering strength in the midst of
the emotional and psychological strain and humiliation, not to mention the pressure and
lack of moral support of her family, brought on by the filing of this case." It also ruled that
EDEN did not voluntarily execute the affidavit of desistance as it was procured "at the
behest of her mother and sister for whom the sanctity of the family and the family's good
name were more important than demanding punishment for whatever injury the
complainant might have suffered in the hands of the accused." Besides, even assuming
arguendo that no such pressure was exerted by her mother and sister, the trial court
declared that it understood EDEN's moral predicament, viz., for a child like EDEN, it was
difficult to charge her own father with rape; insist on his punishment; and thereby inflict
emotional stress and financial strain upon the members of her family, particularly her
mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit "E") of Fedelina
Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly self-serving, and
characterized the testimony of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of belief. As to appellant's claim
that EDEN filed the complaint because of a grudge against him, the trial court found this
"incredible, if not totally absurd," for:
The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is unlikely to possess such
vindictiveness and dearth of conscience as to concoct such a malicious and damaging
story. The complainant appeared, during her entire testimonies on January 20 and May
4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Her retraction on March 16 was sufficiently
explained to this Court (tsn, 5-4 95, testimony of Eden Agbayani, pp. 2-3). She has shown
to this Court the seriousness of the injury upon her person and dignity inflicted upon by
the accused . . . Even assuming argumenti gratia that the complainant would indeed
lodge a complaint against her father solely on account of an altercation with him, it is
highly unlikely that the complainant would concoct a charge which would damage her
and wreck havoc on her family's reputation, destroy the household peace and subject
her father, the accused, to a grave punishment which by dent of express of law, can
obliterate him from the face of this earth. Indeed, to uphold the defense's proposition
would be stretching the imagination too far, if not to the extreme.
The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or intimidation by
virtue of his moral ascendancy over her and his threat that he would kill her if she
reported the incident to anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the
penalty of death when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, rendered judgment
against appellant, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, EDUARDO AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
committed against complainant, Eden Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court, as a
consequence thereof, hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH,
conformably with the provisions of the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. Further, Accused
is hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Eden Agbayani, the sum of P75,000.00 as
damages, with all the necessary penalties provided for by law without subsidiary
imprisonment, however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic
review.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal
and Domingo Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial 21 on the ground that serious
irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were committed during the trial, viz., the
failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a) present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Obrero, Quezon City, who would have testified, on the basis of his certification attached
to the motion, that there was a house bearing No. 30, Makabayan St., in his barangay, but
that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which was the
address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruz's testimony; (c) present
private complainant's mother and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to the
circumstances which brought about he execution of the affidavit of desistance; and (d)
cross-examine complainant and the police investigator exhaustively. He further alleged
that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings, worse,
even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was
presented. He also averred that the trial court used its inherent power of contempt to
intimidate private complainant.
In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Trial, 22 the public and private
prosecutors alleged that there were no such irregularities; neither was there new and
material evidence to be presented that appellant could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted at trial
would probably change the judgment of the court.
In its Order 23 of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new trial for being
devoid of merit and for not being within the purview of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the
Rules of Court.
In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred
in: (a) denying his motion for new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for
new trial, and adds two others, namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his
right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the lower court did not give him the
opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated period of two days prescribed in
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDEN's testimony is not sufficient
to convict, since it is unclear and not free from serious contradictions. Considering their
proximity to EDEN, it was impossible for her sisters or any one of them not to have been
awakened when EDEN was allegedly being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept
quiet and allowed him to abuse her; neither did she shout for help or put up a fight that
would have awakened her sisters. Notably, EDEN and her sisters allowed him to live and
sleep with them again in their rented room even after the alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDEN's testimony is unreliable because her affidavit of
desistance must have necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her "subsequent turn-
around . . . that she was pressured and influenced to execute and sign the affidavit of
desistance further confirmed her being untruthful and, in effect, demolished whatsoever
faith left on her charge against the accused."
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as devoid of
merit. When appellant appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial court
informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel for him if he so desired, to which
appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of
Rule 116 is merely directory and does not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial
after arraignment, especially if the defense, as here, consented thereto. It would have
been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court would have
no other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellant's other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings,
appellant never questioned the way his defense was being handled by his counsel de
oficio. The latter's request for a continuance because he had not yet conferred with
appellant was not evidence of counsel's lack of sincerity. On the contrary, it showed
counsel's awareness of his duty to confer with appellant to ferret out the relevant facts
as regards the second witness for the prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of appellant's
presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him, because on that
date, the defense presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of desistance, and Fedelina
to corroborate the statements of EDEN — which testimonies were in appellant's favor. As
to the manner appellant's counsel de oficio cross-examined the prosecution witnesses,
the OSG stresses that the record shows that said counsel tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as "barren of merit." EDEN's
positive identification of appellant as the author of the crime rendered appellant's
defense of alibi unavailing; moreover, she demonstrated clearly and vividly what
transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994. Thus in view of EDEN's candid and
categorical manner of testifying the OSG concluded that she was a credible witness. 24
As to the commission of rape in a small room and in the presence of other persons, the
OSG maintains that such was not at all improbable. 25 There was, as well, nothing unusual
in EDEN's silence; as she could only attempt to shout because appellant had succeeded in
covering her mouth with his hands and exercised a high level of moral ascendancy over
EDEN, his daughter. 26 Hence the OSG invokes the principle that in a rape committed by a father against
his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or
intimidation. 27
As regards EDEN's affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that courts look with disfavor
on retraction of testimonies previously given in court, for such can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration, 28 as well as the
probability that it may later be repudiated.
In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de
oficio at his arraignment did not relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116
of the Rules of Court to inform him of his right to counsel and that it would be grievous
error to deny an accused such right. Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:
This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People vs.
Domenden, 73 Phil. 349, cited in R.J. Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p.
323 it was held, that:
"The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error to
proceed by sentencing the accused without due process of law and this is not
complete, when the accused is denied the right recognized by said rule. The
records must show compliance therewith or that the accused renounced his
right to be assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice and
remove all doubts that if the accused had waived said right, he was fully
informed before giving his plea of its consequences. Omission by courts whether
voluntary should not truly be censured but also condemned."
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant contends
that said right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is a reversible error and a
ground for new trial. (R.J. Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing
People vs. Mijares, et al., 47 OG 4606; Dumasig v. Morave, 23 SCRA 659). This must be
so ". . . to prevent that any accused be caught unaware and deprived of the means of
properly facing the charges presented against him." LibLex
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the
stenographic notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued by the
trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court appointed de
oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose that
the trial informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does
not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of such right. The precise time the
two counsel de oficio were appointed is not disclosed in the record either. At the recorded
portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December 1994, the two
formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT:
Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).

FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and
direct supervision of the Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor, we are ready to present
our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio. 29
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order
30 of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the
Court with the consent of the accused." Since appellant has miserably failed to show that
he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been
obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. 31 In other
words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section
6 32 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the
right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to
ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the
services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so
desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de
oficio to defend him. 33
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the
procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has
been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved
that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed
that the accused was informed by the court of such right. 34
In U .S. v. Labial, 35 this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in
this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the
judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we
are all agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in
fact fail to advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of sections 17 of
General Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from
the record brought here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so,
is not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be
presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing
the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:

However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether
or not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to
be assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87, 88), in the
sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the
defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on
finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against
the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much
must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things
correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same
doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs.
Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the
appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness
for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant
raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no
time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His
consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-
examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the
alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel. 38
The cases of People v. Domenden 39 and People v. Cachero 40 cited by appellant are
inapplicable. In both cases the trial courts there clearly failed to inform the accused of
their right to counsel nor appoint de oficio counsel during the arraignment. Nevertheless,
we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with
their pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he
desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in
person or he has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must
appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial,
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 9. Time to prepare for trial. — After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to
two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. 41 Only when so
demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. 42
Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. 43 In the instant case, appellant did
not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.
During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public
Attorney's Office in Quezon City, who entered his appearance as de parte, and not as de
oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that Atty. Temanil's services were obtained pursuant
to the law creating the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), formerly the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO). 44 There is at all no showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the
competence and skill to defend appellant. The latter's contention that his counsel was
not ready at all times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a
continuation as he has "not yet interviewed [his] client," 45 is misleading. Atty. Temanil
made that statement after he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that it
was almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and both of them were already hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of trial the
witness appears to be fluent and suffers no difficulty in answering the questions,
even the questions propounded by the Private Prosecutor, Your Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and we are
both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL.
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet interviewed
my client, Your Honor. 46
Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed irregularities: (1) in
not considering the futility of the testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in not presenting the
barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the defense, and EDEN's mother and sister
Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was in the province
and not in their rented room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other hand, the testimony
of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that rape was committed in a rented room
in a house along Makabayan Street in his barangay. Appellant neither testified that he did
not occupy a house numbered 30-A nor denied that he was living with EDEN and her
sisters in that room. Besides, he and his children were not renting the entire house, but
merely a room, which could probably be the unit numbered "30-A" referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal witnesses to
disprove the claim of EDEN that they coerced her into signing the affidavit of desistance,
suffice it to state that there was nothing to show that they were in fact willing to refute
EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of
the stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-
examined EDEN. If he decided to terminate his cross-examination, it could have been due
to the futility of any further cross-examination which might only prove favorable to the
prosecution, as it might have opened another window of opportunity for EDEN to
strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of
EDEN as a witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has
established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
passing upon the credibility or opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and if
considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical and empirical
considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. 47 He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a
witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she
often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tried the
case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor
or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
48 On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which generally does
not reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining
innocence or guilt. 49
At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of death
imposed, this Court took painstaking effort and meticulous care in reviewing the
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her father,
herein appellant, on 19 July 1994, in their rented room in Barangay Obrero, Quezon City.
Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity and candidness of her answers,
as well as by the fact that it came from an innocent girl writhing in emotional and moral
shock and anguish. She must have been torn between the desire to seek justice and the
fear that a revelation of her ordeal might mean the imposition of capital punishment on
her father. By testifying in court, she made public a painful and humiliating secret, which
others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their lives. She thereby
jeopardized her chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man may be reluctant to
marry her because her traumatic experience may be a psychological and emotional
impediment to a blissful union. Moreover, such a revelation divided her family and
brought it shame and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination
of her private parts, she did so inspired by no other motive than to obtain justice and
release from the psychological and emotional burdens the painful experience had foisted
upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and falsely
charged her own father with a heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent
than real. The presence of her sisters in the small room did not at all make impossible the
commission of rape. The evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect
for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere even in places where people
congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a
house where there are other occupants. 50 In People v. Opena, 51 rape was committed in
a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN's other companions in
the room when she was molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep.
That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that
appellant threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed was of no moment. That
threat alone coming from her father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy, was
enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is
addressed to the victim's and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the
victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough
that the intimidation produced fear — fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something far worse would happen to her at that moment.
Where such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into submission as a result
thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of unreasonableness
to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would
nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean
consent to the assault so as to make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary.
52
In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case,
the former's moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or
intimidation. 53 Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her tender age of 14 years, EDEN
could not be expected to act with the equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel,
or to act like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under the
circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. 54 Even in cases
of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and unpredictable reactions. Some may shout;
some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion.
55
Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in the same rented room
disprove the rape. While she was hurt physically, psychologically and emotionally, yet the
thought must have been irresistible and compelling that her assailant was her own father,
who was both a father and mother to her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia and who
provided her with the daily wherewithal to keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside
was uncertain. Instances are not few when daughters raped by their fathers stayed with
the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their hearts the evil deed even if the
memory thereof haunted them forever. LibLex
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have
necessarily contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this
affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract her previous testimony or
claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of
desistance and solemnly declared that she was pressured by her mother and sister to sign
it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court; 56 and affidavits of recantation have been invariably
regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 57
This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor is death
under the first circumstance mentioned in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for a
sin or crime is God's exclusive prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows
Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital punishment in cases of heinous
crimes, 58 hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta
est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written and the Court is duty-
bound to apply it in this case.
To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion
of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his human nature
and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the law must be
weighed against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we concede to him is a
modification of the award of "P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to
P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149 finding accused-
appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to
the above modification as to the amount of indemnity.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of
this case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
(People v. Agbayani y Mendoza, G.R. No. 122770, [January 16, 1998], 348 PHIL 341-
|||
369)
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371. January 22, 1999.]
BALTAZAR D. AMION, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON,
Branch 50, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
A verified complaint was filed by Baltazar D. Amion charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson
with ignorance of the law and oppression. The complaint was relative to a murder case
pending before his court, in which the complainant is the accused. The allegations
against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for
accused-complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on the ground that he had
his own retained counsel. In his comment, respondent judge alleged that his
appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused-complainant is justified
because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the latter's part who has been
represented by a counsel de parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He
averred that the records of the case will show that the accused-complainant and his
lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly foul, to delay the resolution of the
criminal case.
The Court found that the accused-complainant has been the oppressor while
respondent judge appears to be the oppressed. Through the course of the proceedings
in the subject criminal case, accused-complainant had filed several Motions for
Inhibition, a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, and this administrative complaint
with the view of delaying the eventual disposition of the case. The actuation of
respondent judge in the murder case does not warrant reproach and reprimand, but in
fact, merits the acknowledgment and approval of the Supreme Court. Such
manifestation of zeal clearly shows respondent judge's ardent determination to
expedite the case and render justice. The Court resolved to dismiss the administrative
complaint against the respondent judge, imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on accused-
complainant, and admonished said accused-complainant for filing a malicious and
unmeritorious complaint against the respondent judge.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PREFERENCE IN THE CHOICE OF COUNSEL,
CANNOT PARTAKE OF A DISCRETION SO ABSOLUTE AND ARBITRARY AS WOULD MAKE
SUCH REFER EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PREDILECTION OF THE ACCUSED; RATIONALE. — An
examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,
will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a
criminal prosecution. Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of
"preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such
preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. As held
by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina, (229 SCRA 450), withal, the word
"preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter." Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may
likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his
choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would
preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing him.
Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to
the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; A PARTY CANNOT FEIGN DENIAL THEREOF WHEN HE
HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS SIDE; CASE AT BAR. — Accused-complainant
was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process
as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together
with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. Accused-complainant had more than
sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side which would have led
to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due process
when he had the opportunity to present his side. Moreover, there is no denial of the
right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the
accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system. Thus, it has been held by this Court in the
case of Lacambra vs. Ramos: (232 SCRA 435) "the Court cannot help but note the series
of legal maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings of the accused or his
counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the
judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought
upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal
case had been dragging on its lethargic course. aETADI
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; JUDGES; SHOULD
ADMINISTER JUSTICE IMPARTIALLY AND WITHOUT DELAY; CASE AT BAR. — The
actuation of respondent judge in this murder case does not warrant reproach and
reprimand, but in fact, merits the acknowledgment and approval of this Court. Such
manifestation of zeal clearly show respondent judge's ardent determination to expedite
the case and render justice. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should always be imbued with
a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
administer justice.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J p:
A verified complaint dated August 29, 1996 1 was filed by Baltazar D. Amion with this Court on October 7,
1996 charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City with Ignorance of the Law and
Oppression relative to Criminal Case No. 94-159772 pending in said trial court and in which complainant is the accused. LLphil
The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel
de oficio for accused-complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on the ground
that he had his own retained counsel in the person of Atty. Reynaldo C. Depasucat.
Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the
person of Atty. Manuel Lao Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the
scheduled hearing of the aforecited criminal case on March 28 and 29 1996. He further
avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing on said dates but on March 27,
1996, the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was
ill.
It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not represented by his defense
lawyer in the scheduled hearing which prompted respondent judge to appoint Free
Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Manuel Lao Ong. Notwithstanding complainant-accused's
vehement opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the trial on March 28, 1996
with Atty. Ong representing the complainant-accused as counsel de oficio. He also
claims that Atty. Ong did not have sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior
conference was held between said counsel de oficio and himself.
Complainant-accused asserts that the aforesaid incidents constitute a clear violation of
his right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be
defended by counsel of his own choice.
Consequently, complainant-accused filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion 2 stating
therein that he is not accepting the legal services of counsel de oficio Atty. Ong since he
can afford to hire a counsel de parte of his own choice. He further states that
respondent judge is not fair and just and does not have the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. He likewise asseverates that respondent judge is ignorant of the basic
law which makes him unfit to be a judge in any judicial tribunal.
Complainant-accused also alludes oppression to respondent judge when the latter was
still a Municipal Trial Judge of MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City. Complainant was then the
offended party in a criminal case for Slander and it took a year before respondent judge
decided to dismiss the same. He complains that now that he is the accused in Criminal
Case No. 94-15772, respondent judge appears to be "very active" and wants the case to
be terminated immediately.
In addition, accused-complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the
law when the latter, as then municipal trial judge of Bacolod City, heard Criminal Case
No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22 against accused-complainant in the absence of his
counsel.
In a resolution dated March 12, 1997, 3 this Court required respondent judge to file his
Comment on the aforementioned charges.
Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, in his Comment dated April 21, 1997, 4 explained that
accused-complainant would not have filed the administrative case had he acceded to
the latter's plea for his inhibition which he denied, there being no ground therefor. He
claimed that accused-complainant is a police officer charged in Criminal Case No. 94-
15772 for having allegedly killed a fellow policeman on January 24, 1994. From the time
he assumed office as Presiding Judge of said court on November 27, 1995, other than
the arraignment of accused-complainant on September 25, 1995 before Judge Emma
Labayen (former judge of said court) in which accused-complainant pleaded not guilty,
the case has not moved.
When respondent judge set the case for hearing on January 9, 1996, trial was not held
because accused-complainant's counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was not feeling well. The
hearing was reset to January 19, 1996 with a warning that no further postponement
would be entertained. On said date of hearing, Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear in
court. In order to avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Apollo Jacildo of the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) as counsel de oficio. Atty. Jacildo, however, filed a
Manifestation explaining that it is the policy of their office not to represent a party who
has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice.
At the next scheduled hearing of February 21, 1996, 5 accused-complainant's counsel de
parte still did not show up in court, thus, prompting private complainant Mrs.
Antonietta Vaflor (the victim's wife) to speak in open court and pour out all her
frustration about the long delay in the resolution of the case.
In view of the fact that Mrs. Vaflor and another government witness, PO3 Richard
Dejores, both reside at Escalante, about 70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that
the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge Chiongson appointed
Atty. Manuel Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent accused-complainant.
The court, however, made it of record that the appointment of Atty. Ong was without
prejudice to the appearance of counsel de parte. 6 Due to the continued absence of Atty.
Depasucat, the counsel de parte, Atty. Ong, represented the accused-complainant at the
March 28, 1996 hearing which was opposed by the accused in a Manifestation and
Motion filed on March 29, seeking the nullification of the March 28, 1998 hearing and
the inhibition of Judge Chiongson. The hearings were then rescheduled on May 13 and
17, 1996.
On May 8, 1996, accused-complainant's counsel, Atty. Depasucat, filed a motion for
postponement alleging that the motion for inhibition should be resolved and that he
would not be available on the rescheduled dates for hearings as he would be out of the
country during those times.
An order denying the accused-complainant's Motion for Inhibition and Motion to Set
Aside the proceedings of March 28, 1996 was issued by the court on July 18, 1996 on
the ground that the claim of bias and prejudice was without legal basis. 7
At the scheduled hearing on August 1, 1996, Atty. Depasucat asked the court that he be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de parte of the accused-complainant causing further
delay. The trial of the case was again reset to September 2, 5 and 6, 1996 with a warning
that the court will not grant any further postponement and that if the accused-
complainant was still without counsel, a counsel de oficio will be appointed.
Thereafter, the accused-complainant engaged the services of different counsels who
continued to adopt the dilatory tactics utilized by the previous counsel de parte.
Atty. Rosslyn Morana, who entered his appearance as counsel on September 2, 1996,
filed on October 14, 1996 a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent judge on
account of a pending administrative case against the latter. On October 24, 1996, Atty.
Morana submitted an Explanation to the court stating that he could not represent the
accused-complainant as the latter failed to give him the records of the case.
On November 14, 1996, the prosecution filed a motion to cite the accused in contempt
for filing a series of motions for inhibition and for filing an administrative case against
the presiding judge which are plain acts of harassment. prll
Atty. Salvador Sabio entered his appearance as counsel for the accused-complainant on
December 2, 1996 and asked for the cancellation of the scheduled hearings on
December 5 and 6, 1996 as he had to study the case. The court granted the request for
postponement of Atty. Sabio and reset the case on January 24, 1997 with a strong
warning that it will not allow any further dilatory postponement. In the afternoon of
January 23, 1997, the court received another motion for postponement filed by Atty.
Sabio requesting for the cancellation of the January 24 hearing. The court, considering
the same as another delaying tactic, immediately issued an order denying the motion. In
spite of the denial of the motion for postponement, Atty. Sabio failed to appear.
On February 4, 1997, accused-complainant again asked for the voluntary inhibition of
the presiding judge which the court again denied for being merely a dilatory scheme.
On March 24, 1997, when the case was called for hearing, Atty. Sabio informed the
court that he received a written note from the accused-complainant discharging him as
counsel, to which the court responded by ruling that Atty. Sabio would only be allowed
to withdraw as accused-complainant's lawyer upon the entry of appearance of a new
defense counsel.
In a Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 29, 1997, Judge Chiongson
was required to submit a COMMENT 8 on a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by
accused-complainant. Said document has also been submitted to the Court as
Supplemental Comment to this administrative case. 9
Respondent judge reiterated his belief that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to
represent the accused-complainant is justified because of the vexatious and oppressive
delay on the latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de parte who refuses
or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that the records of the case will show that
the accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly
foul, to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 94-15772. He added that the Petition
for Certiorari and the Administrative Case were filed for the purpose of not only
delaying the resolution of the case but also to pressure him into inhibiting himself.
As to the allegation of oppression in connection with a criminal case for slander where
accused-complainant was the alleged offended party while respondent judge was then
the Municipal Trial Judge of MTC, Branch 3, Bacolod City to which the case was being
tried, Judge Chiongson belies the same. He explains that the prosecution in the said case
had rested while the defense filed a demurrer which was granted.
He narrates that the case for slander was filed by herein accused-complainant against
Mrs. Esparcia, a school teacher and sister of a victim alleged to have been killed by the
accused-complainant, when said Mrs. Esparcia told the accused-complainant "Murderer,
why are you not in jail" or words to that effect. This was made when accused-
complainant was seen roaming around the vicinity of the police station when he was
supposed to be a detention prisoner. Accordingly, respondent judge granted the
Demurrer on the finding of the court that the utterance of Mrs. Esparcia was not
slanderous but was merely an expression of exasperation and disgust.
On the charge of Gross Ignorance of the Law, for having tried Criminal Case No. 55099
for violation of B.P. 22 against accused-complainant in the absence of counsel,
respondent judge asserts that accused-complainant has nothing to do with said criminal
case as can be gleaned from the Order relied upon as basis for the aforementioned
charge.
Respondent judge concludes that the sequence of events hereinabove discussed,
exposes clearly the false and dissembled charges filed against him as well as the
determined efforts of the accused-complainant and his counsel to frustrate the ends of
justice.
We find this administrative complaint devoid of merit.
Verily, the facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated
procrastination of the proceedings undertaken by the accused-complainant and his
counsel. Contrary to what accused-complainant would want to impress upon this Court,
it seems that he has been the oppressor while respondent judge Roberto Chiongson
appears to be the oppressed. Through the course of the proceedings in the subject
criminal case, accused-complainant had filed several Motions for Inhibition, a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus and this administrative complaint with the view of
delaying the eventual disposition of the case.
A Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 14,
1998 10 noted that "Criminal Case No. 94-15772 has been pending for almost four (4) years already and the prosecution
has yet to rest its case. Complainant has thrown every legal strategy in the book to delay the trial. . . ."
The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de

oficio constitutes a clear violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his
constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot be
countenanced by this Court.
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,
will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation 11 rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
12
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of
counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot
partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel
refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina: 13
"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then,
the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This
absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter"
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's
discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much
as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent
and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal
prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual
resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional
right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not
appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. 14
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to
present his side which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A
party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his
side. 15
Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's
desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. 16
Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos: 17
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and
repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the
protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the judicial process, not to
mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought

upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal
case had been dragging on its lethargic course.
As to the charges of oppression and gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge
relative to cases under him while he was still in the Municipal Trial Court, the same have
been sufficiently answered in the Comments submitted in this case. The explanation by
the respondent judge indicate that the aforesaid allegations have neither legal nor
factual basis and that the conclusions made therein are merely conjectural.
The actuation of respondent judge in this murder case does not warrant reproach and
reprimand, but in fact, merits the acknowledgment and approval of this Court. Such
manifestation of zeal clearly show respondent judge's ardent determination to expedite
the case and render justice.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer justice impartially
and without delay. 18 A judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge
of his obligation to promptly administer justice. 19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to:

1. DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson of RTC,
Branch 50, Bacolod City for lack of merit.
2. IMPOSE a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and ADMONISH accused-
complainant Baltazar D. Amion for filing a malicious and unmeritorious complaint
against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to delay and prolong the prosecution of the case.
3. DIRECT Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to continue hearing the case and finally dispose
of the same with utmost dispatch. LLphil
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
||| (Amion v. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, [January 22, 1999], 361 PHIL 542-555)
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121562. July 10, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE QUITLONG y FRIAS,
SALVADOR QUITLONG y FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, Jr., y PASCUA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joy B. Labiaga for accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
The information for murder filed against the appellants failed to avert that they
conspired with each other in the commission of the offense charged. But then, after
trial, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 convicted the appellants as
charged, finding that there was conspiracy between and among them in the commission
of the crime and the indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum was imposed. The
conviction was based on the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the evening
of October 20, 1994, while the victim Jonathan Calpito and Jonathan Gosil were
confronting the fishball vendor who did not admit that he had short-changed Calpito,
eight men approached and aggressively confronted Calpito and Gosil. Appellant Emilio
then embraced Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador Quitlong and Ronnie
Quitlong held Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively. Calpito struggled
unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side
of his body just below the nipple which became the cause of his death. On the other
hand, the appellants gave no alibi and admitted their presence at the vicinity of the
crime scene, however, they denied any participation in the commission of the crime.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that in the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved, an accused
can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and his criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective. As so it is that must be so held in this case.
The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the victim is
an issue that ultimately and unvoidably goes into the question of whom to believe
among the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a determination that is
concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on
the stand. Findings of the trial court, following that assessment, must be given the
highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to conclude otherwise.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of
Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr. are found guilty as accomplices in
the commission of the crime.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED
OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM; RIGHT OF ACCUSED
EXPLAINED. — Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court,
evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its
grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised
when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates
that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of
law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such
indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The practice and object of informing
an accused in writing of the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904
decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; MUST SET FORTH THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE A BEARING ON THE CULPABILITY AND LIABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED. — In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the
information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or
more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; MUST BE ALLEGED IN INFORMATION. — Quite unlike the
omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during
trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of
another or others is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature
and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act
of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for
the acts of his co-accused as well.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; A CONSPIRACY INDICTMENT NEED NOT AVER ALL THE COMPONENTS AND
ALLEGE ALL THE DETAILS THEREOF. — A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver
all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each
of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the
facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither
is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in
describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement
of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that
can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of
the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the
language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in
the language of the respective statutes defining them."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY MUST BE ALLEGED, NOT JUST INFERRED. — Verily, the
information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that
there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit
the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of
the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must
aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In
fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term
"conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting
the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on
which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with
or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be
shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
6. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED. — Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it.
7. ID.; ID.; FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE CONSPIRACY IN THE INFORMATION, THE CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED IS INDIVIDUAL AND NOT COLLECTIVE. — In the
absence of conspiracy, so averred and approved as heretofore explained, an accused
can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a
principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's death. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the
precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent.
Simultaneity, however, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity
of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective responsibility of two or more
individuals; indeed, from all indications, the incident would appear to have occurred at
the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore
be held to be mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT, GIVEN HIGHEST DEGREE OF RESPECT. — This issue of credibility requires a
determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of
having been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
deportment of witnesses on the stand. Findings of the trial court, following that
assessment, must be given the highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to
conclude otherwise.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; A WITNESS WHO TESTIFIES IN A CATEGORICAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD
AND SPONTANEOUS MANNER IS A CREDIBLE WITNESS; CASE AT BAR. — In the first
place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has steadfastly stood by,
even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the crime. A witness who testifies in
a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well as remains consistent
on cross and rebuttal examination, is not likely to be an incredible witness.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO IMPROPER MOTIVE TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE APPELLANT; CASE AT
BAR. — Secondly, the defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the part of Adjaro
that would have prompted him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where there is no
evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any improper
motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not prevaricate and
cause damnation to one who has brought him no harm.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; ABUSE OF SUPERIORITY; SUPERIORITY
IN NUMBER WOULD NOT PER SE MEAN SUPERIORITY IN STRENGTH; NOT APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. — The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. While
superiority in number would not per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof was
adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to
secure advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.
13. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; THE MODE OF ATTACK MUST
CONSCIOUSLY BE ADOPTED. — Treachery may not be here considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance although it might have ensured the commission of the crime.
In order that treachery may be taken as an aggravating circumstance, there must be
proof that the accused has consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
14. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY TO THE PRINCIPAL. — Under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal maximum
to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to appropriately
appreciate in this case, appellant Ronnie Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
15 ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY TO THE ACCOMPLICE. — The two accomplices,
appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be subject to the imposition of
the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion temporal maximum to death or,
accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that may be
imposed is reclusion temporal minimum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate sentence of anywhere from prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, as the
minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal minimum, as the
maximum penalty.
16. ID.; PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA; INDIVISIBLE PENALTY. — In the Court's
Resolution of 09 January 1995, clarifying its decision in People vs. Lucas, the Court has
said that — ". . . although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then
remain as an indivisible penalty."
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, 1 disposed of Criminal Case No. 13336-
R; thus: LLjur
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS,
SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged and hereby sentences EACH of
them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as minimum, to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua, as maximum; to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Jonathan Calpito y Castro in the sums
of P50,000.00 for the latter's death; P35,700.00 as consequential damages; and
P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus their proportionate shares in the costs.
"In the service of their sentence, the said accused shall be credited with their
preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
"Conformably with Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the corresponding filing fee for the P100,000.00 moral damages herein
awarded shall constitute a first lien on this judgment.
"The evidence knife, Exhibit 'B', is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.
"Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Warden of the City
Jail of Baguio is directed to immediately transfer the same accused to the custody of
the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Warden of the City Jail of Baguio for his
information and guidance.
"There being no indication that the remaining accused, Jesus Mendoza, and several
John Does could be arrested/identified and arrested shortly, let the case against them
be, as it is hereby, archived without prejudice to its prosecution upon their
apprehension.
"SO ORDERED." 2
The case was generated by an information for murder filed on 25 October 1994 against
accused-appellants Salvador Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong, Emilio Senoto, Jr., and several
other unidentified persons following the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants,
shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation
alleging that "it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim after getting irked
when the latter urinated near and in front" 3 of his wife. The trial court acted favorably
on the motion. On 12 December 1994, the City Prosecutor filed a motion to admit an
amended information on the basis of affidavits 4 executed by Nonita F. delos Reyes,
Nicanor Ellamil, Lydia Q. Cultura, as well as accused-appellants Salvador and Ronnie
Quitlong themselves, to the effect that it was Jesus Mendoza who had been responsible
for the death of the victim. The information, as amended, included Jesus Mendoza
among the named accused. 5 Unlike accused-appellants who were immediately arrested
after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at large. At their
arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. prLL
The evidence of the prosecution has narrated how a simple misunderstanding and
relatively so small a matter could lead to so dastardly and unfortunate an outcome.
At around six o'clock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come
from work as a dispatcher of passenger jeepneys plying the Baguio City-Loakan route,
repaired to a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old University of Baguio
medical technology student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil.
Adjaro was Calpito's neighbor and barkada (gangmate) in Loakan. At past eight o'clock,
Calpito decided that it was time to go home. Since at that hour there were no longer
passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three friends decided to walk down to
Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones grandstand to grab a taxicab. The area was well-
lighted. Wanting to partake of some "fishballs," Calpito and Gosil approached a fishball
vendor about three to four meters away. The two returned with three sticks of fishballs
worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that
he had only been handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the
fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano, a civil engineer driving a passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan
from the Dominican Hill, was seen passing by. Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano
positioned his jeep around four or five meters from where Gosil and Calpito were still
having an argument with the fishball vendor. Soriano called out to the two to board the
jeep but they ignored him. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil
and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Some of the men
later backed out but four of them pursued Calpito who, meanwhile, had started to
retreat from the group. The four men, however, succeeded in cornering Calpito. Soriano
saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been weakened by
the men's punches but, when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano realized
that Calpito had been stabbed.
Adjaro saw no less than eight men approach and aggressively confront Calpito and Gosil.
Seeing that his friends were outnumbered, Adjaro shouted at Calpito and Gosil to run
posthaste. Adjaro promptly boarded Soriano's jeep. From where he sat, Adjaro could
see appellant Emilio Senoto embracing Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong holding Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively.
Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, appellant Ronnie Quitlong
stabbed Calpito at the left side of the body just below the nipple. Once the three men
had released their hold on Calpito, the latter fell to the ground. Despite the condition
that Calpito was already in, his assailants still went on hitting him with their feet.
Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur Viado and Nito Revivis were on foot patrol that
evening. Attracted by the commotion along Harrison Road, the police officers hurriedly
proceeded to the brightly-lighted place and saw Calpito lying on the ground. Three of
the malefactors started to flee upon seeing the approaching police officers but the rest
kept on with their attack on Calpito. Patacsil drew out his service firearm and told the
attackers to freeze. Seeing that the victim had bloodstains on his left chest, Patacsil
advised the victim's companions to rush him to the hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro
took Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital on board Soriano's jeep.
The police officers brought accused-appellants to the police station. SPO1 Gabriel Isican
prepared the complaint assignment sheet 6 before turning them over to the
investigation division. SPO4 Avelino Tolean, officer-in-charge of the police investigation
division on the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight shift, also received a call from the Baguio
General Hospital about the incident. SPO4 Tolean, along with SPO1 Rafael Ortencio, Jr.,
and two "Bombo" radio reporters, went to the hospital where Calpito was by then in the
operating room. The police officers interviewed Adjaro and Gosil at the hospital's
emergency room and then repaired to the crime scene and searched the area.
Recovered near the flowering plants beside the electric post was a "stainless knife" 7
with bloodstains on its blade. Adjaro recognized the knife to be the one used in stabbing
Calpito. SPO4 Gerardo Tumbaga prepared Form 1 of the National Crime Reporting
System indicating that accused-appellants were arrested and that a certain Mendoza
escape and went into hiding. The report also disclosed that Adjaro and Gosil had a
drinking spree with the victim at the Genesis Folkden before the stabbing incident. SPO4
Tumbaga based his findings on the documents attached to the records of the case.
That same evening of 20 October 1994, at 8:55, Calpito died at the Baguio General
Hospital. Dr. Kathryna Ayro, the hospital's medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy
on the victim upon the request of Dr. Samuel Cosme, the attending surgeon, and of First
Assistant City Prosecutor Herminio Carbonell, with the consent of a brother of Calpito. 8
Dr. Ayro found a solitary stab wound that penetrated Calpito's left thoracic cavity at the
level of the 5th intercostal space that caused a "through and through" laceration of his
anterior pericardium and the apex of the left ventricle of his heart. 9 Dr. Ayro indicated
the cause of Calpito's death as being one of hypovolemic shock secondary to stab
wound. 10 She opined that a knife, single or double bladed, must have been used in
inflicting the stab wound. Abrasions were also found on different parts of Calpito's body.
Precy Calpito, the mother of the victim, testified that the family had spent the amount
of P37,500.00 11 for his wake, burial and 9-day prayers. Her youngest son's death left her
losing hope in life and "feeling very badly."
The defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of accused-appellants at the
vicinity of the crime scene; however, it interposed denial by appellants of any
participation in the commission of the crime.
Appellant Emilio Senoto, Jr., a taxicab driver, testified that out of curiosity, after parking
his cab to buy some cigarettes and getting attracted by the commotion, went near the
scene and saw the victim lying on the ground beside a cart. He was about to leave the
place when several policemen arrived and arrested him.
Appellant Salvador Quitlong, a food vendor at the Burnham Park and father of five
children, denied having had any participation in the stabbing incident nor having been
acquainted with Jesus Mendoza. He admitted, however, that on the night in question
when he was selling "fishballs" at the park, around eighty meters away from where
Mendoza was selling his wares, the latter's daughter, who was a classmate of his own
daughter, asked for help yelling that her father was in trouble. He rushed over to
Mendoza's place (puesto) but barely in time to witness the stabbing of Calpito by
Mendoza.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong's 26-year-old younger brother, was also a
sidewalk vendor at the waiting shed along Harrison Road. He learned of the trouble
Mendoza got himself into when the latter's daughter summoned for help. When he and
his brother responded, Mendoza had by then already stabbed Calpito.
Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura, both sidewalk vendors, corroborated the story of
the Quitlong brothers. According to Nonita, it was Mendoza who stabbed Calpito. She
witnessed the incident from a distance of ten meters away. Nonita explained that she
did not immediately reveal what she saw to the authorities because of shock. Lydia
Cultura, on her part, said that she saw Jesus Mendoza in the "rumble" with five or six
men who had come from the Genesis Folkden. She saw Mendoza embrace and stab the
man in white t-shirt. Nonita and Alma Balubar followed appellants to the police station
but did not tell the police what she knew because she was busy attending to the crying
pregnant wife of appellant Ronnie Quitlong. Cdpr
On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions
of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence,
rendered its now assailed decision.
In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers would have it —
"1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in
excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred
inspite of explicit failure to allege in the information or complaint;
excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy between and
among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime;
excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime
of Murder instead of Homicide." 12
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial court has erred in finding conspiracy
among the accused and argues that the crime committed is homicide, not murder, given
the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court had this to say:
"The question is whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and may be
held guilty as co-principals by reason of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim,
Calpito, there being no dispute that the latter died due to the solitary stab inflicted on
him.
"But before proceeding any further, the Court takes notice of the lapse committed,
perhaps inadvertently, by the prosecution in drafting the indictment. Both the original
and amended Informations fail to explicitly allege conspiracy. This could have been
timely cured if obeisance had been observed of the admonition, often given, that the
prosecution should not take the arraignment stage for granted but, instead, treat the
notice thereof as a reminder to review the case and determine if the complaint or
information is in due form and the allegations therein contained are sufficient vis-a-
visthe law involved and the evidence on hand. It is fortunate that in the case at bench
conspiracy may readily be inferred from the way the allegation of abuse of superior
strength has been phrased, to wit: '. . . the above-named accused, being then armed
with a knife, with intent to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical superiority
and combined strength did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y CASTRO . . . ."' 13 prLL
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan 14 the trial court has opined that "conspiracy may be
deemed adequately alleged if the averments in the Information logically convey that
several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose of committing the
offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that purpose." 15
Holding that no direct proof is essential and that it suffices that the existence of a
common design to commit the offense charged is shown by the acts of the malefactors
and attendant circumstances, the trial court has concluded:
"In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie Quitlong and Salvador Quitlong
were admittedly responding to Jesus Mendoza's call for help through the latter's
daughter. They must have, therefore, been disposed, out of empathy with a fellow
sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza all the assistance the latter needed under the
circumstances. They were joined, according to prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and
Herbert Soriano, by no less than six others, including Emilio Senoto, Jr. They came
upon Mendoza engaged in a heated altercation with the victim Calpito. When they
reached Calpito, they pushed him and started beating him up and his companion
Jonathan Gosil. Four to five men manhandled Calpito who kept on retreating and even
went around Soriano's parked jeep until he was cornered. Senoto then held Calpito's
body from behind; Ronnie, his left hand; and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled
him. Calpito struggled to free himself but that proved futile and, instead, Ronnie
stabbed him once. It was only then that he was released and when he fell down on his
back, his attackers still kicked him. Only the arrival of some policemen made some of
the assailants stop and run away. However, Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto, kept on
kicking the victim and they were restrained and arrested.
"Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore cited, it becomes ineluctable for
the Court to conclude that Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto acted in a conspiracy and may
thus be held liable as co-principals for the death of Calpito." 16
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of
conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements.
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 17 The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules.
18 The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him
has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U .S. vs. Karelsen; 19 viz:
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92
U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of times, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged."
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be

informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name
of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the
acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense;. and
the place where the offense has been committed. 20 In embodying the essential
elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that
the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an
allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an
accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person,
regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the
other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. 21 Verily, an accused must
know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his
acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it
follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of
the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language
of the respective statutes defining them." 22
The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as
amended, has but simply stated:
"That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of their
numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and
unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab wound at
the left thorax at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line, penetrating the
pereduum and left ventricle causing left remothones of 700 cc and hemoperecuduum
of 250 cc, which directly caused his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 23
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from the
allegation of abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men, i.e., that ". . .
the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill . . . and
taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y
CASTRO . . ." 24 is difficult to accept. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. 25 Verily, the information must
state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a
community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among
the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words
"conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in
the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the
agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design
among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire"
or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which
basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or
likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be
shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore explained, an
accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective. 26 And so it is that must be so held in this case. The
conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the victim is an issue that ultimately and unavoidably
goes into the question of whom to believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a determination that is
concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on the stand. 27 Findings of the trial court, following that
assessment, must be given the highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to conclude otherwise. 28
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance, disposed to deviate from the foregoing
rule. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has
steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the crime. A
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well
as remains consistent on cross and rebuttal examination, is not likely to be an incredible
witness. 29 Secondly, the defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the part of
Adjaro that would have prompted him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where
there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not
prevaricate and cause damnation to one who has brought him no harm. 30 Finally,
Herbert Soriano and the police, who have testified seeing the already wounded Calpito
lying on the ground and still being attacked, both corroborate Adjaro's positive
identification of appellants as the persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court to be the persons who ganged up
on Calpito, Adjaro testified on their respective participation's in the commission of the
crime; thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of the persons who held the
deceased Jonathan Calpito. What part of the body of Jonathan Calpito did he
hold? llcd
"A His body, sir.

"Q How about Salvador Quitlong whom you also identified in Court. What part of the
body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
"A I saw him hold his hand.
"Q What hand was held by Salvador Quitlong?
"A Right hand, sir.
"Q How about Ronnie Quitlong?
"A His left hand.
"Q After Jonathan Calpito was held by these three persons and other, what happened
next?
"A They mauled ("binugbog") Jonathan Calpito.
"Q Did you notice what part of the body was hit and boxed by these three persons?
"A His body and his face.
"Q What did Jonathan Calpito do, if any, when he is being held by these three persons
and others?
"A He was struggling, sir.
"Q Was he able to free himself from the helds (sic) of these persons?
"A No more, sir.
"Q What do you mean no more?

"A He was not able to free himself.
"Q Yes, why was he not able to free himself anymore?
"A They held him tightly, he could not struggle.
"Q And what happened next when you said he could no longer struggle?
"A They boxed him, and also stabbed him, sir.
"Q Did you see the person who stabbed him?
"A I saw sir.
"Q Will you be able to identify him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q I will request you to again look inside the courtroom and point to the person whom
you saw stab Jonathan Calpito?
"WITNESS:
The person wearing white jacket.

"INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a gentleman inside the courtroom wearing cream jacket
who gave his name as Ronnie Quitlong." 31
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused
the latter's death. 32 Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the
precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity, however, would not itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective responsibility of
two or more individuals; 33 indeed, from all indications, the incident would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be mere accomplices conformably with
Article 18 34 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. 35 While superiority in
number would not per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced,
however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their superiority in strength certainly, out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. 36
Treachery may not be here considered as a generic aggravating circumstance although it
might have ensured the commission of the crime. In order that treachery may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused has consciously
adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself, i.e., appellant Ronnie Quitlong in this case. 37 No such proof has been
adequately shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by
reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances to appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant Ronnie Quitlong, as
principal, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indeterminate penalty of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, has been imposed by the trial court on the premise that
reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty. In the Court's Resolution of 09 January 1995
clarifying its decision 38 in People vs. Lucas, 39 the Court has said that —
". . . although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then
remain as an indivisible penalty." 40 prcd
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be
subject to the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion temporal
maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty that may be imposed is reclusion temporal minimum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, as the minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of
reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor
of the heirs of the victim. The consequential (actual) damages in the amount of
P35,700.00 not having been substantiated, except for the amount P12,000.00 paid to
the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The award of moral damages recoverable under
Article 2219(1), in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from P100,000.00
to P20,000.00
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the
killing of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to
reimburse them the actual damages of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of
P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as
accomplices in the commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor minimum period, as
minimum penalty, to thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10) days of
reclusion temporal minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are also hereby held solidarity liable with appellant Ronnie
Quitlong in the payment of the damages hereinabove mentioned. Costs against
appellants.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the
Department of Justice in order that the other participants in the killing of Jonathan
Calpito, specifically Jesus Mendoza, be arrested and made to face the force of the law.
prcd
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, [July 10, 1998], 354 PHIL 372-396)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.]
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
A.M. Navarro Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED
OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION; ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES. — On the
assumption that the prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for
conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could
not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such
right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights which
the people of Great Britain demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of
Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of the United States and
was extended to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was later
carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973,
and 1987. It has the following objectives: First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts
must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place,
names (plaintiff or defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. ASHaTc
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION; DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL RECITAL OF FACTS STATED IN THE
INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT. — What determines the real nature and cause of
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. It follows then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the
latter as provided by Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding Section 5
prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another. We
have shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents is included in the offense
charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case "can also be considered as
charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents,"
and since the petitioner failed to object before trial to such duplicity, he could be validly
convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. — Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; REQUIRED TO OVERCOME
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT. — The evidence for the prosecution
likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1) personally represented himself as an agent
of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of any of the public and commercial
documents in question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or some of the said
documents. Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove
conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is there evidence of
petitioner's active participation in the commission of the crime. The concordant
combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the
prosecution's evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may
be doubted.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED; WHEN PRESENT. — There is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. It is, however,
settled that the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is likewise
required to support a finding of conspiracy. In other words, conspiracy must be shown to
exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the offense itself in order to
uphold the fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty of a crime except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
6. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL. — The information charges the petitioner
and his co-accused Joe Catre as principals who "conspir[ed], confabulat[ed], conniv[ed],
confederat[ed], and mutually help[ed] one another," with Catre "representing himself to
be a representative of Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a corporation, firm
or partnership which turned out to be non-existent, fake or fictitious." The evidence for
the prosecution, as admitted by the respondent, only showed that it was Catre who
possessed the falsified documents, contracted the services of Calica, and delivered the
documents to the latter for processing. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, Catre,
being the one in possession of the forged documents, is presumed to be the forger. Catre,
however, could not provide the explanation because only the petitioner was tried. The
information states that his address is "unknown," and the record does not show that a
warrant for his arrest was issued. The only warrant of arrest that was issued was that for
the petitioner. Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the prosecution
are to be admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to
prove the guilt of Catre with moral certainty was duly established against Catre as a
principal. Accordingly, if conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally guilty
of the offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in
furtherance of a common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is, in contemplation of
law, the act of each of them.
7. ID.; ID.; TO BE A PARTY THERETO, THE CONSPIRATOR SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED SOME
OVERT ACT AS A DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME.
— It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the
others that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it
is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or
indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt
act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission
of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. IDaCcS
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the appealed judgment of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
In short, we held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged,
viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended — because the said section
penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
consummated — he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily
included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
on the ground that after having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, a special law, he could not be convicted anymore of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents, an offense punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, a general law; otherwise, the constitutional provision on double
jeopardy would be violated. In other words, his acquittal of the crime charged precludes
conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, because both offenses arose from the same overt act as alleged
in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844.
In its Comment on the motion for reconsideration signed only by Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-Marcilla, the Office of
the Solicitor General disagrees with the petitioner and asserts that the rule on double
jeopardy cannot be successfully invoked in this case considering that no new information
for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against the petitioner; only
one information was filed against him and his co-accused. For double jeopardy to exist,
there must be such new information and the accused must be able to show that (1) he
has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a
valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance, (4) for the same offense
or an attempt to or frustration thereof as that charged in the new information, and that
(5) the case has been dismissed or terminated without his consent or after he had pleaded
to the information but before judgment was rendered. 1
Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General joins the petitioner in the latter's plea for
his acquittal, but for another ground, namely, insufficiency of evidence.
In the resolution of 22 August 1995, we directed the Solicitor General to inform the Court
whether he agrees with the recommendation of Assistant Solicitor General De la Cruz and
Solicitor Holgado-Marcilla. In his Manifestation of 14 September 1995, the Solicitor
General not only expressed full agreement with the said recommendation, but even
added the following observations:
10. After reading the Court's Decision, the Solicitor General has noted that petitioner's
conviction is based on circumstantial evidence.
11. The law and a host of the Court's ruling declare that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the following conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt (Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
12. In this case, it should be stressed that the inference that petitioner falsified
documents appears to be based on another inference, i.e., that he was in
possession of the same because he accompanied his co-accused Catre in the
transactions. However, other than accompanying Catre, there is no evidence on
record that petitioner had custody of the falsified documents.
13. As to the conspiracy angle, there is likewise no showing that petitioner interceded
for Catre. In fact, it was Catre who talked to Calica. (p. 19-20, TSN, August 26,
1991) Neither was it shown that petitioner had a hand in the processing of the
import entry declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of
Customs. It was not also proven that he was instrumental in the approval of the
import entry declaration.
14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Manuel, 234 SCRA 532). To
hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown
that he performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.
(People vs. Roxas, 241 SCRA 369). In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that
there is no overt act conclusively attributable to petitioner which would pin him
down as a co-conspirator.
15. Thus, it is the inexorable duty of the Solicitor General to recommend petitioner's
acquittal, as he so recommends, inasmuch as the People was not able to adduce
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of petitioner's
innocence.
We then required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the following
issues:
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents, and
(b) the validity of the conviction therefor under an information for the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, vis-a-vis the constitutional right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General are
one in asserting that the petitioner could not be convicted based entirely on
circumstantial evidence because of the failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites
set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, namely, (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The petitioner further cited portions of the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of the testimony of Customs Broker Constantino Calica which prove
that it was Catre alone who made the introduction to Calica that they were agents of
Eversun Commercial Trading, and that it was Catre who did all the talking and directly
transacted with Calica regarding the terms and conditions of the particular engagement
and who actually delivered the documents to him. There is no evidence that the petitioner
had a hand in the processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs or was instrumental in the approval of the import
entry declaration. Thus:
Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your services?
A They are two, sir, Mr. Joe Catre and Mr. Odon Pecho.
Q Who actually transacted with you with regards to your services, is it Mr. Catre or Mr.
Pecho?
A Mr. Joe Catre, sir.
Q So it was Joe Catre?
A Yes, sir.
Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right?

A Well, he is the companion of Mr. Catre and they introduced themselves to me that
they are the authorized representative of the importer.
Q That is right. Who introduced to you?
A Mr. Catre was the one who talks [sic] to me, sir.
Q But in your testimony, the person who delivered to you the documents, the bill of
lading, the commercial invoices, the packing list, the importer's sworn
statement, etc. which was made the basis of the, of your preparation for the
processing of the import entry, who delivered to you these documents that you
mentioned?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And who talked to you about the terms and conditions of this engagement or
contracts?
A Mr. Catre, sir.

Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who actually delivered to you the documents, Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A It was Mr. Catre, sir, he was the one handling the case.
AJ ESCAREAL
Q [To] Whom did you talk first?

A Mr. Catre, Your Honor, he was the one handling the case, the documents, Your Honor.
Q Do you know how they introduced themselves to you?
A That is the only thing that I remember Your Honor that they came to my office and
told me that they are the importer's representatives and that they are engaging
my services.
Q Who said that?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about Mr. Pecho?

A No, Your Honor.
Q Did he say anything?
A At that time your Honor, it was Mr. Catre who was doing that talking.
Q Did Mr. Catre give his name to you?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How did he introduce himself?
A That he is Mr. Joe Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about his companion, did his companion introduce himself to you or he was
introduced by Mr. Catre to you?
A He did not introduce himself to me Your Honor.
Q So during that meeting you do not know that the name of the companion of Mr. Catre
is Odon Pecho.
A Yes, your Honor.

Q And how did your son attend to it?
A Two days after Your Honor, Mr. Catre called our office to assist and help them in the
preparation of the cargo at the arrastre operator because that is usually being
done by the broker when the shipment goes for examination. (t.s.n., Hearing of
August 26, 1991)
As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the
petitioner and submits that the information in this case contains the essential ingredients
of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents; therefore, assuming
there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents without
violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution on the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
I
We shall first take up the second issue since it involves a constitutional right of the
accused.
On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof
for conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he
could not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
2 Such right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great Britain
demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of
the United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act
No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3 It was
later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973,
and 1987. It has the following objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542).
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent: these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. 4
Conformably therewith, the Rules of Court has prescribed the appropriate rules. 5
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. 6 An incorrect caption is not a fatal
mistake. 7
It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one
charged, is necessarily included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court thus
provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved
or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or
is included in another. We have shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime
of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents is included
in the offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case "can also be
considered as charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
documents," and since the petitioner failed to object before trial to such duplicity, 8 he
could be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved. 9
II
We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution
had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. In
light of the consistent and persistent negative stance of the Office of the Solicitor General,
personally confirmed and reinforced by the Solicitor General in his separate
Manifestation, we re-evaluated the evidence.
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based the conviction of the petitioner on
conspiracy.
The question that logically crops up then is not whether the combination of the
circumstantial evidence proved in this case against the petitioner had established beyond
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents, as asseverated by him and the public
respondent. Rather, the question is whether the prosecution had discharged its duty to
establish conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre.
The information 10 charges the petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre as principals 11 who "conspir[ed],
confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and mutually help[ed] one another," with Catre "representing himself to be a
representative of Eversun Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership which turned out to be non-
existent, fake or fictitious." The evidence for the prosecution, as admitted by the respondent, only showed that it was Catre
who possessed the falsified documents, contracted the services of Calica, and delivered the documents to the latter for
processing. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, Catre, being the one in possession of the forged documents, is presumed
to be the forger. 12 Catre, however, could not provide the explanation because only the petitioner was tried. The information
states that his address is "unknown," and the record does not show that a warrant for his arrest was issued. The only warrant
of arrest that was issued was that for the petitioner. 13 Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the
prima faciecase enough to prove the
prosecution are to be admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a
guilt of Catre with moral certainty was duly established against Catre as a principal.
Accordingly, if conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally guilty of the
offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance
of a common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is, in contemplation of law, the act
of each of them. 14
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 15 Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime
is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. 16 It is, however, settled that the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is likewise required to
support a finding of conspiracy. It other words, conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty of a crime
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. 17
It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the
others that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design. 18 Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned
to be committed. 19 The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. 20
Since conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, then the next
inquiry would be whether the prosecution was able to adduce such proof against the
petitioner. It is in this respect that we agree with the People and the petitioner that the
prosecution had only circumstantial evidence against the petitioner.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially
formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty. 21
In the instant case, all that the prosecution was able to prove insofar as the petitioner is
concerned is that he and co-accused Catre are from Surigao del Norte; that he
accompanied Catre in contracting the services of customs broker Constantino Calica; and
that he also was with Catre when the latter went with Dennis Calica, son of Constantino
Calica, to the Manila International Container Port. In all these instances, however, it was
Catre who transacted the business and did all the talking. As a matter of fact, the
petitioner was not even introduced to Calica. As recapitulated by the Office of the Solicitor
General in its Memorandum:
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for Catre. Prosecution witness Calica
testified that it was Catre and not petitioner, who introduced themselves as agents of
Eversun Commercial Trading. He also testified that it was Catre who did all the talking
and directly transacted with him (Calica) regarding the terms and conditions of the
particular engagement and it was also Catre, and not petitioner, who actually delivered
the documents to him (tsn, August 26, 1991). There is no evidence that petitioner had
a hand in the processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the shipment
from the Bureau of Customs. There is also no evidence that petitioner was instrumental
in the approval of the import entry declaration. In short, there is no showing that
petitioner performed an overt act in furtherance of alleged conspiracy. 22
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1) personally
represented himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of
any of the public and commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at any time,
possession of all or some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy
between the petitioner and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is there evidence of petitioner's
active participation in the commission of the crime. The concordant combination and
cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the prosecution's evidence
fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty 23 can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, 24 the
petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted. 25
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of 14

November 1994 is SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged
decision of 28 June 1993 and resolution of 12 August 1993 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 14844 and ACQUITTING petitioner ODON PECHO of the complex crime
of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, without,
however, prejudice to any appropriate administrative action which his office may take
against him as may be warranted by the circumstances in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
||| (Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, [September 27, 1996], 331 PHIL 1-20)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-65952. July 31, 1984.]
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether
or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a
"contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal
of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation
to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation
the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan
reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an
entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in
bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment
succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
7393 which reads as follows:
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an Assistant City Fiscal
of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the Investigating Fiscal in the case
of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-
2964, for Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his official position and with
grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously demand and request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually received from
said Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00)
Philippine Currency, in consideration for a favorable resolution by dismissing
the above-mentioned case, wherein said accused has to intervene in his official
capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA
Special Prosecutor"
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, as Principal, in the Information, for Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law; and, to pay costs.
"Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations,
and which was fully recovered from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
shall be returned to private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the
National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region."
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the
instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is
to the effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense and
not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, This claim is not meritorious not only
because it is not for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also because
a reading of its decision shows that it explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of
the petitioner and the competence of the witnesses who testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the
petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b)
of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: prcd
(a) . . .
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."
The petitioner states:

"Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct
Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
"The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all, the
offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included
in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the
accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to
dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may
or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint
pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office.
Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all, is Direct Bribery."
(Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
"A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as
used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business
transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or
administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise,
the Act would have so stated in the 'Definition of Terms', Section 2 thereof. But it did
not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and
object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party
wherein the public officer would intervene under the law." (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised
Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the
information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so
that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in
that the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the
judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-
Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
||| (Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952, [July 31, 1984], 216 PHIL 177-182)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of
the City Court of Cebu (Branch I), respondents.
Hermis I. Montecillo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. and
Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega for respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputed to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City
Court of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certiorari proceeding was the absence of an
arraignment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This
notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and
thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such
offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of
arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by
respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit
his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 affirming the judgment of the City
Court. It is the contention of petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due
process, 3 more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right
to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 There was thus, at the very least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5
when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect was of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City
Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for
decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this

Court, duly taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the
grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him
finds support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires
that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted
and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against
him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a
valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through Justice De Joya and following the language of the
American Supreme Court, identified due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to
him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, . . . ." 8 An
arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he
is required to meet . . ." 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case of United
States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules
of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an
affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its importance, he
added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to
exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In
other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." 12 In the terse and apt language of the
Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution." 13 Procedural due process
demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly
arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the
Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.
At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the
state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter, he is no
longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with
sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have
such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even
required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an
arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to
him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect
of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle
ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was
that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted.
It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was
reset for hearing. When that date came, December 14, 1973, without petitioner being
present, although his bondsmen were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the
comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present its evidence
invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the offended party
herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which the prosecution
rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court set the promulgation of the decision
on December 28, 1973." 14 It could then conclude: "Verily, the records clearly show that petitioner was not
arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is
indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. As
categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the leading case of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional
right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such
"constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether
express or implied. It suffices to refer to another leading case, People v. Holgado, 19 where the then Chief Justice Moran
emphatically took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence." 20With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel being thus manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence
imposed on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is

unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its language is
clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor
General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment."
The express mention in the present Constitution of the need for such a step emphasizes
its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accused due process. Without the
accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the applicability of this
exception to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself
and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge
Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote anew from the comment of the Solicitor
General: "Respondent Court of First Instance . . . considered the appeal taken by the
petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the respondent City Court.
Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact, the
Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of
petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to
bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at
anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial."
22
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge
Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent
Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of
Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu
for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of
petitioner.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
||| (Borja v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-45667, [June 20, 1977], 168 PHIL 83-90)

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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.]

"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with

Re: Criminal Case No. 10502

Re: Criminal Case No. 10503

On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8,

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; NULL AND VOID AB INITIO;

Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April

4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the

The Commission submitted the following recommendation. prcd

xxx xxx xxx

7. The custody of the accused; their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a

1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked

3. Re: Objections of respondents. — The other related objections of respondents'

"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion without having participated as

"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN

On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have

"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —

the Court said:

It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52

"xxx xxx xxx

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.

Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates,

"MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person. . .

"HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?

The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the

As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva

q. If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?

q. So that your cash advances will be liquidated?

a. I give them to the cashier only, no other person.

a. At the office, Your Honor.

Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated

1991], 274 PHIL 1143-1156)

"I am ready, your honor.

"SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

That this affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.

(Interpreter calls the case).

While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:

The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de

Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to:

An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be

"A His body, sir.

"Q What do you mean no more?

The person wearing white jacket.

Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right?

A Mr. Catre, sir.

Q [To] Whom did you talk first?

Q How about Mr. Pecho?

A Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of 14

The petitioner states:

Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this

4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

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