Pub Corp – Assignment No.

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Atty. Fernandez

Case Title Case Digest

City of Manila vs IAC FACTS:

• Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however
from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years,
the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation.
• On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio.
His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee.
During the next all soul’s day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed.
The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega.
• Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of
the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's
predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The
court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award
of damages in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUES:

1. WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of
the City of Manila

2. WON the petitioners are liable for damages

HELD:

1. It is a proprietary function. The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper
corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-
public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.

Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a
municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The
New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further
enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is
patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. It is a settled rule that a municipal corporation can be held liable
to third persons with respect to proprietary functions.

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 Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the
City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of
the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the
charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.

2. Yes, petitioners are liable for damages. There is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus, a
lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed
by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the
lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only
beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was
certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.

Municipality of San FACTS:

Fernando v Firme
• On December 16, 1965 –a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.
• Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
• The heirs of Baniña Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
The case was transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Baniña Sr. amended the complaint wherein
the petitioner and its regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its decision rendered the
Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral
damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was liable.

HELD:

• The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State. The general rule Is that the State may not
be sued except when it gives consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be
embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims
involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the government enters into
business contracts and also when the State files a complaint.

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 • Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore
should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable. On the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive
its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.”
• Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of
the municipality insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the SC held that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

Lina, Jr v. Pano FACTS:

• On December 29, 1995 –respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet which was denied on the ground than an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995.

• The ordinance reads:

ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA “ILLEGAL GAMBLING” LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG
LAGUNA:

IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng
Laguna lalo’t higit ang lotto;

• As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3)
an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
• On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE:

WON the local government may deny the operation of lotto in the said locality.

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 HELD:
• NO. The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, merely states the
“objection” of the council to the operation of lotto. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council,
which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna.
• As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of
the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However,
this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not
be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of the first issue,
respondent mayor of San Pedro cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna
as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative
unit concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national
legislature.
• The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic
Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to
operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government
deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot
issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature
expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
• In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being
so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent
allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
“decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state.

Magtajas v. Pryce FACTS:

Properties and Philippine
Amusements and • PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Gaming Corporation Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the
Christmas season.

• Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance
No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for
the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty
for its violation.

• Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869.
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the
operation of casino for the general welfare.

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ISSUE:

Whether the Ordinances are valid.

HELD:
• No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16.
• General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
• Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but
are in fact permitted by law.
• The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

• The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy
to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy
motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.
• Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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GSIS vs Province of FACTS:
Tarlac
• March 26, 1996 –the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Tarlac passed Resolution No. 068-96, which authorized and
approved the conversion of Urquico Memorial Athletic Field into a Government Center, as well as the segregation and
donation of portions of said land to different government agencies for the purpose of constructing or relocating their
office buildings. After receiving two letters of invitation regarding the project, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) decided to put up an office at the site. Thus, Governor Conjuanco issued a Notice of Construction for such.
• The Province of Tarlac and the GSIS then executed a MOA whereby the former donated the said lot to the GSIS. Also,
the Province executed a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of the GSIS which was accepted by the latter. As
stipulated in the MOA, the GSIS donated P 2M to the Province of Tarlac as financial assistance.
• Governor Jose Yap was elected as the new chief executive of Tarlac. He wrote a letter to the GSIS, inviting the latter to
reevaluate their respective positions with respect to the MOA. Evidently, Gov. Yap was of the opinion that the provisions
of the Deed of Donation were unfair to the Province. Later, the Provincial Administrator wrote the GSIS, demanding the
payment of P33,590,000.00 representing the balance of the value of the lot donated, which the GSIS refused to pay.
Hence, the Province filed a complaint against GSIS for declaration of nullity of donation and MOA and recovery of
possession.
• Trial Court –dismissed the complaint
• CA –reversed and set aside the Trial court’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in holding that the Deed of Donation and MOA are null and void

HELD:

• Yes. A transfer of real property by a local government unit to an instrumentality of government without first securing an
appraised valuation from the local committee on awards does not appear to be one of the void contracts enumerated
in the afore-quoted Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Neither does Section 381 of the Local Government Code expressly
prohibit or declare void such transfers if an appraised valuation from the local committee on awards is not first obtained.

SECTION 381. Transfer Without Cost. — Property which has become unserviceable or is no longer needed may be
transferred without cost to another office, agency, subdivision or instrumentality of the national government or another
local government unit at an appraised valuation determined by the local committee on awards. Such transfer shall be
subject to the approval of the sanggunian concerned making the transfer and by the head of the office, agency,
subdivision, instrumentality or local government unit receiving the property.

• The Court of Appeals simply ruled that the absence of a prior appraised valuation by the local committee on awards
rendered the donation null and void. This, to our mind, did not sufficiently overcome the presumption of validity of the
contract, considering that there is no express provision in the law which requires that the said valuation is a condition
sine qua non for the validity of a donation.

• There being a perfected contract, the Province of Tarlac, through Gov. Yap, cannot revoke or renounce the same without
the consent of the other party. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
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has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage, and law. The contract has the force of law between the parties and they are expected to abide in
good faith by their respective contractual commitments. Just as nobody can be forced to enter into a contract, in the
same manner, once a contract is entered into, no party can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the other.