65.

[G.R. No. 142044. November 23, 2001]

PEOPLE vs. TOBECHUKWU NICHOLAS y MABENA

FACTS:
 Nicholas a Nigerian national stabbed his drunk Nigerian national friend Sethubelo aka Atin, after seeing
that Myrna a sex worker whom Nicholas considers his “girlfriend” wanted to have sex with Atin instead
of him.
 RTC decision convicted Nicholas of the crime of murder and bound to suffer a penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
 Accused appelant filed for motion for reconsideration, claiming for self-defense; and that on the
assumption that he is hguilty, he could only be convicted of homicide instead of murder.
 Nicholas claimed that Atin and Myrna took possession of his passport and he only retaliated because
Atin will not produce the passport he claimed to be stolen.

HELD:
 Self defense was not sustained, victim was in a drunken stupor that he cannot even pull his trousers
up for him to unlawfully or criminally ccommit an aggression against accused.
 His claim of voluntary surrender could not be sustained due to his actions right after committing the
crime. His actions failed to satisfy the following requisities of voluntary surrender as mitigating
circumstances:
1. Offender has not been arrested
2. Offender surrendered himself to person of authority
3. The surrender was voluntary
 Must be spontaneous
 Unconditional intent
 Acknowledgment of guilt
 Wishes to save the authority the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture
 His intention during his surrender, is to insure his safety given that his arrest is inevitable, thus the
surrender is not spontaneous. He must have admitted doing the crime and not merely accompanying
the police to the scene of the crime to clean his hands from the crime he committed. In fact he made
testimonies contrary to human experience, thus negating voluntary intention.
 Prosecution however failed to prove treachery and evident premeditation for the crime to qualify
as murder. Abuse of superior strength, which was also alleged in the Information, cannot be
appreciated.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 99-171014,
is MODIFIED as follows: Accused-appellant Tobechukwu Nicholas y Mabena is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Ten (10) Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four
(4) Months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
the victim Serekwane Sethubelo the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
66.

[G.R. No. 130650. September 10, 2002]

PEOPLE vs. MARIO VERCELES, FELIX CORPUZ, MAMERTO SORIANO (At large), PABLO RAMOS (At
large), and JERRY SORIANO (State Witness), accused, MARIO VERCELES and FELIX CORPUZ

FACTS:
 5 people were charged with robbery with rape.
 2 of the 5 accused remained at large
 Verceles, Corpuz, and J. Soriano were brought to court for arraignment.
 J. Soriano was discharged to be a state witness
 He claimed that: on October 18, 1996, the five accused boarded a tricycle owned by Mario Verceles to
visit his cousin in barangay Goliso, located at the boundary of Urbiztondo. At 8:00 in the evening, they
proceeded to barangay Malibong to visit Pepe, a compadre of Mamerto Soriano. Before reaching
Pepes place, they stopped at the house of Jerrys grandmother, Rosita Quilates. Jerry sensed that his
companions had an evil plan, so he and Pablo Ramos tried to leave. However, Mamerto Soriano poked
a gun at Jerry and told them not to leave. Then, they tied Jerry and Pablo under a mango tree. The
three proceeded to the house of Rosita Quilates. While waiting for the three, Jerry and Pablo fell
asleep. When they woke up at 2:00 a.m., they saw the three accused carrying a TV set, VHS and other
things. They helped the three load the items in the tricycle. Then they went home to San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. Several days later, they sold the items and Jerry was given three hundred pesos.
 The prosecution witness Maribeth Bolito testified that on October 19, 1996 at around 2:00 in the
morning, she was awakened by a man fondling her breast and other private parts. She tried to resist
and fight back but her strength proved too weak against her aggressor. Furthermore, the man had a
gun pointed at her head. She later identified her aggressor as Mamerto Soriano. While she was being
ravished, she saw two men standing at the door, whom she identified as accused Mario Verceles and
Felix Corpuz. Soriano undressed her then kissed her on the body and fondled her breasts for five
minutes. She pretended to be thirsty, so Soriano, holding her tightly, brought her to the kitchen. There
he removed his pants and laid her on the floor and tried to insert his penis inside her vagina. Maribeth
lost consciousness and when she came to, her private part was very painful and the three accused
were gone.
 Due to J. Soriano’s testimony, RTC charged Verceles & Corpuz the crime of robbery with rape, with
reclusion perpetua as penalty.

ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC erred in discharging J. Soriano to be a state witness
2. W/N Verceles’ surrender to a brgy captain 16 days after the commision of the crime

HELD:
1. No. J. Soriano’s discharge is in accordance with Rule 119 Section 17 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedures which states that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of the accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Accused J. Soriano does not appear to be the most guilty. His statements was corroborated by another
witness (Bolito).
Conspiracy existed because the crime of robbery was established both by the J. Soriano and Bolito. There is
robbery with rape even if only one person raped Bolito since the act of one is the act of all in a conspiracy.
2. Evidence shows that Mario Verceles surrender to the authorities was not spontaneous and
unconditional. He submitted himself to the police only to clear the matter and to know the reason why the
police were looking for himand when asked what his involvement was to the alleged robbery and rape, he
answered that he does not know anything about the crime.
It was held that accused-appellants defense of alibi and denial cannot overcome Maribeth Bolitos positive
testimony that she was raped and that her grandmothers house was robbed, especially since this was
substantially corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses. Time-honored is the rule that the positive and
categorical assertions of witnesses generally prevail over bare denials.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision finding accused-appellants Mario Verceles and Felix Corpuz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape punished under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00; the
award of exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis and the sum of P50,000.00 is awarded for civil
indemnity.
67.

[G.R. No. 137277. December 20, 2001]

PEOPLE vs. ALFREDO ALMENDRAS

FACTS:
 Appellant Alfredo Almendras was charged with the murder of his uncles common-law wife, Criselda
Manidlangan. The commission of the foregoing offense is, likewise, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime.
 He likewise invoked three mitigating circumstances, namely, voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and
passion and obfuscation.
 The accused testified that he was at the house of his uncle, Leoncio Almendras, at 4:00 in the morning
of June 4, 1996 to confront him. Leoncio was the younger brother of the accuseds late father. The
accused claimed that Leoncio, without permission, opened the tomb of his (the accuseds) father, put
aside the bones and replaced them with the remains of his (Leoncios) wife. His uncle left the bones of
the accuseds father on the ground. The accused discovered this alleged desecration of his fathers
remains when he went to the cemetery on June 1, 1996 and found the bones outside the tomb. The
accused told his uncle, Tay, just return the bones of my father into the tomb. Leoncio promised to return
the bones.
 On June 4, 1996, the accused went to his uncles house to talk to him again about it but Leoncio
immediately boxed the accused, hitting him on the face. The accused fell. Someone advanced towards
him with a piece of wood about three inches long and about one-and-a-half inch in diameter. Thinking
that it was his uncle, the accused immediately stood up and, several times, stabbed the person
approaching him. As the person fell, the accused suddenly realized that he hit not his uncle Leoncio but
Leoncios common-law wife, Criselda Manidlangan.
 The accused ran to his cornfield in Tibal-og and stayed there for quite sometime. Later, he went home
to their bukid in Malabog, Davao City and surrendered to his brother, who brought him to Peaplata.
 The trial court did not appreciate the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and passion and
obfuscation. While it held that voluntary surrender was present, this was purportedly offset by the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the crime was attended by
abuse of superior strength and cruelty.

HELD:
 The Court entertains no doubt that appellant killed Criselda Manidlangan. Appellant himself admitted
killing Criselda when he testified before the Court. Although his testimony alludes to self-defense
appellant claiming that he was attacked by his uncle and that he mistakenly killed the victim in the
process of retaliation the Court rejects this claim to this justifying circumstance. Appellant has not
presented any evidence other than his testimony to overcome this burden and establish the
foregoing requisites.
 The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime was not established by prosecution. The mere
fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain a finding of nocturnity. Requisities
of nightime as aggravating circumstance:
1. it is specially sought by the offender; or
2. it was taken advantage of by him; or
3. it facilitates the commission of the crime to insure his immunity from capture.
In the case at bar, other than the time of the occurrence of the felony, nothing else suggests that it was
consciously resorted to by appellant to facilitate the commission of the crime.
 The trial court further held that extreme cruelty is clearly evident from the seventeen wounds the
helpless Cresilda suffered. Second, cruelty cannot be appreciated in the absence of any showing that
appellant, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted
on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The mere fact that wounds in excess of what was
indispensably necessary to cause death were found in the body of the victim does not necessarily imply
that such wounds were inflicted with the intention of deliberately and inhumanly intensifying or
aggravating the sufferings of the victim. The trial court also found that appellant possessed superior
strength. It noted that he was armed with a knife to weaken Cresilda and ensure the commission of the
crime with impunity. In other words, appellant supposedly took advantage of his sex and his weapon to
 fulfill his criminal intent. To take advantage of superior strength is to use excessive force out of
proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself. In order to be appreciated it
must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefactor to take advantage
thereof.
The prosecution bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstance with the same quantum
of proof as the crime itself. The prosecution has failed to meet this burden. It is true that appellant
admitted stabbing the victim several times albeit in self-defense. While the Court finds this tale tenuous,
the prosecution cannot rest its case on the weakness of the accuseds defense.
Appellant invoked three mitigating circumstances. The belated plea of guilt cannot be appreciated in
his favor. To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilty must be made at
the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness of
a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code requiring
that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution. It is well settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had
begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. In this
case, appellant pleaded guilty only after the prosecution had already presented two witnesses.
 Passion or obfuscation is also absent. For appellant to be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the
following elements should concur:
1. there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and
2. said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity.
Granting that the desecration of the remains of ones ancestors may drive a person to act upon an
impulse as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, appellant has not offered any proof other
than his testimony showing that his uncle had indeed taken the remains from its tomb.
 Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in appellants favor. Appellant fled immediately after the
killing. It took him more than a month- and-a-half to surrender himself to the authorities. It cannot be
said that such surrender, in view of his fleeing and hiding, was spontaneous, showing either
acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his
search and capture would require.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED. Appellant is instead found guilty of
HOMICIDE and sentenced to imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. The trial courts award of civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of Criselda
Manidlangan is, however, AFFIRMED and appellant is ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P50,000.00
for her death and P17,552.00 as actual damages.
68.

[G.R. No. 132750. December 14, 2001]

PEOPLE vs. ELGER GUZMAN

FACTS:
 This is an appeal from the Decision dated September 30, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Ilagan, Isabela, finding accused-appellant Elger Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 Accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and stab with a Fan Knife (Balisong) one
Elmer Aquino, inflicting upon him a stab wound on his body, which directly caused his death.
 RTC ruled that accused is guilty of the the offense charged.
 Appellant ascribed to the trial court this lone error: That the trial court erred when it disregarded and
failed to take into account the two mitigating circumstances of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim and voluntary surrender by the accused immediately after the incident.

HELD:
 Appellant, failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self defense. Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, and
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the case at bar, the request of the victim Elmer
Aquino to appellant that they talk outside the dance area was not an unlawful aggression that justified
appellant to stab him in self-defense. Hence, the trial court did not err in disregarding the said mitigating
circumstance.
 The court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his
favor. Voluntary surrender has the following requisites:
1. Offender has not been arrested
2. Offender surrendered himself to person of authority
3. The surrender was voluntary
 Must be spontaneous
 Unconditional intent
o Acknowledgment of guilt
o Wishes to save the authority the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
search and capture
The trial court erroneously held that appellants surrender was not voluntary because his surrender was
more of an apprehension on his part that if apprehended he would be subjected to torture which is
more speculative than real. However, the transcript showed that initially appellant was afraid to
surrender because he heard that the police always hurt the suspect in jail. Although appellant was
afraid to surrender because of his apprehension that he would be hurt in jail, yet appellant in fact
voluntarily surrendered to policeman Rodrigo Lucas, thus saving the authorities the trouble and
expense in effecting his capture. Granting that it were also true that appellant surrendered to Policeman
Rodrigo Lucas because he was afraid that if apprehended by another policeman he would be subjected
to torture, this circumstance should not affect the voluntariness and spontaneity of his surrender. In the
parallel case of People v. Amazan, although the accused-appellant therein surrendered four (4) days
later because of fear of reprisal, the Court said that the admission should not be taken against him, as it
has been held that said circumstance does not detract from the spontaneity of the surrender, nor does
it alter the fact that by giving himself up, the accused-appellant has saved the State the time and
trouble of searching for him until arrested. In People v. Bautista, the Court appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused-appellant who surrendered himself to a
police authority four (4) days after the commission of a crime. Hence, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of appellant.
 The trial court erroneously appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against appellant on
the ground that the stabbing was somewhat sudden and unexpected, without provocation from the
victim.[owever, it does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted
with treachery. Significantly, in treachery, the mode of attack must be consciously adopted. This means
that the accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or to
 retaliate. The mode of attack, therefore, must be planned by the offender, and must not spring from the
unexpected turn of events. In the case at bar, there is reasonable doubt that appellant deliberately and
consciously adopted a mode of attack to kill the victim without risk to himself considering that both
appellant and the victim were then attending a wedding party, and it was the victim who frontally
approached the appellant who at that time was watching the dance, and asked if they could talk outside
the dance area. Appellant answered that they could talk right then and there, after which appellant
stabbed the victim, hitting him on the left chest. It appears that the decision of appellant to stab the
victim was sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of
alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the
victims helpless position was accidental.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 2527 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Elger Guzman is found guilty of homicide only, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-
appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Elmer Aquino, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
as actual damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages; Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000.00) as loss of earning capacity of the
deceased; and to pay the costs.
69.

[G.R. No. 130654. July 28, 1999]

PEOPLE vs. EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER

FACTS:
 Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were legally married on
December 18, 1954. In their forty-one years of marriage, they begotten children. Accused-appellant and
Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier.
 On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three oclock in the morning, Consolacion Javier Panit, who
lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting
"Arayatan dac ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she heard her
mother scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma who, weeping,
told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma, at the time of the incident was living in her parents'
house. Consolacion and Alma then proceeded to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about
seventy to eighty meters away from their parents' house. The three then proceeded to their parents'
house. Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother and his father, accused-
appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their
father to the hospital. At this point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead and that
their father confessed to him that he killed his wife and thereafter allegedly stabbed himself. Florentina
was found dead in their bedroom, drenched in her own blood.
 RTC convicted accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death.
 SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police Station in La Union,
testified in the investigation he conducted with SPO4 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza
regarding the incident of June 15, 1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the
barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The police
authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in Brgy. Tugod, Sto. Tomas, where they saw
Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered with blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children, Pacho
testified that Manuel told him that his father confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to
him the bolo covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo was allegedly used by
accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. The medical findings indicated that the victim suffered from
multiple injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body.
 Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in their bedroom with
the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same one presented by the prosecution and which
he used in wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed his wife because he could
not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank
and he did not know what he was doing. He claims that he was insane at the time of the
incident.
 Accused-appellant does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting his defense of insanity,
he argues that he should be meted a lower penalty because at the time of the incident, he was suffering
from loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man,
aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit the crime.

HELD:
 The defense never presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor was a psychiatrist ever
presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the defense, during trial, never alleged
the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness and passion and obfuscation, thus weakening the
case of accused-appellant. In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had
been suffering from insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to commit an act beyond his control,
the killing of his wife, Florentina. The defense went on to cite medical literature on the effects of total
and partial sleep loss to support his contentions.
 For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the
presence of the following requisites:
 1. illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and
2. such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the
claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the
accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was
presented regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. No clear and convincing evidence was
shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-
power at the time of the killing. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the
ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that
he was in full control of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an
illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power.
 The circumstance of passion and obfuscation to mitigate his criminal liability was not appreciated.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements
should concur:
1. there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and
2. said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity.
The foregoing elements were not proved to be present in instant case. In fact, during accused-
appellant's testimony, he even stated that he was not jealous of his wife. The allegations propounded
by accused-appellant that his suspicions regarding his wife, aggravated by his illness made it possible
for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down his criminal liability.
 The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of parricide under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:
"Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory death
penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the
application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. The evidence show that the prosecution was not able to prove any
aggravating circumstance. Likewise, no mitigating circumstance is appreciated.Thus, in the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in Criminal Case
No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y
Basin should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.