POLIREV - Rights of The Accused

FRANCISCO TATAD vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.
]
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; DELAY OF THREE YEARS IN THE TERMINATION
OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, A VIOLATION THEREOF. — We find the long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LONG DELAY IN FILING OF INFORMATIONS AGAINST
ACCUSED WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF CASES. — We are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed.
YAP, J p:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to
annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated
August 9, 1985, August 12, 1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from
continuing with trial or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, all
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head
Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau
of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner,
who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said
report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as
Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt
practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges
embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980,
the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-
finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC,
submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min.
TATAD had violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is
also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but
the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On
October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985,
the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon,
recommending that the following informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: LLphil
"1. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his
brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
"2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to
said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
"3. Violation of Section 7 of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978."
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with Violation of Section 3, paragraph
(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for P125,000.00 from Roberto
Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the payment to said
Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum
of January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds
for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accused FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now
Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of
the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:
That on the about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of
the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing
Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the
President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South
East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with the Securities and
Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization and operating expenses came from the confidential
funds of the Department of Public Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects for the government,
without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement
thereof by D' GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement
of the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year (1976), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as a December 31, 1978, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the information on the
following grounds: LLjur
"1. The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973)
do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b)
of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A.
3019, as amended."
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash, stating therein in
particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation, namely:
1. The offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501, have already prescribed and criminal liability
is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For failure to file Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that
the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-
numbered cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed on July
16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on
July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive
period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending
the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is
constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is
separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the
former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more . . ." to submit a statement of
assets and liabilities ". . . regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees
and officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate
and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said informations defective. Finally,
Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it
fixes a period of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation. prcd
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's "Consolidated Motion to Quash"
should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured by amendment,
the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information to change the date of the alleged commission of the
offense therein charged from January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED."
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed an
amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the commission of the offense to September
30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of
his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require the
respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and continuing until
further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial
and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said
resolution, the respondents, through Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, The Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the supervening events,
including the change of administration that had transpired, and the provisions for Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
insofar as the public respondents were concerned, which required the successor official to state whether or not he
maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested
that since "the charges are not political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative
but to pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the position; that in any event,
petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-
evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in
which he concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan. LexLib
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-evaluation with the
Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations
be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be
that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar
as the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of
his constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non-existence of prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of
the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy
disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the
corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses,
which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan
dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was
"nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage
of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any
showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent
accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed
by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would
establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented
and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
"That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the proceedings before the
investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors
which do not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could
even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official. In this respect, We are of the considered opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as
amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the
preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in said
office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise language in Rule 117, Section 2,
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to
arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of its official functions and subject to the charge
that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal of
the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-
guaranteed rights may be presented during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully
threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such as radical relief
during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a precocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in
support thereof."
This bring us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and
the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich-
like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after
the trial? prcd
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from
undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the has been deprived of due process of
law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the
doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed. The complainant,
Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security
Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary
of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of
1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and
had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the
complaint on April 1, 1980 — which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by
Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.
On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavit and
counter-affidavits were in and the case was ready for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal
informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only
after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by
the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and
report. cdphil
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an
office directly under the President in the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly
that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and
fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants
alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established
procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the basis of the
facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period
fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with
absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended
to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause,
but under the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the
Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a
former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not
involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged
bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for
even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but
the absence of a a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time. LexLib
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay
in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In
view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are
hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL 563-577)
SATURNINA GALMAN, ET. AL. v. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 72670. September 12, 1986.]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FINDINGS OF COMMISSION THAT PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN
VITIATED BY LACK OF DUE PROCESS, UPHELD; CASE AT BAR. — The Commission submitted the following
recommendation: "Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure
which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final
outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and
judgment of this Honorable court, that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and
hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted." The Court adopts and approves the
Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record set that the then President (codenamed Olympus) had
stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of
the Aquino Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which
it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. The Court finds that the Commission's Report and
findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of
distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55
years) and in the prosecutorial and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting, the
chaff from the grain, the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public
respondents.
2. ID.; ID.; MOCKERY OF JUDICIAL PROCESS; A CASE OF. — The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning
to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
graphically depicted in the Report, and borned out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur), since the resolution
prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's
dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets
and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacañang conference, would accomplish the two principal clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy.
Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan
Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings
to assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in out annals and
jurisprudence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECRET CONFERENCE AT MALACAÑANG AND THE ENTIRE PROSECUTION PANEL
REGARDING IMMINENT FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED; VITIATED ALL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN. — The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at
which the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire
prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as
admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator"
Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under out penal laws.
This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very
Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and
their ready acquiescence thereto the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified. . . . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacañang Palace on January 10, 1985."
4. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW COLLUSION AS TO HANDLING AND TREATMENT OF
CASES. — No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an
amendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the
very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual
cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondent at the secret
Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive
arguments of respondents accused, particularly General Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that
there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police
investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these
arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial
court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL; DECLARED UNLAWFUL AND VOID AB INITIO; CASE AT BAR. — The Supreme
Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of
judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from
the pressures of politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of
the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE PROSECUTION IS DENIED DUE PROCESS.-
No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of
the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, "Where the prosecution
is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOID WHERE DENIAL OF RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS APPARENT. — "The cardinal present is that
where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the
State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-
30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416
[Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a 'lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
8. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN APPLICABLE. — "Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967
being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process. "In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan
judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was
forcefully disposed of by the Court in People Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the
general rule and pre-supposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of
acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A
void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained.
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. . . .
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE INVOKED IN A SHAM AND MOCK TRIAL. — More so does the rule against the
invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of all the respondent-accused. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and
overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less
than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly
hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as
compared to the nil situation for the defense.
10. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID WHERE VERDICT WAS DICTATED, COERCED AND SCRIPTED. — A dictated,
coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is
no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw." It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people.
11. ID.; ID.; COURTS; CALLED UPON TO RENDER JUSTICE WHERE IT IS DUE. — "Private respondents invoke
'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail, the scales must be balance. It is not to be dispensed for he accused
alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To
the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role.
They render justice where justice is due.
12. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN DURING PENDENCY OF
FINAL ACTION OF SUPREME COURT; CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of
total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilzan,
wherein the Court is setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain
from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by
this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases
[hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
13. ID.; ID.; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; OPINION IN LUZON BROKERAGE CO.,
INC. vs. MARITIME BLDG., CO., INC. (36 SCRA 305 [1978], NOT APPLICABLE. — Respondent invocation of the
writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a
party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's
membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be
put to an end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept
pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration). This
opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly
on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same
was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is not being resolved within five months of its filing after
the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. Then
the second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was not known at the time
of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e., the secret Malacañang conference on
January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as
proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and
predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; GRANTING
THEREOF JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF THE CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NOT
PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED TO THE COURT. — Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not
previously disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire and
ascertain the veracity of the same, to be duly established by sufficient evidence and are indicative of "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case . . .;" and that there exists
"adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist
and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences it could have
otherwise presented, but also predetermined the outcome of the case; . . ." I join in granting petitioner's second motion
for reconsideration.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RULE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
— As it is, the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out before respondent Court all the pertinent
facts which could have helped that Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task. "A public
prosecutor is 'the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice and every definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." (Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil. 556 [1940]). "He owes the state,
the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent may not suffer, and the guilty may not escape unpunished"
(People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453 [1948]).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURTS AND COURT PERSONNEL; SANDIGANBAYAN; EQUALLY
CULPABLE FOR MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the
accused from beginning to end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment, which absolved
the accused, en masse, from any and all liability, is equally culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law,
which "requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and the right of every litigant to "nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs. Juan, 62
SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; NULL AND VOID AB INITIO; VITIATED BY LACK
OF DUE PROCESS. — The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to the detriment of the
State and the People, were invalid and the judgment rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no trial at all
in contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle
the accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W. 757;
State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would
make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W. 1047).
4. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; ATTACHES EVEN IF COLLUSION TAKES PLACE AND THE ACCUSED WERE
NOT A PARTY TO THE SAME; PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The accused, however, argue
that double jeopardy attaches for, even assuming without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place, they
were not a party to the same; and, for those who were charged only either as accomplices or accessories, they contend
that their alleged offense involved only a cover-up in the investigation of the crime so that, whatever pressure was
exerted could only have benefited the principals, consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in
jeopardy. It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction cannot be avoided by the state
(State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both
the prosecution and the Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said that the accused
were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the
accused could no longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the "categorization" of the accused into
principals, accomplices and accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently
conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of protecting them for subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A verdict
of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and
consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense (State vs. Lee, 30A, 1110, 65 Conn. 265, 48 Am. S.R. 202,
27 L. RA. 498).
TEEHANKEE, C.J p:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third anniversary of the
treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for
almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he
was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been committed
long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial
process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but
mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the General Orders issued by
him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted
and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when
he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda
bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November,
1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator
Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but
the truth has never been known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to undergo successful heart
surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home
"to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under
escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at
past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers — and "from a military
viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators reported within a
span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was
revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio
who picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts
gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version
and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly
accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening
of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the
purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free world. The large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most
orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth,
justice and freedom. LibLex
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the treacherous and vicious
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a
national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and
local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and
dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the
Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in
Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages
of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984.
This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by
the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the
report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent
Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was better
known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other members was submitted on the following day to the
then President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim
statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the
chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that
"only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was
"not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who
escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story
to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in
short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the
title of the case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore
"indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August
21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons
who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention." Cdpr
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to our work lies in what will
transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken." The four-
member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien
and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered
institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked
evil would be capable of doing" They wrote: cdphil
"The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the death of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the Board to
uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The
task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored place among the
sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
"More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the late former Senator Aquino has
brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been
haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic instability,
subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble
institutions in our country — the military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and
large, the great majority of the officers and men of these institutions have remained decent and honorable, dedicated
to their noble mission in the service of our country and people.
"The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be
capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. 'Nobody who has great authority can be
trusted not to go beyond its proper limits.' Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have spawned in
secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
"To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public officials should regard public service as a
reflection of human ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.
"A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that followed, would have normally caused
the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest esteem and
respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all other considerations."
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning
disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's
assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he
told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief) in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced
that if any member of my government were involved, I would have known somehow . . . Even at a fairly low level, I
would have known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in
May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
"CBS: 'But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence
seems to indicate that some of the guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy)."
"MARCOS: 'Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are the newspapers and the newspaper
reports have been biased. The evidence still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there
were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the killing.'" 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of absence upon release of the
Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances
under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of
opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused
by some members of the Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of
your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by
the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing
the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured
witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother
and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former
Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to
exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the
prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that
their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino
assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had
scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two
votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page
memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been
submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment. cdll
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to
dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted
from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on
them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to
file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to three vote, with Justice
Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the
legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of
partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an
impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict
because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating
their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued no
restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting
all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This
marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman
(who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the
prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case
had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached therewith.
The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a
Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez
and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and
produce a verdict of acquittal. cdrep
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the
respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to
hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but
reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his
actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after
preliminary investigation and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against
herein private-party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much that need be
said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been
denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or
participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find
sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that
any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in
the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in
the premises that violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his
comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged
that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the
trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law
applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the
Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial,
Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to
take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that he
passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the
writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and
requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note-passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the allegations in the second motion
for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by
Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
"1. AB INITIO, A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate of the criminal case on the death of
Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was dooned to an ignominous end. Malacañang
wanted dismissal — to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the
undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel,
and a resolution charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL.
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former President) summoned to Malacañang
Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and all
the members of the Panel.
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left
earlier, came back and left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all
accused as principals), evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof. LLjur
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the
undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former President
became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino and the communists, lambasting the
Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: 'It will be bloody . .
. Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to do' . . . 'our
understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious;' . . . 'the boys were
frantic when they heard that they will be charged in court, and will be detained at city jail.'
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach. The former President more or less
conceded that for political and legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court. Politically, as it will
become evident that the government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease
public demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted, double
jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso
Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their respective
institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of members of AFP charged in
court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle the trial, and assurance was made
by him that it would be finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly mapped out, the former President
uttered: 'Magmoro-moro na lang kayo.'
The parting words of the former President were: 'Thank you for your cooperation. I know how to reciprocate.'
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign
from the panel, or even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that
with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial would be
conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned
opted to say on."
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of a "make-believe raffle"
within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there
were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacañang; the installation of a
"war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the
evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of
rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should
not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the
Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the
two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty
years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where
civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal." He "associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and
likewise prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a declaration of mistrial will
depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He
submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of
commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No.
70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is
proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double
jeopardy claim. prLL
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas
contended that the proper step for the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at
a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become
moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-accused
on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming
that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the
burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the
nullity.
After petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a
three-member commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired
Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive
evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior
notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted
hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986. On the said last day, respondents
announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected deposition of former President
Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and
Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it discussed fully the
evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
"1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special Investigating Panel composed of
Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-six
(26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be charged as principals of the crime of
double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacañang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the Sandiganbayan, the Special
Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action, President
Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the three members of the Special Investigating Panel, and Justice Pamaran to a
conference in Malacañang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the recommendation of the Special
Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in
court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of
double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail during the trial, considering that
they would be charged with capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be 'categorized' so
that some of them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled personally by Justice Pamaran who
should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacañang conference were followed to the letter; and compliance therewith
manifested itself in several specific instances in the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution
of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran,
suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witnesses who gave adverse testimony
before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the
very decision rendered in the case.
8. That expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be handled and
disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the same in the subsequent
course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion against complying with the Malacañang
directive, Justice Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing
of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by willing dramatis
personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omni-present influence of an authoritarian ruler."
The Commission submitted the following recommendation. prcd
"Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case
and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to
offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case,
the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable
Court, that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully
recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted."
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the Report and required them to
submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986
and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence
received and appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set
forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder
case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-
accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and findings and conclusions are duly
substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity
with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial
services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission
properly appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
"The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a manner suitable to his purposes
was quite understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide
international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who supposedly had the
means and the most compelling motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want
the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear
his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
"The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish thus purpose . . .
"President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the start, he expressed irritation and
displeasure at the recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as
principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and that the
findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued
with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the
charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further street demonstrations. It was
further pointed out that such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court
and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another
prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
"After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but with some of the accused to be
charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody of the accused having thereby
received satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and how long it would
take to be finished.
"According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to personally handle the case. This
was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day
testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain
then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not
to a particular Justice thereof.
"It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such presidential directive. His denial,
however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the
division headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that he was the
only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the Malacañang conference wherein the said directive was given . . .
"The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his admission that he gave President
Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to how long it would take him to finish the case.
"The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an agreement was reached on filing the case
and subsequently acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on
their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate,'
did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part of Justice Fernandez or Justice Pamaran. (No other person present in
the conference was presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their intention to
present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.).
"The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind of the Commission, the only
conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that pressure from Malacañang had indeed been made to bear on both the
court and the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is
readily deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his
instructions were directed, the motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at that time
which enabled the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or stage-manage the
prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the
public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those directly involved were called to attend. The meeting
was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. Actually, no public
mention was ever made of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months later when the former
President was no longer around.
"President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted to take up with the officials he asked
to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or determination
on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite their realization of its
unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from their
unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to beg off,
on the lame excuses that they went there out of 'curiosity,' or 'out of respect to the Office of the President,' or that it
would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility
to presidential pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their
ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. Their
abject deference to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given
seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not say how long) in which
President Marcos did the talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacañang Palace on January 10, 1985." 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on whether the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their
subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by
President Marcos in the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino-Galman
[murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the
heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts: —
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by
categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice,
and recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by saying that, in
the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as
principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that all of the
accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case
of doubt, and in accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious
possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence
presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action should
have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out,
Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacañang
instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then
President's instruction at Malacañang when Gen. Ver's counsel Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of
Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the
Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating
Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. 19 As the
Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of
January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of a press
conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons for them to go to Malacañang
in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses: "Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the
evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case
of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences
were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were
harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the
defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta
Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be
discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial. Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board
"disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to
stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya, eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described
them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to
Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable
alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his
testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that
the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy
from the original transcription which was in Nippon-go. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation
of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men
who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to
leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he could testify
the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported
that Cdpr
". . . Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect on the
cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the case of
Wakamiya . . . She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by armed men; that their
house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the
local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk with her about her
proposed testimony; that a certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy
Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and
William Fariñas offered her two million pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio,
the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her
father, if she would refrain from testifying.
"It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms.
Quijano eventually testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by Justice Fernandez of the
displeasure expressed by Olympus at Justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his
refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms.
Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did not end with
her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the
defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean
Narvasa who was suspected of having coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit 'D'); and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the
courtroom into darkness, and making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over the
railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the
building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building
Justice Herrera declared that the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the
room occupied by Malacañang people who were keeping track of the proceedings."
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana
and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the
informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them away,
also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of
Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc. They have been missing since then,
despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because they
said Marcos was in power [despite his appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one
is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen: "While it is true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies
would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such
showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was
killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of scrambling
Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans
designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said
piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of
the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its
introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense,
as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally uncalled
for. LLjur
"4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of
Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver
before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the
reconsideration of said denial, for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action
on the same . . . His posture . . . is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the
case as soon as possible, if not of something else.
"6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice
Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the
actuality of such directive having been complied with to the letter . . .
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President Marcos to handle the case personally
by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division
thereof. The evidence before the Commission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a
strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran . . . Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to
testify on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could
not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to
Justice Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice Pamaran as
regards the said raffle.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were filed by Justice Herrera on
January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18
minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized as
unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle, there is need for a
certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the
limited time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would ring
with truth.
"What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually conducted which resulted in the
assignment of the case to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on
how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the
two other members of his division . . ."
7. The custody of the accused; their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody
came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the
accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of
the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was given when the
custody was proposed to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of
Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of
the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said
Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of
Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime . . .
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. "There is
an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of
the case outside the Court had been monitored by Malacañang presumably for it to know what was happening and to
take remedial measures as may be necessary, Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly
carrying the label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines'" were installed in the courtroom for that purpose.
There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously called 'war room', wherein military and Malacañang
personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings," the close monitoring by Malacañang showed its results oh several
occasions specified in the Report. Malacañang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence in Justice
Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise
Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at
the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents
for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission
noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the
prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding: "It is abundantly clear that President Marcos
did not only give instructions as to how the case should be handled. He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be
complied with.
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be
acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was
cleverly designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to
then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of
Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for
the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor
of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. . . . It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on the standard ground that their guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there
not being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce
them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.'
It is a rare phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. . . .
"Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who concurred with the majority
decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the
decision was being prepared, Justice Augusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the accused should be
convicted, he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice
Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six
accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this statement (which was
mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19,
1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony of Justice Herrera remained unrebutted." (Emphasis supplied).
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by
the happenings (res ipsa loquitura 22 ), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was
unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to the
Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the
Malacañang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double
jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera
and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure
the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To
borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of
one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys'" acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:
—
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he himself appointed to
investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino"
and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators.
"2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four majority members and
instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and
controlling report; and rebuked the four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report
calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the
chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's
majority and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the
killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any
security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and sealing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin
notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence to the
contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of the
accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two
informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the
basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer
a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with
the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the
criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been
confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is
without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission
noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified . . . Verily, it can be said that
any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacañang Palace on January 10, 1985." LLphil
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory
decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of
the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal
offenses committed by military men 26-a ) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an
impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed
into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." 26-b This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly
Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed
against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the
crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed.
There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the
cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court. LLphil
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts
of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were
allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek
the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed
from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal
Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law
and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial
a mock trial — the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and
void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside
of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
"Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated. 27-a
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction.
Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where
the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49
SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head'
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
"Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
"In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy."
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the
sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of
Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual
resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming
powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass,
intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify,
respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to
terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject
of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise
complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain
period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its
evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time
where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the
sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In
legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To
paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for
the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. prLL
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be
appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs.
Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment.
As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been
issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at
all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it
are void.
xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail, the scales must balance. It is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally
considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily
spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where
the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. — The private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify
and for inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the
defense and arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been
passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June
25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the
merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him
and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacañang" —
"PJ PAMARAN
"Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal later on with that. After all the most
important thing here is, shall we say, the decision of the case."
"J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the capacity of the Justices to sit in judgment. That is
more important than anything else." (p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Italics supplied by Herrera)." 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly
not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:
". . . the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be
remembered that the prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a similar
motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but is also a
confession of official insouciance." (Page 22, Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the
procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent
court might result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the
double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overriding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of
denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete
evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the
temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of
by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of
total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan 35 ,
wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain
from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by
this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases
[hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents. — The other related objections of respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of
the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful
and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment, instead of the present action
which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the
hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof
heard by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated
not only by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for
the rendition of a predetermined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused. cdll
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings or errors of
judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are not entitled to due process is
clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied by the authoritarian
president on public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in
the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is
inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not
speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and
sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating
the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the
first motion for reconsideration). This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion
for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of the first
motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being
resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were
heard by the Court only last August 26th. Then, the second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new
material ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for
reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months
later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per-adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the
petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence,
the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for
reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. — There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in
September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to
trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the
abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new members of the Bar last
May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this
state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality.
In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true
manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and confidence in the courts.
The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength has mainly in public
confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of
objectivity and impartiality, integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law
which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the
Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and
directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as
we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another.
This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the people and
the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The
people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed. cdrep
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the
appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill
the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public
service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to
the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief
Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their
oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation. — The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the invaluable services rendered by
the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of
Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough, competent and dedicated service in discharging their tasks of
hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within
the scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985
dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside
and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its
judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther
Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with
careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to all.
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
||| (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 42-102)
BAYANI ALONTE vs. HON. MAXIMO SAVELLANO JR. [G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]
SYNOPSIS
Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion were charged with rape
based on the complaint of Juvielyn Punongbayan. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. The petition for change of venue was granted
and the case was raffled to respondent judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her
"decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty when arraigned and waived pre-trial.
Immediately following arraignment the prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to the validity and voluntariness
of her affidavit of desistance and that she has no interest in further prosecuting the action. The Prosecution then
manifested that the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She then
moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both accused-petitioners. The two accused did not present any
countervailing evidence, did not take the witness stand nor admitted the act charged in the information. Thereupon,
respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." On December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered
convicting petitioners of rape. IEaCDH
Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it
over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court which should be
strictly adhered to. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an
accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights,
is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground
for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted.
Prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism
and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal
which has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be
wanting in the proceedings yet to follow. TEDaAc
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; REQUISITES. —
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
2. ID.; ID.; THERE CAN BE NO SHORT-CUT TO THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THERE CAN BE NO EXCUSE FOR
NOT AFFORDING AN ACCUSED HIS FULL DAY IN COURT. — The existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise
should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity
to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have
not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. There can be no
short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable
right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN PROBATIVE VALUE. — In the case
of People vs. Junio, the Court held that: Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which
should not be given value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a
solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has
invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]
4. ID.; COURTS; WITH INHERENT POWER TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ANY PERSON TO TESTIFY. —
Courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a
party is not precluded from invoking that authority.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; THOUGH CONSTRUED AS PARDON IN "PRIVATE CRIMES," IT
IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION. — An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when
construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the
action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose
weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. EaSCAH
6. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT A COURT IS IMPARTIAL, IT MUST
ALSO BE PERCEIVED TO BE IMPARTIAL. — Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from
further hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, be best excused
from the case. Possible animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan could again be said: All suitors are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only
to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the
fairness and integrity of the Judge. It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
7. ID.; ATTORNEYS; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE AND UNKIND ASCRIPTIONS CAN HARDLY BE
JUSTIFIED. — While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor,
simple courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility
among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. DHEcCT
8. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTORS; EXPECTED TO ACT WITH UTMOST DEVOTION AND
DEDICATION TO DUTY. — Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely
to discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many times in
the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to
follow.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RECANTATION; CONSTRUED. — A recantation usually applies to a repudiation
by a complainant or a witness, either for the prosecution or the defense, who has previously given an extrajudicial
statement or testimony in court. Repudiation may be made in writing, i.e., by sworn statement, or by testifying on the
witness stand.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY LOOKED UPON WITH DISFAVOR. — Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant
of his or her testimony does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is
that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. This rule applies to crimes,
offenses as well as to administrative offenses. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always
the probability that they will later be repudiated and there would never be an end to criminal litigation. It would also
be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on changed their minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials
a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — The general rule notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptorily
dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. There are instances when a recantation may create serious doubts as to the guilt
of the accused. A retracted statement or testimony must be subject to scrupulous examination. The previous statement
or testimony and the subsequent one must be carefully compared and the circumstances under which each was given
and the reasons and motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each statement or testimony must be
tested by the credibility of the witness which is left for the judge to decide. In short, only where there exists special
circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can a retraction be considered and upheld.
4. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE, GENERALLY WITH NO PERSUASIVE EFFECT. — An affidavit of
desistance is understood to be a sworn statement executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case that
he or she is discontinuing the action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. The court
attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when executed as an afterthought. However, as in retractions,
an affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination of the records of the case. cAHDES
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WEIGHT IN PRIVATE CRIMES. — In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a private
complainant is also frowned upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a second look at the case, there
is hardly an instance when this Court upheld it in private crimes and dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof.
Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant, particularly where there exist
special circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of the affidavit.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRIVATE CRIMES; CANNOT BE PROSECUTED EXCEPT UPON COMPLAINT OF
OFFENDED PARTY. — Private crimes cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended party. In
adultery and concubinage, the offended party must implead both the guilty parties and must not have consented or
pardoned the offenders. In seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian. The complainant must not have expressly pardoned the
offender. The filing of a complaint in private crimes is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. It is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding
without which the fiscal and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case. Once the complaint is filed, the action
proceeds just as in any other crime.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY; MODES. — Article 344 also provides for the
extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly
and timely made, result in the total extinction of criminal liability of the offender. The pardon in private crimes must
be made before the institution of the criminal action. In adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be express or
implied while in seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express. In all cases, the
pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed in court, any pardon
made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal
liability. The only act that extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage
between the offender and the offended party.
8. ID.; ID.; PARDON IN PRIVATE CRIMES; MUST COME BEFORE INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION. —
Pardon by the offended party extinguishes criminal liability when made while the crime is still "private" and within
the control of the offended party. But once the case is filed in court, the pardon cannot ipso facto operate to dismiss the
case. After the institution of the criminal action, any pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be
unavailing, except of course when the offender validly marries the offended party. The offended party's pardon of the
offender in a seduction case after the criminal action had been instituted constitutes no bar to said action. A pardon
given in a rape case after the filing of the action in court "comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence from public
notice."
9. ID.; ID.; DESISTANCE, NOT A GROUND. — Article 344 does not include desistance of the offended party from
prosecuting the case as a ground for extinction of criminal liability whether total or partial. Hence, only when the
desistance is grounded on forgiveness and pardon and is made before the institution of the criminal action, can it
extinguish criminal liability. Desistance, per se, is not equivalent to pardon.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance" of Juvielyn is not an express pardon
of the accused and the crime committed. Private complainant desisted from prosecuting the case against the
petitioners because she wished "to start life anew and live normally again." She reiterated this reason on the witness
stand. She complained that members of the media were bothering and harassing her and that she wanted to go back
to her normal life. She never said that she forgave the petitioners. She did not absolve them from their culpability. She
did not give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her rape. She did not say that she consented to
petitioner Alonte's acts. Moreover, the rape case is already in court and it is no longer her right to decide whether or
not the charge should be continued.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; ACCUSED DENIED THEREOF WHERE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS RENDERED WITHOUT TRIAL. — Justice Puno agrees with the majority that
the November 7, 1997 proceedings could not have been a trial on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not
conform with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the case at bar,
petitioners were never instructed to present evidence to prove their defenses. The parties were never given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There was no
admission by petitioners of the charge in the information as to justify a change in the order of trial. Second, the
admission of private complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in response to respondent judge's
own questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however,
was not marked nor was it formally offered before the court. Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature of the
criminal proceedings before the court, this doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused who must be given the
widest latitude of action to prove his innocence. It is in petitioners' favor that the proceedings of November 7, 1997 be
treated as a hearing on the motion to dismiss, not a trial on the merits. To rule otherwise will effectively deny
petitioners due process and all the other rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights and our Rules in Criminal
Procedure. AHacIS
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RULES STRICTLY ADHERED TO. — Our criminal rules of
procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure to be followed by courts in cases punishable by death. This rule
also applies to all other criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The reason for
this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking life and liberty except that of the guilty.
13. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED, NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. — Evidence
not formally offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case.
Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by him,
otherwise it is excluded and rejected. Indeed, following respondent judge's finding and assuming that the November
7, 1997 hearing was already a trial on the merits, petitioners were never afforded their right to confront and cross-
examine the witness. The court did not, at the very least, inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to cross-
examine private complainant with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-examine was
afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they cannot be deemed to have waived said right by inaction.
VITUG, J p:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R.
No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision
of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated. llcd
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of
Biñan, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The
information contained the following averments; thus:
"That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above named accused, who is the incumbent mayor of Biñan, Laguna after giving complainant-child
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion without having participated as principal or accessory assisted in the
commission of the offense by bringing said complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte at
Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who
subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law." 1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna,
presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a
Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of
the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
"I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue
Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:
"1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte of Biñan, Laguna, with the
RTC-Branch 25 of Biñan, Laguna;
"2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with
the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to
the Office of the President, on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor's
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Biñan Court;
"3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of my college
residence. And when the actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still
indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;
"4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother
had to give up their jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
"5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family,
where we can start life anew, and live normally once again;
"6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other charge for child abuse wherein the
Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information
has not been filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases, whether criminal,
civil, and or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;
"7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-
complainant;
"8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a corresponding commitment that there
will be no reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police force or any other official of officer, my relatives
and friends who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer" 2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue
dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997,
ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of
private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the
public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of
the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition
for change of venue. The Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the
fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the
probability that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some
illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to
transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Biñan, Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The
Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom
Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of
the RTC of Biñan, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br.
XXV of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the complete
records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution." 3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was
assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance"
where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination
as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion,. in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The parties manifested
that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to
proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the
prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of
desistance. 5
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of
her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges
against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was
compelled to desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor
influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a
single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's parents, who
affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the
case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was
signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely
and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents
not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She,
then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor
Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of
bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP
Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to Join the aforestated
motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th
December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in
respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from
the RTC Manila Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on
the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte
could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined
at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been
notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading
concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura
'Wella' Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under
Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which
each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or
imprisonment for twenty (20) years; and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
"In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled and rendered without any further force and effect.
"SO ORDERED." 7
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its
resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail,
Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed
his own petition for certiorariand mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the case
remanded for new trial; thus:
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due
process of law (Article III, §1, Constitution).
rendered a Decision in the case a quo in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total
disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a
quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayan's and Balbin's) which were neither marked nor offered
into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof,
again in violation of petitioner's right to due process (Article III, §1, Constitution).
rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that complainant
was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, §1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous
offenses can result in conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up with the
same result)." 8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:
"1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the prosecution's motion to dismiss the
case is a patent nullity for having been rendered without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total
violation of the petitioner's right to due process of law.
"2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is concerned.
"3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and
neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of
media hype that surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.
"4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a principal
even though he has been charged only as an accomplice in the information." 9
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners'
invocation, i e., even before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge
Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that
—
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand
to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she
expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the
case for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient
enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the private complainant." 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from
the arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in
Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance
executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the
problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And
in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. 12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any
provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the
parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a
lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina, 14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that —
". . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the
parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only
to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an
unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness. 15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of
choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after
she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits
— one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not
used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one
and may be waived."' (emphasis supplied) —
It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of
waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere silence of the holder of the right should
not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been
the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have
dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present
rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners have not
admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be no
short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable
right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to the
court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as
prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it
appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper
disposition of the trial court. LLpr
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement
that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her
complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case of People
vs. Junio, 21 should be instructive. The Court has there explained:
"The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her
mother supported the 'inherent incredibility of prosecution's evidence' is specious. We have said in so many cases that
retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of
having accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that '[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.'
"Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has
given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place
the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184
SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare, 23 a murder case, the
Court has ruled:
"The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation.
To recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683,
citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said
during the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was
no longer interested in prosecuting the case against accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
"3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute
the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with my father's desire;
"It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply
because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any
recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to
cross-examine the recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on her
affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he
testified to did not even bear on the substance of Tessie's affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not
involved in the perpetration of the crime.
"In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128,
134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this
circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon
retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants
his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation.
They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony
and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this
case we think the trial court correctly ruled." 24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any person to testify in a
case pending before it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that authority. 25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as
so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence,
would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold —
"While '[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be,' [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal
Code,] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution of the
criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in
People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was
filed after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be serious in 'signifying (her) intention to
refrain from testifying' since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance.
More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated 'April 1992,' it was only submitted sometime in
August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as
such to coincide with the actual filing of the case." 26
In People vs. Miranda, 27 applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full,
states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness.
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes."
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in
any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not
prohibit the continuance of a prosecution in the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been
instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the
penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender and the offended
party." 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated
on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this
attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which is in question reads: 'The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.' This
provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution,
and means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435
of the old Penal Code provided: 'The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case
the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old Penal
Code became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same.
The Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the effect of
reviving any of its provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article
344, the pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more,
however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and
must be for both offenders to be effective — circumstances which do not concur in this case." 30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is convinced
that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the
personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs.
Kayanan 31 could again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent,
wholly-free disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of
doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. 32 It is not enough
that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before the courts. While
the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy
demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the
legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. 33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many times in the past, although
regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that —
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having
been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said
criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting petitioners is
declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED
from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among
the other branches of that court for proper disposition .
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. Nos. 131652 & 131728, [March 9, 1998], 350 PHIL 700-770)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO [G.R. No. L-21325. October 29, 1971.]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
ACCUSATION NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. — Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state,
both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime.
What is required then is moral certainty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. — By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may
arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation,
to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even
though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may
be innocent.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL JUDGE; GENERALLY RESPECTED ON APPEAL. — With the
testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by appellants, the effort of
their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be
attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the
findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when,
as was not shown in this case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.
FERNANDO, J p:
There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made by counsel de oficio in this appeal of the accused
Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza.
The claim is vigorously pressed that because the information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with
only the two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the other three having been
acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the judgment of conviction against the
appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. To bolster such a contention, certain alleged
deficiencies in the proof offered by the prosecution were noted. A careful study of the evidence of record would leave
no other rational conclusion but that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as found
by the lower court. Hence the appeal cannot prosper. We affirm.
The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the morning of January 9, 1964. The two accused, now
appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio
Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on
a robbery committed in the house of the deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was
decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals
who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo
Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billona, Modesto
Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on
that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery
case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to
station themselves nearby. 1
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was then that
Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of
repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who
warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared
undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow
Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified.
The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin
ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. 2
The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar region, and another in
the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court reached its decision. Its
dispositive portion found the accused, now appellants. Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty "beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified
by the circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said
accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the penalty of [reclusion perpetua]." 3 Reference was likewise made in
such decision as to why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo
Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto
Ronquilla acquitted.
Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From the beginning the accused
Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with the group but that he was fishing in the sea during the night in
question. These facts that is, that none of the prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these three accused
actually helped in the killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were included in the case
only much later after the filing of this case against Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent Contention of
the accused Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the night in question; and the testimonies of
the accused Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa-Billona, Guillerma
Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner, without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience,
and the fact that the testimonies of these witnesses have not been refuted by the PC soldiers [whom they accused of
maltreatment] when they were available to the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very serious doubt as to the
guilt of the said accused." 4
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants Dramayo and Ecubin,
and it must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty.
Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be
implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of the seven accused were held culpable. To repeat,
a meticulous appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged, thus
calling for the affirmance of the decision.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state,
both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.
What is required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. 6 United States v. Lasada, 7 decided in 1910,
yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge
but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute
the offense." 8 To the same effect is an excerpt form the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v.
Esquivel. 9 Thus; "In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the
absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's
mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious
to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." 10
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of appellants
beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied
though that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by
the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand,
required that the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite
quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two
who testified for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The reference then to an opinion of
the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable
only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief
of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Upon the other hand, there are certain
facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the
defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding
of the two gold teeth of the deceased in the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave that hat
. . . to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our minds as be the guilt of the appellant, but also seems to
sustain the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not
foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel
that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to
confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. . . . " 12 The facts of the
present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of appellants on the above decision is
therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the
evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of
innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by
the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt
being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for
the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It
must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court,
notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly
present, did hold the party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having
arisen as to their culpability. 13
2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilty not having been sufficiently de
monstrated with the contention that the lower court over looked or did not properly consider material and significant
facts of record that ought to have substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such
brief, however, with due recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is pressed, would not destroy the
credibility of the facts as testified to concerning the manner in which the deceased was killed and the motive that
prompted appellants to put an end to his life. That such a version could not have been concocted is shown by the
undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It
was understandable then why they would want to do away with the principal witness against them. There was thus a
strong inducement for the appellants to have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing
to no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected
from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to
reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who
was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case,
circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him. 14
WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 is affirmed with the modification that the indemnification to the
heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum of P12,000.00. With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
||| (People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, [October 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 107-116)
PATRICIO DUMLAO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980.]
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their
own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner,
Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. cdasia
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. — In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." (Paragraphing and emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
"Sec. 7. Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold
office for a term of six (6) years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980."
. . ." Batas Pambansa Blg. 51
"Sec. 4. . . .
"Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by
this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and.
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
". . . (Batas Pambansa Blg. 52) (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied).
"Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials. — . . . The election shall be held on January 30, 1980." (BP, Blg. 52).
"Section 6. Election and Campaign Period. — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in
accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29,
1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980." (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some
political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary
to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als., vs. COMELEC et als. (G.R.
No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised. cdasia
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative
of the Constitution.
I. The procedural aspect.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally
unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest
is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan. Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in
the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They, respectively, contest completely different
statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of
petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead time constraints
as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort for petitioner Dumlao, on
one hand, and petitioners Igot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly
procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1)
the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of
constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted
earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit
respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari.
His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this
Court to be "rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record." Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the
primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96
[1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of
which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions…
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
"Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof."
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement"
(People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to
be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts
of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has
been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional. Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the
absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. LibLex
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated
in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960],
thus:
". . . it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing
for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
In the same vein, it has been held:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of
a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality
of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys." (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et
als. 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg.
52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per
se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking
through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a well-settled ruled that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised an presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for
either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows
that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that
his suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely
without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26
SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the
Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzales cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have
impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a
few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the
fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged
provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly
overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. LexLib
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based
on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old
may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages,
say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good
local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there
is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]).
Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is
a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of
the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it
is marred by theoretical inconsistencies: (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision.
Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that
laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta
vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed.
1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to
become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity
that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear
case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear case. Cdphil
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged
proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It
condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between
a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there
is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged
with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to
the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said
paragraph reads:
"SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualifications for any of the elective
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired."
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that ". . . the filing of
charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall
be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. SO ORDERED.
||| (Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52245, [January 22, 1980], 184 PHIL 369-395)
BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 112889. April 18, 1995.]
SYLLABUS
POLITICAL LAW; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR ANY
ELECTIVE LOCAL POSITION; FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE, DEFINED. — The Oversight Committee finally came out
with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: "Art.
73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: "(a) . . .
"(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who
has been convicted by final judgment. " Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity
and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus
holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court’s en banc deliberations), that
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it
confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; SEC. 40; R.A. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991); ART. 73, RULES AND
REGULATIONS; UNREASONABLY EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF DISQUALIFICATION. — Section 40 of R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 enumerates those who are disqualified from running
for any elective local position, among whom is a: (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the
definition given to it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as
appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate
and an undue circumscription of the law. Justice Davide agrees and further submits that it also unreasonably expands
the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been
convicted by final judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are
serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. The
definition thus disregards the true and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for
nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a
reexamination of the meaning of the term.
2. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATIONS, JUSTIFIED. — There are certain fundamental considerations which do not support
the application of the presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights which support disqualification. Firstly,
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified from
exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a
qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek
election for a public office. Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution expressly
so provides. A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., 101; JOAQUIN
BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil.
188 [1920]). Accordingly, stricter qualifications for public office may thus be required by law. Thirdly, the
disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is
not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is
disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because
he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and
convicted, he has successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried
and convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The
disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of
guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption
of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95
SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to case doubt on the validity of the challenged disqualification. Dumlao struck
out as violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4 of B.P.
Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein did
in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of
the constitutional right to presumption of innocence.
VITUG, J p:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of
the term "fugitive from justice" as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor in the Province of Quezon in the 11th
May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private
respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. prLL
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten
(10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his
arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on
the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by
petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC
was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo
warranto proceeding against private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
"Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since the private respondent had
already been proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petitioner below for
disqualification has ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468,
this court held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should be dismissed.
The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in a separate proceeding. llcd
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten (10) days from notice." 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo
warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution,
the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a
reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected, focuses on whether private
respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal
charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice"
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for,
and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further interpretation and
construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitives from
justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General,
taking the side of petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399,
by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes
vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight Committee which,
conformably with Section 5332 of RA. 7160, was convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to
ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy." cdll
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
"'CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
'So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
'REP. CUENCO. What does he want?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito
before the Supreme Court later on.
'REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
'Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad."
'Mabigat 'yung abroad.' One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest pending, unserved. . .
'HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, and — what is a fugitive? It is not defined. We have
loose understanding. . .
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong 'fugitive.'
'Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can
run at this point and I have held that for a long time ago. So can. . .
"MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
"MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very important. Manny, can you come
up?
"MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Okay, Fugitive means a person
convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved
(TSN, Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).
"xxx xxx xxx
"THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2,
lines 43 and 44, 'fugitive from justice.' What 'fugitive?' Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the word — what is meant by the
word 'fugitive.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. 'Fugitive from justice means a person' ba ito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
"HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or means one who has been convicted by
final judgment. It means one who has been convicted by final judgment.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
"THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by final judgment, meaning that if he is
simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final
judgment." 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of
Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those
who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R.A.V. Saguisag who
during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation:
". . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a." 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991. It provided:
"Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
"(a) . . .
"(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person
who has been convicted by final judgment." 5 (Italics supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,
181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it
must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor
constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal
reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive
from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate
and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a
"fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The
omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis
instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter. prLL
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with
dispatch conformably with the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112889, [April 18, 1995], 313 PHIL 417-433)
GENEROSO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 74259. February 14, 1991.]
CRUZ, J p:
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27, 1986, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years and
One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to
the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay
the costs of this suit. Further, the accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to
pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was
designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds
and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. llcd
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of
Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a
shortage in the amount of P72,823.08. 1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay
only P10,159.50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced
by P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his
salary before his dismissal from the service. 2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to the petitioner. The
demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the
respondent court on October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3 He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the
shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the unliquidated withdrawal made
by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on
official leave of absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial
Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said
amount. cdll
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding vouchers dated are described as
follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB
Check No. 956637 dated December 22, 1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by
PNB Check No. SN958525 dated December 23, 1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB
Check No. 956639J dated December 22, 1980.
4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by
PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29, 1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts thereof were
disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which
were all submitted as exhibits). 4 He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged
but was in fact the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to his sick wife in the hospital,
returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980,
were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the hospital. 5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner was not on official
leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had already been encashed on December 23,
1980, the encashment was not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of
temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage." It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and,
when confronted with it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer. 6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cash book. He
explained that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980, he discovered that although the
amount of P50,000.00 appeared to have been already encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's
cash book. As his superior, he required the petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount
withdrawn was already part of the latter's accountability. 7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q. Alconcel, made the
following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused
must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the said amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim that same has not been liquidated
by the paymaster, for the following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the same purpose, and that is, to pay
salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial officials and employees of the province of Nueva
Vizcaya covering the period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December 23, 1980,
and in fact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day. The two (2) other checks (Nos.
956637 and 958526) were issued and encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively. Except for Check No.
958525, which was only entered in accused's Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and
encashment, all the other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued
and encashed on the same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check
on time was a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks, Nos. 956639 and 958525, could not have been liquidated
together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary differentials of government officials and employees
of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he duly liquidated the proceeds of
the four (4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
q. If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?
a. I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the vouchers paid by me or disbursed by me.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. So that your cash advances will be liquidated?
a. Yes, Your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
q. In the absence of the cashier, to whom do you give these documents?
a. I give them to the cashier only, no other person.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO
q. In his absence, do you keep these documents?
a. Yes, Your Honor.
q. For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these payrolls to the cashier?
a. On December 29, sir.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. Duly accomplished?
a. Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
a. At the office, Your Honor.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
q. At what time?
a. In the afternoon, sir.
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
a. He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was supposedly having a check-up but in the
afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp. 16-18)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His
witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are
indicated, shows that during the month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick
leave, which is the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to October
1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the day when Check No. 958525 was
issued and encashed, yet, the other check which was issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturb them,
absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is
convinced that the facts as established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not make any notation that said
amount, though entered, was not actually received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any certification that the
amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he did not file any case, whether
civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement
to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been
established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal use. 8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is
the presence of the following requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not
committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing
money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by
the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion
that the supposed injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be
rejected as an arrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in
which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such
equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with
his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His
conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
||| (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259, [February 14, 1991], 271 PHIL 901-910)
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 94262. May 31, 1991.]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; FINAL JUDGMENTS OR DECREES OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. — Final judgments or
decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
(Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 180 SCRA 609 [1989]).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; FORFEITURE PROCEEDING, NOT PENAL IN
NATURE. — A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature. (People vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., 101 SCRA 86 [1980]).
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
REQUIRED IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. — Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods
illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the
imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of
the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT; NOT AVAILABLE TO
JURIDICAL PERSONS. — A corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which
right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; RULE THEREON NOT APPLICABLE TO
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. — Forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133
which involves such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; WHEN IMPORTATION BEGINS. — Section 1202 of
the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the
jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT; ORDINARILY INFERRED FROM THE FACTS. — It is clear from the provision of the law
that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely
susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore can only be proved by
unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. — The findings of fact of
respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as
affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary
principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that
matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; NOT INDISPENSABLE IN NON-CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS. — "In non-criminal proceedings, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it
deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding
is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted
in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side."
(Nera v. The Auditor General, 164 SCRA 1)
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION THAT DUTY
WAS PERFORMED; CASE AT BAR. — If ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of
Deposa and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or
deny the statements they made. This was not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was
regularly performed stands.
REGALADO, J p:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1990, affirming the
decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of
1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code
and ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo. 1
The facts as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20470 are as follows:
"The M/T 'ULU WAI' a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping
Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil
consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
"On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs
authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the
civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs
team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report.
"The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents,
except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for 'Zamboan.'
"In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued
after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and
Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.
"In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of
facts, to wit:
'1. That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI" subject of S1-2-86, herein identified as Exh. "A", is admitted.
'2. That the existence and identity of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil, subject of S1-2-86-A, herein identified as Exh. "B", is
admitted;
'3. That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil, subject of S1-2-86 herein identified as Exh. "B-1", is
admitted;
'4. That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 and was cleared by Singapore customs authorities for
Zamboanga, Philippines;
'5. That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, sub-province of Guimaras,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about 1120HRS, May 14, 1986;
'6. That subject vessel was boarded by Customs and Immigration authorities for the first time in the afternoon of May
19, 1986, at about 1600HRS;
'7. That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986, submitted by the Team Leader of the Customs and Immigration
Team, Roberto Intrepido, marked and identified as Exh. "C", is admitted;
'8. That at the time of boarding, the Master of subject vessel could not produce any ship and/or shipping documents
regarding her cargo except the Port Clearance Certificate No. 179999 issued by the Port of Singapore authority dated
May 4, 1986, marked as Exh. "D", which is hereby admitted;
'9. That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULU WAI", Capt. Romeo E. Deposa filed a Marine Protest dated same
date, which Marine Protest, marked and identified as Exh. "E", is hereby admitted;
'10. That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E. Deposa, marked and identified as Exh. "F", given on May 26,
1986 before Atty. Hernando Hinojales, Customs Legal Officer, is admitted;
'11. That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres, Owner's representative of M/T "ULU WAI", marked and
identified as Exh. "G" given before Atty. Hernando Hinojales on May 28, 1986, is admitted;
'12. That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas, Master of M/T "CATHEAD" given before Lt. Dennis Asarraga
on June 4, 1986, marked and identified as Exh. "H", is admitted;
'13. That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41 entered into by and between the National Stevedoring &
Lighterage Corporation and the Far East Synergy Corporation, marked and identified as Exh. "I", is admitted; and
'14. That the Preliminary Report of Survey Sounding Report dated June 17, 1986, signed by J.P. Piad, Surveyor of
Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and duly attested by Ernesto Cutay, Chief Officer of the M/T "ULU WAI" marked
and identified as Exh. "J", is also admitted.'" 2
On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, with the following disposition:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T 'ULU WAI' is hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000
M/T Fuel Oil are hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby
forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
"SO ORDERED." 3
Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated May 13, 1987, the decretal
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 19, 1987 of the District Collector of Customs of Iloilo,
ordering the forfeiture of M/T 'ULU WAI' and its cargo of 2,100 metric tons of gas and fuel oil is hereby affirmed in
toto.
"SO ORDERED." 4
On June 25, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision.
On December 14, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision, with this dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs dated May 13, 1987, ordering the forfeiture of
the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' for violation of Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Custom Codes (sic), as amended, and its
cargo of 1,100 metric tons of Gas Oil and 1,000 metric tons of Fuel Oil for violation of Section 2530 * (a) and (f), and (1-
1) of the same Code, is hereby affirmed. With costs.
"SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with this Court. On
March 21, 1990, we issued a resolution 6 referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of our
decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 7 holding that final judgments or decrees of the
Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. LibLex
On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied on July 4, 1990, it interposed this instant petition
contending that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence that an illegal importation had been
committed;
2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent was not
recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; and
3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel in violation of their
constitutional right thereto. 8
We find no merit in the Petition.
1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature,
contrary to the argument advanced by herein petitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et
al., 9 this Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal
proceedings, as follows:
". . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in
nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in
Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those
instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the
administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty
in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer
or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
"In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns the res rather
than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated
the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented. From being assimilated in lawful commerce until
corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the form of fine or of
forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or possessor is
treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal
liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively
liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that
untaxed goods were transported in respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether
criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information
can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven
not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt."
Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since
they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 10
In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or
at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the
forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. LLjur
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that petitioner,
which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available
only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
2. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at least an attempt
thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.
Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier
stated, forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves such
circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. prLL
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft
enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that
mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely
susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11 and therefore can only be proved by
unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally. 12
In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply
supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's
decision:
"It is undisputed that the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' entered the jurisdiction of the Philippines. The issue that calls for
Our resolution is whether or not there was an intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borne by the evidence
convince Us that there was intent to unload. The following circumstances unmistakably point to this conclusion.
"1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga was shorter and Iloilo lies further north.
It is not logical for the sailing vessel to travel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.
"2. When the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not notify the Iloilo port or
Customs authorities of its arrival. The master of the vessel did not file a marine protest until 12 days after it had
anchored, despite the supposed urgency of the repairs needed and notwithstanding the provision (Sec. 1016) of the
Code requiring the master to file protest within 24 hours.
"3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and shipping documents were not on board
except the clearance from Singaporean port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner claims that these
were turned over to the shipping agent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986. However, this claim is belied by the
sworn marine protest (Exhibit 'E') of the master of M/T 'ULU WAI.' Mr. Romeo Deposa.
'It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the crew to: get down of (sic) the vessel and find
means and ways to contact the vessel's representative.'
Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit 'G'), ship agent, Antonio Torres, stated that he did not know the buyer of
the oil, which is impossible if he had the Local Purchase Order of the alleged buyer, Pogun Construction SDN. Torres
also swore that his knowledge came from the vessel's owner, without mentioning the shipping documents which
indicate such data. He also said that he did not know the consignee of the oil which would have been patent from the
documents. Lastly, as also pointed out by the court a quo, the captain of the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI,' Romeo Deposa, in
his sworn statement to custom authorities on May 26, 1986, enumerated the documents he allegedly gave to Mr.
Antonio Torres, but did not mention as among them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and the
Bill of Lading.
"4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T 'CATHEAD,' and the large M/T 'SEMIRANO NO. 819' were
alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge and the tugboat were contracted by Consignee Far East Synergy to
load the cargo of the vessel into the awaiting barge and to discharge the same to Manila (Exhibits '1' and '1-1').
It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI.' Government witnesses,
Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was the vessel's cargo which was to be unloaded and brought to Manila by
them." 13
The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no
compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding
upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Cdpr
3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance of counsel may not be
considered an outright violation of their constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. As explained in the case of Nera
vs. The Auditor General: 14
"The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or a law.
Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may
not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the trial of the accused,
who has the right 'to be heard by himself and counsel,' either retained by him or provided for him by the government
at its expense. These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing
criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life) against
the awesome authority of the State.
"In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed essential to
their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process
clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary
citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side."
Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres, they should have
been presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was
not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly performed stands. In addition,
petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally, petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements
were taken without the assistance of counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken under
anomalous circumstances which would render them inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. We thus find no
compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the said sworn statements.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94262, [May 31, 1991], 274 PHIL 1143-1156)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRISCO HOLGADO [G.R. No. L-2809. March 22, 1950.]
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; QUALIFIED PLEA OF GUILTY; AMBIGUOUS INFORMATION; ACCUSED WITHOUT
COUNSEL; IMPOSITION OF HEAVY PENALTY. — When an accused unaided by counsel qualifiedly admits his
guilt to an ambiguous or vague information from which a serious crime can be deduced, it is not prudent for the trial
court to render a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense without absolutely any evidence to
determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
2. ID.; DUTIES OF COURT WHEN DEFENDANT APPEARS WITHOUT ATTORNEY. — Under the provision of
section 3 of rule 112 of the rules of Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important
duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2)
after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) if he desires and is
unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 94) if the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
3. ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
— One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law," and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court
should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney
of his own.
MORAN, C.J p:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and
detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreag of her personal liberty."
On May 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:
"Court:
"Is this case ready for trial?
"Fiscal:
"I am ready, your honor.
"Court: — to the accused.
"Q. Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
"Court:
Arraign the accused.
"Note:
"Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question.
"Q. What do you plead? — A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
"Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? — A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
"The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
"Fiscal:
"I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with this case and I found no
evidence against this Ocampo.
"Court:
"Sentence reserved."
Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
"[Criminal Case No. V-118]
"THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant.
"SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
"SENTENCE.
"The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the
following.
"INFORMATION
"That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of Romblon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
"Contrary to Law.
"This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above
described.
"The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in its
minimum period to death. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum
degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree, as minimum, or ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
twenty (20) years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of
his preventive imprisonment."
It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the offense charged is
named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged
with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the information filed by the provincial fiscal it is said
that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not
clear as to whether the offense charged is merely "slight illegal detention" as the offense is named therein or the capital
offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since the accused-
appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party, the trial judge must have
deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.
Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was not
prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years,
without absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule
112, section 3, that:.
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply
with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving
him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an
attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform
the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to
inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to
assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney
before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused
as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in
violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court
should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney
of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the
following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true
import of this qualification. The record does not show whether the supposed instruction was real and whether it had
reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea of guilty. No investigation was opened by the
court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied
with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with
this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not
sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused
be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to
be capital by the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a
new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.
||| (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, [March 22, 1950], 85 PHIL 752-757)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI [G.R. No. 122770. January 16, 1998.]
SYNOPSIS
Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of Quezon City for raping her 14-
year old daughter, Eden. The conviction was based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Dr. Florante Baltazar,
the victim and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.
The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi, and one of the evidence presented was the
affidavit of desistance of the victim. However, it was retracted by the victim during the presentation of the rebuttal
evidence claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign it.
Hence, in this appeal the appellant questioned the credibility of the testimony of the victim in view of her execution of
the affidavit of desistance.
The Court ruled that affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court, and affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of
justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would
make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. cIHCST
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR PERFORMANCE OFFICIAL
DUTY; TRIAL COURT PRESUMED TO HAVE COMPLIED WITH ITS DUTY TO INFORM ACCUSED OF HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. — The trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly
appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since appellant miserably failed to show that he was not
informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly
performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold
duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court; namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have
his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of
counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and
(4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE RECORD TO DISCLOSE AFFIRMATIVELY THAT TRIAL JUDGE
ADVISED ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NOT SUFFICIENT TO REVERSE CONVICTION. — It is settled
that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is
not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied
with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be
overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the
record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; RIGHT TO QUESTION FAILURE OF TRIAL
COURT TO INFORM ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL DEEMED WAIVED BY HIS CONSENT TO BE ASSISTED
BY TWO (2) COUNSEL DE OFICIO. — In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted
the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr.
Florante Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to
inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to
do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr.
Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of
his right to counsel.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; TRIAL COURTS' COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DUTIES
MUST APPEAR ON RECORD. — We take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance
with their pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to counsel to ask him if he desires to have one,
and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, a de
oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must appear on record.
5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TWO (2) DAYS TIME TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL MUST BE EXPRESSLY
DEMANDED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED. — Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the
2-day period to prepare for trial Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 9. Time to prepare for trial —
After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause
grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded
does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived,
expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively
waived such right.
6. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; THIS COURT WILL NOT GENERALLY INTERFERE WITH THE JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN PASSING UPON CREDIBILITY OF OPPOSING WITNESSES. — The second assigned error is
equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of the highly
revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is
founded on practical and empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. He had
before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always
stalk boldly forth naked, she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tried
the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which
generally does not reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining innocence or guilt
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVE OF 14-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER IN CHARGING HER OWN FATHER OF RAPE. —If EDEN
did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination of her private parts, she did so
inspired by no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the
painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and
falsely charged her own father with a heinous crime.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; MAY BE COMMITTED WHERE PEOPLE CONGREGATE. — What appellant claims to
be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than real. The presence of her sisters in the small
room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him
bears no respect for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere — even in places where people congregate
such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants.
In People v. Opena, rape was committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN's other
companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep. DHSaCA
9. ID.; ID.; FORCE OR INTIMIDATION; SUBSTITUTED BY MORAL ASCENDANCY OR INFLUENCE BY THE
FATHER OVER HIS DAUGHTER. — That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the
fact that appellant threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming
from her father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or
asking for help. In any event, in a rape committed, by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the former's
moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. Likewise, it must not be
forgotten that at her tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and
with nerves of steel or to act like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under the
circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. Even in cases of rape of mature women,
this Court recognized their different and unpredictable reactions. Some may shout, some may faint, and some may be
shocked into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion.
10. ID.; ID.; INTIMIDATION; SUFFICIENT IF IT PRODUCED FEAR FOR VICTIM'S LIFE; RESISTANCE,
UNNECESSARY. — Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is
addressed to the victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment
at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear — fear that if the victim
did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would happen to her at that moment. Where
such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance
futile, it would be the height of unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If
resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the
assault so as to make the victim' s submission to the sexual act voluntary.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF; DESISTANCE; CONSIDERED INFERIOR TO THE TESTIMONY
GIVEN IN OPEN COURT. — Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have
necessarily contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly,
nowhere therein did she retract her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN
withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she was pressured by her mother and sister to sign it.
Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; and
affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make
a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; P50,000.00 INDEMNITY FOR RAPE. — To take appellant who inflicted his animal greed
on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his
human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the law must be weighed
against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of
"P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.
Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:
Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent persons who recognize that a woman's
cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that will descends to the level of
the odious beast. The act becomes doubly repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on one's own flesh and blood for
the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The latter yields only to biological impulses and is unfettered by
social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her
purity and her trust but also the mores of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on
her in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not
least of all by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and shameless
lechery. 1
At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden Agbayani who charged her own father with rape
committed in the sanctity of their rented room on 19 July 1994, this Court finds itself repeating this declaration. 2
Before this Court on automatic review is the decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in
view of the death penalty imposed by it for the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. 4
On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the National Capital Regional Command,
Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City the complaint of Eden
Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for rape against her father, herein accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza. 5
After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint 6 for rape signed by EDEN, assisted by her sister Fedelina
Agbayani, and subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales, was filed against appellant
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 27 October 1994. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-
59149, then set for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on 22 December 1994. 7
At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys. Samuel Baldado and Edwin de la Cruz as
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. 8 Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the merits immediately
followed, with the prosecution presenting the first witness, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, 9 who was cross-examined by Atty. Baldado. 10 On the succeeding dates of trial, the prosecution
presented EDEN 11 and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. 12 During these hearings, however, appellant was represented by
Atty. Arturo Temanil of the Public Attorney's Office. 13
On its part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina Agbayani, as well as EDEN who identified
her and Fedelina's affidavit of desistance, 14 which was subscribed and sworn to before notary public Eranio Cedillo
on 6 February 1995. Said affidavit reads as follows:
We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina Agbayani, 19 years old, sister of Eden Agbayani, and
presently residing at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta, Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law do hereby depose and states [sic]: dctai
That we are the complainant [sic] against our father, Eduardo Agbayani pending before this honorable Court
docketed as Criminal Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic] to the filing of the instant case I formally realize that the incident
between us and my father is purely family problem that arise from the disciplinarian attitude of our father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided to formally forego this case and withdraw the same:
That I am executing this affidavit for purposes of finally withdrawing the instant case and therefrom requesting this
Honorable Court to dismiss the case against our father.
That this affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.
As EDEN declared in open court that what she said in her previous testimony and sworn statement were not true, the
trial court held her in direct contempt of court, reasoning that her "intentional falsehood" was "offensive to its dignity
and a blatant disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading [to] the administration of justice." Accordingly, the trial
court ordered her "committed to incarceration and imprisonment within the period provided by law," 15 which
penalty, however, was modified to a fine of P200.00 upon EDEN's motion for reconsideration. 1 6
On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted her affidavit of desistance and
claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her mother and elder sister.
The trial court's summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the references to the pages of the stenographic
notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:
The evidence adduced on record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused was
charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape which case was
raffled to the sala of Judge Danilo Manalastas of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan. The case was, however,
provisionally dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted from pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo
Agbayani was thus consequently released from jail on July 13, 1994. Three (3) days thereafter, he began living with
four (4) of his six (6) daughters, Fedelina, Eden, Diana and Edima, in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy.
Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant Eden Agbayani, Medico Legal
Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje, shows that at the above-mentioned address, the
complainant, Eden Agbayani, on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with her father,
the accused Eduardo Agbayani and her youngest sister, Edima, while her sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a bed.
At the time, complainant's mother was outside the country, working in Saudi Arabia. At about 9:00 p.m. of July 19,
Complainant Eden Agbayani was awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her breasts and vagina. She turned to
discover that it was her father who was then molesting her. Frightened, she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa
akin ito, gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan?" and threatened to kill her [sic]. The accused then proceeded to
undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the complainant who
could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter felt blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain.
The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina, of what had been done to her by
her father. She was told not to worry as they would go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan,
who had, the year before, handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were made by her
sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it was only on September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet
with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened tile previously
provisionally dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the accused was arrested on the same
day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City and was later brought to Malolos, Bulacan
where he is currently detained. After the accused's arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned to Station 10 where they made
individual statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje narrating the events leading to and occurring after the incident
of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding Medico-Legal Report. 17
Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have raped his daughter EDEN,
because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter. 18 He declared
that EDEN charged him with rape because he had hit her with a belt after he caught her lying about her whereabouts
one night. Then on 24 July 1994, she left their rented apartment and did not return anymore. 19
Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellant's alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994, appellant requested her to take care
of his children because he was going to Pangasinan to visit his sick father, returning home only on 21 July 1994. 20
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who "appeared, during her entire testimonies on January
20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive;" further, it commended her "for her courage and her
unwavering strength in the midst of the emotional and psychological strain and humiliation, not to mention the
pressure and lack of moral support of her family, brought on by the filing of this case." It also ruled that EDEN did not
voluntarily execute the affidavit of desistance as it was procured "at the behest of her mother and sister for whom the
sanctity of the family and the family's good name were more important than demanding punishment for whatever
injury the complainant might have suffered in the hands of the accused." Besides, even assuming arguendo that no
such pressure was exerted by her mother and sister, the trial court declared that it understood EDEN's moral
predicament, viz., for a child like EDEN, it was difficult to charge her own father with rape; insist on his punishment;
and thereby inflict emotional stress and financial strain upon the members of her family, particularly her mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit "E") of Fedelina Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly self-serving, and characterized the testimony
of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of belief. As to appellant's claim that EDEN filed the complaint because of a grudge
against him, the trial court found this "incredible, if not totally absurd," for:
The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is unlikely to possess such vindictiveness and dearth of
conscience as to concoct such a malicious and damaging story. The complainant appeared, during her entire
testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Her retraction on March 16 was
sufficiently explained to this Court (tsn, 5-4 95, testimony of Eden Agbayani, pp. 2-3). She has shown to this Court the
seriousness of the injury upon her person and dignity inflicted upon by the accused . . . Even assuming argumenti
gratia that the complainant would indeed lodge a complaint against her father solely on account of an altercation with
him, it is highly unlikely that the complainant would concoct a charge which would damage her and wreck havoc on
her family's reputation, destroy the household peace and subject her father, the accused, to a grave punishment which
by dent of express of law, can obliterate him from the face of this earth. Indeed, to uphold the defense's proposition
would be stretching the imagination too far, if not to the extreme.
The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or intimidation by virtue of his moral
ascendancy over her and his threat that he would kill her if she reported the incident to anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the penalty of death when the victim
is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, rendered judgment against
appellant, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, EDUARDO
AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against complainant, Eden
Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court, as a consequence thereof, hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty
of DEATH, conformably with the provisions of the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. Further, Accused is hereby ordered
to pay the complainant, Eden Agbayani, the sum of P75,000.00 as damages, with all the necessary penalties provided
for by law without subsidiary imprisonment, however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal and Domingo Floresta, filed a
Motion for New Trial 21 on the ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were committed
during the trial, viz., the failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a) present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay Obrero,
Quezon City, who would have testified, on the basis of his certification attached to the motion, that there was a house
bearing No. 30, Makabayan St., in his barangay, but that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said
barangay, which was the address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruz's testimony; (c) present
private complainant's mother and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to the circumstances which brought
about he execution of the affidavit of desistance; and (d) cross-examine complainant and the police investigator
exhaustively. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings,
worse, even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also
averred that the trial court used its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private complainant.
In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Trial, 22 the public and private prosecutors alleged that there
were no such irregularities; neither was there new and material evidence to be presented that appellant could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted at trial
would probably change the judgment of the court.
In its Order 23 of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new trial for being devoid of merit and for not
being within the purview of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.
In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred in: (a) denying his motion
for new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime
charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for new trial, and adds two others,
namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the lower court
did not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated period of two days prescribed in Section 9
of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDEN's testimony is not sufficient to convict, since it is unclear
and not free from serious contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it was impossible for her sisters or any
one of them not to have been awakened when EDEN was allegedly being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply
kept quiet and allowed him to abuse her; neither did she shout for help or put up a fight that would have awakened
her sisters. Notably, EDEN and her sisters allowed him to live and sleep with them again in their rented room even
after the alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDEN's testimony is unreliable because her affidavit of desistance must have
necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her "subsequent turn-around . . . that she was pressured and influenced to
execute and sign the affidavit of desistance further confirmed her being untruthful and, in effect, demolished
whatsoever faith left on her charge against the accused."
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as devoid of merit. When appellant
appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial court informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel for
him if he so desired, to which appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in Section 9
of Rule 116 is merely directory and does not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial after arraignment,
especially if the defense, as here, consented thereto. It would have been entirely different if the defense did not agree,
in which case the court would have no other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellant's other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings, appellant never questioned
the way his defense was being handled by his counsel de oficio. The latter's request for a continuance because he had
not yet conferred with appellant was not evidence of counsel's lack of sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsel's
awareness of his duty to confer with appellant to ferret out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for the
prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of appellant's presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him,
because on that date, the defense presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of desistance, and Fedelina to
corroborate the statements of EDEN — which testimonies were in appellant's favor. As to the manner appellant's
counsel de oficio cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, the OSG stresses that the record shows that said counsel
tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as "barren of merit." EDEN's positive identification of appellant
as the author of the crime rendered appellant's defense of alibi unavailing; moreover, she demonstrated clearly and
vividly what transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994. Thus in view of EDEN's candid and categorical manner of
testifying the OSG concluded that she was a credible witness. 24
As to the commission of rape in a small room and in the presence of other persons, the OSG maintains that such was
not at all improbable. 25 There was, as well, nothing unusual in EDEN's silence; as she could only attempt to shout
because appellant had succeeded in covering her mouth with his hands and exercised a high level of moral
ascendancy over EDEN, his daughter. 26 Hence the OSG invokes the principle that in a rape committed by a father
against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or
intimidation. 27
As regards EDEN's affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that courts look with disfavor on retraction of
testimonies previously given in court, for such can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a
monetary consideration, 28 as well as the probability that it may later be repudiated.
In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de oficio at his arraignment did
not relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to inform him of his right to counsel
and that it would be grievous error to deny an accused such right. Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:
This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People vs. Domenden, 73 Phil. 349, cited
in R.J. Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p. 323 it was held, that:
"The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error to proceed by sentencing the accused
without due process of law and this is not complete, when the accused is denied the right recognized by said rule. The
records must show compliance therewith or that the accused renounced his right to be assisted by counsel. This is
demanded by the interest of justice and remove all doubts that if the accused had waived said right, he was fully
informed before giving his plea of its consequences. Omission by courts whether voluntary should not truly be
censured but also condemned."
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant contends that said right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is a reversible error and a ground for new trial. (R.J.
Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing People vs. Mijares, et al., 47 OG 4606; Dumasig v.
Morave, 23 SCRA 659). This must be so ". . . to prevent that any accused be caught unaware and deprived of the
means of properly facing the charges presented against him." LibLex
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only
state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose
that the trial informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial
court failed to inform appellant of such right. The precise time the two counsel de oficio were appointed is not
disclosed in the record either. At the recorded portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December
1994, the two formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT:
Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).
FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and direct supervision of the Trial
Prosecutor, Your Honor, we are ready to present our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio. 29
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order 30 of 22 December 1994
states that said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since appellant
has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been
obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. 31 In other words, the trial court is
presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 32 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1)
to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such
information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of
counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to
employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. 33
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to
counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can
only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in
the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will
be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. 34
In U .S. v. Labial, 35 this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in this case is whether the failure
of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient
ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all
agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact fail to advise the accused of their
rights under the provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere
omission from the record brought here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not
reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be presumed in matters of this kind to
have complied with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:
However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was
arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87, 88), in the sense that unless the contrary
appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If
we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws,
we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and
presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs.
Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28
Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of
whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides, it is only in
this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no
time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by
counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a
waiver of his right to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel. 38
The cases of People v. Domenden 39 and People v. Cachero 40 cited by appellant are inapplicable. In both cases the trial
courts there clearly failed to inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de oficio counsel during the
arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with
their pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to
inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel
will be appointed for him, must appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 9. Time to prepare for trial. — After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial
unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. 41 Only when so demanded does denial thereof
constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. 42 Further, such right may be waived, expressly or
impliedly. 43 In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such
right.
During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public Attorney's Office in
Quezon City, who entered his appearance as de parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that Atty.
Temanil's services were obtained pursuant to the law creating the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), formerly the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). 44 There is at all no showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the competence and
skill to defend appellant. The latter's contention that his counsel was not ready at all times because at the hearing on
20 January 1995 he asked for a continuation as he has "not yet interviewed [his] client," 45 is misleading. Atty. Temanil
made that statement after he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that it was almost 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and both of them were already hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of trial the witness appears to be fluent and suffers no
difficulty in answering the questions, even the questions propounded by the Private Prosecutor, Your Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and we are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL.
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet interviewed my client, Your Honor. 46
Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed irregularities: (1) in not considering the futility
of the testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in not presenting the barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the defense,
and EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was in the province and not in their rented
room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other hand, the testimony of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that
rape was committed in a rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in his barangay. Appellant neither testified
that he did not occupy a house numbered 30-A nor denied that he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room.
Besides, he and his children were not renting the entire house, but merely a room, which could probably be the unit
numbered "30-A" referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal witnesses to disprove the claim of EDEN
that they coerced her into signing the affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that there was nothing to show that they
were in fact willing to refute EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of the stenographic notes
convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he decided to terminate his cross-
examination, it could have been due to the futility of any further cross-examination which might only prove favorable
to the prosecution, as it might have opened another window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of
the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility or opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and if considered, would affect the
result. This is founded on practical and empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. 47 He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth
does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the
judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere
or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. 48 On the other hand, an appellate court has only the
cold record, which generally does not reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining
innocence or guilt. 49
At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of death imposed, this Court took
painstaking effort and meticulous care in reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her father, herein appellant, on 19 July
1994, in their rented room in Barangay Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity
and candidness of her answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an innocent girl writhing in emotional and
moral shock and anguish. She must have been torn between the desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation of
her ordeal might mean the imposition of capital punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she made public a
painful and humiliating secret, which others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their lives. She
thereby jeopardized her chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man may be reluctant to marry her because her
traumatic experience may be a psychological and emotional impediment to a blissful union. Moreover, such a
revelation divided her family and brought it shame and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination of her private parts, she did
so inspired by no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the
painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and
falsely charged her own father with a heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than real. The presence of
her sisters in the small room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no
conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere even in
places where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house
where there are other occupants. 50 In People v. Opena, 51 rape was committed in a room occupied also by other
persons. In the instant case, EDEN's other companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young
girls who were all asleep.
That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that appellant threatened to kill
her. Whether or not he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who
wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the victim's
and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear — fear that if the victim did not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation
existed and the victim was cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be
the height of unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would
nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to
make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary. 52
In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the former's moral ascendancy
or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. 53 Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her
tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with the equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel,
or to act like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. 54 Even in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized
their different and unpredictable reactions. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into
insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. 55
Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in the same rented room disprove the rape. While
she was hurt physically, psychologically and emotionally, yet the thought must have been irresistible and compelling
that her assailant was her own father, who was both a father and mother to her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia
and who provided her with the daily wherewithal to keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside was uncertain.
Instances are not few when daughters raped by their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of
their hearts the evil deed even if the memory thereof haunted them forever. LibLex
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have necessarily contradicted her
previous testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she
retract her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of
desistance and solemnly declared that she was pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits,
being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; 56 and affidavits of
recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because
the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a
mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 57
This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor is death under the first circumstance
mentioned in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as
follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for a sin or crime is God's exclusive
prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital
punishment in cases of heinous crimes, 58 hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex
scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply it in this
case.
To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, thereby
forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest
animal, the full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we concede
to him is a modification of the award of "P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance
with current case law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above
modification as to the amount of indemnity.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forwarded without
delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Agbayani y Mendoza, G.R. No. 122770, [January 16, 1998], 348 PHIL 341-369)
BALTAZAR AMION vs.JUDGE ROBERTO CHIONGSON [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371. January 22, 1999.]
SYNOPSIS
A verified complaint was filed by Baltazar D. Amion charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson with ignorance of the law
and oppression. The complaint was relative to a murder case pending before his court, in which the complainant is
the accused. The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for
accused-complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on the ground that he had his own retained counsel. In his
comment, respondent judge alleged that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused-complainant is
justified because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de
parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that the records of the case will show that the
accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly foul, to delay the resolution of the
criminal case.
The Court found that the accused-complainant has been the oppressor while respondent judge appears to be the
oppressed. Through the course of the proceedings in the subject criminal case, accused-complainant had filed several
Motions for Inhibition, a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,and this administrative complaint with the view of
delaying the eventual disposition of the case. The actuation of respondent judge in the murder case does not warrant
reproach and reprimand, but in fact, merits the acknowledgment and approval of the Supreme Court. Such
manifestation of zeal clearly shows respondent judge's ardent determination to expedite the case and render justice.
The Court resolved to dismiss the administrative complaint against the respondent judge, imposed a fine of P5,000.00
on accused-complainant, and admonished said accused-complainant for filing a malicious and unmeritorious
complaint against the respondent judge.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PREFERENCE IN THE CHOICE OF COUNSEL, CANNOT
PARTAKE OF A DISCRETION SO ABSOLUTE AND ARBITRARY AS WOULD MAKE SUCH REFER EXCLUSIVELY
TO THE PREDILECTION OF THE ACCUSED; RATIONALE. — An examination of related provisions in
the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a
criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. As held by this Court in the case
of People vs. Barasina, (229 SCRA 450), withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as
to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct
the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter." Applying
this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution
with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other
equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution
will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
2. ID.;ID.;RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; A PARTY CANNOT FEIGN DENIAL THEREOF WHEN HE HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS SIDE; CASE AT BAR. — Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of
his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and
to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his
counsel at the scheduled hearings. Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available
opportunity to present his side which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign
denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side. Moreover, there is no denial of the right to
counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the
court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. Thus, it has been held by this
Court in the case of Lacambra vs. Ramos:(232 SCRA 435) "the Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers
resorted to and repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case,
thus making a mockery of the judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought upon the need for the
appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course. aETADI
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; JUDGES; SHOULD ADMINISTER JUSTICE
IMPARTIALLY AND WITHOUT DELAY; CASE AT BAR. — The actuation of respondent judge in this murder case
does not warrant reproach and reprimand, but in fact, merits the acknowledgment and approval of this Court. Such
manifestation of zeal clearly show respondent judge's ardent determination to expedite the case and render justice.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge
should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
administer justice.
MARTINEZ, J p:
A verified complaint dated August 29, 1996 1 was filed by Baltazar D. Amion with this Court on October 7, 1996
charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City with Ignorance of the Law
and Oppression relative to Criminal Case No. 94-159772 pending in said trial court and in which complainant is the
accused. LLphil
The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for accused-
complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on the ground that he had his own retained counsel in the person of
Atty. Reynaldo C. Depasucat.
Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Manuel Lao
Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing of the aforecited criminal case on March
28 and 29 1996. He further avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing on said dates but on March 27, 1996,
the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was ill.
It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not represented by his defense lawyer in the scheduled hearing
which prompted respondent judge to appoint Free Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Manuel Lao Ong. Notwithstanding
complainant-accused's vehement opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the trial on March 28, 1996 with Atty.
Ong representing the complainant-accused as counsel de oficio.He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have sufficient
knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held between said counsel de oficio and himself.
Complainant-accused asserts that the aforesaid incidents constitute a clear violation of his right to due process and a
deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
Consequently, complainant-accused filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion 2 stating therein that he is not accepting
the legal services of counsel de oficio Atty. Ong since he can afford to hire a counsel de parte of his own choice. He
further states that respondent judge is not fair and just and does not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. He
likewise asseverates that respondent judge is ignorant of the basic law which makes him unfit to be a judge in any
judicial tribunal.
Complainant-accused also alludes oppression to respondent judge when the latter was still a Municipal Trial Judge of
MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City. Complainant was then the offended party in a criminal case for Slander and it took a
year before respondent judge decided to dismiss the same. He complains that now that he is the accused in Criminal
Case No. 94-15772, respondent judge appears to be "very active" and wants the case to be terminated immediately.
In addition, accused-complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law when the latter, as then
municipal trial judge of Bacolod City, heard Criminal Case No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22 against accused-
complainant in the absence of his counsel.
In a resolution dated March 12, 1997, 3 this Court required respondent judge to file his Comment on the
aforementioned charges.
Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, in his Comment dated April 21, 1997, 4 explained that accused-complainant would not
have filed the administrative case had he acceded to the latter's plea for his inhibition which he denied, there being no
ground therefor. He claimed that accused-complainant is a police officer charged in Criminal Case No. 94-15772 for
having allegedly killed a fellow policeman on January 24, 1994. From the time he assumed office as Presiding Judge of
said court on November 27, 1995, other than the arraignment of accused-complainant on September 25, 1995 before
Judge Emma Labayen (former judge of said court) in which accused-complainant pleaded not guilty, the case has not
moved.
When respondent judge set the case for hearing on January 9, 1996, trial was not held because accused-complainant's
counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was not feeling well. The hearing was reset to January 19, 1996 with a warning that no
further postponement would be entertained. On said date of hearing, Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear in court.
In order to avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Apollo Jacildo of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) as
counsel de oficio.Atty. Jacildo, however, filed a Manifestation explaining that it is the policy of their office not to
represent a party who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice.
At the next scheduled hearing of February 21, 1996, 5 accused-complainant's counsel de parte still did not show up in
court, thus, prompting private complainant Mrs. Antonietta Vaflor (the victim's wife) to speak in open court and pour
out all her frustration about the long delay in the resolution of the case.
In view of the fact that Mrs. Vaflor and another government witness, PO3 Richard Dejores, both reside at Escalante,
about 70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge
Chiongson appointed Atty. Manuel Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent accused-complainant. The
court, however, made it of record that the appointment of Atty. Ong was without prejudice to the appearance of
counsel de parte. 6 Due to the continued absence of Atty. Depasucat, the counsel de parte,Atty. Ong, represented the
accused-complainant at the March 28, 1996 hearing which was opposed by the accused in a Manifestation and Motion
filed on March 29, seeking the nullification of the March 28, 1998 hearing and the inhibition of Judge Chiongson. The
hearings were then rescheduled on May 13 and 17, 1996.
On May 8, 1996, accused-complainant's counsel, Atty. Depasucat, filed a motion for postponement alleging that the
motion for inhibition should be resolved and that he would not be available on the rescheduled dates for hearings as
he would be out of the country during those times.
An order denying the accused-complainant's Motion for Inhibition and Motion to Set Aside the proceedings of March
28, 1996 was issued by the court on July 18, 1996 on the ground that the claim of bias and prejudice was without legal
basis. 7
At the scheduled hearing on August 1, 1996, Atty. Depasucat asked the court that he be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de parte of the accused-complainant causing further delay. The trial of the case was again reset to September 2,
5 and 6, 1996 with a warning that the court will not grant any further postponement and that if the accused-
complainant was still without counsel, a counsel de oficio will be appointed.
Thereafter, the accused-complainant engaged the services of different counsels who continued to adopt the dilatory
tactics utilized by the previous counsel de parte.
Atty. Rosslyn Morana, who entered his appearance as counsel on September 2, 1996, filed on October 14, 1996 a
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent judge on account of a pending administrative case against the latter.
On October 24, 1996, Atty. Morana submitted an Explanation to the court stating that he could not represent the
accused-complainant as the latter failed to give him the records of the case.
On November 14, 1996, the prosecution filed a motion to cite the accused in contempt for filing a series of motions for
inhibition and for filing an administrative case against the presiding judge which are plain acts of harassment. prll
Atty. Salvador Sabio entered his appearance as counsel for the accused-complainant on December 2, 1996 and asked
for the cancellation of the scheduled hearings on December 5 and 6, 1996 as he had to study the case. The court
granted the request for postponement of Atty. Sabio and reset the case on January 24, 1997 with a strong warning that
it will not allow any further dilatory postponement. In the afternoon of January 23, 1997, the court received another
motion for postponement filed by Atty. Sabio requesting for the cancellation of the January 24 hearing. The court,
considering the same as another delaying tactic, immediately issued an order denying the motion. In spite of the
denial of the motion for postponement, Atty. Sabio failed to appear.
On February 4, 1997, accused-complainant again asked for the voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge which the
court again denied for being merely a dilatory scheme.
On March 24, 1997, when the case was called for hearing, Atty. Sabio informed the court that he received a written
note from the accused-complainant discharging him as counsel, to which the court responded by ruling that Atty.
Sabio would only be allowed to withdraw as accused-complainant's lawyer upon the entry of appearance of a new
defense counsel.
In a Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 29, 1997, Judge Chiongson was required to submit a
COMMENT 8 on a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by accused-complainant. Said document has also been
submitted to the Court as Supplemental Comment to this administrative case. 9
Respondent judge reiterated his belief that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused-complainant
is justified because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de
parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that the records of the case will show that the
accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly foul, to delay the resolution of
Criminal Case No. 94-15772. He added that the Petition for Certiorari and the Administrative Case were filed for the
purpose of not only delaying the resolution of the case but also to pressure him into inhibiting himself.
As to the allegation of oppression in connection with a criminal case for slander where accused-complainant was the
alleged offended party while respondent judge was then the Municipal Trial Judge of MTC, Branch 3, Bacolod City to
which the case was being tried, Judge Chiongson belies the same. He explains that the prosecution in the said case
had rested while the defense filed a demurrer which was granted.
He narrates that the case for slander was filed by herein accused-complainant against Mrs. Esparcia, a school teacher
and sister of a victim alleged to have been killed by the accused-complainant, when said Mrs. Esparcia told the
accused-complainant "Murderer, why are you not in jail" or words to that effect. This was made when accused-
complainant was seen roaming around the vicinity of the police station when he was supposed to be a detention
prisoner. Accordingly, respondent judge granted the Demurrer on the finding of the court that the utterance of Mrs.
Esparcia was not slanderous but was merely an expression of exasperation and disgust.
On the charge of Gross Ignorance of the Law, for having tried Criminal Case No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22 against
accused-complainant in the absence of counsel, respondent judge asserts that accused-complainant has nothing to do
with said criminal case as can be gleaned from the Order relied upon as basis for the aforementioned charge.
Respondent judge concludes that the sequence of events hereinabove discussed, exposes clearly the false and
dissembled charges filed against him as well as the determined efforts of the accused-complainant and his counsel to
frustrate the ends of justice.
We find this administrative complaint devoid of merit.
Verily, the facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated procrastination of the
proceedings undertaken by the accused-complainant and his counsel. Contrary to what accused-complainant would
want to impress upon this Court, it seems that he has been the oppressor while respondent judge Roberto Chiongson
appears to be the oppressed. Through the course of the proceedings in the subject criminal case, accused-complainant
had filed several Motions for Inhibition, a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and this administrative complaint with
the view of delaying the eventual disposition of the case.
A Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 14, 1998 10 noted that "Criminal Case
No. 94-15772 has been pending for almost four (4) years already and the prosecution has yet to rest its case.
Complainant has thrown every legal strategy in the book to delay the trial. . . ."
The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes a clear
violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own
choice cannot be countenanced by this Court.
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation 11 rather
than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. 12
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a
criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina: 13
"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter"
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal
prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would
preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal
prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he
was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he
forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. 14
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side which would
have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the
opportunity to present his side. 15
Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the
accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous
trial system. 16
Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos: 17
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings of the
accused or his counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the judicial
process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought upon the need for the
appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course.
As to the charges of oppression and gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge relative to cases under him
while he was still in the Municipal Trial Court, the same have been sufficiently answered in the Comments submitted
in this case. The explanation by the respondent judge indicate that the aforesaid allegations have neither legal nor
factual basis and that the conclusions made therein are merely conjectural.
The actuation of respondent judge in this murder case does not warrant reproach and reprimand, but in fact, merits
the acknowledgment and approval of this Court. Such manifestation of zeal clearly show respondent judge's ardent
determination to expedite the case and render justice.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. 18 A
judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to
promptly administer justice. 19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to:
1. DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson of RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City for lack
of merit.
2. IMPOSE a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and ADMONISH accused-complainant Baltazar D.
Amion for filing a malicious and unmeritorious complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to delay and prolong
the prosecution of the case.
3. DIRECT Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to continue hearing the case and finally dispose of the same with utmost
dispatch. LLphil
SO ORDERED.
||| (Amion v. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, [January 22, 1999], 361 PHIL 542-555)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.RONNIE QUITLONG [G.R. No. 121562. July 10, 1998.]
SYNOPSIS
The information for murder filed against the appellants failed to avert that they conspired with each other in the
commission of the offense charged. But then, after trial, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 convicted
the appellants as charged, finding that there was conspiracy between and among them in the commission of the crime
and the indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua,as maximum was imposed. The conviction was based on the evidence presented by the prosecution that in
the evening of October 20, 1994, while the victim Jonathan Calpito and Jonathan Gosil were confronting the fishball
vendor who did not admit that he had short-changed Calpito, eight men approached and aggressively confronted
Calpito and Gosil. Appellant Emilio then embraced Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Ronnie Quitlong held Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively. Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free
himself. Suddenly, Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of his body just below the nipple which became
the cause of his death. On the other hand, the appellants gave no alibi and admitted their presence at the vicinity of
the crime scene, however, they denied any participation in the commission of the crime.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that in the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved, an accused can only be made liable for the
acts committed by him alone and his criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. As so it is that must be so
held in this case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the victim is an issue that
ultimately and unvoidably goes into the question of whom to believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility
requires a determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled
to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on the stand. Findings of the
trial court, following that assessment, must be given the highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to
conclude otherwise.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr. are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM; RIGHT OF ACCUSED EXPLAINED. — Overwhelming, such
as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to
respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge
is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due
process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The
practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been explained as early as the
1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; MUST SET FORTH THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE A BEARING ON THE CULPABILITY AND LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. — In
embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances
that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of
conspiracy.
3. ID.;EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; MUST BE ALLEGED IN INFORMATION. — Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for
the act of another or others is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and
can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act
of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
4. ID.;ID.;ID.;A CONSPIRACY INDICTMENT NEED NOT AVER ALL THE COMPONENTS AND ALLEGE ALL
THE DETAILS THEREOF. — A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the
common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It
is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary
and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment
may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the
offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated
crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them."
5. ID.;ID.;ID.;CONSPIRACY MUST BE ALLEGED, NOT JUST INFERRED. — Verily, the information must state that
the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose
or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the
words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the
form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the
community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not
just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused
with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when
properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from
shown acts and conduct of the accused.
6. ID.;ID.;CONSPIRACY; DEFINED. — Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it.
7. ID.;ID.;FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE CONSPIRACY IN THE INFORMATION, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE ACCUSED IS INDIVIDUAL AND NOT COLLECTIVE. — In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and
approved as heretofore explained, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this
criminal responsibility is individual and not collective.
8. ID.;ID.;ID.;APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of
stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,were holding the
hands of Calpito at the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity,
however, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis
for collective responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed, from all indications, the incident would appear to
have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,shall therefore be held to
be mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GIVEN
HIGHEST DEGREE OF RESPECT. — This issue of credibility requires a determination that is concededly best left to
the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the deportment of witnesses on the stand. Findings of the trial court, following that assessment, must be given the
highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to conclude otherwise.
10. ID.;ID.;ID.;A WITNESS WHO TESTIFIES IN A CATEGORICAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND SPONTANEOUS
MANNER IS A CREDIBLE WITNESS; CASE AT BAR. — In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing
of Calpito, has steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the crime. A witness who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well as remains consistent on cross and rebuttal
examination, is not likely to be an incredible witness.
11. ID.;ID.;ID.;NO IMPROPER MOTIVE TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE APPELLANT; CASE AT BAR. — Secondly, the
defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the part of Adjaro that would have prompted him to testify wrongly
against appellants. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not prevaricate and cause damnation to
one who has brought him no harm.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; ABUSE OF SUPERIORITY; SUPERIORITY IN NUMBER
WOULD NOT PER SE MEAN SUPERIORITY IN STRENGTH; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The crime
committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. While superiority in number would not per se mean superiority in
strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.
13. ID.;AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; THE MODE OF ATTACK MUST CONSCIOUSLY BE
ADOPTED. — Treachery may not be here considered as a generic aggravating circumstance although it might have
ensured the commission of the crime. In order that treachery may be taken as an aggravating circumstance, there must
be proof that the accused has consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without
risk to himself.
14. ID.;MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY TO THE PRINCIPAL. — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances to appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant Ronnie Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
15 ID.;ID.;IMPOSABLE PENALTY TO THE ACCOMPLICE. — The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,shall be subject to the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion
temporal maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is reclusion
temporal minimum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, as the
minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
16. ID.;PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA;INDIVISIBLE PENALTY. — In the Court's Resolution of 09 January 1995,
clarifying its decision in People vs. Lucas, the Court has said that — ". . . although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed
the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible
penalty."
VITUG, J p:
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, 1 disposed of Criminal Case No. 13336-R; thus: LLjur
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y
FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged and
hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua,as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the deceased Jonathan Calpito y Castro in the sums of P50,000.00 for the latter's death; P35,700.00 as consequential
damages; and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus their proportionate shares in the costs.
"In the service of their sentence, the said accused shall be credited with their preventive imprisonment under the
terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
"Conformably with Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the corresponding filing
fee for the P100,000.00 moral damages herein awarded shall constitute a first lien on this judgment.
"The evidence knife, Exhibit 'B',is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
"Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Warden of the City Jail of Baguio is directed to
immediately transfer the same accused to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Warden of the City Jail of Baguio for his information and guidance.
"There being no indication that the remaining accused, Jesus Mendoza, and several John Does could be
arrested/identified and arrested shortly, let the case against them be, as it is hereby, archived without prejudice to its
prosecution upon their apprehension.
"SO ORDERED." 2
The case was generated by an information for murder filed on 25 October 1994 against accused-appellants Salvador
Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong, Emilio Senoto, Jr.,and several other unidentified persons following the killing of Jonathan
Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation alleging
that "it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim after getting irked when the latter urinated near and in
front" 3 of his wife. The trial court acted favorably on the motion. On 12 December 1994, the City Prosecutor filed a
motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits 4 executed by Nonita F. delos Reyes, Nicanor
Ellamil, Lydia Q. Cultura, as well as accused-appellants Salvador and Ronnie Quitlong themselves, to the effect that it
was Jesus Mendoza who had been responsible for the death of the victim. The information, as amended, included
Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. 5 Unlike accused-appellants who were immediately arrested after the
commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. prLL
The evidence of the prosecution has narrated how a simple misunderstanding and relatively so small a matter could
lead to so dastardly and unfortunate an outcome.
At around six o'clock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come from work as a dispatcher of
passenger jeepneys plying the Baguio City-Loakan route, repaired to a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old
University of Baguio medical technology student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil. Adjaro was
Calpito's neighbor and barkada (gangmate) in Loakan. At past eight o'clock, Calpito decided that it was time to go
home. Since at that hour there were no longer passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three friends decided to walk
down to Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones grandstand to grab a taxicab. The area was well-lighted. Wanting to
partake of some "fishballs," Calpito and Gosil approached a fishball vendor about three to four meters away. The two
returned with three sticks of fishballs worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he
saw that he had only been handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor would
not admit that he had short-changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano, a civil engineer driving a passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan from the Dominican Hill, was
seen passing by. Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano positioned his jeep around four or five meters from where
Gosil and Calpito were still having an argument with the fishball vendor. Soriano called out to the two to board the
jeep but they ignored him. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito from the
direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Some of the men later backed out but four of them pursued Calpito
who, meanwhile, had started to retreat from the group. The four men, however, succeeded in cornering Calpito.
Soriano saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been weakened by the men's punches but,
when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano realized that Calpito had been stabbed.
Adjaro saw no less than eight men approach and aggressively confront Calpito and Gosil. Seeing that his friends were
outnumbered, Adjaro shouted at Calpito and Gosil to run posthaste. Adjaro promptly boarded Soriano's jeep. From
where he sat, Adjaro could see appellant Emilio Senoto embracing Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong holding Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively. Calpito struggled
unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, appellant Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of the body just
below the nipple. Once the three men had released their hold on Calpito, the latter fell to the ground. Despite the
condition that Calpito was already in, his assailants still went on hitting him with their feet.
Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur Viado and Nito Revivis were on foot patrol that evening. Attracted by the
commotion along Harrison Road, the police officers hurriedly proceeded to the brightly-lighted place and saw Calpito
lying on the ground. Three of the malefactors started to flee upon seeing the approaching police officers but the rest
kept on with their attack on Calpito. Patacsil drew out his service firearm and told the attackers to freeze. Seeing that
the victim had bloodstains on his left chest, Patacsil advised the victim's companions to rush him to the hospital.
Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro took Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital on board Soriano's jeep.
The police officers brought accused-appellants to the police station. SPO1 Gabriel Isican prepared the complaint
assignment sheet 6 before turning them over to the investigation division. SPO4 Avelino Tolean, officer-in-charge of
the police investigation division on the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight shift, also received a call from the Baguio General
Hospital about the incident. SPO4 Tolean, along with SPO1 Rafael Ortencio, Jr.,and two "Bombo" radio reporters,
went to the hospital where Calpito was by then in the operating room. The police officers interviewed Adjaro and
Gosil at the hospital's emergency room and then repaired to the crime scene and searched the area. Recovered near
the flowering plants beside the electric post was a "stainless knife" 7 with bloodstains on its blade. Adjaro recognized
the knife to be the one used in stabbing Calpito. SPO4 Gerardo Tumbaga prepared Form 1 of the National Crime
Reporting System indicating that accused-appellants were arrested and that a certain Mendoza escape and went into
hiding. The report also disclosed that Adjaro and Gosil had a drinking spree with the victim at the Genesis Folkden
before the stabbing incident. SPO4 Tumbaga based his findings on the documents attached to the records of the case.
That same evening of 20 October 1994, at 8:55, Calpito died at the Baguio General Hospital. Dr. Kathryna Ayro, the
hospital's medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy on the victim upon the request of Dr. Samuel Cosme, the
attending surgeon, and of First Assistant City Prosecutor Herminio Carbonell, with the consent of a brother of
Calpito. 8 Dr. Ayro found a solitary stab wound that penetrated Calpito's left thoracic cavity at the level of the 5th
intercostal space that caused a "through and through" laceration of his anterior pericardium and the apex of the left
ventricle of his heart. 9 Dr. Ayro indicated the cause of Calpito's death as being one of hypovolemic shock secondary
to stab wound. 10 She opined that a knife, single or double bladed, must have been used in inflicting the stab wound.
Abrasions were also found on different parts of Calpito's body.
Precy Calpito, the mother of the victim, testified that the family had spent the amount of P37,500.00 11 for his wake,
burial and 9-day prayers. Her youngest son's death left her losing hope in life and "feeling very badly."
The defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of accused-appellants at the vicinity of the crime scene; however,
it interposed denial by appellants of any participation in the commission of the crime.
Appellant Emilio Senoto, Jr.,a taxicab driver, testified that out of curiosity, after parking his cab to buy some cigarettes
and getting attracted by the commotion, went near the scene and saw the victim lying on the ground beside a cart. He
was about to leave the place when several policemen arrived and arrested him.
Appellant Salvador Quitlong, a food vendor at the Burnham Park and father of five children, denied having had any
participation in the stabbing incident nor having been acquainted with Jesus Mendoza. He admitted, however, that on
the night in question when he was selling "fishballs" at the park, around eighty meters away from where Mendoza
was selling his wares, the latter's daughter, who was a classmate of his own daughter, asked for help yelling that her
father was in trouble. He rushed over to Mendoza's place (puesto) but barely in time to witness the stabbing of Calpito
by Mendoza.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong's 26-year-old younger brother, was also a sidewalk vendor at the
waiting shed along Harrison Road. He learned of the trouble Mendoza got himself into when the latter's daughter
summoned for help. When he and his brother responded, Mendoza had by then already stabbed Calpito.
Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura, both sidewalk vendors, corroborated the story of the Quitlong brothers.
According to Nonita, it was Mendoza who stabbed Calpito. She witnessed the incident from a distance of ten meters
away. Nonita explained that she did not immediately reveal what she saw to the authorities because of shock. Lydia
Cultura, on her part, said that she saw Jesus Mendoza in the "rumble" with five or six men who had come from the
Genesis Folkden. She saw Mendoza embrace and stab the man in white t-shirt. Nonita and Alma Balubar followed
appellants to the police station but did not tell the police what she knew because she was busy attending to the crying
pregnant wife of appellant Ronnie Quitlong. Cdpr
On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the prosecution and the
defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed decision.
In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers would have it —
"1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in
finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred inspite of explicit failure to allege in the information or complaint;
finding that there was conspiracy between and among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime;
finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide." 12
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial court has erred in finding conspiracy among the accused and
argues that the crime committed is homicide, not murder, given the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court had this to say:
"The question is whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and may be held guilty as co-principals by
reason of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no dispute that the latter died due to the
solitary stab inflicted on him.
"But before proceeding any further, the Court takes notice of the lapse committed, perhaps inadvertently, by the
prosecution in drafting the indictment. Both the original and amended Informations fail to explicitly allege conspiracy.This
could have been timely cured if obeisance had been observed of the admonition, often given, that the prosecution
should not take the arraignment stage for granted but, instead, treat the notice thereof as a reminder to review the
case and determine if the complaint or information is in due form and the allegations therein contained are
sufficient vis-a-vis the law involved and the evidence on hand. It is fortunate that in the case at bench conspiracy may
readily be inferred from the way the allegation of abuse of superior strength has been phrased, to wit: '. . . the above-named
accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined
strength did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y
CASTRO . . . ."' 13 prLL
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan 14 the trial court has opined that "conspiracy may be deemed adequately alleged if
the averments in the Information logically convey that several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose
of committing the offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that purpose." 15 Holding that
no direct proof is essential and that it suffices that the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged is
shown by the acts of the malefactors and attendant circumstances, the trial court has concluded:
"In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie Quitlong and Salvador Quitlong were admittedly responding to
Jesus Mendoza's call for help through the latter's daughter. They must have, therefore, been disposed, out of empathy
with a fellow sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza all the assistance the latter needed under the circumstances. They
were joined, according to prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and Herbert Soriano, by no less than six others, including
Emilio Senoto, Jr. They came upon Mendoza engaged in a heated altercation with the victim Calpito. When they
reached Calpito, they pushed him and started beating him up and his companion Jonathan Gosil. Four to five men
manhandled Calpito who kept on retreating and even went around Soriano's parked jeep until he was cornered.
Senoto then held Calpito's body from behind; Ronnie, his left hand; and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled
him. Calpito struggled to free himself but that proved futile and, instead, Ronnie stabbed him once. It was only then
that he was released and when he fell down on his back, his attackers still kicked him. Only the arrival of some
policemen made some of the assailants stop and run away. However, Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto, kept on kicking
the victim and they were restrained and arrested.
"Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore cited, it becomes ineluctable for the Court to conclude that
Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto acted in a conspiracy and may thus be held liable as co-principals for the death of
Calpito." 16
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an
accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been
apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article III,
Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal
offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 17 The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit
in procedural rules. 18 The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been
explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U .S. vs. Karelsen; 19 viz:
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.,542).In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of times, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant),and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged."
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the
statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense;.and the place where the offense has been
committed. 20 In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused
persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or
one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to
hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others
in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. 21 Verily, an
accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for
the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof,
like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts
connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe
conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the
indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or
conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is
charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the
language of the respective statutes defining them." 22
The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as amended, has but simply stated:
"That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and
taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and unexpectedly, without any
warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab wound at the left thorax at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular
line, penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle causing left remothones of 700 cc and hemoperecuduum of 250 cc,
which directly caused his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 23
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from the allegation of abuse of superior
strength and with the aid of armed men, i.e.,that "...the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with
intent to kill ...and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO ..." 24 is difficult to
accept. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. 25 Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement
to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words
"conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of
definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the
community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not
just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused
with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when
properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from
shown acts and conduct of the accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore explained, an accused can only be made liable for
the acts committed by him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. 26 And so it is that
must be so held in this case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the victim is an
issue that ultimately and unavoidably goes into the question of whom to believe among the witnesses. This issue of
credibility requires a determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having
been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on the
stand. 27 Findings of the trial court, following that assessment, must be given the highest degree of respect absent
compelling reasons to conclude otherwise. 28
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance, disposed to deviate from the foregoing rule. In the first place, Lito
Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the
commission of the crime. A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well as
remains consistent on cross and rebuttal examination, is not likely to be an incredible witness. 29 Secondly, the
defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the part of Adjaro that would have prompted him to testify wrongly
against appellants. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not prevaricate and cause damnation to
one who has brought him no harm. 30 Finally, Herbert Soriano and the police, who have testified seeing the already
wounded Calpito lying on the ground and still being attacked, both corroborate Adjaro's positive identification of
appellants as the persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court to be the persons who ganged up on Calpito, Adjaro testified on
their respective participation's in the commission of the crime; thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of the persons who held the deceased Jonathan Calpito. What part of
the body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold? llcd
"A His body, sir.
"Q How about Salvador Quitlong whom you also identified in Court. What part of the body of Jonathan Calpito did
he hold?
"A I saw him hold his hand.
"Q What hand was held by Salvador Quitlong?
"A Right hand, sir.
"Q How about Ronnie Quitlong?
"A His left hand.
"Q After Jonathan Calpito was held by these three persons and other, what happened next?
"A They mauled ("binugbog") Jonathan Calpito.
"Q Did you notice what part of the body was hit and boxed by these three persons?
"A His body and his face.
"Q What did Jonathan Calpito do, if any, when he is being held by these three persons and others?
"A He was struggling, sir.
"Q Was he able to free himself from the helds (sic) of these persons?
"A No more, sir.
"Q What do you mean no more?
"A He was not able to free himself.
"Q Yes, why was he not able to free himself anymore?
"A They held him tightly, he could not struggle.
"Q And what happened next when you said he could no longer struggle?
"A They boxed him, and also stabbed him, sir.
"Q Did you see the person who stabbed him?
"A I saw sir.
"Q Will you be able to identify him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q I will request you to again look inside the courtroom and point to the person whom you saw stab Jonathan
Calpito?
"WITNESS:
The person wearing white jacket.
"INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a gentleman inside the courtroom wearing cream jacket who gave his name as Ronnie
Quitlong." 31
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's
death. 32 Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the precise time
that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity, however, would not itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals; 33 indeed, from all indications, the incident would appear to have occurred
at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be mere
accomplices conformably with Article 18 34 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. 35 While superiority in number would not per se mean
superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way
as to secure advantage of their superiority in strength certainly, out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked. 36
Treachery may not be here considered as a generic aggravating circumstance although it might have ensured the
commission of the crime. In order that treachery may be taken as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof
that the accused has consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself, i.e.,appellant Ronnie Quitlong in this case. 37 No such proof has been adequately shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to
death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to appropriately appreciate in this case,
appellant Ronnie Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.The indeterminate penalty of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua,as maximum, has been
imposed by the trial court on the premise that reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty. In the Court's Resolution of 09
January 1995 clarifying its decision 38 in People vs. Lucas, 39 the Court has said that —
". . . although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It
shall then remain as an indivisible penalty." 40 prcd
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,shall be subject to the imposition of the
penalty next lower in degree than reclusion temporal maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that
may be imposed is reclusion temporal minimum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held
to suffer the indeterminate sentence of anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, as the minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal minimum, as the
maximum penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim. The
consequential (actual) damages in the amount of P35,700.00 not having been substantiated, except for the amount
P12,000.00 paid to the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The award of moral damages recoverable under Article
2219(1),in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from P100,000.00 to P20,000.00
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00, to reimburse them the actual damages of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of P50,000.00.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime,
and each shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor minimum
period, as minimum penalty, to thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,are also hereby
held solidarity liable with appellant Ronnie Quitlong in the payment of the damages hereinabove mentioned. Costs
against appellants.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the Department of Justice in order that the
other participants in the killing of Jonathan Calpito, specifically Jesus Mendoza, be arrested and made to face the force
of the law. prcd
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, [July 10, 1998], 354 PHIL 372-396)
ODON PECHO vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.]
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION; ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES. — On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence
had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be convicted
of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the
Bill of Rights which the people of Great Britain demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on 13
February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of the United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act
No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in
the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. It has the following objectives: First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction
or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542).In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant),and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. ASHaTc
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION; DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL RECITAL OF FACTS STATED IN THE INFORMATION OR
COMPLAINT. — What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption
is not a fatal mistake. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one
charged, is necessarily included in the latter as provided by Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding
Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another. We have shown in the
challenged decision why the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents is included in the offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case "can also be
considered as charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents," and since the petitioner failed to object before trial
to such duplicity, he could be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved.
3. ID.;EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. — Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, i.e.,the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty.
4. ID.;ID.;ID.;PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; REQUIRED TO OVERCOME ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT. — The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1)
personally represented himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of any of the public
and commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre
to commit the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is there
evidence of petitioner's active participation in the commission of the crime. The concordant combination and
cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the prosecution's evidence fails to satisfy the requirements
of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner
must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED; WHEN PRESENT. — There is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. It is, however, settled that the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is likewise required to support a finding of conspiracy. In other words, conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the
fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
6. ID.;ID.;THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL. — The information charges the petitioner and his co-accused Joe
Catre as principals who "conspir[ed],confabulat[ed],conniv[ed],confederat[ed],and mutually help[ed] one another,"
with Catre "representing himself to be a representative of Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a
corporation, firm or partnership which turned out to be non-existent, fake or fictitious." The evidence for the
prosecution, as admitted by the respondent, only showed that it was Catre who possessed the falsified documents,
contracted the services of Calica, and delivered the documents to the latter for processing. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation, Catre, being the one in possession of the forged documents, is presumed to be the forger.
Catre, however, could not provide the explanation because only the petitioner was tried. The information states that
his address is "unknown," and the record does not show that a warrant for his arrest was issued. The only warrant of
arrest that was issued was that for the petitioner. Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the
prosecution are to be admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to prove the guilt of
Catre with moral certainty was duly established against Catre as a principal. Accordingly, if conspiracy were proven,
the petitioner would be equally guilty of the offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators
in furtherance of a common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of
them.
7. ID.;ID.;TO BE A PARTY THERETO, THE CONSPIRATOR SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED SOME OVERT ACT AS
A DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME. — It is also essential for one to be
a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others that there be intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is
necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution
of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. IDaCcS
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
In short, we held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended — because the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense
charged in this case was not consummated — he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that after
having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special law, he could not be convicted
anymore of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, an offense punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, a general law; otherwise, the constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be violated.
In other words, his acquittal of the crime charged precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial documents, because both offenses arose from the same overt act as
alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844.
In its Comment on the motion for reconsideration signed only by Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-Marcilla, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the petitioner and asserts
that the rule on double jeopardy cannot be successfully invoked in this case considering that no new information for
estafa through falsification of public document was filed against the petitioner; only one information was filed against
him and his co-accused. For double jeopardy to exist, there must be such new information and the accused must be
able to show that (1) he has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance, (4) for the same offense or an attempt to or frustration
thereof as that charged in the new information, and that (5) the case has been dismissed or terminated without his
consent or after he had pleaded to the information but before judgment was rendered. 1
Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General joins the petitioner in the latter's plea for his acquittal, but for another
ground, namely, insufficiency of evidence.
In the resolution of 22 August 1995, we directed the Solicitor General to inform the Court whether he agrees with the
recommendation of Assistant Solicitor General De la Cruz and Solicitor Holgado-Marcilla. In his Manifestation of 14
September 1995, the Solicitor General not only expressed full agreement with the said recommendation, but even
added the following observations:
10. After reading the Court's Decision, the Solicitor General has noted that petitioner's conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence.
11. The law and a host of the Court's ruling declare that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Section 3,
Rule 133, Rules of Court).
12. In this case, it should be stressed that the inference that petitioner falsified documents appears to be based
on another inference, i.e.,that he was in possession of the same because he accompanied his co-accused Catre in the
transactions. However, other than accompanying Catre, there is no evidence on record that petitioner had custody of
the falsified documents.
13. As to the conspiracy angle, there is likewise no showing that petitioner interceded for Catre. In fact, it was Catre
who talked to Calica. (p. 19-20, TSN, August 26, 1991) Neither was it shown that petitioner had a hand in the
processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of Customs. It was not also
proven that he was instrumental in the approval of the import entry declaration.
14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. (People vs. Manuel, 234 SCRA 532).To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must
be shown that he performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. (People vs. Roxas, 241 SCRA
369).In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that there is no overt act conclusively attributable to petitioner which
would pin him down as a co-conspirator.
15. Thus, it is the inexorable duty of the Solicitor General to recommend petitioner's acquittal, as he so recommends,
inasmuch as the People was not able to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
petitioner's innocence.
We then required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the following issues:
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, and
(b) the validity of the conviction therefor under an information for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, vis-a-vis the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in asserting that the
petitioner could not be convicted based entirely on circumstantial evidence because of the failure of the prosecution to
satisfy the requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, namely, (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner further cited portions of the
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Customs Broker Constantino Calica which prove that it was
Catre alone who made the introduction to Calica that they were agents of Eversun Commercial Trading, and that it
was Catre who did all the talking and directly transacted with Calica regarding the terms and conditions of the
particular engagement and who actually delivered the documents to him. There is no evidence that the petitioner had
a hand in the processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of Customs or
was instrumental in the approval of the import entry declaration. Thus:
Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your services?
A They are two, sir, Mr. Joe Catre and Mr. Odon Pecho.
Q Who actually transacted with you with regards to your services, is it Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A Mr. Joe Catre, sir.
Q So it was Joe Catre?
A Yes, sir.
Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right?
A Well, he is the companion of Mr. Catre and they introduced themselves to me that they are the authorized
representative of the importer.
Q That is right. Who introduced to you?
A Mr. Catre was the one who talks [sic] to me, sir.
Q But in your testimony, the person who delivered to you the documents, the bill of lading, the commercial invoices,
the packing list, the importer's sworn statement, etc. which was made the basis of the, of your preparation for the
processing of the import entry, who delivered to you these documents that you mentioned?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And who talked to you about the terms and conditions of this engagement or contracts?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who actually delivered to you the documents, Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A It was Mr. Catre, sir, he was the one handling the case.
AJ ESCAREAL
Q [To] Whom did you talk first?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor, he was the one handling the case, the documents, Your Honor.
Q Do you know how they introduced themselves to you?
A That is the only thing that I remember Your Honor that they came to my office and told me that they are the
importer's representatives and that they are engaging my services.
Q Who said that?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about Mr. Pecho?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Did he say anything?
A At that time your Honor, it was Mr. Catre who was doing that talking.
Q Did Mr. Catre give his name to you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did he introduce himself?
A That he is Mr. Joe Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about his companion, did his companion introduce himself to you or he was introduced by Mr. Catre to you?
A He did not introduce himself to me Your Honor.
Q So during that meeting you do not know that the name of the companion of Mr. Catre is Odon Pecho.
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And how did your son attend to it?
A Two days after Your Honor, Mr. Catre called our office to assist and help them in the preparation of the cargo at the
arrastre operator because that is usually being done by the broker when the shipment goes for examination.
(t.s.n.,Hearing of August 26, 1991)
As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the petitioner and submits that the
information in this case contains the essential ingredients of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents; therefore, assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III
of the Constitution on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
I
We shall first take up the second issue since it involves a constitutional right of the accused.
On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction for the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in
the petitioner's claim that he could not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 2 Such right, an ancient
bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great Britain demanded and
received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of the
United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3 It was later carried
into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. It has the following
objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542).In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent: these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant),and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. 4
Conformably therewith, the Rules of Court has prescribed the appropriate rules. 5
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. 6 An incorrect caption is not a fatal
mistake. 7
It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged
in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another. We
have shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents is included in the offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case "can
also be considered as charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents," and since the petitioner failed to object
before trial to such duplicity, 8 he could be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved. 9
II
We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents. In light of the consistent and persistent negative stance of the Office of the Solicitor
General, personally confirmed and reinforced by the Solicitor General in his separate Manifestation, we re-evaluated
the evidence.
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based the conviction of the petitioner on conspiracy.
The question that logically crops up then is not whether the combination of the circumstantial evidence proved in this
case against the petitioner had established beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents, as asseverated by him and the public
respondent. Rather, the question is whether the prosecution had discharged its duty to establish conspiracy between
the petitioner and Catre.
The information 10 charges the petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre as principals 11 who "conspir[ed],
confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and mutually help[ed] one another," with Catre "representing himself to
be a representative of Eversun Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership which turned
out to be non-existent, fake or fictitious." The evidence for the prosecution, as admitted by the respondent, only
showed that it was Catre who possessed the falsified documents, contracted the services of Calica, and delivered the
documents to the latter for processing. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, Catre, being the one in possession of
the forged documents, is presumed to be the forger. 12 Catre, however, could not provide the explanation because
only the petitioner was tried. The information states that his address is "unknown," and the record does not show that
a warrant for his arrest was issued. The only warrant of arrest that was issued was that for the
petitioner. 13 Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the prosecution are to be admitted to prove the
commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to prove the guilt of Catre with moral certainty was duly
established against Catre as a principal. Accordingly, if conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally
guilty of the offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common
design or purpose of such a conspiracy is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them. 14
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. 15 Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. 16 It is,
however, settled that the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is likewise required to support a
finding of conspiracy. It other words, conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty of a
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. 17
It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others that there be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. 18 Except when he is the
mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or
indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. 19 The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. 20
Since conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, then the next inquiry would be whether the
prosecution was able to adduce such proof against the petitioner. It is in this respect that we agree with the People
and the petitioner that the prosecution had only circumstantial evidence against the petitioner.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty. 21
In the instant case, all that the prosecution was able to prove insofar as the petitioner is concerned is that he and co-
accused Catre are from Surigao del Norte; that he accompanied Catre in contracting the services of customs broker
Constantino Calica; and that he also was with Catre when the latter went with Dennis Calica, son of Constantino
Calica, to the Manila International Container Port. In all these instances, however, it was Catre who transacted the
business and did all the talking. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was not even introduced to Calica. As recapitulated
by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Memorandum:
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for Catre. Prosecution witness Calica testified that it was Catre and
not petitioner, who introduced themselves as agents of Eversun Commercial Trading. He also testified that it was
Catre who did all the talking and directly transacted with him (Calica) regarding the terms and conditions of the
particular engagement and it was also Catre, and not petitioner, who actually delivered the documents to him (tsn,
August 26, 1991).There is no evidence that petitioner had a hand in the processing of the import entry declaration for
the release of the shipment from the Bureau of Customs. There is also no evidence that petitioner was instrumental in
the approval of the import entry declaration. In short, there is no showing that petitioner performed an overt act in
furtherance of alleged conspiracy. 22
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1) personally represented himself as an
agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of any of the public and commercial documents in
question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre
to commit the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is there
evidence of petitioner's active participation in the commission of the crime. The concordant combination and
cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the prosecution's evidence fails to satisfy the requirements
of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 23 can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, 24 the
petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted. 25
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of 14 November 1994 is SET
ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of 28 June 1993 and resolution of 12
August 1993 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 and ACQUITTING petitioner ODON PECHO of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, without, however,
prejudice to any appropriate administrative action which his office may take against him as may be warranted by the
circumstances in this case. SO ORDERED.
||| (Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, [September 27, 1996], 331 PHIL 1-20)
LAURO SORIANO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. L-65952. July 31, 1984.]
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary
investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the
ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In
the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan
reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put
to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof.
The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which
reads as follows:
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph
(b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an Assistant City Fiscal of the
Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the Investigating Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus
THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his official position and with
grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and request from Thomas
N. Tan the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually received from said
Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine Currency, in consideration for a
favorable resolution by dismissing the above-mentioned case, wherein said accused has to intervene in his official
capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA
Special Prosecutor"
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal, in the
Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY, as maximum; to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
"Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations, and which was fully recovered
from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) shall be returned to private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the
other half, to the National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region."
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is to the effect that the
Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence,
This claim is not meritorious not only because it is not for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also
because a reading of its decision shows that it explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the
competence of the witnesses who testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as
a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly
impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: prcd
(a) . . .
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."
The petitioner states:
"Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized
under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep.
Act 3019, as amended.
"The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all, the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not
the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for
violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a
public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received,
the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him,
which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner
was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at
all, is Direct Bribery." (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
"A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its
scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial,
civil or administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so
stated in the 'Definition of Terms', Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that
the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party
wherein the public officer would intervene under the law." (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because
this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted
him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so
would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is
deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
||| (Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952, [July 31, 1984], 216 PHIL 177-182)
MANUEL BORJA vs. HON. RAFAEL MENDOZA [G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]
FERNANDO, J p:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputed to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City Court of Cebu which was
not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certiorari
proceeding was the absence of an arraignment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries.
This notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and thereafter, in a decision
promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a
period of twenty days of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu
presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without
requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976
affirming the judgment of the City Court. It is the contention of petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of
his constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 There was thus, at the very
least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect
was of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The
comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this Court, duly taken note of in the
comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds support in the
procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be
informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the
sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in People v.
Castillo, 7 speaking through Justice De Joya and following the language of the American Supreme Court, identified
due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under
the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, . . . ." 8 An arraignment
thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is
required to meet . . ." 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case of United
States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the
Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others.
This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its
importance, he added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he
may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he
himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." 12 In the terse and
apt language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal
prosecution." 13 Procedural due process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage
where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be
fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose.
Thereafter, he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient
clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the
charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences.
He is not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment
assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it
is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality,
much less an idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was that notwithstanding its being
conducted in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure
to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When that date came, December 14, 1973, without petitioner being present,
although his bondsmen were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed
the prosecution to present its evidence invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the offended
party herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which the prosecution rested its case. Thereupon,
respondent City Court set the promulgation of the decision on December 28, 1973." 14 It could then conclude: "Verily,
the records clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the
whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's
constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. As categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in
the leading case of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before
sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such "constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt
that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to refer to another
leading case, People v. Holgado, 19 where the then Chief Justice Moran emphatically took note of the importance of
the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence." 20 With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus
manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on
him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the
actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus:
"However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the
indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment." The express mention in the
present Constitution of the need for such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an
accused due process. Without the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the applicability of
this exception to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge Mendoza possess any curative
aspect. To quote anew from the comment of the Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance . . . considered
the appeal taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the respondent City Court. Precisely,
the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in support of the appeal
unmistakably raised as error the absence of petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and
the rules to bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the
requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial." 22
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated
December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside.
Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid
decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the
prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of
Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
||| (Borja v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-45667, [June 20, 1977], 168 PHIL 83-90)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE [G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003.]
SYNOPSIS
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by the
operatives of the NBI and the PNP NARCOM at the premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence
yielded huge quantities of marijuana. The City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged appellant with illegal possession of
marijuana, which later on resulted to the filing of two separate informations which were docketed to Criminal Cases
Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R. In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of
marijuana from appellant's rented premises was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence
against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court found that the evidence
for the prosecution was more than ample to prove appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R and duly convicted
him of illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced him to death. Hence, this automatic review.
According to the Court, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-
called reopening of the case to complete the testimony of the prosecution witness. Appellant was never deprived of
his day in court. Appellant was given every opportunity to support his case or to refute the prosecution's evidence
after the prosecution rested its case. The physical evidence in this case corroborated what the prosecution's witness
testified to. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
The penalty, however; was reduced to reclusion perpetua as neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance was
present in the instant case.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANT ISSUED SHOULD
DESCRIBE WITH PARTICULARITY THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED; RATIONALE. — The constitutional requirement
of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers
serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong
items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general
characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT NECESSARY; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. —
However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would
mean that no warrant could issue. Thus, it has been held that the term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in
particularity as to create a general warrant. Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs
so broad as to be unconstitutional. A search warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin"
has been held sufficiently particular. Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined
amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant: Noteworthy, what
is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its
character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be
unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. Thus, this Court
has held that the description "illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH WARRANT; REQUIRES THAT THE JUDGE MUST PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE
COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION BEFORE THE ISSUANCE THEREOF.
— Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation. The
personal examination must not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive. . . . It is
presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as
long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched. IAEcaH
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; GROUNDS AND OBJECTIONS NOT
RAISED THEREIN PRESUMED WAIVED. — But it is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all
grounds and objections then available; existent or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.
5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. — A speedy trial means a trial conducted
according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that "where a prosecuting
officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." The
concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated involves the
weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and
the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to
the accused.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DEEMED VIOLATED. — The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for
criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of an accused to
speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and
secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
7. ID.; ID.; REOPENING OF CASES; RESTS UPON THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT; RESTRICTIONS
THEREOF, NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — As a rule, the matter of reopening of a case for reception of further
evidence after either prosecution or defense has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial court. However, a
concession to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or deny him the opportunity to introduce counter evidence.
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion to reopen may
properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before
judgment.
8. ID.; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; CANNOT BE DISREGARDED ENTIRELY EVEN WHEN ONLY
PART THEREOF WERE FOUND TRUE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — It is the bounden duty of the courts to
test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties
meted out for drug offenses. Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of Abratique, we find no cogent reason to
disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear aware of treading the thin line between innocence and
feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story tending to be self-exculpatory. However, his whole testimony could
not be discredited. The established rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in other
parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is
accepted, as a matter of common sense, that if certain parts of a witness' testimony are found true, his testimony
cannot be disregarded entirely.
9. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS; ELEMENTS; CONSTRUED. — In a
prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1)
that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. . . . In People v. de los Reyes,
239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of
dangerous drugs by any person, and no person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said doctrine is equally applicable
with respect to possession of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the possession of prohibited
drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to possess said articles, without
authority of law. Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs must be
with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said articles.
Nonetheless, this dictum must be read in consonance with our ruling that possession of a prohibited drug per
se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. In effect, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to explain the absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi in this situation.
10. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The legislature never intended that where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be imposed. The statute
prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and death. Hence, the penalty to be imposed must conform with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The rules in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs involved are in
excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425. Thus, finding neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the present case, appellant's possession of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana in Criminal
Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
QUISUMBING, J p:
For automatic review is the consolidated judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated
September 17, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, involving violations of Section 8, Article II, of
the Dangerous Drugs Law. 2 Since appellant was acquitted in the second case, we focus on the first case, where
appellant has been found guilty and sentenced to death and fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81 kilos in violation of Section 8, Article II of RA 6425 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the Information, seized by virtue of a search warrant and sentences him to the
supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of 1 million pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27) are ordered forfeited in
favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused Modesto Tee
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of the charge of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of
Section 8, Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the Information since the marijuana
confiscated have to be excluded in evidence as a product of unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their component parts) although
excluded in evidence as the product(s) of unreasonable search and seizure, are nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor
of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law considering that they are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to release the accused Modesto Tee in connection with Crim. Case No.
15822-R unless held on other charges.
COST(S) DE OFICIO.
SO ORDERED. 3
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP
NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI
had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion,
however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 15800-R, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias "Estoy Tee,"
with illegal possession of marijuana, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried flowering tops
separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms; and
3. Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (boxes) and a yellow sack,
weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms, a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in
violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to "amend" the foregoing charge sheet "considering that subject marijuana
were seized in two (2) different places." 5
As a result, the information in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (26) boxes and a yellow sack,
weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
A separate amended information docketed as Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried flowering tops
separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms;
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to quash the search warrant and ordered appellant's
arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, appellant refused to enter a plea. The trial court entered
a plea of not guilty for him. 8 Trial on the merits then ensued.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto Tee are well acquainted
with each other, since Abratique's wife is the sister of Tee's sister-in-law. 9
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of smuggled
cigarettes. 10 Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a house for rent in Bakakeng,
Baguio City. After negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros agreed to rent out his place to appellant.
Appellant then brought several boxes of purported "blue seal" cigarettes to the leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were not "blue seal" cigarettes but
marijuana. Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both later prevailed upon appellant to remove
them from the premises. 11
Appellant then hired Abratique's taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the Ballesteros place to appellant's
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. 12
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of buying and
transporting strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan,
Benguet, where appellant proceeded to load several sacks of marijuana in Abratique's taxi. He then asked Abratique
to find him a place where he could store the contraband. 13
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmother's house at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., QM Subdivision, Baguio City, which
was being managed by Abratique's aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea agreed to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and
appellant unloaded and stored there the sacks of marijuana brought from Sablan. 14 Abratique was aware that they
were transporting marijuana as some of the articles in the sacks became exposed in the process of loading. 15
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the rented room. She confided
to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As Alice Fianza's brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was
an NBI agent, Alice and Abratique phoned him and disclosed what had transpired. 16
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks of prohibited drugs that
day, Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No. 27, Dr. Cariño St. While the NBI agents
were conducting their surveillance, they noticed that several PNP NARCOM personnel were also watching the
place. 17 The NBI then learned that the PNP NARCOM had received a tip from one of their informers regarding the
presence of a huge amount of drugs in that place. The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents became apprehensive that the whole operation
could be jeopardized. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to enter the room rented by appellant. She
acceded and allowed them entry. The NBI team then searched the rented premises and found four (4) boxes and
thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana, totaling 336.93 kilograms. 18
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied for a search warrant
from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence. 19 Judge Reyes ordered the NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Delilah Muñoz, so the proceedings could be properly recorded. After Atty. Muñoz arrived, Judge Reyes
questioned Lising and Abratique. Thereafter, the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellant's
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City, for marijuana. 20
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellant's residence where they
served the warrant upon appellant himself. 21 The search was witnessed by appellant, members of his
family, barangay officials, and members of the media. 22 Photographs were taken during the actual search. 23 The law
enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried marijuana 24 in the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellant's
residence. 25 The total weight of the haul was 591.81 kilograms. 26 Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of
marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist Maria Carina Madrigal
conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic examinations of the items taken from appellant's
rented room at No. 27, Dr. Cariño St., as well as those from his residence at Green Valley, showed these to be
marijuana. 27
In his defense, appellant contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally obtained, being the
products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted that the search warrant was too general and
the process by which said warrant was acquired did not satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a
valid search warrant. Moreover, Abratique's testimony, which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the
warrant, was hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the 336.93 kilograms of
marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against appellant. Appellant was
accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court found that the prosecution's evidence was more than
ample to prove appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal
possession of marijuana and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court erred in:
1. . . . UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF COMPLIANCE OF (sic)
SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;
2. . . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING ABRATIQUE TO
TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ABRATIQUE;
4. . . .NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH DESPITE THE
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE FIRST CASE. 28
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the search conducted at the
appellant's residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening of the case and absences of the prosecution
witness, on appellant's right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to sustain a finding of
guilt with moral certainty; and (4) the propriety of the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and seize "an
undetermined amount of marijuana," was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists that Abratique could
already estimate the amount of marijuana supposed to be found at appellant's residence since Abratique helped to
transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is issued if a judge finds
probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a
specific amount of it. The OSG points out that, as the trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the
exact amount of prohibited drugs that a person has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of marijuana" as used in the search warrant fails to satisfy
the requirement of Article III, Section 2 29 of the Constitution that the things to be seized must be particularly
described. Appellant's contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; 30 and
(2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. 31 What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general
characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. 32 However, it is not required that
technical precision of description be required, 33 particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could
issue. 34
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as to create a general
warrant. 35 Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and
records pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be
unconstitutional. 36 A search warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held
sufficiently particular. 37
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to
satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is
property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under
which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible,
except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. 38 Thus, this Court has held that the description
"illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized. 39
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or
Indian hemp," in our view, has satisfied the Constitution's requirements on particularity of description. The
description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact — not
of law — by which the peace officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be
seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 40 Said warrant
imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents
exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could be guilty of violation
of Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as said statute lists a number of offenses
with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his possession and control
marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98), 41 and we find that it is captioned "For Violation of R.A.
6425, as amended." 42 It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that "there is probable cause to believe that a case
for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended
by R.A. 7659 has been and is being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy.,
Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having in his possession and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF
MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law." 43 In an earlier case, we held that though
the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause." 44 Appellant's averment is, therefore,
baseless. Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense, namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to exhaustively examine the
applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate should not have swallowed all of Abratique's
statements — hook, line, and sinker. He points out that since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the
marijuana, the examining judge should have elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for
squealing on appellant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the
warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellant's contention is apparent. The OSG points out that Abratique personally
assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latter's house and to appellant's rented room at
No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal knowledge on Abratique's part. Law enforcers
cannot themselves be eyewitnesses to every crime; they are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge.
In this case, witness Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the NBI did not rely on hearsay
information in applying for a search warrant but on personal knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution 45 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure 46 require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath or
affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and
exhaustive. 47 In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special
Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique.
Notes of the proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61, whom
Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City,
Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of "notes" at "pages 7–11." 48 We have thoroughly perused the
records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find said "notes." The depositions of Lising and Abratique were
not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the
purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of
probable cause. 49 The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the
records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is
evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented. 50 In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes
required Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit; 51 there were instances when Judge Reyes questioned him
extensively. 52 It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, 53 absent a showing to the
contrary. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, 54 as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. 55 Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought
to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415 (7-98) in his motion to
quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching
questions of the applicant and his witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily
examined said witness. 56 But it is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections
then available, existent or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived. 57
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lising's knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellant's house was indeed
hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge about said drugs and their particular
location. Abratique's statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As the NBI's
witness, Abratique was a person on whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellant's
activities with respect to the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not
depending on casual rumor circulating in the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. 58
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the place to be searched.
The OSG points out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as can be. The NBI even submitted a detailed
sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that there would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended 59 and distinguish it from other places in the community. 60 A designation
or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads
the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search warrant. Appellant fails,
however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee,
appellant's mother, testified on the search conducted but she said nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of
the NBI operatives who conducted the search and seizure. 61 What the record discloses is that the warrant was served
on appellant, 62 who was given time to read it, 63 and the search was witnessed by the barangay officials, police
operatives, members of the media, and appellant's kith and kin. 64 No breakage or other damage to the place searched
is shown. No injuries sustained by appellant, or any witness, appears on record. The execution of the warrant, in our
view, has been orderly and peaceably performed. EHIcaT
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellant's Substantive Rights
Appellant insists that the prosecution's unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness Abratique unduly delayed
the resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or
willful refusal of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on the prosecution's part
violated Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98. 65 Appellant now alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to
delaying the case to cause him untold miseries.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great length of time as to
amount to a violation of appellant's right to a speedy trial. A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or
postponements, but absent any showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive, the State should not be
deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prosecute the criminal action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear in no less than eighteen
(18) hearings, namely those set for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24; March 9, 15, 22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19,
all in 1999. 66 No less than four (4) warrants of arrest were issued against him to compel him to testify. 67 The NBI
agent who supposedly had him in custody was found guilty of contempt of court for failing to produce Abratique at
said hearings and sanctioned. 68 The prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio City and NBI
Director in Manila regarding the failure of the Bureau's agents to bring Abratique to court. 69 Nothing on record
discloses the reason for Abratique's aforecited absences. On the scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent
thus causing the trial court to again order his arrest for the fifth time. 70 He also failed to show up at the hearing of
June 8, 1999. 71
Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20) hearing dates violated
appellant's constitutional 72 and statutory right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. 73 In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court
held that "where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against
his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated involves
the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution
and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage
caused to the accused. 74
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty
(180) days. 75 However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. 76 The right to a
speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; 77 or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; 78 or (3) when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 79
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing days, there is
no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratique's absences so as to vex or oppress appellant
and deny him his rights. On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the
prosecution went to the extent of praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at
trial. The prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureau's custody, but
to no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and rest its case
on the evidence already offered. 80
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay of less than two
months has been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of time. 81
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the prosecution to produce
its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to require that witness Abratique post bail to
ensure that the latter would testify when required. 82 Appellant could have moved to have Abratique found in
contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his
right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellant's claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. One must
take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of delay. But in the absence of a
showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity
of prosecuting an accused. 83
Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality, when it allowed the
reopening of the case after the prosecution had failed to present Abratique on several occasions and had been directed
to rest its case. Appellant stresses that the lower court's order to reopen the case to receive Abratique's further
testimony is an indication that the trial court favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.
On appellee's behalf, the Solicitor General points out that the trial court's order was in the interest of substantial
justice and hence, cannot be termed as an abuse of discretion. The OSG points out that the prosecution had not
formally rested its case and had yet to present its formal offer of evidence, hence, the submission of additional
testimony by the same witness cannot be prejudicial to the accused, it being but the mere continuation of an
uncompleted testimony. Furthermore, appellant did not properly oppose the prosecution's motion to reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure were in
effect. There was no specific provision at that time governing motions to reopen. 84 Nonetheless, long and established
usage has led to the recognition and acceptance of a motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific procedural
rule, the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen was the paramount interests of justice. As a rule, the
matter of reopening of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution or defense has rested its case is
within the discretion of the trial court. 85 However, a concession to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or
deny him the opportunity to introduce counter evidence. 86
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion to reopen may
properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before
judgment. 87 In the instant case, the records show that on April 19, 1999, the prosecution was directed to close its
evidence and given 15 days to make its formal offer of evidence. 88 This order apparently arose from the
manifestation of the prosecution on April 16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next
scheduled hearing the prosecution would rest its case. 89 On April 19, 1999, which was the next scheduled hearing
after April 16, 1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and warrants of arrest. However, on April
27, 1999, or before the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the trial court by the
NBI. In its order of said date, the trial court pointed out that the prosecution could move to "reopen" the case for the
taking of Abratique's testimony. 90 On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet formally
offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the accused would not be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had
yet to present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the motion. The trial court granted the motion six days
later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the prosecution had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of
Abratique's testimony was not for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for
the completion of his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs. Base, 91 we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to
reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of
additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge's mind with reference to particular facts
involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his testimony, which
is what happened in this case. It is but proper that the judge's mind be satisfied on any and all questions presented
during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.
Appellant's claim that the trial court's concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well taken. We
note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecution's
evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in
court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice. 92 Thus, we are unable to hold
that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order to
complete the testimony of a prosecution witness.
3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant insists that Abratique's
testimony is profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, hence incredible. According to appellant, Abratique was
evasive from the outset with respect to certain questions of the trial court. He adds that it appeared the court
entertained in particular the suspicion that witness Abratique had conspired with appellant in committing the crime
charged. Appellant questions Abratique's motive in informing the NBI about his activities related to the marijuana
taking, transfer, and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratique's testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that Abratique testified in a
straightforward manner as to his knowledge of the huge cache of prohibited drugs stashed by appellant in two
different places. His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with the physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of
marijuana found by law enforcers at appellant's residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no innocent person is made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties meted out for drug offenses. 93 Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony
of Abratique, we find no cogent reason to disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear aware treading
the thin line between innocence and feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story tending to be self-exculpatory.
However, his whole testimony could not be discredited. The established rule is that testimony of a witness may be
believed in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and
improbabilities of the case. But it is accepted, as a matter of common sense, that if certain parts of a witness' testimony
are found true, his testimony cannot be disregarded entirely. 94
Abratique testified in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he helped appellant transport
huge amounts of marijuana to appellant's rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., Baguio City and to appellant's
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. He also declared on the witness stand that out
of fear of being involved, he decided to divulge his knowledge of appellant's possession of large caches of marijuana
to the NBI. When the places referred to by Abratique were searched by the authorities, marijuana in staggering
quantities was found and seized by the law enforcers. Stated plainly, the physical evidence in this case corroborated
Abratique's testimony on material points.
Appellant imputes questionable motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands that Abratique
should likewise be prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible guilt of Abratique a tenable defense for
appellant. Nor would Abratique's prosecution mean appellant's absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 95
We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt.
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from appellant's residence
served to prove appellant's possession of a prohibited drug. Tests conducted by the NBI forensic chemist proved the
seized articles to be marijuana. These articles were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully
admissible in evidence.
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies generally to all persons
and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person, and no person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said
doctrine is equally applicable with respect to possession of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes
the possession of prohibited drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to
possess said articles, without authority of law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge
of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said articles. 96 Nonetheless,
this dictum must be read in consonance with our ruling that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of
such possession. 97 In effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi 98 in this situation.
Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother as his lone witness, who
testified on matters totally irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude that, failing to discharge the burden of the
evidence on the possession of prohibited drug, appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
4. On The Proper Penalty
Under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) 99 shall be imposed
if the quantity of marijuana involved in a conviction for possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or
more. 100
In the present case, the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to be far in excess of 750
grams, as stressed by the trial court:
The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact, when they were first
brought to the court, it took hours to load them on the truck and hours also to unload them prompting the court to
direct that the boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept at the NBI office in Baguio. And the identification of said
marijuana during the trial was made in the NBI premises itself by the witnesses since it was physically cumbersome
and inconvenient to keep bringing them to the court during every trial. 101
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana bales involved, but also
"the acts of accused of hiding them in different places . . . and transferring them from place to place and making them
appear as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade apprehension and detection." They showed his being a big supplier,
said the trial court, [whose] criminal perversity and craft that "deserve the supreme penalty of death." 102
We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature never intended that
where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of
death shall automatically be imposed. 103 The statute prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and
death. Hence, the penalty to be imposed must conform with Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal Code. As already
held, the death penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. 105 The rules
in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs involved are in excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20
of Republic Act No. 6425. 106 Thus, finding neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the present case,
appellant's possession of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital
punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of
illegal drugs. This being within the limits allowed by the law, the amount of the fine must be sustained. All these
sanctions might not remedy all the havoc wrought by prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially
the youth. 107 But these penalties should warn peddlers of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply their trade in our
streets with impunity.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 15800-R,
convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias "ESTOY" TEE of violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is
likewise directed to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, [January 20, 2003], 443 PHIL 521-554)
FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. L-25769. December 10, 1974.]
FERNANDO, J p:
A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial 1 led this Court to act affirmatively on a certiorari proceeding
for the dismissal of a case then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering the length of time that had elapsed, it is
readily discernible why an inquiry into the matter is well-nigh unavoidable. The accusation for robbery against
petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was filed as far back as December 31, 1951. The decision rendered on
November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For
a period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that day, there was a
resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness
deemed material for the disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution was amended by a second resolution dated
August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for counsel of appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that
evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one
may be rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4 Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower court with
the former decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a year because the
offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged
that when thereafter he did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized as a mere
"fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime, there was even a failure to identify the two
accused. 6 Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having been set aside as required by the Court of
Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years having
elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them due to such
inordinate delay in their disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of
almost a decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent Court of Appeals was
unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of counsel for petitioners, its last order being a denial of
a second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
the facts as above set forth were substantially admitted. However, a special and affirmative defense raised was that
the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an
office exercising Judicial functions and that without the Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition, it cannot
be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was expressed
that under the circumstances, it was not adequately shown that the right to a speedy trial had been violated, as the
Court of Appeals had taken all the steps necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original
trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right to a speedy trial,
so zealously guarded in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due respect. There is thus
merit in the petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, . . ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within
the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he
will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his
opportunity to present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-
observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11 The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine announced, even
before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced
categorically that the trial, to comply with the requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act,
must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal proposition that,
where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom." 14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v. Castañeda, 15 where it was
shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take place,
it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the accused. As
was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal
proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the
law." 16 It was on the basis of the above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide
was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first information had been dismissed after a lapse of
one year and seven months from the time the original complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions
the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled
the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to have been heard. 17 The same result followed in Esguerra v. De
la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally prosecuted for
an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a year and three months, with the lower court
twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus compelling him to
resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case was his right to a speedy trial was violated,
a remedy deemed appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That was in Mercado v.
Santos. 19 Here, for a period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying
his deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on
the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for
reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused
moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the matter
to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of
time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion likewise
considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an information was filed charging
the accused with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the right to a
speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It
does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted
criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
authorized to be commenced." 21 The latest decision in point, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 22 presented an even clearer
case. The information for damage to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May 19, 1965,
when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years
elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses for
the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought the postponement, but the accused countered with a
motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind
and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid
decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss
in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as
promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be
deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to
suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of
August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the
sole basis for the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by
this Court time and time again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been met. The decisive question has been answered. There
is an affirmation of the worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much significance should be
attached to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the People of the Philippines that the Court of Appeals
should have been made the party respondent. What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right. It did amount at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion. Whatever deficiency in
the pleading may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one of the most important
safeguards granted an accused. To deny petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt form over substance. At any
rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the
defenses that could have interposed to justify the action taken were invoked by the People of the Philippines. They
certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to a speedy Trial speak too categorically to be misread. This is one of
those situations then where, in the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities
should give way to the realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R
entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order of
January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966 denying the second motion
for reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against
petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
||| (Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
AURELIA CONDE vs. PABLO RIVERA [G.R. No. 21741. January 25, 1924.]
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SPEEDY TRIAL. — Philippine organic and statutory law
expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
2. ID.; ID. — The Government of the Philippine Islands should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in
the administration of justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS; HABEAS CORPUS. — WHERE A Prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five
information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less
than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was
filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if
innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed
without her consent, is pal palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon the
appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the
case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought then we had
pointed out the way for the parties. We hope propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain
justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a
persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Island s which should be the
last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and
legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of
the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of
the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,
the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160
Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance,
Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236. 1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute
the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous in formations, and the charges now
pending before the justice of the of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with costs against the respondent fiscal.
We append to our order the observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts
of record, will take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may
not recur. So ordered.
||| (Conde v. Rivera, G.R. No. 21741, [January 25, 1924], 45 PHIL 650-652)
MANUEL MATEO, JR., ET. AL. v. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ [G.R. Nos. L-34756-59. March 31, 1973.]
FERNANDO, J p:
The novel issue presented in this prohibition proceeding arose from the gnawing fear that the prized ideal of "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" 1 implicit in the due process guarantee may be set at naught. Petitioners are among
being tried by respondent Judge for the offense of robbery in band with homicide. Thereafter, an extrajudicial
statement by one Rolando Reyes, who was later on likewise indicted for the same offense, implicating petitioners, was
subscribed before respondent Judge. That was the background of a motion for his disqualification, as the aforesaid
Rolando Reyes, when called upon to testify as an additional witness for the prosecution impugned his written
declaration stating that it was executed as a result of a threat by a government agent. It is now contended that such a
repudiation would not sit well with respondent Judge, who had thus placed himself in a position of being unable to
pass on such question with that degree of objectivity required by due process, although admittedly, such a move did
not fall squarely within one of the specific grounds to inhibit judges. 2 Respondent Judge turned down this plea for
disqualification. Hence this petition, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to be convicted of an
offense without due process of law. This Court, after t careful consideration of the matter and in the light of past
decisions to be hereafter noted, looks upon such failure of respondent Judge to disqualify himself as a grave abuse of
discretion correctible by prohibition. The petition is meritorious.
The facts, in the language of the petition, follow: "On or about June 4, 1971, the American Express Bank at Sangley
Point, Cavite, was robbed and an American serviceman was killed. In connection with that robbery, and the death of
the serviceman, four (4) criminal actions were filed against petitioners and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-
843 to 846, Cavite, for robbery in band with homicide, all captioned 'People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Manuel
Mateo, et al., Accused' . . . The Information fell in the sala of the Honorable Respondent Judge because the complaints
were filed there; and, in fact, it was the Honorable Respondent Judge who ordered District State Prosecutor Cornelio
Melendres [or] Assistant City Fiscal Enrique A. Cube to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioners Manuel
Mateo, Jr. and Esmeraldo Cruz were arraigned on June 24, 1971 while petitioners Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez
filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground of "insufficiency of evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the
existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify the accused by competent evidence.' On September 25, 1971, petitioner
Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez amplified his motion to dismiss with a Supplemental Motion based on the claim
that 'the pre-trial identification by prosecution witness Elliot Grey of your accused Roberto Martinez in a police line-
up in the absence of defendant's counsel is unconstitutional; and the in-court testimony of said Elliot Grey identifying
your accused Roberto Martinez is inadmissible in evidence and should be stricken out from the records'. The
prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss. To date, the motions to dismiss have not been decided by the Honorable
Respondent Judge . . . In the meantime, another suspect in the Sangley Point Robbery — one Rolando Reyes — was
arrested. On October 5, 1971, when petitioner's Motion to Dismiss together with the Opposition thereto were
submitted for resolution, the Honorable Presiding Judge in an Order ruled that 'pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the
New Rules of Court, let the Motion to Dismiss be resolved until after the prosecution has presented and rested its
evidence as against Rolando Reyes . . . It appears that the said Rolando Reyes had executed an extrajudicial statement
on October 1, 1971 and had signed and sworn to its truth before the Honorable Respondent Judge; and, in that
statement had implicated petitioners; evidently, the Honorable Respondent Judge was aware of this, and it was for
this reason that he had deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben Martinez' motions and supplemental motion to dismiss
'until after the prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes.' Rolando Reyes, however,
was tried separately from and in absence of petitioners; so that the proceedings against him did not constitute
evidence against petitioner. So, on November 26, 1971, while petitioner Martinez' Motion and Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss remained unresolved, the prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence.' . . . On December 4,
1971, petitioner Manuel Mateo filed an Opposition to the prosecution's Motion to Present Additional Evidence on the
ground that 'to allow the prosecution to present additional evidence in favor of the State after the prosecution has
rested, while the accused has a pending motion to dismiss under consideration would be prejudicial to the substantial
rights of herein accused because it would effectively deprive him of a fair trial.' . . . On December 24, 1971, respondent
Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence' ruling that 'it is well settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the
presentation of additional evidence after the parties have rested their case.' . . . On February 3, 1972, the prosecution
called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness, and in the course of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement
purportedly executed by him on October 1, 1971 as Exh. 'P' . . . Rolando Reyes repudiated it, stated that he had
executed it because he had been threatened by a government agent. The statement, Exh. 'P' . . . , purports to have been
subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge on October 1, 1971. As soon as the foregoing facts were made of
record in the case, defendants [petitioners herein] verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to enable them to file a
motion to disqualify the Honorable Respondent Judge; and the motion for suspension was granted. On February 5,
1971, petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Disqualification of respondent Judge contending that respondent Judge 'in
the exercise of his sound discretion [should] disqualify himself from sitting in this case under the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that he, Reyes, had
sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter perforce would have to pass upon that
repudiation . . . On February 11, 1972, the prosecution filed an Opposition to petitioners' Joint Motion for
Disqualification . . . On February 12, 1972, respondent Judge denied petitioners' Joint Motion for Disqualification." 3
The specific question raised not having been passed upon previously, coupled with the exhaustive petition submitted
by counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose W. Diokno, led this Court, in its resolution of February 25, 1972 to require
comment from respondent Judge, with a temporary restraining order likewise being issued. The then Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice, Felix Antonio, did so in an equally well-researched pleading on March 16, 1972 which,
by our resolution of March 22, was considered his answer. Thereafter, with memoranda being submitted by both
parties, the case was deemed submitted for decision on August 4 last year. There is, to repeat, a highly persuasive and
scholarly quality in the manner in which the plea for petitioners was made. Nonetheless, with due recognition of the
imperative character of the safeguard of due process connoting, at the very least, an impartial tribunal. the Court
cannot consider the circumstances disclosed a sufficient to call for the disqualification of respondent Judge.
1. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part
of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair al being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that
the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play
favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that
due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 4 He should, to quote from another decision "at all
times manifest depth commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who
deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the
rest of his fellow mortals." 6 penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 7 Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no
awareness of the due process aspect of an impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice
Street as far back as 1926 in Government v. Abella, 8 a 1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion that
the litigant had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." 9 There was a reiteration of such a view in a case
decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, 10 with Justice Vickers as ponente, in these words: "Although a judge may not have
been disqualified [according to the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant
was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if
it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." 11
2. Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental requisite of impartiality for due
process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains
this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." 12 Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the
bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication,
there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to
betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well,
therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to
disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved.
What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process
vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, 13 drawing "attention of all
judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously
comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting
in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with
bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect the probability that a losing party might nurture at
the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part judge may be generated because of serious charges misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great
care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved.
He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable
prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend
to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sit a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of
the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice." 14
3. The imperfections of human institutions being such, what is fit and proper is not always achieved. The invitation to
judges to disqualify themselves is not always heeded. For that matter, it is not always desirable that they should do
so. It could amount in certain cases to their being recreant to their trust. Justice Perfecto's warning is not to be ignored;
"to shirk the responsibility" entails "the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction." 15 It could be an
instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasive skill.
With all such considerations in mind, there is still cogency in the approach that would look with favor on the exercise
of discretion in favor of disqualification, given the likelihood that bias or prejudice is unavoidable. Even before the
amendment of Section 1 of Rule 137, this Court, in at least two decisions, 16 gave its approval to such a move. Then
came People v. Gomez, 17 where this Court, the ponente being Justice J. P. Bengzon, held: "Now considering that the
Revised Rules of Court, already in effect when respondent Judge filed his answer herein containing the prayer to be
disqualified from the case, although not yet in effect when the proceedings at issue were taken in the court below,
states in Section 1 of Rule 137 that, 'A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons' other than the usual grounds for disqualification, this Court, after
considering all the circumstances of the case, finds as reasonable, respondent Judge's afore-stated request for
disqualification from further sitting in the Richard case, and We rule that he is thereby deemed, in light of the new
Rules, to have inhibited himself from further taking cognizance of the case." 18
There is even greater deference paid to the due process requirement of impartiality when, in Luque v.
Kayanan, 19 decided in 1969, this Court, through Justice Sanchez, could categorically rule: "All suitors, we must say,
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and impartial
tribunal. It has been said that 'next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in
such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.' Let it not be said that the
administration of justice in this country suffers from too many human imperfections. To our mind, respondent judge
should inhibit himself since it has become apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in the best
interest of justice, which he is bound to serve." 20 There was a reiteration of such a principle in Paredes v.
Gopengco, 21 where the following appears in the opinion of Justice Teehankee for the Court: "It is pertinent to state
that the restriction provided in the Rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings where the trial judge denies a
motion for his disqualification is not an absolute rule even in civil cases, and has not been taken as precluding a resort
in appropriate cases to the special civil actions of prohibition and certiorari before the higher courts for determination,
ahead of the judgment on the merits, whether the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction refusing to disqualify himself." 22 There is thus respectable authority for the view that with
the possibility of a trial being tainted by partiality, this Court can step in to assure respect for the demands of due
process.
4. Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we have the power to set aside the order denying the motion for
disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to our
corrective authority. Certainly, there can be no question its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse
inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's impartiality. The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether
the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to
describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in
the course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the
Constitution requires? The answer must be in the affirmative. Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought.
Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial
statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later
declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to
respondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The
absence of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he
who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime
and in addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them was
pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested its
evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a separate proceeding. It
cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely.
With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture there is apparent the
situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact
became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given
his opinion. It is this inroad in one's, objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The
misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are
more than justified. Hence the conclusion reached by us.
5. To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well-advised to limit themselves to the task
of adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters
away his time and energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the executive branch, the less the danger of his being
a participant in any event that might lend itself to the interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised.
There is much to be said for displaying zeal and eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a
judge who must bide his time until the case is before him. He must ever be on guard lest what is done by him, even
from the best of motives, may be thought of as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of
judicial conduct. Thus should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted. The restraining order is issued by this Court on February 25,
1972 is made permanent. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in this and the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
||| (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, [March 31, 1973], 151-A PHIL 21-34)
HON. GREGORIO GARCIA vs. HON. FELIX DOMINGO [G.R. No. L-30104. July 25, 1973.]
FERNANDO, J p:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved, is the
meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. 1 More specifically, did respondent Judge commit a
grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the other
respondents 2 inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as petitioner. 3 That was done in the
order now impugned in this suit, although such a procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents
as defendants, the hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part,
and without an iota of evidence offered to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded
from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste
or intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the facts ascertained — the unique aspect
of this case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly altercation, force likewise being employed, due to
the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two
respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by
city court Judge in the above manner — we rule that there was no transgression of the right to a public trial, and grant
the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge,
there were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal actions against
respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo
Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal
Case No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against
Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for slight
physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of
Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila
(resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for slander." 4 The above was followed by this recital: "The
trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968,
April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4, 1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968,
August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates — except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 —
fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as
possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and
Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5 Also this: "The trial of
the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge
Garcia." 6 Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of
several months (from March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel,
who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There
was only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on
April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of
the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this
constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked
for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael
Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect
of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had
not objected to — pointed out — any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their
behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases." 7 It was stated next in the
petition: "The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to
September 28, 1968, at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and
again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco
Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The
applications for postponement were not grounded upon and supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of
October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the
Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction . . . [alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith
issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly
had, there was an order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been
violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] ;that the trial of these cases lasting several
weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open to the public';" and ordering the city court
Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have
rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) . . . pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petitioners on January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to this Tribunal
by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969, respondents were
required to answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As was to be expected the answer filed by
respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by the other respondents on March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the
validity of the finding that there was a failure to respect the right to a public trial of accused persons. Neither in such
pleadings nor in the memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there
any persuasive showing of a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the basic issue to be resolved.
Rather it was the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper
understanding of its implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant the merits
prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset,
explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear,
under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single,
terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to
gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in
an illegal and unjust manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had
provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the
United States. 13 Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in
the leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its
roots in [the] English common law heritage." 15 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it
likely evolved long before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury
trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in
a state constitution in 1776." 18 He could conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every
state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public." 19 Such is the
venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused
the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where
language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It
possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment.
No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the
accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of the importance of this right singled
out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in
procedural due process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases
are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present
are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." 21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was
in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative
of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a
fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are
smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter
with what offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of
the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice
Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriate]y the lack of weight, to any such
objection now raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his
right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively
appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his
right is deemed waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight years
ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other objection to the conduct of the
proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an
order at war with the obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged abdication by an
assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again here there was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party
could complain at all, it is the People of the Philippines for whom a fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law
be termed an offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming that
respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been aware that
thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention,
mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was
not affected . . . but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene . . . ," 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the
mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of
words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an
evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection
ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of
the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all
make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its
presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for
their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is
not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the
knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk
of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-
conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal
force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo, dated November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge
or any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in Civil Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, except that of dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of
February 26, 1969 against the actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against respondent
policemen, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
Makalintal, Actg. C .J ., Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esquerra, JJ ., concur.
Castro, J ., did not take part.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ ., are on leave.
||| (Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104 (Resolution), [July 25, 1973], 152 PHIL 129-139)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. [G.R. Nos. 111206-08. October 6, 1995.]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION; TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST; FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED. — Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police
in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the
alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is
nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this
mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched
and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was
to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped
with people and with high security risk. Leino's fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been
shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief
of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where
suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the
criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio
and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the
gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture
of appellant or read any report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot
identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the
admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino. We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's
identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away
when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against
appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense
counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the
crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RULE REQUIRES THE REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS WHOSE STATEMENT
HAS NOT BEEN PRIORLY REDUCED TO WRITING. — Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was
sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in
his throat. There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not
been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog to erode Leino's credibility is
misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the
finding that the prosecution's evidence was, at best, circumstantial and "suspiciously short in important details," there
being no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.
4. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IT IS THE NATURAL REACTION OF VICTIMS OF CRIMINAL
VIOLENCE TO STRIVE TO SEE THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR ASSAILANTS AND OBSERVE THE MANNER THE
CRIME WAS COMMITTED. — We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to
have remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is
not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows that precisely because of the
unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high
degree of reliability the identity of criminals. We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements
of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no
improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each
other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY ADMITTED; HARMLESS ERROR RULE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR. — Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios
acta when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule
known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was
presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new trial." The Exchequer rule has
long been laid to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in
its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned." American courts adopted this
approach especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court to "give
judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." We have likewise followed the harmless error rule
in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its
impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant we disregard the error as it will not
overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. In the case at bar, the reference
by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the
linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the
appellant was convicted mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility. cdlex
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARAFFIN TEST; INCONCLUSIVE. — Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing
he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely
unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction
for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas,
beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these
substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong
wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified
and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also
remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than
seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates
could have already been removed by washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates, more
than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL NOT
INCOMPATIBLE TO A FREE PRESS. — We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial
trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity,
just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field . . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism." Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our
communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These
news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are
mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When a
gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will
outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who
will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains
and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard
off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of
prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test
of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial
judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; CANNOT BE APPRECIATED IN
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT ASSAILANT CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY ADOPTED HIS MODE OF
ATTACK TO INSURE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS CRIMINAL DESIGN WITHOUT RISK TO HIMSELF.
— We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the
sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from
his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned
who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and
asked what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack
was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was
carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove
that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design
without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They
were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of
Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We
have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence, absent
any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of
Chapman.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT WHERE ASSAILANT PURPOSELY PLACED HIS VICTIMS IN A COMPLETELY
DEFENSELESS POSITION BEFORE SHOOTING THEM. — As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen
Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting
Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the
side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance
between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While
seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two
victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of
Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured
the execution of the crime without risk to himself . Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against
appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
10. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ADOPTIVE FATHER ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. — Under
the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is
entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides: . . . "(2) When the parents,
legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters; . . . "(5) When
only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate"; It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was
survived by her natural father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their
claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
11. ID.; DAMAGES; TO BE COMPENSATED FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT
THE VICTIM AT THE TIME OF INJURY OR DEATH IS GAINFULLY EMPLOYED. — To be compensated for loss of
earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH IS COMPUTED ON THE BASIS OF THE LIFE EXPECTANCY
OF THE DECEASED AND NOT THE BENEFICIARY. — It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is
well-settled that the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, and not the
beneficiary.
PUNO, J p:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of
ROLAND CHAPMAN , and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to MURDER. 1
The Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
"That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to
kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Roland John Chapman who was hit in the chest, thereby inflicting
mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Roland John Chapman. cdll
"Contrary to law." 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill
and evident premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal
wounds which directly caused the death of the said Maureen Hultman.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death
of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of his will,
that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
"Contrary to law." 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus
filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that it would present the
surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the circumstances resulting to the wounding
of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident
pending that day was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge for the killing of
Chapman only. He opined that Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of
Leino and Hultman would be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the testimony of Leino would be
limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused were charged involved only one
continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and
the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present Leino to testify on all three
(3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if
accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned
before it could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after arraignment of accused on the
condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The defense
counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The prosecution then started to adduce
evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman
and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at
past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where students of International School hang out. 10 After an
hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their
group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Chapman
tagged along. 12 When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block
away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too
much noise in going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino
offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When they reached the corner of
Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee,
Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached
them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities.
He reached into his pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB)
I.D. 14 Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired what was going on. He
stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into
his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why
did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused
ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed the gun at him and asked: "Do you want trouble?" Leino said "no"
and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us.
Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused
ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3
meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's car. Accused tried but
failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase
lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down
beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in front of them stood
accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit
on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw
Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive
away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people looking on and standing
outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private security guard hired
by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE
MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street,
Dasmariñas Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey,
located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their employer, while driver Mangubat was in
his quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first gunshot while at their
respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was happening, while Mangubat and
Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house and looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a man
(Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino) sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up and
holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer
car. However, because of Florece's distance from the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He
saw the control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the getaway car as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white
("medyo puti"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as
silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a
mere four (4) meters away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away from the scene of the
crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place was
adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went near the scene of the crime. He
noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and Mangubat requested him to
report the shooting incident to the security officers of Dasmariñas Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post
and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece
noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the gunman's
car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati
Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of the Makati police, together with
SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial investigation disclosed that the gunman's
car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with
the village Homeowners' Association and were able to track down two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number
566. One was registered in the name of JOSE MONTAÑO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate
number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street,
Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also tasked by then NBI Director
Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the house of Jose
Montaño 35 where they found ahead of them the Makati police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol.
Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montaño whether the white Lancer car registered in the name of Mr. Montaño and
bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs. Montaño denied and declared they had already sold the car to
Saldaña Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in said company, who
resides in Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs. Montaño called up her husband and informed him about the investigation. She
also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montaño came around noon. Conti followed with the white Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the NBI office for
investigation, together with the Lancer car. At the NBI, Ranin inquired from Montaño the whereabouts of his car on
July 12 and 13, 1991. Montaño informed him that the car was at the residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E.
Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car
to their office at Saldaña Enterprises. Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from
two (2) NBI agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montaño left his car at the NBI
parking lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 38
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the
shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their office the next day for further
investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even
denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmariñas Village
that night and served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The
NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas
Village, near the scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was not white but light gray. A
foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents exerted every
effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a representative of the
Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn
statement. 41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was
lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still
withholding information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get
involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin
assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the gunman's car as a box-type
Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where Montaño's white Lancer car was
parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if Montaño's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that
its color was different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the parking lot and to point the color that most
resembled the color of the gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he
pointed to was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to
his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10") taken from the NBI files. One
of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture
(Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at the back of said picture.
Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a search warrant. After a
searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the
NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number
PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, to implement
the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told
Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to the NBI office for investigation.
Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the house at that time. She excused herself, went to the
kitchen and called up someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured accused's car. After a while,
Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him that the keys were with accused. Upon
Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited
him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents
then towed the car of accused to the NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and waited for accused. Accused
came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them that he just came from the Makati
police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that he has given a statement to the Makati police and was
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer car at the time of the
shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back and was no longer functioning.
The car had been parked in his mother's house at Dasmariñas Village since then. Due to the lateness of the evening,
the group decided to continue the investigation the following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what really happened at
Dasmariñas Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that he would be confronted with
some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the lineup composed of seven (7)
men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman
from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other agents brought accused to Forbes Park
for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from the hospital the day
before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the
gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted him and his father to a vacant
house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the house and placed
in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car
with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men who
would be coming out of the house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the street, in a line-up.
Leino noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that time due to the
extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to
remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The men in the lineup were herded back inside
the house. After a couple of minutes, they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup,
Leino identified accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of murder and double frustrated
murder against accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-
Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the
NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see security guard Vicente
Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in Dasmariñas Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and
invited him to the Makati police station where his statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. 59
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house and brought him to the
Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would be coming and see if the person
was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at the second floor of the station. 60
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat
and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado
inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat initially declined to identify accused, saying that he
wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused
was accompanied by a police Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked
Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60 Accused, together with Major
Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at Dasmariñas
Village by other Makati policemen. 61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked him again if accused was really
the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he would no longer
ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if
he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to
"E-11") of different men and was asked to identify the gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that
of accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat signed at the back of said picture. Mangubat's statement was
taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a personal identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of the media. At that time, accused's
counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the
submission of accused to identification. They pointed out that since the cases against accused had already been filed
in court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification
of accused should be made in the courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their
on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that identification be made without
the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is not identified in the lineup, the
media coverage would favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's office and remained seated. Ranin
was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the lineup and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin
then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
"FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter, located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial
line, directed backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and central and lateral incisors, both sides, to
the buccal cavity then lacerating the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine, tongue and
tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign body (bullet fragments) along the superior
alveolar border on the right. No remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the right palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with
associated soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx" 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After entering Leino's head, it fractured his
upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed
contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a
consequence of the gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were
performed on the upper portion of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in
speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like
in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He concluded that the gun must have
been pointed above Leino's head considering the acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He
testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was bloodied all over. Maureen had a
bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the
left side of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also given a CT scan. The examination
revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were several splintered bullets in her brain and the
major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who operated on her brain to arrest the
bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets embedded in her brain.
Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed
undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained
unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for further observation. cdlex
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due to the unpatched
undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A second surgery was made on
July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the
destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues through her
nose was lessened but Maureen developed infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen
developed brain abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove brain abscess and all
possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that Maureen was shot at the
left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the bullet
fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull.
The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the body, the brain. When
Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused
hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the forehead brought about by edema
in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the fragmented bullet. The whole interior
portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal bleeding and remove the splintered
bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was
also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived, she would have led a vegetating
life and she would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would have been
completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her
senses would have been modified and the same would have affected her motor functions There was practically no
possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a
breathing soul on October 17, 1991. LexLibris
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was not
anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo,
Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning.
Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmariñas shooting when he read the
newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat
before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He,
however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident in February
1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house
in Dasmariñas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded that although the car was not
in good running condition, it could still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of
Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his
mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted
himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was
tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI
for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the statement he earlier gave to
the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for breakfast. When they
returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's office.
The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man
who was to identify him was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as
the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes
Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join
another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the identification and ordered a group of
men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that
he was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from
May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566 in going to
school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at
the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and damage to his father's
car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a little off and the car was hard to start. They had the
car repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon City. After a month, he brought the car to the
residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and
drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled
for further repairs and they preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from that
time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and since
he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim
Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have been an overprotective father.
This theory was formed when an eyewitness allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag,
Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile witness. Llibris
ANDERS HULTMAN testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman were married in the Philippines
in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He legally adopted
Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3) children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage of the investigation, i.e., that
Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen
could not have uttered those words for Maureen never spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him
"Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m.
Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time of the
shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a
security guard came to their house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at the Makati municipal jail. On
several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused was not in his cell. The jail guards even
covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime
Prevention, headed by Congressman Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO
FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose Montaño that he sold his white
Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaña Lending Investors in February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben
Conti, Operations Manager of said company and was in the residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other
witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montaño's white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montaño's residence at
the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the
get-away car but could not give the control letters of the car's license plate. Fernandez went to one of the houses at the
corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call,
the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't."
Fernandez tried to get the maid's name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the
court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13")
prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmariñas
Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes, accused and
company arrived. When accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he could
identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger
and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was signed by Florece
in his presence. In said statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test she conducted on
July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a negative
result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin
test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period
within which nitrate residues may not be removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person
who has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand for the defense. He testified
that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security
agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured
at the NBI and was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however,
admitted the defense did not compel the attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the
torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities committed in the off-court
identification of their client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he objected to
the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he filed a petition for review raising this issue with the
Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred
to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at that time. He also declared that although they knew that
arraignment would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation and preliminary
investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in the investigation of the case. It presented
seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave
Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's
Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the
testimonies of the news reporters, thus: cdasia
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news reports as having been partly
written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS"
(Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is
usually the product of collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the practice of pooling news reports
where several reporters are tasked to cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports
they file and summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
"Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the investigation of the murders of Roland
Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and three members of a family — Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela,
19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7."
Exhibit "1-B"
"Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when Hultman, a 10th grader at the International
School in Makati was escorted home by Chapman after going to a disco."
Exhibit "1-C"
"The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman."
Exhibit "1-D"
"The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to escape."
Exhibit "1-E"
"Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive" matter that might involve
influential people." 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to
"1-D." He just culled them from previous news reports of other newspapers. He admitted that the only portion he
wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco was Exhibit "1-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS
'RIGHT' SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof, which were not
written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital region, claims, however, that another security
guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his
companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at
the CIS laboratory indicated that he may not have fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2) newspaper clippings which
were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS
PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3," thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
"Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy" shortly before Chapman's shooting."
Exhibit "3-b"
"But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a dancer before she was adopted by her foster
parent."
Exhibit "3-c"
"Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside the village after the shooting and was
believed to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using the Palm street gate."
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c." He just reiterated previous reports
in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR DASMA SLAY," which
appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
"According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the witness showed up and said that the
gunman was on board a silver-metallic Lancer."
Exhibit "4-C"
"The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car and was talking to Hultman, who was
shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times." 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as
Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on information available at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON
DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she wrote a portion
thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c," and the sources of her information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c"
reads:
"Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was arrested at his house.
"They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control number 566 who had not been questioned,
voluntarily went to police headquarters upon invitation of Makati Police chief Superintendent Remy Macaspac." 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of the investigators to implicate
accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and that someone whom Maureen
called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c) that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car was a
white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the
gunman became a silver gray Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman. LLjur
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote in the news item, entitled: "I
WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the
source of her information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman said the day after his 17-year old
daughter was cremated." 115
Exhibit "6-b"
"The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman family's request for permission to
visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told me
that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as Exhibit "6." Specifically, he wrote
Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was quoted as telling Vergel de Dios."
Exhibit "6-e"
"BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases
because he belongs to a secret but very influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other
crimes in high levels of government and society." 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be
identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and consuming personal rage and bias of
Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by some
congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news account which appeared on the July
16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of
said article (Exhibit "7-c) and the source of his information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
"Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number '566.' The witnesses cannot tell
the plate's control letters." 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled:
"N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of said news item
which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
"At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked not to be identified insisted that the NBI
got the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case from the CIS."
Exhibit "8-c"
"He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as "resembling Teehankee but looks much
younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
"The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the
early morning of July 13. The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman."122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE," which appeared on
the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news account, 124 portions of
which were marked by the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
"The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness" picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an
NBI lineup."
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview Mangubat himself . 125
Exhibit "9-b"
"Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang
suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang ituturo," said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want to be identified."
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT
DEAD," which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof
were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
"The victims were on their way home in Olavi Leino's Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's plate number when a white
Lancer with plate number PKX-566 blocked its path."
Exhibit "10-a-2"
"US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a communications specialist. He said the shooting
could be the result of an altercation on the street." 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account he wrote which appeared on the
July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item
were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . "He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas
Village at past 4 a.m. Friday."
Exhibit "22-c"
"The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who was killed in front of his friends on his way
home from a party. The armed men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car
inside the village before the shooting."
Exhibit "22-a-1"
"The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman to alight from the car. They shot
Chapman several times in the body, while his companions identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olavi Leino,
were seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed the car with bullets. prLL
"The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the names of the detained suspects after
their initial investigation." 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which appeared on the July 18,
1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
"The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car on Mahogany St. in the subdivision."
Exhibit "23-a-2"
"Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olavi
Leino, a Finn, to get out of their car." cdll
Exhibit "23-a-3"
"They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate No. PDW 566. They added that they saw
the same car in the garage of the Teehankee family."129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (2) stories was the NBI and they were based on information
available to the NBI at that time. 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted
that he was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police station. He reiterated that the next
day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of work in Dasmariñas Village and asked him if he was sure
about the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado then said him he would no longer require
him to sign the statement he prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also presented as a prosecution
rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates
lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued washing with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue
embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours from the time of the alleged
firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin test. She related that she once
attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training, two (2) NBI
agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands. They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using
diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be
taken as a corroborative evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the presentation by the defense of sur-
rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a Constancia 135 manifesting that it
shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being unnecessary. The defense, however, declared
that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary. cdll
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The prosecution moved in open court that
the main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision in view of the absence of defense counsels who had
manifested that they would no longer present their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties
were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order within which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It
does not appear that the defense objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a motion asking for additional
time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged. 138 The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
"(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said
accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate and exemplary damages in the sum of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;
offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to
suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-
One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages;
offense of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00),
Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-
Four Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00,
both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of
said offended party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
"(4) In all these three cases, ordering said accused to pay all the offended parties the sum of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
"(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
"Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED." cdlex
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for New
Trial, 139 alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for decision not only the
petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further evidence was
violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND
PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE
SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR
BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who positively identified him as
the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar.
Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an occupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the
NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed
jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes.
During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His senses were also dulled by the
five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night. Llibris
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first
assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or
failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as
the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe
eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander,
involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the
witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of
these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal
human fallibilities and suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied). 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are
shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity
of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-
of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an
unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security
reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by
U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused
to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear
for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the
NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of
the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he
personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown
three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He, however,
categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to
the shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive.
Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court
identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted
by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5)
minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was
unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked
how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been
somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information
revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially
the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable
to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence which requires the
rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on the
case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on
the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the prosecution's evidence was, at best,
circumstantial and "suspiciously short in important details," there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by
the police. cdll
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the
description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the
NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not
resemble appellant is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered appellant's
face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to
etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality
committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance
of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant
create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper
motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other
before their chance encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses
that when the Dasmariñas security force and the Makati police conducted an on-the-spot investigation on the day of
the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed
Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information
to anyone as to what he supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the
NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly
told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was
sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was not
imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to
an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection from NBI officials that he
agreed to cooperate with the authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get
involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not
considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an indicium of incredulity. 154 It will
not depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas
passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his torture. The allegation is an out and out hearsay
as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of
torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise
extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of defense witness Pat.
James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the gunman
the first time he was brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he
positively identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He averred that the day after he identified
appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place of work in Dasmariñas and asked him again whether appellant was the
gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement
(Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to
state that appellant, whom he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to the testimony
of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as
generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its
jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a
congressional investigation. LexLibris
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not holding that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting incidents for this
contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an
examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the
body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found
it to be silver metallic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated
July 15, 1991, said that he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me
and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the
crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI
towed accused's car from Dasmariñas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running
condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz: (a) ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted
in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO,
another resident of Dasmariñas Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license plate control number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when
he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the
English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have
caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid
to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion,
some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach
especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court to "give judgment after
an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our
jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the
substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome
the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless
error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting
appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses
with high credibility. Llibris
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the
crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary
value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was
vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmariñas Village where it was parked to the NBI office.
Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its
ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in
running condition. Even appellant's evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son,
Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmariñas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of the color of the gunman's car.
Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163 Mangubat
declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies
amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat
white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the
break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses
unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves
scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the
gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not
have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons:
Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167 Moreover, Leino outrightly
dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this
possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in
the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely
establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that
the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a
number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may
also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears
gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In
the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or
washing of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She
likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the
shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by washing
or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon
noted that when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the
time of the alleged shooting. cdlex
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his
case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking
government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and
then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Corazon Aquino
even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge
failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
He claims there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the courtroom clapped
their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger
sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is
true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be
sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has
always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . .. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of
appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the
mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our
communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These
news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are
mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When a
gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will
outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who
will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains
and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity
that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., 175 we rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial judge allowed
the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper
behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention of the court to the visible display of a
placard inside the courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately directed that the placard be hidden.
Only then did he order the start of the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the media after they had enough opportunity to
take pictures. The court granted defense's request, noting that the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When
part of the audience clapped their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and
moved for the exclusion of the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the public was
not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court regarding media
coverage of trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of
sympathy by spectators inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that he
personally saw that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the courtroom, a group of
young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he
could not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at the spur of
the moment. He then admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage of the trial by the press. The defense
alleged that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny accused's constitutional right to due process. It
invoked the provision in the Rules of Court which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except
the organic personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered only in prosecution of
private offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public
offenses. He quoted the U.S case of Sheppard v. Maxwell 180 where it was held: "A responsible press is always regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the courtroom is public
property." The trial judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance to cover the proceedings before the trial proper but,
thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were
ordered to desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge gave the media two (2) minutes to take video
coverage and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media two (2) minutes to take pictures before the
trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the proceedings and
just take down notes. 183
6. On September 10, 1992, before the start of the afternoon session, the judge admonished the media people present in the
courtroom to stop taking pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records
reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for
his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of
the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the
same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further
hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial
judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality
against the trial judge. LLjur
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman,
and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means,
methods and forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove
treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at bar with treachery and evident
premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident
was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and
vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the
sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from
his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned
who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and
asked what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack
was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even
then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to
insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the
spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and
the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part
of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would
not, by itself, constitute treachery. 187 Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable
for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of
the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement.
Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen
moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen
and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by
appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There
was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which
appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was
thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of
Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the awards of moral and exemplary
damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He
likewise claims that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino and the heirs of victims Hultman and Chapman the following
damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00)
for loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay: Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
indemnity for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an
amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino; and, One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a
total of three million pesos) for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter of damages recoverable in case
of death arising from a felony, thus:
"When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are governed by penal laws,
'. . . subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages.' (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
"Thus, 'every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil
liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id. ) and said
consequential damages in turn include '. . . those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.'
(Art. 107, id. ) Since these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code,
(w)e will now turn to said provisions.
"The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
"In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably foseseen by the defendant." (Art. 2202)
"When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
"The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
"(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased
on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
death;
"(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the descendant's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
"(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
"The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00
in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 18793, promulgated
October 11, 1968, 190 and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be
adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being 'left to the discretion of
the court, according to the circumstances of each case.' (Art. 2216)
"Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being 'separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party.' (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
"In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art.
2206) and in cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, (Art. 2230) '. . . damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances,' (Art. 2204) 'but the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.' (Art.
2203) 'Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court.' (Art.
2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have
been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil action."
"Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following
items of damages:
"1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense — P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of any
evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances attending the
commission of the offense.
"2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an amount to be fixed by the court according to the
circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life expectancy, the
said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning
capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to
give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for
not more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
"3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
"4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, — an amount to be
fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
"5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, — the actual amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to
recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
"6. Interests in the proper cases.
"7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and for moral damages
are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00) corresponding to the
indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened
according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons." 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the law and the
case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or temperate and
exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together the awards for moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the particular
amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind. We shall, however, consider their propriety and
reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as temperate or moderate damages for the
records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be given as exemplary damages. The killing of
Chapman was not attended by either evident premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be
considered as one for moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:
"Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be at least (fifty thousand pesos, under
current jurisprudence) . . . In addition: LexLibris
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by appellant, we increase the amount of moral
damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and
her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of
Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders
Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of the adopted concur with the
adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;"
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural father. During the trial of these cases,
only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in
their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the circumstances. The records
reveal that Maureen hovered between life and death for ninety-seven (97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and
valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time, she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was
never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and go with death. She could not be left alone at the hospital.
Her parents had to be perpetually by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings
had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her
family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her and their bills
ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on the goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving
contributions from other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen never regained
consciousness until her demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229
of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be adjudged in order to
deter the commission of similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to
mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the
wanton acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her
youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason.
Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their families. Considering our soaring crime
rate, the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from taking the lives of people without
any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of
the New Civil Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against appellant for
the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary damages to victim
JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries as a result of the shooting. His
upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to restore it. His tongue was also injured.
He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were also affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he
had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The
roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and
suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a vacation
at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to come
and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the
middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to mind. 196 Understandably, the ill-effects of
the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to
relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find
that an award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of
the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS
JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is
gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn
money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of
his earning capacity although he was still a medical student at the time of injury. However, the award was not
without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was
presented at the trial, justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due
time; and a doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga would have earned had he
finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos, of Forty Thousand Dollars (U.S.
$40,000.00) for the loss of earning capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly
speculative and should be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the International
School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991
to pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero
Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his first year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a mere
high school graduate. Under the foregoing circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to
justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club and
ultimately become a professional pilot. cdll
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of
deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court incorrectly used the monthly salary of a
secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per the estimate given by
Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed
for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman
himself testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
"ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued her studies, what professional career would
she would (sic) like to pursue considering her interests and inclinations?
"WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection is that, certainly she would have been an artist
in the creative side. She would have become an actress or a movie producer or probably she would have been a college
graduate.
"ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in Sweden, how much would she have earned?
A Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month." 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen for
loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden. LLjur
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school, Maureen took up a short
personality development course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at the time
of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just received her first salary, for which reason she went out with her
friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed
at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum
wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos
(P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net income per
annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 —
age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have been received by the heirs
as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four
Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased, the life
expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that the award of damages for death is
computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00),
claiming that the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees
and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some
hearings having both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and half years. More than forty
(40) witnesses testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of the cases came up to this
Court for review at least twice during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the evident effort
exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00)
pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where no less than forty-one (41)
witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning the murder charge for
the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination
of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due process when
the trial court considered all the cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its sur-
rebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991. The
incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that,
initially, there was only one murder charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the
course of the proceedings on October 17, 1991. prLL
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's petition for bail. The
prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and
inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the
testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of Leino and
Hultman) were concerned. He argued that since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the
killing of Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were recommended was
irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should
wait until after accused's arraignment on August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial
on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first witness to testify on all
three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings conducted by the trial court were
limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence relative to the shooting incident, including
evidence in support of the claim for damages. These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the defense
counsels. The defense never objected that evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit
presentation of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court issued an Order 211directing the parties to submit
their Memorandum, after which "the main case as well as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for Decision and
Resolution." After receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file the
defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's Order submitting for decision the main
case and the petition for bail. Neither did it move for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had witnesses
to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum praying for accused's acquittal. This is inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing conducted was
only on the petition for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for decision was only his petition for bail, he
would have only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial court, the defense did not interpose any objection
to the intended promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the promulgation of the Decision and manifested that they were ready
therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard simultaneously and appellant
acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present additional evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On
the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It
took the defense almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense presented more than twenty (20)
witnesses and several documentary evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant
that he filed a motion for new trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that
the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a
chance to present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did
not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he
could not have produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy
to delay the decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court, dated December
22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.
crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One
Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two
Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos
and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual
damages; One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages. LexLibris
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3) offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos) for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, [October 6, 1995], 319 PHIL 128-216)
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO vs. JOSEPH ESTRADA and
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13, 2001.]
SYNOPSIS
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court denying petitioners' request for permission to televise
and broadcast live the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. This motion was filed by
the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argued that there is really no conflict between the right of the
people to public information and the freedom of the press, on one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a
fair trial. He further elaborated that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of
the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information,
and live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit
of selfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterated his objection to
the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule. ETHSAI
The Court ruled that considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an
audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the
National Museum and in the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition
pursuant to law.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON
MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA WILL BE FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES ONLY. — Considering the
significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings
will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains.
The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES FOR AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING INSIDE THE COURTROOM. — For the purpose
of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement
of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public
pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the
documentary except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-
visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case
may be.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR TELEVISED RECORDING. — There are several reasons for such televised
recording. First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that
"the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how
their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people. Above all, there is the need to keep audio-
visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of
the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events.
They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of
the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during
the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes. SEIacA
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE FOR THE DELAY OF THE RELEASE OF THE TAPES FOR BROADCAST. — On
the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings
will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles — whether as
counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges — will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of
justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be
minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can
render its own will be avoided. At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial — which, it
may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials — will be
addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast
will be avoided.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT A BAR TO THE PRODUCTION OF SUCH
DOCUMENTARY. — Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day
Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him
or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MAKING OF A MOVIE BASED ON THE TRIAL COULD NOT BE PREVENTED. — No one can
prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings,
any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to
distort the truth can thus be averted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTARY RECORDING OF CELEBRATED CASES; EXPLAINED. — Indeed, a somewhat
similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes célèbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul
Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained: "In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my
lay friends found similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther
leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the
case was concluded — concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal. No one could witness the trial without a
feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law
copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with
which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities. I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the
courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the
broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I
would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial
is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding. Understanding of
our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate need." Professor Freund's
observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious
risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running
high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual
recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS FOR AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE TRIAL. — [A]n audio-visual
recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the
account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting
such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement
of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings
before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision
and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it;
and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall
be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NOT DIMINISHED BY
ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. — Due process is timeless. It is a precious fundamental right that
secures and protects, under a rule of law, the life and liberty of a person from the oppression of power. A cherished
fixture in our bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee will not be diminished by advances in science and technology.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; CAN BE
ACHIEVED VIA OTHER MEDIA COVERAGE OTHER THAN LIVE RADIO/TV COVERAGE. — I see it as being an
implicit retreat, unwisely, from an age-old struggle of the individual against the tyranny of the sovereign. The right of
the public to information, in any event, is not here really being sacrificed. The right to know can very well be achieved
via other media coverage; the windows of information through which the public might observe and learn are not
closed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA WILL BE FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES ONLY; REASONS. — In addressing the present
motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court opine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings for documentary purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic significance; second,
the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their
government works; third, the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civic training of the people; and
fourth, such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or
decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPERIENCE ATTESTS TO THE INTIMIDATING EFFECT OF CAMERAS AND
ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN COURTROOMS. — The proposition has novel features; regrettably, I still find it hard to
believe that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court
proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the
intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In addition,
the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in
contravention of normal experience. The demeanor of the witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of
the judge to accurately assess the credibility of such witnesses. The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not
adequately address the dangers mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many
imponderables.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS NOT PRIVACY THAT CAN CAUSE CONCERN MORE THAN THE EROSION OF
REALITY THAT CAMERAS TEND TO CAST. — Most importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a
spectacle of the cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in every human being, and
there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can
cause concern more than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast. TcEDHa
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE RULE MUST BE OF GENERAL APPLICATION. — In the petition, albeit entitled an
administrative matter, the only issue raised is whether the cases of a former President pending before the
Sandiganbayan can be covered by live television and radio broadcast. The matter now being sought to be addressed
by my esteemed colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be considered at all, the rule must be of general application
and promulgated after a thorough study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have been said and done in
this case. Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given, should prove to be helpful and of value.
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and
broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary
of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public
information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial;
that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a
safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. STCDaI
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his
trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the
impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other.
Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no
reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the
trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members, 1 the Court denies the motion for
reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has resolved to order the
audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices 3 vote against the audio-visual
recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of
preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings.
The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be
available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law. 4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall
be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public
pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the
documentary except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-
visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case
may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an
affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod
Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by
audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the
people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings
will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it
cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a
review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of
the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the
proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles —
whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges — will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before
the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can
be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can
render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial — which, it may be assumed, is the concern of
those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials — will be addressed since the tapes will not be
released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the
tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served by audio-visual recordings
without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, 5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a
documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
the 1986 EDSA. people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character." 6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made of the
proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and
any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes célèbres was made way
back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational
television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the
document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was concluded — concluded incidentally, with a
verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the truth was
searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden
of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use
of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded
and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few
equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate need. 7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its
recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially
when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity
of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after
passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby
ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan determine should not be held public
under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without
comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d)
the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of
the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be
made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant
to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast,
the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (Resolution), [September 13, 2001], 417 PHIL 395-409)
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL. [A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. June 14, 2011.]
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to
Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists
in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-
162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et
al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn
Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, 1 individual journalists 2 from various media
entities, and members of the academe 3 filed a petition before this Court praying that live television
and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders)
be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. 4 The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines 5 (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong
Mamamahayag 6 (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-
Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases
and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall
beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court. 7 The Court docketed the petition
as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 8 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out
"in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The
President expressed "earnest hope that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic
deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits." 9 The
Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. AHCaES
By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, 10 the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-
SC. The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
Meanwhile, various groups 11 also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions and statements bearing on
these matters.
The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6,
2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also filed a
Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They
principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon
C. Aquino's Libel Case 12 and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada 13 which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed
restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a
viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the
gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that
reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict
orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the
courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter 14 to Judge Solis-Reyes,
requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases.
Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Court's
attention through appropriate motion." 15 Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the
press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress
of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court
proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly. IaEASH
Putt's Law 16 states that "technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not
manage, and those who manage what they do not understand." Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their
judicial robe and don the experts' gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks
from the use of technology inside the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that
delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.
The indication of "serious risks" posed by live media coverage to the accused's right to due process, left unexplained
and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to
public information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a
feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be
dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal
administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and
solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same
underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm — "[a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to
all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the
dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated." The observation that "[m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the
trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum" stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes
shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior
to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial
proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted as above indicated. 17 SHTaID
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that "[t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s]
the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the
one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a
court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial." The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or
liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 18
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer
of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions:
. . . (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine
should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity
and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and
shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain
them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the
cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and
shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual
recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. 19
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas 20 which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the
dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose
members are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of
evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the
wake of latest jurisprudence 21 and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of
Columbia, allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdom's Supreme
Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast. 22 The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video
streaming in the internet. 23
On the media coverage's influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out thatAquino and Estrada,
like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where
the conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study
on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly
explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. 24 and Estrada v. Desierto, 25 that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a
fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to
a fair trial. caSDCA
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment
arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party
may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for
disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise
exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility
of accommodating even the parties to the cases — the private complainants/families of the victims and other
witnesses — inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. 26 (underscoring
supplied) IaHAcT
Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may observe the proceedings, the
peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of
families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond
mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears
noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties,
whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.
Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court
lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and
for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the
audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical
plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations
and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings
without an application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-
angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting
or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and
controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should
not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must
be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on
the physical set-up of the camera and equipment. ISAcHD
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in
such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall
be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking
cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue
commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities' facilities, the media entities shall
access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or
from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images
and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or
encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court 27 applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon
motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification
issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the
dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the
audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be
allowed until the day's proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be
broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain
them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the
contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief
footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. TSADaI
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court
which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the
grant of application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate
arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning
the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special
Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology
that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field
of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices
such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be
observed in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key
constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and
regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the
various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to
the guidelines herein outlined.
SO ORDERED.
||| (In re Ampatuan, A.M. Nos. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC & 10-11-7-SC (Resolution), [June 14, 2011], 667 PHIL 128-143)
UNITED STATES vs. LAZARO JAVIER ET AL [G.R. No. L-12990. January 21, 1918.]
SYLLABUS
1. THEFT OF LARGE CATTLE; PROOF. — A carabao, seen in the possession of the accused and later found tied in
front of a house, was identified as the carabao, which had been taken from the corral of Doroteo Natividad. Held: That
the accused having offered no satisfactory explanation for their possession of the carabao, they can properly be
convicted of the crime of theft.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES. — There are two principal reasons for the
provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says: "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face." The first reason is the right of cross-examination, and the second is that
the tribunal may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while testifying.
3. ID.; ID. — Exhibit B of the prosecution is the sworn statement before the justice of the peace of the municipality of
Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas, of the sergeant, now deceased, who was the leader of the patrol of the
Constabulary which encountered the accused, and whose signature was identified. Held: That Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
MALCOLM, J p:
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows.
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in
the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to
look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the
matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased,
on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de
Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following
day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa
Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken
from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the
accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of this character
is that, although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their identify
remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the
commission of the crime and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be properly
convicted of the crime. (See U.S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil. 425.) In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to
insinuate that one of the Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the lower
court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presca,
now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas,
Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says,
"That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the
provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to
the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U.S.
[1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses
are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence,
and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused
upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of
the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. vs. Anastasio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for
example U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908, 12 Phil. 87.) It is for us now to determine whether
the present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some
exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave the defense an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is
therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former action
between the same relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298. No. 8, of the
Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the
statement of Presca a dying declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can
rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div]) occurring in the year 1696. It Bristol
under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all
opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of
both courts that these depositions should not be given in evidence, the defendant not being present when they were
taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are faced with the alternative
of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-
examination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone of accepting the
statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find this to be versible error
and remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing except
delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable
evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, connection with article 520, as amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the
defendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio correccional, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of the costs of both instances; the carabao shall be
returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
||| (U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, [January 21, 1918], 37 PHIL 449-453)
AGUSTIN TALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos. L-75511-14. March 16, 1987.]
CRUZ,J p:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to
any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this
case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that
it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction. prLL
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa through falsification
of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four
government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments 2 Docketed as
CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had
rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. 3 They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves
in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating
in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all
the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the
petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the following remarks about the separate trial:
"The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed, upon their petition, separate trials for the
accused Basilio and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in deciding these cases as
against them, the evidence for the prosecution as well as their own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused
can not be taken up.
"It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many
incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino
and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they
were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies
can not now be considered against said three accused.
"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid story related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution
did not endeavor to call Ulat and put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal evidence. Had this been done, there
would have been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused." 5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused,
especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true
that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we
have held in several cases that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence,
although, as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there
appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the
prosecution shall remain on record against all the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the
separate trial of the other accused. 8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for
separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the
serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according
the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine
them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory
information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their
libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless
the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the
dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
"...With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine
origin (Dowdell v. U.S. [1911],221 U.S. 325) that it `intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused
to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination.' In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before
it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906],6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of
cases. (See for example U.S. v. Tanjuanco [1902],1 Phil.,374; U.S. v. Bello [1908],11 Phil.,526; U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908],12
Phil. 87.) ...."
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the
testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention
of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his
complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Thus: LexLib
"If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor participation in the conspiracy to defraud, he would
have questioned this obvious irregularity. He would have asked whoever was following up the vouchers why two
biddings were conducted, why the awards to `D'Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and when
the new bidding was made.
"The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino. While his duty to initial or sign the vouchers as
regards the adequacy of funds may have been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear
evidence of his complicity in the conspiracy.
"Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers (including three made out in favor of `D'Alfenor
Repair Shop') were brought to him for his certificate as regards the availability of funds. He had signed all the four
vouchers. In the afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers were also presented to him for certification as to
funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits `A',`B' and `C' which he had earlier signed but which, according to
Talino, were disallowed and cancelled. Talino claims that he had examined the supporting documents of the last three
vouchers — the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at least
the abstract of bids submitted in the morning, where `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder, must
have been different from the ones submitted together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would have raised his
suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively)
when it was only that morning that the abstracts containing the name of `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The
fact that he readily approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that he
knew he was facilitating an irregular transaction.
"It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond doubt the participation of both Agustin Talino and
Alejandro Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in the informations." 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the
evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court speaking.
That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was
inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat," and was not even required to be
present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been
presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment
to the use of his testimony against the other accused." As this was not done, the trial court could not and did not
consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner' s part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we
see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence
because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. LLphil
Teehankee, C.J.,Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr.,Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on official leave.
Alampay, J., took no part, was on leave during deliberation.
||| (Talino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, [March 16, 1987], 232 PHIL 554-561)
DOMINGO ROCO vs. HON. EDWARD CONTRERAS [G.R. No. 158275. June 28,
2005.]
GARCIA, J p:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court are the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038, to wit:
1. Decision dated 20 August 2002, 1 dismissing the appeal filed by herein petitioner Domingo Roco contra the 18 October
2000 resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Roxas City, denying due course to and dismissing his petition
for certiorari in SP Case No. 7489; and
2. Resolution dated 12 May 2003, 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. Sometime in 1993, he
purchased his supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cal's Poultry Supply Corporation (Cal's
Corporation, for short), a domestic corporation controlled and managed by one Danilo Yap. As payment for his
purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to Cal’s Corporation against his account with the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), which checks bear the following particulars:
Check No. Date Amount
004502 26 April 1993 P329,931.40

004503 4 May 1993 P319,314.40
004507 19 May 1993 P380,560.20
004511 26 May 1993 P258,660.20
004523 22 May 1993 P141,738.55
Cal's Corporation deposited the above checks in its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for having been
drawn against a closed account. Thereafter, Cal's Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
After preliminary investigation, five (5) informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Roxas City, thereat docketed as Crim. Cases No. 94-2172-12 to 94-2176-12, all
of which were raffled to Branch 2 of said court.
Meanwhile, and even before trial could commence, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) at Iloilo
City a denunciation letter against Cal's Corporation for the latter's alleged violation of Section 258 in relation to
Section 263 of the National Internal Revenue Code in that it failed to issue commercial invoices on its sales of
merchandise. Upon BIR's investigation, it was found that Cal's Corporation’s sales on account were unavoidable,
hence, the corporation had to defer the issuance of "Sales Invoices" until the purchases of its customers were paid in
full. With respect to the sales invoices of petitioner, the investigation disclosed that the same could not, as yet, be
issued by the corporation precisely because the checks drawn and issued by him in payment of his purchases were
dishonored by PCIB for the reason that the checks were drawn against a closed account. Accordingly, the BIR found
no prima facia evidence of tax evasion against Cal's Corporation. 3 aEHADT
Thereupon, trial of the criminal cases proceeded. After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted
for decision on account of petitioner's failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, the same court rendered a
judgment of conviction against petitioner.
Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his
right to due process when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording him of the right to present his
evidence. Agreeing with the petitioner, the RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the cases to it for the
reception of petitioner's evidence.
On 11 March 1999, during the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance
of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal's
Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19 May 1999 and to bring with
them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999, to wit: DHcTaE
a) Sales Journal for the year 1993;
b) Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;
c) Sales Ledger for the year 1993;
d) Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in its absence, Accounts Receivable Ledger for the years 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998 or 1999);
e) Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statements as of February
1999;
f) Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999; and
g) Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
The prosecution did not object to this request.
When the cases were called on 19 May 1999, the MTCC, then presided by Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an
order granting petitioner's aforementioned request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas.
During the trial of 14 July 1999, the private prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the trial court to have
directed the issuance of the requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner countered by saying that Judge Delfin's
order of 19 May 1999 had become final and hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing
the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioner's request for the issuance of subpoenas. IADaSE
The prosecution did file its opposition, thereunder arguing that:
a) Vivian Deocampo, who previously testified for Lota Briones-Roco in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-2177-12 to 94-2182-12
before Branch 1 of the MTC, had earlier attested to the fact that the following documents, records and books of
accounts for 1993 sought by petitioner were already burned:
1. Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statement as of February
1999;
2. Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999; and
3. Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
b) the Sales Ledger for the year 1993 cannot be produced because Cal's Corporation did not maintain such ledger; and
c) the account Receivable Ledger for the periods from 1993, the Income Statement for 1993 and the Balance Sheet as of
February 1999, cannot also be produced because Cal's Corporation recently computerized its accounting records and
was still in the process of completing the same. SEcTHA
For its part, the corporation itself maintained that the production of the above-mentioned documents was
inappropriate because they are immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted.
In a resolution dated 19 October 1999, the MTCC, this time thru its regular Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B.
Contreras, denied petitioner's request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other
records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only
unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
His motion for reconsideration of the denial resolution having been similarly denied by Judge Contreras, petitioner
then went to the RTC on a petition for certiorari with plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Contreras, which petition was
docketed in the RTC as SP Case No. V-7489. cDAITS
In a resolution dated 18 October 2000, the RTC denied due course to and dismissed the petition for petitioner's failure
to show that Judge Contreras committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A
motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioner, but it, too, was likewise denied.
Undaunted, petitioner went on appeal via certiorari to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038.
As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 20 August 2002, 4 dismissed the petition and
accordingly affirmed the impugned resolutions of the RTC. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the same court in its resolution of 12 May 2003, 5 petitioner is now with us via the present recourse on his
submissions that —
I.
. . . THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AS
ENSHRINED IN ART. III, SEC. 14 (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
II.
. . . THERE MUST BE A BALANCING OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE RIGH [sic] OF AN ACCUSED TO PROVE HIS
INNOCENCE AND THE RIGHT OF A COMPLAINANT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE.
As we see it, the pivotal issue is whether or not the three (3) courts below committed reversible error in denying
petitioner's request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the five
(5) criminal cases for violation of BP 22 filed against him and now pending trial before the MTCC.
We rule in the negative.
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action
or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. 6
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records,
things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: 7
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it
concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books,
documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant
to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the
parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow: 8
In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by
the court, it is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or
rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its
production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted
with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be enforced. (Emphasis
supplied) CHIEDS
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., 9 we held:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it must
appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant
and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence
has been so designated or described that it may be identified. (Emphasis supplied)
Going by established precedents, it thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court,
the relevancy and the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it.
Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his
request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.
It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner
miserably failed to discharge his burden.
In the recent case of Aguirre vs. People of the Philippines, 10 the Court reiterated the following discussions regarding
violations of BP 22:
. . . what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of
Appeals, 233 SCRA 301). All the elements, therefore, of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are all present in the
instant criminal cases and for which the accused is solely liable, to wit: [a] the making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply to account or for value; [2] the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and [3] subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).
We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. 11 The offense is already consummated from the very moment a
person issues a worthless check, albeit payment of the value of the check, either by the drawer or by the drawee bank,
within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense because the prima
facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance
of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by such payment. 12
Here, petitioner would want it appear that the books and documents subject of his request for subpoena duces
tecum are indispensable, or, at least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court disagrees.
Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal’s
Corporation with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad
slips had been validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents
requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment. In the words of the appellate court:
The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the Regional Trial Court, that he had been issued temporary receipts in
the form of yellow pad slips of paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments which were all validated by the
Private Respondent (Exhibits "8" and "F" and their submarkings). Even if the temporary receipts issued by the Private
Respondent may not have been the official receipts for Petitioner's payments, the same are as efficacious and binding
on the Private Respondent as official receipts issued by the latter.
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this Court must have to disbelieve the
factual findings of the appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel
the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to
testify and bring with them the records and documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to
further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.
Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on their very face thereof, what the fact that the
requested Audited Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax Returns, etc. pertained to the years 1994
to 1999 which could not have reflected petitioner's alleged payment because the subject transaction happened in 1993.
Again, we quote from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals:
The checks subject of the criminal indictments against the Petitioner were drawn and dated in 1993. The Petitioner has
not demonstrated the justification, for the production of the books/records for 1994, and onwards, up to 1999.
Especially so, when the "Informations" against the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed, with the Trial Court,
as early as 1994. aCSHDI
We are inclined to believe, along with that court, that petitioner was just embarking on a "fishing expedition" to derail
"the placid flow of trial".
With the above, it becomes evident to this Court that petitioner’s request for the production of books and documents
referred to in his request are nakedly calculated to merely lengthen the proceedings in the subject criminal cases, if not
to fish for evidence. The Court deeply deplores petitioner's tactics and will never allow the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
||| (Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, [June 28, 2005], 500 PHIL 275-287)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OMAR MAPALAO [G.R. No. 92415. May 14, 1991.]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; APPELLANT'S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED SINCE HE
REMAINED AT LARGE WHILE HIS APPEAL WAS PENDING; REASON FOR RULE UNDER SECTION 8, RULE
122 OF THE 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. — Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." In
this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal
must be dismissed. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; SECTION 6, RULE 120 OF THE 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE
MODIFIED TO READ THAT ACCUSED WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL IF UPON PROMULGATION OF
JUDGMENT HE FAILS TO APPEAL WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE. — Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be modified to read that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appeal
without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived
his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is
otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.
3. ID.; ID.; BAIL; ACCUSED WHO IS AT LARGE CANNOT APPLY FOR BAIL OR BE GRANTED ANY OTHER
RELIEF BY THE COURTS UNTIL HE SUBMITS HIMSELF TO ITS JURISDICTION OR IS ARRESTED. — By the same
token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and had not been apprehended or otherwise has
not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts
until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF GUILT; ESCAPE OF ACCUSED IS EVIDENCE OF THEIR GUILT. — Contrary to the
claim of appellant that he is innocent as he did not escape together with Edris who was allegedly the principal player
in the holdup, the fact remains that the appellant escaped to the mountains together with his co-accused Magumnang
and Gumanak Ompa. Their escape is evidence of their guilt.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Highway robbery with homicide is a heinous offense. It is condemnable enough for a person to commit robbery by
way of a holdup but if in the process human life is taken, the criminal act is certainly detestable. No less than the
death penalty provided by law should be meted out if we are to contain the proliferation of this odious offense.
Unfortunately, unless Congress and Malacañang act accordingly to consider by law this class of crimes as heinous
offenses, the Courts must have to comply with the constitutional injunction against the imposition of the supreme
penalty. Cdpr
The facts are accurately related by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City as follows:
"It appears from the Evidence that Adolfo Quiambao is a businessman selling textile materials. He has a stall in the
Hilltop Market in Baguio where he sells his goods. But sometimes on weekends, he goes to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet
to sell his goods.
On September 19, 1987 at about 3:00 to 4:00 A.M., he went to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet using his Ford Fiera with his
driver Felizardo Galves and a certain Jimmy Jetwani (a bombay), where he sold his goods in the afternoon until at
night and so, stayed overnight thereat.
The next day, at about 7:00 A.M. of September 20, 1987, after breakfast, Adolfo Quiambao, his driver Felizardo
Galvez, and Jimmy Jetwani proceeded to Mankayan, Benguet. This time four Muslims rode with them, namely: Omar
Mapalao, Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, and a certain Anwar Hadji Edris. Incidentally, Omar Mapalao and Rex
Magumnang had previously rode once with Adolfo Quiambao in the latter's vehicle sometime September 13, 1987
while Anwar Hadji Edris (alias Randy) was known to Adolfo Quiambao for sometime already. They arrived in
Mankayan at about 8:00 A.M. They stayed 4 hours in Mankayan to sell goods and collect from customers.
At about 12:00 noon of the same day of September 20, 1987, they, the same passengers previously, started from
Mankayan going back to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, with one passenger added, Simeon Calama. At Abatan, Adolfo
Quiambao collected amounts from his customers for about an hour.
At about 1:00 to 2:00 P.M. on September 20, 1987, Adolfo Quiambao proceeded on his way back to Baguio. They were
10 in all who rode in his Ford Fiera, namely: (1) his driver Felizardo Galves; (2) Jimmy Jetwani; (3) Simeon Calama, a
son of his customer in Mankayan; (4) Rene Salonga, a friend with whom he stayed in Abatan when he started his
business; (5) Eduardo Lopez, a co-vendor who sells also goods in Abatan; (6) Omar Mapalao; (7) Rex Magumnang; (8)
Aliman Bara-akal; (9) Anwar Hadji Edris; and (10) Adolfo Quiambao himself.
On the way, they stopped at Natubleng, Buguias, Benguet at about 3:00 P.M. where Jimmy Jetwani and Adolfo
Quiambao collected their credits for less than an hour.
From there, they proceeded to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet where they stopped at about 5:00 P.M. for Adolfo Quiambao
and Jimmy Jetwani to collect their credits. At Sayangan, too, they ate in a restaurant.
It was about 6:00 P.M. already when they left Sayangan to proceed to Baguio. But when they left Sayangan, Adolfo
Quiambao noticed that there were now 5 Muslims with apparently Gumanak Ompa joining them making them 11
passengers in all in his Ford Fiera.
On the way back to Baguio, after about an hour of driving, one of the passengers stopped the vehicle in order to
urinate. So they all alighted to urinate. At this point, Adolfo Quiambao took over driving telling his driver Felizardo
Galvez to rest.
After about 30 minutes of driving from the time Adolfo Quiambao took over, one of the Muslims stopped the vehicle
at Km. 24, Caliking, Atok, Benguet, in order to urinate. And so again they stopped with the Muslims alighting to
urinate.
Thereafter, when Adolfo Quiambao was about to start the vehicle to proceed to Baguio, while waiting for the Muslims
to board, Omar Mapalao went to the left side of the vehicle near the driver's seat, pointed a gun (Exh. G) at Adolfo
Quiambao and announced 'This is a holdup.' Another Muslim went to the other side of the front seat while another
Muslim went to the back to guard the back door of the Ford Fiera. And Gumanak Ompa and Rex Magumnang, each
armed with a knife, went inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their knives on the passengers. Forthwith,
Omar Mapalao, while pointing the gun, ordered all passengers in front to go inside the back of the vehicle. Adolfo
Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani complied. But as Adolfo Quiambao went inside the back of the vehicle, he heard
arguing outside and noticed a rumble and a commotion by the left side of the vehicle involving his driver, Felizardo
Galvez, and the Muslims. As a consequence, the driver Galves was injured. Adolfo Quiambao pleaded that they are
willing to give their money and valuables provided they (the Muslims) will not harm them. Rex Magumnang and
Gumanak Ompa, while poking their knives on the passengers, divested Adolfo Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jimmy
Jetwani of P14,000.00, and Simeon Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, watch and clothes.
After divesting the passengers of their money, Rex Magumnang went to the driver's seat to start the vehicle but could
not and so he called for Adolfo Quiambao to start it. But Adolfo Quiambao, too, could not start the vehicle. Angered,
Omar Mapalao started counting 1 to 3 threatening to shoot Quiambao if the vehicle would not start. Adolfo Quiambao
pleaded that he was not the driver and so called for Felizardo Galvez, despite the latter being injured, to start the
vehicle. After Galvez was able to start the engine, immediately Rex Magumnang went by the side of the driver,
Galvez, and took hold of the steering wheel while ordering the latter to step on the accelerator and proceed to the
direction of the left side of the road towards the precipice (bangin) indicating an intention to have the vehicle driven
to the precipice. It was at this point when Galvez struggled and fought with Rex Magumnang for control of the
steering wheel as it was being directed to the ravine. It was good Galvez was able to step on the brakes on time to
prevent it from falling into the precipice. It was then that Rex Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife on Galvez
with the latter jerking saying 'aray' in pain. At this point, too, the passengers panicked and jumped out of the vehicle
scampering in different directions for safety. Adolfo Quiambao jumped out into the ground first and when he saw
Mapalao pointing a gun at him, he jumped into the precipice thinking it was better than to be shot at and in doing so
hurt himself. The driver Galvez fell to the ravine upon being stabbed. Jimmy Jetwani jumped out of the vehicle and
ran to the mountains without looking back. Simeon Calama and Eduardo Lopez and Rene Salonga, too, jumped out
and sought safety on the road.
Meantime, a vegetable truck passed by and immediately Aliman Bara-akal boarded the same on the front seat with
the driver. Eduardo Lopez also ran after the same truck and boarded it at the back. Not far behind the first vegetable
truck was another vegetable truck following it. Simeon Calama stopped it asking for help but Omar Mapalao, with
gun in his hand, prevented him. And so the second vegetable truck went on but before it could fully pass by, Simeon
Calama took the chance of boarding it when Omar Mapalao's attention was diverted.
Thus, the two vegetable trucks proceeded on their way till they stopped at the toll gate at Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
Immediately, Simeon Calama and Eduardo Lopez alighted and reported to the Police Station near the toll gate that
they were held up and that one of the Muslims who held them up was in the first truck parked near the toll gate.
Aliman Bara-akal was, thus, arrested by the Tublay Police and the amount of P4,015.00 was recovered from him when
frisked at the Police Station.
Meanwhile, at the crime scene, the 3 Muslims left thereat, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa, fled
to the mountains leaving their victims and avoided the road so as not to be seen.
It is not clear on record where Anwar Hadji Edris (alias Randy) went after the holdup but in any case he eluded arrest.
After the Muslims have left, Adolfo Quiambao went up to the road level and by then saw also his driver Galvez
wounded lying in the precipice.
Thereafter, another vegetable truck passed by, and Adolfo Quiambao asked the driver to help them bring his
wounded driver, Felizardo Galvez, from the ravine. Thus, Galvez was brought up to the road and placed inside the
Ford Fiera. The vegetable truck driver helped in starting the Ford Fiera. And from there, they proceeded immediately
to the Benguet Hospital at La Trinidad, Benguet, but when there was no doctor, they brought Galvez to the Baguio
General Hospital.
At the Baguio General Hospital, efforts to save the life of Felizardo Galvez proved futile as the next morning he died
of his stab wounds.
Dr. Wi submitted an Autopsy Report (Exh. A) as follows:
'I. STAB WOUNDS:
1. Right Mid-clavicular area, 7th Intercostal Space, penetrating with round edges, 0.5 x 0.5 cm.
2. Left Lumbar area, level 11th Intercostal Space, penetrating, with clean cut edges, 1.9 cm.
3. Anterior-superior right pre-auricular area, with clean cut edges, 3.5 cm., and 2 cm. deep.
4. Right Mid-clavicular area level 2nd rib, non penetrating, 3 x 0.7 cm., and 2 cm. deep.
5. Left anterior Deltoid area, 9.5 cm. (extended Surgically).
6. Posterior leaf of the left Diaphragm 3 cm. with hemorrhages around the wound.
7. Through and through, Right lower lobe of the Lung, 0.5 x 0.5 cm. with round edges.
'II. INCISED WOUNDS:
1. Right lateral neck, superficial, 2 cm.
2. Left supraclavicular to left submandibular area, superficial, 12.5 cm.
3. Left upper arm, lateral area, 2 cm. and 2 mm. deep.'
Dr. Wi, also, submitted a sketch of the human body showing the stab wounds sustained in the body of Felizardo
Galvez (Exh. B and Exh. C) and the Death Certificate (Exh. D) showing the cause of death as 'Hypovolemic Shock
secondary to Multiple Stab wounds at the right anterior superior and auricular area, right anterior chest, left deltoid
area, left lumbar area, posterior with laceration of the right lower lobe of the lung, etc.'
Adolfo Quiambao was also treated of his injuries as shown in his Medical Certificate (Exh. E).
Subsequently, the Tublay Police were able to locate and apprehend on September 21, 1987 at Sto. Niño, Tublay, Omar
Mapalao, Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa.
Also, Jimmy Jetwani, who fled to the mountains at the scene of the incident was found and rescued the next morning
after the holdup.
In a confrontation at the Tublay Police Station on September 22, 1987, Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon
Calama positively identified the four (4) Muslims in custody, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang, Gumanak Ompa and
Aliman Bara-akal as among those who held them up at the Halsema Road (mountain trail), Km. 24, Caliking, Atok,
Benguet.
Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama gave their statements (Exhs. F, M and N) to the police.
At the Tublay Police Station, too, the gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to G-5) and the
knife (Exh. G-6) used in the holdup were recovered from the possession of Gumanak Ompa.
Finally, the policemen who apprehended Aliman Bara-akal at the toll gate executed a joint affidavit (Exhs. O and P)
and the policemen who apprehended Mapalao, Ompa and Magumnang at Sto. Niño, Tublay, executed a joint
affidavit (Exh. R)." 1
In due course, an amended information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City charging Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-
akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532, which was allegedly committed on September 20, 1987 at
Km. 24 along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok, Benguet.
Upon arraignment, accused Omar Mapalao, Gumanak Ompa, Rex Magumnang and Aliman Bara-akal, assisted by
their counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Accused Anwar Hadji Edris had not been arrested and remained at large. On March 17, 1988, accused Aliman Bara-
akal died in jail during the trial so the case was dismissed as to him on April 4, 1988. Accused Rex Magumnang, after
being positively identified by witnesses Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama during the trial,
escaped from detention on September 25, 1988 when brought for medical treatment to the Baguio General Hospital, so
the trial in absentia continued as to him. LLpr
After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990 convicting the accused of
the offense charged as follows —
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Omar Mapalao y Dianalan, Gumanak Ompa, and Rex Magumnang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation, of the offense of Robbery with Homicide in a Highway
in violation of PD 532, as charged, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of deceased Felizardo Galvez the sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos
for his death; to indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Adolfo Quiambao the sum of Forty Thousand
(P40,000.00) Pesos; Jimmy Jetwani the sum of Fourteen Thousand (P14,000.00) Pesos; and Simeon Calama, the sum of
Three Thousand Seven Hundred (P3,700.00) Pesos as actual damages, all indemnifications being without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The accused Omar Mapalao and Gumanak Ompa being detention prisoners are entitled to 4/5 of their preventive
imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the service of their sentence.
The gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to G-5), and the knife (Exh. G-6) being
instruments of the crime are hereby declared forfeited and confiscated in favor of the State.
SO ORDERED." 2
Not satisfied therewith the accused Omar Mapalao and Rex Magumnang appealed the decision to this Court alleging
the following errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER SIGNIFICANT EXCULPATORY FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY AS PRINCIPALS IN THE CRIME
CHARGED AND SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF FROM 17 YEARS, 4
MONTHS AND 1 DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL
AS MAXIMUM." 3
Parenthetically, the appeal of appellant Rex Magumnang should be struck down. After arraignment and during the
trial, he escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in
absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated.
Nevertheless, through counsel, he appealed to this Court. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." In
this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal
must be dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and
so the trial in absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2)
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal
therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court
as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court.
To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:
"If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall
further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or
his counsel."
It should provide instead that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable
cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to
appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise
arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been apprehended or
otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief
by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested. prLL
In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 4 this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in this wise —
"First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private
respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22, 1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary
appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-
private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this — was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed
to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier
cases, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads
not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the
termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a 'trial in absentia' may be had
when the following requisites are present; (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been
notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private
respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also
informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the
notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that private respondent
escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings
was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the
reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred
when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The
court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to
present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose
is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported
instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non-appearance.
What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be
proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it
should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished.'
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a
judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based
upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be
no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present
evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these
rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right
given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of
our Constitution,to wit:
'. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice
shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been
notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and
on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained . . .'
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives
his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against
him."
Now to the appeal of appellant Omar Mapalao.
The main thrust of his appeal is a denial of his complicity. While he admitted to be among the passengers of the
vehicle on that fateful day and to be present during the holdup, he alleged that he did not participate at all in the
commission of the crime and that he did not know anything about its commission as in fact he left with Magumnang
after the alleged holdup. He also asserted that the prosecution witnesses could not have identified him in view of the
darkness of the night then. He said that when they were apprehended by the police no firearm or money was found in
his possession.
The Court finds that the appeal is devoid of merit.
The evidence shows very clearly that on the date of the holdup the appellant was already a passenger in the vehicle of
Adolfo Quiambao since 7:00 A.M. of September 20, 1987 which was driven by Felizardo Galvez, with Jimmy Jetwani,
Quiambao, Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris and Calama. They were together the whole day
up to the evening in going to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet and in the afternoon of the same day they were also together
on the way back to Baguio from Abatan until the holdup occurred in the early evening of the same day at Km. 24,
Caliking, Atok, Benguet. The Muslims stopped the vehicle to urinate at said place. Appellant went to the left side of
the vehicle near the driver's seat and pointed a gun at Quiambao and announced "this is a holdup." A Muslim went to
the other side of the front sea while another Muslim went to the back to stand guard. Gumanak Ompa and Rex
Magumnang, each armed with a knife, went inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their knives at the
passengers. Appellant while pointing the gun ordered the passengers to go to the back of the vehicle so Quiambao
and Jetwani complied. After Quiambao went to the back of the vehicle he noticed a commotion near the left side of the
vehicle involving his driver Galvez and the Muslims. Galvez was harmed. Quiambao pleaded that they are willing to
give their money and valuables provided the Muslims will not harm them. Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa
divested Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jetwani of P14,000.00 and Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, a watch and clothes while
poking their knives at them. cdrep
Magumnang tried to start the vehicle but as he could not he called Quiambao to start it but the latter also failed.
Angered, the appellant started counting 1 to 3 threatening to shoot Quiambao if the vehicle did not start. Quiambao
called Galvez who was able to start the engine. Magumnang went by the side of Galvez and took the steering wheel
and drove towards the precipice. Galvez struggled and fought with Magumnang for control of the steering wheel as it
was directed to the ravine. Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife at Galvez. The passengers panicked and jumped
and ran away in different directions. Mapalao, Magumnang and Ompa fled to the mountains.
From the foregoing evidence of the prosecution there can be no question as to the participation of the appellant in the
robbery holdup. He was positively identified by witnesses who were together with the appellant from the morning up
to the evening of the same day in the Ford Fiera. Quiambao categorically testified that it was the appellant who was
holding the gun with two hands ordered them to give their cash collections and personal belongings to them. 5 Jimmy
Jetwani corroborated Quiambao's testimony in that it was the appellant who ordered them at gunpoint to get down
from the vehicle and to go to the back and to give their money to them. Although it was already dark there was a light
inside the vehicle. 6
On cross-examination Jetwani stuck to his identification of the appellant as one of the culprits as he saw not only his
face but the gun he used by the side of the door facing him and Quiambao. 7 Another prosecution witness, Simeon
Calama, also identified appellant as the one who pointed a gun at them in front. He stated he is familiar with his voice
as during the journey they were joking with each other. 8
The identification of the culprits in offenses of this nature is vital and decisive. In this case the identification was made
by eyewitnesses who were together with the appellant practically the whole day in the same vehicle, and who
themselves are the victims of the holdup staged by the appellant with his other co-accused. Although it was already
dark there was light in the vehicle. Moreover, there were no other persons in the vicinity at the time of the holdup
except the appellant, his co-accused and the victims. LLphil
Contrary to the claim of appellant that he is innocent as he did not escape together with Edris who was allegedly the
principal player in the holdup, the fact remains that the appellant escaped to the mountains together with his co-
accused Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa. Their escape is evidence of their guilt.
As the Court observed at the opening paragraph of this decision, robbery attended by homicide or murder is certainly
a heinous offense, more so when in this case it is committed in the highway. There is hardly any justification for the
court to share the leniency of the trial court by imposing only the life imprisonment as penalty. The circumstances of
the commission of the offense do not justify at all or require any killing or injury to be inflicted on any of the victims.
The appellant and his confederates were all armed while the victims were not. They were at their mercy. None of
them attempted to fight back or to resist. They gave all their valuables and personal belongings. All they were
pleading for was that their lives be spared. It fell on deaf ears. It was a senseless killing for no valid reason. The
appellant and his confederates deserve the supreme penalty of death and no less. Cdpr
But as the Court said, this is not possible under the Constitution.
Our peace and order situation today is very volatile. We have experienced several attempted coups and we are
warned of other possible coups. Our peace and order problem is a continuing one. The division in our society is
obvious and gaping. Our country is suffering from the economic depression caused not only by the recent calamities
that visited us which were compounded by the Gulf War. Thus, measures should be undertaken in order to minimize
if not entirely prevent serious crimes against life, chastity and of property resulting in the wanton taking of human
life. Our hope is for a lasting peace and order in our society. A law must now be enacted defining what are the
heinous offenses punishable with the death penalty. We should not tarry too long.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415, [May 14, 1991], 274 PHIL 354-369)
[G.R. Nos. 103604-05. September 23, 1993.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENGRACIO VALERIANO Y TUMAHIG, MACARIO E.
ACABAL @ "MOMONG," JUANITO RISMUNDO, ABUNDIO NAHID and JOHN DOES, accused. MACARIO E.
ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION; RULE FOR VALIDITY THEREOF;
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — We find that the decision substantially complies with the
Rules of Court on judgments as it did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction
shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been
reserved or waived. As we earlier observed, the challenged decision does not contain the usual dispositive portion.
The last two paragraphs of the decision merely embody its conclusions that: (1) the appellants are guilty of murder,
and (2) taking into account the "attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning
the house of the victim, . . . the abuse of superior strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will be in its maximum degree,
that is reclusion perpetua" considering that "the penalty now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." While
the decision leaves much to be desired, it nevertheless contains the court's findings of facts, the law applicable to the
set of facts and what it believes to be the imposable penalty under the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually
the penalty imposed on the accused-appellants. It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case No. 4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal
immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently filed their written notice of
appeal.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BEFORE THE PROMULGATION THEREOF WILL NOT DIVEST THE
COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. — Accused-appellants contend
that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest
and immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal.
In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court on bail, we ruled in People vs. Cortez that: ". . . an
accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, and is thereafter
convicted of the offense charged, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to
this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." We have
already said that the decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail bonds
and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned contention is highly
illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused-appellants. For too obvious reasons, their notices of appeal which they claim have put an end to the trial
court's jurisdiction over them could not have been filed before the promulgation of the decision. The order is therefore
valid and enforceable. Also, it may be recalled that the accused-appellants had earlier raised this issue before us in a
petition for habeas corpus dated 16 January 1992 and docketed as G.R. Nos. 103602-03. We dismissed that petition on 17
February 1992 for failure to comply with requirement no. (2) of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91 on
forum shopping. Their motion for reconsideration was denied on 27 May 1993.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES; LIES WITH THE PROSECUTION. — The testimony
of the other witnesses for the prosecution likewise do not provide sufficient proof of the accused-appellant's guilt.
Visitacion Silvano's testimony that she saw and identified the accused-appellants at the scene of the crime taxes the
imagination. It was humanly impossible for her to see the accused-appellants even if she were aided by the light from
the truck as she herself said that she was then in her house, three kilometers away from the house of her parents-in-
law. Wilson Silvano did not testify at all that he saw the persons who hacked and killed his mother. In conclusion,
because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit
him. Accordingly, unless the prosecution discharges its burden of proving the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt, they need not even offer evidence in their behalf. The weakness of their defense of alibi thus
becomes irrelevant.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; WHEN ALLEGED AS GENERIC AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES, COURT CANNOT ELEVATE THE SAME AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES. — The trial
court, however, erred in considering nighttime, use of fire and abuse of superior strength as "attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances." The information in Criminal Case No. 4585 alleged only treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying aggravating circumstances. Nighttime, band, use of fire, craft, fraud or disguise and
ignominy were alleged as generic aggravating circumstances only. The trial court cannot elevate the status of any of
the generic aggravating circumstances and consider them as qualifying circumstances for the crime of murder.
Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
5. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — It was an error for the trial court to state that "the penalty now for
murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The penalty for murder remains to be reclusion temporal maximum to
death. But in view of paragraph (1), Section 19, Article III of the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of the penalty
of death, where death would have been the proper penalty instead of reclusion perpetua.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; WHEN AVAILABLE. — The trial court
further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584
because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court
ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence
commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been
arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who
jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in
absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment
in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be
present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In two separate informations dated 28 February 1981 and filed with the then Court of First Instance, now Regional
Trial Court, of Negros Oriental, Engracio Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal, Abundio Nahid and several
John Does were charged with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder. The accusatory portion in the information
for murder, 1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 4585, reads as follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
including several 'John Does', conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery
and evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos and 'pinuti', did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the latter was
about to leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked
behind the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there set the house on fire while the
aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to escape therefrom, and allowing her to be
burned inside said house which was burned to the ground, thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano her
death and burning her beyond recognition.
That the crime was committed with attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, by means of fire,
craft [,] fraud or disguise employed; and that means have been employed which brought added ignominy to the
natural effects of their acts.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code."
The information for frustrated murder, 2 docketed as Criminal Case No. 4584, alleged that in the evening of the 28th
of January 1980 — immediately after the commission of the murder charged in Criminal Case No. 4585 — the accused
hacked and struck Wilson Silvano, son of the victim in the murder case, with bladed weapons such as bolos
and pinuti thereby inflicting upon him multiple hack wounds which would have produced the crime of murder were
it not for the timely and able medical assistance given to him. It further alleged that the crime was committed with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia or treachery and the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, with the
aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity, and that craft, fraud or disguise were employed.
At the arraignment, all the accused, except the John Does who remained unidentified and at large, pleaded not guilty
in both cases. 3 Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, joint trial was ordered by the trial court. 4
Trial on the merits was conducted by Branch 37 of the court a quo presided over by Judge Temistocles B. Diez. But on
16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the records of these two cases were burned.
The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the prosecuting fiscal. 5 The testimonies of the
witnesses were retaken, however, before it could commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the warrant
for his arrest issued on 16 November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. 6 An alias warrant
for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, 7 but he remains at large up to the present.
The evidence for the prosecution, as disclosed by the testimonies of its witnesses, is as follows:
Antonio Silvano, then the barangay captain of Barangay Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, testified that at
about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 28 January 1980, or two nights before the 30 January 1980 local election, three men
entered his yard. He recognized these men as Juanito Rismundo, his neighbor since 1964, Engracio Valeriano, also
another neighbor, and Macario Acabal, his sub-barangay captain. 8 The three men called him, but he did not answer.
Instead, his wife, Rizalina, did and she told them that he was attending a meeting "in the town." They did not believe
her and replied that they just saw Antonio enter the house. Juanito asked her whether they (Antonio and Rizalina)
were selling their votes because they will buy them but Rizalina answered in the negative. Juanito then said, "You
choose, if you want something to happen to you or not [sic]." Another man, Abundio Nahid, asked Antonio to come
down because they have something to tell him. As Antonio was about to kick the door open, he saw the men outside
his house increasing in number and were armed with bladed weapons (pinuti). When he turned around, Antonio
smelled gasoline and he saw Abundio Nahid set fire to his store located at the right side of his house. 9 He and his
wife Rizalina escaped to the roof of the kitchen while the other members of their family who were in that house —
their son Elmer Silvano and eldest daughter Celsita Legaspina with her two children - escaped towards the sugarcane
field which was about thirty meters away. When Rizalina fell from the roof to the floor, Macario Acabal, Juanito
Rismundo and Engracio Valeriano hacked her. Each of them delivered a single blow with Abundio Nahid hitting her
four times. 10
On cross-examination, Antonio Silvano admitted that, as barangay captain of Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, and as trusted
man of Mrs. Clotilde Carballo in whose land his house is built, he supported the latter as the official candidate of the
KBL for Mayor of Sta. Catalina, as well as the other candidates of her party for the local election of 30 January 1980,
including Lorenzo Teves, the KBL's candidate for Governor of the Province of Negros Oriental. On the other hand, the
accused supported and campaigned hard for Mrs. Carballo's opponent, a certain Jose Napigkit who was a candidate
of the Pusyon Bisaya and who eventually won in the election. In his barrio, Mrs. Carballo lost heavily to
Napigkit. 11 He further admitted that although he first reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
which investigated him, he cannot remember if he was made to sign anything by the PC investigator. On 15 February
1980, he was again investigated but this time in the office of Governor Teves. There, he was made to subscribe and
swear to an affidavit 12 that, as admitted by the prosecuting fiscal, was made the basis for the filing of the
information. No statement by the PC was presented to the fiscal. 13
Visitacion Silvano, wife of Wilson who is the son of Antonio and Rizalina, testified that she heard the shouts for help
of her mother-in-law 14 so she woke up Wilson. He then went down the house and turned on the headlights of the
truck parked in front of their house facing his parents' house which was located three kilometers away. He ran
towards the burning house of his parents but before he reached it, he was met by Engracio Valeriano and the latter
hacked him. When he ran away, Engracio's companions, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid,
chased him until he reached the sugarcane fields. 15 Visitacion stayed in her house and saw Engracio Valeriano hack
her husband. She also saw the other accused-appellants in the vicinity of the house of her parents-in-law. 16
Dr. Avelino Torres, Chief of Hospital of Bayawan District Hospital, examined the body of Rizalina Silvano at 1:00
o'clock in the early morning of 29 January 1980 and was presented as a witness for the prosecution. According to him,
the body was burned and charred beyond recognition but the parts thereof were still intact. It was still warm and
smelt of freshly burned flesh. 17 He found the following "evidence of hacking:"
"(1) right leg amputated below the knee;
(2) left leg hacked behind the knee;
(3) abdomen hacked with viscerae eviscerated." 18
He concluded that the wounds were inflicted before the body was burned. 19 He also examined Wilson Silvano at
about 1:30 o'clock that same morning and found seven hack wounds on Wilson. He testified at the trial that without
medical attention, Wilson could have bled to death. 20
Atty. Castulo Caballes, then the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, stated in court that on
7 February 1980, he was fetched from his house by someone from the office of Governor Lorenzo Teves and was
asked to assist the Governor in taking the affidavit of Juanito Rismundo. 21 After the latter "admitted that was his
affidavit," he "subscribed to him the oath and so [he] signed as a notary public." 22 In this affidavit, Rismundo
implicated Jose Napigkit as having ordered the kidnapping and killing of KBL leaders and the burning of their
houses.
Also on 7 February 1980, according to Atty. Elson Bustamante, then Assistant Provincial Attorney, he was called by
Governor Teves to assist in the taking of the statements also of Juanito Rismundo. The Governor himself propounded
the questions to Juanito who was accompanied by the son of Mrs. Carballo and a PC soldier named Lodove.
Bustamante heard Mrs. Carballo's son tell the Governor that Juanito went to their (Carballos') house and "confessed"
to a certain incident which happened in Sta. Catalina on 28 January 1980, and since there were PC soldiers still
assigned to the Carballos' residence at that time, they brought Juanito to Governor Teves, the Provincial Chairman of
the KBL. 23
Another prosecution witness, Jufelinito Pareja, then Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, told the court that on 18
February 1980, accused Macario Acabal was brought to his office. Acabal subscribed and swore to a statement before
him. The latter first read it to Acabal and after ascertaining that Acabal voluntarily executed the statement, he
administered the oath to said affiant. 24 This sworn statement also implicated Jose Napigkit.
Accused-appellants put up the defense of alibi. They allege that they were in different places when the incident in
question occurred. Macario Acabal was in sitio Canggabok, Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, attending the wake for deceased
barangay captain Filomeno Cumahig. 25 On 29 January 1980, he was arrested by military men in the house of his aunt
at the breakwater of Poblacion Sta. Catalina. One of them struck him three times on his left and right chest with an
armalite rifle. Thereafter, he was loaded into a pick-up truck owned by Mrs. Clotilde Carballo and taken to her house.
On 7 February 1980, he was brought to Bayawan and was again manhandled, causing injuries to him which required
treatment at the Bayawan District Hospital, as certified by Dr. Torres. From the hospital, he was brought to the
municipal jail of Bayawan and then to the Provincial Jail in Dumaguete City. Later, he was taken to the office of the
Governor and was forced to sign an affidavit (Exhibit "F"). Prior to 28 January 1989, he did not know the other accused
in this case. 26
Juanito Rismundo was in Sitio Dinapo, Bgy. Alangilan, Sta. Catalina, graining corn in the house of Alfreda
Ortega. 27 On 6 February 1980, he met a PC soldier named Boy Gudobe (Lodove), who was then stationed in Bgy.
Kawitan, Sta. Catalina, accompanied by Diosdado Silvano, grandson of Antonio Silvano, at the Sta. Catalina market.
Gudobe allegedly hit him and, together with Diosdado and a Boy Carballo, the son of Mrs. Clotilde Carballo, brought
him to the Capitol Building in Dumaguete City. While there, he averred that he was forced by a lawyer to sign an
affidavit (Exhibit "D") in the office of the Governor after he was struck with the handle of a revolver at the back of his
head. 28
Abundio Nahid was in his house in Sugong Milagros, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, about 20 kilometers from
Nagbinlud. He charged that Wilson Silvano testified against him because the Silvanos supported Mrs. Carballo of the
KBL while he led the supporters of Mrs. Carballo's opponent Jose Napigkit of the Pusyon Bisaya. 29
The prosecution presented on rebuttal Mrs. Clotilde Carballo and Fiscal Wilfredo Salmin. The former testified that on
7 February 1980 accused Juanito Rismundo voluntarily surrendered to her at her residence in Sta. Catalina and told
her that he wanted to see the Governor. She then asked her son to bring Juanito to Dumaguete City. 30
Fiscal Wilfredo Salmin belied the claim of Acabal that he (Salmin) went to the Provincial Jail on 10 February 1980 and
forced Acabal to sign a document. He alleged that on 16 February 1980, not on 10 February 1980 as claimed by Acabal,
Acabal came to his office at the Provincial Attorney's Office and executed a sworn statement, but Acabal did not sign
the same upon the advice of Atty. Geminiano Eleccion. 31
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal Cases Nos. 4584 and
4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court, then presided over by Judge Pacifico S. Bulado. 32
The decision 33 of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31 October 1991 but promulgated on 20
December 1991, contained no specific dispositive portion. Its rulings are found in the last two paragraphs which read
as follows:
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina Apatan-Silvano having been
proved by the prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO
NAHID, considering the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the
house of victim Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death, the
abuse of superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua
taking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court
believes that simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused Engracio Valeriano only. But since the
person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio Valeriano only is nowhere to be
found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large, no penalty could be imposed on him
since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO RISMUNDO and
ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from frustrated
homicide.
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid are
hereby ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate confinement." 34
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi because "[i]t was not shown by plausible and convincing evidence . . . that
it was physically impossible for them to go to the scene of the crime and to return to the place of residence (People vs.
Solis, 182 SCRA 182)." Upon the other hand, it ruled that "the prosecution witnesses . . . clearly, positively identified
them as the culprits, they being neighbors for a long time and co-workers." 35
Immediately after the promulgation of the decision, counsel for the accused manifested in open court their intention
to appeal the decision. On the same day, counsel for accused Abundio Nahid filed a notice of appeal with a motion for
the immediate release of his client, which was opposed by the prosecution. The court a quo denied the motion also on
the same day. 36
On 31 December 1991, all the convicted accused filed a motion for the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for
immediate release. The later motion was denied on 3 January 1992. A day earlier or on 2 January 1992, accused
Macario Acabal and Juanito Rismundo had filed their notice of appeal. 37
The records of both cases were transmitted to us and we accepted the appeal on 26 February 1992.
The accused-appellants raise in their Brief 38 the following assignment of errors:
"I. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CANCELLING THE BAIL BONDS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AND ORDERING THEIR IMMEDIATE ARRESTS WHEN THE ONLY PENALTY IMPOSED BY IT
FOR ALL THE ACCUSED IS "TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS.
II. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS DEFINED AND PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE
248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
(ANTONIO SILVANO, WILSON SILVANO, AND VISITACION SILVANO), HUSBAND AND CHILDREN,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE DECEASED RIZALINA APATAN-SILVANO, HAVE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE
ACCUSED AS THE CULPRITS WHEN ONLY ANTONIO SILVANO TESTIFIED AS TO WHO ALLEGEDLY KILLED
HIS WIFE, AND WHILE OTHER TWO (2) WITNESSES ONLY TESTIFIED AS TO THE WOUNDING OF WILSON
SILVANO BY ENGRACIO VALERIANO AND ALL THESE WITNESSES WERE VERY VOCAL IN THEIR SILENCE
AS TO THE IDENTITIES OF THE ACCUSED FOR A LONG TIME.
IV. AND, THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ALL THE
ACCUSED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND/OR AT LEAST ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF REASONABLE
DOUBT."
In support of the first assigned error, they claim that: (a) the trial court could not have ordered the cancellation of their
bail bonds and their arrest and immediate confinement because the only penalty it imposed on them was "to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos" without imposing any sentence; it
merely suggested that ". . . the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion
perpetua . . ."; and (b) since they already perfected their appeal immediately after the promulgation of the sentence, the
trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and could not validly cancel their bail bonds and order their arrest. 39
In its Brief, 40 the Appellee asserts that the judgment appealed from is valid and enforceable. Although the word
"impossable" [sic] is "imprecise," it is clear that what the judge actually meant was that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was what the law allowed or mandated him to impose. As to the grant of bail, since they committed a capital
offense and the court had already found that the evidence of their guilt is strong, the accused-appellants should not be
entitled to bail.
We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did sentence the accused-
appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the
commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived. 41 As we earlier observed, the
challenged decision does not contain the usual dispositive portion. The last two paragraphs of the decision merely
embody its conclusions that: (1) the appellants are guilty of murder, and (2) taking into account the "attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of the victim, . . . the abuse of
superior strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua" considering
that "the penalty now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." While the decision leaves much to be
desired, it nevertheless contains the court's findings of facts, the law applicable to the set of facts and what it believes
to be the imposable penalty under the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually the penalty imposed on the
accused-appellants. It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585. Were it
otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal immediately after the promulgation
of the decision and would not have subsequently filed their written notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail
bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when
they perfected their appeal.
In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court on bail, we ruled in People vs. Cortez 42 that:
". . . an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, and is thereafter
convicted of the offense charged, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to
this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."
We have already said that the decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their
bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned
contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the
persons of the accused-appellants. For too obvious reasons, their notices of appeal which they claim have put an end
to the trial court's jurisdiction over them could not have been filed before the promulgation of the decision. The order
is therefore valid and enforceable. Also, it may be recalled that the accused-appellants had earlier raised this issue
before us in a petition for habeas corpus dated 16 January 1992 and docketed as G.R. Nos. 103602-03. We dismissed that
petition on 17 February 1992 for failure to comply with requirement no. (2) of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular
No. 28-91 on forum shopping. 43 Their motion for reconsideration was denied on 27 May 1993.
The trial court, however, erred in considering nighttime, use of fire and abuse of superior strength as "attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances." The information in Criminal Case No. 4585 alleged only treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying aggravating circumstances. Nighttime, band, use of fire, craft, fraud or disguise and
ignominy were alleged as generic aggravating circumstances only. The trial court cannot elevate the status of any of
the generic aggravating circumstances and consider them as qualifying circumstances for the crime of murder.
Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was likewise an error for the trial court to state that "the penalty now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua." The penalty for murder remains to be reclusion temporal maximum to death. But in view of paragraph (1),
Section 19, Article III of the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of the penalty of death, where death would have
been the proper penalty in a case, the court must instead impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 44
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal
Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at
large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of
evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the
accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case 45 and promulgation may be made by
simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the
notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel. 46
Having disposed of the first issue raised by the accused-appellants, we now come to the second, third and fourth
assigned errors which shall be discussed jointly, considering that they are interrelated and deal with the question of
whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in relying on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Antonio Silvano, Wilson Silvano and Visitacion Silvano and in concluding that they clearly and positively identified
the accused-appellants as the culprits. According to them, only Antonio Silvano testified that he saw the accused burn
his house, kill his wife Rizalina and drag her into the fire. Neither Visitacion Silvano nor Wilson Silvano testified that
they saw what occurred in the elder Silvanos' house. But even the testimony of Antonio Silvano is not reliable because
it lacks truthfulness and validity. They singled out his testimony that while the fire was raging, his wife told him to
save himself as she will also save herself, then the direction of the wind changed and he jumped from the roof of the
house into the bushes. They concluded that he could not have seen who killed his wife. 47 Also, the ruling that
conclusions and findings of the lower court are entitled to great weight is not applicable in this case because the judge
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses in its entirety was not the same judge who penned the decision. They
further stressed the delay incurred by Antonio in reporting the crime to the authorities. The crime was committed on
28 January 1980 but he reported it to the Office of the Governor of Negros Oriental in Dumaguete City only on 18
February 1980 or some 21 days after its commission. Finally, they maintain that they have sufficiently established their
defense of alibi.
On the other hand, the Appellee seeks the affirmance of the judgment convicting the accused. The Appellee reasons
out that the accused-appellants were positively identified by prosecution witness Antonio Silvano; and that even
while it is true that only Antonio Silvano saw the murderers, Visitacion and Wilson Silvano testified on the presence
of the accused-appellants at the scene of the crime.
As the Appellee admits, however, the most damning testimony against the accused-appellants in this case is only that
of Antonio Silvano who claimed that he actually saw them hack and kill his wife. To us, whether such testimony
could be relied upon is altogether a different matter. Although it is a settled rule that the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses should be given the highest respect because it had the advantage of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or lying through their teeth, 48 we
cannot rely on that rule in this appeal because the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not the same
judge who penned the decision. Judge Temistocles Diez of Branch 37 received and heard the testimonies of the
witnesses but it was Judge Pacifico S. Bulado who rendered the decision. The latter had no opportunity to observe the
witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, which are important considerations in assessing credibility. 49
We have carefully read the transcripts of the testimony of Antonio Silvano. We cannot give him full faith and credit
for the following reasons:
1. Although he testified on cross-examination that he first reported the incident to and was investigated by the PC, it
is clear to this Court that it was only on 15 February 1980, or on the eighteenth day after the incident that he was
investigated at the office of the Governor. Being the barangay captain of Nagbinlud, the owner of a house that was
intentionally set on fire, the father of the man who was hacked several times and almost died, and the husband of the
murder victim whose body was charred beyond recognition, the compelling call of duty and the mournful cry for
justice cannot tolerate any delay in reporting the incident to the proper authorities. The prosecution was hard put for
an explanation for this delay; it did not even attempt to make any. If Antonio Silvano could offer no explanation
therefor, it could only mean that he was either unable to identify the real perpetrators of the crime against his family
or he was afraid to do so. For whichever reason, such failure only bolsters the claim of the defense that the crime was
committed by the "Salvatore" group whose operations Antonio admitted he was very much aware of, thus:
"Q As such barangay captain you remember that in the month of January, 1980 there was such a group of armed men
referred to or commonly called as Salvatore, is that correct that used to roam around in the interior part of Sta.
Catalina?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men used to plunder or steal from houses, kill certain persons and burn also houses, is that
correct?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men known as 'Salvatore' continued to exist even after January 1980?
A That was only up to 1980.
Q Yes, but after January 1980 this 'Salvatore' group continued to exist for sometime up to or beyond the year 1980, is
that correct?
A They were only about 2 weeks because they were arrested by the authorities.
Q That is two weeks after January 28, 1980?
A Yes." 50
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Antonio did report the incident to the PC as no PC personnel corroborated him
thereon and according to him, he did not sign any statement during the said investigation, which is unusual. The
fiscal himself admitted in open court that no statement taken by the PC was submitted to his office. 51 If indeed
Antonio was investigated by the PC, the investigator should have formally taken his statement in view of its
importance. As no such statement was proved to exist, it is logical to presume that Antonio did not or could not
disclose to the investigator the names of the perpetrators.
2. Antonio admitted on cross-examination that he had no quarrel and misunderstanding 52 or grudges 53 whatsoever
with the accused-appellants. If that were so, it is odd that he could not explain why he, a barangay captain who was
expected to attend to the requests and problems of his constituents, deliberately chose not to respond to the alleged
call of the accused-appellants on the night of the incident and instead allowed his wife to lie to them by saying that he
was attending a meeting. Again, the only plausible explanation for his behavior was that the men who came belonged
to the "Salvatore" group and this terrified him, for he knew that the group had been roaming around, killing people
and burning houses in his area.
3. Also, on cross-examination, Antonio affirmed as true the contents of his sworn statement 54 taken two weeks after
the incident. In it, he failed to state the fact that he witnessed the killing of his wife and to identify her killers. 55 Since
his sworn statement was precisely taken to obtain from him vital facts relative to the incident, more specifically on the
killing of his wife, and considering that he had already stated therein that he saw the accused-appellants, it is contrary
to human nature and inconsistent with experience for him to fail to identify them as the killers of his wife, if such is
the fact. It has been said that where the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail such that the affiant
would not have failed to mention it, the omission could affect the affiant's credibility. 56 Verily, it was obvious from
his answer to Question No. 16 of the investigator that he had no opportunity to identify the killers:
"Q Question No. 16, 'Q-What else did you do?', and you answered, 'A-My wife told me to just save myself because she
will also save herself. Thereafter the wind changed it(s) course and (the) fire grew big and because of this, I had the
occasion to jumped (sic) from our house and thereafter I ran towards the bushes.' . . .
A Yes, sir, that is true.
Q How far is that bush to which you ran from your house which was burning?
A It is about thirty (30) meters because it is a sugarcane field." 57
4. Antonio categorically declared that Engracio Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo and Macario Acabal each hacked her
once hitting her on the forehead, right leg and left arm, respectively, while Abundio Nahid hacked her four times,
hitting her at the forehead, left arm, right leg and stomach. 58 In other words, from his testimony, his wife sustained
seven wounds. Yet, the medical evidence belies this. Per the findings of Dr. Avelino Torres, 59 there were only three
"evidence" of hacking, viz.: at the right leg, left leg and abdomen.
5. Nowhere in his sworn statement did Antonio mention the name of accused-appellant Abundio Nahid. If in fact he
saw the latter who he claimed in his direct testimony hacked his wife four times, Nahid's name would have occupied
a prominent place in his sworn statement.
The testimony of the other witnesses for the prosecution likewise do not provide sufficient proof of the accused-
appellants' guilt. Visitacion Silvano's testimony that she saw and identified the accused-appellants at the scene of the
crime taxes the imagination. It was humanly impossible for her to see the accused-appellants even if she were aided
by the light from the truck as she herself said that she was then in her house, three kilometers away from the house of
her parents-in-law. Wilson Silvano did not testify at all that he saw the persons who hacked and killed his mother.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every accused
is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The
contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of
the court to acquit him. 60 Accordingly, unless the prosecution discharges its burden of proving the guilt of the
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt, they need not even offer evidence in their behalf. 61 The weakness of
their defense of alibi thus becomes irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in Criminal Case
No. 4585 is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellants MACARIO ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO
NAHID are ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt, and their immediate release from confinement is hereby
ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds exist for their further detention.
The trial court is directed to render judgment against accused-appellant ENGRACIO VALERIANO in Criminal Case
No. 4584.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Valeriano y Tumahig, G.R. Nos. 103604-05, [September 23, 1993])

POLIREV - Rights of The Accused

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FRANCISCO TATAD vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.

004502 26 April 1993 P329,931.40

[G.R. Nos. 103604-05. September 23, 1993.]

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