REPUBLIC VS.

CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057 January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.

FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial
confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged
that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government
until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming
the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after
filing his formal opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable
only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before
the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed.
 There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property
is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that
the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation

stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property,
thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none,
it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and
the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)

would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all
lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from
enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and
disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-
in-interest of the land since 1945.
 AYOG VS. CUSI
No. L-46729 November 19, 1982
Aquino, J.

FACTS:
The Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Binan Development Co., Inc. a
parcel of land situated in Davao City with an area of 250 hectares on the basis of its
1951 Sales Application. The occupants of the said land were then ordered to vacate the
same and remove the improvements constructed thereon. Upon the refusal of the
occupants of the land, the corporation filed an ejectment suit against them. The Director
found that the occupants entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation
and could not be regarded as bona fide occupants. On July 18, 1961, the corporation
fully paid the purchase price for the land. More than thirteen years later, August 14,
1975, the Sales Patent was issued to the corporation with a reduced area of 175.3
hectares.

The occupants, herein petitioners, contested that the adoption of the

Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which
render it legally impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment of awarding the land in
question to the corporation. The constitutional prohibition only allows lease of alienable
lands of public domain by private corporation or organization which should not exceed
to 1000 hectares in area.

The Director of Lands pointed out that the corporation had complied with the said
requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution and that the applicant had
acquired a vested right to its issuance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the
trial court’s 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners.
RULING:
The constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

A right is vested when the right to the enjoyment has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a present interest, which has become fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.

A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment
or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in the legitimate exercise of the police power.

In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, where the applicant, before the Constitution
took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order
to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification
for refusing to issue or release the sales patent. He should be deemed to have acquired
by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new
Constitution would not apply.

The corporation’s compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for
the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public
domain. The corporation’s right to obtain a patent is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without the due process.