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New Religious movements or new religions, which are usually conceived distinct from
traditional, mainstream religions, has a long history in Korea starting with Tonghak
(1860), the first Korean new religion. At this paper, it is attempted to give a general
description on the development of Korean new religious movements with their
characteristics in each period. Especially, a considerable attention is paid to a new
or “New Age” type of religious groups, which have been expanding since the middle
of the 1980's in South Korea. These groups differentiate themselves from the existing
new religions by their non- or less hierarchical, loose organizational structure, and
their paying clients, among others. The increasing popularity of those programs which
these groups offer reflects the changing religious needs in modern South Korean
society, namely, the pursuit of more individualized or subjective form of
religiosity/salvation, which is believed to be more effective in maximizing the
(spiritual/mental) potentiality of individuals. In order to demonstrate this changed
religious consciousness of individuals, some results of questionnaire surveys were
presented which were conducted by this author.
The phrase “new religion” is, together with “new religious movement,”
generally used to designate religious phenomena that are seemingly not
compatible with mainstream established religions. Here, traditional religions
serve as criteria by which a certain religious group or movement is perceived
as “new,” sometimes an another expression of “exotic” or “deviant.” For this
reason, the term “new religion” is often criticized as a residual category, as the
term is attached to a religious phenomenon that doesn’t fit neatly in the
generally accepted picture of “religion” in a given society, which itself is based
on mainstream religions. Therefore, it is important not to overlook the fact that
even though scholars of religion tend to make use of the term “new religion”
as a value-neutral technical term, the word is entangled with religious
hegemonic judgments.
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* This paper was presented at the 2010 International Conference of Korean Academy of New
Religions, held at the School of Theology at Claremont in California, USA. For information,
this paper is partly based on author's previous writing, “Koreans’ ‘new’ religious concerns”
which is published as a chapter of Religions in Focus: New Approaches to Tradition and
Contemporary Practices (ed. by Graham Harvey, London: Equinox, 2009).
There are attempts to draw a line between “new” and “traditional” religions in
terms of their starting date. Western scholars often identify “new religions” as
having emerged principally since the Second World War and having come into
prominence in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But this periodization is
irrelevant to those religious movements which arose outside of Western
societies. In Korea, the first new religion, Tonghak (Eastern Learning), emerged
in 1860 and soon established itself as a religious as well as political power in
the country. It was followed by other influential new religions (e.g.
Taejong-gyo, Chŭngsan-gyo, Wonbulkyo) at the outset of the twentieth century.
Given the continued existence of all these religions today, they are now by no
means “new.” Indeed, some of them are well established (in Japan especially)
even as forms of mainstream religion. Because the developmental history of
Korean new religions covers a long period, Korean scholars of new religion
tend to divide the period into several parts based on the drastic social changes
during the time which have also impacted on new religions. A common
periodization which is used to describe the historical development of Korean
new religions is as follows:
The first period (1860–1910), which starts with the appearance of the first new
religion, Tonghak, was a transition to modern society as the traditional social
or class system of the Yi dynasty (1392–1910) slowly collapsed, and
Neo-Confucianism, the ideological basis of the dynasty, increasingly lost its
hegemonic power. This process was accelerated not only by the intrusion of
foreign imperialist powers into the country but also by the introduction of
Catholicism. This totally heterogeneous religious system caused a sort of
cultural shock at that time. During this period Tonghak (founded 1860),
Chŏngsan-gyo (founded 1901) and Taejonggyo(founded 1909) emerged,
subsequently serving as fertile soil from which a number of Korean new
religions arose. These religions reinterpreted the Korean religious heritage
(Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and folk beliefs) and developed coherent
religious doctrines from various religious elements. At the same time, they
showed a strong nationalist or anti-imperialist tendency. Tonghak followers led
a rebellion in 1864 called the Tonghak Peasant Revolt, which initially targeted
corrupt and exploitative officials but soon spread under anti-feudal and
anti-imperialist slogans. Another new religion, Taejong-gyo (where Tangun, the
mystical progenitor of the Korean people and nation, is the central figure of
worship), played an important role in the nationalist movement. New religions
during this period had a shared world view, anticipating the advent of a new
world to follow from the present era of social turmoil. This is expressed in
the term huch’ŏn-gaebyŏk, "the Beginning of the Second World".
During the second period (1911–1945), when Japan had annexed the Korean
peninsula as a colony, new religions that had already sprouted in the last
decades began to split into many different groups, and a number of additional
new religions appeared. Tonghak was reorganized into Ch’ŏndo-gyo after the
Peasant Revolt ended in failure, establishing itself as the largest new religion at
that time. It focused on campaigns for enlightenment until 1930 when the
Japanese colonial governments ordered the dissolution of yusa-jongyo
(quasi-religion), as new religions were labeled. The government acknowledged
only Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and State Shinto as “religion”,
banning other religious groups that were suspected of being subversive of
Japanese colonial power. Additionally, the Japanese colonial government carried
out the separation of religion and state, and so the modern concept of
“religion” was introduced into the country. This changed policy drastically
weakened the socio-cultural influence of Buddhism and Confucianism, which
were traditionally closely related with ruling powers, but at the same time
spurred a group of Buddhist and Confucian elites to reform the old structure
of their religions. An attempt to reform traditional Buddhism was also
undertaken outside of established Buddhism by Wonbulgyo or Won-Buddhism
(founded 1916), a new religion. The latter claimed to have reformed Buddhist
teachings into more a modern, reasonable, and practicable form that better fit
into contemporary advanced material civilization, independent of another
declaration that it had combined the core essences of all religions into its
teaching.
The end of colonial rule in 1945 and the following occupation of Korea below
the 38th parallel by the American Army in the Pacific again changed the
Korean religious landscape to a great degree. The American occupation force
issued a decree of religious freedom, freeing religious organizations from state
control and encouraging free competition between them. On the other hand,
under the United States occupation a pro-American and anti-Communist
standpoint developed as the dominant ideology in the country, and religious
groups that supported that ideology obtained influence in society. Accordingly,
Catholic and Protestant churches, which were openly hostile to Communism,
gained both numbers and influence. In these circumstances, a group of new
religions like Unification Church (founded 1954), the Olive Tree Church
(founded 1954), and the Mount Yongmun Retreat (founded 1955) emerged and
prospered. These reinterpreted Christian teaching by integrating Eastern ideas
and autochthonous beliefs, while stressing a leading role for Korean people in
the history of salvation. Conversely, old new religions such as Ch’ŏndo-gyo
and Taejong-gyo which maintained traditional values and nationalist ideas and
above all favored re-unification, became marginalized.
In the 1960s the South Korean government proceeded with all-out economic
development, and in the 1970s industrialization and urbanization were speeded
up. The result was that the traditional social network based on local and
kinship ties was largely dissolved, and groups alienated from the process of
industrialization increased in number. During the period a group of new
religions came into being which put Christian eschatology (teaching about the
end of this world) in the foreground but combined it with mystical elements of
traditional Korean religions. Additionally, reform movement within old
indigenous new religions formed new religions like Chŭngsan-do (founded
1972) and Taesun Jinri-hwoe (founded 1978), which as splinter groups of
Chŭngsan-gyo later consolidated as an influential Korean new religion. The
rapid growth of these religions is due to the reevaluation of traditional Korean
culture in the 1970s and 1980s as a part of a protest movement against the
rigorous modernization policy of the dictatorial regime of that time. It is
noteworthy that college campuses were hotbeds of both the pro-democracy
movement and of these religions, which were critical toward modern
materialized society and offered alternative world views that have an affinity
with traditional Korean religious culture. The new religions that appeared
during the period have in common that they are urban-centered and lay
particular weight on individual salvation.
Since the 1980s the tendency to seek “salvation” at the individual level has
been strengthened. This tendency relates to material abundance as well as to
the advanced fragmentation of society brought about by the “successful”
industrialization or modernization of South Korea. Consequently, old new
religions which propagate collective salvation — together with a concern for
the good of the community as a whole — have declined. At the same time a
totally new type of religious group surfaced. These differentiate themselves
from the existing new religions by their non-hierarchical, loose organizational
structure and the fact that they gather paying clients instead of committed
believers. The appearance of these groups reflects the changed religious
interests of modern people, who are particularly concerned with the present,
seeking inner peace and wellbeing in daily life, and simultaneously pursing the
maximization of their physical and mental capability to cope with the rapidly
changing world around them. Accordingly, these new religious groups offer
techniques that promise to produce a perfect harmony between body and mind,
while activating previously latent human abilities. Certainly, the spread of this
kind of self-centered and this-worldly religious activity outside of established
religions is not confined to South Korean society but is a global phenomenon,
observed especially in post-capitalist societies and generally named “New Age”
or “new spirituality.”
Since the 1990s not only traditional arts of self-training but also diverse
self-development programs have been offered. The latter usually combine the
latest trends in Western psychotherapy with traditional meditation. Some of
them demand quite a high price for their courses, which supposedly enable
speedy “enlightenment” or total transformation of the self. A good example is
the Avatar courses which were introduced to South Korea (the first Asia
country to receive them) in 1993. The Avatar program is a product of Star’s
Edge Inc., which franchises the brand worldwide, supervising courses, fixing
prices and licensing Avatar-teachers. A Korean counterpart is Maum Suryon or
Maum Meditation (founded 1996) which has grown rapidly, managing
ninety-three meditation centers worldwide.
In South Korea “new religions” in narrow sense, that is those with charismatic
or authoritarian leadership, fixed doctrine and a community of committed
believers, have been in a marginal position. This is despite the socio-cultural
impact that a group of older new religions as Tonghak (later Ch’ondo-gyo)
once had. According to the census of the National Statistical Office in 2005
even the biggest new religion, Wonbulgyo (Won-Buddhism), has only
approximately 130,000 members (0.3 percent of 4.7 million South Koreans).
Even when the members of well-known new religions, Wonbulgyo,
Ch’ŏndo-gyo, Taejong-gyo, Chŭngsan-do, and Taesun Jinri-hwoe are added up,
they still amount to less than 1 percent of the general population. The number
of Korean believers of the Unification Church (estimated to be around 35,000)
is indefinable in official statistics because followers of the religion identify
themselves as Protestants. In comparison with the weak presence of new
religions, the statistics show that the power of traditional religions is quite firm
and relatively stable. Among the people who answered that they are affiliated
with a certain “religion” (53.1 percent of the general population), Buddhists
represent 43 percent, Protestants 34.5 percent, and Catholics 20.6 percent.
Regardless of whether the above numbers are reliable, this signals that the
general interest in seeking religious or spiritual experience outside of
established religions is broadening. It must be also taken into consideration that
many of the people affiliated to an established religion are also involved in
various self-training and meditation arts, and do not necessarily feel conflict
between their religious confession and any extra self-training they take up. This
is based both on the long history of religious pluralism in Korea and on the
claim of self-training groups that they are not “religions.” Even though Korean
Catholic and Protestant churches condemn these groups as anti-Christian, they
are not able to prevent their members from taking part in such alternative
self-training which operates in the private domain exclusively.
To the question, “What is the ultimate concern for you?” most respondents
chose “the ultimate meaning of life” and “peace of mind,” followed by
“enlightenment,” and then “realization of the self,” “mental and physical
health,” “mental training” and “development of potentialities,” while only one
person chose “material wealth.” These answers show their ultimate concerns are
nothing but “religious,” even though they have a stronger tendency towards
active involvement in self-development.
To the question “Do you believe in reincarnation?” the absolute majority of the
participants answered “yes.” This result suggests that “reincarnation” or
“rebirth,” originally a Hindu or Buddhist idea, is broadly accepted in South
Korean popular culture, especially by those who are engaged in alternative
self-training, including Christians. In addition, the result shows that the
incongruity between official religious doctrines and the subjective religious
world is rather a natural phenomenon.
To the question “Did you participate in other workshops or courses except the
present one?” the majority answered “yes,” and most answered regarding the
number of visited courses “1–4,” followed by “5–9.” So the answer “yes” of
the absolute majority of the participants to the question, “Do you intend to
visit further workshops or programs?” is not surprising. These results indicate
that the people who are interested in alternative self-training are
“workshop-hoppers” who tend to experience and test for themselves as many
different programs as possible. Because this kind of religious experiment
requires money, time, and often some knowledge to understand the techniques
which are offered, as the survey shows, the participants are mostly highly
educated (university graduates), middle class, and largely self-employed.
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that alternative self-training is a
privilege of better-situated people. A number of diverse ki-training and yoga
courses are offered for public benefit by almost every regional community and
apartment residents’ association at minimal or no cost, although the standard of
this popularized form of “self-training” is not very high.
References