REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
45
MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS,
respondents.
FACTS:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of
respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of
Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-
hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao
(now Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of
what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao
District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase
of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per
hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of
P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however,
annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales
applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the
bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled
bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4,
1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder.
He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro
and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price
of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to
Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the
proceedings had in connection with the Sales Application
No. 5436 were in accordance with law and existing
regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded to
the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare
or P2,211.00 for the whole tract.
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed
at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales Application, the
Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514.
On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land
awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos.
1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area
of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an
amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus
stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales
Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed
by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the
said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom
portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and
as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course."
The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very
land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued
Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from
sale and settlement and reserving the same for military
purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff,
Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.
covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400 hectares,
the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended.
This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No.
1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the
Sales Application at the time the payment was made.
Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose
P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus,
pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having
an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of
Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena
granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of
agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island
of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares,
64 ares, and 00 centa.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by
virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the
area for medical center site purposes.
HELD: YES
Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title
over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares,
designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion
thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease
pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation
No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay
legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical
Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health,
of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration
under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is
constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of
the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands
in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration
Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." 9 It would
be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of
Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable
title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease
pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the
full extent of the reservation, when the proclamation
explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081
hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity.
It proceeds from the recognized competence of the
president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable
lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service.
10 section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code
empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other
disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land
belonging to the private domain of the Government of the
Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law. the land reserved "shall be used for the specific
purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise
provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act
(CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain
as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the
Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the
military "camp site" was executed between Eugenior de
jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be
void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights
over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936.
In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon
already withrew the area from sale or settlement and
reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate
Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the
donation was not the land itself but "the possessory and
special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We
disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation
may consist of a thing or right. But the term "right" must
be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the
processor has the jus disponendi. This is because, in true
donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of
the donor or diminution of his assets. Eugenio de Jesus
cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right
over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed
12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot
had already been severed from the mass of disposable
public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the
Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a
consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In
fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that
the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award,
still the same may not be the subject of donation.
Director of Land vs. IAC and ACME Plywood & Veneer Co.
FACTS:
This case started when ACME Plywood, sought to register 5
parcels of land. The Director of Land opposes the
registration.
▪ Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented
by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of
land
▪ Possession of the Infiels over the land dates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
▪ Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant
to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members
of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them
or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain
▪ Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more
than P45M worth of improvements
▪ Ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered was duly recognized by the government.
▪ IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
Director of Land’s Contention
➢ The land is of public domain.
➢ Corporations are prohibited by the 1973
Constitution (the Constitution in effect that time)
to lands of public domain except in lease not
exceeding 1,000 hectares.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is already a private land
→ Yes
Whether or not the constitutional prohibition
against acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies → No
RULING:
Whether or not the land is already a private land?
- The land is already private land not only in right to a
grant but by operation of law.
- The SC further said that for the grant to be honored
by the court, it is not necessary that they have a
certificate of title, an application for registration is
sufficient for the grant to be honored.
“The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens Title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent”
“The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law”
Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies?
The SC held in this case that the constitutional prohibition
does not apply because the land was already a private land
to which the Infiels, who are members of the Dumagat
Tribe, have a legal, sufficient and transferrable title over
the land on October 29, 1962 when ACME acquired it from
them.
Since the land acquired by the private corporation is a
private land to begin with then ACME has a perfect right to
make such acquisition.
The only limitation imposed to the corporations when the
acquisition was made was that they could not hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,0124 hectares.
The SC said that there is no need to dwell on the 1935 or
the 1973 Constitution as contended by the Director of Land
because the land is already converted to private land. And
there is no prohibition whether in the 1935 or 1973
Constitution on the acquisition of private corporations over
private lands. The 1973 Constitution and the present 1987
Constitution only gives a prohibition on private
corporations in their acquiring lands of the public domain,
meaning your agricultural lands.
Now the INFIELS in the evidence that was presented by
Acme proved that the INFIELS were already in possession
since time immemorial, even before Magellan discovered
the Philippines. So even before the Spaniards discovered
the Philippines, it was already private property. So if the
land has already been converted to private land, then the
private corporation may own that land because there is no
prohibition on the acquisition of a private corporation on
private lands.
LAUSAN AYOG, ET.AL., vs. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI
November 19, 1982
FACTS:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after
bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co., Inc. a parcel
of land with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares.
The occupants of said land, herein petitioners, were
ordered to vacate the same. Upon the refusal of the
occupants of the said, the corporation filed an ejectment
suit. After an investigation, the Director of Lands found out
that the occupants entered the land only after it was
awarded to the corporation. Thus, they could not be
regarded as bona fide occupants. On July 18, 1961, the
corporation fully paid the purchase price for the land. More
than thirteen years later, the Sales Patent was issued to the
corporation with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares.
The petitioners contested that the adoption of the
Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a
supervening fact which render it legally impossible to
execute the trial court’s judgment of awarding the land in
question to the corporation. They invoked the
constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area."
The Director of Lands pointed out that the
corporation had complied with the said requirements long
before the effectivity of the Constitution and that the
applicant had acquired a vested right to its issuance.
ISSUE:
Whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to
the implementation of the trial court’s 1964 judgment
ejecting the petitioners.
RULING: NO.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Biñan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to
purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become
the property of some particular person or persons as a
present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to
enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and
enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law"
or "some right or interest in property which has become
fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy"
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power"
n the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become
fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or
controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land
Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).
n resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant
prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied
upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution
of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive
application to that case and does not divest the trial court
of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA,
PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA
and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO,
VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-
appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR.,
private oppositors-appellees.
Facts:
Appelllants, heirs of Pelagio Zara filed an application for
registration of a parcel of land on August 4, 1960. Their
grounds were on the basis on provisions of Act 496 that
their grandfather has been granted a Spanish Title and CA
141 Chap 8 Sec. 48, that their predecessor-­­in-­­interest
had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land
in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Their
application was opposed by the Director of Lands and
Vicente V. de Villa on the ground that parcel of land had
been included in the parcel of land applied for in
registration by Vicente de Villa in Civil Case No. 26, L.R.
Case No. 601 was adjudicated on September 30, 1949.
Issue:
W/N the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107
hectares in question to be public land precludes a
subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial
confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession
for at least thirty years?
Held:
The right to file an application under the foregoing
provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to
December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the
alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under
Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title
or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at
least thirty years. It may be that although they were not
actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is
a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative,
since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so
this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government,
in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in
question to be public land. In any case, appellants'
imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed
by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding
contemplated in the aforecited provision of
Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is
public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation
authorized therein is not that the land is already privately
owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but
rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty
years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-
appellees have the necessary personality to file an
opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also
claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore
applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the
case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment
on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-
appellees.
Florencia Diaz vs. Republic
Facts:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration for the
third time of the resolution of the Supreme Court denying
the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia Diaz.
The petitioner filed an application for registration of a vast
tract of land in Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she possessed
the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested
the agricultural products and benefits of the same
continuously, publicly and adversely for more than 26
years.
OSG opposed the application because the land in question
was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation. Thus,
it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
Prior to this case, the Supreme Court already ruled in the
case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes that the property was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation and
the existence of a Possessory Information Title No. 216
(registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla) which
the respondent in the sited case anchored its claim on the
land, was not proven.
CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA
ruled in favor of the Republic.
Subsequently, CA encouraged the parties to reach an
amicable settlement on the matter. The parties entered
into one. However, OSG backed out from the settlement
and informed the CA that the track of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military
reservation.
CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and assailed the
decision of Justice Mendoza saying that Mendoza should
have inhibited himself when the case reached CA since he
was also the assistance SolGen during the initial stages of
the land registration proceedings. Petitioner then filed for a
review on certiorari which the SC denied. The MR was also
denied. The petitioner then wants the case referred to the
SC en banc which was likewise denied. SC then issued a
directive that no further pleadings would be entertained.
Petitioner then wrote letters addressed to Justice
Quisumbing and Justice Puno alleging there was a
miscarriage of justice and that the petitioner was tempted
to go to media regarding the situation.
Issue:
WON the land in dispute can be registered to the
petitioner.
Ruling:
1. The ruling in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes is
applicable in this case and thus constitutes res judicata. The
Supreme Court ruled that in registration cases filed under
the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the
land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata,
not only against the adverse claimant but also against all
persons.
2. Before the military reservation was established, the
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for is is shown by
the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous
and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing,
it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said
land consist of public forest. It is well-settled that forest
land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued using the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title. However, it is true that forest
lands may be registered when they have been reclassified
as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical
manner (upon the recommendation of the proper
department head who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable,
timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the
claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, she was not able to
produce such evidence. Her occupation thereof could not
have ripened into ownership of the subject land.
3. The compromise agreement is null and void. The land in
question could not have been a valid subject matter of a
contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable.
MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
FACTS:
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land
Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146
hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality
of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information
and no other documentation. The State opposed the
petition averring that the land is part of the US military
reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State
appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should
be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez &
Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the
land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the
government. The government is still the absolute owner of
the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of
the land has not been of such a character as to require the
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of
animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used
by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of
the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did
the State remained the absolute owner. Land was not
registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be
able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted,
is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no
attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father
ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a
trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the
government when a private individual claims property as
his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be
deemed private absent contrary proof.
CRUZ VS DENR GR NO 135385
FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the
RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the
ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources.
Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and
“ancestral lands” which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they
voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no majority
vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

RATIO:

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-

encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA

defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of

delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by

the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation,
the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,

traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and

practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over

all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples.