[G.R. No.

L-24721             November 3, 1925]

TOMAS DE GUZMAN vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LA UNION and JUAN LUCERO

This proceedings is for the purpose of having this court issue a mandamus addressed to the provincial board of canvassers
of the Province of La Union, ordering it to meet and reject and annul all the votes adjudicated to the respondent Juan T.
Lucero, and after correcting the election return, to proclaim and certify the petitioner elected for the office of provincial
governor of La Union in accordance with law.

As ground of the petition, it is alleged that the respondent provincial board of canvassers met on June 22, 1925, for the
purpose of counting the votes cast in the election for provincial officers and certifying the result of the count, and after
gathering all the election returns, it found that the petitioner had obtained 7,662 votes and the respondent Juan T. Lucero,
8,771 votes; that the original of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent Juan T. Lucero, a certified copy of which is
Exhibit A, was not duly sworn to, as required by law, while the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman,
the original of which is Exhibit B, was prepared and filed in accordance with the requirements of the law; that
notwithstanding that Juan T. Lucero did not file a certificate of candidacy duly sworn to, as provided in section 404 of the
Election Law, the respondent provincial board of canvassers willfully and illegally adjudicated the 8,771 votes to the
respondent, and afterwards illegally proclaimed and certified him as governor-elect of the Province of La Union; that in
view of these facts the respondent Juan T. Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal candidate for the office in
question, and could not have been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.

To this complaint the respondent filed a demurrer on the ground: (a) That the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter in litigation; (b) that the court had no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant members of the extinguished
provincial board of canvassers of La Union; and (c) that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of
action.

The question to be decided in this proceeding is whether or not the respondent has filed a certificate of candidacy in
accordance with the law, and in case he has not, whether the writ applied for should be issued.

Section 41 of Act No. 3030, amending section 471 of the Election Law, provides that the provincial board of canvassers or
the Governor-General, as the case may be, shall certify elected for the offices of senator or member of the House of
Representatives and for provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the highest number of votes, and filed their
certificates of candidacy in accordance with the provisions of section 404 of this law. And said section 404, as amended by
section 3 of the same Act No. 3030, provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of senator, representative or
any provincial office, unless within the time fixed by the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy duly verified. The
meaning of the phrase "a certificate of candidacy duly verified," is explained by this court in Viola vs. Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo, (47 Phil., 849), to the effect that ". . . only when the corresponding receipt has been
issued and the certificate filed can it be presumed that it has been duly verified and filed."

In the instant case, according to the allegations of the petitioner the respondent Juan T. Lucero filed his certificate of
candidacy in the office of the secretary of the provincial board of La Union on April 15, 1925, the provincial secretary
having issued the proper receipt for the filing of said certificate, together with a statement of the expenses attached
thereto (Exhibit 2). It, therefore, seems clear that the respondent filed his certificate in accordance with the Spanish text
of section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of act No. 3030.

But the petitioner argues that section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3030, is mandatory in
its terms, and therefore must be complied with the provincial board, respondent herein. Granting that the English text of
the law in this case makes clear the Spanish text "Certificado de candidatura debidamente acreditado" (certificate of
candidacy duly verified), it will be seen that said section 3 of Act No. 3030 requires the candidate to file a "certificate of
candidacy duly verified," indicating by these two words that the certificate of candidacy must be sworn to. In the case
before us the certificate of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity
might have justified the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor,
if an objection on the part of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time. Yet we are of the opinion that
this irregularity does not invalidate the election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the
votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.

This court in the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil., 521), following authoritative decisions of the United States, which
establish rules of interpretation of election laws, said:
 The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the
validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a
substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory.

When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure
has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated
to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of
voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held
directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. lawph!1.net

And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, (39 Phil., 208), this court laid down the following doctrine:

It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are
mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be
deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law
were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeatthat
object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the
officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty.
The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of
the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.

We hold that the legal provision here in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would
have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate. But after the people have expressed their
will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the respondent who was certified by the
provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his certificate of
candidacy. The situation is somewhat like that of a voter placing his ballot in the box. There are certain requirements of
the law, affecting the vote, which have been considered by this court as of a mandatory character until the ballot is placed
in the ballot box; but we have held that the validity of the count cannot be questioned, nor the vote stricken out after the
ballots had been placed in the ballot boxes, simply for non-compliance with such provisions. After the termination of the
election, public interest must be made to prevail over that of the defeated candidate, and we cannot declare that the
election of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was illegal, and that he should quit the office for which he was elected, simply
by reason of a defect in his certificate of candidacy, which defect could have been corrected before the election, but which
cannot be cured after its termination, and after the result of the election was published by the provincial board of
canvassers, respondents herein.

Of course the conclusion which we have arrived at tends to sustain the third ground of the demurrer of the respondent.
We will not enter upon the discussion of the two first grounds of said demurrer, for it may be seen that they are clearly
untenable.

The demurrer of the respondent is therefore sustained upon the third ground, and considering that in view of our ruling
upon the only legal question raised in this proceeding, the complaint cannot be amended, this case is definitely
adjudicated, and the writ of mandamus applied for is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 105436 June 2, 1994]

EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY, MEDINA, MELENCIO CASTELO and GODOFREDO
LIBAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTONIO HERNANDEZ

EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA, MELENCIO CASTELO, GODOFREDO LIBAN and
ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were among the candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six (6) positions
of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City.

On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections his certificate of candidacy
for one of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates,
Quezon City." However, he did not indicate on the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the
particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. 1 His biodata submitted together with his certificate of candidacy
gave his address as "Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City," 2 which is part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. 3 In other
words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered
voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which provides:

Sec. 39. Qualifications — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

In view of the seeming deficiency in the certificate of candidacy of private respondent, petitioners herein challenged his
qualification before public respondent COMELEC explaining however that since they became aware of the grounds for
private respondent’s qualification only after the elections, they chose to file their petition under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation. 4

On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its questioned resolution denying the petition for disqualification for being filed
outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646, which pertains to nuisance candidates. 5 Hence the instant
petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC in
issuing the assailed resolution of 2 June 1992.

It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the
law does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the
Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he
intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.

In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by
him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District
of Quezon City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he
was already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of Quezon City.

In his Petition for Inclusion in the Registry of Registered Voters of Second District, Quezon City, private respondent
explained that —

. . . since 1990, he is a resident of Block 26, Lot 1, New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol Bliss), Barangay
Batasan Hills, Quezon City; that he failed to register as a voter during the general registration held at
Quezon City on March 14 and 15, 1992 because he was sick of Acute Gastroenteritis as evidenced by the
Medical Certificate duly issued by Dr. Angelito S. Regala, M.D., of the Family Clinic, Inc.; that he was a
previous registered voter of Manila . . . that he would like to transfer and to register as voter in Quezon
City, particularly at Precinct 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City because he is now a resident of
Quezon City.6

Confirming the explanation of private respondent, Barangay Captain Manuel Laxina testified that he was the Barangay
Captain of New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol Bliss), Barangay Batasan, Quezon City, since 8 October 1986; that
petitioner (private respondent herein) was a resident of New Capitol Estates for two (2) years as of the time he testified.
After due notice and hearing, and without any written opposition, the petition was granted by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City the dispositive portion of the order stating that —

WHEREFORE . . . and it appearing that petitioner Antonio Viana Hernandez also known as Anthony Alonzo
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter plus the fact that there was no
opposition at all, the court resolves to grant his petition. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol Bliss), Quezon City, is
hereby ordered to include in the official list of voters the name of Antonio Viana Hernandez also known
as Anthony Alonzo and to allow him to cast his vote in the coming May 1992 election. Let copy of the
Order be furnished the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 233-B, New Capitol
Estates formerly Capitol Bliss, Quezon City, Election Registrar, Commission on Elections, Quezon City,
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, for their information and guidance. 7

Consequently, as a registered voter of Precinct Number 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City, as judicially confirmed,
the COMELEC had no other recourse but to declare that he was eligible, hence qualified, to run for the position in
question.

COMELEC referred to the action taken by petitioners herein as one to declare private respondent a "nuisance candidate"
and intimating that they should have instead petitioned COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of private respondent, citing Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881, which provides:

Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.

Certainly, the holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance candidate" is erroneous because,
tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence,
the procedure therein provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at any day after the last day for filing
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondent Hernandez should be treated as
a "nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the
candidacy of private respondent he being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan
Hills, must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Commission on Elections in issuing its
questioned resolution of 2 June 1992, the instant petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993]

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and MANUEL PINEDA

The applicability to private respondent Manuel S. Pineda of Section 66 of the Election Code is what is chiefly involved in
the case at bar. Said section reads as follows:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.— Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary
of the Philippine National Oil Co., from September 17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when his
employment was terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are not disputed.

In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction
Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of
Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for
the position. Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortly thereafter
registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. The mayor communicated with the PNOC-EDC — thru Engr.
Ernesto Patanao, Resident Manager, Tongonan Geothermal Project — to express the view that Pineda could not actively
participate in politics unless he officially resigned from PNOC-EDC.1 Nothing seems to have resulted from this protest.

The local elections in Leyte, scheduled for January, 1988, were reset to and held on February 1, 1988. Pineda was among
the official candidates voted for, and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Some vacillation appears to
have been evinced by Pineda at about this time. On February 8, 1988, he wrote to the COMELEC Chairman, expressing his
desire to withdraw from the political contest on account of what he considered to be election irregularities; 2 and on
March 19, 1988, he wrote to the Secretary of Justice seeking legal opinion on the question, among others, of whether or
not he was "considered automatically resigned upon . . . filing of . . . (his) certificate of candidacy," and whether or not, in
case he was elected, he could "remain appointed to any corporate offspring of a government-owned or controlled
corporation."3 Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office in June, 1988 as councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga,
Leyte.4 And despite so qualifying as councilor, and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the
latter's Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project,
Ormoc City.

On June 7, 1988, Marcelino M. Tongco, Department Manager of the Engineering and Construction Department, PNOC-
EDC, addressed an inquiry to the latter's Legal Department regarding the status of Manuel S. Pineda as employee in view
of his candidacy for the office of municipal councilor.5 In response, the Legal Department rendered an opinion to the effect
that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered  ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in
November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.6

Pineda appealed the PNOC-EDC Legal Department's ruling to N.C. Vasquez, the Vice-President of PNOC-EDC, on July 14,
1988. In his letter of appeal,7 he invoked a "court ruling in the case of Caagusan and Donato vs. PNOC-Exploration
Corp. . . . (to the effect that) while the government-owned or controlled corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law
(as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1985) (sic), the subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are
not." In the same letter he declared his wish to continue resign from his position as councilor/member of the Sangguniang
Bayan.

He also wrote a letter dated October 1, 1988 to the Department of Local Government inquiring about the status of his
employment with PNOC-EDC in relation to his election as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He was advised by DLG
Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillo, Jr., by letter dated March 31, 1989, that there was no legal impediment to his continuing
in his employment with PNOC-EDC while holding at the same time the elective position of municipal councilor. Cited as
basis by Undersecretary Rubillo was Section 2(1) Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and this Court's ruling in NASECO
vs.  NLRC, 168 SCRA 122. Undersecretary Rubillo went on to say that Pineda could receive his per diems as municipal
councilor as well as the corresponding representation and transportation allowance [RATA] "provided the PNOC-EDC
charter does not provide otherwise and public shall not be prejudiced."8
The PNOC-EDC did not, however, share the Undersecretary's views. On January 26, 1989, the PNOC-EDC, through
Marcelino Tongco (Manager, Engineering and Construction Department), notified Manuel S. Pineda in writing (1) that after
having given him "ample time" to make some major adjustments before . . . separation from the company," his
employment was being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, effective upon receipt of notice,
and (2) that he was entitled to "proper compensation" for the services rendered by him from the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy until his actual separation from the service. 9

On October 16, 1989, Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VIII, NLRC,
Tacloban City. Impleaded as respondents were the PNOC-EDC and the Manager of its Engineering and Construction
Department, Marcelino M. Tongco.10

After due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Araceli H. Maraya, to whom the case was assigned, rendered a decision on December
28, 1990,11 declaring Manuel S. Pineda's dismissal from the service illegal, and ordering his reinstatement to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages corresponding to the period from his illegal
dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Arbiter pointed out that the ruling relied upon by PNOC-EDC to
justify Pineda's dismissal from the service, i.e., NHA v. Juco,12 had already been abandoned; and that "as early as
November 29, 1988," the governing principle laid down by case law — in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution13 — has been that government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated under the Corporation Code,
the general law — as distinguished from those created by special charter — are not deemed to be within the coverage of
the Civil Service Law, and consequently their employees, like those of the PNOC-EDC, are subject to the provisions of the
Labor Code rather than the Civil Service Law.14

The PNOC-EDC filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. The latter dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit in a decision dated April 24, 1991. 15 PNOC-EDC sought reconsideration;16 its motion was denied by the Commission
in a Resolution dated June 21, 1991.17

It is this decision of April 24, 1991 and the Resolution of June 21, 1991 that the PNOC-EDC seeks to be annulled and set
aside in the special civil action for certiorari at bar. It contends that the respondent Commission gravely abused its
discretion:

1) when it ruled that Manuel S. Pineda was not covered by the Civil Service Rules when he filed his
candidacy for the 1988 local government elections in November 1987;

2) when it ruled that Pineda was not covered by the Omnibus Election Code at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1988 local elections;

3) when it ruled that Pineda was illegally dismissed despite the fact that he was considered automatically
resigned pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code; and

4) when it ruled that Pineda could occupy a local government position and be simultaneously employed
in a government-owned or controlled corporation, a situation patently violative of the constitutional
prohibition on additional compensation.

Acting on the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent NLRC from implementing
or enforcing its decision and resolution dated April 24, 1991 and June 21, 1991, respectively.

In the comment required of him by the Court, the Solicitor General expressed agreement with the respondent
Commission's holding that Manuel Pineda had indeed been illegally separated from his employment in the PNOC-EDC; in
other words, that his running for public office and his election thereto had no effect on his employment with the PNOC-
EDC, a corporation not embraced within the Civil Service.

Petitioner PNOC-EDC argues that at the time that Pineda filed his certificate of candidacy for municipal councilor in
November, 1987, the case law "applicable as far as coverage of government-owned or controlled corporations are
concerned . . . ( was to the following effect): 18

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issue of jurisdiction had been resolved in a string of
cases starting with the National Housing Authority vs.  Juco (134 SCRA 172) followed by Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez (143 SCRA 602) and the comparatively recent case
of Quimpo vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72553, Dec. 2, 1986) in which this Court squarely ruled that PNOC
 subsidiaries, whether or not originally created as government-owned or controlled corporations are
governed by the Civil Service Law.

This doctrine, petitioner further argues, was not "automatically reversed" by the 1987 Constitution because not "amended
or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress;"19 and this Court's decision in November, 1988, in National Service
Corporation vs.  NLRC, supra20 — abandoning the Juco ruling — "cannot be given retroactive effect . . . (in view of ) the
time-honored principle . . . that laws (judicial decisions included) shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided (Articles 4 and 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines)."

Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Implicit in the provision is that government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters — i.e., organized
under the general law, the Corporation Code — are not comprehended within the Civil Service Law. So has this Court
construed the provision.21

In National Service Corporation (NASECO), et al. v. NLRC, et al., etc.,22 decided on November 29, 1988, it was ruled that the
1987 Constitution "starkly varies" from the 1973 charter — upon which the Juco doctrine rested — in that unlike the
latter, the present constitution qualifies the term, "government-owned or controlled corporations," by the phrase, "with
original charter;" hence, the clear implication is that the Civil Service no longer includes government-owned or controlled
corporations without original charters, i.e., those organized under the general corporation law. 23 NASECO further ruled
that the Juco ruling should not apply retroactively, considering that prior to its promulgation on January 17, 1985, this
Court had expressly recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to government-owned or controlled corporations. 24

Lumanta, et al.  v.  NLRC, et al.,25 decided on February 8, 1989, made the same pronouncement: that Juco had been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution for implicit in the language of Section 2 (1), Article IX thereof, is the proposition that
government-owned or controlled corporations without original charter do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under
the Labor Code.

And in PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo, etc., et al.,26 promulgated on July 5, 1989, this Court ruled that conformably with the
apparent intendment of the NASECO case, supra, since the PNOC-EDC, a government-owned or controlled company had
been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, its employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.

It is thus clear that the Juco doctrine prevailing at the time of the effectivity of the fundamental charter in 1987 — i.e., that
government-owned or controlled corporations were part of the Civil Service and its employees subject to Civil Service laws
and regulations,27 regardless of the manner of the mode of their organization or incorporation — is no longer good law,
being at "stark variance," to paraphrase NASECO, with the 1987 Constitution. In other words, and contrary to the
petitioner's view, as of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations without
original charters, or, as Mr. Justice Cruz insists in his concurring opinion in NASECO v.NLRC,28 a legislative charter (i.e.,
those organized under the Corporation Code), ceased to pertain to the Civil Service and its employees could no longer be
considered as subject to Civil Service Laws, rules or regulations.

The basic question is whether an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an original charter
(and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, viz.:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.— Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985, in connection with its deliberations on
and subsequent enactment of related and repealing legislation — i.e., Republic Acts Numbered 7166: "An Act Providing
for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes" (effective November 26, 1991), 6646: "An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and
for Other Purposes" (effective January 5, 1988) and 6636: "An Act Resetting the Local Elections, etc., (effective November
6, 1987), it was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or
controlled corporations were of two (2) categories — those with original charters, and those organized under the general
law — and (b) employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds — those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations because employed in corporations having original charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to
the Labor Code because employed in said corporations organized under the general law, or the Corporation Code. Yet
Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or
their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any
employee "in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy."29

Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlled corporation does not lose its
character as such because not possessed of an original charter but organized under the general law. If a corporation's
capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling
the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or controlled corporation even if
organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute; and employees thereof, even if not covered by the
Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless "employees in government-owned or controlled corporations," and
come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto resigned from . . . office
upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of candidacy."

What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not
having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code.
In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor
Code, as amended.

The conclusions here reached make unnecessary discussion and resolution of the other issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated April
24, 1991 and its Resolution dated June 21, 1991 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE; and the complaint of Manuel S. Pineda is
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 189698               February 22, 2010]

ELEAZAR QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC)
motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors’ motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).1

The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino,
Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369,2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,4mainly on the ground
that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus
paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office
notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit the
following arguments:

(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the
participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to
elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions
and is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and

(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such
reversal.

We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.

I.

Procedural Issues

First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC’s motion for reconsideration which was
filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed
after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.

i. Timeliness of COMELEC’s Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the same rules,6COMELEC
had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration.
COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a
Motion for Reconsideration.

The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The corresponding
Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on
December 17, 2009 – still within the reglementary period.

ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following
requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2)
such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. 7

Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for intervention
may be filed, viz.:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
(italics supplied)

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who
have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, 8 when the
petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,9 and even where
the assailed order has already become final and executory.10 In Lim v. Pacquing,11 the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the
substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court 12 after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure
whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. 14 Its purpose is not to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.15

We rule that, with the exception of the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may properly intervene in the
case at bar.

First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the case.

As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision, which
nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and
as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its system of
government.

On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May 2010 elections
running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts
and are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.

Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Court’s Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the
land.

With regard to the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this case involves the
constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be allowed to
intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal as it
resolves issues of transcendental importance."16

Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character,
too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.

We now turn to the substantive issues.

II.
 Substantive Issues

The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:

(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;

(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a)
without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they
limit these civil servants’ activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether
they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and

(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these public appointive
officials.

We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and
accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.

III.

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the
matter, viz.:

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, 17which
repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it
considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for
which they are running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position
without forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political
campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

MS. QUESADA.

xxxx

Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee
in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost the same provision as
in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the government service have actually experienced how this provision has been
violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many government officials.

So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict, and which would deter
its violation?
MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter are more than
exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public service from engaging in any form of partisan
political activity. But the problem really lies in implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior
officers of offices and agencies of government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan
political activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really implement the
constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x20 (italics supplied)

To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is presently reflected and
implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 – respectively provide in relevant part:

Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:

xxxx

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

xxxx

(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office.

xxxx

Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall
engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his
official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be
understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and employees
holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election
Code.

Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by civil service officers
and employees in partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:

SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxxx

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding
political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special
forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may
hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political
activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.

But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding
apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that
"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."21 This is because elected public officials, by the very
nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign
period.22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included. 23

The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express their views on
political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On
line 13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the
word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.

May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.

MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which was adopted in both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as
a qualification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections.

Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount to
disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the
Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the right to vote in an election, if public interest so
required. I would only like to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who may want to
vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or electioneering may vote.

MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no intention on the part of the
Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision was
precisely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense that they are not being deprived of the freedom
of expression in a political contest. The last phrase or clause might have given the impression that a government employee
or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the case. They are still free to
express their views although the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign. 24

IV.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

i. Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. 25

In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As
Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election
Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of
certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to
be operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view of having
the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal
dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions
between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. We ruled:

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A.
Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take
(sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat
these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court
to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 26

The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed Decision gave it new life. We
ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner.27 This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of
the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If
a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide
alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for
the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my
breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts. 28

Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere
obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum.29 This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the regular
course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on
which the decision is predicated.30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent
because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of
other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did.31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.:32

… A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal
of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought
forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2)
or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such
points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more
dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta.33 (italics supplied)

ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law

The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction.34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.35 The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 36 which has four
requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.37

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive
officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain," viz.:

… For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign
affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when
both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use
the resources of his office to support his campaign.38

Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need
not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time."39 In addressing a societal
concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or
excluded.40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the
legislative judgment.41 We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully
achieved by expanding the class.42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will
not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.43 There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach
each and every class to which it might be applied;44 that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all
or none.

Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a classification
that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious."45 He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether
or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment,46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be
sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable."47In the case at bar, the petitioners failed –
and in fact did not even attempt – to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on
this point even while we submitted the following thesis:

... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute’s distinction is unfair, underinclusive,
unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational
reason for the differing treatment.48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? I submit that there is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people.49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.50 Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term
for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the
law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally
compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.51 (emphasis in the original)

In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating provisions of law that seek to
restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are
unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over another in which a significant
portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.

The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis-à-vis
appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring – but not by this
Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our
constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of
the times. It is certainly within the Legislature’s power to make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to elected
officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the
balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and
impose on the people the best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.

iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled

Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision adverted to, and
extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.52 This was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed
Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:

(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms – freedom of
expression and association;

(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to strict equal
protection review; and

(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force,
the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them
unconstitutional.

It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had
already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit."

Our assailed Decision’s reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact that the United
States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States Court of
Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al. 53 and
Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al.,54 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether
statutory provisions prohibiting federal55 and state56 employees from taking an active part in political management or in
political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal
from employment and possible criminal sanctions.

The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in regulating the speech of
its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech
of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression
against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees’ expression interferes
with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and
(iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any
statutory restrictions.57 Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an
interest-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests
and the prohibitions in question.58

Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:

Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan political activities
by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their
proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences.
The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but
apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or religious
minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the
polls.

But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, 59 the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and
‘the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech
of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the (government), as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ Although Congress is free to strike a different
balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important
interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.

It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those working for
any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their
own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Government
without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch
Act is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal employees,
for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political
campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair
and effective government.

There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact
avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.

Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps the immediate
occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work
force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the
1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be
raised against the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the thousands or hundreds of thousands
of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure and political campaigns.

A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that employment and
advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and at the same time to make sure that
Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or
perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be
urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judgment of the Executive
and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts
and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. For example, at the
hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission stated that ‘the prohibitions against active participation in partisan political management and partisan
political campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . ..’ Perhaps Congress at some time will
come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its current view of the matter,
and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event. 60 x x x

xxxx

As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to
comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)

Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally permissible, viz.:

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan political conduct of state
employees. Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and important state interests, particularly with
respect to attracting greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of the
elective process, and by protecting them from ‘political extortion.’ Rather, appellants maintain that however permissible,
even commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions too broad in
their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For these
and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be
enforced against them or anyone else.

We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.61 We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so
vague that ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’62 Whatever other problems there are with
s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails
to set out ‘explicit standards' for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified
employee from being ‘an officer or member’ of a ‘partisan political club’ or a candidate for ‘any paid public office.’ It
forbids solicitation of contributions ‘for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose’ and taking part ‘in
the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign.’ Words inevitably contain germs of
uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 as ‘partisan,’ or
‘take part in,’ or ‘affairs of’ political parties. But what was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here: ‘there are limitations in
the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the
prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' x
xx

xxxx

[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as well as unprotected
conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable of any constitutional application. We do
not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner here.

xxxx

The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement
of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so
narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression. Application of the
overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only
as a last resort. x x x

x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct-even if
expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded,
may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot,
with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against
conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and
not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that
whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at political
expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather,
seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been
subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of
conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was
established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers. Under
the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees
from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming
members of national, state, or local committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political
clubs, or candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any political party's partisan
political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking
an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan
effort to get voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating
partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate.

x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some other improper
applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be discarded in toto because some persons’
arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad
and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)

It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles enunciated in Letter
Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of
Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of facts," viz.:

In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the
Hatch Act’s prohibition against "active participation in political management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired
to campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal employees to run for state and local offices, to
participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club.

In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the (sic) Oklahoma’s
Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the State’s classified civil servants, in
much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal employees. Prior to the
commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior, and
were administratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to give
referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving and
distributing campaign posters in bulk.

Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time
police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing the
resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter.

Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of facts,
Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)

We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim, Letter Carriers,
Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:

(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to the
Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality of §14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter,
which prohibits "continuing in the classified service of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or
election to any public office."

(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening
to enforce, the Hatch Act’s prohibition against "active participation in political management or political
campaigns"63 with respect to certain defined activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to
this discussion are:
 (a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members were desirous of, among
others, running in local elections for offices such as school board member, city council member or mayor;

(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough
Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his
job; and

(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan
election for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his
job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act.

The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns" by cross-referring to the rules
made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:

30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State, county, or municipal office
is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not merely to formal announcement of candidacy but
also to the preliminaries leading to such announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to
be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee
acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence constitutes an infraction of the
prohibitions against political activity. (italics supplied)

Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay
compensation to these persons.64

(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality
of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklahoma’s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the
paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that "[n]o employee in the classified service shall be … a candidate for
nomination or election to any paid public office…" Violation of Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible
criminal sanctions and limited state employment ineligibility.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the
imagination could Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-
to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It was thus not surprising for the
First Circuit Court of Appeals – the same court that decided Mancuso – to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v.
Lynch65 that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:

Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtucket’s "Little Hatch Act" prohibits
city employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically
proscribed,66 the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action
against the city officials on the ground that that the provision of the city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court,
fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It
observed that the view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less
restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding
that the government’s interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its
interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the
coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress,
and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public employees substantially served
government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the employees’ First Amendment rights. 67

It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in Magill was characterized as
nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active
bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled the court:

The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's candidacy in even a
nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme Court decisions, Civil
Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws barring civil servants from
partisan political activity. Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of
the Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" against constitutional attack,
limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred only activity in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we
assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan elections would not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and
Broadrick compel new analysis.

xxxx

What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the Court’s interest balancing
approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this record. We believe that the district court found more
residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our
view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive alternatives
were not available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not government employees, the Court in
Letter Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees
differs significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only was United Public Workers v.
Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the
coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress.
We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing'
process".68 It appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits substantially
serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights. x x x (italics
supplied)

Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major governmental interests
discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as follows:

In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient government, faithful to the Congress
rather than to party. The district court discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election would not
likely be committed to a state or national platform. This observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to
broad policy positions is concerned. But a different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient administration could be
thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of administration
favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning,
licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second governmental interest in the avoidance of
the appearance of "political justice" as to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political
preferment in privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors
evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election process. Where, as here, party
support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the city might reasonably fear that politically
active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the
city's interest in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee
campaigning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is
as easily identified.

A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a powerful political
machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district court
felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control over nominations. But in fact candidates sought party
endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be highly effective both in determining who would emerge from the
primary election and who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs, known party affiliation and
support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have feared that a
politically active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an unbreakable grasp on
the reins of power. In municipal elections especially, the small size of the electorate and the limited powers of local
government may inhibit the growth of interest groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force.
Even when nonpartisan issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence voters
or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will mass the scattered powers of
government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional misuse of the public trust to pursue private
political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views of individual employees may balance each other out. But
party discipline eliminates this diversity and tends to make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured
into advancing their immediate superior's political ambitions, the entire government work force may be expected to turn
out for many candidates in every election. In Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a
carefully orchestrated use of city employees in support of the incumbent party's candidates is possible. The danger is
scarcely lessened by the openness of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots.

The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees achieve advancement on
their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. The district court
did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a civil servant using his position to influence voters, and
held this to be no more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion
of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the
systematic and coordinated exploitation of public servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to see as the
primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of public employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan
system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride herd on the politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but
without party officials looking over their shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.

In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in nominally nonpartisan elections if
political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the
interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court lose much of their force. While the employees' First Amendment rights
would normally outbalance these diminished interests, we do not suggest that they would always do so. Even when
parties are absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one strong public interest, an
interest that looms larger in the context of municipal elections than it does in the national elections considered in Letter
Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his superior or running for a
position that confers great power over his superior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat
poses less of a direct challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a fireman or policeman who runs for
mayor or city council. The possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should an employee gather
substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)

The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect of the petitioners’
overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not to be taken lightly, much less to be
taken in the dark," the court held:

The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth in a closely analogous case.
Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than
unprotected speech) and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major
uncertainties attend the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define "substantial" overbreadth.
We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate, and they
were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities, including soliciting contributions for political
candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth
approach. The facts of this case are so similar that we may reach the same result without worrying unduly about the
sometimes opaque distinction between speech and conduct.

The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth in a statute restricting
partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the
substantiality of a statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid
applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid
application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. The question is a matter of
degree; it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law substantially
overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea of the number of potentially
invalid applications the statute permits. Often, simply reading the statute in the light of common experience or litigated
cases will suggest a number of probable invalid applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad
depends in large part on the number of elections that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees.
For all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is actively contested by political
parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even in campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan
in other cities. School committee candidates, for example, are endorsed by the local Democratic committee.

The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to
be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in the short period before the election was held, was on
the constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but they
should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices,
the candidacy for which by municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to government efficiency and
integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for consideration of
plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)

Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied upon by the
ponencia, has effectively been overruled.69 As it is no longer good law, the ponencia’s exhortation that "[since] the
Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being
unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit" is misplaced and unwarranted. 70

Accordingly, our assailed Decision’s submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two
fundamental freedoms – those of expression and association – lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never
recognized a fundamental right to express one’s political views through candidacy, 71 as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review.72 Bart v. Telford73 pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public
office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, one’s interest in seeking office, by itself,
is not entitled to constitutional protection.74 Moreover, one cannot bring one’s action under the rubric of freedom of
association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the political ideas of a
particular set of voters.75

Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the
equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil
service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political
justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve
advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity).
These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and
employees to seek elective office.1avvphi1

En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing76 and Morial, et al. v. Judiciary
Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al.77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run provisions are valid
only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:

…U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when applied to specified or
particular officials, as distinguished from all others,78 under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law.
These resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test
of being germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to
particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis in the original)

This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run provisions in these cases were
upheld not because they referred to specified or particular officials (vis-à-vis a general class); the questioned provisions
were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and found that a regulation is not devoid of
a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements
revolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are subject to the resign-to-
run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme Court:

Article XVI, § 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically resign their positions if
they become candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the current term is one year or less.
The burdens that § 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial than those imposed by § 19. The two provisions, of
course, serve essentially the same state interests. The District Court found § 65 deficient, however, not because of the
nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the manner in which the offices are classified.
According to the District Court, the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because Texas has failed
to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject to § 65 and why others are not. As with the case of §
19, we conclude that § 65 survives a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is
no rational predicate to the classification scheme.

The history behind § 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time" approach that this Court has
undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional
principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65
extended the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to four years. The provision also staggered the
terms of other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at each election. The automatic
resignation proviso to § 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added in
Art. XI, § 11, which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer than two years. Section 11 allows
home rule cities the option of extending the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.

Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms of 1958. That the State did
not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms were not extended by §
11 or § 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected officeholder's candidacy for another elected
office unless and until it places similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language and its history belie any
notion that § 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying access to the political process to identifiable classes of potential
candidates. (citations omitted and italics supplied)

Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket approval of restrictions on
the right of public employees to become candidates for public office" out of context. A correct reading of that line readily
shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as each equal protection challenge would
necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests vis-à-vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:

The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably entitled to the protection
of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should be taken to imply that public employees may
be prohibited from expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with the
proper performance of their public duties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of
public employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general restrictions on the political and
civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it. A
requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a reasonably
necessary relation to the achievement of the state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial
impropriety. Such a requirement offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression and association nor
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (italics supplied)

Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:

In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions require restrictions
on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit
the positions upon which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)

V.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from
Overbreadth

Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:

(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts without due regard for
the type of position being held by the employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto;79 and

(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding appointive positions without
due regard for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the
national, municipal or barangay level.

Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.

i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Official’s Position, Valid

According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately
to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee
running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.

Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the incumbent
appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful
political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent
workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."80 As elucidated in our prior exposition:81

Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective positions
(apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable – even innocuous – particularly when viewed in isolation
from other similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally
(if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute
a veiled effort on the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda through a "carefully
orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.

…[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political machine an
"unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive
public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of
influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)

ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid

The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they are made to apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being
sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.

This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it
fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant
distinctive treatment,"82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions can validly
apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore, that such
restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be
considered as overbroad.

Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the alleged overbreadth
is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:

A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of
certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections.83 Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be
noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the
candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. On
this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with
other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for
nonpartisan public offices.

The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since these are the only
elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices.84

In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has
intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed
resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provision states:

Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. – No person shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang barangay
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the commencement of the election period but
not later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The
candidate shall state the barangay office for which he is a candidate.

xxxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military
service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned
upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would
be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later
reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of
RA 9369 must also fail. 85

In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public
offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:

In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has not received judicial
imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the government has an
interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 86

Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad, particularly
where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.87

In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute’s overbreadth would entail, among other things, a rough
balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. 88 In this regard,
some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that
is probable.89 The question is a matter of degree.90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan
distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth
attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the
number of potentially invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry but were
nevertheless closed to appointive employees) that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute. 91

The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words of Magill v. Lynch,
indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,92 especially since an overbreadth finding in
this case would effectively prohibit the State from ‘enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is
admittedly within its power to proscribe.’93

This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the overbreadth
doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort. 94

In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the court, the
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or
conduct to go unpunished.95 Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be
placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least
substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. 96

In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as
they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by
the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.a1f

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes – which are, at best, bold predictions –
cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and
has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. 97Instead, the more prudent
approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather
than through a total invalidation of the statute itself.98
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor
Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without
relinquishing their posts.99 Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of Candidacy in their
respective provinces.100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for representative of the first
district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009101 – even as her position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over
the City and Provincial Prosecutors,102 who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. 103 The
Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We
cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor.

For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely
reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration;
REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring
as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 147741       May 10, 2001]

REP. MA. CATALINA GO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE MONTEJO and ARVIN ANTONI

The Case

In her petition for certiorari,1 petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed
certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late
by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.

Forthwith, we issued an order2 to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing petitioner's certificate of candidacy for
governor in the meantime.

In its Comment,3 the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of her
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes
late at the office of the municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed with said office at 12:28
a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original copy thereof was actually received by the office of the municipal election officer of
Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, to whom
petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where petitioner filed certificate of candidacy for mayor.1âwphi1.nêt

The Facts

Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon
on 30 June 2001.

On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate
of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at
Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she
attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of
Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal
thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her
affidavit of withdrawal by fax4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election
officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. 5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte,
received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.6

On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to
deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner.7 Respondent Antoni filed a similar petitions,
namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.1âwphi1.nêt

On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement, referred the
cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his
prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously with the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001.9

In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without
affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a
report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc10

The report and recommendation reads:

"Submitted for due consideration is the petition filed by Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V. Antoni on
March 5, 2001, before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte, seeking to deny due course and/or
to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Catalina L. Go for Governor of Leyte.

"Both petitions which are exactly worded in the same language allege, as follows:

"This petition is heretofore filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE and Section 15, as well, of RESOLUTION NO. 3253-A of the COMELEC EN BANC promulgated
on November 20, 2000. Ditto, this petition is filed within the reglementary period following the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy on February 28, 2001.

'Petitioner Atty. Felipe V. Montejo is of voting age, Filipino, lawyer by profession, married, and a resident
of #50 Juan Luna Street, Tacloban City, of which locality he is a registered voter.

'Respondent re. Catalina L. Go, on the other hand, is likewise of legal age, married, resident of Baybay,
Leyte, of which locality she is a registered voter, and the incumbent Member of the House of
Representatives representing the 5th Congressional District of Leyte.

'Respondent CATALINA L. GO filed a certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor of the Municipality of
Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001. Without canceling or withdrawing the said certificate of candidacy
this time for the office of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 28, 2001. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, respondent indubitably failed to declare
under oath the office for which she desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the
other office.

'Verily, at the time respondent filed her certificate of candidacy for Provincial Governor, she knew fully
well that she was ineligible for the said office, having filed, a day earlier, a certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. Hence, respondent falsely represented in her certificate of candidacy for
provincial Governor, and under oath, that she is ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material fact required by
law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy. In fine, respondent likewise falsely
represented in her certificates of candidacy, under oath, the she will OBEY THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS,
RESOLUTIONS AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND ISSUED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES; a material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy.'

"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is anchored on Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted hereunder.

'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed
more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be
eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.'

"In relation to Section (1) (b) of the Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A, to wit:

'SECTION 1. Certificate of Candidacy. xxxxxx (b) No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in
the same election. If he files a certificate of candidacy for more than one office he shall not be eligible for either.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, he may declare under oath
the office for which he desire to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the office or offices.'

"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is ineligible to run either Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.
 "Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7, 2001, the certificate of
candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.

"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the affidavit of
withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer of
Baybay, Leyte, which she filed on February 28, 2001.

"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:

"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for the MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
LEYTE;

"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging me to run for mayor of the
Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse but to follow desire of my political constituents;

"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay,
leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my certificate for Governor of Leyte.

"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte Province
although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was
filed only on March 1, 2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other word, there are two (2)
certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor of Leyte and the other for Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte.

"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of baybay, Leyte, both her
certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective
making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her
ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS as follows:

"1.) To give due course to the petition of Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V. Antonio against the certificates
of candidacy of Catalina Loreto-Go for Governor of Leyte; and

"2.) To direct the Provincial Election Suprevisor of Leyte and the Election Officer to delete/cancel the name of
CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from the certified list of candidates for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty candidates
of Baybay, Leyte, and to accordingly notify the parties and the above-named Comelec Officials." 11

On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law Department and adopted the
resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.12

Hence, this petition.13

The Issues

At the oral argument on 07 May 2001, at 3:00 p.m., we defined the following issues to be addressed by the parties:

I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates
of candidacy for both positions?

II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?

(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of
candidacy was filed?

(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?

III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor
of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of
Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. 14 We hold that
petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and
left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.15

Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:

"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to
the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate
of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of
the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where
the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC,
the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to
which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the
withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, 16such requirement
is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can
not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.17Hence, the filing of petitioner's
affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to
effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner
ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.

There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution canceling petitioner's certificates of
candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural due process of law.18 The petition to cancel her certificate of
candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the provincial election supervisor of Leyte who inhibited
himself and referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division,
acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his inhibition and required the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte to immediately forward his copy of the records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at
Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing.19 On 18 April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibañez issued
summons/subpoena to petitioner Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits including
position paper within three (3) days form notice.20 On 23 April 2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position
paper.21 On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibañez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties.

In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELCE conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give
petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for
cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It was not even
aware of the proceedings before Director Ibañez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte  study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the
Law Department submitted its report and recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.

During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
requires that notice be given to the respondent . Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to
or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:

"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

 "xxxx

"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice. (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the
petitioner of procedural due process of law.22 The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it.23

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS COMELEC Resolution No. 3982, adopted on 23 April
2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte. The Chairman, Commission on
Elections, Manila, and the provincial election supervisor of Leyte shall immediately order the inclusion of petitioner's
name in the certified list of candidates for Governor, province of Leyte, to be posted in each polling place,/voting booth in
every precinct throughout the province of Leyte, in the voters information sheet to be given to each registered voter
therein, in the election returns, statement of votes by percents, and certificate of canvass, and all other election papers.

The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent.

This decision is immediately executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-59343 April 24, 1985

CARLOS PONTAWE and LOUIE LOPEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROSARIO CABANGON and ALFREDO FLORES

G.R. No. L-61497 April 24, 1985

FEDERICO PONTAWE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROSARIO CABANGON and CARLOS PONTAWE

Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were the candidates for the positions of Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respectively, of the Nacionalista Party (NP) during the elections of January 30, 1980 in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. On
the other hand, Rosario T. Cabangon and Alfredo Flores were the candidates for Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respectively, of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). On January 24, 1980, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualified Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez on the ground of turncoatism in PDC Case No. 42.

The Nacionalista Party, on January 29, 1980, upon receipt of the notice of the COMELEC of said disqualification, nominated
Carlos Pontawe, son of the disqualified Federico Pontawe, and Louie Lopez, to substitute for Federico Pontawe and
Wilfredo Lopez, respectively. On the same day, January 29, 1980, disqualified candidates Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo
Lopez filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court to Annul the resolution of the COMELEC ordering their disqualification.
The petition was docketed as G. R. No. L-52433. However, upon separate manifestations of Federico Pontawe and
Wilfredo Lopez that they were abandoning their appeal, this Court, on April 24, 1980 and June 10, 1980, dismissed G. R.
No. L-52433.

On January 31, 1980, Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan as the duly elected Municipal Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively. As a
consequence, on February 11, 1980, Rosario Cabangon and three other KBL candidates who lost in the elections filed an
election protest against Carlos Pontawe, Louie Lopez and two others in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
Dagupan City).

On February 2, 1981, the lower court declared the election of Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez as null and void and
proclaimed Rosario Cabangon and Alfredo Flores as duly elected Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively.

On November 3,1981, the COMELEC affirmed the decision of the trial court. This decision of the COMELEC is the subject of
the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-59343. The petition was given due course and parties have filed their respective
memoranda. In the meantime, Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were allowed to continue in their respective positions as
Mayor and member of the Sangguniang Bayan pending the final determination this case.

On August 6, 1982, Federico Pontawe filed another petition for certiorari, docketed in this Court as G. R. No. L-61497,
against the COMELEC, Rosario Cabangon and Carlos Pontawe, questioning the refusal of the COMELEC to allow him to
intervene in the electoral protest filed by Rosario Cabangon and Alfredo Flores against Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez. In
our resolution of August 31, 1982, We ordered the consolidation of G. R. No. L-61497 and G. R. No. 59343 inasmuch as
they involve the issue as to who were the duly elected Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan in the elections on January 30, 1980.

Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides:

SEC. 28. Candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification of another.— If, after the last day for
filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die, withdraw
or be disqualified for any cause, any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office for which the deceased, the candidate who has withdrawn, or disqualified person was a
candidate in accordance with the preceding sections on or before mid-day of the day of the election, and
if the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and the
mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any election committee in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate: Provided, however, That if the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified is the official candidate of a political party, group or aggrupation, only a person belonging to,
and certified by, the same political party, group or aggrupation may file a certificate of candidacy for the
same office.

Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were nominated as substitute candidates in lieu of Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez
whose disqualification were decreed by the COMELEC on January 24, 1980. The substitution was made on January 29,
1980, or the day before the election, by the Nacionalista Party to which the disqualified candidates belong. Thus, there is
no question that there was a valid nomination of Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez in which case all the Pontawe and Lopez
votes should be credited to them (Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez), including those cast by block voting in favor of the
Nacionalista Party to which they were affiliated.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers favored Carlos Pontawe with 7,124 votes as against 5,632 for Rosario Cabangon.
However, the Court of First Instance ruled that Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were still candidates on January 30,
1980 because of the appeal taken by them to the Supreme Court disputing the order of disqualification by the COMELEC
which they did not consider as final and executory. The lower court found that the final total votes of the protestees and
the protestants are as follows: (pp. 16-17, Rollo of G. R. No. L- 59343)

CARLOS PONTAWE WE 

as per revision.......................................................................................... 7,462
minus Federico Pontawe & F. Pontawe votes .....................................1,013 
minus PONTAWE votes (stray)............................................... 5,346 6,359

Final total votes 1,103

LOUIE LOPEZ
as per revision............................................................................................ 6,442
minus Wilfredo, William & W. LOPEZ votes......................................... 2,190
minus LOPEZ votes (stray)......................................................... 3,333 5,523

Final total votes............................................................................................. 919

ROSITA CABANGON
as per revision (uncontested) .................................................................. 5,627

Final total votes.......................................................................................... 5,627

ALFREDO FLORES 
as per revision (uncontested) ...................................................................5,331

Final total votes ...........................................................................................5,331

The issue then is whether or not Federico Pontawe and Wilfred Lopez were still candidates on election day. If they were,
then the votes "Pontawe" or "Lopez" would be considered stray. On the other hand, if they were not, said votes would be
credited to Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez.

On this point, We hold that Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were no longer candidates on election day, January 30,
1980.

1. Section 28, of The 1978 Election Code allows the substitution of candidates who may have been disqualified after the
last day for filing the certificates of candidacy. The substitution may be on or before mid-day of the day of the election. A
substitute is one who takes the place of another who is no longer a candidate, otherwise the former would be an
additional, not a substitute candidate. And, if the disqualification is not immediately executory, there would be no need of
nominating a substitute. Having been disqualified before election day the votes "Pontawe" and "Lopez" could not be
counted for Federico and Wilfredo, but should be credited as they were by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in favor of
Carlos and Louie

2. Section l86 of The l978 EIection Code reads:

SEC. 186. Measure to ensure enforcement for the effective enforcement.—For the provisions of this Code.
the Commission is further vested and charged with the following powers, duties and responsibilities:

xxx xxx xxx

3. To cancel at any time before proclamation the certificate of candidacy of any candidate found, through
summary proceedings, to have (a) given money or other material inducements to influence, induce or
 corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) solicited or received contributions from foreigners or foreign government; (d)
violated the provisions regulating campaign propaganda; (e) committed any of the prohibited acts
provided in Section 178 hereof; (f) knowingly tolerated his supporters in committing such acts; or (g)
spend for his campaign more than the amount provided in Section 51 hereof.

Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission cancelling a certificate of candidacy as provided in the
preceding paragraph shall be immediately executory.

It will be noted that the second paragraph of paragraph 3 of Section 186 provides that the decision, order or ruling of the
Commission cancelling a certificate or candidacy shall be immediately executory. In the case at bar, the order of
disqualification by the COMELEC took place before the elections. The fact that it occurred sooner or before the
proclamation would not matter. What matters is, a disqualification was ordered and, as a consequence, a substitution was
in order.

3. The fact that Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez filed a Petition for certiorari (G.R. No. L-52433) with this Court
questioning their disqualification by the COMELEC does not mean that the COMELEC ruling was not immediately
executory. It is their right to ask for a review of a COMELEC ruling as provided for by the Constitution, Section 11, Article
XII thereof. The question remains not as to whether the COMELEC ruling was appealable, but whether it was already
effective and binding on election day. The facts and law in the case at bar would indicate that it was.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the COMELEC sustaining the election of Rosario Cabangon and Alfredo Flores for the
positions of Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, respectively, is hereby SET ASIDE
and another one rendered declaring CARLOS PONTAWE and LOUIE LOPEZ as having been duly elected to the said
positions. With this decision the issue raised in G. R. No. L-61497 has become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165983            April 24, 2007

JOY CHRISMA LUNA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TOMAS LAYAO, SOLOMON LALUGAN III, NELIA LAZAGA,
ANTHONY LAYAO, CIPRIANO LAPEZ, JR., VICTORIA LAYAO, MODERNO LAPEZ, RODRIGO PARIÑAS, and EUGENIO CABER
DONATO

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, writ of
preliminary injunction or status quo order questioning the 4 June 2004 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) First Division and the 22 November 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA Case No. 04-306. The 4
June 2004 Resolution denied due course to the substitution of petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna (Luna) for Hans Roger Luna
(Hans Roger) and declared the substitution invalid. The 22 November 2004 Resolution denied Luna’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts

On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute
for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan,
Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.

On 20 April 2004, private respondents Tomas Layao, Solomon Lalugan III, Nelia Lazaga, Anthony Layao, Cipriano Lapez, Jr.,
Victoria Layao, Moderno Lapez, Rodrigo Pariñas, and Eugenio Caber Donato (private respondents) filed a petition for the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false
material representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a
registered voter of Bangued, Abra. Private respondents also claimed that Luna’s certificate of candidacy was not validly
filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only
20 years old on election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by
Luna.21ªvvphi1.nét

The COMELEC’s Ruling

In the 4 June 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted the petition and denied due course to the substitution
of Luna for Hans Roger. The COMELEC First Division ruled that, while Luna complied with the procedural requirements for
substitution, Hans Roger was not a valid candidate for vice-mayor. The COMELEC First Division pointed out that Hans
Roger, being underage,3 did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, Hans Roger was not a valid candidate for
vice-mayor who could be substituted by Luna. The COMELEC First Division also ruled that Luna was not a registered voter
of Lagayan, Abra and that this was sufficient to disqualify Luna from running as vice-mayor.

On 28 June 2004, Luna filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. Luna added that the 4 June 2004
Resolution was issued in violation of her right to due process because she was not given the opportunity to present
evidence on her behalf with the COMELEC First Division.

In the 22 November 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed with
modification the 4 June 2004 Resolution. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being underage,
may not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that Luna’s right to due process was not violated
because Luna was notified of the petition and was given the opportunity to be heard. However, the COMELEC En
Banc ruled that Luna was a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra.

Hence, this petition.

In a Resolution dated 11 January 2005, we required the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing before the issuance
of the assailed COMELEC resolutions pending the resolution of this petition. 4

The Issues

Luna raised the following issues:

1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no violation of Luna’s
right to due process; and
 2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution
by Luna for Hans Roger.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Luna’s Right to Due Process was not Violated

Luna contends that her right to due process was violated because she was not given the opportunity to present her
evidence before the COMELEC First Division.

Under Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The law mandates that the candidates must be notified of the
petition against them and should be given the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf.5 This is the essence of due
process.

In this case, the COMELEC En Banc stated that the records showed that three days after the petition was filed, the
Provincial Election Supervisor, as hearing officer, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police Provincial Command,
tried to personally serve a copy of the petition to Luna. But Luna refused to formally receive the petition. On 26 April 2004,
the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor sent the notice via registered mail and still Luna did not file an answer.

The Court finds that Luna’s right to due process was not violated. The COMELEC notified Luna of the petition filed against
her and Luna was given the opportunity to present evidence on her behalf. This constitutes compliance with the
requirements of due process.

Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid

Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon Hans Roger’s withdrawal of
his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna.

On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate who could be substituted by Luna.

When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code) provides:

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.- The Commission, provincial election supervisor,
election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding
section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, 6 the COMELEC had the ministerial duty
to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty
to give due course to Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy.7

On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows a person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. 8 There
is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election. 9

On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code
prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is
disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code
provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.

Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the
procedural requirements for a valid substitution, 10 Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans
Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.11 In Sanchez v. Del Rosario,12 the Court ruled that the question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

Section 7413 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of
the person filing the certificate. Section 7814 of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of
candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility
may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The
COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in
the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper
proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy.
For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate
at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due
course.15 However, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC.

Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid
candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with
Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that there was no violation
of petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna’s right to due process. We SET ASIDE the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that the
substitution by petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna for Hans Roger Luna was invalid. Petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna validly
substituted for Hans Roger Luna.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2539             May 28, 1949

JOSE MONSALE vs. PAULINO NICO

This is appeal by the protestee from a decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo declaring the protestant elected
municipal mayor of Miagao as a result of the general elections held on November 11, 1947. It appears that the
protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on November 7, attempted to revive it by
withdrawing his withdrawal. The commission on Election, however, rules on November 8 thatthe protestant could no
longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee
Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale,
none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered
candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.

The pivotal question presented in this appeal is whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may
revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline
provided by law for the filling of such certificate.

Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless, within the
time fixed by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at least sixty days
before a regular election and thirty days at least before a special election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal
offices shall be filed with the municipal secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling place
concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to the Commission on Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after
the expiration of the time limit for filling certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed
should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate of candidacy for the office for which
the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding section on or before midday of the
day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and the midday
of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or
in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission on Elections."

In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and requested the
Commission on Election that it "be considered as though it has never been filed at all." There is no question as to the right
off a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such
withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-on days before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his
own voluntary act, and as a matter of facts the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao we duly
notified of his letter to the Commission on Election dated November 6, 1947, which subscribed and swore to before a
notary public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered
as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted
under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at sixty days before the election.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a)
to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to make the
choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the
choice or election by the voter to duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were
voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
candidate for another office in the same election. The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate
ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed
dies or becomes disqualified.

The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in
spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In the case Clutario vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-1704, this court
sustained the ruling of said commission upon similar facts that "by own voluntary act and deed petitioner has nullified his
certificate of candidacy and in the light of the election laws such certificate of candidacy has been definitely withdrawn
hence nonexisting." Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a petition contesting the election of a provincial or
municipal officer-elect shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province by any candidate voted for insaid
election and who has presented a certificate of candidacy." This clearly implies that a candidate voted for who has not
presented a certificate of candidacy has no right to contest the election. In other words, the herein protestant, not being a
registered candidate, has no standing before the court. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the protest is
ordered dismissed with costs against the appellee. So ordered.

G.R. No. 205136               December 2, 2014

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

For the consideration of the Court is the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the ruling of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) which cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica (Kimberly) and denied the substitution of Kimberly by petitioner Olivia Da Silva Cerafica
(Olivia).

On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she
was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, 1 in contravention of
the requirement that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). 2 As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing
due to the age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing,Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17 December
2012.3 Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory
hearing no longer pushed through.

In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra (Director Amora-Ladra) of the Comelec Law
Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of
Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Comelec Resolution No. 9551,4 Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed
by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted.

In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec on 3 January 2013,5 the Comelec adopted the recommendation of Director
Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberly’s COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation
of Kimberly’s COC, viz:6

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing recommendation of Director Esmeralda-
AmoraLadra, Law Department, as follows:

1. To cancelthe Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of aspirant Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica without prejudice to any civil,
criminal or administrative liability that she may have incurred pursuant to Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution
9518; and

2. To deny the substitution of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica as an effect of the cancellation
of the COC of Kimberly.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Olivia then filed the present petition for certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Status
Quo AnteOrder, and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, raising the following issues: 7

I.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED MINUTE
RESOLUTION RESULTING IN THE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) OF ASPIRANT KIMBERLY DA
SILVA CERAFICA AND THE DENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA
AS AN EFFECT OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE COC OF KIMBERLY.

II.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS
NO VALID SUBSTITUTION BY PETITIONER FOR KIMBERLY RESULTING IN THE MOTU PROPRIO DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

III.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THEREBY RESULTING IN THE MOTU
PROPRIODENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA.

In its Comment8 filed on 22 April 2013, respondent Comelec argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter
was never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her age, and that, moreover, the
COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the
office she seeks to be elected to.9 The Comelec further averred that it can cancel Kimberly’s COC motu proprioas it may
look into patent defects in the COCs, such as Kimberly’s failure to comply with the age requirement. 10

In her Reply11 filed on 10 May 2013, Oliviacountered that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election
because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be
substituted.12 Olivia also claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of
qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth dateto qualify for the position of
councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew her COC
upon learning that she was not qualified.13

At the outset, we note that a verification with the Comelec database yields the finding that Olivia was not among the
official candidates14 for the 2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted for.15 As such, a ruling on the present petition would
no longer be of practical use or value. Even if we were to resolve the petition for the purpose of determining Olivia’s legal
status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office, such purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a result
of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the 2013 elections.16

Be that as it may, the Court deems it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only to caution the Comelec against
the precipitate cancellation of COCs.

In Albaña v. Comelec,17 we held that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In this case, we find it necessary
to resolve the issues raised in the petition in order to prevent a repetition thereof and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and
peaceful elections.

VALID SUBSTITUTION

In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion.

Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates 18 and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec.
78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. 19

In Cipriano v. Comelec,20 we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. We
emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that
whilethe Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the procedure of substitution of candidates, to wit:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of election day of the election.

If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party" may be substituted.21 In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal
Party;22 thus, she can be validly substituted.

The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution; we answer in the
affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia
belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; 23 and third, Olivia filed her COC not
later than mid-day of election day.24

In Luna v. Comelec,25 where the candidate, who was also under age, withdrew his COC before election day and was
substituted by a qualified candidate, we declared that suchsubstitution was valid. The Court eloquently explained:

Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid

Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon Hans Roger’s withdrawal of
his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna. On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans
Roger, being under age, could not be considered tohave filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid
candidate who could be substituted by Luna.

When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code(Election Code) provides:

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. – The Commission, provincial election supervisor,
election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding
section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
give due course to Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy.

On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows a person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There
is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election.

On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code
prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is
disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code
provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited politicalparty dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
thanmid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.

Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans
Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility
or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of the
person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy
has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility
may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacyof Hans Roger. The
COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in
the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper
proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Roger’s certificate of
candidacy.1âwphi1 For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then
he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled
and denied due course. However, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the
COMELEC.

Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid
candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with
Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by
Luna.26 (Emphases supplied.)

LACK OF DUE PROCESS

Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the
latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the
Comelec once more gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminds the Comelec that, inthe exercise of it adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution27 mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the En Banc.

Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. 28 As
cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should
have first decided this case.

In Bautista v. Comelec, et al.,29 where the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of a candidate’s COC
for lack of qualification, and which recommendation was affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, the Court held that the
Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it
denies due process to the candidate. The Court held:

A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a
division for summary hearing.

xxxx

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It isthus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise
of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in divisionshould first decide. More so in this case
where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the
lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en bane cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate. 30 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. 31 We thus caution the Comelec against its
practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department
when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that cancellation of certificate of candidacy is a quasi-
judicial process, and accordingly is heard by the Commission on Elections in Division and En Banc on appeal, we DISMISS
the present petition for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON,
VIVENCIO LIRIO 

Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1 (which dismissed his
petition to set aside respondent Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July 31, 1980 denying his petition for
annulment of the proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and for his
proclamation instead as such elected vice-mayor for having received the clear majority of the votes cast), the comments
of public and private respondents and petitioner's consolidated reply and manifestation and motion of June 25, 1985
(stating that respondent abandoned his claim to the office and accepted and assumed on June 10, 1985, the position of
municipal trial judge of Lucban and Sampaloc, Quezon, as verified from the records of the Office of the Court
Administrator), the Court Resolved to RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to GRANT the petition at bar.

The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of
vice-mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his
own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980,
petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of
Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. ... The results
showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent
respondent Lirio's 2,660 votes). But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as
stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's name does not appear
in the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy was not duly
approved by the Comelec so that his votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly proclaimed
respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of the municipality of
Dolores.

Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two grounds after
citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:

The 1978 Election Code provides:

SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files
with the office which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of
withdrawal ...

SEC. 28. ... If, after  last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy
duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of
election ...

Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength of
Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his
certificate is not under oath, as required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect.
For another, said withdrawal was made not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of
candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that very same day.  (Emphasis copies)

Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will of the
electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal or technical defects. (De Guzman vs. Board of
Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918) Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969];
Yra vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522 [1963],
Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [19721; and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72 SCRA 170 [19761).

The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy,
i.e. that Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath," should be rejected. It is not seriously
contended by respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a reality, so much so
that no votes were cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even though his candidacy was filed on the last day within
the deadline, was not in the Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn withdrawalfiled later on the same day had
been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection, On the other hand, since there was no time to
include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of registered candidates, because the election was only four days away,
petitioner as substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens
election committees in compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.

The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's
will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly
applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the
certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have
expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his
certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this Court
in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be
merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the very same day that he filed his
certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for filing of certificates of candidacy shows that he
was not serious about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not be done to would be bonafide candidates, like
petitioner who had not filed his candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his " co-planners " with
"some concerned citizens ... (who) held causes to put up a slate that will run against the erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."

The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance
with the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in
case of death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was
filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that
same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the
statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo
Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be successfully assailed. It follows that the votes
cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as
Vice Mayor...

ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the proclamation of
respondent Lirio as elected 
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and
entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999

JOEL MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case No. 98-288
which disposed:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:

1. AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) in SPA
No. 98-019 promulgated on May 5, 1998, to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the
Petition. Respondent JOSE "PEMPE" MIRANDA's certificate of candidacy for the position
of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of Santiago City in the
May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued
therefor;

3. DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, PREPARE a new certificate of
canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the winning candidate among those voted upon as the duly
elected mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election; and

4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the
President of the Philippines; the Department of Interior and Local Government; the Department of
Finance, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Santiago City.

SO ORDERED.

The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First Division
of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing private respondent's petition to declare the substitution of Jose "Pempe"
Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void.

Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:

On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its
resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner
garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20,336 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the
nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.

On May 16, 1998, Comelec's First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private respondent
moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision
aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G.
Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City.

On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Court's intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the Court resolved to issue
a temporary restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition. On December 14, 1998, private
respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-234, Rollo) and on February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its
counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated
reply within 10 days from notice, but petitioner twice asked for an extension of the period. Without granting the motions
for extension of time to file consolidated reply, the Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.

Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued

without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private
respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution and
proclamation of petitioner.

On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Barretto (25 Phil, 245 [1913]), this Court had occasion to apply the following principles:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. Since it is the
power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power
or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is
what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, as we have said before,
the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelec's action nullifying the
substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.

Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws
or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe" Miranda in the May 5, 1998 resolution
and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has been disqualified for
any cause.

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a
candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the
certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the
Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial
and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter
case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or
cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and
conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under
the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only "an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840,
November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy" (p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person
who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

The law clearly provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files
a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any person who
attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of
votes would catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of
candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the
same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose
certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to
the elective office aspired for.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are:
(a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to
make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not
confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for
as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor
of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Monsale vs. Nice, 83 Phil. 758 [1949]).

It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. It
cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the
cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista we
ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and
considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.

Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as "disqualification for any cause" in this case)
follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in
the instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned (see:
Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 [1979]). A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy,
otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code.
In the case of withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of
candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under
the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a
substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous
instances.

Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning, where
there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be adopted. To include
those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled among
those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is
allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a candidate in the first place — a person who did not have a
valid certificate of candidacy prior to substitution. Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to
his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one can give what he does not have.

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes
the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who
never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place
because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a
candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we
were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the
filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple case of hair-splitting. A candidate
may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. Another candidate may likewise
be not qualified and at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for which reason, said certificate of
candidacy is also cancelled and/or denied due course. Or, a third candidate may be qualified but, his certificate of
candidacy may be denied due course and/or cancelled. This is possible because the grounds for disqualification (see:
Omnibus Election Code, Section 68 — Disqualifications) are totally separate and distinct from the grounds for cancellation
and/or denying due course to a certificate of candidacy (Ibid., Section 69 — nuisance candidates; and Section 78 —
material misrepresentation). Only the candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy may be substituted.

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its
May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the
position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the
following manner:

SO ORDERED.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently
clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the
matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of
due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. It may be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences
of this May 5, 1998 resolution are independent of the issue of whether or not the Comelec was correct in reviving SPA No.
98-019 by consolidating it with SPA No. 98-288 in its December 8, 1998 resolution.

As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following considerations are also in point:

It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over decisions of the Constitutional
Commissions, in general, and the Commission on Elections, in particular, were rather particularly defined and "limited" by
the 1987 Constitution, as they were also circumscribed in the 1973 Constitution, to a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]), the Court held:

. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]) — as regards
recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which is that judgments
of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

In Aratuc, we declared:

It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a
definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as
 the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and
honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have
definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court." And since instead of maintaining
that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change
the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a
review, is well known in remedial law.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," which,
as Aratuc  tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court," which in turn suggests an appeal by review by petition for review under
Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to
complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.

To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished Member of this Court, Mr.
Justice Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas' query during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution
thusly:

FR. BERNAS. So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the Committee? What are the
grounds for certiorari?

MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review by certiorari would be
relying on the provision of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the Rules of Court that laid down the three
grounds.

(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited in Bernas, S.J, The

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p.
903.)

Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule 65. Generally, certiorari lies where
a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. "Without jurisdiction" refers to an
absolute want of jurisdiction; "excess of jurisdiction" refers to the case where the court has jurisdiction, but it transcended
the same or acted without any statutory authority; "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the
present case, such is not within the province of certiorari, as a remedial measure, to correct. The only issue that may be
taken cognizance of in the present case is whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed decision.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion
when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 170 SCRA 246 [1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988]; Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court of
Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same
as "grave abuse of discretion". An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically
(Soriano vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284 [1989]).

Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution by and
proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to substitute for disqualified
the candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse of discretion for the
Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the winning candidate in the May 11, 1998 election.

Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution in SPA No. 98-019, which was
not elevated to it on review, the same having already attained finality by then.

While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it motu
proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in which was by then already final, it does not necessarily follow
that the Comelec also committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private respondent's motion for
reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G. Miranda. Evidently, what is under review before us in
this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and not SPA No. 98-019.

The question to answer is: will the Comelec's act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-019 be
tantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and distinct case of SPA No. 98-288 as
well? Clearly, non sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its own accord, and not under the shadow of SPA No. 98-
019.

Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion, in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. As earlier
pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the issues involved in
SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for
the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be
annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari.

As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelec's disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the fact that former candidate Jose
"Pempe" Miranda's certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. There is no dispute that the complaint
or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED
without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further
relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even necessary
for the Comelec to reiterate this in its December 8, 1998 resolution. At best, the Comelec's motu proprio  act of
resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that the certificate of candidacy of Joel
"Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled did not depend on the en banc resolution dated December 8,
1998 of the Comelec. It stems from the fact that the May 5, 1998 resolution GRANTED private respondent's Petition to
Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.

Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the instant case and that it was a
valid ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-019. Also, there appears to be sound basis to rule that a
certificate of candidacy which has been denied due course on account of misrepresentation is, in every legal
contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there is nothing to substitute. If this judgment, rendered in the Comelec's rightful
exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-288 may, at all, be considered flawed, this blemish would only constitute an error
of judgment and definitely not grave abuse of discretion. And, of course, errors of judgment may not be corrected
by certiorari.

It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting opinion (pp. 93-99, Rollo). However,
her legal opinion failed to convince the majority of the collegiate body and was not adopted by the Commission en banc.
This Court in the present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Comelec without violating
the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the matter. The Comelec's decision is not subject to appeal to this Court. We
may only strike out a Comelec decision if it was rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the sovereign will of the
electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should always be reminded that ours is a government of laws not of men. If
this Court should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every "clamor" of the majority of the supposed constituency,
where shall order and justice lie? Without the least intention to degrade, where shall "people power" end, and where shall
"law and justice" begin? Would the apparent results of the canvassing of votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the
law instead? The answers to the foregoing are obvious. The Court cannot choose otherwise but to exercise its sacred duty
to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the Republic for and under which it exists. Besides, only history will discern
whether Jose "Pempe" Miranda's filing of a certificate of candidacy for a 4th term and the intended substitution by his son
was a ploy to perpetrate the Mirandas in power by way of a political dynasty disdained and abhorred by our Constitution
which declared:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.

(Article II, 1987 Constitution)

The invalidation of petitioner's supposed substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda brings about the disqualification of
petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections (275 SCRA 763
[1997]) may be recalled:

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v.  Comelec (254 SCRA 514
[1996]), viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner Julius O.
Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing
rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost
the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered
the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.

Garcia's plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can be treated as
stray, void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of
the elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the
above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1[1989]).

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled ruling
consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA
400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).

Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to petitioner as the
electors' choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on the matter, nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to the fact that private
respondent was not then the choice of the people of Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has no authority under any law to
impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on succession
under section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. Said provision
relevantly states:

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor, —
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member, or, in case of his
permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice
 governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

xxx xxx xxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on
the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election and proclamation
of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is, however, hereby GRANTED so as to MODIFY the resolution of the
Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the
winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11, 1998 elections. The law on succession should be
enforced. Accordingly, the restraining order issued in this case is forthwith LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202202               March 19, 2013

SILVERIO TAGOLINO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March 22, 2012
Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the
validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal Party’s replacement candidate for the
position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.

The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy 2 (CoC) with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of
the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla),
filed a Verified Petition,3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City,
Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard,
Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI 4 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In
addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. 5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition without any
qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify
Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly,
RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of
residency requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution
dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in
order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution." 8

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband,
Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law
Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution
No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:

STUDY AND OBSERVATION

On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his counsel, opposing
the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr. Richard I. Gomez.

The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to
substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks for disqualification
of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:

‘Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify
Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED
as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.’

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is
nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was
declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent
totally to a candidate.
Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate to run in the public
office.

The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 12 (May 9, 2010
Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May
10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his
opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes,
respectively.13 In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of private respondent
and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010 Motion relative to
Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private respondent from
her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1) year residency requirement under Section
6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan 16 to the
Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void
ab initio; and (3) private respondent’s CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements
i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing officer. 17

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations and claimed that she validly substituted her
husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC,
one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to have presented any competent proof of identity during the
notarization of the said document. Lastly, she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in
Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she was born and raised.

During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated September 2, 2010, the
parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;

2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;

3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the necessary petition for
disqualification with the COMELEC;

4. Whether or not respondent’s COC was duly subscribed; and

5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for lack
of residency requirement.19

Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision 20 which dismissed the quo warranto petition
and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative
District). It observed that the resolution denying Richard’s candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010
Resolution, spoke of disqualification and not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent
in lieu of Richard was legal and valid.21 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondent’s CoC due to petitioner’s failure to
controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC. 22 Finally, the HRET ruled
that while it had been admitted that private respondent resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael,
Bulacan, the fact was she continued to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only
temporary.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was
validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the
former’s failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

It is petitioner’s submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of private respondent’s
substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is impermissible where the substituted candidate’s
CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that
Richard’s CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore,
was properly substituted by private respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these
which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition
to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are
well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the
latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal
laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3)
spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections
80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same
provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had
already been elected.35

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate,
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her
statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by
law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC 36 is
premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for.
It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the
same in the CoC.37 The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court
illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications
but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is
eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly
in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is
of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a material qualification in the
CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate
misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or
not.39 What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the
basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and
purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. 41 In Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:

x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC.

The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on candidate substitution.

B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states that:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether
the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states
that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. 43

As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate.
The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC
formalizes not only a person’s public declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be
elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or
lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs,
if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other words,
absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held in Talaga: 45
x x x a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for
the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the
person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the
precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person’s
CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The
existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. 46

C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis-à-vis candidate
substitution

Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a disqualification case
under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case under Section 78 vis-à-vis their respective
effects on candidate substitution under Section 77.1âwphi1

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly
substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a
candidate.48 Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a
disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is
discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible,
that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid
basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

D. Application to the case at bar

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply
with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in
the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting
the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In
short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled –
would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the
invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s
"disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC,
misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective
office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. 51 There is therefore no legal
basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election laws. Accordingly, given Richard’s non-compliance
with the one year residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division’s unqualified grant of
Juntilla’s "Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification" 52 – which prayed that the COMELEC declare
Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of Representatives" and "x x x
that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED"53 – carried with it the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to Section 78.

Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and the same is granted
by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidate’s CoC in in order. This is precisely the crux of
the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in upholding the COMELEC En Banc’s nullification of the substitution in that case,
decreed that the COMELEC Division’s unqualified grant of the petition necessarily included the denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term "disqualified" in the COMELEC Division’s
resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the COMELEC in its
May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for
the City of Snatiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC ruled favorably in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe"
MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998
national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no
qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific
prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course
and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is likewise no question that the said petition
was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the COMELEC
granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was
granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:

3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to declare Ramon
disqualified and to cancel his CoC

xxxx

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or
cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced – in apparent contradiction – that Joel
Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification,
disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC.

xxxx

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or denying
due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010
Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not
denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked
the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence,
disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.

Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave abuse of
discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards
the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte due
to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for the denial of due course
to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition without any
qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc’s
erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks only of "disqualification and not
of cancellation of Richard’s CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the qualifications of
the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate 58 be
circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is the Court’s disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET, 59 to wit:

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when reference to
the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC respecting
the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around,
because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or
qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may have passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Member’s qualification while the Member was still a
candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two
cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. More particularly, the term "qualifications" refers to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to
run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public
office.61 In this relation, private respondent’s own qualification to run for public office – which was inextricably linked to
her husband’s own qualifications due to her substitution – was the proper subject of quo warranto proceedings falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest
the jurisdiction divide between the two be blurred.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s independence is not without limitation. As earlier mentioned, the
Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion. In
this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET’s independence; rather, it merely fulfills its
duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.

In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the COMELEC En Banc’s
flawed findings regarding private respondent’s eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her
substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have
been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues
respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147909            April 16, 2002

MAUYAG PAPANDAYAN, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FAHIDA BALT

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 8, 2001, of the Second Division 1 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor of the
Municipality of Tubaran, Province of Lanao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, and the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, dated May 12, 2001, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely:
petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and
Maiko Hassan Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC,
alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of
Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joint affidavit,2 dated February 14, 2001, of Barangay Chairman
Hadji Bashir Ayonga and two members of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal, Tubaran, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori
Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran as they personally knew all the registered voters
of the said barangay; that petitioner omitted to own nor lease any house in Barangay Tangcal; and that petitioner’s father,
the late Mauyag Papandayan, Sr., who was a school superintendent, and his family were permanent residents of Bayang,
Lanao del Sur. Respondent also submitted a similar affidavit, 3 dated February 17, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, a member of
the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal. She averred that petitioner did not state in his Voter Registration
Record,4 accomplished on May 8, 1999, the number of years and months (Annex D-1) he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Tubaran.

In his answer,5 petitioner claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran; that he was the son of the
late Mauyag Capal Papandayan, Sr., a former school superintendent, and Hadja Khalida Magangcong Balt; that both the
Capal and Papandayan clans were natives of Tangcal, Tubaran, and the Magangcong clan were from Boribid, Tubaran
while most of the Balt clan were residents of Bayang; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and
stayed there with his wife Raina Guina Dimaporo, whose family and relatives were residents and natives of Tangcal,
Tubaran; that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and that he filed in 1998 his
certificate of candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.

To support his allegations, petitioner presented the following:

1. Affidavit,6 dated March 8, 2001, of Taha C. Ali, Municipal Election Officer of the Office of the Assistant Regional Election
Director of the COMELEC, Region XII, Iligan City, stating that, based on the continuous verification of household members
in Tubaran, petitioner and his wife lived at No. 13 Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran.

2. Affidavit of Witness,7 dated March 8, 2001, of Delgado Caontongan, stating that he was an elementary school teacher of
Tubaran and that he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal,
Tubaran in the May 8, 1999 registration of voters; that he personally received the Voter Registration Record of petitioner
whom he knew to be a resident of Tubaran; and that he knew petitioner to be a qualified voter and, for that reason, he
approved petitioner’s Voter Registration Record and included his name in the master list of voters in Precinct No. 28-A.

3. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor8 of petitioner, filed on January 11, 2001, with the COMELEC stating, among other
things, that he was born on October 14, 1964; that his place of birth was Marawi City; that he was employed as a
municipal employee of a local government unit in Bayang; that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; that
he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 28-A in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; and that his length of
residency in the Philippines was 36 years and 10 months (Annex 3-A).

4. Affidavit of Witness,9 dated March 8, 2001, of Rafael Guina Dimaporo (brother of petitioner’s wife), stating that his
family and the family of petitioner were residents of Tangcal, Tubaran; that his relatives on the maternal side (the Andag
and the Guina clans) were natives of Barangays Tangcal and Datumanong, both in the Municipality of Tubaran; and that
during the May 11, 1992 national and local elections, he was one of the mayoralty candidates who garnered the second
highest number of votes.

5. Affidavit of Witness,10 dated March 8, 2001, of Sobair Tagtal, stating that he was a farmer and one of the share tenants
of an agricultural land located in Tubaran, co-owned by petitioner and the latter’s siblings; that petitioner had been
managing the land and residing in Tangcal, Tubaran since 1990; and that he knew petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy in the 1998 mayoralty election in Tubaran.

6. Certification,11 dated March 7, 2001, by Salem Buzar, Election Officer in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, certifying that petitioner
was not registered as a voter of Bayang in the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001 elections.

7. Affidavit of Desistance,12 dated March 8, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, stating that he was withdrawing the joint
affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, which he had earlier executed, together with Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, as
he did not understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit and its contents had not been explained to him; that
he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner who was a first cousin of his
grandchildren; that he knew petitioner to be a registered voter and a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran; and that
petitioner is a native of Tubaran because he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side
and a legitimate member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.

8. Affidavit of Desistance,13 dated March 8, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, stating that he was withdrawing the affidavit, dated
February 17, 2001, which he had earlier executed, as he did not understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit
and its contents had not been explained to him; that he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification
case against petitioner; that he knew petitioner to be a registered voter and a candidate for municipal mayor of Tubaran;
and that petitioner is a native of Tubaran because he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the
paternal side and a legitimate member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.

In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared petitioner to be
disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes cast in his favor not to be counted
but considered as stray votes. Citing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher
Batawe, and Saadori Buat and the affidavit of Samoranao Sarip stating that petitioner had not at any time been a resident
of Tangcal, Tubaran, the COMELEC ruled that it was the fact of petitioner’s residence, not the statement in his certificate
of candidacy, which determined whether or not he had satisfied the residency requirement of one (1) year preceding the
May 14, 2001 elections. In finding that petitioner never intended to relinquish his former domicile in Bayang, the
COMELEC took note of the testimony of petitioner in the exclusion proceedings against him before the municipal trial
court (Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T), in which petitioner stated that he was living in Marawi City where he
was the private secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.

On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by the electorate for the position of
municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he received a telegram14 from the COMELEC notifying him of the resolution, dated
May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc which denied his motion for reconsideration.

On May 17, 2001, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division) in SPC No. 01-039 seeking the
issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his
favor during the May 14, 2001 elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution N. 4116. The said resolution provides that if the
disqualification case has not become final and executory on the day of the election, the BEI shall tally and count the votes
of the candidate declared disqualified.

On the other hand, respondent filed a pre-proclamation case (SPC No. 01-259) in the COMELEC.

On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order suspending the proclamation of
petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present petition. However, despite the said
order (in SPC No. 01-039), the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner
on June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent, therefore, the COMELEC (First Division), in an order, dated June 25, 2001,
set aside the proclamation of petitioner, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges against the members of
the Board responsible for the proclamation.15 Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated January 30,
2002, sustaining the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039 for being moot and
academic. It appears that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Tubaran assumed the position of
mayor pursuant to the COMELEC en banc resolution dated January 30, 2002.

On May 22, 2001, this Court required the COMELEC and respondent Fahida Balt to comment on the petition and, upon the
posting of a bond by petitioner in the amount of P10,000.00, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC
from implementing its resolutions of May 8 and May 12, 2001.

In a manifestation,16 dated May 28, 2001, petitioner submitted the certificates of votes (Annexes A to A-30), duly signed by
the BEI Chairman and his two members, showing that in the 31 precincts of Tubaran, he obtained 1,744 votes [should be
1,730] votes, while respondent Balt and Bantuas obtained 1,528 votes [should be 1,540 votes] and 974 votes [should be
967 votes], respectively. Respondent countered that, despite these results, petitioner could not be proclaimed mayor as
she had appealed from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran, wherein she sought the exclusion and
the annulment of the election returns from certain precincts in Tubaran because of massive fraud, terrorism, and
substitution of registered voters.
After canvass of the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a Municipal Certificate of
Canvass17showing the following results:

Petitioner Papandayan – 1,744 votes

Respondent Balt – 1,540 votes
Maiko Hassan Bantuas – 968 votes

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment, recommending that this Court grant the present
petition. It contends that the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and
Sangguniang Barangay members Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner had not at any time been a
resident of Tubaran, constituted hearsay evidence as the three affiants were never presented during the proceedings of
the case. In fact, one of the affiants, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, later executed an Affidavit of Desistance, dated March 8, 2001,
retracting his earlier statements. As for the statements made by petitioner in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-
T, pending before the municipal trial court, that he was then "not residing" in Bayang but in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
although "living" in Marawi City, the Solicitor General says that the same does not necessarily mean that petitioner was
not a resident of Tubaran as such answer merely means that he was previously living in Marawi City.

In her comment, respondent insists that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran but of Bayang. She contends that
petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May
11, 1998 elections and that he was a registered voter in the May 11, 1998 elections; that when petitioner registered as a
voter in Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran on May 8, 1999, he refused to fill out the space corresponding to the period
of his residency in Tubaran; that it was unusual for the BEI Chairman to execute an affidavit, stating therein that he
allowed the registration of the petitioner because he had known the latter to be a "legitimate resident of [Tubaran] even
prior to the May 8, 1999 registration"; that it was doubtful if the election officer of Tubaran really conducted a continuous
verification of household members of Tubaran; and that the certification of the election officer of Bayang that petitioner
was not a registered voter in Bayang during the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001 elections does not prove that he was a
registered voter in Tubaran. Respondent argues that the COMELEC did not commit any "error of jurisdiction" to justify the
grant of this petition for certiorari but, if at all, only an "error of judgment," which is correctible by ordinary appeal.

In his reply to respondent’s comment, petitioner points out that respondent did not appear at the March 9, 2001 hearing
of the disqualification case before the COMELEC; that of the six witnesses whom respondent said she was presenting, only
two ¾ Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat ¾ appeared, and both merely affirmed their joint affidavit; that, although the
cross-examination of the two was reset on March 12, 2001, they nevertheless failed to appear and thus deprived
petitioner’s counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine them; that respondent’s four other witnesses ¾ Hadji Bashir
Ayonga, Sultan Sarip Bilao, Osio Balbal, and Puno Balbal ¾ did not appear either; that instead Sultan Sarip Bilao later
executed an affidavit18 denying his earlier statement that the petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran; and that the
Second Division of the COMELEC and the COMELEC en banc did not conduct any hearing in the disqualification case and
merely relied on the recommendations submitted by the hearing officer. According to petitioner, while he filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections, the same was later withdrawn on his behalf
by Casim A. Guro, his brother-in-law. This fact was corroborated by Macawaris P. Masanang, a sultan in Tubaran, who
stated that he had been an Election Assistant of the COMELEC since 1978 and that, as such, he received petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy, which was later withdrawn by Casim A. Guro on behalf of petitioner.

After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be correct. Hence, his petition should be
granted.

First. Petitioner contends that the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc was not yet final and
executory when the elections were held on May 14, 2001. Consequently, the Board of Election Inspectors of Tubaran, in
the exercise of its ministerial duty, had to count the votes cast in his favor. Respondent, on the other hand, avers that the
assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc had attained finality five (5) days thereafter, on May 17,
2001, as its enforcement had not been restrained by this Court within the said period. The temporary restraining order
should thus be set aside, the same having been issued by this Court only on May 22, 2001.

At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, had not become final
and executory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was duty bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of
petitioner. As R.A. No. 6646, §6 provides:
 Effect of disqualification. ¾ Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

On the other hand, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, promulgated on May 7, 2001, in pertinent parts reads:

RESOLUTION NO. 4116

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification cases).

Sec. 13, Rule 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions or Resolutions provides:

"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. ¾ (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies,
and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

(b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become final
and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all
other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation."

Special Actions cases refer to the following:

a) Petition to deny due course to certificate of candidacy;

b) Petition to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate;

c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

....

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on Special
Actions cases (disqualification cases); the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

1. the decision or resolution of the en banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

2. the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after the lapse
of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;

3. where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of election
laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final and executory,
the BEI shall tally and count the votes of such disqualified candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent, therefore, is in error in assuming that the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this Court within five
(5) days after the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc is the
operative act that prevents it from attaining finality. The purpose of temporary restraining order was to enjoin the May 12,
2001 resolution of the COMELEC from being enforced despite the fact that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,
par. 3, as above quoted, the said resolution had not attained finality.
Second. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified on the ground that
he is not a resident of Tubaran. On the other hand, respondent argues that whether or not petitioner is a resident of
Tubaran is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and determined by the Second Division of the COMELEC
and later by the COMELEC en banc. Respondent echoes the ruling of the COMELEC in its resolution of May 12, 2001, which
said that, as an "administrative body and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall, it has more than enough expertise in its field, and its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality."

With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be insufficient to sustain its resolution. We
agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident
of the Municipality of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his
actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other language or dialect.

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied
with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine
whether a candidate has an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a
determination whether there has been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart
therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that
respondent’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent
was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,20 respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his
election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In
sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,21 applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent
to return," stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified
public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute
loss of residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoang revealed that he
always had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections,22 it was explained that the determination
of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities,
and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local
elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the
COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga,
Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election
by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that
she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that petitioner
Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for
the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her
husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she
occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving
that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,23 the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term
"residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G.
Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the
sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-
exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an
abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they resided in Tangcal,
Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to
be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to
Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to
be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to
Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof of animus manendi.

Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered as a voter in Tubaran and that in
fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters, he
was again registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran.

In addition, the following bolster petitioners’ claim that since 1990 he has been a resident of Tubaran: (a) the continuous
verification of household members in Tubaran conducted by the election officer showed that petitioner and his wife were
members of household No. 13 in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran; (b) petitioner co-owned an agricultural land in Tubaran; and
(c) Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracted their previous affidavits which they had earlier executed and said
that they did not understand the contents thereof and did not know that the affidavits would be used in a disqualification
case against petitioner.

Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
Constitution’s residency qualification requirement. In holding petitioner not to be a resident of Tubaran, the COMELEC
said:

Three (3) disinterested senior citizens, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, all from
Tangcal, Tubaran executed a joint affidavit (Exhibits A to A-1) stating that the respondent has not at any time
resided or lived in said barangay. Moreover, in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T, the respondent
admitted that he was living in Marawi City and was private secretary to Mayor Abdillah Ampatua (T.S.N., Election
Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T). As opined by Hearing Officer Atty. Cristeto J. Limbaco, these statements
made by the respondent in open court are considered judicial admissions which do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted unless proved to have been made through palpable mistake, citing Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat (L-23-23,
August 31, 1968). On May 3, 2001, respondent through counsel submitted a Motion to Admit Supplemental
Memorandum alleging that "respondent could be a domicile of Tubaran even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places citing the case of Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300, 302." The fact remains
though that respondent in open court admitted that he was living in Marawi City. (T.S.N. of Election Case Nos.
2001-237-T to 2001-244-T).24

A candidate running for an elective office should at least have resided in the place where he seeks election for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. Herein respondent is wanting in this respect.

In citing the joint affidavit of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, the COMELEC overlooked the fact
that Hadji Bashir Ayonga subsequently repudiated his affidavit on the ground that the same had not been explained to him
and he did not know that it would be used to disqualify petitioner. Hadji Bashir Ayonga affirmed that petitioner was a
resident of Tubaran. Indeed, in its findings of fact, the COMELEC stated:

On March 8, 2001, witness for petitioner Hadji Bashir Ayonga executed an Affidavit of Desistance thereby
withdrawing his affidavit and stated that he did not know the consequences of signing the affidavit he executed
on February 14, 2001 as the same was not explained to him and would be used in a disqualification case against
the respondent. A similar affidavit was also filed by Samoranao Sarip withdrawing his prior affidavit and stating
that he did not know the consequences of his signing said affidavit of February 17, 2001.25
Apparently, the COMELEC (Second Division) forgot its own findings.

Respondent claims that in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T for exclusion of petitioner as a voter of Tubaran,
petitioner admitted that he was not a resident of that municipality but of Marawi City. Petitioner’s testimony is as follows:

Atty. P. Dimaampao: MAUYAG PAPANDAYAN, Jr., what is your job now?

WITNESS: I’m the private Secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.

Atty. P. Dimaampao: For how long?

WITNESS: Since he was elected Mayor of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

Atty. P. Dimaampao: Are you residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

WITNESS: No, I’m in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. And I was living in Marawi City.26

Petitioner’s statement that "[he] was living in Marawi City" cannot be read as saying he was a resident of Marawi City,
because, when asked whether he was residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, he replied: "No, I’m in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur."
What he seems to be saying is that although he worked as a private secretary of the Mayor of Bayang, he was not a
resident of Bayang, because he was living in Tubaran.

When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to
the office, the will of the electorate should be respected.27 For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters.28 To successfully challenge petitioner’s disqualification, respondent must clearly
demonstrate that petitioner’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote.29 Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division), dated May 8, 2001,
disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the
resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158830             August 10, 2004

ELLAN MARIE CIPRIANO, a minor represented by her father ROLANDO CIPRIANO, (AND OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND
AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY SITUATED) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Election Officer LOPE GAYO, JR., 1st District, Pasay City, SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY thru its Chairman
JOHNNY SANTIAGO of Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG PAOLO ALCERA in his capacity as SK Federation President of Pasay
City, EDNA TIBAR – a minor assisted by parents, KRISTAL GALE BONGGO – a minor assisted by parents, SK Chairman
RUEL TAYAM DECENA of Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SANGGUNIANG ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS AND YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED and THEIR AGENTS
AND REPRESENTATIVES 
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer election
laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the
qualifications prescribed by law? This is the issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for certiorarifiled by Ellan Marie
P. Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the
COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that she was not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.

On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.1

On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the
Commission’s Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the
SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the
other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run.2

Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted from the official list
of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly
elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City.3 She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002.4

On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due course or
cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner, the report
of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel one’s certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also claimed that
she was denied due process when her certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and
hearing. Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of the Commission that has authority to decide
election-related cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended that she may only be removed by
a petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman.5

On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5781,6 resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It cited
its previous resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No.
5584 its policy on proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they
were elected. It explained:

A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the procedure adopted by the Commission in denying due course the
certificate of candidacy of a candidate. It reads:

Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Election Officers were given the duty to: (1) verify whether all
candidates for barangay  and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered voters of
the barangay where they filed their certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the
certificates of candidacy and determine on the basis of said entries whether the candidate concerned
possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.

Further, Election Officers are mandated to report by registered mail and by rush telegram to the Law
Department of this Commission the names of candidates who are not registered voters in the place
where they seek to run for public office within three (3) days from the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy. The names of these candidates, however, shall still be included in the certified lists of
candidates until the Commission directs otherwise.

By virtue of the said report, the Law Department makes a recommendation to the Commission En Banc,
and the latter, by virtue of an En Banc  Resolution either gives due course to or denies/cancels the
certificates of candidacy of the said candidates.

Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on the eligibility of candidates starts from the time
they filed their certificates of candidacy. The candidates, by virtue of the publication of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 on May 25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin are deemed to have
constructive notice of the said administrative inquiry. Thus, the Commission, by virtue of its
 administrative powers, may motu proprio deny/cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who are
found to be not registered voters in the place where they seek to run for public office.

Any registered candidate for the same office may also file a verified petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy pursuant to Section 69 (nuisance candidate) or Sec. 78 (material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus Election Code either personally or
through a duly authorized representative within five (5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of
candidacy directly with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor or with the Office of the Election
Officer concerned.

Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the alleged ineligibility in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801, or the petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy was filed
within the reglementary period, the fact that the Resolution of this Commission, denying due course to or
canceling the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate, was not promulgated or did not arrive
prior to or on the day of the elections is therefore of no moment. The proclamation of an ineligible
candidate is not a bar to the exercise of this Commission’s power to implement the said Resolution of the
Commission En Banc because it already acquired the jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility of the
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy even before elections by virtue of either the report of
the Election Officer or the petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy filed
against them.

On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 are
likewise clear: (1) ‘A verified petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground of ineligibility or under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed at anytime before proclamation of the winning
candidate by any registered voter or any candidate for the same office,’ (2) ‘All disqualification cases filed
on the ground of ineligibility shall survive, although the candidate has already been proclaimed.’

Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted provisions, the proclamation of a candidate who is found to be
disqualified is also not a bar to the Commission’s power to order a proclaimed candidate to cease and
desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected.

By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed candidates who were found to be ineligible only after they were
elected and proclaimed, the provisions of Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code are clear: The
remedy of losing candidates is to file a petition for quo warranto  before the metropolitan or municipal
trial court. This is logical – The Commission did not acquire jurisdiction over these proclaimed candidates
prior to election (i.e., There was no report from the Election Officer regarding their ineligibility and no
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and/or petition for disqualification was
filed against them.) Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction to annul their proclamation on the ground
of ineligibility, except in cases wherein the proclamation is null and void for being based on incomplete
canvass.

Thus, the Commission ruled:

Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to establish a policy as follows:

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.

(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or cancelled by
virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit  such Resolution did not arrive on time.

1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the Commission deleting the
name of the candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;

2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking his oath of
office or from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order was
issued by the Supreme Court; and
 3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates
and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation. 7

The Commission further stated:

Considering that there are queries as to the status of the proclamation of disqualified candidates as an offshoot of
Resolution No. 5584, the same was amended by virtue of Resolution No. 5666, the dispositive portion of which
now reads:

Considering the above-quoted provision, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE
the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain to amend Resolution No. 5584 promulgated on 10 August
2002 with modification.

Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall now read as follows:

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX

(a) xxx

(b) xxx

(c) xxx

(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his
disqualification or despite the pending disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is hereby declared
void from the beginning, even if the dispositive portion of the resolution disqualifying him or canceling his
certificate of candidacy does not provide for such an annulment.8

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:

a) To declare illegal and unconstitutional the COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on 15 July 2002 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 promulgated on October 7, 2002 and any other COMELEC actions and resolutions
which are intended to summarily oust and remove petitioner as SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City without
any notice, inquiry, election protest, petition for quo warranto, investigation and hearing, and therefore a clear
violation of due process of law.

b) To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC Resolutions sitting en banc  which does not have authority to decide
election related case, including pre-proclamation controversies, in the first instance, in consonance to this
Honorable Court’s ruling in the cases of Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308, August 29, 1989 and Garvida vs.
Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997.

c) To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 and also to declare the age of membership and its
officers of the KK or SK organization from 15 to 21 years old in accordance with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b) and
other provisions of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991.

d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as constitutional to direct all SK Officers and Members who are
now more than 18 years old to cease and desist from continuously functioning as such SK Officers and Members
and to vacate their respective SK Officers position, as they are no longer members of the Sangguniang Kabataan
organization or Katipunan ng Kabataan organization for being over age upon attaining the age of 18 years old.

e) To direct respondents to pay the salary, allowance and other benefits of the petitioner as SK Chairperson of
Barangay 38, Pasay City.9

Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in this case is the validity of Resolution No. 5363 of the COMELEC.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due process when the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 canceling her
certificate of candidacy. She claims that the resolution was intended to oust her from her position as SK Chairman without
any appropriate action and proceedings.

The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its resolution by invoking its administrative power to enforce and administer
election laws. Thus, in the exercise of such power, it may motu proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of
candidates who are found to be unqualified for the position they are seeking. The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the conduct of the Barangay  and SK elections in two newspapers
of general circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates regarding the Commission’s administrative inquiry into their
certificates of candidacy.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to govern the conduct of elections and to ensure that the
electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." 10 As an independent Constitutional
Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial
powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to determine the number and
location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law
enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections;
register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses,
and recommend to the President the removal or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee
it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. It also has direct control and supervision over
all personnel involved in the conduct of election.11 Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer.12 The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was granted exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial
and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.13

Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the
Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The
exercise of such authority, however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law.

The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on
its broad administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.

We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial election supervisor,
election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the
succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy.14 The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in
character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing
on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of
said body.15

Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false. It states:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
 at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.

It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him and he should
be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. This is the essence of due process. Due process demands prior
notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support its
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his
side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case.16 In a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since the proceedings are required to be summary, the parties may, after
due notice, be required to submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other documentary
evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the
Commission en banc or Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.17

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is
not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs.18 We have earlier enumerated the scope of the Commission’s administrative functions. On the other
hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. 19

The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination
whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
deprivation of one’s right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is only proper and
fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to
refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate
be notified of the Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be
allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No. 5781, canceling petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.

We need not rule on the question raised by petitioner as regards the constitutionality of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act
No. 9164 lowering the age of membership in the SK as it is not the lis mota of this case.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on July 15, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5781
issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-13001             March 18, 1958

ALFREDO ABCEDE vs. HON. DOMINGO IMPERIAL, GAUDENCIO GARCIA, and SIXTO BRILLANTES, Commisioners Elections

Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on Elections, his certificate of candidacy
for the Office of the President of the Philippines, in connection with the elections to be held on November 12 of the same
year. On or about said date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the Commission on Elections to appear
before the same on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be considered as filed
in good faith and to be given due course," with the admonition that their failure to so appear would be sufficient ground
for the Commission to consider said certificates of candidacy as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto.
After due hearing, at which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a resolution dated October
4, 1957, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of the persons therein named, including that of said petitioner, "shall
not be given due course." A reconsideration of such resolution having been denied, Abcede filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the resolution be annulled and that his aforementioned certificate of candidacy
be given due course. Upon motion of petitioner herein, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
respondent to refrain and desist from carrying out the resolution above referred to, pending the final disposition of the
case at bar.

Insofar as petitioner herein is concerned, the action taken by the Commissision on Elections is based upon the following
facts, set forth in its said resolution, from which we quote:

Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which his votes were nil. In this
election he presents his candidacy for President of the Philippines, with the redemption of the Japanese war
notes as his main program of government. It is of record that the Bureau of Posts, by Fraud Order No. 2, dated
November 2, 1955, banned from the use of the Philippine mail matter of whatever class mailed by, or addressed
to, theJapanese War Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc., and its agentand representatives, including
Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede, which order was based on the findings of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, confirmed by the Secretary of Justice, that said entity aid its agents and representatives,
including Alfredo Abcede, are engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the public by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed
for motives other than a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.

In holding that it has, under these facts the power not to give due course to petitioner's certficate of candidacy, the
Commission on Elections gave the following reasons:

The Commission believes that while Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes upon the commission the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge certificates of candidacy, the law leaves to the Commission a
measure:of discretion on whether to give due course to a particular certificate of candidacy should it find said
certificate of candidacy to have been filed not bona fide. We also believe that a certificate of candidacy is
not bona fide when it is filed, as a matter of caprice or fancy, by a person who is incapable of understanding the
full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election and without any political organization or visible
supporters behind him so that he, has not even the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a
substantial portion of the electorate, or when the one who files the same exerts no tangible effort, shown by
overt acts, to pursue to a semblance of success his candidacy.

The law requires the certificate of candidacy to be under oath in acknowledgment of its serious character as an
indispensable segment in the process of election, the first step that a citizen has to take in seeking public trust
and in avoiding service to the common weal. It is a solemn matter, not to be taken lightly.

The giving due course to a certificate of candidacy is a process of no mean proportion, particularly for the offices
of President and Vice President of the Philippines and Senator which involve the printing at public expense of
around 136,000 copies of each certificate of candidacy; the printing of the names of the candidates in several
election forms; the mailing, sorting, and distribution of the copies of said certificates of candidacy and forms
among the 34,000 polling places throughout the country; the entering of the names of the candidates by the
board of inspectors in still other forms; etc. Conisidering all these, the Commission is satisfied with the view that
Congress could not have meant to make as a ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course to every
certificate of candidacy, no matter how senseless said certificate of candidacy may be, thus in effect authorizing a
meaningless expenditure of a considerable amount of public funds, and in the process put added routinary
burden on the already heavily burdened election machinery, as well as shear off the election much of its dignity as
a solemn process of democracy.

Based on existing records of the Commission and on evidence adduced during the hearing on the certificates of
candidacy mentioned above, the Commission finds, and so declares, that the said certificates of candidacy have
not been filed in good faith on grounds hereunder stated.

Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that 96 certificates of candidacy of candiddtes for President . . . shall be
filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order the preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the
election precincts of the Philippines. . . .
It further provides that said certificates shall be distributed as follows:

. . . the Commission on Elections . . . shall immediately send copies thereof  to the secretary of the Provincial Board
of each province where the elections will be held, and the latter shall in turn immediately forward copies to all the
polling places. The Commission on Elections shall communicate the names of said candidates to the secretary of
the provincial board by telegraph. If the certificate of candidacy is sent by mail, it shall  be by registered mail, and
the date on which the package was deposited in the post-office may be considered as the filing date thereof if
confirmed by a telegram or radiogram addressed to the Commission on Elections on the same date.

Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code:

The Commission on Election, the secretary of the provincial board, and the municipal secretary, in their respective
cases, shall have the ministerial duty to receive the certificates of candidacy referred to in the preceding section
and to immediately acknowledge receipt thereof.

The foregoing provisions give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. On the contrary, the Conunission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy.
Of what use would it be to receive it if the certificate were not to be given due course? We must not assume that Congress
intended to require a useless act — that it would have imposed a mandatory duty to do something vain, futile and empty.

Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission "shall immediately send copies" of said certificates to the
secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of this requirement, evinced by the imperative character
generally attached to the term "shall", is stressed by the peremptory connotation of the adverb "immediately."

Again, the Constitution fixes the qualifications for the office of the highest magistrate of the land. All possessors of such
qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at least, to aspire to such office and to run therefor, provided that they file
their respective certificates of candidacy within the time, at the place and in the manner provided by law, and petitioner
herein has done so.

Lastly, as the branch of the executive  department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution
has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement  and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of
the Philippines.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote". It may not even pass upon the legality
of a given vote (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, * 47 Off.; Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it
could whether, if so granted — in the vague, abstract, indeter-assert the greater and more far-reaching authority  to
determine who — among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the
procedural requirements relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy — should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits
intended by law therefor. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits — a candidate must be capable of
"understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election," and must have — over a month prior, to
the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) "the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a
substantial portion of the electorate," is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement  of the law, which policy
must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory
grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious minate and undefined manner
necessary in order that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not he deemed
made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar) — the legislative
enactment would not amount to undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.).

The case of Ciriaco S. Garcia vs. Imperial, L-12930 (October 22, 1957) cited in respondent's answer is not in point. That
case referred to the certificates of candidacy of Ciriaco S. Garcia of San Simon, Pampanga, Carlos C. Garcia of Iloilo City and
Eulogio Palma Garcia of Butuan City, all for the Office of the President of the Philippines, filed in September, 1957. The
facts therein are set forth in the pertinent resolution of the Commission on Elections from which we quote:

Ciriaco S. Garcia, . . . admitted, . . . that he had not up to the date of the hearing held any public meeting relative
to his candidacy; had not posted any handbills or posters or banners announcing candidacy; had not established
any national headquarters; and had no line up for vice-president, senators, or members of Congress. In
connection with the case of Ciriaco S. Garcia, counsel for the intervenor presented documents as exhibits. . . . all
showing that Ciriaco S. Garcia had not shown any active interest in his candidacy. Relative to the case of Carlos C.
Garcia, counsel for intervenor presented a witness, Salvador del Rosario who testifed to the effect that he knows
personally said Carlos C. Garcia as a former dress maker and now maintains a bar in a city of Iloilo; that he has not
 done anything to promote his candidacy; and that he is a brother-in-law of Atty. Tomas Vargas a
prominent Liberal Party leader in the province of iloilo. He also submitted as evidence the telegram of the
provincial commanderr of Iloilo reporting that said Carlos C. Garcia is not a well known person in Iloilo. And as
regard Eulogio Palma Garcia, counsel for intervenor likewise submitted a telegram of the provincial commander
of Agusan to the effect that said Eulogio Palma Garcia is an unknown person in Agusan. He farther pointed out
that the address of said Eulogio Palma Garcia, as appearing in this certificate of candidacy, is % Tranquilino O.
Calo, Jr., a nephew of ex-congressman Calo, and official candidate of the Liberal Party for Senator. (Emphasis
ours.)

The findings of the Commission were as follows:

The Commission is convinced that the failure of Carlos C. Garcia, a bar tender, and Eulogio Palma Garcia, a person
who has not even a residence of his own, to appear before the Commission, notwithstanding the mandatory
statement issued them, which had been received in their behalf, to the effect that failure to appear on their part
before the Commission as required would be sufficient for the Commission to consider their certificates of
candidacy, as filed in bad faith, shows that they are not actually interested in the outcome of their pretended
candidacy, and/or that they fear that their personal appearance before the Commission would not expose too
clearly the true motives behind the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

As regards Ciriaco S. Garcia, a former chief of police, with no visible property to his name, . . . the Commission is
likewise satisfied . . . that his certificate of candidacy was filed without the least idea of actively pursuing the
same, but simply to prejudice a legitimate and bona fide candidate, President Carlos P. Garcia.

Each of said three certificates of candidacy is a well fitted piece in an overall conspired scheme to fairly prejudice
the candidacy of President Carlos P. Garcia. Even the circumstances of geography and of course of names have
been suitably played upon to achieve in the most effective way the desired objective of destroying legitimate
votes for the bona fide candidate. Ciriaco S. Garcia hails from Central Luzon; Carlos C. Garcia is from Central
Visayas; and Eulogio Palma Garcia is from Northern Mindanao. The names used are such that all votes for "Carlos
Garcia", "C. Garcia", "P. Garcia", and "Garcia" would, be declared stray. The mischief aimed to be realize by the
plan is too plain to be missed by any impartial mind. . . .

The Commission, . . . is clear in the conclusion that all raid three certificates of candidacy have been filed not for
the purpose of winning the election or even to obtain a substantial number of votes for the presidency of the
Philippines but  for the purpose of prejudicing the candidacy of a candidate in good faith by nullifying the votes
cast for the same name and/or surname of said candidate in good faith.

xxx     xxx     xxx

We reiterate here what the Commission has already said in the similar case of Re-Certificate of Candidacy of
Eduardo A. Barreto. (Case No. 179):

The duty of the Commission under these circumstances is too plain to be mistaken. The law could not have
intended nor will the Commission allow itself to be made a party to fraud  against the integrity  and  purity  of
election. Election is not a game of mean political tricks where deceit wins a premium. It is an honest process,
governed by fair rules of law and good conduct. In election as well as in any other field of fair
contest, deceit cannot be allowed to clothe itself in legal technicalities and demand a prize. It must be
condemned and never tolerated. (Emphasis ours.)

In other words, the candidates in question did not really aspire to be elected President of the Philippines. Their certificates
of candidacy were filed merely for the purpose of nullifying, in effect, all votes cast in favor of "Garcia", "C. Garcia", and "P.
Garcia", even if the voters intended to vote for Carlos P. Garcia, the incumbent of said office. The objective was, evidently,
to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. Had the certificates of candidacy in question been
given due course, whether or not such tax penalty, or sum has been election inspectors, who would be at a loss as to
whom to credit the votes cast for "Carlos Garcia", "C. Garcia", "P. Garcia", and "Garcia" or whether said votes should not
be counted, as stray votes. Thus, an opportunity would be created to subject the election officers throughout the
Philippines to complaints, either by the opponents of, the incumbent President, if the votes were credited to him or by the
Nacionalista Party, if the votes were counted in favor of either Ciriaco S. Garcia, or Carlos C. Garcia, or Eulogio Palma
Garcia, or considered as stray votes. What this could have led to, or given an excuse for,public disorders which may not
have been altogether unlikely, in the light of the conditions then existing. Worse, still, there would have been no means,
under the law, to ascertain whether the aforementioned votes were intended for the incumbent President Carlos P.
Garcia or for the petitioners in said case. The action of the Commission therein tended, therefore, to insure free, orderly
and honest elections, which is its main Concern, under our fundamental law and the Revised Election Code. Such,
however, is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.

Whether or not the Commission on Election should incur the expenses incident to the preparation and distribution of
copies of the certificates of candidacy of those who, in its opinion, do not have a chance to get a substantial number of
votes, is another question of policy for Congress,not the Commission, to settle. When the Revised Election Code imposes
upon the Commission the ministerial duty to receive those certificates and provides that said Commission shall
immediately prepare and distribute copies thereof to the offices mentioned in section 36 of said Code, it necessarily
implies that compliance with the latter provision is, likewise, ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the
effect thereof is to unnecessarily impose a useless burden upon the Government, then the remedy is to call the attention
of Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding proposals, recommendations, or suggestions for such amendments
as may be deemed best, consistently with the democratic nature of our political system.

Needless to say, the vigilant attitude of the Commission on Elections and the efforts exerted by the same to comply with
what it considers its duty, merit full and unqualified recognition, as well as commendation of the highest order. In this
particular case, however, the action of the Commission as regards petitioner's certificate of candidacy is beyond the
bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void.

Wherefore, the aforementioned resolution of the Commission on Elections is hereby annulled, insofar as petitioner
Alfredo Abcede is concerned, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued made permanent, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

LYNETTE GARVIDA vs.FLORENCIO SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER
DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO

Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996.
On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that
petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court
found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. 3

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent
Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner's certificate
of candidacy again due to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who
set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. 6

On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24
hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of the
COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan,
filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner
Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en bancissued an
order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. The order reads as follows:

Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by petitioner
Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of
which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason
that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11,
1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex
"A";

6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified; that her certificate of
candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be cancelled;

xxx xxx xxx

the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of Election
Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation
of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of votes for the position of
Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].

Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and to pay
the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.

SO ORDERED. 9
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. 10 In accordance
with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the
winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested party." 12 On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng
mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of
the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 13

Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to act on the petition
to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground
that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.

Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the
supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in
Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before election.

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on
the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be
heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by
the COMELEC itself. 15

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC
sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only
motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear
from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:

Sec.  3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and
decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies,
contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission. 17

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It
therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the
order of May 2, 1996. 18

II

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal
requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These requirements are:

Sec.  1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible
copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant
must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional respondents or
protestees.
 Sec.  2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be filed
directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in
these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the
requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.

Sec.  3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed
or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino.

xxx xxx xxx

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and
filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the
COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by
registered mail.

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and
is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. 21 The
receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of
Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the
authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing
the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.

III

To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.

The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a
barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years
of age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express their views and opinions and
participate in issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together
with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18
years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the maximum age of the
Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."

The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however,
retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7)
members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for
cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30

Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government Code of
1991, viz:

Sec.  424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the
Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or
in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.
 A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses
the following qualifications:

Sec.  428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1)
year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not
have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen;
(b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly
registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an
elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but
not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991
in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an
elective official. Thus:

Sec.  3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person must
be:

a) a citizen of the Philippines;

b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must have been
born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.  6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:

a) a qualified voter;

b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election
Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between
May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual
resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must:
(a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra
vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code
itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not
turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.

A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum
age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other
hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The
addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of
age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however,
must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code
itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum
dissimilis est ratio. 31 The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification. 32

The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the election is not
provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed
that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the
maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at
exactly 21 years on the day of the election.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very
clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood
that years are of 365 days each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. 35 In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the
first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second
cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day
of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After
this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day
cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It
does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles.
"Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does
not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth official was expressly
stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the youth
official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen
years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did
not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the
Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the
matter open to confusion and doubt. 37

Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991 declared
that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was
because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time President Aquino
assumed power. 38 They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit
at not more than 21 years 39 and the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:

Sec. 423. Creation and Election. —

a) . . . ;

b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one
(21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
 The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on
the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.
Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st
birthday." 40 Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423
[b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on
the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day.
Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the
maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.

In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May
6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was
21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days
old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the
Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate
for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the
day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the
day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory,
nor will it validate his election. 42 The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. 43

The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. 44 A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office. 45 Moreover, despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually
knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises
and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. 47

Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be succeeded
by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996
elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, 49 is
convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent
without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."

The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility.50 Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of
being legally chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK
member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from
among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and
shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age
qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her
position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang
Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133676 April 14, 1999

TUPAY LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN, respondents. YUSOP JIKIRI, intervenor.

 In a bid to, improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on December 22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of an
automated election system. The new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC
Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.

The voting in Sulu was relatively peaceful and orderly. 1 The problem started during the automated counting of votes for
the local officials of Sulu at the Sulu at the Sulu State College. At about 6 a.m. of May 12, 1998, some election inspectors
and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the
mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. Some ballots picked at random by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. confirmed that
votes in favor of a mayoralty candidate were not reflected in the printed election returns. He suspended the automated
counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the
automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated
machines failed to read them correctly.2

At 12:30 p.m. of the same day, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the
military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Those who attended were the various candidates for governor,
namely, petitioner Tupay Loong, private respondent Abdusakar Tan, intervenor Yusop Jikiri and Kimar Tulawie. Also in
attendance were Brig. Gen. Edgardo Espinosa, AFP, Marine forces, Southern Philippines, Brig. Gen. Percival Subala, AFP,
3rd Marine Brigade, Supt. Charlemagne Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu, PNP Command and congressional candidate
Bensandi Tulawie.3

The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of
agreement. Those who recommended a shift to manual count were Brig. Generals Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director
Alejandro, gubernational candidates Tan and Tulawie and congressional candidate Bensandi Tulawie. Those who insisted
on an automated count were gubernational candidates Loong and Jikiri. In view of their differences in opinion, Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. requested the parties to submit their written position papers. 4

Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the
COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These
municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong
sequence code.5

Private respondent Tan and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. sent separate commucations to the COMELEC en banc  in Manila. Still, on
May 12, 1998, Tan requested for the suspension of the automated counting of ballots throughout the Sulu province. 6 On
the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata. The resolution reads:7

xxx xxx xxx

In the matter of the Petition dated May 12, 1998 of Abdusakur Tan, Governor, Sulu, to suspend or stop
counting of ballots through automation (sic) machines for the following grounds, quoted to wit:

1. The Election Returns for the Municipality of Pata, Province of Sulu-District II do not
reflect or reveal the mandate of the voters:

DISCUSSIONS

That the watchers called the attention of our political leaders and candidates regarding
their discovery that the election returns generated after the last ballots for a precinct is
scanned revealed that some candidates obtained zero votes, among others the
Provincial Board Members, Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and the councilors for the LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP;

That the top ballot, however, reveals that the ballots contained votes for Anton
Burahan, candidate for Municipal Mayor while the Election Return shows zero vote;

That further review of the Election Return reveals that John Masillam, candidate for
Mayor under the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLF obtains (sic) 100% votes of the total
number of voters who actually voted;
 The foregoing discrepancies were likewise noted and confirmed by the chairmen, poll
clerks and members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) such as Rena Jawan,
Amkanta Hajirul, Dulba Kadil, Teddy Mirajuli, Rainer Talcon, Mike Jupakal, Armina
Akmad, Romulo Roldan and Lerma Amrawali to mention some;

The Pata incident can be confirmed by no less than Atty. Jose Tolentino, Head, task Force
Sulu, whose attention was called regarding the discrepancies;

The foregoing is a clear evidence that the automated machine (scanner) cannot be relied
upon as to truly reflect the contents of the ballots. If such happened in the Municipality
of Pata, it is very possible that the same is happening in the counting of votes in the
other municipalities of this province. If this will not be suspended or stopped, the use of
automated machines will serve as a vehicle to frustrate the will of the sovereign people
of Sulu;

Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered and in the interest of an honest and
orderly election, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that an Order be
issued immediately suspending or stopping the use of the automated machine (scanner)
in the counting of votes for all the eighteen (18) municipalities in the Province of Sulu
and in lieu thereof, to avoid delay, counting be done through the usual way known
tested by us.

While the commission does not agree with the conclusions stated in the petition, and the failure of the
machine to read votes may have been occasioned by other factors, a matter that requires immediate
investigation, but in the public interest, the Commission,

RESOLVED to grant the Petition dated May 12, 1998 and to Order that the counting of
votes shall be done manually in the Municipality of PATA, the only place in Sulu where
the automated machine failed to read the ballots, subject to notice to all parties
concerned.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and
recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu, viz:8

The undersigned stopped the counting in the municipality of Pata since he discovered that votes for a
candidate for mayor was credited in favor of the other candidate. Verification with the Sulu Technical
Staff, including Pat Squires of ES & S, reveals that the cause of the errors is the way the ballot was
printed. Aside from misalignment of the ovals and use of codes assigned to another municipality (which
caused the rejection of all local ballots in one precinct in Talipao), error messages appeared on the screen
although the actual condition of the ballots would have shown a different message. Because of these, the
undersigned directed that counting for all ballots in Sulu be stopped to enable the Commission to
determine the problem and rectify the same. It is submitted that stopping the counting is more in
consonance with the Commission's mandate than proceeding with an automated but inaccurate
count.1âwphi1.nêt

In view of the error discovered in Pata and the undersigned's order to suspend that counting, the
following documents were submitted to him.

1. Unsigned letter dated May 12, 1998 submitted by Congressman

Tulawie for manual counting and canvassing;

2. Petition of Governor Sakur Tan for manual counting;

3. Position paper of Tupay Loong, Benjamin Loong, and Asani Tamang

for automated count;

4. MNLF Position for automated count; and

 5. Recommendation of General E.V. Espinosa, General PM Subala, and
PD CS Alejandrino for manual count;

Additional marines have been deployed at the SSC. The undersigned is not sure if it is merely intended to
tame a disorderly crowd, inside and outside SSC, or a show of force.

It is submitted that since an error was discovered in a machine which is supposed to have an error rate of
1: 1,000,000, not a few people would believe that this error in Pata would extend to the other
municipalities. Whether or not this true, it would be more prudent to stay away from a lifeless thing that
has sown tension and anxiety among and between the voters of Sulu.

Respectfully submitted:

12 May 1998

(Sgd.) JOSE M. TOLENTINO, JR.

The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation
and the manner of its implementation as suggested by Executive Director Resurrection Z. Borra. The Resolution reads: 9

In the matter of the Memorandum dated 13 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurrection Z. Borra,
pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:

In connection with Min. Res. No. 98-1747 promulgated May 12, 1998 which resolved to order that the
counting of votes shall be done manually in the municipality of Pata, the only place in Sulu where the
automated counting machine failed to read the ballots, subject to notice to all parties concerned, please
find the following:

1. Handwritten Memo of Director Jose M. Tolentino, Jr., Task Force Head, Sulu,
addressed to the Executive Director on the subject counting and canvassing in the
municipality of Pata due to the errors of the counting of votes by the machine brought
about by the error in the printing of the ballot, causing misalignment of ovals and use of
codes assigned to another municipality.

He recommended to revert to the manual counting of votes in the whole of Sulu. He

attached the stand of Congressman Tulawie, Governor Sakur Tan and recommendation
of Brigadier General Edgardo Espinosa, General Percival Subla, P/Supt. Charlemagne
Alejandrino for manual counting. The position paper of former Governor Tupay Loong,
Mr. Benjamin Loong and Mr. Asani S. Tammang, who are candidates for Governor and
Congressman of 1st and 2nd Districts respectively, who wanted the continuation of the
automated counting.

While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security to our Comelec officials, BEIs and other
deputies, the political tensions and imminent violence and bloodshed may not be prevented, as per
report received, the MNLF forces are readying their forces to surround the venue for automated counting
and canvassing in Sulu in order that the automation process will continue.

Director Borra recommends, that while he supports Minute Resolution No. 98-1747, implementation
thereof shall be done as follows:

1. That all the counting machines from Jolo, Sulu be transported back by C130 to Manila
and be located at the available space at PICC for purposes of both automated and
manual operations. This approach will keep the COMELEC officials away from violence
and bloodshed between the two camps who are determined to slug each other as above
mentioned in Jolo, Sulu. Only authorized political party and candidate watchers will be
allowed in PICC with proper security, both inside and outside the perimeters of the
venue at PICC.
 2. With this process, there will be an objective analysis and supervision of the
automated and manual operations by both the MIS and Technical Expert of the ES & S
away from the thundering mortars and the sounds of sophisticated heavy weapons from
both sides of the warring factions.

3. Lastly, it will be directly under the close supervision and control of Commission on
Elections En Banc.

RESOLVED:

1. To transport all counting machines from Jolo, Sulu by C130 to Manila

for purposes of both automated and manual operations, with notice to
all parties concerned;

2. To authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers concerned

for the conduct of the automated and manual operations of the
counting of votes at PICC under the close supervision and control of the
Commission En Banc. For this purpose, to make available a designated
space at the PICC;

3. To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized representative

of the political parties concerned and the candidates watchers both
outside and inside the perimeters of the venue at PICC.

Atty. Tolentino, Jr. furnished the parties with copies of Minute Resolution No. 98-1750 and called for another meeting the
next day, May 14, 1998, to discuss the implementation of the resolution. 10 The meeting was attended by the parties, by
Lt. Gen. Joselin Nazareno, then Chief of the AFP Southern Command, the NAMFREL, media, and the public. Especially
discussed was the manner of transporting the ballots and the counting machines to the PICC in Manila. They agreed allow
each political party to have at least one (1) escort/watcher for municipality to acompany the flight. Two C130s were used
for purpose. 11

On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual
count, viz: 12

In the matter of the Memorandum dated 15 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurrection Z. Borra,
quoted to wit:

In the implementation of COMELEC Min. Resolution No. 98-1750 promulgated 13 May

1998 in the manual counting of votes of Pata, Sulu, and in view of the arrival of the
counting machines, ballot boxes, documents and other election paraphernalia for the
whole province of Sulu now stored in PICC, as well as the arrival of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of said Municipality in Sulu, and after conference with some members of
the Senior Staff and Technical Committee of this Commission, the following are hereby
respectfully recommended:

1. Manual counting of the local ballots of the automated election

system in Pata, Sulu;

2. Automated counting of the national ballots considering that there

are no questions raised on the National Elective Officials as pre-printed
in the mark-sensed ballots;

3. The creation of the following Special Boards of Inspectors under the

supervision of Atty. Jose M. Tolentino, Jr., Task Force Head, Sulu,
namely:

a) Atty. Mamasapunod M. Aguam

 Ms. Gloria Fernandez

Ms. Esperanza Nicolas

b) Director Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas

Ms. Celia Romero

Ms. Rebecca Macaraya

c) Atty. Zenaida S. Soriano

Ms. Jocelyn Guiang

Ma. Jacelyn Tan

d) Atty. Erlinda C. Echavia

Ms. Theresa A. Torralba

Ms. Ma. Carmen Llamas

e) Director Estrella P. de Mesa

Ms. Teresita Velasco

Ms. Nelly Jaena

4. Additional Special Board of Inspectors may be created when

necessary.

5. The Provincial Board of Canvassers which by standing Resolution is

headed by the Task Force Sulu Head shall consolidate the manual and
automated results as submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers
of the whole province with two members composed of Directors
Estrella P. de Mesa and Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas;

6. The political parties and the candidates in Sulu as well as the Party-
List Candidates are authorized to appoint their own watchers upon
approval of the Commission',

RESOLVED to approve the foregoing recommendations in the implementation of Min.

Resolution No. 98-1750 promulgated on 13 May 1998 providing for the manual counting
of votes in the municipality of Pata, Sulu.

RESOLVED, moreover, considering the recommendation of Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe,

Commissioner-In-Charge, ARMM, to conduct a parallel manual counting on all 18
municipalities of Sulu as a final guidance of the reliability of the counting machine which
will serve as basis for the proclamation of the winning candidates and for future
reference on the use of the automated counting machine.

On May 18, 1998, petitioner filed his objection to Minute Resolution No. 98-1796, viz: 13

1. The minute resolution under agenda No. 98-1796 violates the provisions of Republic Act No. 8436
providing for an automated counting of the ballots in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
automated counting is mandatory and could not be substituted by a manual counting. Where the
machines are allegedly defective, the only remedy provided for by law is to replace the machine. Manual
counting is prohibited by law;
 2. There are strong indications that in the municipality of Pata the ballots of the said municipality were
rejected by the counting machine because the ballots were tampered and/or the texture of the ballots
fed to the counting machine are not the official ballots of the Comelec;

3. The automated counting machines of the Comelec have been designed in such a way that only genuine
official ballots could be read and counted by the machine;

4. The counting machines in the other municipalities are in order. In fact, the automated counting has
already started. The automated counting in the municipalities of Lugus and Panglima Tahil has been
completed. There is no legal basis for the "parallel manual counting" ordained in the disputed minute
resolution.

Nonetheless, COMELEC started the manual count on the same date, May 18, 1998.

On May 25, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. He contended that: (a) COMELEC issued Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1747, 98-1750, and 98-1798 without prior
notice and hearing to him; (b) the order for manual counting violated R.A. No. 8436; (c) manual counting gave
"opportunity to the following election cheatings," namely:

(a) The counting by human hands of the tampered, fake and counterfeit ballots which the counting
machines have been programmed to reject (Section 7, 8 & 9 of Rep. Act 8436).

(b) The opportunity to substitute the ballots all stored at the PICC. In fact, no less than the head of the
COMELEC Task Force of Sulu, Atty. Jose M. Tolentino, Jr. who recommended to the COMELEC the
anomalous manual counting, had approached the watchers of petitioners to allow the retrival of the
ballots, saying "tayo, tayo lang mga watchers, pag-usapan natin," clearly indicating overtures of possible
bribery of the watchers of petitioner (ANNEX E).

(c) With the creation by the COMELEC of only 22 Boards of Election Inspectors to manually count the
1,194 precincts, the manipulators are given sufficient time to change and tamper the ballots to be
manually counted.

(d) There is the opportunity of delaying the proclamation of the winning candidates through the usually
dilatory moves in a pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and certificates of canvass are
already human (sic) made. In the automated counting there is no room for any dilatory pre-proclamation
controversy because the returns and the MBC and PBC certificates of canvass are machine made and
immediate proclamation is ordained thereafter.

Petitioner then prayed:

WHEREFORE, it is most especially prayed of the Honorable Court that:

1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the COMELEC from
conducting a manual counting of the ballots of the 1,194 precincts of the 18 municipalities of the
Province of Sulu but instead proceed with the automated counting of the ballots, [preparation of the
election returns and MBC, PBC certificates of canvass and proclaim the winning candidates on the basis of
the automated counting and consolidation of results;

2. this petition be given due course and the respondents be required to answer;

3. after due hearing, the questioned COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolutions of May 12, 13, 15, and 17,
1998 be all declared null and void ab initio for having been issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and for being in violation of due process of law;

4. the winning candidates of the Province of Sulu be proclaimed on the basis of the results of the
automated counting, automated election returns, automated MBC and PBC certificates of canvass;

x x x           x x x          x x x
On June 8, 1998, private respondents Tan was proclaimed governor-elect of Sulu on the basis of the manual
count. 14 Private respondents garnered 43,573 votes. Petitioner was third with 35,452 votes or a difference of 8,121 votes.

On June 23, 1998, this Court required the respondents to file their Comment to the petition and directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo  prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition." 15 The vice-governor elect was allowed to
temporarily discharge the powers and functions of governor.

On August 20, 1998, Yusop Jikiri, the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLF candidate for governor filed a motion for intervention and
a Memorandum in Intervention. 16 The result of the manual count showed he received 38,993 votes and placed second.
Similarly, he alleged denial of due process, lack of factual basis of the COMELEC resolutions and illegality of manual count
in light of R.A. No. 8436. The Court noted his intervention. 17 A similar petition for intervention filed by Abdulwahid
Sahidulla, a candidate for vice-governor, on October 7, 1998 was denied as it was filed too late.

In due time, the parties filed their respective Comments. On September 25, 1998, the Court heard the parties in oral
argument 18 which was followed by the submission of their written memoranda.

The issues for resolution are the following:

1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.

2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count.

2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?

2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?

2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the
COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?

3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it
is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.

We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.

First. We hold that certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Section 7, Article IX (A) of the 1987 Constitution states
that "unless provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." We have
interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the powers. 19 Contrariwise, administrative orders
of the COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit subjects of a petition for certiorari. The main issue in the case at bar is
whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered a manual count of the 1998 Sulu local elections. A
resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power
of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election . . .." The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered
with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the
intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.

Second. The big issue, one of first impression, is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it ordered a manual count in light of R.A. No. 8436. The post election realities on ground will
show that the order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.

a. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots
in the municipality of Pata. A mayoralty candidate, Mr. Anton Burahan, obtained zero
votes despite the representations of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors
and others that they voted for him. Another candidate garnered 100% of the votes.
 b. It is likewise conceded that the automated machines rejected and would not count
the local ballots in the municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo.

c. These flaws in the automated counting of local ballots in the municipalities of Pata,
Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo were carefully analyzed by the technical experts of
COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines. All of them found nothing wrong
the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by he
National Printing Office. In the case of the of the municipality of Pata, it was discovered
that the ovals of the local ballots were misaligned and could not be read correctly by the
automated machines. In the case of the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal
and Jolo, it turned out that the local ballots contained the wrong sequence code. Each
municipality was assigned a sequence code as a security measure. Ballots with the
wrong sequence code were programmed to be rejected by the automated machines.

It is plain that to continue with the automated count in these five (5) municipalities would result in a grossly erroneous
count. It cannot also be gainsaid that the count in these five (5) municipalities will affect the local elections in Sulu. There
was no need for more sampling of locals ballots in these municipalities as they suffered from the same defects. All local
ballots in Pata with misaligned ovals will be erroneously read by the automated machines. Similarly, all local ballots in
Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo with wrong sequence codes are certain to be rejected by the automated machines.
There is no showing in the records that the local ballots in these five (5) municipalities are dissimilar which could justify
the call for their greater sampling.

Third. These failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent
elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in
the counting of votes. The evidence of this fragile peace and order cannot be downgraded. In his handwritten report to
the COMELEC dated May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Additional marines have been deployed at the SSC. The undersigned is not sure if it is merely intended to
tame a disorderly crowd inside and outside SSC, or a show of force.

It is submitted that since an error was discovered in a machine which is supposed to have an error rate of
1:1,000,000, not a few people would believe that this error in Pata would extend to the other
municipalities. Whether or not this is true, it would be more prudent to stay away from a lifeless thing
that has shown tension and anxiety among and between the voters of Sulu.

Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra, Task Force Head, ARMM in his May 13, 1998 Memorandum to the
COMELEC likewise stated:

xxx xxx xxx

While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security to our COMELEC officials, BEI's and other
deputies, the political tensions and imminent violence and bloodshed may not be prevented, as per
report received, the MNLF forces are readying their forces to surround the venue for automated counting
and canvassing in Sulu in order that automation process will continue.

Last but not the least, the military and the police authorities unanimously recommended manual counting to
preserve peace and order. Brig. Gen. Edgardo V. Espinosa, Commanding General, Marine Forces Southern
Philippines, Brig. Gen. Percival M. Subala, Commanding General, 3rd Marine Brigade, and Supt. Charlemagne S.
Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu PNP Command explained that it". . . will not only serve the interest of
majority of the political parties involved in the electoral process but also serve the interest of the military and
police forces in maintaining peace and order throughout the province of Sulu."

An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the
electorate. Its aftermath could have been a bloodbath. COMELEC avoided this imminent probality by ordering a manual
count of the votes. It would be the height of irony if the Court condemns COMELEC for aborting violence in the Sulu
elections.
Fourth. We also find that petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum
clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual in count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were
orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and
the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end. We
quote the Tolentino memorandum, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

On or about 6:00 a.m. of May 12, 1998, while automated counting of all the ballots for the province of
Sulu was being conducted at the counting center located at the Sulu State College, the COMELEC Sulu
Task Force Head (TF Head) proceeded to the room where the counting machine assigned to the
municipality of Pata was installed to verify the cause of the commotion therein.

During the interview conducted by the TF Head, the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
and watchers present in said room stated that the counting machine assigned to the municipality of Pata
did not reflect the true results of the voting thereat. The members of the BEI complained that their votes
were not reflected in the printout of the election returns since per election returns of their precincts, the
candidate they voted for obtained "zero". After verifying the printout of some election returns as against
the official ballots, the TF Head discovered that votes cast in favor of a mayoralty candidate were credited
in favor of his opponent.

In his attempt to remedy the situation, the TF Head suspended the counting of all ballots for said
municipality to enable COMELEC field technicians to determine the cause of the technical error, rectify
the same, and thereafter proceed with automated counting. In the meantime, the counting of the ballots
for the other municipalities proceeded under the automated system.

Technical experts of the supplier based in Manila were informed of the problem and after numerous
consultations through long distance calls, the technical experts concluded that the cause of the error was
in the manner the ballots for local positions were printed by the National Printing Office (NPO), namely,
that the ovals opposite the names of the candidates were not properly aligned. As regards the ballots for
national positions, no error was found.

Since the problem was not machine-related, it was obvious that the use of counting machines from other
municipalities to count the ballots of the municipality of Pata would still result in the same erroneous
count. Thus, it was found necessary to determine the extent of the error in the ballot printing process
before proceeding with the automated counting.

To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, the TF Head, on
or about 11:45 a.m. ordered the suspension of the counting of all ballots in the province to enable him to
call a meeting with the heads of the political parties which fielded candidates in the province, inform
them of the technical error, and find solutions to the problem.

On or about 12:30 p.m., the TF Head presided over a conference at Camp General Bautista (3rd Marine
Brigade) to discuss the process by which the will of the electorate could be determined. Present during
the meeting were:

1. Brig. Gen. Edgardo Espinoza

Marine Forces, Southern Philippines.

2. Brig. Gen. Percival Subala

3rd Marine Brigade

3. Provincial Dir. Charlemagne Alejandrino

Sulu PNP Command

4. Gubernatorial Candidate Tupay Loong

LAKAS-NUCD Loong Wing

5. Gubernatorial Candidate Abdusakur Tan

LAKAS-NUCD Tan Wing

6. Gubernatorial Candidate Yusop Jikiri

LAKAS-NUCD Tan Wing

7. Gubernatorial Candidate Kimar Tulawie

LAMMP

8. Congressional Candidate Bensaudi Tulawie

LAMMP

During said meeting, all of the above parties verbally advanced their respective positions. Those in favor
of a manual count were:

1. Brig. Gen. Edgardo Espinoza

2. Brig. Gen. Percival Subala

3. Provincial Dir. Charlemagne Alejandrino

4. Gubernatorial Candidate Abdusakur Tan

5. Gubernatorial Candidate Kimar Tulawie

6. Congressional Candidate Bensaudi Tulawie

and those in favor of an automated count were:

1. Gubernatorial Candidate Tupay Loong

2. Gubernatorial Candidate Yusop Jikiri

Said parties were then requested by the TF Head to submit their respective position papers so that the
same map be forwarded to the Commission en banc, together with the recommendations of the TF Head.

The TF Head returned to the counting center at the Sulu State College and called his technical staff to
determine the extent of the technical error and to enable him to submit the appropriate
recommendation to the Commission en banc.

Upon consultation with the technical staff, it was discovered that in the Municipality of Talipao, some of
the local ballots were rejected by the machine. Verification showed that while the ballots were genuine,
ballot paper bearing a wrong "sequence code" was used by the NPO during the printing process.

Briefly, the following is the manner by which a "sequence code" determined genuineness of a ballot. A
municipality is assigned a specific (except for Jolo, which assigned two (2) machines, and sharing of one
(1) machine by two (2) municipalities, namely, H.P. Tahil and Maimbung, Apandami and K. Caluang, Pata
and Tongkil and Panamao and Lugus). A machine is then assigned a specific "sequence code" as one of
the security features to detect whether the ballots passing through it are genuine. Since a counting
machine is programmed to read the specific "sequence code" assigned to it, ballots which bear a
"sequence code" assigned to another machine/municipality, even if said ballots were genuine will be
rejected by the machine.

Other municipalities, such as Siasi, Indanan, Tapul and Jolo also had the same problem of rejected ballots.
However, since the operators were not aware that one of the reasons for rejection of ballots is the use of
wrong "sequence code", they failed to determine whether the cause for rejection of ballots for said
municipalities was the same as that for the municipality of Talipao.

In the case of "misaligned ovals", the counting machine will not reject the ballot because all the security
features, such as "sequence code", are present in the ballot, however, since the oval is misaligned or not
placed in its proper position, the machine will credit the shaded oval for the position where the machine
is programmed to "read" the oval. Thus, instead of rejecting the ballot, the machine will credit the votes
of a candidate in favor of his opponent, or in the adjacent space where the oval should be properly
placed.

It could not be determined if the other municipalities also had the same technical error in their official
ballots since the "misaligned ovals" were discovered only after members of the Board of Election
Inspectors of the Municipality of Pata complained that their votes were not reflected in the printout of
the election results.

As the extent or coverage of the technical errors could not be determined, the TF Head, upon
consultation with his technical staff, was of the belief that it would be more prudent to count the ballots
manually than to proceed with an automated system which will result in an erroneous count.

The TF Head thus ordered the indefinite suspension of counting of ballots until such time as the
Commission shall have resolved the petition/position papers to be submitted by the parties. The TF Head
and his staff returned to Camp General Bautista to await the submission of the position papers of the
parties concerned.

Upon receipt of the position papers of the parties, the TF Head faxed the same in the evening of May 12,
1998, together with his handwritten recommendation to proceed with a manual count. Attached are
copies of the recommendations of the TF Head (Annex "1"), and the position papers of the Philippine
Marines and Philippine National Police (Annex "2"), LAKAS-NUCD Tan Wing Annex (Annex "3"), Lakas-
NUCD Loong Wing (Annex "4"), LAKAS-NUCD-MNLF Wing (Annex "5") and LAMMP (Annex "6"). Said
recommendations and position papers were the bases for the promulgation of COMELEC Minute
Resolution No. 98-1750 dated May 13, 1998 (Annex "7"), directing, among other things, that the ballots
and counting machines be transported by C130 to Manila for both automated and manual operations.

Minute Resolution No. 98-1750 was received by the TF Head through fax on or about 5:30 in the evening
of May 13, 1998. Copies were then served through personal delivery to the heads of the political parties,
with notice to them that another conference will be conducted at the 3rd Marine Brigade on May 14,
1998 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, this time, with Lt. General Joselin Nazareno, then AFP Commander,
Southern Command. Attached is a copy of said notice (Annex "8") bearing the signatures of candidates
Tan (Annex "8-A") and Loong (Annex "8-B") and the representatives of candidates Tulawie (Annex "8-C")
and Jikiri (Annex "8-D").

On May 14, 1998, the TF Head presided over said conference in the presence of the heads of the political
parties of Sulu, together with their counsel, including Lt. Gen. Nazareno, Brig. Gen. Subala,
representatives of the NAMFREL, media and the public.

After hearing the sides of all parties concerned, including that of NAMFREL, the procedure by which the
ballots and counting machines were to be transported to Manila was finalized, with each political party
authorized to send at least one (1) escort/watcher for every municipality to accompany the ballot boxes
and counting machines from the counting center at the Sulu State College to the Sulu Airport to the PICC,
where the COMELEC was then conducting its Senatariol Canvass. There being four parties, a total of
seventy-two (72) escorts/watchers accompanied the ballots and counting machines.
 Two C130s left Sulu on May 15, 1998 to transport all the ballot boxes and counting machines,
accompanied by all the authorized escorts. Said ballots boxes reached the PICC on the same day, with all
escorts/watchers allowed to station themselves at the ballot box storage area. On May 17, 1998, another
C130 left Sulu to ferry the members of the board of canvassers.

Fifth. The evidence is clear that the integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were transferred from Sulu to
Manila and when they were manually counted.

A shown by the Tolentino memorandum, representatives of the political parties escorted the transfer of ballots from Sulu
to PICC. Indeed, in his May 14, 1992 letter to Atty. Tolentino, Jr., petitioner Tupay Loong himself submitted the names of
his representative who would company the ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia, viz: 20

Dear Atty. Tolentino:

Submitted herewith are the names of escort(s) to accompany the ballot boxes and other election
pharaphernalia to be transported to COMELEC, Manila, to wit:

1. Jolo — Joseph Lu

2. Patikul — Fathie B. Loong

3. Indanan — Dixon Jadi

4. Siasi — Jamal Ismael

5. K. Kaluang — Enjimar Abam

6. Pata — Marvin Hassan

7. Parang — Siyang Loong

8. Pangutaran — Hji. Nasser Loong

9. Marunggas — Taib Mangkabong

10. Luuk — Jun Arbison

11. Pandami — Orkan Osman

12. Tongkil — Usman Sahidulla

13. Tapul — Alphawanis Tupay

14. Lugus — Patta Alih

15. Maimbong — Mike Bangahan

16. P. Estino — Yasir Ibba

17. Panamso — Hamba Loong

18. Talipao — Ismael Sali

Hoping for your kind and (sic) consideration for approval on this matter.

Thank you.
 Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Tupay T. Loong

(sgd.) Asani S. Tammang

The ballot boxes were consistently under the watchful eyes of the parties representatives. They were placed in an open
space at the PICC. The watchers stationed themselves some five (5) meters away form the ballot boxes. They watched 24
hours a day and slept at the PICC. 21

The parties' watchers again accompanied the transfer of the ballot boxes from PICC to the public schools of Pasay City
where the ballots were counted. After the counting, they once more escorted the return of the ballot boxes to 
PICC. 22

In fine, petitioner's charge that the ballots could have been tampered with before the manual counting is totally
unfounded.

Sixth. The evidence also reveals that the result of the manual count is reliable.

It bears stressing that the ballots used in the case at bar were specially made to suit an automated election. The ballots
were uncomplicated. They had fairly large ovals opposite the names of candidates. A voter needed only to check the oval
opposite the name of his candidate. When the COMELEC ordered a manual count of the votes, it issued special rules as
the counting involved a different kind of ballot, albeit, more simple ballots. The Omnibus Election Code rules on
appreciation of ballots cannot apply for they only apply to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the
ballots. The rules were spelled out in Minute Resolution 98-1798, viz: 23

In the matter of the Memorandum dated 17 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra,
reprocedure of the counting of votes for Sulu for the convening of the Board of Election Inspectors, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and the Provincial Board on May 18, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC).

RESOLVED to approve the following procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the
PICC:

I. Common Provisions:

1. Open the ballot box, retrieve the Minutes of Voting and the
uncounted ballots or the envelope containing the counted ballots as
the case may be;

2. Segregate the national ballots from the local ballots;

3. Count the number of pieces of both the national and local ballots and
compare the same with the number of votes who actually voted as
stated in the Minutes of Voting:

If there is no Minutes of Voting, refer to the Voting Records at the back

of the VRRs to determine the number of voters who actually voted.

If there are more ballots than the number of voters who actually voted,
the poll clerk shall draw out as many local and national ballots as may
be equal to the excess and place them in the envelope for excess
ballots.

II. Counting of Votes

A. National Ballots:
 1. If the national ballots have already been counted, return the same
inside the envelope for counted ballots, reseal and place the envelope
inside the ballot box;

2. If the national ballots have not yet been counted, place them inside
an envelope and give the envelope through a liaison officer to the
machine operator concerned for counting and printing of the election
returns;

3. The machine operator shall affix his signature and thumbmark

thereon, and return the same to the members of the BEI concerned for
their signatures and thumbmarks;

4. The said returns shall then be placed in corresponding envelopes for

distribution;

B. Local Ballots:

1. Group the local ballots in piles of fifty (50);

2. The Chairman shall read the votes while the poll clerk and the third
member shall simultaneously accomplish the election returns and the
tally board respectively.

If the voters shaded more ovals than the number of positions to be

voted for, no vote shall be counted in favor of any candidate.

3. After all the local ballots shall have been manually counted, the same
shall be given to the machine operator concerned for counting by the
scanning machine. The machine operator shall then save the results in a
diskette and print out the election returns for COMELEC reference.

4. The BEI shall accomplish the certification portion of the election

returns and announce the results;

5. Place the election returns in their respective envelopes and distribute

them accordingly;

6. Return all pertinent election documents and paraphernalia inside the

ballot box.

III. Consolidation of Results

A. National Ballots

1. The results of the counting for the national ballots for each
municipality shall be consolidated by using the ERs of the automated
election system;

2. After the consolidation, the Machine Operator shall print the

certificate of canvass by municipality and statement of votes by
precinct;

3. To consolidate the provincial results, the MO shall load all the

diskettes used in the scanner to the ERs;

4. The MO shall print the provincial certificate of canvass and the SOV
by municipality;
 5. In case there is system failure in the counting and/or consolidation of
the results, the POBC/MOBC shall revert to manual consolidation.

B. Local Ballots

1. The consolidation of votes shall be done manually by the

Provincial/Municipal Board of Canvassers;

2. The proclamation of winning candidates shall be based manual

consolidation.

RESOLVED, moreover that the pertinent provisions of COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2971
and 3030 shall apply.

Let the Executive Director implement this resolution.

As aforestated, five (5) Special Boards were initially created under Atty. Tolentino, Jr. to undertake the manual
counting, 24 viz:

a) Atty. Mamasapunod M. Aguam

Ms. G1oria Fernandez

Ms. Esperanza Nicolas

b) Director Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas

Ms. Celia Romero

Ms. Rebecca Macaraya

c) Atty. Zenaida S. Soriano

Ms. Jocelyn Guiang

Ma. Jocelyn Tan

d) Atty. Erlinda C. Echavia

Ms. Teresa A. Torralba

Ms. Ma. Carmen Llamas

e) Director Estrella P. de Mesa

Ms. Teresita Velasco

Ms. Nelly Jaena

Later, the COMELEC utilized the services of 600 public school teachers from Pasay City to do the manual counting.
Five (5) elementary schools served as the venues of the counting, viz: 25

1. Gotamco Elementary School, Gotamco Street, Pasay City — for the

municipalities of Indanan, Pangutaran, Panglima Tahil, Maimbung;

2. Zamora Elementary School, Zamora Street, Pasay City — for the

municipalities of Jolo, Talipao, Panglima Estino, and Tapul;
 3. Epifanio Elementary School, Tramo Street, Pasay City — for the
municipalities of Parang, Lugus, Panamao;

4. Burgos Elementary School, Burgos Street, Pasay City — for the

municipalities of Luuk and Tongkil;

5. Palma Elementary School — for the municipalities of Siasi and

Kalingalang Caluang.

From beginning to end, the manual counting was done with the watchers of the parties concerned in attendance.
Thereafter, the certificates of canvass were prepared and signed by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers composed of
the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Secretary. They were also signed by the parties' watchers. 26

The correctness of the manual count cannot therefore be doubted. There was no need for an expert to count the votes.
The naked eye could see the checkmarks opposite the big ovals. Indeed, nobody complained that the votes could not be
read and counted. The COMELEC representatives had no difficulty counting the votes. The 600 public school teachers of
Pasay City had no difficulty. The watchers of the parties had no difficulty. Petitioner did not object to the rules on manual
count on the ground that the ballots cannot be manually counted. Indeed, in his original Petition, petitioner did not
complain that the local ballots could not be counted by a layman. Neither did the intervenor complain in his petition for
intervention. The allegation that it will take a trained eye to read the ballots is more imagined than real.

This is not all. As private respondent Tan alleged, the manual count could not have been manipulated in his favor because
the results shows that most of his political opponents won. Thus, "the official results show that the two congressional
seats in Sulu were won by Congressman Hussin Amin of the LAKAS-MNLF Wing for the 1st District and Congressman Asani
Tammang of the LAKAS-Loong Wing for the 2nd District. In the provincial level, of the eight (8) seats for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, two (2) were won by the camp of respondent Tan; three (3) by the camp of petitioner Loong; two (2) by the
MNLF; and one (1) by LAMMP. In the mayoral race, seven (7) out of eighteen (18) victorious municipal mayors were
identified with respondent Tan; four (4) with petitioner Loong; three (3) with the MNLF; two (2) with LAMMP and one (1)
with REPORMA.27 There is logic to private respondent Tan's contention that if the manual count was tampered, his
candidates would not have miserably lost.1âwphi1.nêt

Seventh. We further hold that petitioner cannot insist on automated counting under R.A. No. 8436 after the machines
misread or rejected the local ballots in five (5) municipalities in Sulu. Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436 provides:

Sec. 9. Systems Breakdown in the Counting Center. — In the event of a systems breakdown of all assigned
machines in the counting center, the Commission shall use any available machine or any component
thereof from another city/municipality upon approval of the Commission En Banc or any of its divisions.

The transfer of such machines or any component thereof shall be undertaken in the presence of
representatives of political parties and citizens' arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the
election officer of such transfer.

There is a systems breakdown in the counting center when the machine fails to read the ballots or fails to
store/save results or fails to print the results after it has read the ballots; or when the computer fails to
consolidate election results/reports or fails to print election results-reports after consolidation.

As the facts show, it was inutile for the COMELEC to use other machines to count the local votes in Sulu. The
errors in counting were due to the misprinting of ovals and the use of wrong sequence codes in the local ballots.
The errors were not machine-related. Needless to state, to grant petitioner's prayer to continue the machine
count of the local ballots will certainly result in an erroneous count and subvert the will of the electorate.

Eighth. In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not
machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the
conduct of our elections. Thus, we held in Sumulong v. COMELEC: 28
 Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions . . .. There are
no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative
to the conduct of election, . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on
Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not reasonable. It was the only way to count the
decisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is
that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away
the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting
when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

Ninth. Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices, candidates do not follow
the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten
to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be
debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances. Even more, we cannot order a special election unless demanded by exceptional circumstances. Thus, the
plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be
grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes,
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

To begin with, the plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court. Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166 which provides:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement, declaration of
failure of elections and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes
for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after casting of votes or on the day of the
election.

The grounds for failure of election —  force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes — clearly involve
questions of fact. It is for this reason that they can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice
and hearing to the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner never asked the COMELEC en banc to call for a special
election in Sulu. Even his original petition with this Court, petitioner did not pray for a special election. His plea for
a special election is a mere afterthought. Too late in the day and too unprocedural. Worse, the grounds for failure
of election are inexistent. The records show that the voters of Sulu were able to cast their votes freely and fairly.
Their votes were counted correctly, albeit manually. The people have spoken. Their sovereign will has to be
obeyed.

There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the
position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law.
The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties.
Thus, two (2) congressmen, a vice-governor, eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and eighteen (18)
mayors, numerous vice-mayors and municipal councilors are now serving in their official capacities. These officials were
proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of
office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be
treated unalikes.

A final word. Our decision merely reinforces our collective efforts to endow COMELEC with enough power to hold free,
honest, orderly and credible elections. A quick flashback of its history is necessary lest our efforts be lost in the labyrinth
of time.

The COMELEC was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August 22, 1940. The power to enforce our
election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised through the Department of Interior. According to Dean
Sinco, 29 the view ultimately that an independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the
enforcement of our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.

From a statutory creation, the COMELEC was transformed to a constitutional body by virtue of the 1940 amendments to
the 1935 Constitution which took effect on December 2, 1940. COMELEC was generously granted the power to "have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections . . .. 30

Then came the 1973 Constitution. It further broadened the powers of COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all election
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective provincial
and city officials. 31 In fine, the COMELEC was given judicial power aside from its traditional administrative and executive
functions.

The 1987 Constitution quickened this trend of strengthening the COMELEC. Today, COMELEC enforces and administers all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election contests
involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive original jurisdiction. All contests involving
elective municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate jurisdiction. 32

Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the COMELEC in order that it can more
effectively perform its duty of safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC, 33 we laid down this
liberal approach, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils
that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate,
must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In
the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to
promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections,
unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.

In Pacis vs. COMELEC, 34 we reiterated the guiding principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of
the remedy." The dissent, for all its depth, is out of step with this movement. It condemns COMELEC for exercising
its discretion to resort to manual count when this was its only viable alternative. It would set aside the results of
the manual count even when the results are free from fraud and irregularity. Worse, it would set aside the
judgment of the people electing the private respondent as Governor. Upholding the sovereignty of the people is
what democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not
enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do everything have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well
done is always better than well said.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being
no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-
1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.