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ACCOUNTABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND OFFICIALS

A. SUABILITY AND LIABILITY

1. Section 22 (a)(2), LGC
Sec. 22, (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
(2) To sue and be sued

2. Section 44, LGC

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor,
vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest-ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or
vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest-ranking sanggunian
barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest-ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in
each district in the immediately preceding local election.

3. Test of liability of the Local Government

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991
Facts:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by
Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries
they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants
filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate
cause of the collision.

Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses.

Private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has
the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice.

Issue:

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Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-
suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Ruling:
Non-suability of the state.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to
suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive
its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

"Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions.

Dual capacity of LGU.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a
public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public
agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in
their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary
capacity.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a
load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable
for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

B. LIABILITY OF LGUs
1. Art. 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision. (n)

a. City of Manila v. Teotico, 22SCRA267

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Facts:
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into
an uncovered manhole, resulting injuries upon him . Thereafter he sued for damages under Art.2189 of the
Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the
chief of police. The CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the CFI ruling and held
that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico.
The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall
not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter
is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in
national highway.

Issue:
Whether the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the
damages suffered by Teotico.

Held:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of Manila is
a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each
law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its
officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. There is
no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the
damages caused to a certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.” The allegation that the incident happened
in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City‟s motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law
contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is
under the City‟s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective
conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where
Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city‟s roads, P.
Burgos included.

b. Jimenez v. City of Manila, 150SCRA510

Despite a management and operating contract with Asiatic Integrated Corporation over the Sta. Ana Public
Market, the City of Manila (because of Mayor Bagatsing‟s admission that the City still has control and
supervision) is solidarity liable for injuries sustained by an individual who stepped on a rusted nail while the
market was flooded.

c. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan, 171SCRA382

Liability of the City for injuries due to defective roads attaches even if the road does not belong to the local
government unit, as long as the City exercises control or supervision over said road

2. Art. 2180 (6th par) of the Civil Code

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article
2176 shall be applicable.

3. Art. 34 of Civil Code

When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person
in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent
of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

a. Gontang v. Alayan, G.R. No. 191691, 16 January 2013

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FACTS:
Respondent Engr. Cecilia Alayan (Alayan) was appointed as Municipal Assessor in Gainza, Camarines
Sur. She applied for a change in status from temporary to permanent, which the Civil Service Commission-
Camarines Sur Field Office (CSC-CSFO) denied for lack of relevant experience. On appeal, the CSC-
Regional Office approved her application. Thus, she reported for work and sought recognition of her
appointment and the grant of the emoluments of the position from petitioner, then incumbent Mayor
Romeo A. Gontang (Mayor Gontang) of Gainza. The mayor denied her requests which prompted her to file
a petition for mandamus before the RTC, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019. The RTC
denied her petition on the ground of prematurity since the CSC decision has not yet attained finality.

Alayan appealed to the Court of Appeals that ruled in her favour holding that the pendency of an appeal is
not a justification to prevent her from assuming office. Said decision attained finality.

Meanwhile, Alayan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution by the RTC for her alleged
unsatisfied judgment award representing her unpaid salaries and allowances during the pendency of her
appeal in the CSC Resolutions. The RTC issued the alias writ of execution.

Dissatisfied, Mayor Gontang, represented by Atty. Fandino and Atty. Saulon, a private attorney, filed a
petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. However, the CA denied the petition on the ground that Atty.
Saulon, a private attorney, lacks legal authority to represent the Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur.

Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground of unauthorized representation of Mayor Gontang by private lawyer?

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW: municipal corporations

The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The
damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, Mayor Gontang be deemed to have
been improperly represented by private counsel. InAlinsug v. RTC Br. 58, the Court ruled that in instances
like the present case where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may
properly secure the services of private counsel.

It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity,
is later held to have exceeded his authority. Personal liability can attach to him without, however, his
having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in
the discharge of governmental functions, „municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers,
except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity
with the requirements thereof. In one case, the Court held that where rigid adherence to the law on
representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper.

b. Civil Service Commision v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833 09 May 2005

c. Regis Jr. v. Osmeña, G.R. No. 26785, 23 May 1991

d. Municipality of San Juan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121920, 09 August 2005
May a city or municipality be liable for accidents occurring on national roads?
FACTS:
KC, the contractor, was instructed by MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno
and Santolan Road, a national road, in San Juan City. KC is working under a Contract for Water Service
Connection between it and the MWSS. The workers installed four (4) barricades made up of two-inch
thick GI pipes welded together, 1.3 meters wide and 1.2 meters high, at the area where the digging is to
take place. The digging operations started at 9 o‟clock in the morning and ended at about 3 o‟clock in the

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afternoon. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the
excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and stone excavated from the area. At that time, only ¾
of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular
portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires

On May 31, 1988, Priscilla and a passenger, Ms. Biglang-Awa, a prosecutor, passed thru the right side of
Santolan Rd going to Pinaglabanan St., at a speed of 30 kilometres per hour. The streets were flooded
owing to the heavy rains. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of
KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was
fractured. Thereupon, Priscilla Chan contacted Biglang-awa‟s husband who immediately arrived at the
scene and brought his wife to the Cardinal Santos Hospital.

According to the police officer who investigated the accident, he did not see any barricades placed on the
road when he arrived less than an hour after the accident.
Because of this, Ms. Biglang-awa filed an action for damages against the MWSS, the municipality (now a
city), some municipal officials, and KC.

After trial, the lower court found the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages in favour of Ms.
Biglang-awa.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with a slight modification on the amount of damages.
The municipality of San Juan appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that since Santolan Road
is a national road, it is not liable for accidents thereon, since as a municipality, it is only responsible for the
construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
bridges, parks and other public places, under the provisions of the then existing Local Government Code. It
also argued that the under the terms of an Metropolitan Manila Commission circular, the permitte/excavator
is liable for damages, not the municipality.

In denying the appeal filed by the municipality of San Juan, the Supreme Court ruled:
“Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient
that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof. This, we made clear in City of
Manila vs. Teotico, et al:
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
“control or supervision” over said street or road. x x x”
xxx

“Doubtless, the term “regulate” found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean that
petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations
for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, supra, of the Local Government Code, the
phrases “regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes”, and “adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other
similar hazards to life and property”, are not modified by the term “municipal road”. And neither can it be
fairly inferred from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioner‟s power of regulation vis-à-vis the
activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal
roads. To our mind, the municipality‟s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether
the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its
territorial jurisdiction.”

e. Torio v. Fontanilla, 85SCRA599

Facts:

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On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for
management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and
stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being
held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the
following day. Fontanilla‟s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants
were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer, defendant
municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions
and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can
arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that
they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the
management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing
the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person
to construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants
solidarily liable for damages.

Issues:
1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate
function of the municipality?
2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?
3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for the
death of Fontanilla?

Held:
1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a
private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority
to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding
a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act
for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in
pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or
gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished
from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. No governmental or
public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the
right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts
are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by
the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents,
and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in
the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.

2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers,
employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

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Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or

omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the
construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the post and
braces used were of bamboo material. The collapse of the stage was also attributable to the great number of
onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its
command to prevent such an occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of
the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the
stage.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed
the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the
sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted
merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier,
petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The
legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a
corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and
the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla
committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or
wanton negligence on their part. The records do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in
the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.

f. City of Cebu v. Judge Piccio, 110PHIL558

C. LIABILITY OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

1. Sec. 60 of LGC
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the
proper court.

2. General Supervision and Disciplining Authority

Joson v. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, 20 May 1998
The power of supervision is compatible with the power to discipline. The power to discipline does not amount
to executive control which is proscribed under Section, 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. 1.1 The
President‟s power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully
executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. The
power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President

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to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his/her opinion the good of the public
service so requires (Joson vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20, 1998).

Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities:
the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. The Disciplinary Authority may 12 January 2016
Reviewer on Local Government Law Alberto C. Agra, Ateneo Law School 88 constitute a Special
Investigating Committee in lieu of the SILG. With respect to a provincial governor, the disciplining Authority
is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself/herself or through the Executive Secretary (Joson
vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20, 1998).

The SILG is the Investigating Authority, who may act himself/ herself or constitute and Investigating
Committee. The Secretary of the Department, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of
the Department Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee (Joson
vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20, 1998).

3. Administrative Liability differs from Criminal Liability

Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141336, 29 June 2004

The basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a
public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. However,
the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred
by him/her during his/her previous term of office (Valencia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141336, June 29,
2004).

4. Committed in relation to office

Montilla v. Hilarion, G.R. No. L-4922, September 24, 1951
For an offense to be “committed in relation to the office”, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense,
the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the
crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six,
Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element;
and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of 12 January 2016 Reviewer on Local
Government Law Alberto C. Agra, Ateneo Law School 89 the commission of the crime (Montilla vs. Hilario,
G.R. No. L-4922, September 24, 1951).

5. Personal Liability
a. Correa v. CFI Bulacan, 92 SCRA 312
In Correa v. CFI of Bulacan, the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions, “municipal
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, the only to the extent that, they
have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof.”

b. Salcedo v. CA, 81 SCRA 408

Facts:
Arsenio Salcedo was appointed Chief of Police of Candelaria, Quezon. Records show that Salcedo then
held civil service eligibility, having passed the U.S. Civil Service Examination for Messenger and Skilled
laborer in 1928.Considering his eligibility appropriate to the position of Chief of Police, the Commissioner of
Civil Service validated the same and attested the appointment of Salcedo as permanent. Since then Salcedo has
discharged the functions of his office. An administrative complaint for misconduct and serious irregularities
was later filed against Salcedo. It seemed however that the mayor of Candelaria, Venancio Dia wanted him
kicked out right away so he terminated the services of the poor guy. The basis of the termination was erroneous
and illegal, since Salcedo didn‟t possess the appropriate eligibility for the position of Chief of Police (his civil
service eligibility arose form a U.S based test, remember?) Salcedo appealed to the Commissioner of Civil
Service. Although the Commissioner found him guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer, he was
nevertheless reinstated and was given a fine and a warning instead.

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The Mayor however really hated the guy. He refused to have Salcedo reinstated. The CA agrees with the
mayor. The lone issue in this instant action is whether the respondent mayor can legally terminate Salcedo‟s
services notwithstanding the attestation of the latter‟s appointment as permanent by the Commissioner of Civil
Service.

Held:
The mayor cannot terminate Salcedo‟s services. The reason is that even though he did not take the required
examination either under the Old or New Civil Service Law, that wasn't his fault. His claim to eligibility came
from the U. S. Civil Service Examination he took in 1928 when the Philippines was still a U.S Colony. Salcedo
cannot be required to take the examination again after his eligibility had already been declared permanently by
the Commission. The respondent mayor persistently ignored the order of reinstatement given by the
Commissioner of Civil Service. He defied the directive of a superior body with final authority on the matter,
which is the mayor's duty to comply. For acting arbitrarily and without legal justification in terminating the
services of petitioner and refusing to reinstate him as Chief of Police, the mayor must be held personally liable
for the back salaries of Salcedo, except for the time Salcedo was suspended.

c. Pilar v. Sanggunian Bayan of Donsol, 128 SCRA173

This is an original action for mandamus to compel the Sanguniang Bayan and the municipal treasurer to
pay the salary due petitioner Hon. Expedito B. Pilar, in his capacity as the Vice Mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan, as
provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 and as implemented by Circular 9-A of Joint Commission on Local
Government and Personnel Administration and to recover actual, moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney‟s fees.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. Elected with him were
Lodovico Espinosa as the municipal mayor and the following members of the Sanguniang Bayan, to wit:
Avelino Nacar, Luz Jimenez, Gerardo Rivera, Juan Bonus, Apolonio G. Abella, Jaime Abella, Laurentino
Balaoing and Elifas Vidal. All of them assumed office on March 1, 1980. Later on, the following also became
members of the Sanguniang Bayan: Linda Bustria, Abraham Balaoing and Ceferino Quinitio.
On March 4, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the
mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said resolution did
not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to an annual
salary of P16,044.00 1 (Circular No. 9-A).
Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his
salary. He wrote letters to the proper authorities complaining about the matter and asking that something
should be done to correct it. The proper provincial 2 and national officials 3 endorsed compliance with Circular
9-A of the Joint Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration in giving the revised rate of
salary for petitioner. In fact, the mayor was sent a letter by the Executive Secretary of the Commission advising
him that the Municipality should pay the Vice-Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the Municipal
Treasurer per Circular No. 15.
On December 12, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00
per month as the salary of the petitioner. This amount was increased to P774.00 per month in December, 1981.
4
On October 26, 1982, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P15,144.00
as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982. The resolution
was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of this petition for a writ of
mandamus on February 16, 1983. 5
In their comment, the respondents alleged that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The filing of the petition is premature because the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies
contending that petitioner should have lodged his complaint first with the Ministry of Local Government and
Community Development; (2) that the petition involves a question of fact and, therefore, this Court does not
have jurisdiction over the case because the right of the petitioner to receive a salary depends on the availability
of municipal funds and "the availability or non-availability of municipal funds is a factual issue which is not
cognizable by the Supreme Court; and (3) that the petition is now moot and academic because on April 20,
1983, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted an appropriation ordinance which among others appropriated an amount
of P29,985.00 as payment of salary differentials of the petitioner pursuant to the Supplemental Budget No. 3
Gen. Fund, C.Y. 1983.

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Petitioner in his reply argues that: (1) There is no violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies because only the writ of mandamus offers him an adequate and speedy remedy to his legal problem,
and the said doctrine can be dispensed with if the issue involved is a legal one and the issue to be resolved in
this case - on whether the appropriation of a salary of a vice mayor is a discretionary act or ministerial act - is a
legal issue. (2) The only factual issue involved in this case is the ascertainment of damages inflicted to the
petitioner due to the failure of the respondents to pay him his lawful salary. The existence of municipal funds
from which the salary of the petitioner could be appropriated is not a factual issue anymore due to the
certification of the municipal treasurer as to the existence of such funds, and (3) The issue has not become
moot and academic because there is no guarantee that even though a resolution appropriating the salary of the
Vice Mayor has been enacted, actual payment shall be made to the petitioner.
On June 1, 1983, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner admitted that at the time he submitted his memorandum, he has been fully paid of his salaries as
provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg 51 and implemented by Circular No. 9-A of the Joint Commission for
Local Government and Personnel Administration. 6
Since petitioner‟s claim for salaries has already been provided for and paid, the case has become moot and
academic.
Nevertheless, We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to damages and attorney‟s fees because the facts
show that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which was unduly denied him for
three (3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner‟s plainly
valid, just and demandable claim. (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code).
That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the
miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982
the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner. 7 While "to veto or not to
veto involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded
his authority in an arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds
from which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. 8 Respondent Mayor‟s refusal, neglect or omission in
complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local
Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and
oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally
to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.
Petitioner is likewise entitled to actual damages and costs of litigation which We reduce from P13,643.50
to P5,000.00 and for mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury, We hold that petitioner is entitled to P5,000.00 as moral damages.
All the above sums as damages including attorney‟s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 shall be paid
personally by respondent Mayor Lodovico Espinosa from his private funds.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby considered moot and academic but respondent Mayor is hereby
ordered to pay petitioner from his private and personal funds actual damages and costs of litigation the amount
of P5,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00; exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P5,000.00; and attorney‟s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
Costs against respondent Mayor.

6. Liability for Contracts

a. Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability
A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits
accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract (Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147
SCRA 447).
The doctrine applies to all cases where money or property of a party is received under such circumstances
that the general law, independent of an express contract, implies an obligation to do justice with respect to the
same.
Thus, in this case, the Province of Cebu cannot set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still
retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping benefits.

Cebu v. IAC, 147SCRA447

On 1964, while then incumbent Governor Espina was on official business in Manila, the Vice-
Gov, Almendras and 3 members of the Provincial Board enacted A Resolution donating to the City of Cebu an

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area of over 380 hectares. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu
by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The
document of donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer.
The donated lots were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its public
improvement projects. Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina disagreed with the donation and to
prevent the sale of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League along with some taxpayers,
including Atty. Garcia, filed a case seeking to have the donation declared illegal, null and void Named
defendants in the suit were the City of Cebu, City Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. and the Cebu provincial officials
responsible for the donation of the province-owned lots.
Subsequently, the court dismissed the Case on the ground that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest
in the case.
After the city announced the sale of the lots, Governor Espina, engaged the services of respondent Garcia,
for the annulment of the deed of donation

The Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Attorney, Baguia, to enter his
appearance for the Province of Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the
Provincial Board in this case.
A compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu.
For services rendered Atty. Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien, praying that his statement of claim
of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon the records. To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu opposed:
law does not allow the payment of attorney‟s fees.
TC: in favor of Atty Garcia; on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount at P30,000.00.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the TC but reduced the
amount of the fees.

ISSUE: Whether the governor may validly engage the services of a private lawyer and whether the
province may be held liable to pay the fees

HELD: Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not allowed.
Sec.1683 Revised Administrative Code: ”The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality,.. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council”
The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it
Ratio: (1) local government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer; (2) the
interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations.
However, the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are such that the rule (governor must be authorized
by resolution to hire private lawyer) cannot be applied. The Provincial Board would never have given such
authorization. The present case, the controversy involved an intramural fight between the Provincial Governor
on one hand and the members of the Provincial Board on the other hand. The Provincial Board would not adopt
a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ Atty. Garcia to act as counsel for the Province of Cebu for
the purpose of filing and prosecuting a case against the members to the same Provincial Board According to
the claimant
A strict application of the provisions of the Revise Administrative Code on the matter would deprive the
plaintiffs in the court below of redress for a valid grievance.
Respondent counsel's representation of the Province of Cebu became necessary because of the Provincial
Board's failure or refusal to direct the bringing of the action to recover the properties it had donated to the City
of Cebu.
Anent the question of liability for respondent counsel's services, the general rule that an attorney cannot
recover his fees from one who did not employ him or authorize his employment is subject to its own exception.
His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the
lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and
appear for his client.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated upon an
implied contract to pay the reasonable a value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has
the general power to contract. The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still

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retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the
petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of denying answerability.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
1. Section 61, LGC
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified complaint against any
erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent
component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.

2. Due Process
Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, 08 June 2005
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include
the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent‟s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one‟s favor, and to defend one‟s
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. (Casimiro
v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, 08 June 2005)

3. Voting and Opinion

Malinao v. Reyes, G.R. No. 117618, 29 March 1996
FACTS:
Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of due
process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On August 12, 1994, members of the
Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found Red guilty, vote signed only by presiding chairman. On September
5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted Red of the charges against him. This vote was embodied in a
Decision which was signed by all the members. Malinao argued that the First Sanggunian decision had
already become final and executory for failure of Red to appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second Decision is valid.

HELD:
Yes, the second decision of acquittal is valid. In any case, this issue is already moot and academic
as a result of the expiration of Red‟s term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and
further proceedings are barred by his reelection. [Sec 66(b) LGC]. Reelection abates any administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official. [Under Sec. 66 (b) of the LGC, the penalty of
suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding
against said official is abated if in the meantime he is re-elected because such re-election is a condonation
of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term. In order to render a decision in
an administrative case involving elected local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing,
stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision.

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