A party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy

within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the decision, as to him,
becomes final and binding.
xxx
The Court has repeatedly held that the failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and
within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final, with the result
that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.||
(Rivelisa Realty, Inc. v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corp., G.R. No. 189618 (Resolution),
[January 15, 2014], 724 PHIL 508-519)

In Siliman University v. Fontelo-Paalan, G.R. No. 170948, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA
759 and Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc. v. NLRC, 202 Phil. 850 (1982), we have explained that:
The rule is well-settled that a party cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him; and while he may make counter assignment of errors, he can do so
only to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to seek modification or reversal
thereof, for in such case, he must appeal.
(Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150334, [March 20, 2009], 601 PHIL 43-53)

In Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007|||,
the Court ruled, thus:
"The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. The limitation on the period of
appeal is not without reason. They must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of
justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to
controversies. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly
comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the
right to appeal."
In Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150334, March 20, 2009||, the Court
declared that:
. . . we cannot condone the practice of parties who, either by their own or their
counsel's inadvertence, have allowed a judgment to become final and executory and,
after the same has become immutable, seek iniquitous ways to assail it. The finality
of a decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the
convenience of the parties.
Clearly, allowing an appeal, even if belatedly filed, should never be taken lightly. The
judgment attains finality by the lapse of the period for taking an appeal without such
appeal or motion for reconsideration being filed.
(Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, [December 10, 2012], 700
PHIL 749-759)
 The failure of a party to perfect his appeal in the manner and within the period fixed
by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final, with the result that no court can
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. For it is more important that a case be
settled than it be settled right. It is only in exceptional cases when we have allowed a
relaxation of the rules governing the periods of appeal. 21
A careful perusal of this case reveals that the decision of the respondent court had
become final and executory due to the failure of petitioner to file his motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. Since petitioner's counsel received a copy of
the decision on July 17, 1996, the aforesaid motion should have been filed not later than
August 1, 1996. Petitioner's filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration on July 26, 1996 and the motion for reconsideration only on August 20, 1996,
was a procedural lapse fatal to his cause.
(Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126337, [February 12, 1998], 349 PHIL 1002-
1014)
In a long line of cases, this court has held that "[a]lthough the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is
nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or
estoppel."
The rule is stated in La'O v. Republic of the Philippines and the Government
Service Insurance System:
While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled
that a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel After
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to question the jurisdiction
of the court. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a particular
matter to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape liability. 44 (Citations omitted)
The wisdom that underlies this was explained at length in Tijam, et al. v.
Sibonghanoy, et al.:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estopped by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted. A
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties
 was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. And in Littleton vs.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in
the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect
that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al.,
G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100
Phil. p. 277
(Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Chua, G.R. No. 187491, [July 8, 2015])