BRAZIL

Article 5. Only votes to regularly-registered candidates and political parties shall be considered valid
in the proportional election system.

ON THE COALITIONS

Paragraph 1. The coalition shall have a specific name, which may consist in the merger of all member
parties´ acronyms, and, with regard to the electoral process, it shall be granted all the prerogatives
and attributions of a political party, and shall work as a single party when interacting with the
Electoral Justice and when handling inter-party interests.

 TSE Case nos. 345/1998, 15,529/1998, 22,107/2004, 5,052/2005 and 25,015/2005: the existence of
the coalition is based on the consent of the involved political parties rather than on a ratification
issued by the Electoral Justice.

Paragraph 1-A. The denomination of the coalition shall not coincide with, include or refer to other
candidate´s name or registration number, nor shall it feature request for vote in favor of any political
party.

 Paragraph 1-A as amended by Article 3 of Law N. 12,034/2009.

Paragraph 10. The conditions of eligibility and the causes of ineligibility shall be checked by the time
the request for candidacy registration is formalized, exception made to factual or legal amendments
effected after the registration that render ineligibility inapplicable.

Article 12. The candidate for proportional elections shall indicate, in his/her registration request,
his/her full name and up to three nominal variations he/she wishes to be acknowledged by, which
may include name, surname, nickname, abbreviated name or name he/she is more generally
referred to, provided it does not create any doubt with regard to his/her identity, and does not
sound indecent, ridiculous nor irreverent, noting that the said candidate shall register such names in
order of preference.

Paragraph 1. In the event of homonymous names, the Electoral Justice shall adopt the following
measures:

I – in case of doubt, it may ask for the candidate to prove that he/she is known by the name
that was indicated in the registration request;

II – if, on the last day to file a registration request, a candidate is exercising or has exercised
a public elective mandate over the past four years, or if the said candidate has run a campaign over
the said four-year term under the name he/she registered, the use of such name shall be granted
and other candidates shall be prohibited to run a campaign using that name;

III – if a candidate is known by a certain name he/she indicated in his/her registration

request because of his/her political, social or professional experience, the registration of that name
shall be granted, provided the conditions set forth in the last part of the previous item are observed;

IV – the two previous items should apply to candidates with homonymous names;
nevertheless, if such rules are not sufficient to solve the problem, the Electoral Justice shall notify
these candidates, urging them to try and reach a consensus, within two days, on the names to be
used;

V – in case the consensus referred to in the previous item is not reached, the Electoral
Justice shall register each candidate under the name and surname informed in their respective
registration requests, in the reported order of preference.

 TSE Precedent (SUM) n. 4/1992: “should there be no preference between candidates who
intend to register the same nominal variation, the candidate who first requires the
registration of such name shall have his/her request granted”. In that sense, see TSE Cases
ns. 265/1998, 275/1998 and 20,228/2002.

Paragraph 2. The Electoral Justice may ask for the candidate to prove that he/she is known by the
nominal option he/she indicated in case the use of such name is expected to leave voters confused.

Paragraph 3. The Electoral Justice shall deny nominal variation requests that coincide with names
of candidates for majority elections, except for candidates who are exercising or have exercised a
public elective mandate over the past four years, or who have ran a campaign using that same
name over the same four-year term.

Paragraph 4. The Electoral Justice shall publish the nominal variations granted to each candidate
after reviewing the registration requests.

Paragraph 5. The Electoral Justice shall organize and publish, within thirty days before the elections
are held, the following lists to be used for voting and polling purposes:

 TSE Resolution (RES) n. 21,607/2004: organization of only a list of candidates, in alphabetic

order, without prejudice to other lists of candidates, organized by the numbers the
candidates are running under, which may be kept and disclosed by electoral registries.

I – the first list, organized by the political parties, features the candidates in numerical order,
comprising the three nominal variations of each candidate, in the order of preference they
indicated;

II – the second list features a name index and is organized in alphabetic order, detailing the
full name and the nominal variations of each candidate, also in alphabetic order, followed by
their respective party and campaign number.
The Rationale for E-voting in
Brazil
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/the-rationale-for-e-voting-in-brazil

National Democratic Institute

Electronic voting in Brazil was introduced to reduce fraud in the results-

tabulation process and increase voter accessibility to the ballot. Such problems
had consistently compromised the integrity of elections, and electronic voting was
seen as a method of combating previous shortcomings attributed to the Brazilian
paper-ballot system. 
The adoption of electronic voting in Brazil was initiated by the Superior Electoral
Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral or TSE), the judicial body charged with
implementing Brazil’s electoral laws. While outside actors had some input, the move
to electronic voting was largely an autonomous process carried out by the TSE; and
consequently, actors within the judicial institution made most major decisions.
The primary reason for adopting electronic voting machines was to combat endemic
fraud in the paper ballot tabulation process. Due to the complex electoral
environment created by Brazil’s electoral rules, where voters would regularly have to
choose among thousands of legislative candidates, the tabulation of votes was a
complex and lengthy affair. Vote tabulation was also a huge logistical challenge,
involving hundreds of thousands of vote counters who were often government
employees from the state-owned banks or the postal service. In the 1994 national
elections, for example, vote tabulation required about 170,000 people. Because of
the scale of the task, vote counting could take weeks, and the post-election period
was a time of great uncertainty and tension. 
Most importantly, the lengthy tabulation period increased the opportunity for vote
counters allied with candidates to manipulate the vote count. While representatives
of political parties could observe the vote count, the lengthy vote count period made
it difficult for partisan and other civil society actors to fully monitor the process. The
most common type of fraud was manipulation of the tabulation sheets, where vote
counters who were allied with candidates would subtract votes from some
candidates’ tallies and add them to their favored candidates’ counts.
A secondary motivation for switching to electronic voting was accessibility problems
in the paper system. Because of the large number of candidates that ran in
legislative elections, the TSE used paper ballots that required voters to write in the
names or identifying numbers of their preferred legislative candidates. Because of
the difficulty of casting and counting hand-written ballots, the fraction of blank and
invalid votes approached 40 percent in legislative elections in 1994. For the
approximately 20 percent (according to the 1990 census) of the electorate that was
illiterate, writing a five- or six-digit sequence of numbers was not a trivial task. This
was compounded by the fact that, in legislative elections, voters vote for multiple
offices and would have to fill in a total of 16 to 19 numbers if they were to cast votes
for all offices. Furthermore, voters had no way to verify that the numbers they wrote
on their ballots actually corresponded to the candidates or parties they intended to
vote for. 
Electronic voting machines have been able to eliminate some of these significant
problems, delivering results much more quickly and eliminating many of the means
by which the results were previously manipulated, although they clearly brought new
challenges to the conduct of elections.

Brazil: Decision Making

Process on Electronic Voting
Last updated on December 17, 2013

https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/brazil-CS/decision-making-process
Brazil began shifting toward electronic voting in 1994. The impetus for the initial
move to e-voting was largely led and managed by the TSE. The TSE has jurisdiction
over all aspects of elections in Brazil and regulates the functioning of political parties.
Over its history, the TSE has developed a reputation for trustworthiness,
competence and autonomy in the management of the electoral process. In addition
to its election management role, the TSE is also responsible for revising the electoral
law every two years and submitting it to the legislature for approval, as required by
Brazilian law. Because of its good reputation, the electoral law submitted by the TSE
is rarely debated; and this gave the TSE significant leeway to purse electronic voting
as a solution to challenges faced by the electoral process. While outside actors had
some input, the move to electronic voting was largely an autonomous process
carried out by the TSE, and consequently, actors within the judicial institution made
most of the major decisions. 
There were two primary reasons why the TSE adopted electronic voting machines
(EVM). The first was to combat endemic fraud in the paper ballot tabulation process.
The second was to address issues related to electoral accessibility and spoiled
ballots in the paper voting system. Due to Brazil’s complex electoral rules, voters
regularly have to choose from thousands of legislative candidates. This makes
results tabulation a logistical challenge because the paper voting system involves
hundreds of thousands of vote counters who were often government employees from
State-owned banks or the postal service. Because of the scale of the task, vote
counting could take weeks and this post-election period was a time of great
uncertainty and tension. 
Most importantly, the lengthy tabulation period increased opportunity for vote
counters allied with candidates to manipulate the vote count because the lengthy
vote count was difficult for partisan and other civil society actors to fully monitor. The
most common type of fraud was manipulation of the tabulation sheets known as
“maps” where vote counters who were allied with candidates would subtract votes
from one candidate’s tally and add them to the favored candidate’s count.  This type
45

of electoral fraud became a national issue after the 1994 presidential and legislative
elections when a scheme to manipulate the election results involving electoral judges
was uncovered in Rio de Janeiro. The local branch of the TSE was forced to annul
the results for the legislative elections and hold a new one, leading to questions
about the pervasiveness of fraud in elections. 
A secondary motivation for switching to electronic voting was due to accessibility
problems in the paper-based system. This system was a hugely complicated, as it
required voters to write in the name or identifying number of their preferred
legislative candidate. Two factors, the large number of candidates in legislative
races, as well as the level of illiteracy in the country (approximately 20 percent,
according to the 1990 census) resulted in almost 40 percent of votes being blank or
invalid in 1994 legislative elections. These factors were compounded by the fact that,
in legislative elections, voters voted for multiple offices and would fill in several
names or numbers to cast votes for all offices. TSE officials argued that the high
number of blank votes cast could be attributed to illiterate voters, who did not want to
take a long time writing in a name, revealing they could not write. 
The disenfranchising effect of complex ballots also made fraud easier, as described
by Federal Deputy Tourinho Dantas:
If an illiterate voter doesn’t know how to read or write, how can he vote? They
humiliate themselves at the moment in which they vote. When he goes to the ballot
booth and he doesn’t know what to do, he casts a blank vote. This vote, in the
majority of places, is filled out by those perpetrating fraud. It is by this means that
fraudulent votes are cast in so many places. 46

The initial decision to switch to electronic voting was made by President of the TSE,
Minister Sepúlveda Pertence, in 1994. He cited the Rio de Janeiro scandal as a
factor:
After the experience we have lived through, not in the poorest regions, but rather in
one of the most important cities in the country [Rio de Janeiro], we cannot retreat
from the imperative of automation, or if that is not possible, the “mechanization” of
the vote.
The impetus to change voting technologies came almost wholly from within the TSE,
and was based in part on previous positive experiences with the use of technology in
voter registration and results tabulation. When the decision was made between 1994
and 1995, there were no other major societal actors such as political parties, civil
society organizations or other government bodies advocating for the abandonment of
paper ballots. 
In Brazil, a pilot was not carried out to test electronic voting. Instead, a gradual
introduction of universal electronic voting was achieved over the course of three
elections: in the 1996 elections, 30 percent of voters (33 million) directly voted
through the electronic voting machines; in 1998, an additional 30 percent (35 million
voters) voted through e-voting machines; and in the 2000 elections, the entire nation
voted through electronic voting (100 million voters).
2. THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC VOTING ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 2.1. Electoral Rules and
Voting Technology in Brazil Brazil is a federation of 27 states, which themselves comprise over 5000
municipalities. Each state has its own legislature (Assembléia Legislativa) and a directly elected
governor (Governador).10 Federal legislation establishes the same election rules for all states.
Legislators are elected under an open-list proportional representation with the entire state being a
single multi-member district (at-large elections).

Under open-list rule, a citizen casts a vote to an individual candidate, not a party list. The
combination of large districts and voting for individual candidates makes voters face a large number
of candidates, making listing names or illustrations in a ballot impractical. Moreover, state elections
in Brazil are held jointly with federal elections for president, the federal senate, and the lower
chamber of congress. For example, in the 1998 election, a voter in the state of S˘ao Paulo had to
choose one candidate out of 1265 for the state legislature; 661 candidates for the lower chamber of
federal congress; 10 candidates for state governor; 13 candidates for the federal senate; and 12
presidential candidates. This exemplifies the impossibility of simplified voting under paper ballots, as
well as the overall complexity of voting. Until 1994, Brazilian elections used only paper ballots.
Voting for a state legislator involved writing down the chosen candidate’s name or electoral number,
a five-digit code assigned by the election authority to each candidate. A paper ballot is depicted in
Figure 1. There are only written instructions: to write “the name or number of candidate or party”
on the box for “state” or “federal” legislator. In the mid-1990s, the independent branch of the
federal judiciary that regulates electoral procedures (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) introduced a new
direct-record EV technology in order to reduce the time and costs of vote counting. The interface of
the new technology is constituted of a small screen and a set of keys closely resembling a telephone
keypad with three additional colored buttons. The voter types the candidate’s number into this
keypad. The machine responds by providing her name, party affiliation, and picture on the screen.
The voter can then confirm the vote or choose to start the process again. Figure 1 depicts the initial
screen of the device, and the screen just before a vote can be confirmed. There are at least four
distinct reasons why less educated voters would find voting under EV easier. First, it provides visual
aids (candidates’ pictures) which were absent in paper ballots. Second, the machine guides the user
through the many votes that must be cast (state legislator, governor, federal deputy, senate,
president). This minimizes voter confusion over which paper ballot to use for each vote (e.g., casting
the vote for federal legislator in the state ballot). Third, the machine provides feedback to users. A
voter can check if the number he typed corresponds to his choice of candidate. If the typed number
does not correspond to an existing candidate, the machine provides a message stating “wrong
number” (and does not provide a picture), alerting the voter that he is about to cast a residual vote.
Fourth, it uses a number-based interface that resembles familiar devices (telephone keypads and
ATMs). As noted by electoral authority staff, “numbers are the easiest way for people to interact
with an interface. People with low schooling, through the use of numbers, can use telephones. The
illiterate are able to make phone calls” (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2011)).12 The Supplemental
Material (Fujiwara (2015)) further describes voting procedures under both paper and EV
technologies and discusses why the guidance and feedback can have an effect on an illiterate voter,
given the device’s graphical interface. The government also conducted a large-scale campaign, using
public service announcements on TV and radio to instruct the public on how to use the new
machines. While the discussion above indicates that the elections authority took deliberate steps to
design an easily operable voting technology, reducing residual votes does not appear to have been
the primary aim.