301. CORDERO v. CABATUANDO
NPC
6 SCRA 418 [1962]
Manuel Cordero, a trial lawyer of the TENANCY
COUNSEL UNIT (TCU) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Vicente Salazar
who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana.
Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero as
counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act
No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines
indicates that representation by counsel of tenants who
cannot afford to pay should be done by the public
defenders of the Department of Labor. Judge Jose
Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero
appealed. During pendency of the appeal Republic Act No.
2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 1199, was passed. This law, particularly Sections
19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now
allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent
tenants and Secretary of Justice to mediate tenancy
disputes through a tenancy mediation division.
Respondent contended that the tenancy mediation
division was inexistence under the Republic Act no. 1199
which violates the provisions.
WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDMENT WAS VALID.
YES. The constitutional requirement is complied,
Agricultural Tenancy Act as the single general subject and
the amendatory provisions are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject.
MAINPOINT Every bill passed by the congress shall
embrace one subject. This is intended to prevent riders,
or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to ensure its
approval.
302. PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ (LONG CASE!)
235 SCRA 506 (1994)
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (PHILCONSA)
FILED a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the
disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress in pursuant
to Republic Act No. 3836 (AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION
(c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH. The inclusion
of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of
C.A. 186, as amended, will enable them to retire
voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of
twenty years as a Member of Congress. It is argued that
the provision for the retirement of the members and
certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of
the bill, in violation of section 26 (1) of Article VI of the
Constitution.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TITLE OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3836 IS GERMANE TO THE SUBJECT MATTER EXPRESSED
IN THE ACT
NO. The title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is
not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null
and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of
Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as
being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued was
made permanent. No costs.
MAINPOINT No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill.
303. ALALAYAN V.
24 SCRA 172 [1968]
Santiago Alalayan assailed that Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth
Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by
Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty
One) which amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National
Power Corporation) is a rider, because first, it was not
included in the title of the amending law nor was it
included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose
of RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR
hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not
germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3 OF RA 3043 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
RULING YES. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment to fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional which
can prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
MAINPOINT It is sufficient if the title serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it informs the
legislators of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation which can prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
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304. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY v. CTA
104 SCRA 710 [1981]
Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American
company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The
ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it
used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956,
Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof
provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions.
It was contended that the subject of RA 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the
Act deals with another subject which is the partial
exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial
exemption on which the Company based its claim for
refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid
Act.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISION ON SECTION 5
WHICH CREATES AN EXEMPTION IS ALIEN TO THE SUBJECT
OF THE LAW
NO. Clearly, the provision for exemptions comes
under the general subject of the law. Thus, the CTA out of
the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08
was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did
not allow the refund of the full because the ILC’s right to
claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those
paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29,
1963 had already prescribed.
MAINPOINT It is sufficient if the title serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it informs the
legislators of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation which can prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
305. TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
151 SCRA 208 [1987]
In 1985, Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need
to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects
to the movie industry. The increase of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the
movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if
videograms are to be taxed. In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed
the PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the
ground that section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30%
tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISION ON SECTION 10 IS
A RIDER
NO. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
MAINPOINT The Constitutional requirement that
“every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied
with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
306. PHIL. JUDGES ASSN v. PRADO
227 SCRA 703 [1993]
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular
No.92-28 implemented Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
(otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992).
Section 35 is a Repealing Clause of the Act.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry
and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
Petitioners submitted that Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354, the repealing clause which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, is not expressed in the title of
the law. The petitioners maintained that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and the Supreme Court
under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No.
4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violated Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution.
The petitioners also invoked Sec. 74 of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate
shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers. They stress that
Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between
both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have
been validly added as an amendment.
Whether or not the Sec. 35 of the R.A. No. 7354 is
unconstitutional because it is not expressed in the title of
the law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) of the
Constitution. NO.
Whether or not the second paragraph of Sec. 35
R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional because it did not pass
the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were in violation
of Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. NO.
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 (1) NO. Sec. 35 of the R.A. No. 7354 is NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court ruled that by virtue of its
nature as a repealing clause, it did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.
The Court held that there was sufficient
description of the subject of the law in its title, including
the repeal of franking privilege. The Court held: To require
every end and means necessary for the second
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to
be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable
but would actually render legislation impossible. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 279). As has been
correctly explained: the details of a legislative act need not
be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be
included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same
act the machinery by which acts is to enforced, to
prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove
obtacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the
title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725)
(2) NO. Sec. 35 of the R.A. No. 7354 is NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court held that both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certified that the
measure was duly enacted, that is, in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
The Court held that it is a matter of record that
the conference Committee Report on the bill in question
was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali
A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both
Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the
Court held that they may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have
to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the
final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court, as the Court held in the old
(but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where the Court
explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.
MAIN POINTS:
(1) Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution provides that
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Purposes:
(1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling"
legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the title gives no intimation, and which
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly
and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subject of legislation that is being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desire.
(2) Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readingson
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its members
three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
307. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630 [1994]
The petitioner filed a motion reiterating previous
claims that R.A. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law)
did not “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution. Although petitioner admitted that H.No.
11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it
passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to
the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complained that
the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S.No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.
Petitioner tolentino added that what the Senate
Committee should have done was to amend H.No. 11197
by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with
text of S.No. 1630.
Whether or not R.A. 7716 originated both in the
House of Congress and the Senate and that it is the
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product of two “half-baked bills because neither House Bill
No. 11197 nor Senate Bill No. 1630 was passed by both
Houses of Congress. YES.
The Court held that in several instances the
provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No.
11197. The very comparison of the provisions of H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the
basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing
differences between the two bills, at the same time
indicated that the provisions of the Senate Bill were
precisely intended to be amendments to the House Bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted
S.No. 1630. Because the Senate Bill was a mere
amendment of the House Bill, H. No. 11197 in its original
form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three
readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first
reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be
passed by the House of Representatives before the two
bills could be referred to Conference Committee.
MAIN POINT: Amendment of bills is required to
originate in the House by prescribing that the number of
House Bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause
must be preserved although the text of the Senate
amendment may be incorporated in place of the original
body of the bill.
308. TOBIAS v. ABALOS
239 SCRA 106 [1994]
R.A. 7675 (An Act Converting Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong) was signed into law by President
Ramos. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a
plebiscite was held for the conversion of the said city.
Petitioners contended that Art. VIII, Sec. 49 of R.A.
7675 is unconstitutional for being violative of “one
subject-one bill” rule of Art.VI, Sec. 26 (1) of the
Constitution. Petitioners alleged that the inclusion of the
assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized City;
and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners
contend that the second aforestated subject is not
germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the
said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law,
the “one subject-one bill” rule has not been complied
with.
Whether or not Art. VIII, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675 violated
the “one subject-one bill rule” of the Constitution.
NO. The Court held that contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of
R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
MAIN POINT: Art. VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution
should be given liberal construction of the “one title- one
subject” rule. It means that it should be given practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to
that general subject.
309. TATAD V. SEC. OF DOE
281 SCRA 330
G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FACTS: In March 1996, the Congress enacted R.A.
8180 (The Downstream Deregulation Act of 1996). The
petitioner seeks the annulment of Section 5(b) of R.A.
8180 on tariff differential provision. The petitioner
contends that the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b)
of R.A.8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the
deregulation of downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec.5(b) of R.A.8180 on tariff
differential violates the one title- one subject requirement
of the Constitution.
RULING: NO. Under Sec. 26 (1), Art. 26 of the
Constitution, every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. In the case at bar, the Court, as a policy, has
adopted the liberal construction of one title- one subject
rule. The Court held that Sec.5(b) providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of R.A. 8180. Hence,
Sec. 5(b) did not violate the one title- one subject
requirement of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT:A law having a single, general
subject indicated in its title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how adverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject.(Nachura reviewer pg 268)
RA 8180: Any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products
from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil or use the same for his own
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requirement," subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy.
310. CAWALING V. COMELEC
GR NO. 146319, OCTOBER 26, 2001
Note: This was erroneously indicated as “De Guzman”
v. COMELEC in the syllabus. Don’t fret. The citation is
the same.
FACTS: On August 16, 2000, former Pres. Estrada
signed into law RA 8806 (An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor).Petitioner contended that RA 8806
embraced two principal subjects which are: (1) the
creation of the City of Sorsogon,and (2) the abolition of
the municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title
of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the
creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claimed that no such
information had been providedon the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 8806 violates the “one
subject-one bill” rule under Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution.
RULING: NO. The Court held that contrary to
petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced
in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of
Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate
existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct
from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is
the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was
created. Hence, the title of the law, “An Act creating the
City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor”, cannot be said to exclude
the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities,
nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair
information on this consequence.
MAIN POINT: The “one title- one subject” rule does
not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, the Supreme Court had invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation”.
311. ABAKADA V. ERMITA
496 SCRA 1, SEPT. 1, 2005 & OCT. 18, 2005
FACTS: R.A. No. 9337 (E-VAT Law) is a
consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill
Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Thus, came
R.A. No. 9337. Before said law took effect, petitioners
ABAKADA GURO Party Listassailed the constitutionality
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,on the ground that it
violated the “no amendment rule” of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 9337 violates Art.
VI, Sec. 26 (2) of Constitution on the No-Amendment Rule.
RULING/Main point:No. Amendment Rule refers
only to the procedure to be followed by each house of
Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said
respective houses before said bill is transmitted to the
other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to
construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would
lead the other house of Congress would be deprived of its
constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution
cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have
been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
prohibited.
312. BANAT V. COMELEC
595 SCRA 477 (2009)
FACTS: Petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral
organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that
RA 9369(Election Automation Law) violated Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution. It alleged that thetitle of RA
9369 was misleading because it speaks of poll
automation but contains substantial provisions dealing
with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner
also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither
embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of
RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintained that the
title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics
which deal not only with the automation process but with
everything related to its purpose encouraging a
transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9639 violated Section 26(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution?
RULING/ Main Point: NO.
The requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The
title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
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act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise
nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
In the case at bar, the Court held that RA 9369 is an
amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act
No. 8436. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covered
the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP
881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related
election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner
dealt with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166
and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend
Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2)
Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.
Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and
BP 881, among others.
313. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR 196271, October 18, 2011
FACTS: On June 30,2011, RA 10153 (An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the
National and Local Elections and for other
purposes)resetting the next ARMM regular elections to
May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the countrywas enacted.
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of both bills
from HOR and Senate before the promulgation of RA
10153 for violation of the three-readings-on-separate-
days requirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153
violates Section 26(2),Art. VI of the Constitution.
RULING: No. The Court held that the records show
that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of the law synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the National and Local Elections. In the case of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court held that the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from hearing to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
MAIN POINT: Section 26(2), Art. VI of the
Constitution provides that before bills passed by either the
House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass
through three (3) readings on separate days. The
EXEMPTION is when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
314. ABAS KIDA V. SENATE
GR 196271, October 18, 2011
Supra no. 305.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further
maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply
with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution.
1. W/N provisions of RA No. 10153, in
postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA
No. 9054 thus, constitutes a Rider
2. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153
violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
Ruling:
1. No. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054
reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
the first ARMM elections; it does not
provide the date for the succeeding regular
ARMM elections. In providing for the date of
the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA
No. 9054 since these laws do not change or
revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing
the date of the ARMM elections subsequent
to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No.
9054.
2. No. In the present case, the records show
that the President wrote to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a
law synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections.Following our
Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.
MAIN POINT: In Relation to Prohibition of Riders RA 10153
cannot be considered as Rider because it does not amend
the 1st organic Act being a separate act.
ART. VI SEC. 27 - Passage of Bills
315. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
277 SCRA 268 (1997)
Facts: The petitioners (members of the HOR) filed a
case questioning the validity of R.A. 8240 (which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
for imposition of SIN TAXES). The law originated in the
House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. A bicameral
conference committee (reconciled the disagreeing
versions of the Bill) submitted its report to the House for
their review. Rep. Sarmiento was the first one to
interpellate. However, Rep. Arroyo interrupted him and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. Petitioners'
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
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because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the "constitutional
mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious
Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that what was alleged based
from the foregoing facts were merely violations of internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-
27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum
but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of
the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Main Point: The Constitution requires that the
yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a
house has to vote upon:
1. The last and third readings of the Bill. (Art VI,
26 (2))
2. The request of the one-fifth of the members
present (Art VI, Sec. 27 (1))
3. In repassing the bill over the veto of the
President.
316. ABAKADA V ERMITA (SUPRA NO. 303)
469 SCRA 1
FACTS: The constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 or the
RVAT/EVAT Law (Revitalized Value Added Tax Law) was
put into issue as alleged to be not duly enacted.
In the Senate, several provisions, which were not found
in the H.B. 3705, were inserted. A Bicameral Conference
Committee (BCC) was formed where representatives from
both Houses were sent to settle the disagreeing
provisions. BCC further inserted several provisions to S.B.
1950, i.e., stand by power was granted to the President to
raise the valued-added tax rate. Further still, the “No pass”
provision was deleted – this provision prohibited the
passing of value-added tax to consumers. Said version was
passed into law hence the promulgation of R.A. No.
9337.ABAKADA questioned its constitutionality.
Respondents in this case invoked the ruling in the case
of Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance or the Enrolled Bill
Doctrine, which state that the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. As such, R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the conclusive
presumption of constitutionality and that the courts
cannot go behind the enrolled bill.
ISSUE: W/N the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this
case.
RULING/Main point: Yes. There is no reason to
abandon the ruling in Tolentino. The Supreme Court is not
the proper venue to raise concerns regarding
parliamentary procedures. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Congress is the best judge of how it should
conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most
orderly manner.
If a change is desired in the practice of the BBC it must
be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by
any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house. To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make
such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems,
therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the BCC to
be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient
legislative action.
Sec. 27.Procedure in Passage of Bills; Item Veto
Presidential Veto
317. CIR vs. CTA and Manila Golf and Country Club
185 SCRA 329 [1990]
Facts: Petitioner assessed Manila Golf club caterer’s
tax pursuant to RA 6610. PR contest the assessment by
alleging that the Section 42* (providing the 20% caterer’s
tax on gross receipts on various operators of restaurants)
was vetoed by President Marcos, hence it is without legal
basis. CIR argued that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed
but merely the words "hotels, motels, resthouses" on the
ground that it might restrain the development of hotels
which is essential to the tourism industry. CTA opined that
the President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but
only an entire item.
Issue: whether the veto referring merely to the
inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20%
caterer's tax bracket and not to the whole section is a valid
exercise of presidential veto;
Ruling/ Main point: Yes. The inclusion of hotels,
motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are
"items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3),
Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the
President has the power to veto.
An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an
entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but
rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the
portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a
section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons
liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate.
*SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section 191-A which
imposes a caterer's tax of three percent of the gross
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receipts of proprietors or operators of restaurants,
refreshment parlors and other eating places; three
percent of gross receipts from sale of food or
refreshment and seven percent on gross receipts from the
sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines, on
proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and
other eating places, including clubs, where distilled spirits,
fermented liquors, or wines are served; and twenty
percent of gross receipts on proprietor or operators of
restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other
eating places maintained within the premises or
compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race
track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club, or which are
accessible to patrons of said establishments by means of a
connecting door or passage.
The burden of petition will be shifted to the consuming
public.
The development of hotels, essential to our tourist
industry, may be restrained considering that a big portion
of hotel earnings comes from food sale
318. GONZALES v. MACARAIG
191 SCRA 452 (1990) Landmark case, important.
Hence, the (semi) long digest.
Re: Inappropriate provisions; General Appropriations
Act
FACTS: The President Aquino vetoed provisions of the
GAA 1989 (Sec 55) and GAA 1990 (Sec.16) which prohibits
the restoration/ increase (by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes throughaugmentation) of
appropriations disapproved/ reduced (recommended by
the President in the Budget) by the Congress. **Such item
of appropriations is deemed disapproved if no
corresponding appropriation for specific purpose is
provided in the Act. (Meaning, there’s no SPECIFIC amount
of money indicated for SPECIFIC purpose.) The President
opined that these provisions would nullify his
constitutional and statutory authority to augment items
from savings, and such Sections are inconsistent with the
other provisions of the Act.
SolGen says Sec. 55 is a “rider”because it is
extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore,
merits the President’s veto.
Petitioners argue: 1) Provision in issue is not an “item”
but a “provision”; 2) power of “item veto” does not
include the power to veto a condition without vetoing the
entire provision; 3) power of “augmentation” has to be
provided by Congress and may be restricted by Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the
item-veto power accorded by the Constitution.
Or differently put, has the President the power to
veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
RULING: Yes. Explicit is the requirement that a
provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some" particular appropriation" therein. The
challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply
generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress
in the Appropriations Bill.
Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover
them, resort will have to be made to the original
recommendations made by the President and to the
source indicated by petitioners themselves.
Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and
Section 16 (FY ‘90) although labelled as "provisions," are
actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated
as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
MAIN POINT: pg. 265:The doctrine of “inappropriate
provisions” refers to a provision that is constitutionally
inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out
for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue
“item”. In essence what this means is that the President
may veto “riders” in an appropriation bill.
319. BENGZON v. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the veto
by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The instant petition filed by the petitioners with the
assertions that:1) The subject veto is not an item veto;2)
The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers;3) The veto deprives the retired
Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;4) The
questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President of
certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional
Ruling/ Main point: No.Veto is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation
and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill
refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose. An "item"of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself
is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill."
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 What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by
Congress to insure that permanent and continuing
obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell
due.
An examination of the entire sections and the
underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will
readily show that portions of the item have been
chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all
of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed
portions are not items. They are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations
found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by
transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a
provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief
Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There
is no specific appropriation of money involved.
320. PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ (LONG CASE!)
235 SCRA 506 (1994)
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of the
Presidents veto on the RA 7663 or General Appropriations
Act of 1994 (GAA). GAA contains special provision that
authorized any member of the Congress to propose and
identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and
to realign their respective operating budgets provided that
the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations
on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. Petitioners contest
the constitutionality of the veto.
Issue: Does the President have the power to veto
“provisions” of an Appropriations Bill? YES.
Ruling: The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks
the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Section 25 [2]).
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, said that
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions
inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as
it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in
the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds
other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the
General Appropriations Act of 1991. Likewise the vetoed
provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to
reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a
separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds. The
President cited Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,
Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, and Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, in vetoing said appropriation, further stating that all
income earned by all government offices and agencies
shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government.
Hence, the creation and establishment of revolving funds
shall be authorized by substantive law.
Main Point: EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT simply
means refusal of the President to spend funds already
allocated by Congress for a specific purpose.
321. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA
11 SCRA 486 (1964)
Facts: A public works bill contained an item
appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television
stations, subject to the condition that the amount would
not be available to places where there were commercial
television stations. Then President Macapagal approved
the appropriation but vetoed the condition. Petitioners
now assail the validity of the veto.
Issue: Whether or not the veto is validly exercised in
this case
Ruling: No. The veto isineffectual and that the
approval of the item carried with it the approval of the
condition attached to it.
Main Point: A CONDITION IN AN APPROPRIATION
BILL MAY NOT BE VETOED WITHOUT VETOING THE ITEM
TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED.
322. TANADA v. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (1986)
FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked
due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval.
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 ISSUE: May the publication of laws prior to their
effectivity be dispensed with?
RULING/ Main point: No. publication in every case is
indispensable. Total omission of publication would be
denial of due process in that the people would not know
what laws to obey
ART 6, SEC 28: TAXATION
Scope and Purpose:
323. PLANTERS v. FERTIPHIL
548 SCRA 485
FACTS: Petitioner assail the validity of LOI no. 1465
which provided the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of
fertilizers in the Philippinesfor being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid, and an unlawful imposition and alleged
that the LOI solely favored PPI, a private owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its
monopoly of the fertilizer industry
ISSUES:Whether LOI 1465 constitutes a valid
legislation pursuant to the exercise of taxation
RULING:No. The levy is unconstitutional because it
was not for a public purpose. The levy was imposed to give
undue benefit to PPI.
MAIN POINT:An inherent limitation on the power of
taxation is for public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a
public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private
purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.
The power to tax exist for the general welfare; hence,
implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used
only for a public purpose.
Limitations on the power: Uniform and Equitable
324. CIR v. CA
261 SCRA 236 (1996)
FACTS:The CIR issued a revenue memorandum
circular which set an ad valorem tax of 55% to cigarette
products of Fortune Tobacco for being foreign branded
cigarette without public notification. Thus, private
respondent assails said circular on the basis that it violates
their rule that there should be prior notice and hearing
before the circular’s implementation considering that said
circular is a quasi-legislative function of CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not CIR has violated the due
process law of taxation?
RULING:Yes. The CTA held that
petitionerCommissioner of Internal Revenue failed to
observe due process of law in issuing RMC 37-93 as there
was no prior notice and hearing, and that RMC 37-93 was
in itself discriminatory
MAIN POINT: The RMC was made to place the
three brands as locally made Cigarettes bearing foreign
brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.
Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory
provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes
which at the time of its effectivity were not classified as
having foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC,
the brands were subject to 45% ad valorem tax. In so
doing, the BIR did not simply interpreted the law but it
legislated under its quasi legislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
of publication should not have been then ignored.
ART 6, SEC 28: Limitations on the power: Uniform and
Equitable
325. CIR v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc
164 SCRA 27
FACTS: PR assails the constitutionality of the
municipal franchise tax imposed by the municipality of
Pangasinan. The franchises provided that the grantee shall
pay quarterly to the provincial treasury of Pangasinan, 1%
of the gross earnings attained through the privilege for the
first 20 years (from 1946), and 2% during the remaining 15
years of the lifetime of the franchise. In 1955, the BIR
assessed and demanded against the company deficiency
franchise taxes and surcharges from the years 1946 to
1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on gross
receipts from 1948 to 1954. The company asked for a
reinvestigation, which was denied. CTA, however, ruled for
Lingayen.
ISSUE: Whether a rate below 5% is violative of
the uniformity clause in the Constitution
RULING: No. The legislature has the inherent
power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to
grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have never been
deemed violative of the equal protection clause. Herein,
the 5% franchise tax rate provided in Section 259 of the
Tax Code was never intended to have universal
application. Section 259 expressly allows the payment of
taxes at rates lower than 5% when the charter granting
the franchise precludes the imposition of a higher tax. RA
3843, the law granting the franchise, did not only fix and
specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts but made
it in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary
notwithstanding. The company, hence, is not liable for
deficiency taxes.
MAIN POINT: A tax is uniform when it operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property
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belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. The
Legislature has the inherent power not only to select the
subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax
exemptions have never been deemed violative of the
equal protection clause
ART 6, SEC 28: Limitations on the power: Uniform and
Equitable
326. TOLENTINO v SEC. OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 596
FACTS: Petitioners challenge the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme (SNITS) due to its violation of the
constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation. Said
law imposed a tax on taxable net income from all sources,
other than income from salaries, of every individual
whether a citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in
the Philippines who is self-employed or practices his
profession herein. Pet argues that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorship and professionals
differently from the manner that it imposes tax on
corporations and partnerships
ISSUE: Is the law invalid for it runs counter to the
constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and
equitable?
RULING: No, uniformity in taxation merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly
situated be treated alike in both privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not forbid classification as long as – 1) The
standards that are used therefore are substantial and not
arbitrary; 2) The categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose; 3) The law applies all things being
equal, to both present and future conditions, and 4) The
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to
the same class. What may instead be perceived to be
apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent
to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
scheduler approach in the income taxation of individual
taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global
treatment on the taxable corporations. We certainly do
not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.
MAIN POINT: The VAT is not a license tax. It is not
a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease
or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange
of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is
not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Petitioner’s theory amounts to saying that under
the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which
only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI,
SEC 28 (3).
327. TAN v. DEL ROSARIO
237 SCRA 324 (1994)
FACTS: Petitioner seeks declaration of
unconstitutionality of RA 7496 (also known as Simplified
Net Income Taxation) due to violation of Article VI, Section
28(1). The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal
protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one who
practice his profession and not to those who are engaged
to single proprietorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates Art 6,
Sec 28 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
RULING: No. The said law is not arbitrary; it is
germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all
things of equal conditions and of same class.
It is neither violative of equal protection clause
due to the existence of substantial difference between
one who practice his profession alone and one who is
engaged to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA
7496 is just an amendatory provision of the code of
taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in to four main
groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial
Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have
appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496
was an independent law. But since it is attached to a law
that has already classified taxpayers, there is no violation
of equal protection clause.
MAIN POINT: Where tax measure becomes as
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of
property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for
despite all its plentitude, the power to tax cannot override
constitutional prescriptions. The said law is not arbitrary; it
is germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all
things of equal conditions and of same class.
328. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT v. PHIL. CEMENT
G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Southern Cross is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of cement
manufacturing, production and importation on 22 May
2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry
(“DTI”) accepted an application from Philcemcor (PCMC).
Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of
provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on
the import of cement pursuant to the SMA (RA No. 8800,
also known as the Safeguard Measures Act.) After
preliminary investigation, the Bureau of Import Services of
the DTI, determined that critical circumstances existed
justifying the imposition of provisional measures. The DTI
then issued an Customs Memorandum Order to take
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effect that same day and to remain in force for two
hundred (200) days. Due to DTI’s imposition of the
provisional measure, Southern Cross filed with the Court a
“Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his
decision. Southern Cross prayed to "cease and desist from
taking any and all actions pursuant to or under the null
and void CA Decision and DTI Decision, including
proceedings to extend the safeguard measure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the executive can impose
taxation safeguard measures
RULING: Yes. The safeguard measures imposable
under the SMA generally involve duties on imported
products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on
the importation of a product into the country. Without
Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no
authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies
involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that
Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the
SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it
would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative
power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such
delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be
recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to
the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent
executive power. The qualifiers mandated by the
Constitution on this presidential authority attain
primordial consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2) there
must be specified limits; and (3) Congress may impose
limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority.
MAIN POINT: Under the conditions of Sec 28 (2).
This delegation of taxation power by the legislative to the
executive if authorized by the Constitution itself. At the
same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating
authority (Congress) to right to impose restrictions and
limitations on taxation power delegated to the President.
The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Congress
take on the mantle of a constitutional command which the
executive branch is obliged to observe
ART 6, SEC 28: Delegated Tax Legislation
329. ABAKADA v. ERMITA (SUPRA 303)
FACTS: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect,
petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on
sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT
on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT
on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniformed provision is
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have
been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is undue delegation
of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of
the Constitution
RULING: NO. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
MAIN POINT: It is the ministerial duty of the
President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President
Art. 6/Sec 28, Doctrine of Qualified Agency
330. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO v. CUISIA
GR 106064 Oct. 13 2005
Facts: Petitioners Constantino are members of
the non-government organization, Freedom from Debt
Coalition, which advocates a “pro-people and just
Philippine debt policy.” They question the Financing
Program started by then President Corazon Aquino,
characterized as a “multi-option financing package”,
wherein the President entered into three restricting
agreements with foreign creditor governments. Spouses
Constantino et.al seeks to enjoin respondents from
executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto
and stresses that the power to incur foreign debts is
expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President.
Issue: W/N the President can validly delegate the
power to incur foreign debts to the respondents
Ruling: Yes, based on the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency. Each head of the department is and must
be, President’s alter ego who in this case is the Secretary
of Finance in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority under
Section 28(2), Article 6, the delegation of the taxation
power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by
the Constitution itself.
Main Point: Congress could designate the DTI
Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of the President, to
exercise the authority, but Constitution also grants the
Congress the right to impose restrictions and limitations
on the taxation power.
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