G. No.

L-5120
Facts The petitioner, Cipriano P. Primicias, was charged before the court of First Instance of Manila w/ two
statutory offense; (1) Violation of the Commonwealth Act No. 606 and (2) Violaton of Sec. 129 in Relation
to Sec. 2713 of Revised Administrative Code.

On April 23, 1952, the Petitioner filed for motion praying that his case be appointed with an assessor to
assist the court in considering the questions of fact (Section 49 of R.A. No. 49 as reference). Subsequently,
on April 28, 1952, the court denied his request holding in effect, that with the promulgation of the Rules of
Court by the Supreme Court, referenced Statute 49 is irrelevant.

A detailed review of the said statute was done, and it proved to be substantive. And that the SC. not
incorporating the fact that they’ve removed the provision of Statute 49 on the present Rule of Courts, may
be due to it appearing as mockery of its rule-making power.

The court, therefore, invoke the petitioner of his rights to an assessor.

Issues:

1. W/N the petitioner has a right to the aid of an assessor as it is a substantive and mandatory right;
2. W/N the right to trial with the aid of an assessor cannot be impaired by the court in the exercise of
its rule-making power;
3. W/N the Rules of Court revoked Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of
the Old Charter of Manila;

Held/Rationale:

1. Yes
In reference of Section 49 of R.A. No. 409 Assessors in the courts in the city “The aid of assessors
in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the municipal court, or the court of first instance, within
the city, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure”

And as in mentioned in Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Section 2477 of the Old
Charter of Manila, those rights are substantive and vital in protecting the rights of a litigating party.
2. Yes
It is believed that the present court is in no position to revoke the right to an assessor, despite of its
rule-making power, because as per direct mandate of the Constitution; their rule-making power is
limited to matters referring to pleading, practice, and procedure.
3. Yes
Section 154 of the Code of Procedure and Section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila is indeed part
of a substantive law, as in this case, it regulates the rights of the petitioner concerning his life and
liberty. It is also important to know that this matter is referred to as a right bestowed by the law to a
party litigant and is deemed to be absolute and substantial by the court.
 4.

G.R. No. 156982

Facts: On March 25, 1994, then President Fidel V. Ramos created the government agency National
Amnesty Commission through Proclamation 347. Composed of seven members, NAC is tasked to receive,
process, and review amnesty applications.

Moving forward, after attending a couple of meetings personally, three of the NAC members turned-over
their work to their appointed representative. Who of which receives an honoraria, until resident auditor
Eulalia disallowed on audit, the payments to the representatives amounting to P255,750 in pursuant of
COA Memorandum 97-038 dated on September 19, 1997 (disallowance of payments of any form to
specific officials including representatives).

Subsequently, on April 28, 1999, NAC passed and was approved by President Estrada accordingly,
Administrative Order No.2 which mentions that ex officio members may designate their representatives to
the Commission and such may be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be
authorized by law.

The petitioner therefore invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in lieu of the resident auditor’s decision, as well
as the instruction on COA Memorandum 97-038.

Issues:

1. W/N COA is mandated to publish Memorandum 97-038 in lieu of its implementation.

2. W/N COA committed grave abuse of discretion in not paying the representatives, as their authority
in the office is questionable.
3. W/N the representatives of the ex officio members are entitled to compensation.

Held/Rationale:

1. No
Memorandum 97-038 need not be published to validate its effectivity. Looking at Article 2 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.

It must be noted that this rule only covers those of Presidential decrees, Executive orders by the
President, Administrative rules and regulations. Therefore, COA Memorandum 98-038 being only
an internal regulation or letter of instruction doesn’t call for publication.
 2. No
The COA is right on not granting any forms of payment to the representatives, as it lacks legal
basis.

It is significant to point out that these representatives acted voluntarily, and assumed position
despite having no proper appointment. Their un-official appointment doesn’t entitle them to any
payment, as there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position Payments on
the other hand, to the position is already tied to the principal office and doesn’t warrant any need
for additional compensation.
3. No
The ex officios’ representatives were merely designated and not appointed, making their title
unofficial to the government.
There is a fine line concerning the meaning of DESIGNATED and APPOINTED.
It must be noted that Designation to the position is plainly done by the lawful seated individual. It
doesn’t entitle them to any pay, as the position is already being compensated by the government to
the person they chose lawfully.
Meanwhile, Appointment is the lawful assignment of the proper authority to an individual by who is
to exercise the powers and functions of a given office.
Therefore, anyone in assumption of a position, without the order of proper authorities, doesn’t
permit him/her to receive compensation as well.

G.R. No. 179987

Facts:

Mario Malabanan, who had purchased a parcel of land in Barangat Tibig, Silang Cavite (Lot 9864-A, Cad-
452-D with an area of 71,324 square meters) from Eduardo Velazco, applied for land registration on
February 20, 1998. He claims that he and his heirs have occupied the land for more than 30 years,
uninterrupted.

In able to attest that the land can be registered under his name, Malabanan provided a certification dated
June 11, 2001 from CENRO, proving that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain that was approved under FO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982

On December 3, 2002, the RTC granted Malabanan application for land registration under the operation of
Act 141. Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Law). Not long after, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) appealed to the CA, with an argument that Malabanan failed to prove that the land is
considered alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and that he’s been in possession for more
than three decades.
The CA reversed the decision of RTC, on February 23, 2007, and dismissed the application for registration.
Stating Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree:

“Any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession”

Unfortunately, Malabanan passed away, leaving his heirs to appeal the CA’s decision.

Issues:

W/N the heirs are entitled to the application of land registration under their names in pursuant of either, or
both, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2).

Held/Rationale:

No.

The argument provided by the OSG is more comprehensive, as to the conditions, one can prove
inhabitation of a land and proving its classification. Accordingly, there was no physical evidence that the
land had been re-classified and become candidate for public domain and land registration.

The petitioners also failed to establish that Mario Malabanan indeed possessed the land since June 12,
1945 (or earlier) that might entitle him to its ownership. And despite having ascertain that their land is
already classified as alienable and disposable, there are no public documents at hand that may prove the
land got converted from patrimonial land of the state into a public domain land.