Regime Progress: Towards International Small Trade: and Problems

Towards an International Regime on Small
Arms Trade: Progress and Problems
Tom Lansford
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the global arms trade showed a downward trend.
From 1990 through 1995, worldwide arms exports declined by 73 per cent.’ By
1997, the value of major arms transfers was approximately $25 billion, which was
62 per cent of the value of the arms trade in 1986.~ As a result, major international
arms manufacturers sought to diversify their sales and expand their markets. Con-
currently, there was mounting international pressure by specific nations and non-
governmental organizations to ban certain types of weapons, including landmines
and limit the global trade in small arms and light weapons. However, the US, the
world’s sole military superpower, opposed these efforts. This article makes an
attempt to examine various efforts to develop a regime which limits the global .
trade in small arms.
Regimes and Arms Control

Since the Second World War, there has been an expansion of international organ-
izations and institutions. These bodies, which deal with issues ranging from eco-
nomic to security to human rights, have influenced world politics to a great extent.33
The evolution of international regimes has served as the basis for increasing
The author is associated with the University of Southern Mississippi, USA.
The author is thankful to the anonymous referee for his/her comments and suggestions.
1
US, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers (WMEAT), 1995 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996). p.15.
2 See, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security, 1998 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3
For liberal institutionalists, power is defined broadly: "power is more than military strength. It
depends at least as much on economic strength, the attractiveness of one’s ideas and economic
system, and one’s willingness to spend resources on foreign policy. For many purposes—securing
cooperation from other advanced societies, ensuring growth in the world economy, cleaning the
global environment—military strength is not very important at all"; Robert O. Keohane, "The
Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies," in Helga Haftendorn
and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder: Westview,
1993), pp. 44-45.
Downloaded from isq.sagepub.com at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Biblioteca Alfonso Borrero Cabal, S.J. on May 20, 2015
366/
cooperation. Regimes can be defined as the &dquo;sets of implicit or explicit principles,

norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations.&dquo;’ They represent the accepted
ideals and norms which serve as the foundation for international bodies. Norms
refer to the &dquo;collective beliefs that regulate the behaviour and identity of actors.&dquo;5
At the specific level, they are the &dquo;standards of behaviour defined in terms of
rights and obligations.&dquo; Examples of common international norms include sover-
eignty, collective security and free traded lnstitutions are the formalized embodi-
ments of regimes.’ Since regimes are merely the codification of norms and values,
they do not have the ability to enforce compliance;’ they must rely on institutions
to carry-out enforcement measures.’
There are many types of arms control regimes that have achieved great success
in promoting cooperation between nations and limiting or eliminating the proli-
feration of certain types of weapons. 10 While no regime has succeeded in ensuring
complete compliance, examples of usually successful arms control regimes include
those dealing with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.’ However,, even these
regimes face certain problems which make arms control regimes different from
other international regimes.
While there has been a proliferation of regimes and institutions in the post-
Second World War era, their efficiency and utility have varied. To begin with, cer-
tain issue-based regimes have proved to be more effective than others. Trade
4
Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables," in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),
p. 2.
5 Andrew Farkas, "The Evolution of International Norms," International Studies Quarterly, vol.
40, no. 3, September 1996, p. 362; Robert Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security," in
Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(New York: Columbia University, 1996), p. 274.
6
Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., "How do International Institutions Matter? The
Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40,
no. 4 (December) 1996, p. 452.
7
Charles A. Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security," in George W. Downs, ed., Collective
Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). p. 48.
8Andreas Hansenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The
Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (October)
1996, p. 179.
9 Robert O. Keohane combines principles, norms and rules into a single category with his definition
of regimes: "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments. that pertain to particular
sets of issues in international relations"; Robert O. Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Per-
spective on World Politics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., International Institutions and State Power:
Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1989). p. 4. However, Keohane’s
narrow definition has been subject to much criticism, especially over its inability to account for the
relationships between the factors within a regime.

10
For an opposing view of the utility of arms control regimes, see Christopher Parker. "New
Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing
States," International Security, vol. 23. no. 4 (spring) 1999, pp. 119-46.
11
For a critique of the utility of regimes, see "Cave! Hic dragones
: A Critique of Regime Analysis,"
in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 337-54.
367
regimes in particular have developed highly effective methods for ensuring the
compliance with the rules, norms and procedures of the bodies and their resultant
institutions. 12 The factors that have contributed to the success of regimes such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), include commonality of interest, transparency, both
explicit and implicit rules, linkage strategies and leadership.’ ~ Such a combination
of factors has allowed contemporary free trade regimes to overcome economic
barriers that limited the success of past regimes.’4
Of particular importance for regime formation and continuation is leadership. ’5
Often a major or hegemonic power is necessary to take the initiative and establish
the basis for a regime. Such powerful states can set and administer the rules of the
international system, since &dquo;hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single
country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes,
whose rules are relatively precise and well-obeyed&dquo; .16 Although in the post-Cold
War era, international bodies such as the European Union (EU) or the United Na-
tions (UN) have played leadership roles, the support of major powers remains a
critical component in the success of regimes.&dquo;
Security regimes differ from economic regimes as it is difficult to ensure trans-
parency, linkages and leadership. 18 For instance, security concerns may prevent
transparency in arms control verification regimes. Further, whereas economic
gains by one country may &dquo;spillover&dquo; into others, security gains by a single nation
are often perceived in a zero-sum game framework in which other nations &dquo;lose&dquo;,
leading to the deterioration of overall security.&dquo; In addition, arms control regimes

face the dilemma of regulating both economic and security matters as the sale of
dual-use technology and arms by private companies may undermine national
efforts to counter proliferation.&dquo;’
12
See, Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, eds, Non-State Actors in World Politics (London:
Palgrave/St. Martin’s, 2002).
13
Charles Lipson, "The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change,"
in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 233-72.
14
John Conybeare, "Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and
Hawley-Smoot Conflicts," in Keneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), pp. 147-72.
15
Jock L. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers:
Regime Dynamics and Functions," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 273-314.
16
See Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International
Economic Regimes, 1967-77," in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander L. George, eds.,
Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview, 1980).
17
On the hegemonic power of the EU, see Miles Kahler, Regional Futures and Transatlantic
Economic Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).
18
Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 174-75.
19
This is the "security dilemma" whereby "actions taken by your state, intended to increase the
security of your citizens, result in an adversary taking countervailing actions that ultimately diminish
the security of all"; John Nagl, "Defending Against New Dangers: Arms Control of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in a Globalized World." World Affairs, vol. 62, no. 4 (spring) 2000, p. 158.
20
Jason Ellis, "Beyond Nonproliferation: Secondary Supply. Proliferation Management, and
U.S. Foreign Policy," Comparative Strategy, vol. 20, no. 1 (January-March) 2001, pp. 1-24.
368
Those who are making efforts to limit the spread of small arms and light weapons
may learn two major lessons from the plethora of existing non-proliferation
regimes. First, transparency remains the key to the success of arms control regimes.
Verification methods must be in place to ensure that weapons are not transferred. 2I
Second, the involvement and support of the major powers of the day is also crucial.
For instance, US-Soviet cooperation was key to the early success of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and regime.22 On the other hand, the unwillingness
of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has
undermined the success of the regime and the efforts to use the CTBT to develop
a fissile material control regime. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was
also delayed because of the slow pace of ratification in Russia and the United
States and the &dquo;ambivalence&dquo; of the latter to assume a leadership role (including
enacting legislation necessary to the regime).23 Similarly, the failure of major
powers to adopt leadership roles in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
has come in the way of establishing verification and control procedures and
mechanisms.24
The Landmine Regime as a Precursor
Among the post-Cold War arms control efforts is the 1996 Ottawa Initiative to
eliminate the use of landmines .21 The United Nations estimates that some 110
million landmines of various types remain buried in the ground in at least sixty-
eight countries around the world 21 because of the various sub-state conflicts in
the 1990s. Landmines are dangerous specially to civilian populations since once
laid, they may remain undetected long after the end of the conflict; most mines
remain effective for more than fifty years. During the 1990s, it is estimated that
landmines killed 500 people per week on an average.2’
To deal with this a global coalition of nations, non-governmental organizations
and international bodies worked to develop a comprehensive ban on landmines.
By 1995, some forty-one nations had declared their willingness to ban these
weapons.&dquo; Furthermore, the importance of banning landmines was highly
21
Malcolm Dando, "Conflict Resolution: Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions,"
Disarmament, no. 20 (winter) 2000, pp. 32-47.
22
See J. Mohan Malik, "China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," Contemporary
Southeast Asia, vol. 22, no. 3 (December) 2000, pp. 445-78.
23
Brad Roberts, "The Road Ahead for Arms Control," Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 2
(spring) 2000, p. 222.
24
Ibid., pp. 222-24.
25 The Ottawa Initiative resulted in the 1996 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.
26
United Nations (UN), Impact ofA rmed Conflict on Children: Land-mines, a Deadly Inheritance
(available online at www.unicef.org/graca/mines.htm).
27
NATO, Canadian Joint Delegation,
"Canadian Policy Initiatives: Land Mines," (Brussels:
January 2000).
28
UN, Impact of Armed Conflict.
/ 369
publicized by prominent international figures, including the late Princess Diana.

As a result, in 1996, delegates from around the world met in Ottawa to develop
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (commonly known as the Ottawa
Convention). The Convention has been signed by 133 nations and ratified by 122
so far.19
Several countries and international bodies, including the UN and the EU, have
pledged support in terms of providing resources and funding for the destruction
or removal of landmines. For instance, both Australia and Canada have committed
$100 million towards demining programmes, while the EU allocates around $50
million per year for this purpose .30 The Convention has achieved success, albeit
in specific areas. For example, the total number of landmines still lying buried
has declined to approximately seventy million.3’
However, the landmine convention is opposed by, among others, the United
States which puts a question mark on its effectiveness.;2 The opposition is spear-
headed by the US Department of Defense and American arms manufacturers.
One Defence department official summarized the American view of the Convention
by saying that &dquo;when we have something to replace land mines with&dquo;, we might
think of eliminating them. In the meantime &dquo;we would use anything in our arsenal
to defeat the enemy.&dquo;33 In 1998, President Clinton issued a directive (Presidential
Decision Directive 64) which called for the development of alternative weapons
system for the gradual elimination of antipersonnel mines outside of Korea by
2003 and for the US to sign the Ottawa Convention in 2006.34 This directive has
been quietly set aside by the administration of President Bush in order to save
some $4.1 billion needed for developing the alternative weapons systems.&dquo;
The failure of the US to lead the Ottawa Convention has blunted the effectiveness
of the regime. For instance, a number of major powers, including China, Russia,
Belarus, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Korea, retain their stockpiles
29
Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "The Ottawa Convention
Status Report," 10 October 2001.
30
Much of this support is targeted to specific nations. In the case of Australia, the primary
demining efforts have been in Cambodia and Laos (76 per cent of total expenditures) while other
aid recipients include Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Sri Lanka and Thailand; Australia, Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Global Issues Land mines (Sydney: ADFAT, 2001).
31
Ibid.
32
Although the treaty has been responsible for the destruction of some 25 million landmines
and fifty-five nations have destroyed all or are in the process of destroying all of their mines, the
United States continues to insist upon the right to use landmines as a legitimate military weapon;
for an overview of US policy on landmines, see US, Department of Defense, "Report on DoD’s
Implementation of the U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine (APL) Policy," no. 245-97 (May 1997).
33
Chris Strohm, "Pentagon Directs Army to Continue Alternative Land Mines Program," Inside
the Army (24 December 2001).
34 US, White House, Presidential Decision Directive 64 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998).
35
This figure includes nineteen different development and procurement programmes budgeted
from 2001 to 2007; Strohm.
370/
and partly cite the US refusal as a justification.36 Furthermore, a number of signatory

states, including most of the NATO members, have US troops deployed in their
territories with landmines, although all, except Germany, have pressed for the
ultimate removal of those mines.&dquo; The refusal of the US to join the landmine
convention was a precursor to its later disinclination to join the efforts to develop
an international small arms control regime.
The Small Arms and Light Weapons Trade
Following the end of the Cold War, several governments and groups began working
toward the development of an international regime to control trade in small arms
and light weapons. While the threat of a global superpower conflict subsided, the
1990s witnessed ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world. Violent conflicts
in countries such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, were fought
mainly with small arms and light weapons. The easy availability of firearms was
considered to be one of the main factors that fuelled such conflicts.
With the overall decline in the international arms trade, each individual com-
ponent or weapons type became important for arms manufacturers. By definition,
small arms and light weapons include handguns, rifles, shotguns, assault rifles,
machine guns, shoulder-launched rockets and hand-delivered explosive devices
(hand grenades). The legal trade in small arms and light weapons is estimated at
$6 billion, while the illegal trade accounts for $1 billion. The trade involves com-
panies in at least ninety-five nations and 600 firms throughout the world.38 Arms
companies manufacture around four million small arms and light weapons per
year which are added to the global total of 550 million such weapons that are
legally-owned .39 The value of new small arms production in 2000 was approxi-
mately $1.4 billion. In the same year, fifteen billion units of ammunition were
produced which had a value of $2.6 billion. It is important to note that 75 per cent
of new small arms are produced in the United States, mainly for domestic sale.10
The world’s top four small arms manufacturers are the United States, Brazil, China
and Russia. Each exports small arms and light weapons worth $75 million. About
half of the world’s firearm manufacturers are located in the United States which
in 1998 sold $463 million worth of small arms to 124 different countries (includ-
ing thirty in the midst of some form of armed conflicts and five where the UN
36
Mary Wareham, Antipersonnel Land Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction: Fact Sheet, Human
Rights Watch (14 December 1999).
37
For instance, the United States has approximately 530,000 antipersonnel mines stockpiled in
six nations that are party to the Convention: Germany (112,000), Italy (91,000), Japan (156,000),
Norway (123,000), Spain (38,000) and the United Kingdom (10,000); "Landmine Treaty Trans-
parency Reporting: Fact Sheet," Landmine Monitor (11January 2000).
38
"Controlling the World’s Guns," The Economist, 10 July 2001.
39United Nations (UN), "Press Conference on Small Arms Survey," 10 July 2000. available at
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2001/smallarmssurvey.doc.htm.
40
Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies,
2000).
/ 371
peacekeepers were on active duty). Besides the major small arms producers, there
are twenty-three medium-size producers who export arms worth $1 million
annually, and twenty-nine minor producers which export less than $1 million.4’
The trade in small arms and light weapons has increased significantly over the
years. Between 1960 and 1990, there was a six-fold increase in the number of
companies producing such weapons. The number of companies involved in the
manufacture of small arms has increased by 25 per cent since the 1980s.42 In the
1990s, a trend began which involved the licensing of firearms production. Fourteen
of the world’s main arms producing countries, ranging from the United States to
Belgium to Singapore, signed various agreements which allowed the manufacture
of arms and ammunition in forty-four developing nations. This has increased
internal trade in weapons in many nations and also resulted in the expansion of
the illegal trade, since many of these nations often do not have stringent export
controls.
In 2001, some 305 million (or 56 per cent) firearms were legally owned by
private individuals across the globe. In addition, 226 million small arms (or 411
per cent of the total) were possessed by the military, while eighteen million (or 3
per cent) were held by the police. Just 0.9 million (or 0.2 per cent) were used by
insurgents or rebel groups. 13 It is difficult to estimate the number of illegal small
arms and light weapons used by others than the anti-government groups. Small
arms are produced illegally in at least twenty-five nations. This accounts for
approximately 16 per cent of the total small arms production. The majority of the
illegal trade in weapons relates to small arms and light weapons. The majority of
these weapons are from stockpiles that were built up during the Cold War.
The most common weapon used in low-intensity conflicts around the world is
the Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle. Approximately fifty million of these firearms
are in use around the world,&dquo; This weapon is known for its reliability and effective-
ness. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, lax security at former
Soviet military bases facilitated as many as one million of the rifles to be smuggled
out. By the mid-1990s, &dquo;the business of stealing from stockpiles matured into a
tightly organized black market&dquo;. The trade was led by &dquo;savvy Russian-speaking
men who could cash in on their connections in the ex-Soviet military and in coun-
tries where it once had influence&dquo;.45 In the meanwhile, the major Russian defence
41
The medium-sized producers include: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Singapore, South
Africa. South Korea, Spain. Switzerland, Taiwan and Turkey. The small-sized producers include:
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia. Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Indonesia, Japan, Luxembourg. Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela
and Yugoslavia; Small Arms Survey.
42
Amnesty International, Proliferation: Global Growth in Small Arms (June 2001).
43
Ibid.
44
Margaret Coker, "Illegal Soviet Weapons Fuel Wars Around World," Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, 8 July 2000, p. 1.
45
Ibid.
372
companies lost control over factories in other former Soviet republics. These fac-
tories were no longer required to pay the license fees and faced no legal restrictions
on the sale of large numbers of AK-47s which they provided. These weapons
were sold in the illegal market.
The impact of small and light weapons is highly disproportionate to their
numbers. To begin with, since 1990 small arms and light weapons have been used
in forty-nine major conflicts as main weapons. They have also been responsible
for at least four million deaths or 90 per cent of all combat fatalities since 1990.
Further, less developed countries tend to rely on small arms greatly because of
the low cost of these arms. The United Nations has estimated that two-thirds of
the thirty least developed nations were affected by conflicts in which small arms
played a key role.’ The use of these weapons has also had a disastrous economic
impact. For instance, the Inter-American Development Bank has estimated that
the economic cost of the use of small arms in Latin America is $170 billion per
year. 41 In 2000, in Colombia alone, 4,000 people were killed with small arms and
the continuing internal conflict in the county between the government and its
paramilitary forces on the one hand and the drug traffickers and anti-government
rebels on the other has resulted in the creation of an estimated 300,000 internal
refugees.48
Since the end of the Cold War, small arms and light weapons have killed more
combatants and civilians than heavy weapons such as artillery, tanks and aircraft.
Small arms are popular due to three factors: low cost, effectiveness and trans-
portability. It has been pointed out that unlike major conventional weapons, such
as fighter jets and tanks, &dquo;which are procured almost exclusively by national mili-
tary forces, small arms span the dividing line between government forces-police
and soldiers-and civilian populations&dquo;.49 Assault rifles, such as the AK-47, can
be purchased in some nations for as low a price as the equivalent of $15. In ad-
dition, these arms can be used for twenty to forty years. Also, unlike major weapons
systems, small arms usually require very little maintenance and can be easily
transported by individuals. Individuals can use these weapons with minimum
46
Mark Malloch Brown, "United Nations Development Program Statement on the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects" United Nations Development Program, 13
July 2001.
47
"Controlling the World’s Guns," Economist.
48 In 2000, there were an estimated 25,000 rebels and 8,000 pro-government paramilitaries.
Between 1995 and 2000, Columbian government forces seized 15,000 small arms and 2.5 million
rounds of ammunition. The main revolutionary groups, the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Columbia
(FARC) finances its operations through a combination of kidnappings, trade in illicit drugs and
extortion. From these sources FARC earns between $250 million and $350 million annually. These
funds are used for arms purchases. One FARC operation alone funnelled 10,000 AK-47s from
Jordan to Peru and then smuggled into Columbia; Mike Williams, "Columbia: Drug ’Taxes’ Fund
Arsenals," Atlanta Journal and Constitution (9 July 2001).
49
Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, "Special Report: Waging a New Kind of War—A
Scourge of Small Arms," 17 May 2000; available online at http://www.sciam.com/2000/0600issue/
0600boutwell.html.
/373
training even though these weapons are extremely deadly. Most assault rifles and
light machine guns can fire of up to 700 rounds per minute. In some cases, these
weapons not only match but sometimes prove to be far superior to those used by
a country’s police force and the military.5°
During the 1990s, the illegal flow of arms had its disastrous impact on certain
African countries. The lengthy civil wars in Angola, the Sudan and Sierra Leone
and ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo are the examples. For
instance, there was a UN-backed weapons embargo on Angolan rebel groups
such as the national Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) since
1993, even though arms continued to flow into the country from neighboring
states such as Zambia. The 1994 Rwandan Civil War claimed the lives of some
one million ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu (most killed with small
arms and un-
sophisticated weapons such as machetes). Before the ethnic killing began, the
Hutu government distributed assault weapons and small arms to militia groups.
Events in Africa also demonstrated that even a relatively small number of these
weapons could have a major impact. Take the case of Charles Taylor who, with
only 100 supporters armed with light weapons, seized power in Liberia in 1991.
The coup in Liberia was followed by a civil war in Sierra Leone in 1999 which
claimed the lives of 50,000 and injured more than 100,000.
.
Efforts to Control Small Arms Trade
Since the end of the Cold War there have been sporadic efforts to develop multi-
lateral controls for both the legal and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
Specific nations and a number of non-governmental organizations have taken
initiatives at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels to control/regulate the small
arms trade. A number of . ountries have also endeavoured to develop internal
programmes to reduce the use of small arms within their borders. Efforts have
been made at three broad levels: national, regional and global.
National Level Efforts

At the national level, there have been efforts to address both the supply and demand
of small arms and light weapons. Certain governments with either large weapons
stockpiles or major arms producing firms have initiated a variety of strategies
designed to limit the supply of weapons, especially to strife-torn areas and to
non-government actors, mainly rebel groups and drug traffickers. Some of the
world’s major arms exporting nations actually have the most stringent export
laws in place. In the 1970s, the Carter administration implemented the Arms Export
Control Act to restrict weapons exports under specific conditions. In 1986, Canada
formulated its Export Control Policy which was more restrictive than that of the
50
The reasons behind the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are detailed in International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed
Conflict" (1 June 1999).
374 /
United States.5’ Germany, the United Kingdom, as well as many developing nations
such as South Africa, also have in place strict export regulation laws. These laws
limit or forbid arms transfers to nations that are afflicted with domestic conflicts
or human rights abuses. For instance, in South Africa export of small arms is
evaluated on the basis of such considerations as human rights and regional security
by a cabinet-level committee.52
Nonetheless, there are wide discrepancies among national export control laws.
Many arms-producing nations such as China have very loose export controls and
few enforcement mechanisms. Italy’s Arms Control law, ratified in 1990, places
strict restrictions on military arms. However, weapons that are exported for Civilian
use quite literally fall under the same export controls as pasta.5; As a result, Italy
exports small arms and, more importantly, ammunition to over a 100 nations. In-
cluded in the definition of weapons for civilian use are semi-automatic weapons,
including assault rifles and almost all categories of munitions. From 1993 to 1997,
Italy was the main supplier of weapons to Sierra Leone (with a value of $1.6 mil-
lion). It supplied the Republic of the Congo firearms and ammunition worth $7
million and exported to Algeria arms and bullets worth $6 million. These transfers
took place despite the fact that each country was embroiled in domestic conflicts.
Further, international arms brokers have also developed supply routes that allow
them to bypass export controls by first purchasing arms legally and then transferring
them to areas under embargo. For instance, in 1996, the government of Rwanda
obtained arms worth $300,000, including 2,500 AK-47s, ammunition, explosives
and mortars, by an arrangement through which the weapons were first legally
sold by Seychellian firms to agents in Zaire, who then transferred the weapons to
Rwanda despite the fact that the nation had been under an arms embargo since
1994.~ The black market in arms has developed highly intricate methods.55
As mentioned above, the theft and transfer of arms also continue to be major
sources of illegal weapons. Following the breakdown of civil government
in Albania in 1997, an estimated 750,000 small arms and light weapons were
looted from government and military stores. A large quantity of these weapons
51
Ibid., pp. 40-44.
52
T. Robinson and Jeffrey Boutwell. "South Africa’s Arms Industry: A New Era of Democratic
Accountability," Armed Forces & Society, Summer 1996, pp. 613-14.
53
Amnesty International, "Italy and Small Arms: A Case Study," June 2001, available online at
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ttt.nsf/june2001/italy.
54
United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda). S/1996/195. 14
March 1996, p. 15.
55
In this regard the observation made by OXFAM is quite interesting: "In some case the arms
will be delivered by a shipping firm based in one country, with its aeroplane registered in a second,
which flies out from a third, will pick up arms in a fourth country, re-fuel in a fifth, be scheduled to
land in a sixth, but actually will deliver its lethal consignment in a seventh country. To make things
even more complex, it would appear that shipping company details change on a fairly frequent
basis, suggesting that they are often set up purely to manage the delivery of a particular consignment
of arms." OXFAM, Out of Control: The Loopholes in UK Controls on the Arms Trade (Oxford:
OXFAM, 1998). Section 2.
/ 375
was subsequently smuggled into Kosovo and Macedonia to support ethnic Albanian
separatist movements. 16
One of the most significant actions taken to check the illicit trade in weapons
occurred at the sub-national level when arms manufacturers in the United States
and Europe agreed in July 2001 to implement a voluntary programme to mark
small arms. This programme would allow domestic and international officials to
more accurately trace the origins of weapons seized or confiscated. Besides the
United States, major small arms firms in-Canada, Colombia, Nigeria, France,
Italy and the United Kingdom also agreed to participate in the programme. They
also pledged to take action if their weapons are found in the global black market
.
in firearms. 57
Since the efforts to develop stricter national export laws have been disparate,
they have not been effective in substantially reducing the illicit trade in arms, al-
though they have had some impact on the legal trade. In response, many nations
have sought to curtail the demand for weapons and to reduce domestic supplies
of arms. Increasingly, a major component of political settlements involves the
surrender of arms. These efforts to collect and destroy weapons are often modelled
after the popular US gun buy-back programmes. 58 By 2000, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia had implemented buy-back programmes. 59 A national
collection programme in Australia received 644,000 weapons or almost 10 per
cent of the total number of guns in the country at a cost of $210 million ($108
million less than what the government had expected to pays These programmes
have greatly succeeded in developed nations such as Australia and the United
Kingdom and have worked well along with stricter gun control laws.
A report by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey contends that in nations
which are in the midst of or have recently settled armed conflict, practical disarma-
ment is optimally done in a multi-stage process. Phase one relates to &dquo;disarmament
by command&dquo; whereby militia groups, rebels and paramilitary forces surrender
56
C. Smith and D. Sogramosa, Illegal Weapons in Albunia: An Emerging European Security
Prublem? (London: North-South Defence and Security Programme, 1998), p. 7.
57
"Arms Makers Agree to Pact," Washington Post, 12 July 2001, p. 24.
58
These programmes centre around offers of cash or some other inducement for weapons. The
first such programme in the United States was initiated in Baltimore over 20 years ago and has
been responsible for the collection of 130.000 firearms. However. in the United States, research
has shown that these programmes sometimes have only a limited impact. In some cases, they
remove fewer than 1 per cent of the arms and often provide the means with which to purchase
newer or more sophisticated weapons: see for instance, C.M. Callahan, F.P. Rivara and T.D. Koepsell,
"Money for Guns: Evaluation of the Seattle Gun Buy-Back Program," Public Health Reports, vol.
10. no. 4. 1994, pp. 470-77.
59
These states include: Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii.
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia. Washington, West Virginia.
60
Sami Faltas, Glenn McDonald and Camilla Waszink, Removing Small Arms From Society: A
Review of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes, Occasional Paper, no. 2 (Geneva:
Small Arms Survey, July 2001), p. 4.
376 /
their weapons immediately at the end of a conflict. This phase tends to be &dquo;organ-
ized, supervised, public, and collective&dquo;. It is usually more &dquo;coercive than phase
two disarmament as wartime structures and leaders are used to consolidate peace.&dquo;61
The lingering conflict in Angola or the inability to secure peace in Northern Ireland
are demonstrative of the problems which are confronted when peace settlements
are reached without first agreeing to phase one disarmament. Phase two disarma-
ment is centred around the voluntary collection of weapons. Disarmament is not

achieved by &dquo;command&dquo; and usually individuals are induced to surrender their
weapons through initiatives such as buy-back programmes, amnesties and re-
duction in demand through a lessening of violent conflicts and the growth of civil
society. The United Nations has sponsored a number of programmes that provide
development assistance in exchange for the collection and destruction of weapons
within given communities. In response to the proliferation of weapons in Albania,
the UN provided community development grants after some 5,000 small arms
and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition were surrendered.&dquo; Similar to the buy-
back approach, this method is known as &dquo;weapons for development&dquo;. The Small
Arms Survey study concludes that phase one disarmament is much more effective
and usually easier to implement than phase two, in spite-of the incentives provided
by the latter. 63
Regional Level Efforts
Regional control initiatives should have much greater success in restricting the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, but so far such endeavours have
been handicapped by their limited geographic scope and lack of effective enforce-
ment mechanisms. While many of the nations involved in regional efforts have
accepted the norms and principles that form the foundation of a small arms regime,
they lack the necessary means and political will to establish the institutions needed
to ensure this.
Regional efforts have worked well in South America, Europe, Africa and Asia.
The majority of these programmes have focused on phase one weapons collections
and have been sponsored by regional or international organizations such as the
EU, Organization of American States (OAS), Organization of African Union (OAU)
and the UN. In Latin America, post-conflict disarmament programmes succeeded
only to a limited extent (see Table 1). Weapons collection programmes were under-
taken which were funded by a variety of sources. For instance, in Nicaragua these
were funded by both the OAS and the Italian government. In El Salvador they
were undertaken the UN, OAS and the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua,
while the initiative in Haiti was overseen by the US Army under the auspices of
the UN. One common factor that characterized these programmes was that they
all involved attempts to disarm former combatants. Another was that all weapons
61
Ibid., p. 6.
62
ICRC, "Arms Availability," pp. 16-18.
63
Faltas, McDonald and Waszink, Removing Small Arms, pp. 6-7.
/ 377
which were surrendered or confiscated were destroyed. Unfortunately, these

initiatives did not succeed in putting a substantial percentage of weapons out of
circulation from these countries. For instance, there remained an estimated two
million weapons in circulation in Guatemala and 360,000 in El Salvador.’
Table 1
Weapons Collection Programmes in Latin America
Source: Sami Faltas, Glenn McDonald and Camilla Waszink, Removing Small Arms from
Society: A Review of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes, Occasional
Paper, No. 2 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, July 2000).
In 1996, Mexico and Columbia initiated consultations to develop a broad

regional framework to eliminate the illicit arms trade through the OAS which
ultimately resulted in the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manu-
facturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related
Materials. The Convention has been signed by thirty-three nations and ratified by
twelve. The purpose of the Convention is &dquo;to prevent, combat, and eradicate the
illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and
other related materials&dquo;.65 It aims to establish uniform export and licensing systems
for arms exports and regular systems of cooperation to facilitate the exchange of
information on illicit arms transfers and to aid multilateral investigations. A further
purpose of the Convention is to institute a system of marking weapons to trace
their origins. So far, the Convention has led to the establishment of a Consultative
Committee which is entrusted with developing the framework for regional co-
operation. A multilateral committee has been asked to &dquo;establish an assembly of
binding norms to complement in internal actions with international cooperation
of all the countries of the region&dquo;.66
Efforts in Europe moved along two tracks. The EU established broad guidelines
to control the export of weapons in the wake of the Gulf War. These guidelines,
which were not binding, called for the banning of exports to regions in the midst
of internal conflicts and for a closer examination of the records of importing
64
Ibid., pp. 10-12.
65
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (November
1997).
66
Miguel Ruiz Cabanas, "Presentation of CIFTA During the United Nations Conference on the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects," 11 July 2001, available online at
http://www.un/org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/statements/consultativeE.html.
378
nations to guard against the re-export of weapons. Since some countries, including
France and the United Kingdom, continued to export in violation of the guidelines,
the EU adopted a programme to counter the illicit trade in small arms in 1997 and
followed it a year later with a general/broad Code of Conduct to regulate arms
transfers which incorporated the previous guidelines. The Code took into account
&dquo;the human rights’ situation in the recipient country; the level of democracy; the
absence of violent conflict and the reliability of the recipient country as an end
user of the goods and services delivered&dquo;. But it failed to address a host of issues
such as its non-binding character, the vagueness of the conditions to regulate
arms transfer, the absence of a clear list of goods and services and the difficulty to
actually control end users’ agreements after delivery. It also remained vague about
the level of transparency needed to democratically monitor the implementation
of the Code such as submitting annual reports to the respective national as well as
European parliaments.&dquo;
The EU cooperated with the United States to ensure transparency in arms
exports. The United States, on its part, expressed support for the EU Code and
declared its willingness to accept it as a model for an &dquo;international arms sales
code&dquo;. 68 Cooperation between the two major arms producers in the world (the US
and the EU) is essential, but current initiatives need to be strengthened and
broadened to include other arms producers.
The main multilateral law enforcement agency of the EU, the International
Criminal Police Agency (Interpol), has developed several major databases to
monitor the illicit arms trade and track international arms brokers in Europe. The
main programme, the Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS),
serves as a clearinghouse for information on arms trafficking and offensive
weapons. This can be used by national police forces to track criminals and aid
investigations. Cooperation between national and international law enforcement
agencies increases the likelihood of illicit arms operation being checked and the
perpetrators being held accountable.
Within Europe-besides limited national initiatives within EU nations such as
gun buy-back programmes in the United Kingdom-most of the efforts to limit
the number of weapons in circulation have focused on the Balkans region. These
efforts are centred around phase one programmes to collect weapons in the im-
mediate aftermath of civil conflicts. The UN has been the umbrella organization
for these weapons collection programmes, although the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has also conducted most of the operations in the states of
the former Yugoslavia, mainly Bosnia and Kosovo (see Table 2).
67
Ernst Guelcher, "Titley Report on Arms Exports (Implementation of the Code of Conduct on
EU Arms Exports)," News from the European Parliament, 4 October 2000, available online at
http://www.onelist.com/community/ENAAT.
68
United States and the European Union, Declaration by the United States and The European
Union on the Responsibilities of States and on the Transparency Regarding Arnis Exports,
Washington, D.C. (18 December 2000).
379
Table 2
Major Weapons Collection Programmes in Europe
Source: Removing Small Arms from Society.
Regional organizations such as NATO and the EU have also played an important
role in moderating state behaviour by insisting on compliance with their norms
from nations seeking membership in these bodies. For instance, several nations
have changed arms export procedures to make their policies consistent with those
of the EU.69 Unfortunately, as in Latin America, the European initiatives have
also been able to eliminate only a small quantity of weapons.
Similarly, regional bodies in Africa have launched welcome initiatives to deal
with the issues. As in other regions, the majority of programmes were launched as
post-conflict efforts to eliminate excess weaponry. The two most significant pro-
grammes to date concerned those in West Africa and Southern Africa. In both the
regions, the specific initiatives were partially funded by the EU and the UN and
supported by the OAS and other regional bodies such as the Economic Community
of West African States and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). In 1995, the UN increased its support for arms control by establishing a
trust fund for Central Africa &dquo;to control&dquo; the illicit transfer and proliferation of
small arms in the subregion, to promote arms restraint and transparency in military
acquisitions through the establishment of a subregional register of conventional
armaments, to foster inter-State cooperation on security matters and to contribute
to the peaceful resolution of existing conflicts in the subregion, in particular those
in Angola and in the countries of the Great Lakes area. 70
The West African programmes centred around a group of nations that have
been seriously afflicted with internal conflict. These included Liberia, Mali, Nigeria
69
For instance, Bulgaria has reduced exports of AK-47s by 90 per cent in order to bolster its
chances for membership in the EU and NATO; "Arms Without a Safety Catch," Stockholm Dagens
Nyheter, 12 July 2001, FBIS, EUP 200107000357.
70
UN, "Secretary-General Announces Establishment of Trust Fund to Promote Confidence-
Building in Central Africa," UN Press Release SG/SM/5942, 29 March 1996. The trust fund is
overseen by the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa which had
been established in 1992 in response to the UN General Assembly resolution 46/37/B of December
1991. The organization’s mandate was to "promote confidence-building measures, arm restraint
and disarmament in the subregion". The eleven members of the Committee are Angola, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic. Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome
and Principe and Zaire"; ibid.
380
and Sierra Leone (Table 3). In each case the main motive was to disarm groups
previously or currently involved in civil strife. As with other regional efforts,
these programmes, too, removed only a small percentage of available weapons,
but in several cases the symbolism attached to the attempts prompted closer
cooperation in combating the illicit arms trade. For instance, between 1995 and
1996, the EU and the Economic Community of West African States sponsored a
weapons exchange programme. In return for surrendering arms, former combatants
were given a variety of incentives which included food, cash and vocational
training. Although the effort resulted in the collection of 3,000 arms only, it became
a symbol of national reconciliation as the weapons were publicly destroyed in a
ceremony known as the &dquo;Flame of Peace&dquo;.&dquo; Such an experience led the government
of Mali to call for a moratorium on the production and import of small arms and
light weapons. This moratorium was accepted for a period of three years in October
1998. The EU and other arms producing nations pledged to respect the moratorium
and the OAS used it as a model for similar efforts elsewhere on the continent.
Table 3 .
Major Weapons Collection Programmes in Africa
*Includes both small arms and light weapons.

South Africa has led the regional efforts to control the illicit trade in arms in
Southern Africa. The South African initiatives involved both phase one and phase
two programmes. At the domestic level, the government worked with private
organizations and NGOs to implement weapons exchange and gun buy-back pro-
grammes. Incentives included cash and raffle vouchers for prizes up to $25,000.11
In 1998, the government also announced a plan to destroy all surplus or obsolete
military small arms and light weapons. With monetary support from Norway,
South Africa has already destroyed over 500,000 kgs of surplus military weapons.
It possesses radars that are capable of detecting low-flying aircraft of the type
usually used for arms trafficking. These are located on the border between South
Africa and Botswana and have been responsible for reducing illicit arms transfers
into Angola.&dquo;
71
Faltas, McDonald and Waszink, Removing Small Arms, p. 13.
72
Ibid., p. 14.
73
Unfortunately, the presence of this radar system has prompted arms smugglers to utilize
alternative routes.
/ 381
The South African government was also the primary sponsor of the Southern
African Regional Action Plan, adopted by the SADC in 1998. The plan had four
main objectives: combating illicit arms transfers; encouraging the collection of
arms in domestic circulation and the destruction of surplus arms; strengthening
the regulation of legal arms transfers and increasing transparency on matters relat-
ing to arms trade and transfer in the region and enhancing coordination between
police and customs services to combat illicit transfers.&dquo; South Africa also worked
bilaterally with countries such as Mozambique to destroy caches of weapons in
both countries.&dquo;
In Asia-Pacific, Australia had enormously successful programmes which resulted
in removing almost 10 per cent of weapons from circulation. Japan also has at-
tempted to decrease the demand for small arms and light weapons in the developing
world by linking foreign aid to efforts to curb weapons proliferation. Specifically,
it proposes to assist in the training of the police and improving the infrastructure
to curb the illicit import of arms. Furthermore, aid is also being linked to nations’
capability to meet &dquo;benchmarks&dquo; in their attempts to collect weapons and stop
arms imports. 16
Asian efforts, including those sponsored by organizations such as the UN, have
very few accomplishments to their credit (see Table 4). The most efficient phase
one weapons programme in Asia to date has been the ongoing UN-sponsored
effort in Cambodia. The Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia is
a coalition of NGOs, international organizations and the Cambodian government
which has worked with the UN to implement phase one and phase two programmes.
Cash incentives for the surrender of specific small arms have been offered by the
Cambodian government such as $7.50 for an AK-47, $5 for an M-16 and $1.25
for hand grenades or landmines&dquo; (see Table 4).
Table 4
Major Weapons Collection Programmes in Asia
*The majority of weapons were obsolete or non-functional.

74
ICRC, "Arms Availability," p. 44.
75
Cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique led to a series of operations code-named
"Rachel". To date, there have been six Rachel operations which have resulted in the collection and
destruction of 15,000 weapons.
76
Hiroaki Wada, "Japan to Tie its ODA, Other Foreign Aid to Weapons Collection," Tokyo Mainichi
Daily News, 7 July 2001.
77
Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia (WGWR), Public Opinion Survey on the
Weapons Confiscation Program of the Royal Government of Cambodia (Phnom Penh: WGWR,
1999).
382 /
Efforts to Develop a Global Regime

The successof regional efforts to control the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons has been mixed. While some efforts have worked well, others have been
limited in scope or have suffered due to lack of resources. As a result, advocates
of small arms control regime have sought to concentrate their efforts at the global
level in the late 1990s. Hoping to build on the momentum created by the Con-
vention banning landmines, efforts have been undertaken to bring together the
various regional and existent global programmes under the auspices of the UN.
It may be noted that various regional initiatives to control the legal and illicit
arms trade have been undertaken concurrently with some broad global pro-
grammes. A number of international bodies have sought to regulate arms proli-

feration by funding both phase one and phase two programmes. Organizations
such as the World Bank and the UN-backed Group of Interested States have funded
a variety of programmes designed to collect and/or destroy small arms and light
weapons. In addition, the UN has lent its support to these regional endeavours. It
has been the focal point of most international programmes. It is worth recalling that
the world body began to address the issues of arms proliferation as early as in 1962.
In 1992, US President George Bush called upon the UN Security Council to
adopt a voluntary code of &dquo;responsible&dquo; arms transfers. Although meetings were
held among the five permanent members of the Security Council, China dissociated
itself from the efforts to develop an international arms code and withdrew from
the talks after the US decision to sell sophisticated aircraft to Taiwan.&dquo; Following
the failure of this initiative, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali
pleaded that advances in nuclear disarmament should be &dquo;followed by parallel
progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons&dquo;.&dquo; His
call produced a variety of reports and studies and a resolution calling for the
establishment of an international accord to combat the illicit trade in arms.
Support for UN efforts to develop an effective regime came from a variety of
other quarters also. For instance, in May 1998, the Group of Eight Industrialized
Nations endorsed the UN proposal to work towards a binding agreement to limit
the arms trade. This was followed by a meeting of twenty-one &dquo;like-minded states&dquo;
in Oslo in July 1998. The meeting was organized by Canada and Norway. It
sought to develop consensus on terms, definitions and measures to limit the illicit
trade in small arms and light weapons.&dquo; The meeting issued a document titled, An
International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common
Understanding, which called for a variety of measures including increased border
controls, the implementation of both phase one and phase two weapons pro-
grammes, the destruction of surplus small arms and steps to make it easier to
78
ICRC, "Arms Availability." p. 38.
79
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace," UN Document A/50/60, 3
January 1995.
80
ICRC, "Arms Availability," p. 40.
/383
trace the manufacturer of arms/’ The Oslo meeting was followed by a summit in
Brussels in October 1998 which brought together governments, NGOs and various
international organizations. The Brussels meeting produced an action plan which
incorporated many of the features of the Oslo agreement.
In an effort to bring together all the countries of the world to address the licit
and illicit small arms trade and to codify the norms and values of a control regime,
the UN sponsored an international conference in July 2001. The purpose of the
UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its
aspects was to &dquo;find ways to curb and eliminate the illicit trafficking&dquo; in small
arms and light weapons. The Conference did not aim at &dquo;outlawing the legal
manufacture or trade&dquo; of these weapons, &dquo;nor their legal, private ownership&dquo;.

Further, it sought to work towards a &dquo;politically binding declaration, containing a
programme of action with measures that States can take at the national, regional
and international levels&dquo; .12 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan exhorted the Con-
ference to develop a &dquo;framework of binding norms and standards to eliminate the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons&dquo;.&dquo;
However, the Conference ran into problems. Regional organizations such as
the EU and the OAU called for the adoption of a legally-binding accord prohibiting
the sale of arms to rebel groups. The countries which supported such an agreement
included all the EU states, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Mexico and South Africa.
Indeed the EU states decided to move ahead with its own binding restrictions,
regardless of the outcome of the Conference. Much of the European support came
as a result of EU members’ experiences with weapons collection programmes in
the Balkans.&dquo;
Most of the major small arms exporting nations, including the United States,
China and Russia, opposed wide-ranging regulations. But Russia and China were
far more open to dialogue and to the development of some framework than the
United States. For instance, Russia proposed the adoption of regulations that would
only allow the re-export of weapons with the permission of the original exporter
as a means to curb the secondary trade in weapons and encourage greater trans-
parency in the flow of weapons and arms.85 It also advocated the unilateral adoption
of voluntary programmes to destroy excess stockpiles of weapons (citing an exist-
ing Russian programme as a model).&dquo;
The US opposed the restriction on arms transfer to rebel groups on the ground
that such transfers were necessary to support pro-democracy movements in totali-
81
Group of 21 Like-Minded States, An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons:
Elements of a Common Understanding (Oslo, Norway, July 1998).
82
UN, "Conference on Small Arms Set to Convene at Headquarters, 9-20 July," UN Document
DC/27/82,5 July 2001.
83 Kofi Annan, "Small Arms, Big Problems," International Herald Tribune, 10 July 2001.
84
Menno Steketee, "NATO Anticipates ’Meager Harvest’ in Macedonia" Rotterdam NRC
Hundelsblad, 25 August 2001.
85
"Russia Destroys ’Excessive’ Light Weapons," ITAR-TASS, 6 December 2001.
86
From 1998 to 2000, 420.000 small arms and light weapons were destroyed in Russia under
this programme; ibid.
384
tarian countries. It also opposed restrictions on private gun ownership as these

ran counter to its own domestic legislation such as the Second Amendment Rights
and American gun rights. The US representative to the Conference declared that
this country &dquo;will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures
contrary to our constitutional right to keep and bear arms&dquo;,81 Instead the US
advocated a non-binding programme that would promote cooperation without
putting restrictions. It was supported by China and Cuba88 and opposed by the
African nations. Nigeria and Sierra Leone in particular were strongly opposed to
the US plan, but eventually agreed to come to a compromise.89
Thus, as with several other arms control regimes, including the landmine regime,
the United States became the main obstacle in developing a strong international
agreement on small arms. The US opposition was based on two main grounds.
First, the US objected to what it regarded as &dquo;one size fits all&dquo; approach and
sought to preserve flexibility to sell or transfer small arms and light weapons as a
tool of its foreign policy. 90 Second, there were concerns over the domestic impli-
cations of international restrictions and monitoring of small arms, particularly in
the case of efforts to track weapons.9’
The EU nations were able to convince other members of the importance of
reaching an agreement as the beginning towards a more comprehensive treaty
later. As part of the compromise, an agreement among the participants was reached
for a follow-up conference in February 2002 and another major conference in
2006 to work out a more comprehensive international accord. Concurrently, the
European countries, led by the Belgian delegation, also agreed to develop a system
of voluntary &dquo;marking, tracing and transfer norms&dquo; in order to improve the trans-
parency of small arms transfers and sales. 92 It was believed that such a system
would enhance the ability of states and international bodies to trace the flow of
arms and identify arms and weapons that were illegally bought and sold.
To avoid the experience of the landmine Convention, due consideration was
given to the US proposal. The result was a non-binding programme that called for
special markings on arms so as to effectively trace their origin and aid in control
efforts. It also suggested measures to monitor the transfer of weapons in a more
efficient manner and called upon countries to destroy stockpiles of surplus arms.
Most importantly, it urged nations not to transfer weapons to regions in the midst
87
Quoted in Colum Lynch, "U.S. Fights U.N. Accord to Control Small Arms," Washington Post,
10 July 2001, A1.
88
Rachel Stohl, "United States Weakens Outcome of UN Small Arms and Light Weapons
Conference," Arms Control Today, 1 September 2001.
89
Ewen MacAskill, The Guardian, 23 July 2001.
90Joe Fiorill, "Small Arms: Countries Examining Voluntary Measures," UN Wire (26 February
2002).
91
US, Department of State, Donald J. McConnell, "Combating the Spread of Small Arms: The
U.S. Approach" (13 June 2001).
92
The Bush Administration perceived that such measures might force new registration legislation
in the United States that would be politically unpopular; US, Department of State, "Richard Boucher
Press Conference on the UN Small Arms Conference," 10 July 2001.
385
of conflict. The main concession that the Conference was able to extract from the
US was that it agreed to another conference before 2006.93
While the Conference failed to establish the institutional framework necessary
to establish the regime, a number of positive steps were taken. In support of the
UN programme, many countries pledged additional aid for weapons collection. 94
Although the programme is not legally binding, many nations agreed to implement
its recommendations. Ambivalence of the United States, however, remains a
problem for the long-term success of the nascent regime. The United States is the
world’s primary arms producing nation and its decision to continue to employ
arms transfer as a foreign policy tool undermines efforts to establish a full-fledged
small arms and light weapons trade regime.

_
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the world’s
major producer and exporter of small arms and light weapons. Hegemonic or
primary powers are usually necessary to initiate cooperation in international affairs
and to the formation of global regimes. They provide the means to enforce the
norms and rules of the regime and to punish those who violate. The reluctance of
the United States to assume a leadership role in developing a global small arms
control regime has limited the effectiveness and utility of the nascent regime.
Nonetheless, patterns of cooperation on arms control in other issues areas,
including landmines and weapons of mass destruction have been internalized by
nations and such cooperation has created the basis for other arms control regimes.
With regard to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, this has happened
at the regional level. Organizations such as the EU, OAS and OAU have provided
the forums for cooperation on an arms control regime, even without the support
of powerful individual state actors. Most of the cases relating to the elimination
of small arms through phase one and phase two programmes in Africa and Europe
have been successful with the aid and support of regional bodies.
At the global, instead of fostering cooperation towards the establishment of a
regime on small arms trade, the primary power has proved a stumbling block. At
one level, the United States has supported specific rules and norms designed to
curb the illicit trade in arms. At another level, it has asserted its national interest
in such a way as to create problems for norm development and restrain regime
formation.
August 2002
93
Judy Aita, "Nations Agree on Plan to Curb Illicit Weapons Flows," Washington File (22 July
2001).
94
For instance, Belgium pledged $1.5 million for phase one and phase two programmes in the
Great Lakes Region of Africa and the United Kingdom pledged $27 million for UN and regional
organizations in their efforts to combat the illicit trade in weapons; UN, "Governments Pledge
Support for Small Arms Programmes," UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 24 July 2001.

Regime Progress: Towards International Small Trade: and Problems

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Towards an International Regime on Small

Arms Trade: Progress and Problems

Regimes and Arms Control

The author is associated with the University of Southern Mississippi, USA.

cooperation. Regimes can be defined as the &dquo;sets of implicit or explicit principles,

relationships between the factors within a regime.

leading to the deterioration of overall security.&dquo; In addition, arms control regimes

The Landmine Regime as a Precursor

publicized by prominent international figures, including the late Princess Diana.

and partly cite the US refusal as a justification.36 Furthermore, a number of signatory

The Small Arms and Light Weapons Trade

National Level Efforts

ment is centred around the voluntary collection of weapons. Disarmament is not

Regional Level Efforts

which were surrendered or confiscated were destroyed. Unfortunately, these

In 1996, Mexico and Columbia initiated consultations to develop a broad

Source: Removing Small Arms from Society.

Major Weapons Collection Programmes in Africa

*Includes both small arms and light weapons.

*The majority of weapons were obsolete or non-functional.

Efforts to Develop a Global Regime

grammes. A number of international bodies have sought to regulate arms proli-

manufacture or trade&dquo; of these weapons, &dquo;nor their legal, private ownership&dquo;.

tarian countries. It also opposed restrictions on private gun ownership as these

small arms and light weapons trade regime.

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