1.

CITIZENSHIP
a) Who are citizens of the Philippines – Art IV, sec.1
b) Natural born citizens, Art IV, Sec. 2
 Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, G.R No.177721, July 3, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent announced an appointment in favor of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the of Associate
Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen,
that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners contend that the appointment
extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Is Sandiganbayan Justice Ong a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:
No. It is clear from the records of the Court that respondent Ong is a naturalized
Filipino and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship
status is a substantial change.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong’s out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing
records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show
that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary
to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the
burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship
under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

c) Naturalized citizens
 Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes the ground that the
marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer on the
 latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the
qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even she has
proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully
naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the
disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)

 Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248

FACTS:
Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She
claims that she possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for naturalization as a Filipino citizen, she applied for cancellation of her Alien
Certificate or Registration. This was opposed by the Solicitor General, but the
trial court dismissed the opposition and declare that Zita Ngo Burca has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and
that she being married to a Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the
Philippines. Such judgement of the trial court was appealed.

ISSUE:
WON the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be granted?

RULING:
NO. The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire
the status of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be
lawfully naturalized. An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship
reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law.
As to the merits of the case: Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a
petition for naturalization should state petitioner’s “present and former places
of residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former
places of residence is that information regarding petitioner and objection to his
application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding.
The state is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner’s
fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the
petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.
 We find one other flaw in petitioner’s petition. Said petition is not supported by
the affidavit of at least two credible persons, “stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be resident of the Philippines
for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to “set
forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case”.

These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of
the character of the petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail. Here, the
case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses
were presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement. Upon the view
we take of his case, the judgement appealed from is hereby reversed and the
petition dismissed.

 Edison So vs. Republic, G.R. No.170603, January 29, 2007

FACTS:
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following petition: He
was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
No. 582 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives
an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging
and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese, and
Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of C.A No. 473, as amended,
because her was born in the Philippines, and studies in a school recognized by
the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught;
he is a person of good moral character; he believes in the principles underlying
the Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and
has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and
ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under Section
2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A No. 473, as amended;
he is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
government; he is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of
men’s ideas; he is not a polygamist; he has not been convicted of any crime
 involving moral turpitude he is not suffering from any incurable contagious
disease or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at
war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China;
and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of
the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The
petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.

ISSUE:
WON petition for naturalization be granted?

HELD:
DENIED. Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the
CA denying the petition for naturalization without prejudice. It me stressed that
admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the
Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred
except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the
law.

 Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent announced an appointment in favor of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the of Associate
Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen,
that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners contend that the appointment
extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Is Sandiganbayan Justice Ong a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:
No. It is clear from the records of the Court that respondent Ong is a naturalized
Filipino and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship
status is a substantial change.
 The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong’s out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing
records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show
that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary
to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the
burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship
under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

 Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009

FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as
Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the
parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen,
hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents
of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually
proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a

natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio
Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in
an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification
case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply
to disqualification based on citizenship.

RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one
person should be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the
law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the
representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate
denaturalization proceeding.
 2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she
had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on
July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and
no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over the
disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in
Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply
to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure.

 Villando vs. HRET, G.R. No. 192147, August 23, 2011

FACTS:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.
Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed
disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her
father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by
virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case
against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were
cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after
due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of
votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the
following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as
the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with
Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of
the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition
before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she
is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction
over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUES:
WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with
the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of
the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong
as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The

SC has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect
to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole”
in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.

3. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on

November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935
Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity
of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a
naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935
Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement
for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976,

accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected
as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates
how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a
definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after
January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens
 of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935
Constitution.

The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the
March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not
disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
District, Negros Oriental.

2. Loss and reacquisition of citizenship – See: Art. IV, Sec. 3; CA No. 63; R.A. No. 8171
 Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of
Allegianceto the RP on 10 July 2008. On the same day an order of approval of his
citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. In 2009,
Aarnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Respondent
Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and presented a record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in
entering and departing the Philippines. COMELEC issued an order requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the
petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed
his answer. COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner
Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming that the cancellation of
Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, him, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with the
trial and hearing. However, it reversed and set aside the ruling of first division
and granted Arnadoâs MR. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner
in the 2010 mayoralty race.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amount to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing
oneâs foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
oneâs nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained
by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 provides: Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public
in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.
He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he became eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship,
he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal
presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself subjected the issue
of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing
his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for
public office. Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he
had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. When Arnado used his
US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely
and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America."38 We agree with
the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;
it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by
using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by
the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to
be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other. We therefore hold that Arnado, by
using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the
same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. Maquiling is not
a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC54Â and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered
at all in determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes for the
ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected. As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine
the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of
the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
 eligible as candidates. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it
impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was
already proclaimed the winner. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in
his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

 Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543

FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father
and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and
came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since
then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate,
as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition
for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were
the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of
her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
 The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
so also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is
not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid

repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States
of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him
and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so
in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
 Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692

FACTS:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a na tural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. The congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislative district are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds
that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a
resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong
Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a
Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree
Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a
voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as
natural born citizens. Besides, private r e s p o n d e n t d i d m o r e t h a n
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
l i f e h e r e i n t h e Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that
a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It
is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of
a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires
that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
 Re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese
father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935
Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an

application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the
Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified
accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony
was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to
take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's
petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship,
under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act
providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall
be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the
present jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

RULING:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the
election should be made within 3 years from “upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14
years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within
the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of
 Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

 Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country."

Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation

under Republic Act No. 2630 entitled as “An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service
To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States.” He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered

service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
 reacquired Philippine citizenship as provided under Section 1 of R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.

Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of the House
of Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, thus
the petition was dismissed.

 Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that
he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate,
the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos
answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after
he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the
elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application
and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government
in the May 10, 2004 elections.
 Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed
his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and
cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe,
who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that
he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to
be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence
of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof
and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that
Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen.
And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
 natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is
legitimate or illegitimate.

 Ma vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010

FACTS:
On February 16, 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-
Affidavit of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,
a Taiwanese and his seven (7) children from Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina,
namely, Balgamelo, Felix Jr., Valeriano, Lechi Ann, Arceli, Nicolas and Isidro, are
undesirable and overstaying aliens. Records reveal that petitioners, Felix Jr.,
Balgamelo and Valeriano were born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. They were all
raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost 60 years;
they spent their whole lives and they have already raised their respectvie
families in the Philippines. During their age of minority, they secured from the
Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).

Immediately upon reaching the age of 21, they claimed Philippine Citizenship in
accordance with Sec. 1 (4), Art. IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that
“those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship” are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, Felix
Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano, upon reaching their age of majority, executed their
affidavit of election of the Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance
as Philippine citizens.

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizen, petitioners however

failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required
under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. It was only on July 27, 2005 or more
than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship, that Balgamelo
and Felix Jr., did so. On the otherhand, there is no showing that Valeriano
complied with the registration requirement.

After Felix ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute
the allegations, the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration,
composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment dated February 2,
2005, finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613
and were sentenced to suffer (1) summary deportation; (2) issuance of warrant
deportation; (3) inclusion in the Immigration Blacklist, and (4) Exclusion from the
Philippines of Felix Ma and his seven (7) children.

On May 3, 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. They sought nullification of the issuances
 of the public respondents Judgment dated February 2, 2005 and Resolution
dated April 8, 2005, denying the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On August 29, 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition after finding
that petitioners “failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law
providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the
Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals”.

On May 29, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated September 20, 2007, hence this
petition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother
and an alien father, upon reaching their majority age, executed an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government but failed to immediately file the documents of election with the
nearest civil registry be considered as foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration.

RULING:
The Decision dated August 29, 2007 and the Resolution dated May 29, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals affirming the Judgment dated February 2, 2005 and the
Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration are SET ASIDE with
respect to petitioners Balgamelo, Felix Jr., and Valeriano Ma. Petitioners are
given ninety (90) days from notice within which to COMPLY with the
requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in nits Judgment of
February 2, 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements,
including the payment of their financial obligations to the state, if any, have
been complied with the subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; and Act thereon in
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court

 Rep. of the Phils. vs. Sagun, February 15, 2012

FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and
Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio
City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and registered with
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter
of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted
in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted
that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to
entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April
3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.

Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is
hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of
Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.

Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for
review on certiorari before us. Petitioner points out that while respondent
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of
her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which
was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she
was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.

ISSUES:
Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible?

Is an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the
age of majority, considered to have been made within a reasonable time as
interpreted by jurisprudence?

RULING:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration
of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of
justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass
upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents’ Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the
court's competence.

As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of

election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether
respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she
has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states
that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on
the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those
covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with

the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine
citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous
 and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements,
respondents’ petition before the trial court must be denied. (Re: Application For
Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1,
1999, 316 SCRA 1, 7-8.)

3. Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance and Founding

 Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 221697-2216700, March 11, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing
the parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano
Militar and his wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling and
issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the
name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan
Kelley (aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a
petition foe her adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that
her name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988,
she applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998,
she renewed her passport.
She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after
enrolling and pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to fly back to the U.S. after
their wedding. She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two
daughters in the Philippines.
She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the
Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004
elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter. They then returned to the
U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend
to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and
immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property
where she and her children resided.
In 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003; she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which was
granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and
took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of
Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.
In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to
the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on
16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The
petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of
them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that
she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that
Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however,
abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

RULING:
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born
Filipino. It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they
are already impliedly so recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language
permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitution’s
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
 Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some
treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of
the country in which the foundling is found.

 Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of
Allegianceto the RP on 10 July 2008. On the same day an order of approval of his
citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. In 2009,
Aarnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Respondent
Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and presented a record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in
entering and departing the Philippines. COMELEC issued an order requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the
petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed
his answer. COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner
Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming that the cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, him, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with the
trial and hearing. However, it reversed and set aside the ruling of first division
and granted Arnado’s MR. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner
in the 2010 mayoralty race.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amount to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing
oneâs foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
oneâs nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained
by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 provides: Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public
in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.
He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he became eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship,
he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal
presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33 Arnado himself subjected the
issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship,
he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for
public office. Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he
had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. When Arnado used his
US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36Â that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America."38 We agree
with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must
be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship
but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by
the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to
be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other. We therefore hold that Arnado, by
using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the
same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. Maquiling is not
a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC
and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all
in determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes for the ineligible
candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected. As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of
the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it
impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was
 already proclaimed the winner. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in
his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

 AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner
avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual
allegiance.

RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not
self-executing provision.

What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens

who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.

 Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office
on the ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having
been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition
and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local
Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run
office in the local position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual
 citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.

 Corodora vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009

FACTS:
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections]... and
Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections:
No. 6 - I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
No. 9 - No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
No. 12 - I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency
requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was
born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied
that he was naturalized as an American citizen. Tambunting's possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen.
Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance... pursuant to R.A. No. 9225. To
refute Cordora's claim that the number of years of residency... is false because
Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an American
citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not the same
as citizenship. COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of
Cordora's complaint.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed and was convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

ISSUES:
WON Cordora's petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of
Tambunting's failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is
the present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-
resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly
making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual
 citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring
to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus,
like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public... office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear
to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is
brought about by the individual's active participation in the naturalization
process. Under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to
retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit
renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.
Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines
shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath “The twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in
the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him. Cordora's reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a
fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent
upon citizenship. We hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting
indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting is
eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship
and residency requirements prescribed by law.

 LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.182701, July 23, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He was
eventually declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of
Lopez because he was ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to
be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition
for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
for disqualifying petitioner.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in
the Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the same is not enough to
allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of
an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he
failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.
 Jacot vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship
requirement. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who
became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of
Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the
COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws. When the
local and national elections were held petitioner garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Vice Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its
Resolution disqualifying the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as
required by law for persons seeking public office.

RULING:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship. It specifically provides that public office in the Philippines
should meet the Constitutional requirements and existing laws. At the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in
Philippine elections must only have one citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship.
This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to
dual citizens and received the highest number of votes for an elective position
does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, the citizenship
requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was
qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly
applied. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED.
Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and petitioner was DISQUALIFIED.
 Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty)
were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
MacArthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007. Japzon
instituted SPA No. 07-568, a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.

Japzon’s Contention:
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, born on
9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now
the Municipality of General MacArthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a
Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the
United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof and has been
residing in the USA for the last 25 years. As alleged by Japzon in his Petition, Ty
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, where he falsely indicatded
therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General MacArthur,
Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, not being a permanent
resident or immigrant of any foreign country. Japzon also alleged that though Ty
may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never
actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required
under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. Despite of reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Ty
continued travelling to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October
2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.

Ty has already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but
still continues to consider himself an American citizen proven by his frequent
travel to the USA. Japzon prayed in his Petition for the immediate
disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the
Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy.

Ty’s Contention:
Ty admitted that he is a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and
subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that
prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he
already performed the following acts:
That with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship;
That on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles, California, USA;

That Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating which indicates that his
residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
MacArthur, Eastern Samar. Ty’s application was approved and he was issued on
26 October 2005 a Philippine passport;
That on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General MacArthur, in which he stated
that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General MacArthur, Eastern Samar;

That Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his
address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General MacArthur, Eastern Samar; and
That Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship.
Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship,
and he has been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty
sought the dismissal of Japzon’s Petition in SPA No. 07-568. Ty acquired the
highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May
2007.

The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of
Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than
to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz,

Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March
19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate
for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was a
naturalized citizen.
Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It
reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was
naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the
elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to
obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the
instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of
discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.

Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July
2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc,
respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty’s
Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar.
Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC
already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of
evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, stated that Ty failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit
in the Petition at bar.
On 19 March 2007, Ty personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship,
keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the
Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal
Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s immigration to
the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he
was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence
of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18,
1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions.

RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective
position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not
at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does
it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship
on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic
Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period
prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a
resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.

The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually
present in the Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for
at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if
length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of
residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty’s
avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to
comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections.
In Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able
to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for
election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found
 in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General MacArthur,
Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which
he garnered the most number of votes.

To successfully challenge Ty’s disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate

that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his
claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is dismissed.

 Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First
Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-
mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was a naturalized American.
However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225.
Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such,
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his
American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

RULING:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his
failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the
law, becomes citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
 Petitioner’s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with
section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is
disqualified from running for vice mayor.

 Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231

FACTS:
Jose Ugdoracion and Ephraim Tungol were rival mayoralty candidates in
Albuquerque, Bohol inthe May 2007 elections. Tungol filed a petition to cancel
Ugdoracion’s Certificate of Candidacy contending that the latter’s declaration of
eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation; that he is actually a
“green card” holder or a permanent resident of the US. It appears that
Ugdoracion became a permanent US resident on September 26, 2001 and was
issued an Alien Number by the USINS. Ugdoracion, on the other hand, presented
the following documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the
residency requirement: (1) residence certificate; (2) an application for a new
voter’s registration; and (3) a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent
Resident Status. COMELEC cancelled Ugdoracion’s COC and removed his name
from the certified list of candidates for Mayor. His motion for recon was denied.
Hence, the petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
1) Whether there is material misrepresentation which is a valid ground for the
cancellation of Ugdoracion’s COC.
2) Whether Ugdoracion lost his domicile of origin.

RULING:
1) YES. Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true, and any false
representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation
thereof, thus: SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his
oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge. x x x x SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the
election. The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
pertains to material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact
refers to a candidate’s qualification for elective office such as one’s citizenship
and residence. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation
under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. “Section 74
specifically requires a statement in the COC that the candidate is “not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country.” Ugdoracion explicitly
stated in his COC that head resided in Albuquerque, Bohol before the May 2007
elections for 41 years. Even if Ugdoracion might have been of the mistaken belief
that he remained a resident of the Philippines, he hid the fact of his immigration
to the USA and his status as a “green card “holder. Although Ugdoracion have won
the election as Mayor of Albuquerque before, it does not substitute for the
specific requirements of law on a person’s eligibility for public office which he
lacked, and does not cure his material misrepresentation which is a valid ground
for the cancellation of his COC.

2) YES.Residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to domicile.

Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi).
Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of
the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.