Hyperbaric Evacuation

HYPERBARIC EVACUATION
Contingency Planning after 72-hours
Naam : Sven Willekes

Datum Eindwerk : 08-10-2009
Eindwerk opleiding : MVK – 18
Promotienummer :
Promotor : Dhr. E.Segers
INDEX
1 ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 4
2 PREAMBLE ........................................................................................................... 5
3 SUMMERY ............................................................................................................. 5
4 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 6
4.1 Saturation Diving .............................................................................................6

4.2 Decompression and breathing gas ..................................................................8
4.3 Hyperbaric Evacuation.....................................................................................9
4.3.1 Evacuation methods ............................................................................................. 9

4.3.2 Noorhoek Constructor – SPHL ........................................................................... 10
5 SCOPE .................................................................................................................12
5.1 Summery .......................................................................................................12

5.2 Completion of decompression .......................................................................12
5.3 Transport to decompression facility ...............................................................13
6 METHOD OF ASSESSING RISKS .......................................................................14
7 INITIAL RISK ASSESSMENT...............................................................................15
7.1 Transport .......................................................................................................15
7.1.1 Sailing to a port under own power ...................................................................... 15
7.2 Decompression..............................................................................................16
7.2.1 Decompression without contingency plans ........................................................ 16
7.3 Initial conclusion ............................................................................................16
8 COMPLETION OF DECOMPRESSION ................................................................17
8.1 Risk associated with methods of completing decompression .........................19

rd
8.1.1 Decompression in 3 party complex .................................................................. 19
8.1.2 Decompression by means of a LSP ................................................................... 20
8.2 Conclusion: Decompression ..........................................................................20
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9 METHODS OF TRANSPORT ...............................................................................21
9.1 Risks associated with methods of transport ...................................................21
9.1.1 Sailing the SPHL to a rig where a LSP is located .............................................. 22

rd
9.1.2 Towing SPHL by 3 party vessel ....................................................................... 23
rd
9.1.3 Transporting SPHL with 3 party vessel ............................................................ 24
rd
9.1.4 Connecting SPHL life support to a 3 party DSV............................................... 25
9.2 Conclusion: Transport....................................................................................26
10 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................27
11 ATTACHMENTS ...................................................................................................28
11.1 Noordhoek Constructor (under construction) .................................................29

11.2 Arbeidstijdenbesluit: artikel 5.14:8 .................................................................30
11.3 IMO – Hyperbaric evacuation systems ..........................................................31
11.4 SPHL .............................................................................................................43
11.5 External connection manifold .........................................................................44
11.6 Area of operations .........................................................................................45
Page 3 of 45
1 Abbreviations
DSV - Diving support vessel
HBL - Hyperbaric lifeboat
Heliox - Breathing mixture of helium and oxygen
HES - Hyperbaric evacuation system
HEU - Hyperbaric evacuation unit
IMCA - International Marine Contractors Association
IMO - International Maritime Organisation
LSP - Life support package
msw - Meters of seawater
NHC - Noordhoek Constructor
O2 - Oxygen
PPO2 - Partial pressure oxygen
SPHL - Self propelled hyperbaric lifeboat
Page 4 of 45
2 Preamble
This report is specifically written to assess the risks in relation to hyperbaric evacuation
and contingency planning of the new build vessel “Noordhoek Constructor” (NHC*).
Not all technical aspects of saturation diving or hyperbaric evacuation will be addressed,
only those in direct relation to the hyperbaric evacuation.
3 Summery
In saturation diving; procedures and materials (equipment) for the hyperbaric (under
pressure) evacuation of the divers in a saturation system is an absolute necessity.
Incomplete procedures and/or materials for the evacuation could result serious medical
consequences for the diving team.
This thesis will address the risks associated with the hyperbaric evacuation of the diving
team from the new build vessel “Noordhoek Constructor” and be limited to;
the reaching of a safe haven and safely completing decompression of the diving team.
As a result of the risk assessments, an advise concerning preferred methods of transport

and decompression will be formulated.
* See attachment-11.1: Noordhoek Constructor
Page 5 of 45
4 Introduction
Certain technical aspects of saturation diving and decompression are applicable to the
scope of this report and are described in the following chapters.
4.1 Saturation Diving
Saturation diving is a diving technique that allows divers to stay at their working depth for
prolonged periods of time, thus increasing bottom times and the amount of work that can
be done in any certain period.
The maximum period for saturation diving is limited by Dutch (and various other national)
legislation* to 28 days, including decompression.
During these 28 days the divers will live in a chamber complex (see figure-1), at a
pressure equivalent to the depth of the worksite. Transport to the worksite is done by
means of a closed diving bell, thus ensuring that the divers do not undergo a change in
pressure during transit from the living chambers to the worksite and vice versa.
Figure.1 – schematic view of saturation diving system
* See attachment-11.2: Arbeidstijdenbesluit: artikel 5.14:8
Page 6 of 45
During any form of overpressure related work, the bodily tissues will start absorbing inert
gasses to the point of being saturated. In “normal” surface supplied diving techniques this
point of saturation is not reached and decompression of the diver will follow directly after
the dive. In these cases the decompression schedule is then directly related to the diving
depth and time. These decompression periods are limited to a couple of hours.
Once the bodily tissues are saturated with inert gasses, the time for decompression will
not increase with further exposure. Only the depth of the dive will now have an influence
on the decompression schedule and time. Decompression periods after a 200 meter
saturation dive may run for over eight days, this is to a small extent dependent on the
diving tables used.
Page 7 of 45
4.2 Decompression and breathing gas
The breathing gas used during saturation diving on board the NHC will be a mixture of
helium and oxygen. The concentrations of the mix are depth dependent;
The diving system as will be installed on the NHC is a 200 msw rated system, this will
relate in a maximum saturation pressure of 20.11 barg.
P=ρ*g*h
P= 1.025 * 0.981 * 200
P = 20.11 barg
where,
 P is the hydrostatic pressure
 ρ is the liquid density
 g is gravitational acceleration
 h is the height of liquid above
The human body requires a partial oxygen pressure (PPO2).
This partial pressure is related to the oxygen percentage of a gas mixture at any certain
pressure, at atmospheric conditions the PPO2 is approximately 210 mbar
(21% O2 @ 1 bar).
PPO2 = % O2 * Atm.press
100
For medical treatment cases this partial pressure may be increased to a pressure of
several bars. Under normal saturation conditions the PPO2 will be maintained at an
average of 500 mbar, higher concentrations of oxygen for prolonged periods of time may
lead to “chronic oxygen poisoning”, which may result in reduced vital capacity and great
discomfort for the divers.
A PPO2 of 500 mbars during saturation, would result in a gas mixture of 2.48% O2 and
97.52% Helium at 200msw.
During decompression the oxygen content of the mixture will gradually be increased while
maintaining a PPO2 of 500 mbars, towards the end of the decompression the PPO2 will be
decreased to a level corresponding to normal atmospheric conditions.
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4.3 Hyperbaric Evacuation
Due to the prolonged periods necessary to safely decompress the divers after a saturation
dive, it is required by international law* the the saturation system is equipped with a HES
(hyperbaric evacuation system) available for the safe evacuation of the divers from the
platform or vessel they are on in the case of an emergency.
"Hyperbaric evacuation system" means the whole plant and equipment necessary for the
evacuation of divers in saturation from a surface compression chamber to a place where
decompression can be carried out. The main components of a hyperbaric evacuation
system include the hyperbaric evacuation unit, handling system and life-support system.
The hyperbaric evacuation units (HEU) should have the capacity to maintain the life
support of the full diving team for a minimum of 72 hours.
4.3.1 Evacuation methods
There are various evacuation methods stated in the “IMO Hyperbaric evacuation systems”
as described below.
1. hyperbaric self-propelled lifeboats;

2. towable hyperbaric evacuation units (HEU);
3. hyperbaric evacuation units (HEU) which may or may not be towable suitable for
offloading on to an attendant vessel;
4. transfer of the diving bell to another facility;
5. transfer of the divers from one diving bell to another when in the water and under
pressure;
6. negatively buoyant unit with inherent reserves of buoyancy, stability and life
support capable of returning to the surface to await independent recovery.
For the scope of this report I will only be looking at the so called SPHL (Self propelled
hyperbaric lifeboat). This is the evacuation system that will be installed on the “Noordhoek
Constructor”, for which contingency plans must be set up prior to first operation.
The bases of this system is a fully enclosed lifeboat equipped with a compression
chamber and life-support systems to safely maintain the lives of the full diving team (12-
man) for a minimum of 72 hours.
Decompression with the means available on the SPHL is not a desirable option; the life-
support systems are specifically designed to maintain pressure, breathing gas make-up
and atmospheric conditions within acceptable margins for the mentioned 72 hours.
The on-board systems do not have the storage capacity to facilitate the O2% increase
needed during the decompression schedule.
Any form of decompression will be dependent on external systems.
* see attachment-11.3: IMO Hyperbaric evacuation systems
Page 9 of 45
4.3.2 Noorhoek Constructor – SPHL
(See attachment-11.4: SPHL)
The Self propelled hyperbaric lifeboat to be installed on the NHC will be built and
designed to accommodate twelve divers and the crew needed to sail the boat and operate
the diver’s life support systems.
Figure.2 - Self propelled hyperbaric lifeboat
Dimensions;
 10.50 * 3.30 * 1.28 mtr.

 Total estimated weight including 12 divers and 4 crew: 18 Tonnes
The systems in the SPHL are designed to maintain, within acceptable margins, the
compression cambers;
 Pressure
 Oxygen percentage
 CO2 percentage
 Temperature
 Humidity
The SPHL’s life support systems and power supply may be connected to an external life
support system by means of a junction box*.
The life lifeboat is designed to sail with a speed of 6 knots with deck-spray (deluge system
to protect the boat from external heat or fire) engaged, the fuel quantity is sufficient to
maintain full speed for 72 hrs.
* See attachment-11.5: External connection manifold
Page 10 of 45
A 75 mtr towing line is included with the lifeboat.
The navigational and communications equipment consists of;
 Marine band VHF

 SART (Search and rescue transponder)
 EPIRB (Emergency position indicating radio beacon)
 Magnetic compass
Without going into to much detail, the outfitting of navigational and communications
equipment means the following;
 VHF: radio communications with other vessels and/or aircraft to a line-of-site range
of about 10 nm (approx 20 km), based on the elevated level of a ships VHF
antenna.
 SART: An emergency transponding beacon that can be picked up by the 3 cm
radars of other vessels, to a line-of-site range of about 10 nm.
 EPIRB: An emergency beacon that transmits the lifeboats details to a satellite, the
lifeboats position can be determined by Doppler shift. The EPIRB also sends out a
121.5 MHz signal that can be picked up by aircraft, in the line-of-site range.
 Magnetic compass: determining the lifeboats heading based on the earths
magnetic field.
The navigational and communications equipment outfitting means that the lifeboat is
suited to sail an approximate course and await being found by other vessels and/or
aircraft.
Current International maritime search and rescue guidelines advise mariners to maintain
their position in case of evacuating the vessel and await being found by search and
rescue services.
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5 Scope
5.1 Summery
All aspects of the hyperbaric evacuation are in place to the point of releasing the SPHL
from the vessel.
From that point on the there are at this time no clear contingency plans. It is clear that the
SPHL including it’s crew and the divers in the chamber must reach a safe haven within the
stated 72 hours of life-support, where decompression can be completed.
This thesis will concentrate on the risks associated with the following two aspects of the
hyperbaric evacuation;
 Ensuring the divers can be decompressed in a controlled manner.

 Ensuring a safe haven is reached within the required 72 hours
The area of operations will be limited to the North- and Irish Sea; this will be the principle
area of operations* for the NHC.
The hyperbaric evacuation contingency plans will have to be re-evaluated if the NHC
starts operating in other parts of the world.
5.2 Completion of decompression
In order to safely decompress the divers in saturation, contingency plans must be created
to either connect the SPHL to a 3rd party saturation complex and transfer the divers to this
complex or to provide suitable equipment and breathing gas to decompress the divers
while still in the SPHL.
With the decompression there are certain issues to be taken into account;
 Availability of a third party decompression facility

 Possibilities to connect the SPHL to a 3rd party decompression facility
 Availability of suitable equipment to support the SPHL’s life support systems during
decompression
 Availability of sufficient and suitable breathing gas
 Comfort and wellbeing of the divers
 The possibility of having injured divers on board
* See attachment-11.6: Area of operations
Page 12 of 45
5.3 Transport to decompression facility
In order to ensure the safety of the divers and lifeboat crew, the lifeboat needs to reach a
safe haven where decompression can be completed within the 72 hrs of life support.
With the transport there certain issues to be taken into account;
 Maintaining life support during transit

 The wellbeing of crew and divers, due to weather and sea state
 Camber hygiene due to sea sickness
 The possibility of having injured divers on board
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6 Method of assessing risks
The “Fine & Kinney” calculation method will be used to assess the risks associated with
transport and decompression.
Risk (R) = Severity (S) * Frequency (F) * Probability (P)
S=Severity
1 Slight, minor injury
3 Serious, injury with lost time
7 Significant, permanent disability
15 Sever, one fatality
40 Disaster, several fatalities
F=Frequency
0.5 Very rarely
1 Rarely
2 Sometimes
3 Occasionally
6 Regularly
10 Permanently
P=Probability
0.1 Almost impossible
0.2 Most unlikely
0.5 Unlikely
1 Unlikely, but possible
3 Likely
6 Most likely
10 Almost certain
R=Risk
<21 Slight risk, acceptable
21-< 71 Attention needed
71- < 201 Action required
201- < 401 Direct action required
> 400 Not acceptable
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7 Initial Risk Assessment
The following risk assessment is based on the assumption that no contingency plans exit,
to safely transport the SPHL to a port and decompress the divers.
7.1 Transport
7.1.1 Sailing to a port under own power

Transit of lifeboat under own power to port, without assistance.
Risk
Death or injury due to failure of life support during transit, S F P R
excessive transit time. 40 10 6 1600
Risk
S F P R
Sickness and injury due to sea state.
3 6 10 180
Risk
S F P R
Sickness due to poor hygienic conditions in chamber.
7 10 3 210
Risk
Additional injury to previously injured divers, due to sea S F P R
state and absence of sufficient medical care. 15 6 1 90
Risk
Damage to SPHL or injury to divers and crew, during S F P R
lifting of SPHL from port to trailer. 40 1 0.2 8
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7.2 Decompression
7.2.1 Decompression without contingency plans

Risks in relation to decompression without existing contingency plans.
Risk
Death or injury due to (mechanical) failure of life support S F P R
during decompression 40 10 1 400
Risk
Death or injury due to lack of additional life support. Not S F P R
being available of suitable auxiliary life support equip. 15 10 6 600
Risk
Death or injury due to lack of additional breathing gas S F P R
needed for decompression 40 10 0.2 80
Risk
S F P R
Illness due to poor hygienic conditions on board
3 10 3 90
Risk
Additional injury to previously injured divers, due to lack S F P R
of proper medical care 15 10 1 150
7.3 Initial conclusion
Based on my own and other mariners experience, any lifeboat either SPHL or standard, is
not suited to sail long distances over sea. Any increase in sea state or current will greatly
decrease the sailing performance of the lifeboat, to the point of it only being able to
maintain its heading into the seas.
Although, in the case of an actual evacuation of the NHC it should be considered as an

option to let the lifeboat sail itself to a safe haven, especially if this haven is located in the
direct vicinity of the SPHL the chances if this being possible and safe are near to
negligible. This is based on the nominal meteorological conditions on the North Sea and
the navigational and communications equipment of the lifeboat.
Concerning the decompression, the SPHL in not designed as a decompression system.

This means that a safe decompression of the divers is dependent of outside assistance.
Relying on only the SPHL’s capabilities and gas storage is not a feasible possibility and
may result in disaster.
For both transport and decompression, contingency plans must be created.
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8 Completion of decompression
Safely completing decompression is dependent on several factors and may be

accomplished in two general methods:
 Connecting the SPHL’s life support systems to a so called “Life Support Package”
(LSP)
 Connecting the SPHL to a 3rd party saturation complex and transferring the divers
to this complex
A life support package is a system that can be connected to the SPHL by means of the
external connection manifold*.
The main goal of the LSP is to supplement the SPHL’s life support systems and provide
sufficient breathing gas to complete decompression. The LSP will be used as a shore (or
rig) based reception for the SPHL.
The Noordhoek SPHL has all systems on board to maintain life support for a period of 72
hrs. These systems are dependent on the following media:
 (sea)Water for engine (power supply) cooling and for maintaining camber
temperature at expectable levels
 Fuel
 Heliox and oxygen
The above stated media, as a minimum should be taken into account with regards to the
LSP.
A full LSP for the Noordhoek SPHL may consist of the following systems:
 Hot water (maintaining chamber climate)

 Chilled water (maintaining chamber climate)
 A chamber motoring system (pressure, temperature, CO2 analyser, O2 analyser)
 Breathing gas makeup system
 Breathing gas
 Power supply
 CCTV, Radio and unscrambler (helium breathing)
 Appropriate connections
The LSP should be capable of supplementing the SPHL’s life support systems to level of
ensuring that decompression can be completed safely.
Using a LSP to decompress the divers in saturation would mean the divers are confined to
the SPHL for the duration of the decompression. The risks associated with this will be
evaluated in the next chapter.
* See attachment-11.5: External connection manifold
Page 17 of 45
There are two possibilities within the NHC’s area of operations to connect the SPHL to a
3rd party fixed saturation complex:
 The NHC (National Hyperbaric Center) Aberdeen, Scotland

 NUI (Norwegean underwater intervention) Bergen, Norway
Figure.3 – Diver transfer to hyperbaric complex in Bergen
Both complexes have the capability to connect the SPHL to the system and transfer the
divers to their living quarters to complete decompression and/or receive medical attention.
The services provided by the hyperbaric centres include transport from the port to the
hyperbaric reception facility.
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8.1 Risk associated with methods of completing decompression

8.1.1 Decompression in 3rd party complex
In order to complete decompression in a third party complex, certain arrangements should

be made with the concerned hyperbaric centres.
Both hyperbaric centres provide services in the reception of hyperbaric lifeboats. These
services are provided on a contract bases.
The possibility of connecting the SPHL to the hyperbaric centres complex must be
ensured prior to commencement of diving activities.
Risk Assessment:
Risk
during decompression 40 10 0.1 40
Risk
being available of suitable auxiliary life support equip. 15 10 0.1 15
Risk
Risk
S F P R
Illness due to poor hygienic conditions in complex
3 10 0.2 6
Risk
of proper medical care 15 10 0.1 15
Risk
Injury to divers, failure of connection between SPHL and S F P R
complex 40 1 0.1 4
Risk
Injury to divers during transfer from SPHL to complex S F P R
(tripping, falling) 3 1 1 3
Page 19 of 45
8.1.2 Decompression by means of a LSP
In order to make use of a LSP in case of a vessel evacuation, the equipment content of
the LSP should be determined and available prior to first saturation diving operations.
The LSP should be available at a suitable location (port or rig), this location should be
determined by means of a risk assessment before a diving project.
Risk Assessment:
Risk
during decompression 40 10 0.1 40
Risk
being available of suitable auxiliary life support equip. 15 10 0.2 30
Risk
Risk
S F P R
3 10 3 90
Risk
8.2 Conclusion: Decompression
Based on the above stated risk assessments, connecting the SPHL to a 3rd party
saturation complex is the preferred method of completing decompression of the diving
team.
Using a LSP to complete decompression is a good alternative, but does have clear
disadvantages in the area of diver wellbeing, hygiene and the lack of full medical
treatment capabilities.
Both methods of completing decompression require prior planning operationally and need
to be fully arranged prior to first diving operations.
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9 Methods of transport
There are a limited number of methods to transport the SPHL to a suitable location to
complete decompression;
1. Sailing the SPHL to a rig where a LSP is located

2. Towing the SPHL to a safe port by means of a 3rd party vessel
3. Lifting the SPHL to a 3rd party or other Noordhoek vessel in order to transit to a
safe port
4. Lifting the SPHL to a 3rd party saturation-DSV in order to connect the SPHL to the
DSV’s life support systems
9.1 Risks associated with methods of transport
One of the major issues in relation to transporting the SPHL to a decompression facility is
maintaining life support during transit. The SPHL it’s self is very well capable of doing this,
however these systems are dependent on the SPHL being in the water. As soon as the
SPHL is lifted clear of the water provisions should be in place to provide the required
cooling water to maintain the on board life support systems.
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9.1.1 Sailing the SPHL to a rig where a LSP is located
In order to complete decompression on board a rig located in the direct vicinity of the
project, certain arrangements should be made prior to commencement of the project:
 Ensuring a LSP is present on the rig during saturation period

 Ensuring the rig has sufficient space to accommodate the SPHL and the LSP
 Obtaining permission from rig owner to decompress on board of the rig in case of
an emergency, possible restrictions may be present due to the rigs safety case.
 Ensuring the rigs crane is capable of lifting the SPHL to deck
Risk Assessment:
Risk
Injury to lifeboat crew due to averse weather conditions S F P R
when connecting SPHL to crane 15 6 1 90
Risk
Failure of lifting equipment (crane, wires, lifting points) S F P R
during lift to deck 40 3 0.5 60
Risk
S F P R
3 10 3 90
Risk
Risk
S F P R
Rig emergencies during decompression period
40 10 0.2 80
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9.1.2 Towing SPHL by 3rd party vessel
Towing of the SPHL is a possibility, a 3rd party or other Noordhoek vessel could possibly
tow the SPHL to a safe port where either the SPHL can be connected to a LSP or to a
saturation complex where the divers can transfer to the complex.
Risk Assessment:
Risk
Damage to SPHL while towing in averse weather S F P R
conditions, resulting in excessive transport time 40 10 1 400
Risk
excessive transit time. 40 10 0.5 200
Risk
S F P R
3 6 10 180
Risk
S F P R
3 10 3 90
Risk
state and absence of sufficient medical care. 15 6 3 270
Risk
Damage to SPHL or injury to divers and crew, during S F P R
lifting of SPHL from port to trailer. 15 1 0.2 3
Page 23 of 45
9.1.3 Transporting SPHL with 3rd party vessel
Lifting the SPHL to the deck of 3rd party or other Noordhoek vessel could provide the
SPHL with a safe and fast means of transport. However, certain arrangements should be
made prior to commencement of the project:
 Ensuring availability of a vessel capable of lifting the SPHL to deck

 Ensuring availability of a vessel capable supporting the SPHL on deck, either in a
cradle or by other means
 Ensuring availability of a vessel capable supporting the SPHL’s life support
systems. This may also be accomplished by means of a LSP
Risk Assessment:
Risk
Risk
excessive transit time. 40 10 0.2 80
Risk
S F P R
3 6 1 18
Risk
S F P R
3 10 3 90
Risk
state and absence of sufficient medical care. 15 10 0.5 75
Risk
Failure of life support during transit onboard vessel, the S F P R
life support system requires (cooling)water. 3 10 0.5 15
Page 24 of 45
9.1.4 Connecting SPHL life support to a 3rd party DSV
In the event of an actual evacuation of the NHC, contact should be sought with college
diving companies. If a 3rd party DSV is in the direct vicinity of the vessel abandonment,
placing the SPHL on board that vessel could be a fast and effective method to start a safe
decompression.
A 3rd party DSV would function as a LSP for the SPHL, connecting to SPHL’s systems to
the DSV’s systems.
The possibility of transferring the divers to the saturation complex on board the DSV must
be considered as negligible.
Apart from incompatibility between connection flanges, a DSV at sea will most likely have
its saturation system occupied by a diving team. Although decompression of the on-board
diving team could be started immediately, this would still take several days.
In addition to functioning as a LSP, another DSV would also house a large amount of
experience related to diving and SPHL systems.
Risk Assessment:
Risk
Risk
excessive transit time before boarding the DSV 40 10 0.2 80
Risk
S F P R
3 6 1 18
Risk
S F P R
3 10 3 90
Risk
state and absence of sufficient medical care. 15 10 0.2 30
Risk
Failure of life support during transit onboard vessel, the S F P R
life support system requires (cooling)water. 3 10 0.5 15
Risk
Incompatibility of life support system connections, S F P R
resulting in loss of life support 40 10 0.2 80
Page 25 of 45
9.2 Conclusion: Transport
There exists no single preferred method of transporting the SPHL to a suitable

decompression facility.
What is clear from the risk assessments is that there are some issues that must be taken
into account when a transport of the SPHL is being planned:
 The time needed to reach decompression facility must be reduced to a minimum.

This would make a LSP on a rig the preferred option; however the NHC will not
necessarily be operation in the vicinity of a rig.
 Maintaining the wellbeing and health of the divers and crew. Transporting the
SPHL by means of a vessel would greatly decrease the discomfort of the crew in
comparison to the SPHL being towed or sailing itself.
 In all cases where the SPHL will become dependent on 3rd party systems (cooling
water, heating, Heliox, etc.) when lifted clear of the water, the connection
compatibilities needs to be assured.
Prior to any project the options for transporting the SPHL to a decompression facility need
to be risk assessed, taking into account the above stated assessments. The variables in
projects, vessel location and meteorological conditions are to great to generically
determine the best method of transport.
Page 26 of 45
10 Conclusion
There is not one single preferred method of transporting the SPHL and decompressing
the divers. In an actual emergency evacuation of the NHC, transport and decompression
methods will need to be re evaluated. This evaluation will for a large part have to be
determined on a project bases, and must include but not be limited to:
 Formal Risk assessment

 Proposed method transport
 Proposed method of decompression
 Location of LSP
 Emergency contact list
 Clear instructions to the SPHL crew
These issues need to be planed prior to commencement of project operations, ensuring

the SPHL crew are in the possession of an initial contingency plan after leaving the
vessel. The “Noordhoek Emergency Response Team” will need to evaluate possible safer
alternatives to the pre planned transport and decompression methods, depending on
actual meteorological conditions.
There are however various issues which Noordhoek can resolve prior to first operations
and are therefore advised:
 The acquisition of a LSP

 Contracting one or both of the HBL reception centres and ensuring all systems and
connections are compatible.
 Formulating generic emergency plans
 Ensuring all external SPHL connections are known and documented
Page 27 of 45
11 Attachments
11.1 - Noordhoek Constructor (Under construction)
11.2 - Arbeidstijdenbesluit: artikel 5.14:8
11.3 - IMO – Hyperbaric Evacuation systems
11.4 - SPHL
11.5 - External connection Manifold
11.6 - Area of operations
Page 28 of 45
11.1 Noordhoek Constructor (under construction)
Page 29 of 45
11.2 Arbeidstijdenbesluit: artikel 5.14:8
Saturatieduiken
Artikel 5.14:8
1. Dit artikel is uitsluitend van toepassing op arbeid die bestaat uit saturatieduiken en de direct
daarmee
samenhangende werkzaamheden, verricht ten behoeve van een mijnbouwinstallatie.
2. De artikelen 5:3, tweede lid, 5:5, tweede lid, en 5:7 en 5:8 van de wet zijn niet van toepassing,
indien
dit artikel wordt toegepast.
3. De werkgever organiseert de arbeid zodanig, dat de werknemer:

a. gedurende ten hoogste 28 maal achtereen ten hoogste 11 uren per dienst onderscheidenlijk per
nachtdienst en in een periode van 16 aaneengesloten weken gemiddeld 40 uren per week arbeid
verricht;
b. na arbeid te hebben verricht in die dienst een onafgebroken rusttijd heeft van ten minste 12
uren,
en
c. tegenover iedere periode van 24 uren waarin arbeid wordt verricht na het beëindigen van die
arbeid direct aansluitend een onafgebroken rusttijd heeft van ten minste 24 uren elders.
4. Toepassing van dit artikel is uitsluitend mogelijk bij collectieve regeling. Elk beding waarbij wordt
afgeweken van de vorige zin dan wel het tweede of derde lid, is nietig.
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11.3 IMO – Hyperbaric evacuation systems
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11.4 SPHL
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11.5 External connection manifold
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11.6 Area of operations
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Hyperbaric Evacuation

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Hyperbaric Evacuation

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HYPERBARIC EVACUATION

Contingency Planning after 72-hours

Naam : Sven Willekes

4.1 Saturation Diving .............................................................................................6

4.3.1 Evacuation methods ............................................................................................. 9

5.1 Summery .......................................................................................................12

6 METHOD OF ASSESSING RISKS .......................................................................14

7 INITIAL RISK ASSESSMENT...............................................................................15

7.1 Transport .......................................................................................................15

7.1.1 Sailing to a port under own power ...................................................................... 15

7.2.1 Decompression without contingency plans ........................................................ 16

7.3 Initial conclusion ............................................................................................16

8 COMPLETION OF DECOMPRESSION ................................................................17

8.1 Risk associated with methods of completing decompression .........................19

8.2 Conclusion: Decompression ..........................................................................20

9 METHODS OF TRANSPORT ...............................................................................21

9.1 Risks associated with methods of transport ...................................................21

9.1.1 Sailing the SPHL to a rig where a LSP is located .............................................. 22

9.2 Conclusion: Transport....................................................................................26

11.1 Noordhoek Constructor (under construction) .................................................29

DSV - Diving support vessel

HBL - Hyperbaric lifeboat

Heliox - Breathing mixture of helium and oxygen

HES - Hyperbaric evacuation system

HEU - Hyperbaric evacuation unit

IMCA - International Marine Contractors Association

IMO - International Maritime Organisation

LSP - Life support package

msw - Meters of seawater

NHC - Noordhoek Constructor

PPO2 - Partial pressure oxygen

SPHL - Self propelled hyperbaric lifeboat

As a result of the risk assessments, an advise concerning preferred methods of transport

* See attachment-11.1: Noordhoek Constructor

4.1 Saturation Diving

Figure.1 – schematic view of saturation diving system

* See attachment-11.2: Arbeidstijdenbesluit: artikel 5.14:8

4.2 Decompression and breathing gas

The human body requires a partial oxygen pressure (PPO2).

4.3 Hyperbaric Evacuation

4.3.1 Evacuation methods

1. hyperbaric self-propelled lifeboats;

Any form of decompression will be dependent on external systems.

* see attachment-11.3: IMO Hyperbaric evacuation systems

4.3.2 Noorhoek Constructor – SPHL

(See attachment-11.4: SPHL)

Figure.2 - Self propelled hyperbaric lifeboat

 10.50 * 3.30 * 1.28 mtr.

* See attachment-11.5: External connection manifold

A 75 mtr towing line is included with the lifeboat.

The navigational and communications equipment consists of;

 Marine band VHF

 Ensuring the divers can be decompressed in a controlled manner.

5.2 Completion of decompression

 Availability of a third party decompression facility

* See attachment-11.6: Area of operations

5.3 Transport to decompression facility

With the transport there certain issues to be taken into account;

 Maintaining life support during transit

6 Method of assessing risks

Risk (R) = Severity (S) * Frequency (F) * Probability (P)

7 Initial Risk Assessment

7.1.1 Sailing to a port under own power

7.2.1 Decompression without contingency plans