G.R. No.

129783 December 22, 1997

MARCELINO LIBANAN vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JOSE RAMIREZ

The 28th May 1997 decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"), which affirmed the proclamation
of herein private respondent Jose Tan Ramirez declaring him to be the duly elected Representative of Eastern Samar for
having obtained the plurality of votes over petitioner Marcelino Libanan, and the 20th June 1997 resolution of the HRET,
which denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are sought to be annulled in this special civil action
for certiorari.

Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone congressional
seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected
Representative of the District with a total of forty-one thousand five hundred twenty-three (41,523) votes, compared to
petitioner's forty thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (40,869) votes, or a margin of six hundred fifty-four(654) votes over
those of petitioner.

Petitioner Libanan seasonably filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the 08th May
1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent
Ramirez, as well as his leaders and followers, in the twenty-three (23) municipalities of the lone district of Eastern Samar
with the aid, in various instances, of peace officers supposedly charged with maintaining an orderly and honest election.
Petitioner contested seventy-nine (79) precincts in five (5) municipalities. He also maintained that the election returns
and/or ballots in certain precincts were tampered with, substituted, or systematically marked in favor of respondent
Ramirez. Libanan prayed that, after due proceedings, the HRET should issue an order to annul the election and
proclamation of Ramirez and to thereafter so proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Eastern Samar.

In his answer and counter-protest, with a petition for preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative defenses,
respondent Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-protested the results of the elections in certain precincts where, he
claimed, Libanan engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to disenfranchise
voters therein listed. Accordingly, he prayed, inter alia, for the dismissal of the protest and the confirmation of his election
as the duly elected representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar.

After some peripheral issues were settled by the HRET, the revision of ballots in the protested precincts commenced on 20
February 1996. The HRET noted that Libanan contested a total of seventy-nine (79) precincts. It was noted during the
revision, however, that six (6) of the contested precincts, namely, Precincts Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of Arteche, were
found to have been merged during the 08 May 1995 elections into three (3) precincts, i.e., Precincts Nos. 14 and 19,
Precincts Nos. 15 and 16 and Precincts Nos. 18 and 20. Thus, only seventy-six (76) ballot boxes were actually opened for
revision, one of which, Precinct No. 4-1 of Guiuan, did not contain any ballot.

On 22 February 1996, while the revision of the counter-protested precincts was being held, Ramirez filed an "Urgent
Motion to Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest in Specific Municipalities/Precincts" praying that he be granted leave to
withdraw and abandon partially his counter-protest in certain precincts. 1 Libanan filed an opposition thereto but the
motion was eventually granted by the Chairman of the HRET and subsequently confirmed in a resolution by the tribunal.

On 21 March 1996, the HRET designated a Hearing Commissioner and a Deputy Hearing Commissioner for the reception of
evidence. Following that reception, the respective memoranda of Libanan and Ramirez were filed.

The evidence and the issues submitted by the parties for consideration by the HRET related mainly to the proper
appreciation of the ballots objected to, or claimed by, the parties during the revision. No evidence was presented in
support of the other allegations of the protest (like the alleged tampering of election returns) and of the counter-protest
(such as the alleged tearing of some of the pages of the computerized list of voters to disenfranchise legitimate voters and
the use of goons to terrorize and compel voters to vote for Libanan), nor were these issues discussed in the memoranda of
the parties. The HRET thus concentrated, such as can be rightly expected, its attention to the basic appreciation of ballots. 2

The particular matter focused in this petition deals with what petitioner claims to be spurious ballots; on this score, the
HRET has explained:
 No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have
any of the following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI
Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by the
Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.

The Tribunal did not adopt protestant's submission in his Memorandum that the absence of thumbmark or BEI
Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot rendered the ballot spurious. The applicable law on this issue is Sec.
24, R.A. 7166. It reads:

In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof.
Failure to so authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the board of election offense
punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

As may be gleaned above, unlike the provision of Section 210 of the Omnibus Election Code where the BEI
Chairman was required to affix his right thumbmark at the back of the ballot immediately after it was counted,
the present law no longer requires the same.

Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that failure to authenticate the ballot
shall constitute an election offense, there is nothing in the said law which provides that ballots not so
authenticated shall be considered invalid. In fact, the members of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms agreed during their deliberation on the subject that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the
back of the ballot will not per se make a ballot spurious.

Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, mentioned
during his sponsorship speech that one of the salient features of the bill filed was "to require the chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by affixing his signature on (sic) the back
thereof and to consider any ballot as spurious," R.A. 7166, as approved, does not contain any provision to that
effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress as a whole (House of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the
proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots without the BEI Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious.
What is clearly provided under the said law is the sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not
the disenfranchisement of the voter.3

In its assailed decision, the HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez; it concluded:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Tribunal Resolved to DISMISS the instant election protest, including the
parties' mutual claims for damages and attorney's fee; AFFIRM the proclamation of Protestee Jose Tan Ramirez;
and DECLARE him to be the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar, for having obtained
a plurality of 143 votes over second placer Protestant Marcelino Libanan. 4

Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the HRET arguing, among other grounds, 5 that the
absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those
issued to the voters during the elections. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate
or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter. Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the HRET credited
petitioner Libanan with thirty (30) votes because of the error in the computation of the base figure and rejected twelve
(12) ballots for respondent Ramirez. Respondent Ramirez, nevertheless, remained to be the winner with a lead of ninety-
nine (99) votes in his favor. As regards the absence of BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots, the HRET
stressed:

Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides in part that "in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless
there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection." In the instant case, there is no evidence to support
protestant's allegation that the ballots he enumerated in his Motion for Reconsideration are substitute ballots.
The absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot cannot be an indication of ballot switching
or substitution. At best, such absence of BEI Chairman's signature is a  prima facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen
concerned were derelict in their duty of authenticating the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the Decision, is not
fatal to the validity of the ballots.6

Thus, the present recourse.

A perusal of the grounds raised by petitioner to annul the HRET decision and resolution boils down to the issue of whether
or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI
in the ballots did not render the ballots spurious.

Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven (311) ballots (265 of which have been for private respondent
Ramirez) without the signature of the Chairman of the BEI, but which had the COMELEC water-marks and/or colored
fibers, should be invalidated. It is the position of petitioner that the purpose of the law in requiring the BEI Chairman to
affix his signature at the back of the ballot when he issues it to the voter is "to authenticate" the ballot and, absent that
signature, the ballot must be considered spurious.

Prefatorily, the Court touches base on its jurisdiction to review and pass upon decisions or resolutions of the electoral
tribunals.

The Constitutions mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall
each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members.7 In Lazatin vs. HRET ,8 the Court has observed that —

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the
power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature." Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. 9

The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by
the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or
curtail it or even affect the same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs.  HRET ,10 the Court has
explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but
only, "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be remedy for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs.  Bocar,11 the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission
"is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.HRET,12 venture into the perilous
area of the correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to
vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution
itself calls for remedial action.

In the instant controversy, it would appear that the HRET "reviewed and passed upon the validity of all the ballots in the
protested and counter-protested precincts, including those not contested and claimed by the parties." 13 The Tribunal,
added, that "(t)his course of action was adopted not only to give effect to the intent of each and every voter, but also to
rectify any mistake in appreciation, deliberate or otherwise, committed at the precinct level and overlooked during the
revision stage of this case."14 In holding that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI at the back of the
ballot does not invalidate it, the HRET has ratiocinated in this wise:

No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have
any of the following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI
Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by the
Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.

xxx xxx xxx

 Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that failure to authenticate the ballot
shall constitute an election offense, there is nothing in the said law which provides that ballots not so
authenticated shall be considered invalid. In fact, the members of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms agreed during their deliberation on the subject that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the
back of the ballot will not per se  make a ballot spurious.

Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, mentioned
during his sponsorship speech that one of the salient features of the bill filed was "to require the chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by affixing his signature on (sic) the back
thereof and to consider any ballot as spurious," R.A. 7166, as approved, does not contain any provision to that
effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress as a whole (House of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the
proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots without the BEI Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious.
What is clearly provided under the said law is the sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not
the disenfranchisement of the voter.15

The pertinent provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides:

Sec. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. — In every case before delivering an official ballot to
the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspector shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at
the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board of Election Inspectors and
shall constitute an election offense punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authenticated shall thereby be deemed
spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers.
Where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature
should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there should be no
room for construction.16

As so aptly observed by the Solicitor-General, House Bill ("HB") No. 34811 (which later become R.A. No. 7166), approved
by the House of Representatives on third reading, was a consolidation of different bills. Two of the bills consolidated and
considered in drafting H.B. No. 34811 were H.B. 34639 and H.B. No. 34660. Section 22 of the two latter bills provided that:

In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors
shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Any ballot which is not so authenticated
shall be deemed spurious. Failure to so authenticate shall constitute an election offense. 17

During the deliberation of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, held on 08 August 1991, the members
agreed to delete the phrase "Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious." Pertinent portions of the
transcript of stenographic notes ("TSN") taken during the Meeting of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
read:

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Mercado.

HON. MERCADO. I, think, Section 22, we go to the intent of the provision. I think the intent here is to sanction the
inspector so I would propose a compromise. The ballot should not be deemed as spurious. However, it would
rather be failure of the inspector to, or the chairman to affix his signature would rather be a circumstance which
would aggravate the crime, which would aggravate the election offense, on the part of the inspector, but not to
disenfranchise the voter. Because the intention here is to punish the election inspector for not affixing the
signature. Why should we punish the voter? So I think the compromise here. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. A serious election offense.

HON. MERCADO. Yes, it should be a serious election offense on the part of the chairman for not affixing the
signature, but not to make the ballot spurious.

HON. RONO. Mr. Chairman.

 THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Rono.

HON. RONO. One thing that we have to guard against is when we deal with the ballot and the right to suffrage, we
should not really make law that would prevent the flexibility of the Commission on Elections, and the Supreme
Court from getting other extraneous efforts to confirm authenticity or the spuriousness of the ballot, by making a
provision that by that single mistake or inadvertence of the chairman we make the ballot automatically spurious is
dangerous. It should be . . . what I'm saying is that the Commission or the proper bodies by which this matter will
be taken up may consider it as one of the evidences of spuriousness but notper se or  ipso facto it becomes; it
should look for other extraneous evidence. So what I am suggesting is let us give them this kind of flexibility
before we determine or before we say that this ballot is spurious, we give the COMELEC some flexibility in the
determination of other extraneous evidence.

HON. GARCIA. May I offer a suggestion?

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Garcia.

HON. GARCIA. That the fact that a ballot does not contain the signature, I think, initial will not be
sufficient, the signature of the Chairman should be noted in the minutes. Noted in the minutes.
So that in case of protest, there is basis.

HON. RONO. OO, may basis na. Iyon lang. I think that would solve our problem.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

MR. MONSOD. Your honor, we're willing to accept that amendment. Take out that sentence
spurious, with the introduction of the proposed measure . . .18

The TSN of the proceedings of the Bicameral conference Committee on Election Law, held on 29 October 1991, in turn,
would show these exchanges;

CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ: Are there anything more?

HON. ROCO. There is a section in the Senate version about the ballot being signed at the
back.

CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ. Counter side.

HON. ROCO. If it is not signed then it is being spurious which is a very dangerous, I
(think) (it) is a very dangerous provision and so . . .

MR. MONSOD. We agree with the House version that anyway when chairman of BEI
doesn't sign subject to an election offense. But it should not be a basis for
disenfranchisement of the voter. So, we believe we set this in the hearings in the House
that we should strike out that sentence that says that this ballot is automatically
spurious.19

Thus the final draft, which was later to become R.A. No. 7166, no longer included the provision "Any ballot not so
authenticated shall be deemed spurious." The intention of the legislature even then was quite evident.

The reliance on Bautista vs. Castro20 by petitioner, is misdirected. It must be stressed that B.P. Blg.
222, 21otherwise known as the "Barangay Election Act of 1982," approved on 25 March 1982, itself categorically
expresses that it shall only be "applicable to the election of barangay officials." Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222 and its
implementing rule in Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539 have both provided:

Section 14 of B.P. 222:

Sec. 14. Official barangay ballots. — The official barangay ballots shall be provided by the city or
municipality concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by the Commission on Elections.
 Such official ballot shall, before it is handed to the voter at the voting center, be authenticated in the
presence of the voter, the other Tellers, and the watchers present by the Chairman of the Board of
Election Tellers who shall affix his signature at the back thereof.

Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539:

Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. — . . .

b. Delivery of ballot. — Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the chairman shall, in the presence of
the voter, the other members of the board and the watchers present, affix his signature at the back
thereof and write the serial number of the ballot in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with No.
"1" for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the succeeding ballots, which serial number
shall be entered in the corresponding space of the voting record. He shall the fold the ballot once, and
without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter, together with a ball pen.

xxx xxx xxx

e. Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter shall affix his right
hand thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable coupon, and shall give the folded ballot
to the chairman. (2) The chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at its contents, and in the
presence of the voter and all the members of the Board, verify if it bears his signature and the same serial
number recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the voter shall then be
required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in the voting record. (4) The chairman
shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded ballot in the compartment for valid ballot and
the coupon in the compartment for spoiled ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.

f. When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot returned to the chairman with its coupon already
detached, or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial number that
does not tally with the serial number of the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record,
shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and signed by the members of the board and shall not
be 
counted.22

The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The stringent requirements in B.P. Blg. 222 should
be justifiable considering that the official barangay ballots would be provided by the city or municipality
concerned with the COMELEC merely prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official ballots in B.P. Blg. 222,
being supplied and furnished by the local government themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily
counterfeited might not have been discounted. The absence of authenticating marks prescribed by law, i.e., the
signature of the chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the back of the ballot, could have well been really
thought of to be fatal to the validity of the ballot.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no similar stringent provisions such as that seen in
Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The pertinent part in Resolution No. 2676 on the requirement of
the signature of the chairman is found in Section 73 thereof which merely provides:

Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. — In every case, the chairman of the board
shall, in the presence of the voter, authenticate every ballot by affixing his signature at the back thereof
before delivering it to the voter. FAILURE TO SO AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN THE MINUTES OF
THE BOARD AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE.

Again, in Resolution No. 2738,23 promulgated by the COMELEC on 03 January 1995,24 which implemented, among
other election laws, R.A. No. 7166 (that governed the election for Members of the House of Representatives held
on 08 May 1995), the relevant provision is in Section 13 which itself has only stated:

Sec. 13. Authentication of the ballot. — Before delivering a ballot to the voter, the chairman of the board
shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof.

It would appear evident that the ruling in Bautista vs. Castro was prompted because of the express declaration in
Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, implementing Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222, that: "Any ballot
returned to the chairman . . . which does not bear the signature of the chairman . . . shall be considered as spoiled
. . . and shall not be counted." This Court thus stated in Bautista:

The law (Sec 14 of B.P. Blg. 222,) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave
no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers
in the ballot given to a voter as a required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot
is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.

It should be noteworthy that in an unsigned 03rd April 1990 resolution, in "Jolly Fernandez vs. COMELEC,"25the
Court en banc had the opportunity to debunk the argument that all ballots not signed at the back thereof by the
Chairman and the Poll Clerk were to be considered spurious for non-compliance with Section 15 of R.A. No.
6646,26 i.e., "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," reading as follows:

Sec. 15. — Signature of Chairman and Poll Clerk at the Back of Every Ballot. — In addition to the
preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated in Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the
chairman and the poll clerk of the board of election inspector shall affix their signatures at the back of
each and every official ballot to be used during the voting. A certification to that effect must be entered
in the minutes of the voting.

The Court declared:

The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and give effect to the intention of
the voter. That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of the said section as suggested by
the petitioner for it would result in the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the voter,
and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the election officials. The citizen cannot
be deprived of his constitutional right of suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were
negligent in performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was purely ministerial and technical, by
no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to authenticate the ballot. A contrary
ruling would place a premium on official ineptness
and make it possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence — or, worse, their deliberate
inaction — to frustrate the will of the electorate.27

Petitioner Libanan suggests that the Court might apply the "ruling" of respondent HRET in the case of Yap
vs.Calalay (HRET Case No. 95-026). He states that "it is the HRET itself, ironically, that deals the coup de graceto
its ruling HRET Case No. 95-020." The "ruling" cited by petitioner is actually a "Confidential
Memorandum,"28 dated 28 April 1997, from a certain Atty. Emmanuel Mapili addressed to "PA Committees in
HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay)" which has for its subject "(n)ew rulings to be followed in the appreciation
of ballots in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay) and other concerns." Petitioner Libanan quotes the pertinent
portion of the said Memorandum, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved that the following rules and guidelines on the appreciation of ballots
shall be given effect in the resolution of this case and shall be applied prospectively to other pending
cases:

1. The absence of the signature of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot shall nullify
the same and all the votes therein shall not be counted in favor of any candidate. 29

Reliance by petitioner on this alleged "ruling", obviously deserves scant consideration. What should, instead, be
given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long
as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. 30 It is only
when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

It is quite clear, in the opinion of the Court, that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in its issuance of the assailed decision and resolution.

On other important point. Regarding the membership of certain Justices of this Court in the HRET and their
participation in the resolution of the instant petition, the Court sees no conflict at all, and it, therefore, rejects the
 offer of inhibition by each of the concerned justices. As early as Vera vs.  Avelino,31 this Court, confronted with a
like situation, has said unequivocally:

. . . Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings about coincidence. Their designation to the
electoral tribunals deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this Supreme Court, and did
not disqualify them in this litigation. Nor will their deliverances hereat on a given question operate to
prevent them from voting in the electoral forum on identical questions; because the Constitution,
establishing no incompatibility between the two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want, justices
opining one way here, and thereafter holding otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral tribunal, or vice-
versa.32

Such has thus been, and so it is to be in this petition, as well as in the cases that may yet come before the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126669 April 27, 1998

ERNESTO PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND MENESES

G.R. No. 127900 April 27, 1998

FERDINAND MENESES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO PUNZALAN

G.R. No. 128800 April 27, 1998

ERNESTO PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND MENESES

G.R. No. 132435 April 27, 1998

ERNESTO PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND MENESES

Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections.

On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor,
having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas' 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan's 8,612 votes.

On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95 before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in the municipality's forty-seven (47)
precincts. 1 In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21)
precincts 2 of the 47 protested by Manalastas.

On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the
RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157)
precincts. 3 Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts 4 of the 157
protested by Punzalan.

Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were ordered consolidated and
were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.

Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud,
irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the counting of
votes such as:

a. the registration of flying voters;

b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;

c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the "lansadera;"

d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant;

e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the
respondent/protestee;

f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee;

g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as
to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee;

h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and
the reducing of the votes actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the
preparation of the corresponding election return;
 i. groups of two or more ballots for the respondent/protestee were written each group,
by only one (1) person;

j. one (1) ballot for the respondent/protestee written by two or more persons. 5

By way of counter-protest to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that he, too, was a victim of massive fraud
and illegal electoral practices such as:

a) The preparation of the ballots by persons other than the registered electors
concerned;

b) The use of electoral fraudulent practice known as the "lansadera;"

c) False reading of votes for the protestee;

d) The counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes for the protestant;

e) Switching of ballots in favor of protestant;

f) Tampering with the ballots for the Protestee after having been cast, so as to annul the
same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for the protestant;

g) The adding of more votes to those actually counted for the protestant and the
reducing of the votes actually counted for the protestee in the preparation of the
corresponding election returns;

h) Group of two (2) or more ballots for protestant were written, each group, by only one
(1) person;

i) One (1) ballot for the protestant written by two (2) or more persons. 6

Finding the protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered a revision of the ballots.
The result of said physical count coincided with the figures reflected in the election returns, thus: Meneses — 10,301
votes; Manalastas — 9,317 votes; and Punzalan — 8,612 votes.

After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 with the following
findings, viz: that massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and serious anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that
ballots, election returns and tally sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70 "disappeared under
mysterious circumstances;" and that filled-up ballots with undetached lower stubs and groups of ballots with stubs cut out
with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the trial court was constrained to examine
the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon and came up with the declaration that Punzalan was the
winner in the elections. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In EPC No. E-005-95 — declaring Ferdinand D. Meneses as having garnered 7,719 votes or 33 votes
more than the 7,686 votes received by Danilo D. Manalastas and dismissing the instant protest.

2. In EPC No. E-006-95 — declaring Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Mexico,
Pampanga. Protestee Ferdinand D. Meneses is hereby ordered to vacate his position and to cease and
desist from further discharging the duties and functions officially vested in the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga which now and henceforth, unless otherwise disqualified by law, are
conferred unto and in favor of Ernesto M. Punzalan, who is hereby ordered to act, perform and discharge
the duties, functions and responsibilities and all incidents appertaining to and in connection with the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, immediately and after he shall have taken his oath
of office as such.

3. The counterclaims interposed by Ferdinand D. Meneses in both cases are hereby dismissed.
 The authorities concerned are hereby ordered to enforce, implement and assist in the enforcement and
implementation of this Decision immediately after Ernesto M. Punzalan shall have had taken his oath of
office.

As soon as this Decision becomes final, let notice thereof be sent to the Commission on Elections,
Department of Interior and Local Governments and Commission on Audit.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 7

Immediately thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision declaring Punzalan as the duly
elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. The case was docketed as EAC No. 48-96 by the COMELEC. Manalastas did not
appeal from the said decision.

On October 1, 1996, Punzalan filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga. On
the same day, the COMELEC issued an order directing the RTC to elevate the entire records of the case.

On October 10, 1996, the RTC issued an order which granted Punzalan's motion for execution pending appeal. On the
same date, Meneses filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, docketed as SPR No. 47-96, seeking the nullification of
the RTC's order of execution pending appeal.

On October 11, 1996, the COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its Order dated October 10, 1996.

On October 22, 1996, Meneses filed with the COMELEC a motion for contempt against Punzalan, alleging that the latter
was holding the office of mayor of Mexico, Pampanga in violation of the TRO issued by the COMELEC.

On October 28, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 126669, to set aside
the COMELEC's TRO issued on October 11, 1996.

On November 7, 1996, the COMELEC issued two (2) orders, one which submitted for resolution Meneses' application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and motion for contempt and another which granted a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the enforcement of the RTC's order of execution dated October 10, 1996.

On November 12, 1996, this Court issued a TRO directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing the TRO it
issued on October 11, 1996 in SPR No. 47-96.

On November 21, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a supplement to the petition seeking to declare as void the
COMELEC's preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and to declare Meneses in contempt of court.

On January 9, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order which dispositively read as follows:

Considering that the 7 November 1996 preliminary injunction of the Commission was pursuant to its 11
October 1996 temporary restraining order, which was specifically covered by the Supreme Court's
temporary restraining order, the Commission will respect and abide by the order of the Supreme Court.
Considering, however, that the temporary restraining order of the Supreme Court relates only to the
implementation of the order of execution of judgment pending appeal of the Regional Trial Court, the
Commission finds no legal impediment to proceed with the resolution of the main action
for certioraripending before it and shall act accordingly.

On January 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order stating that: 1) it need not act on Meneses' motion reiterating the
prayer to suspend pendente lite the implementation of the Order dated January 9, 1997, and 2) the Order dated January
9, 1997 shall take effect thirty (30) days from notice thereof to the parties.
On February 10, 1997 Meneses filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 127900, which sought to set aside the
COMELEC Orders dated January 9 and 30, 1997.

On April 24, 1997, the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition of Meneses to set aside the RTC's order of
execution pending appeal and allowing Meneses to continue to discharge the duties and functions of municipal mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga, without prejudice to the resolution of his pending appeal from the RTC's decision.

On April 28, 1997, Punzalan filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 128000, which sought to
nullify the COMELEC's Resolution dated April 24, 1997.

On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in EAC No. 48-96 setting aside the trial court's decision and
affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo in Election Protest Case No. E-006-95
declaring protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
Mexico, Pampanga in the May 8, 1995 local elections is hereby ANNULLED and SET-ASIDE.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission [First Division] hereby AFFIRMS the proclamation of protestee-appellant
Ferdinand D. Meneses by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Mexico,
Pampanga but with the modification that protestee-appellant received only 9,864 votes, or a deduction
of 437 votes from his original 10,301 votes. Further, this Commission [First Division] hereby COMMANDS
protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan to RELINQUISH his post in favor of protestee-appellant
Ferdinand Meneses immediately upon finality of this Resolution. 8

Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. In its Resolution dated February 13, 1998, the
COMELEC denied said motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, filed on February 16, 1998 and docketed as G.R. No. 132435, to set aside the COMELEC's resolutions of December 8,
1997 and February 13, 1998. Thus, petitioner alleges:

1. that the decision (resolution) in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

2. that it was rendered in disregard of law and the evidence;

3. that the decision (resolution) in question is a "prejudged decision;" and

4 that the decision (resolution) in question is the culmination of a series of acts of the
public respondent favoring the private respondent. 9

First. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited
to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this Court
in Bautista v.  Castro 10 wherein it was held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a
voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.

This contention is not meritorious.

While Section 24 11 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms," requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere
failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI
chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule
that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with
disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people. 12
In the recent case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose T . Ramirez, 13this Court
affirmed the ruling of the Tribunal in Libanan v.  Ramirez 14 to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairman's signature at
the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the
COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the
presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. The Court explained in this wise:

What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is
considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the
COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the
ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines"
provides that in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear
and good reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to affix his signature at the
back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.

Second. Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring valid (a) the ballots
wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen were different from their respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC
documents, (b) those group of ballots allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by two
(2) persons. He argues that the trial court's findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail over the findings
of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was based first on the findings of the revisors with the
assistance of an expert witness in the person of Atty. Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was
arrived at after an adversarial proceeding where both parties were represented by their lawyers and the expert witness
was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the public respondent were made unilaterally, without any
hearing and without the presence of the lawyers of the parties and of the parties themselves. 15

These arguments fail to persuade us.

The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is the
constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional,
provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law,
the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court. 16

Anent Punzalan's assertion that the trial court's finding which was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding wherein an
expert witness testified and was cross-examined, should not be interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was
arrived at without the benefit of a hearing or the aid of an expert, it is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct an
adversarial proceeding or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots or the handwriting found thereon. Neither
does it need to solicit the help of handwriting experts in examining or comparing the handwriting. 17In fact, even
evidence aliunde is not necessary to enable the Commission to determine the authenticity of the ballots and the
genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as an examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient. 18

In Erni v.  COMELEC, 19 we held that:

. . . . With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been ordered
to determine whether they had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only one
hand, we hold that the Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying
petitioner-protestee's request. The rule is settled that the Commission itself can make the determination
without the need of calling handwriting experts.

Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of the
handwriting on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient . . . . 20

In Bocobo v.  COMELEC, 21 we likewise ruled that:

 . . . . Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed
to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52
Phil. 718) . . . . 22

In the case at bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a handwriting expert, was not binding upon the
COMELEC especially so where the question involved the mere similarity or dissimilarity of handwritings which could be
determined by a comparison of existing signatures or handwriting. 23 Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge."

In Lorenzo v. Diaz, 24 this Court enumerated the tools to aid one in the examination of handwriting, thus:

The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics,
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm,
presence of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the
questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity.
The result of examination of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific
instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is
written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, played an
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case,
absolute absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence of the character of
a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between the questioned handwriting and an authentic one. 25

Indeed, the haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the surroundings of polling places could certainly
affect the handwriting of both the voters and the election officers manning the said precincts. The volume of work to be
done and the numerous documents to be filled up and signed must likewise be considered. Verily, minor and insignificant
variations in handwriting must be perceived as indicia of genuineness rather than of falsity.

In Go Fay v.  Bank of the Philippines Islands, 26 this Court held that carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed
in signing are evidence of genuineness. In U . S. v. Kosel, 27 it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain letters in a handwriting
may be attributed to the mental and physical condition of the signer and his position when he signed. Grief, anger,
vexation, stimulant, pressure and weather have some influence in one's writing. Because of these, it is an accepted fact
that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a person's signature are exactly alike.

On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the specimens examined by Atty.
Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and
documents concerned. 28 This fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination
of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court (the COMELEC in this case) to make itself the comparison of the disputed handwriting "with
writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence is offered."

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their
testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose
upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise
unreasonable. 29

In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the COMELEC by personally and
actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb its findings.

In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. 30 An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
Prescinding from the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No.
132435. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby DISMISSED. The status quo order issued by
this Court on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot and
academic by the foregoing disquisition.

Further, this decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time between now and the next elections and
to prevent the case from becoming moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169865             July 21, 2006

VIRGINIO VILLAMOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AMYTIS* DE DIOS-BATAO

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the April 11, 2005 Resolution 1 of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EAC No. A-11-2004 as well as the Order of the COMELEC En Banc
dated August 5, 2005. The assailed resolution affirmed the Order2 dated July 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao
City, Branch 25 in Case No. EP-2004-02 which reconsidered its Order3 dated June 24, 2004 dismissing the election protest
filed by respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 13, 2004, petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as mayor of Carmen, Cebu, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) in the elections held on May 10, 2004 over his opponent, respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao. On May 17,
2004, respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner alleging as grounds the illegal composition of the
MBC and its proceedings. The case was docketed as SPC No. 04-083 and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. 4

Subsequently, or on May 24, 2004, respondent filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City which
was docketed as Case No. EP-2004-02 and raffled to Branch 25 thereof. Petitioner filed his Answer to the Petition with
Counter Protest on June 7, 2004.5 However, in its Order6 dated June 24, 2004, the trial court dismissed the election protest
for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed one-day late.

Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, an election protest should be filed within 10 days from the
date of proclamation of the results of the election. Since petitioner was proclaimed on May 13, 2004, respondent had until
May 23, 2004 to file an election protest. However, respondent filed the same only on May 24, 2004, thus, it was dismissed
by the trial court in an Order dated June 24, 2004.7

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondent which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated July 23,
2004 because it found that the election protest was actually filed on time. Since the last day to file the protest fell on May
23, 2004 which was a Sunday, thus, under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the time should not run until the next
working day which was May 24, 2004. Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the courts inherent power to amend
and control its processes and orders to conform with law and justice. 8

Petitioner appealed the Order granting respondent's motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC and was docketed as
EAC No. A-11-2004 and was raffled to its Second Division. In the assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005, the Second
Division of the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. On August 5, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued on May 9, 2005 a Resolution 9 in SPC No. 04-083 which is the
petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition To Declare Null And Void Proclamation dated 17 May 2004
filed by petitioners Amythis De Dios Batao, et al., is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. MAY A REGULAR COURT, IN AN ELECTION PROTEST, ACT ON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM AN
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE ELECTION PROTEST CONSIDERING THAT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PROHIBITED PLEADING?

2. MAY A REGULAR COURT ADMIT AN ELECTION PROTEST PREMATURELY CONSIDERING THAT THE PROTESTANT
HAS STILL A PENDING PETITION FOR PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY IN THE ANNULMENT OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE PROTESTEE IN THE COMELEC AND IF IT DOES SO, MAY THE PERIOD FOR THE FILING OF
THE COUNTER-PROTEST BE COUNTED FROM THE RECEIPT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC DENYING THE
PETITION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE PROCLAMATION?11
The core issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether the trial court can act on a motion for reconsideration in an
election protest; and (2) whether the trial court prematurely admitted respondent's election protest pending a pre-
proclamation controversy.

We shall first discuss the second issue. As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.12 The filing
of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or
amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass
upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.13 The reason is that once the competent tribunal has
acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.14

Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of the period for filing an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto.15 For it is not the relief prayed for which distinguishes actions under § 24816 from an
election protest or quo warranto proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based.17

In the case at bar, respondent's petition to annul the proclamation rested mainly on the alleged illegal composition of the
municipal board of canvassers18 and its proceedings which is an issue that may be properly raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy.19 Under paragraph (b) of Section 5 of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, if the petition involves the
illegal composition of the board of canvassers, it must be filed immediately when the board begins to act as such, or at the
time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of the
board, or immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal. Thus, we held in Laodenio v.
Commission on Elections20 that when the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board, the same cannot be
questioned after the proclamation of the winner, to wit:

Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5 par. (a)(1) (not Sec. 4 as erroneously cited by petitioner), of Rule 27 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also allow filing of a petition directly with respondent COMELEC when the issue
involves the illegal composition of the Board, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule requires that it must be filed
immediately when the Board begins to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose
capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point
where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal. In the present case, the petition was filed five (5) days after
respondent Longcop had been proclaimed by the Board. At any rate, the real issue appears to be – not what it
appears to petitioner – whether he can still dispute the composition of the Board after having actively
participated in the proceedings therein. In this regard, we sustain respondent COMELEC. 21

In the instant case, respondent's petition to annul petitioner's proclamation based on the alleged illegal composition of
the board of canvassers is a pre-proclamation controversy which should have been filed prior to petitioner's proclamation.
However, respondent filed the petition on May 17, 2004 only or four days after petitioner's proclamation. As such, the
filing of the petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner did not suspend the running of the reglementary period
within which to file an election protest and inevitably, it did not suspend the latter's period to file an Answer with Counter
Protest. Accordingly, the subsequent filing of the election protest on May 24, 2004 by respondent amounted to the
abandonment of the pre-proclamation controversy earlier filed.

Anent the first issue, petitioner asserts that a motion for reconsideration of the election protest filed by respondent was a
prohibited pleading thus its filing did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Consequently, when the latter failed to
appeal within five days from the June 24, 2004 Order of the trial court, the dismissal of the election protest became final.

On the other hand, respondent alleges that a motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited pleading and claims that even
if the motion was not filed, the trial court could reinstate the petition motu proprio before the said order became final.

We agree with petitioner.

Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),22 the trial court cannot entertain a motion for reconsideration of
its decision in an election contest affecting municipal officers filed by the aggrieved party. However, the latter may appeal
to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now COMELEC) within five days after the receipt of a copy of the decision. Likewise,
Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure implementing the abovementioned Section 256 provides:
 Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of the Court shall be promulgated on a date set by it
of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after its promulgation. No motion
for reconsideration shall be entertained. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent received a copy of the Order dismissing the election protest for lack of jurisdiction on June 25, 2004. Thus,
respondent had until June 30, 2004 within which to file an appeal with the COMELEC but failed to do so. Instead,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading. As such, it did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period.

In Veloria v. Commission on Elections,23 a case involving candidates for municipal mayor, vice-mayor, and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Manaoag, Pangasinan, where instead of perfecting an appeal within five days as provided by law,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, we held that:

The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in the trial
court on March 20, 1990 did not suspend the period to appeal since a "motion for reconsideration" is prohibited
under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege
that must be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law, x x x and its timely
perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and jurisdictional x x x, Judge Abasolo gravely abused his
discretion when he gave due course to the petitioners' tardy appeal from his predecessor's x x x resoluti(o)n x x x
dismissing the petitioners' election protest. Said resolution had become final and unappealable. 24

The rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.25 Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 19, Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure clearly state that no motion for reconsideration should be entertained. Thus, there is no
room to apply the rules of ordinary civil procedure suppletorily. Nor can resort be made by the trial court to Section
5(g)26 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to sustain its actions. The trial court did not conform to law and justice when it
granted the motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April 11, 2005 of the COMELEC
Second Division and the Order dated August 5, 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc in EAC No. A-11-2004 which affirmed the
Order dated July 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 in Case No. EP-2004-02 granting the motion
for reconsideration of respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 24, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court dismissing respondent's election protest for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25444             January 31, 1966

WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO

This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of certain
precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said
Commission.

The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain questioned precincts were
"obviously manufactured" within the meaning of pertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens, 1 we issued on
December 24, 1965, a short resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject the returns of about fifty
precincts.

It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities — in the first set, in each precinct the number of
registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied  for each and
every  candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party
got exactly zero; and in the second set, — again contrary to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes
were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in
each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero  in all said precincts.

We opined that the election result to said precincts as reported, was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. For it is not
likely, in the ordinary course of things, that all the electors  of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eight
candidates  of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one  of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such
extraordinary coincidence was quite impossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide
organization, with branches in every province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands.

We also know from our experience in examining ballots in the three Electoral Tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House)
that a large portion of the electors do not fill all the blanks  for senators in their ballots. Indeed, this observation is
confirmed by the big differences in the votes received by the eight winning senators in this as well as in previous national
elections;2 almost a million votes between the first place and the eight. Furthermore, in 1965, the total number of electors
who cast their votes was 6,833,369 (more or less). If every voter had written eight names on his ballot, the total number
of votes cast for all the candidates  would be that number multiplied by 8, namely 54,666,952. But the total number of the
votes tallied for the candidates for senator amounted to 49,374,942 only. The difference between the two sums
represents the number of ballots  that did not contain  eight names for senators. In other words, some 5 million ballots  did
not carry eight names. Of course, this is a rough estimate, because some ballots may have omitted more names, in which
case, the number of incomplete ballots would be less. But the general idea and the statistical premise is there.

The same statistical result is deducible from the 1963 election data: total number of electors who voted, 7,712,019; if each
of them named eight senators, the total votes tallied should have been 61,696,152; and yet the total number tallied for all
the senatorial candidates was 45,812,470 only. A greater number of incomplete ballots.

It must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one  return gives to one candidate all the votes in the precinct, even
as it gives exactly zero to the other. This is not a case where  some senatorial candidates obtain zero exactly, while some
others receive a few scattered votes. Here, all the eight  candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them
receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates  of the other party got precisely nothing.

The main point to remember is that  there is no block-voting nowadays.

What happened to the vote of the Nacionalista inspector? There was one in every precinct. Evidently, either he became a
traitor to his party, or was made to sign a false return by force or other illegal means. If he signed voluntarily, but in
breach of faith, the Nacionalista inspector betrayed his party; and, any voting or counting of ballots therein, was a sham
and a mockery of the national suffrage.

Hence, denying  prima facie recognition to such returns on the ground that they are manifestly fabricated or falsified,
would constitute a practical approach to the Commission's mission to insure free and honest elections.

In Mitchell vs. Stevens, supra, the returns showed a noticeable excess of votes over the number of registered voters, and
the court rejected the returns as obviously "manufactured". Why? The excess could have been due to the fact that,
disregarding all pertinent data, the election officers wrote the number of votes their fancy dictated; and so the return was
literally a "manufactured", "fabricated" return. Or maybe because persons other than voters, were permitted to take part
and vote; or because registered voters cast more than one ballot each, or because those in charge of the tally sheet
falsified their counts. Hence, as the Mitchell decision concluded, the returns were "not true returns . . . but simply
manufactured evidences of an attempt to defeat the popular will." All these possibilities and/or probabilities were plain
fraudulent practices, resulting in misrepresentation of the election outcome. "Manufactured" was the word used.
"Fabricated" or "false" could as well have been employed.

The same  ratio decidendi  applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned. These returns were obviously false or
fabricated — prima facie. Let us take for example, precinct No. 3 of Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648 registered
voters. According to such return all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party got 648 each,3 and the eight Nacionalista
candidates got exactly  zero. We hold such return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of the inherent improbability
of such a result — against statistical probabilities — specially because  at least one vote should have been received by the
Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the Nacionalista inspector. It is, of course, "possible" that such inspector did not
like his party's senatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he dislikedall of such candidates, and it is not likely that he
favored all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false
return, or else he betrayed his party, in which case, the election therein — if any — was no more than a barefaced fraud
and a brazen contempt of the popular polls.

Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled — and finally settled — by the
corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence, is
necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur —  the thing speaks for itself), there is
no reason to accept it and give it  prima facie value.

At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately  be ascertained before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.4 All we hold now, is that the returns show "prima facie" that they do not reflect true and valid reports
of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco — in the corresponding election protest.

The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory,
i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire, or has expired. And so the notion has spread among
candidates for public office that the "important thing" is the proclamation; and to win it, they or their partisans have
tolerated or abetted the tampering or the "manufacture" of election returns just to get the proclamation, and then let the
victimized candidate to file the protest, and spend his money to work for an empty triumph.

It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in all previous elections. Never was the point pressed upon us in a
more clear-cut manner. And without, in any way, modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacionalista Party vs.
Commission decision, we feel the mores of the day require application — even extension — of the principle in the Mitchell
decision, which is realistic and common sensical even as it strikes a blow at such pernicious "grab - the - proclamation -
prolong - the - protest" slogan of some candidates or parties.

It is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are quite "possible", bearing in mind the religious or political
control of some leaders in the localities affected. We say, possible, not probable. It is possible to win the sweepstakes ten
times; but not probable. Anyway, judges are not disposed to believe that such "control" has proved so powerful as to
convert the electors into mere sheep or robots voting as ordered. Their reason and conscience refuse to believe that 100%
of the voters in such precincts abjectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious freedom to choose the senators of this
Republic.

Indeed, social scientists might wonder whether courts could, consistently with morality and public policy,5 render
judgment acknowledging such "control" or validating such "controlled votes" as candidate Climaco chose to call them.

In view of the foregoing, and overlooking some intemperate language which detracts from the force of the arguments, we
hereby deny the motion to reconsider our resolution of December 24, 1965, as well as the petition for a re-hearing.

G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998

MANUEL SUNGA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND TRINIDAD

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-2131 dismissing the petition for disqualification against private
respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended
by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate
for re-election in the same municipality.

On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint 2 for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of
using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC charging
Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of
coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint.
This was followed by an Amended Petition4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint,
including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed
as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995,5 the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand,
opted not to submit any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion,
Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report6 to the COMELEC En Bancrecommending that
Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par.
(a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261,
par. (o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law
Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected
Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and
assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding
informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations 7for various elections offenses
were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred
to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent
Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the
petition for disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that —

1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically
enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in
which respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed . . . .

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu propio, or on motion of
any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter
in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election
laws . . . .
 2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as a winner
shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department of this Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the
complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for
preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima
facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt
is strong.

As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v.  Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the outright
dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case was filed before the election but
remains unresolved until after the election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the
proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.

If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26
1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the
amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050
mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition contending
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the
proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the
filing of four (4) informations against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified;
and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General concurred with petitioner's
arguments.

Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May
1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never
docketed by the COMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required
to answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition,
docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having
been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.

COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and the Silvestre v.Duavit8 ruling in
support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification
case was warranted under any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election
but was still pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the
proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election and after the proclamation of the
winner.

The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualification
case against private respondent Trinidad.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We find private respondent's arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly
recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint,
thus —
 This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of letter from petitioner
accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying for the latter's immediate
disqualification. Another letter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II
reiterated petitioner's prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism and
violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the
Commission containing substantially the same allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and
other documentary evidence.

That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no consequence. It was merely a
reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the
elections. Consequently, the Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely
supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the
action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. 9

The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42,
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees above described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to
take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates
that it is permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in
case of non-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the
non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the
procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent payment of docket fees, and private respondent was served with
summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private respondent has no cause to
complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon him, or that he was not required to answer.

Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050
declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint
to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring
candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a
disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and
the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.

Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v.  Duavit  infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, 10which provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest  and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong
(emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is
mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. 11The implication is that the COMELEC is left with
no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright
dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows
what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be
countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-
judicialbodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the
scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses
would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply
because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses
were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to
employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be
decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose
of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of
authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam
v. COMELEC12 this Court held —

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any
canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we
have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of
the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging
the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily
supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation.

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the
ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-
blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect,
on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus,
under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice."
It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even
without prior criminal conviction.13

It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sunga's motion to suspend the proclamation of Trinidad. The last
sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares that the Commission may order the suspension of the
proclamation of a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a
scintilla of doubt that the evidence of Trinidad's guilt was strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the
COMELEC Law Department —

Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioner's petition against the respondent for disqualification for the alleged
commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act
of terrorism, intimidation and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of
witnesses and other documents. Consequently, the petitioner's evidence supporting the disqualification of
respondent remain unrebutted simply because respondent has expressly waived his right to present evidence in
SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16
June 1995, thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right of respondent TRINIDAD.

In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing of four (4) criminal informations
against Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication that there was indeedprima facie evidence of violation of
election laws.

However, Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig,
Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. 14
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the sociological and psychological
elements behind voters' preferences. Election is the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular
will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the
men and women who will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.15

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
people of Iguig, Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a
plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected."16 In Aquino v.  COMELEC,17 this Court made the following pronouncement:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the election. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in
a field which excludes the disqualified candidate; the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No. 7160, 18 which provides in part —

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned
shall become the Governor or Mayor . . .

For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office . . . .

This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for interpretation but merely application.
This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy
will be created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-
mayor shall succeed as provided by law.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad,"
for disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1208 January 26, 1995

JACINTO MAPPALA vs. JUDGE CRISPULO NUÑEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela
This is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto Mappala against Judge Crispulo A. Nuñez, the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela for gross inefficiency, serious misconduct and violation of the code of
Judicial Ethics.

In 1989, the Provincial prosecutor of Isabela filed: (1) an information against Alejandro Angoluan for illegal possession of a
firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 22-954); (2) an information against Angoluan and five other co-
accused for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 22-955); and (3) an information against Alejandro and Honorato
Angoluan for violation of the Omnibus election code (Criminal Case No. 22-965). The complaining witness in Criminal Case
No. 22-955 was Jacinto Mappala, the complainant against respondent in this administrative case. All the actions were
consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, presided by respondent.

On December 20, 1993, respondent rendered a consolidated decision in the aforementioned cases, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and considerations, in Criminal Case No. 955, this Court finds
that the accused ALEJANDRO ANGOLUAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide. The prescribed penalty is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years orprision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be taken from the penalty one (1) degree
lower which is  prision correcional. He is therefore sentenced to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correcional as Minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor as maximum and to pay the complainant Jacinto Mappala the sum of P18,514.00 representing
hospitalization and medical expenses; and to pay the costs. The accused Honorato Angoluan, Bienvenido
Angoluan, Jr., Zaldy Angoluan, Teodoro Zipagan, Jr., and Ramon Soriano are hereby ACQUITTED FOR
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

In Criminal Case No. 954, this Court finds the accused ALEJANDRO ANGOLUAN "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Violation of P.D. No. 1866.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law. The penalty imposed is governed by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Section 1 of which provides:

Sec. 1 . . . If the offense is punished by other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.

The prescribed penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms under P.D. 1866 is Reclusion
Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua. The Court hereby sentences him to an imprisonment from TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY. The firearm,
Exhibit "H", is forfeited to the government.

And in Criminal Case No. 965, for Violation of the Omnibus election Code against Alejandro Angoluan and
Honorato Angoluan, this Court finds both accused "NOT GUILTY" of the crime and therefore are
ACQUITTED (Rollo, pp. 45-46).

The said decision is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In his letter-complaint dated March 28, 1994, complainant alleged that while the trial of the three cases was terminated in
December 1992 and the last pleading in the case, the prosecution's memorandum, was submitted on May 27, 1993,
respondent rendered his decision only on December 20, 1993 (Rollo, 
p. 14).

Complainant charged respondent with: (1) gross inefficiency for rendering the decision beyond the reglementary period of
ninety days or seven months after the cases were submitted for decision; (2) serious misconduct for acquitting Alejandro
Angoluan of violation of the Omnibus Election Code in Criminal Case No. 22-965; and (3) violation of the Code of Judicial
Ethics for giving credence to the alibi of the accused Rizaldy Angoluan in Criminal Case No. 22-955 in the absence of any
corroborating testimony of any witness (Rollo, pp. 10-11). Complainant likewise accused respondent of accepting bribes in
connection with cases pending before him (Rollo, p. 11).

In his comment, respondent averred that the three actions involved grave offenses that required more time in the
preparation of the decision. He alleged that he had to await the memorandum of the public prosecutors who requested
additional time for the submission thereof (Rollo, p. 6).

He justified the acquittal of Alejandro of violation of the Election Law in Criminal Case No. 965 on the ground that ". . . the
firearm was not taken from his person within the precinct but was not taken . . . more than 50 meters away from the
precinct" (Rollo,  p. 7).

Furthermore, he claimed that what the law considered as a crime was the "carrying of firearms within (50) or 100 meters
away from the precinct. The firearm was not taken from the accused within the 50 or 100 meters distance from the
precinct because in truth and in fact the said firearm was surrendered by the accused two (2) days after the elections. The
mistake in the distance is merely a clerical error. But be it 50 meters or 100 meters, still the accused could not be
convicted under the said provision, specifically Section 261, Subsection (p) of Article XXII of the Omnibus election Code"
(Rollo, p. 7).

Respondent claimed that the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics was utterly irresponsible and baseless, being
the handiwork of a disgruntled litigant with the purpose of discrediting his reputation (Rollo, 
pp. 7-8).

Respondent denied having received bribes.

II

As to complainant's charge of gross inefficiency, we find that respondent rendered the decision beyond the reglementary
period of ninety days, reckoned from May 27, 1993, the date when the last pleading was filed.

We are not impressed with respondent's excuse that it took time to resolve the three consolidated actions involving grave
offenses. If respondent required more time to resolve the cases, he is not without recourse. He should have asked for
more time to decide the cases from this Court, giving the justification therefor.

In Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482 (1993), we emphasized "for the guidance of the judges manning our courts,
that cases pending before their salas must be decided within the aforementioned period and that failure to observe said
rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge" (citing Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA
51 [1983]).

Respondent acquitted Alejandro Angoluan of violation of Section 261 (p) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Said provision reads as follows:

Deadly weapons. — Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place and within a radius of
one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the
polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of
affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise
the election is entitled to carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving and enforcing
the law.

In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct No. 2 located at the elementary
school building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections on March 28, 1989. Respondent also found that
Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of the weapon was an implied admission
that it was the one used by Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent acquitted
Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while
he was the precinct. According to respondent:

. . . With respect to the other accused Alejandro Angoluan, although there is evidence to prove that he
shot the complainant Jacinto Mappala, the gun which he allegedly used was surrendered by him two (2)
 days after the incident and he was not apprehended in possession of the gun within 100 meters radius of
the precinct. This Court believes that he should not be prosecuted (sic) in violation of Article 22, Section
261, Subsection (p) of the Omnibus Election Code (Rollo,  p. 45; Emphasis supplied).

To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code, it is not necessary that the deadly weapon
should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is
enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon "in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters
thereof" during any of the specified days and hours. After respondent himself had found that the prosecution had
established these facts, it is difficult to understand why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p)
of the Omnibus election Code.

The charge of serious misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics in connection with the acquittal of Rizaldy
Angoluan after sustaining his defense of alibi pertains to respondent's judicial functions in the appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. there is not enough evidence to set aside said finding of fact.

For failure of complainant to substantiate his charge that respondent accepted monetary favors in resolving the cases
pending before him, we dismiss the same. While the Judiciary is in the process of cleansing its ranks, we do not favor
complaints based on mere hearsay.

WHEREFORE, respondent is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to be paid within thirty days from receipt hereof, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or of acts calling for disciplinary action will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115022 August 14, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. WILFREDO REYES, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Manila and BUENAVENTURA MANIEGO
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul and set aside the
orders dated September 23, 1993 and January 25, 1994 of respondent Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-120275.

The facts reveal that respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II, Bureau of Customs,
Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued MICP Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92 dated January 10, 1992
assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations
as Special Assistant.1 The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992.

On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio
claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus
Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992
synchronized national and local elections.

After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed on May 6, 1995 an information with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
36, Manila charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B. P. Blg. 881 committed as follows:

That on or about January 14, 1992 which was within the election period of the May 11, 1992 synchronized
elections and within the effectivity of the ban on transfer or detail of officers and employees in the civil service, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public official, being the Collector of Customs VI, Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs, by
taking advantage of his position and abuse of authority, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, transfer
Jovencio D. Ebio, Chief of the Piers and Inspection Division, Manila International Container Port, Bureau of
Customs, to Special Assistant in the office of the Deputy Collector for Operations, of the same office, without a
prior written authority from the Commission on Elections. 2

Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on
that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It purportedly became punishable only on January 15,
1992, the date of effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner,
through the COMELEC, opposed the motion to quash.

On September 23, 1993, the trial court granted private respondent's motion to quash and dismissed Criminal Case No. 93-
120275.3 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied on January 25, 1995. 4 Petitioner forthwith elevated the
case to this Court on a pure question of law.

We affirm.

The basic law supposed to have been violated by respondent Maniego is Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 which reads as
follows:

Sec. 261. Prohibited acts. — The following shall be guilty of any election offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. — Any public official who makes or causes any transfer
or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers,within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution has fixed the election period for all elections to commence ninety (90) days before the day of election
and end thirty (30) days thereafter, unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the COMELEC. 5 For the May 11, 1992
synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC fixed a longer election period of one hundred twenty (120) days
before the scheduled elections and thirty (30) days thereafter. It issued Resolution No. 2314 on September 23, 1991
primarily adopting therein a calendar of activities. In the process, it designated January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992 as the
election period, viz.:

RESOLUTION NO. 2314

 Pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), and Republic Act No. 7166, the Commission on Elections has RESOLVED to adopt, the
following calendar of activities for the May 11, 1992 elections:

Date/Period Activities

November 28, 1991 — Start of the period of nomination and selection of official candidates for President, Vice-
President and Senators (165 days, SEC. 6, R.A.7166)

January 2, 1992 — Last day for appointment of members of boards of election inspectors (Sec.164, OEC) (Subject
to appointments which may be extended later in account of lack of public school teachers and disqualifications
due to relationship to candidates.)

January 12, 1992 — ELECTION PERIOD (120 (Sunday) todays, per Res. No. ____ )
June 10, 1992 Bans on carrying of firearms Wednesday suspension of elective local officials, organization of strike
forces, etc. (Sec. 261, 
OEC)6

xxx xxx xxx

On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2328 for the sole and specific purpose of fixing for the said
elections the election period from January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992. 7 This Resolution was published in the January 5,
1992 issue of the  Manila Times and the January 6, 1992 issue of the Philippine Times Journal.8

On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC also passed Resolution No. 2333 which promulgated the necessary rules to enforce
Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881. We quote its pertinent portions:

RESOLUTION NO. 2333

WHEREAS, the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides:

Sec. 261. Prohibited acts, — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. — Any public official who makes or
causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including
public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, to enforce effectively the foregoing provisions, there is need to promulgate the necessary rules for the
guidance of all concerned;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the power vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic
Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission has RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby
promulgates, the following rules to implement the provisions of Sec. 261, subsections (g), (h) and (x) of the
Omnibus Election Code.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Request for authority of the Commission. — Any request for authority to make or cause any transfer or
detail of any officer or employee in the civil service, including public school teachers, shall be submitted in writing
to the Commission indicating therein the office and place to which the officer or employee is proposed to be
transferred or detailed, and stating the reason therefor.

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 6. Effectivity. — This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day after its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

Resolution No. 2333 was published in the January 8, 1992 issues of Malaya and the Manila Standard. Hence, it took effect
on January 15, 1992, the seventh day after its publication.

It is undeniable that the transfer of complainant Ebio on January 14, 1992 was made during the election period. The
question, however, is whether this transfer ipso facto  makes respondent Maniego liable for an election offense under
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.

We rule in the negative.

We start with the constitutional injunction that no officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. 9 This prohibition is reiterated in the Administrative Code of
1987. 10 Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 implements this constitutional prohibition.

It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not  per se outlaw the transfer of a
government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure, the transfer or detail of a public officer or
employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. 11 It is necessary to meet the exigencies of public service sometimes
too difficult to perceive and predict. Without this inherent prerogative, the appointing authority may not be able to cope
with emergencies to the detriment of public service. Clearly then, the transfer or detail of government officer or employee
will not be penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to promote efficiency in the government service. Hence,
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333 provides that the COMELEC has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or
detail, viz: "Any request for authority to make or cause any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in the civil service,
including public school teachers, shall be submitted in writing to the Commission indicating therein the office and place to
which the officer or employee is proposed to be transferred or detailed, and stating the reason therefor. 12

Prescinding from this predicate, two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg.
881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election period as fixed by the
COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its
implementing rules and regulations.

In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, then the Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the
Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant on January 14, 1992. On this date, January 14, 1992, the
election period for the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections had already been fixed to commence January 12, 1992 until
June 10, 1992. As aforestated, this election period had been determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 2314 dated
November 20, 1991 and Resolution No. 2328 January 2, 1992. Nonetheless, it was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took
effect on January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its approval on the transfer or
detail of public officers or employees during the election period. Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable. Needless to state, respondent Maniego could
not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on
that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were yet in existent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and the orders dated September 23, 1993 and January 25, 1995 of the
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 93-120275 are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8957             April 29, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRES FERRER

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the dispositive part of which states:

Five (5) days after receipt of a copy of this Order by the prosecution, the information in this case shall be deemed
cancelled and released, unless in the meantime the prosecution amends the information so as to allege sufficient
facts constituting an offense under section 51 of our Revised Election Code.

The information held defective by the trial court reads as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan and the Provincial Fiscals of Nueva Ecija and Batanes, on special
detail in Pangasinan by Administrative Orders Nos. 6 and 13, dated January 12 and 27, 1954, respectively, of the
Secretary of Justice, accuse Andres G. Ferrer of the offense violation of Sections 51 and 54 in the relation to
Sections 51 and 54 in relation to Section 183, 184 and 185 of the revised Election Code, committed as follows:

That on or about 10th day of November, 1953, (Election Day), and for sometime prior thereto in the municipality
of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Andres G. Ferrer, being then and there a Foreign Affairs Officer, Class III, Department of Foreign
Affairs, and classified civil service officer, duly qualified and appointed as such, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, in utter disregard and defiance of the specific and several legal prohibition
on the subject, and in disregard of the civil service rules and regulations, induce, influence, sway and make the
electors vote in favor of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the following manner, to wit: (1) that sometime
before the elections on November 10, 1958, the said accused, Andres G. Ferrer, delivered a speech during a
political rally of the Liberal Party in Barrio Caloocan Norte, of the said municipality of Binmaley, Pangasinan,
inducing the electors to vote for the candidates of the Liberal Party but more particularly for President Quirino
and Speaker Perez; that during said political meeting the said accused caused to be distributed to the people who
attended said meeting cigarettes and pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party; and (2) that the said accused,
Andres G. Ferrer, sometime prior to the last elections campaigned in the Barrio of Caloocan Norte, of the said
municipality of Binmaley, going from house to house and induced the electors to whom he distributed sample,
ballots of the Liberal Party.

Contrary to sections 51 and 54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended.
(Crim. Case No. 20320.)

The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that it charges more than one offense and that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of either section 51 or section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The trial court is of the opinion that causing cigarettes or pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party to be distributed to the
people who attended a political meeting, charged against the defendant, does not constitute a violation of section 51 of
the Revised Election Code, because it is not giving "food" for tobacco is not food; nor does it constitute a violation of that
part of section 51 which makes unlawfully the contributing or giving, directly or indirectly, of money or things of value,
because the information merely charges the defendant with-having caused cigarettes, etc. to be distributed, and it does
not state that the cigarette belonged to the defendant and were being given away by him as his contribution for
electioneering purposes. True, cigarettes are not food, but they have and are of value and the charge that the defendant
caused cigarettes and pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party to be distributed to the people who attended a political
meeting mentioned in the information is a sufficient allegation that he gave or contributed things of value for
electioneering purposes. If the cigarettes did not belong to him, that is a matter of defense. The trial court is also of the
opinion that the defendant is not a classified civil service officer or employee, because to be such it is necessary that he be
assigned in the Department of Foreign Affairs under section 6, Republic Act. No. 708 and if and when thus assigned he will
for purposes of civil service law and regulations, be considered as first grade civil service eligible," and that even if the
prosecution could establish that the defendant at the time of the commission of the violation charged was assigned in the
Department of Foreign Affairs under the section just mentioned, still such assignment would not make him a classified civil
service officer embraced within the provisions of section 54 of the Revised Election Code, for, according to the trial court,
section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the classified civil service embraces all persons not expressly
declared to be the unclassified civil service and section 671 enumerates the persons embraced in the unclassified civil
service; and concludes; that the defendant is in the unclassified civil service under section 671, paragraph b, of the Revised
Administrative Code, because the defendant was appointed by the President first as Foreign Affairs Officer Class III,
Department of Foreign Affairs, and later on as Vice Consul the last appointment having been duly confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, and that the, assignment or detail in the Department of Foreign Affairs would make him by
mere legal fiction a first grade civil service eligible under section 6, Republic Act No. 708.
The reason advanced by the trial court are defense matters. The allegation in the information that the defendant is "a
classified civil service officer, duly qualified and appointed as such," for purposes the motion to quash, is deemed
admitted. The trial court cannot go beyond the allegations of the information.

Nevertheless, the information is defective, because it charges two violations of the Revised Election Code, to wit: section
51 to which a heavier penalty is attached, and section 54 for which a lighter penalty is provided. And the prosecuting
attorneys had that in mind when at the end of the information filed by them they stated: "Contrary to Sections 51 and 54
in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended." Causing cigarettes which are things of
value to be distributed, made unlawful by section 51 and punished by section 183, cannot be deemed a necessary means
to commit the lesser violation of section 54 were the penalty attached to it taken into consideration. The rule in the case
of People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil., 536, cited and invoked by the State, has no application to the case, because there the
defendant, who was not a duly licensed physician, gave medical assistance and treatment to a certain person and
advertised himself and offered services as a physician by means of cards or letterheads and advertisement in the
newspapers, latter being a means to commit the former, and both violations are punishable with the same penalty,
whereas in the present case causing cigarettes or things of value to be distributed by the defendant to the people who
attended a political meeting is a violation distinct from that of electioneering committed by a classified civil service officer
or employee. The former has no connection with the latter.

If the penalty provided for violation of section 51 and 54 were the same as in the case of the violation of the Medical Law,
the rule in the case of People vs. Buenviaje supra, might be invoked and applied.

That a violation of section 51 is distinct from that of section 54 is further shown by the fact that a violation of the former
may be committed by any candidate, political committee, voter or any other person, whereas a violation of the latter may
only be committed by a justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, officer or employee of the Army,
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and classified civil service officer or employee.

Under the information in question, if the charges be proved, the defendant may be convicted and sentenced under either
section or both. The rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in an information has for aim to give the
defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable, him to prepare his defense. The State should not heap upon
the defendant two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.

The order appealed from is affirmed, not upon the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but on the ground that the
information charges two different violations, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-61998 February 22, 1983

ROGELIO DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

The question of law posed for determination in this petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan may be propounded thus: Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try
election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office — the Commission on Elections and the Court of
First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan?

After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of
mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de
Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to
the Ministry of Justice which endorsed the same to the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation. Noting that
petitioner was being charged in relation to his office, Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog in their capacity as
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal Genova issued a resolution finding the
existence of a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 1and sub-sections [x] 2 and [mm] 3 of Section
178 of the Election Code of 1978. After approval thereof by the Tanodbayan, the following information, dated January 27,
1982, was filed before the Sandiganbayan:

That on or about January 30, 1980 and sometime thereafter to February 6, 1980, in the Municipality of
Casiguran Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused while discharging the Office of the Election Registrar in the Municipality of
Casiguran, Province of Sorsogon, taking advantage and abusing his official position, did there and there
wilfully unlawfully and feloniously by reason of his being a registrar knowingly registered persons in order
to vote on January 30, 1980 being an election day and at the same time issuing Identification cards during
election day, thereby violating the provision of the Election Code of 1978 and at the same time tampering
with the election reports by mag it appear that 10,727 persons were the total number of registered
voters for the election of January 30, 1980, when in truth and in fact the actual total number of voters as
- sported on January 27, 1980 by the accused was only 10,532 but then changed to 10,727, thereby
violating the provisions of Section '89' and Section.'178' under Article XVI specifically sub- section 'X' and
sub-section 'MM' which is a violation of the Election Code of 1978 to the erosion of public faith and
confidence.

The case, docketed as SB Criminal Case No. 5054, was raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has
the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense

xxx xxx xxx

[x] Any election registrar or any person acting in his behalf who issues or causes the issuance of a voter's
certificate of registration or cancels or causes the cancellation thereof the violation of the provisions of
this Code.

xxx xxx xxx

[mm] Any person who, without authority, acts as, or assumes r performs any -function of a member of
the election committee, or the board of canvassers, or deputy of representative of the Commission.

charged in the information, the same being an election offense over which the power to investigate, prosecute and try is
lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the
Tanodbayan's exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against
petitioner.

The COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case, entered its appearance as amicus curiae, and through its law
department manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez, Jr., submitted a memorandum supporting petitioner's stand. 4

On August 13, 1982, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the motion to quash. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The legal question posed being one of first impression, this, Court resolved to give due course to the petition, treating the
same as an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode by which relief from the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan could be obtained from this Tribunal. Petitioner and respondents rely on different
provisions of the 1973 Constitution as bases for their respective contentions. Petitioner invokes Section 2 of Article XII[c]
of the 1973 Constitution which vests upon the COMELEC the power "to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," and its implementing legislation, Section 182 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides the
following:

Section 182 — Prosecution. The Commission shall, thru its duly authorized legal officer, have the power
to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code and to prosecute
the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

Petitioner further cites Section 184 of the same Code which invests the court of first instance with "exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this code except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the city or municipal courts. ... The
Solicitor General supports the petitioner's views. 5

Upon the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, in its resolution of August 13, 1982, 6 asserts its jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 5054 on the authority of Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, which mandated the creation by the Batasan
Pambansa of "a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices, and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those
in government-owned and controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."

To the Sandiganbayan, as set forth in the challenged resolution, ... the key phrase in the determination as to which of the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts of first instance should take cognizance of an election offense, is the phrase, 'in
relation to their office'." Thus, it would distinguish between election offenses committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office and those committed not in relation to their office, in this manner:

If the election offense is committed by a public officer or employee NOT in relation to their office,
generally, jurisdiction will be assumed by the regular courts. If, on the other hand, the offense was
committed by a public officer or employee in relation to their office, then there is no other tribunal
vested with jurisdiction to try such offense but this court, in consonance with the mandate of the
Constitution that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, lover ... offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office.

We find the position of the Sandiganbayan devoid of merit.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor
implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contra-distinguished from the clear and categorical
bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

Under the Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ... offenses committed by public officers ... in
relation to their office as may be determined by law" [Sec. 5, Art. XIII]; while the Office of the Tanodbayan shall "receive
and investigate complaints relative to public office." [Sec. 6, Art. XIII]. The clause, "as may be determined by law" is, to Our
mind imbued with grave import. It called for a legislation that would define and delineate the power and jurisdiction of
both the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan, as what, in fact had been provided for in Presidential Decree Nos. 1606 and
1607, creating the said entities.

Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
 [a] Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;

[b] Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; and,

[c] Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.

Plainly, the above quoted paragraph [c] is but a re-statement of the constitutional provision relating to the
Sandiganbayan. It is also to be noted that it is phased in terms so broad and general that it cannot be legitimately
construed to vest said entity with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses committed by public officers in relation to
their office. Neither can it be interpreted to impliedly repeal the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted by Section 184
of the Election Code of 1978 to the court of first instance to hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as
to the status of the accused.

Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are not favored. it is noted that while Section 184 of the Election Code
deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4[c] of P.D. No, 1606 speaks generally of "other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers ... in relation to their office." Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the
former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. 7 And where a
reconciliation between the statute is possible, as in the case at bar, the former should be deemed an exception to the
latter. 8

The same principle of statutory construction should be applied with respect to the powers vested upon the COMELEC and
the Tanodbayan in so far as election offenses are concerned.

Moreover, as aptly observed by the COMELEC as well as the Solicitor General, splitting the jurisdiction over election
offenses would serve no beneficial purpose but would rather spawn much controversy — "complaints about unequal
protection, about inconsistent decisions, etc. (which are) not conducive to a fair and speedy administration of justice." [p.
17, Comment, Solicitor General].

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan Second Division dated August 13, 1982 is hereby set aside and Criminal
Case No. 5054. entitled "People of the Philippines versus Rogelio de Jesus" is ordered dismissed. The COMELEC is hereby
directed to forthwith conduct an investigation, and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against
petitioner before the proper court of first instance. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

GR No. L-42288 February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.  CORNELIO BAYONA

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty
of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a
fine of P50 , with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:

At about eleven o'clock in the morning of June 5, 1934, while the general elections were held in the electoral
precinct number 4, located in the neighborhood of Aranguel of the Municipality of Pilar, Province of Capiz, the
accused here was surprised by Jose E. Desiderio, who was then the representative of the Department of the
Interior to inspect the general elections in the Province of Capiz, and by the commander of the Constabularia FB
Agdamag who was on that occasion with the aforementioned Jose E. Desiderio, carrying in his
The Coltrevolver caliber 32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, within the fence surrounding the building for the
aforementioned electoral college number 4 and a distance of 22 meters from the aforementioned electoral
college. Immediately Jose E. Desiderio seized the revolver in question.

The defense, through the testimony of Jose D. Benliro and Dioscoro Buenvenida, tried to establish that the
defendant here stopped in the street facing the electoral college number 4 at the invitation of said Jose D. Benliro
and in order to beg him to the aforementioned defendant to take home the voters of the aforementioned Jose D.
Benliro who had already finished voting, and that when Jose E. Desidierio and the commander FB Agdamag
arrived, the defendant was in the street. From the polling station to the place where, according to said witnesses,
the defendant was when the Exhibit a revolver was removed, there is a distance of 27 meters.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

1. The Court a quo erro to declare that the appellant was surprised with his revolver within the fence of the
school house of the Barrio de Aranguel, Municipality of Pilar, which was qualified as an electoral college.

2. The Court to which it is guilty in declaring the appellant guilty of the infringement of the Electoral Act and,
consequently, in condemning him to imprisonment and a fine.

As to the question of the fact that the record shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the
Interior, and Major Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the elections in the
Province of Capiz, testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when
Desiderio took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also disposes of that part of the argument
under the second assignment of error based on the theory that the defendant was in a public road, where he had a right
to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument under the second assignment of error is that if it is conceded
that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he
was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; That
there were many people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his gun in his
automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and that is incurring in a violation of the law
.

As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk of losing it because
he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to leave his
automobile because somebody standing near the polling place had called him, nor does the record show that it was
necessary for the defender to carry arms on that occasion.

The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not construct buildings for electoral precincts but merely
utilizes whatever building there may be, and all election precincts are within fifty meters from some road, to literal
application of the law would be absurd, because members of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal
would be included in that prohibition and could not use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; That people
living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their own
residences on registration and election days;

That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way the
free and voluntary exercise of suffrage;

That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in question should only
be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them directly or
indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon
[GR No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place
to preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at
the bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy
of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral
precinct ; That was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the election was being held when a friend
of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and
unreasonable to convict him.

We can not accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The law which the
defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which I have violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded
that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of
his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, I committed the act complained
of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was completed. The intention to intimidate the
voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender
actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,

The rule is that in acts bad in there must be a criminal intent, but in those bad prohibit it is sufficient if the prohibited act
was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime
and the intent to perpetrate the act ..." (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)

While it is true, that they should not be held criminally responsible for acts committed by them without guilty
knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec 286), the courts have always
recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great
master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their criminal
commission without regard to the intent of the doer. (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128, US vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.,
488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge
or motive to be shown. (US vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)

The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to have any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man
with a revolver simply passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate
the provision of law in question, because he had not tried to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be
true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a
polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not
carry firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs. Urdeleon , supra , we
have recently held in the case ofPeople vs . Ayre, and Degracia (p.169, ante ), that a policeman who goes to a polling place
on the request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his
arms.

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not proved that he
wanted to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a
cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity

As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question, that is a matter for
the Chief Executive or the Legislature.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.