MARCOS YRA vs.

MAXIMO ABANO
G.R. No. 30187. November 15, 1928
FACTS:
Maximo Abaño: is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He transferred to Manila to complete his
education, and Abaño registered as a voter there. After passing the bar, Abaño returned to live in Meycauayan on May 10,
1927. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he applied for the cancellation of his registration in Manila, which was
dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the
mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abaño ran for the position of municipal president of Meycauayan in the
1928 elections and was elected by popular vote.
Marcos Yra: the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He filed the present quo warranto case against Abaño,
alleging that the latter had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election, and was thus
ineligible.

HELD:
a.) The Election Law, as amended, in Section 404 provides that "No person shall be eligible for any elective municipal
office unless, within the time fixed by law, he shall file a duly sworn certificate of candidacy. Said certificate shall
declare that he is a resident of the municipality, in which his candidacy is offered; that he is a duly qualified
elector therein, and that he is eligible to the office." Section 431 of the Election Law prescribes the qualifications
for voters, section 432 the disqualifications.
b.) One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly
qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term 'qualified' when applied to a voter does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not
need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and
none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in
the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for."
c.) The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and
the respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI, which
held in favor of Abaño and declared the complaint as without merit.
 ABELARDO APORTADERA vs. MANUEL SOTTO
G.R. No. L-16876           November 30, 1961
FACTS:
Manuel Sotto: was elected and proclaimed as the Vice-Governor of Davao after obtaining 78,346 votes in the November
1959 general elections.
Abelardo Aportadera: was also a candidate for the office of the Vice-Governor, but lost in the election, obtaining only
66,209. He instituted the quo warranto proceedings against Sotto, on grounds that the latter was not a qualified voter of
the Province of Davao. Aportadera contends that on October 3, 1959, Sotto registered as a new voter in Precinct No. 9 of
Davao City without first "securing the transfer to Davao Province or City or the cancellation of his registration as a voter"
in Precinct No. 16-A of Manila. Further, in order for Sotto to register as a new voter in Davao, he subscribed to a voter's
affidavit stating that he was "not at present actually registered in any other precinct," thus committing a felony punishable
under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. By committing such crime, Sotto disqualified himself
as a voter, and, hence, became ineligible to the office of Vice-Governor of Davao.
HELD:
a. Registration is essential to the exercise of the right of suffrage, not to the possession thereof. Indeed, only those
who have such right may be registered. In other words, the right must be possessed before the registration. The
latter does not confer it. Section 98 of the Revised Election Code cannot be construed as adding registration to
the original requirements of a qualified voter, for, otherwise, it would conflict with Article V of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as registration is not essential, under this Article, for the possession of the right of suffrage, defendant's
contention cannot be sustained without holding that section 98 of the Revised Election Code seeks to amend said
provision of our fundamental law, and, hence, without becoming unconstitutional.
b. It is unnecessary, therefore, to pass upon the validity of respondent's registration in Davao, owing to his failure to
seasonably apply for the cancellation of his registration in Manila, for even if he had not been registered at all in
Davao, this could not decisively affect the question whether or not he is a "qualified voter," if he meets the
conditions prescribed in said Article V of the Constitution, and, in addition thereto, has the age and residence
required in section 2071, which are not impugned by petitioner herein.
c. Upon the other hand, the disqualifications to vote are set forth in section 99 of the Revised Election Code.
Admittedly, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e) of this section are inapplicable to the case at bar. Neither does the
offense allegedly committed by respondent fall under subdivisions (a) and (b), inasmuch as a "final judgment" of
conviction is necessary for the application thereof, and, admittedly, no such judgment has been rendered against
him.
 AKBAYAN - Youth, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001
FACTS:
AKBAYAN – Youth, et. al.: representing the youth sector, they seek to direct the COMELEC to conduct a two-day special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC under RA 8189, or the
Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
COMELEC: issued Resolution 3584, which denied the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters
on February 17, and 18 2001. The COMELEC argues, “The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration
since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the
like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of securing the voter's substantive right to be included
in the list of voters.”
HELD:
a. The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel
of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Proceeding from the significance of
registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that
even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly
manner - one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
b. COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, COMELEC
simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, COMELEC merely exercised a
prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally
mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act.
c. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty,
not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to
act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
 ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 157013            July 10, 2003
Atty. Romulo Macalintal: as a taxpayer and as a lawyer, he questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA
9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. He contends, among others, that Section 5(d) of RA
9189, in allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere
act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.
HELD:
a. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that
Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence,
in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI
(The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
b. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and
an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to
elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous
with domicile.
c. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go
back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had
not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under
Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform
a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
 LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, et. al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

FACTS:
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al.: Before the May 2004 elections, they sought to register as "overseas absentee voter" only to
be advised by the DFA that as per a letter from COMELEC, petitioners have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to
their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. Thus, referring to themselves as "duals",
petitioners pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under RA 9189, the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and that the COMELEC be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee
voters under the aegis of RA 9189.
COMELEC: contends that although RA 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, those who have availed of the law
cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence,
as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on September 18, 2003 at the earliest, and as law and
jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the one-year residence requirement
prescribed under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 
HELD:
a.) There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in
implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
b.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to
vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
 NARDO VELASCO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MOZART PANLAQUI
G.R. No. 180051             December 24, 2008

Nardo Velasco: was born in Sasmuan, Pampanga, but in 1983, he moved to the US where he subsequently became a
citizen. Then in 2006, Velasco applied for and was granted a dual citizenship under RA 9225. He then returned to the
Philippines on September 14, 2006 and has not left since. On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter
of Sasmuan, Pampanga, but the Election Registration Board denied his application. The ERB decision was reversed by the
MTC, but when the appeal reached the RTC, the latter court ruled that Velasco only reacquired his Philippine residency on
July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship. Thus, Velasco failed to comply with the residency requirement
under the Constitution, making him ineligible to vote in the May 14, 2007 elections. Nonetheless, Velasco filed on March
28, 2007 his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, claiming that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of
Sasmuan, Pampanga.
Mozart Panlaqui: who also filed his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To
and/or To Cancel Velasco's COC, claiming that contrary to Velasco's claim, he is not a registered voter of Sasmuan,
Pampanga, as his name is not included in the list of voters. Consequently, Velasco is not eligible to run for office since he is
not a qualified voter. COMELEC eventually cancelled Velasco's COC.
HELD:
a.) Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code governs the cancellation of, and grant or
denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the facts stated in the
COC by the would-be candidate be true, as any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the COC's
cancellation or the withholding of due course. The false representation that these provisions mention must
necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences
of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve;
in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that
refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Separately from
the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must
be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public
office.
b.) In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he is registered voter when he is
not, as has been determined by a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material
misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate
price - the nullification of his election victory. He may also have to account in a criminal court for making a false
statement under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.
 LUIS ASISTIO vs. JUDGE THELMA AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 191124               April 27, 2010
FACTS:
Luis Asistio: is a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City in the 2010 elections. He filed against Enrico Echiverri a Petition to
Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Enrico Echiverri: is also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City. He claims that when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy
of his Answer to the latter’s petition, he found out that Asistio’s address is non-existent. Thus, Echiverri filed against
Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City before the MeTC. He alleged
that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically of No. 110 Unit 1, P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, but that the
address used in Asistio’s current COC is situated in Barangay 17, contrary to what was stated in Asistio’s COC. After
HELD:
a.) "Residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally
settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and
utterances.
b.) Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal
or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. 36 There must be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
c.) Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan
City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992,
1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio
cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines
above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan
City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily
abandoned his residence in Caloocan City.
 NURHUSSEIN UTUTALUM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARDEN ANNI
G.R. No. 84843-44               January 22, 1990
FACTS:
Arden Anni: was the winning candidate for the May 30, 1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. He
received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801 registered voters.
Nurhussein Ututalum: was also a candidate for the May 30, 1987 Congressional elections, but he received only 482 votes.
He sought to reject the returns from the Municipality of Siasi on the ground that they "appear to be tampered with or
falsified" owing to the "great excess of votes" appearing in said returns. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Ututalum
would have a lead of 5,301 votes.
COMELEC: upon petition by one Lupay Loong, COMELEC issued a Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters "on the
ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and ordering a
new registration of voters for the local elections of February 15, 1988. A new Registry List was subsequently prepared
yielding only 12,555 names. Nonetheless, COMELEC held that “to annul all the votes in the municipality for purposes of
the May 30, 1987 elections would disenfranchise the good or valid votes.”
HELD:
a.) The Siasi returns do not show  prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually a great
excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out of
the 39,801 voters. Basically, therefore, petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which,
indeed, is not a listed ground for a pre- proclamation controversy. Padded voters' list, massive fraud, and
terrorism are clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper
grounds for an election protest. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated
under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive
b.) Where the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation controversies cease. A pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point in time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy
thereafter is an election protest before the proper forum. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matter in
controversy conclusively and once and for all.