Rule 110

PP vs. Ilarde
Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Iloilo, Branch V, presided by the respondent Judge Ricardo M. Ilarde, granting the motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 13086, entitled, "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus
Cecile Santibañez and Avelino T. Javellana, accused."
The information in Criminal Case No. 13086 was filed on March 4, 1981 by City Fiscal Ricardo P. Galvez. It
reads:
"The undersigned City Fiscal upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party Efraim Santibañez,
copies of which are thereto attached as Annexes 'A' and 'B' hereby accused CECILE SANTIBAÑEZ and
AVELINO T. JAVELLANA of the crime of adultery, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, said accused Cecile Santibañez being lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, which marriage at that
time has not been legally dissolved, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally
have sexual intercourse with her co-accused Avelino T. Javellana, a man not her husband and who in turn
knowing fully well that his co-accused was then lawfully married to EfraimSantibañez, did then and
there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there has been compliance with the requirement of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, that "the crimes of adultery
and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party.

HELD:
We rule in the affirmative.
We are aware that in a long line of decisions,[3] this Court has maintained strict adherence to the requirement
imposed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial."[4] Thus,
the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the
erring spouse. And this, to Our mind, should be the overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether
or not the condition precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For needless to state, this
Court should be guided by the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law.
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibañez, to bring his wife and her alleged paramour
to justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by
which he filed his complaint with the police [Annex 'A', supra]; the strong and unequivocal statement contained
in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal's Office that "I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty.
Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint
against them" [Annex 'B', supra]; his filing of a complaint for legal separation against Cecile Santibañez with the
local Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; and finally, in disinheriting his wife in his Last Will and Testament
dated January 10, 1981.
In quashing the information, respondent judge relied upon Our decision in People vs. Santos[5] to the effect that a
"salaysay"' or sworn statement of the offended party, which prompted the fiscal to conduct a
preliminary investigation and then to file an information in court, was not the complaint required by Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code.
The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, the "salaysay" executed by
complainant Bansuelo was not considered the complaint contemplated by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
because it was a mere narration of how the crime of rape was committed against her. However, in the affidavit-
complaint submitted by Efraim Santibañez, the latter not only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting
the crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically charged private respondents with the said offense.

People vs Ramos
FACTS:
Consequent to the Attended provisions, of Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Section I(e), Rule 122
of the Rules of Court, the judgement in Criminal Case No. V-0646 is now before us for automatic review of the
death penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Feliciano M. Ramos by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, of
Villasis, Pangasinan.[1]
On October 16, 1995, one Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint[2] or rape against appellant in the
11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Villasis-Sto. Tomas, at Villasis, Pangasinan. It was alleged therein
that appellant was able to perpetrate the felony against the minor complainant through the use of force and
intimidation in its execution.
After preliminary investigation, the judge designate[3] of the MCTC found appellant probably guilty of the
accusation and issued a warrant of arrest for his immediate apprehension.[4] However, before that warrant could
be duly implemented, the circuit judge[5] of the said MCTC issued a subpoena to appellant granting him the
opportunity to file his counter affidavits in answer to the complaint against him.[6] The subpoena was, however
returned unserved when appellant could not be located at his given address in Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis,
Pangasinan.[7]
In the absence of any controverting affidavit and testimony, an information[8] for rape was then filed on
February 1, 1996 against appellant in the trial court where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. V-0646. It was
likewise alleged therein that the crime was committed through appellant's employment of force and intimidation
against the minor Elizabeth. In detail, the accusatory portion of the information[9] alleges --
That during the month of April, 1995 at Barangay San Nicolas, Municipality of Villasis, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one Elizabeth T. Ramos, a minor of 14-years old (sic) against the latter's
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Elizabeth T. Ramos.

ISSUE: W/N the relationship of accused and the victim be considered as an attendant circumstance despite lack
of allegation in the information.
RULING: Yes.
For the trial court, relationship in the rape case before it cannot be considered a qualifying circumstance
because it does not alter the nature of the crime of rape. As it rationalized, whether such circumstance is alleged
in the information or not, the crime remains to be rape, unlike in the crime of parricide. Hence, treating
relationship as a generic aggravating circumstance, the court below considered the relationship of appellant and
complainant as attendant in the case despite the absence of any allegation thereof in the information.
Appellant takes issue in this point, by asserting that since the fact of relationship was not alleged in the
information, only the penalty prescribe for simple rape can be imposed upon him. This is where we depart from
the conclusions of the lower court and agree with appellant's position.
A rape by a father of his minor daugther is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death and not
by reclusion perpetua to death, as the lower court erroneously believed.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense. [46]
An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt
may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information
on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense
with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in
the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. [47]
To be more precise, we declared in Garcia that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed
of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charge with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense
and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
Contrary, therefore, to the pose of the lower court and the Solicitor General, the non-allegation of the
relationship between appellant and offended party in an information for a rape is a bar to the imposition of the
death penalty since relationship in this particular form of rape is a qualifying and not merely aggravating. Having
been informed only of the elements of simple rape, appellant can only be convicted of such crime and accordingly
be punished with reclusion perpetua.
Now, it is accepted that qualifying circumstances not pleaded in the indictment but duly proven without
objection during the trial may be considered as aggravating circumstances. [48]The general principles of criminal
law provide that aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial
over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence merely forms
part of the proof of the actual commission of the offense and its consideration by the courts do not violate the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We, therefore, call the attention of the members of the prosecution service and peace officers charged with the
preparation of informations and complaints, that the attendant circumstances provided by Republic Act No.
7659 must be specifically alleged in an information for rape in order that they may properly qualify the crime to
the penalty specially prescribed by the law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON
(BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, respondents.
Doctrine:
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
(Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the
facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law.

***The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed
timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed
belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
Facts:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon dismissing the information filed
therein.
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in
an information which read:
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to
wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and the
reconsideration sought was denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
WoN the information charged an offense.
Held:
YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially alleged all the elements of the
crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information
did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless,
said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom,
without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit,
sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or
permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the
asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is
tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.
 When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. The fact
that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs
and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. While it is only
the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow
that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in
private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on
its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the
failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it
alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.
Dispositive Portion:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the information
is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.
TOPIC: Illegal possession of firearms

G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000

People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam y Milapil

Facts:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit:
1) Maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972); - In his house in Rio Hondo, Zamboanga City.
2) Illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act. No. 8294; - then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted
firearms and explosives
3) Direct assault with multiple attempted homicide.-For
4) Charged with illegal possession of drugs – For methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu)
He was with his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini but the cases were dismissed
for them upon reinvestigation.

The following information was provided by the prosecution:

 In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from
the second floor of the said house.
 They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
 Policemen took cover in the concrete fence. And slowly went inside the House
 After gaining entrance, they saw two old women and young girl and 3 children.
 Upon seeing to policemen 1 old woman went up with a child.
 This opted one of this policeman to shout “Don’t shoot the second floor! There are children”
The two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the
rifle.
 As he noticed their presence, the appellant went inside the bathroom, dismantled the window, and jumped
from the window to the roof of a neighboring house.
 He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
 Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house.
 Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
 A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
  Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition,
nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.

Issues:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Ruling:
NOPE.

The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only of two offenses:
(1) Direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and
(2) Maintaining a drug den.
Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or
ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal
possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer
only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the
law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can
be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no
longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively absolves the appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an
offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first
is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for
illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and
scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however,
necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any
perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no
discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
legislature. [The Court's] task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven
facts, and [this Court] have done so in this case.

To keep things simple: No illegal possession of fire arm. Illegal possession of firearm will only be applied if
there are no other crimes committed. He committed Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide, therefore, no
Illegal Possession of Firearm. Also, No aggravating cause there wasn’t any homicide or murder. <3

TEEHANKEE, JR. VS. MADAYAG

Facts:
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated murder for shooting Hultman who was
comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died. The prosecution sought to change the
information from frustrated murder to consummated murder.

Issue:
Distinguish amendment of information from substitution of information.

Held:
The first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the rules for
amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the
information or complaint. It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of
the information may be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects:
 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a
substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of
the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and
the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the
accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy.
On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different
offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.

Galvez vs. CA
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one
Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado
and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on
December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day,
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge
Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994,
Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on
January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the
reinstatement of the original informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8,
1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24,
1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new informations. As
earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that there was
no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have amended the original informations
instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. They postulate that the principle of nolle prosequi does
not apply in this case since the withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court which has the option to grant or deny it and the prosecution cannot impose its
opinion on the court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need to change the nature of the offense charged,
that is, from homicide to murder, by adding the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper
remedy is through the filing of the corresponding amended information; and that the withdrawal of an
information is allowed only where the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is
not included in the offense originally charged.
Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones
substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the
fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still
stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no
difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a
matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information.
Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the prosecution of offenses. Section 14
thereof, quoted infra, provides in its second paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a
defective information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the permissible stage for
effecting that substitution is "at any time before judgment," unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that "it
appears . . . that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The situation under said Section
14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of the period from the filing of the information up to and before
trial. Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a
review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge
himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such
error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense
charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute
remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he
would be recreant to his duties.
Under the second paragraph or Rule 110, Section 14, the court can order the filing of another information to
charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could
only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the original information.
In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, et al., 31 however, Section 14 of Rule 110 was clarified
to mean as follows: It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may
be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects: 1. Amendment may
involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from
the original charge; 2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed; 3. Where
the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the
plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused
has to plead anew to the new information; and 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in
the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different
offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot
claim double jeopardy. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule
is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where
the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution
is in order.

Santiago vs Garchitorena

Facts:

On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by
her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a
presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution
which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion
was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which
Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On
November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion
for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9,
1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment.

More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who
would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. It appears that
petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to
issue the hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the
dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with
no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country.

The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and
DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and
from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code?

Held:

The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor,
it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law —
difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes
penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services
rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide
the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The
original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law -
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is
affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the
original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993
is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
RULE 111
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon
obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right
of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper
preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary
investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was
granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in
sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact
that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for
murder filed against petitioner

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following:

1. whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and
2. whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING:
The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there
are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful.
Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The
police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge
on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner
who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that
petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a
preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for
a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that
petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought
by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of.

On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the
prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his
right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering
questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above
reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme
Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary
investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.
People vs Poculan
FACTS

Three (3) Identical Informations differing only as to the date, time and place of commission were subsequently
filed on 29 September 1981 before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch VI, Dipolog
City. 1 To quote a typical one:

That in the evening on or about the 22nd day of March 1980, at around 6:30 p.m. in the
municipality of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said
accused moved by lewd and unchaste design, did then and there, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Conchita
Rone, against her will and without her consent.

Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of his power as a Municipal mayor
by requiring the victim to report to his house in the pretext of performing official work, before
she was raped.

Complainant Conchita B. Rone, a commerce graduate, then 28 years of age and single, worked as a clerk since
1 November 1977 in the Office of the Mayor, Appellant Atty. Robert Poculan, in Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte.
While working as such, she was boarding in the house of her aunt Sofronias B. Eroy in the poblacion of Rizal,
Zamboanga del Norte.
In the morning of 22 March 1980, a Saturday, the Vice Mayor of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, Julieta Pila,
dropped in at Complainant's boarding house and requested Complainant to accompany her in looking for a Ford
Fiera to be hired and used by the teacher members of the election committees in going to Dipolog City on the
following day of 23 March 1980. A recounting of ballots at the Pilot Demonstration School in Dipolog City was
scheduled on that date.

At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, a certain Servolo Herodias told her that Appellant wanted her
to go to his house. At Appellant's house, she arranged some documents and papers, complied with other
instructions, and typewrote something.

After finishing her work, Complainant asked permission to leave at 6:30 P.M. Appellant told her to take the
motorcab which was parked nearby. After she sat in the motorcab, Appellant followed and said that he was also
taking the motorcab to go to the adjoining barangay of Mapang, and he would just drop her at her boarding
house along the way.

The motorcab did not proceed towards Complainant's boarding house. She thought that Appellant would just
pick up something nearby. After the motorcab ran very fast downgrade towards Nilabo, Rizal, Zamboanga del
Norte, she became apprehensive. She touched the driver and inquired where the motorcab was bound for. The
driver, however, did not answer. She wanted to get out of the cab but Appellant held her hand and said, "Do not
move or else I will kill you now."
Upon reaching the small creek of Nilabo, the motorcab stopped. It could not go farther for after the creek was
already a hill. In short, the complainant was raped thereafter.
on 9 April 1980, accompanied by her cousin Antonio Bartolome, she left for Dipolog City. She met Father
Paulo Briones and narrated to him everything that Appellant did to her.
On 21 April 1980, at the central office of the National Bureau of Investigation, she submitted herself for
medicolegal examination.

On 7 May 1980, Complainant, accompanied by Father Paulo Briones, sought the help of Minister Juan Ponce
Enrile, then of the Ministry of National Defense, at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, who, after hearing Complainant's plaints, sent them to the office of Col. Soriano. Thereat, on the same
day, she subscribed and swore to her Affidavit (Exhibit "L") before lst Lt. Camilo A. Catalan, and later re-
subscribed it before Major Aniano A. Desierto, Chief, Prosecution Service, Military Tribunals, on 23 July 1980.

On the same day, 7 May 1980, an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order was issued against Appellant, and on 17
May 1980, he was arrested and detained at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, Taguig, Metro Manila.
In its Assignments of Error, the defense points to alleged fatal defects not only in the evidence but also in the
procedure the prosecution had pursued in prosecuting the case.
ISSUE:
W/N The trial Court fatally erred in holding that there had been a preliminary investigation of these complaints
of the complainant and in proceeding with the trial and convictions subjects of this appeal without such
preliminary investigation.

HELD:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is
placed upon trial is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
That purpose has been satisfied in these cases. The records disclose that the accused was given all the
opportunity to submit countervailing evidence.

In the proceedings before the Judge Advocate General Service, AFP, Capt. Jose O. Montero, the Summary
Preliminary Investigation Officer, issued a Resolution in Case SPI No. 80390, reading in part:

1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 (a) 1 of PD No. 39, as amended, in relation to PD 91 1, a preliminary

investigation was conducted on the above-entitled case.

xxx xxx xxx

4. On 29 July 1980, respondent was furnished copies of the charge sheet and copies of the
documentary evidence against him. He was required to file his counter-affidavit and counter-
evidence within ten (10) days upon receipt. Before the expiration of the 10-days period given
him, he filed, thru counsel, a request that he be granted an extension of twenty (20) days from the
expiry date (8 August 1980) within which to file his counter-evidence. The request was granted.
On 27 August 1980, counsel for respondent filed a letter-request that respondent be granted
authority and permission to go to Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte under escort and in the company
of his counsel, to procure the necessary affidavits and other evidences of his defense, and that he
be granted a period of ten (10) days after his return from Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, within
which to submit his counter evidence. The request was denied on 1 Sept. 1980 and respondent
was required to file immediately his counter-affidavit otherwise his failure to file the same would
be considered as a waiver on his part to file his counter-evidence. He is, therefore, deemed to
have submitted the case for resolution. (Exhibit "X-4-C Court", pp. 2-8)

The defense maintains that the rejection of the second request denied him the opportunity to present
controverting evidence. That is not so. What was rejected was the accused's plea to be released from detention
so he could go home to secure affidavits of his witnesses. That did not bar him nor his lawyers, however, from
still presenting counterbalancing evidence as, in fact, the defense was still given the opportunity to do so.

Thus it was that, acting on Capt. Montero's aforestated Resolution recommending prosecution, the letter, dated
15 September 1980, of Brig. Gen. Hamilton B. Dimaya to the Chief, Detainee Affairs, Camp. General Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, stated that "the preliminary investigation has been completed and the SPI Officer has
recommended prosecution of respondent Mayor before the Military Tribunals"

Pp vs Jugueta
FACTS

This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca,
Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with
Multiple Attempted Murder.

ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstances need to be alleged in the information for the awarding of civil
damages.

Ruling:
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to
trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or
she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as
well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper
penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would
entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.

COJUANGCO V CA

Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for
acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts
characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted,
public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking to set aside
CA’s decision, after it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay him
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in sweepstakes races.
Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes due him but private respondents PCSO
and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld
on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before the Manila RTC but before the receipt
summons, PCGG advised private respondents that “it poses no more objection to its remittance of the prized
winnings”. This was immediately communicated to petitioner’s counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the
former refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings
since no writ of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private respondents to pay in solidum the
claimed winnings, the trial court further held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith
amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was pending with the
CA, the petitioner moved for partial execution pending appeal to which the private respondents posed no
objection to.
CA reversed the trial court’s finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying
out the instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascoso’s acts of promptly replying to demands and
not objecting to partial execution negated bad faith.

Issue:
W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law
Held:
YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest of ill
will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court’s
conclusion that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the
extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a very
close political and business associate of the former President Marcos. Sequestration was also a novel remedy.
Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, on
what to do and more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino,
“freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wife…their close
friends, subordinates, business associates…”

The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done
in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of clear showing of any of
the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. The trial court’s award of these kinds of damages must
perforce be deleted.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held
liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties.

We hold that petitioner’s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso
may have relied upon the PCGG’s instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A
little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration
of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses
either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued
sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

GARCIA vs CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Q.C. Prosecutor’s Office, charging his wife,
private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos with Bigamy.

In the RTC trial, it was mentioned that the accused was previously married with Reynaldo Quiroca, and without
the said marriage having been dissolved, subsequently contracted the second marriage with the petitioner.

Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground. She contended that
by the petitioner’s admissions in his testimony in a Civil Case and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service
Commission, the petitioner discovered the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Art 91 of the RPC, the
period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or
15 years after its discovery by the petitioner.
The CA, although gave credence to the respondent’s evidence and recognized that the 15 year prescriptive
period had certainly lapsed. However, the quashal of an information based on prescription could only be
invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal.

Hence, this appeal to remand the case in the RTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Trial Court’s order granting the motion to
quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in Criminal Case No. Q-
92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v.
Alaga, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2,
and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117, viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His
additional claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally
without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision
in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability,
Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as
follows:

Sec. 2. Foms and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It
shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than
those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a).

It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since
extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in
Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced
to grove such grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is
that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la Rosa,
SC stated:

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not
constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the case of People vs.
Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the
prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash.

In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of the prosecution, allowed the
private respondent to offer evidence in support of her claim that the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the
trial court, upon indubitable proof of prescription, correctly granted the motion to quash. It would have been, to
quote De la Rosa, “pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to [the fact of prescription) and still give due
course to the prosecution of the case” — a technicality which would have meant loss of valuable time of the
court and the parties.

Rule 112
LINO BROCKA vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

FACTS:
 Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a demonstration held in
sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners arrested by Northern Police District
Officers – Jan 28 ‘85
 Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC
 All petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and
Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no
bail was recommended
 Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 ’85 a On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85,
RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et al’s provisional release; recommended bail at
P6,0000 each a Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds BUT…
 Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a respondents-police officers invoked
Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ‘85
o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al.
 Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious filing of this
second offense as follows:
o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM
for undisclosed reasons a another phone call subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of
Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM
o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a complainants’ affidavits had not yet been
received
o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants against Brocka, et
al for alleged inciting to sedition
o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al had been
officially received a informed that said charges were never coursed through the Records Office
o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same
utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled
to be relased on bail as a matter of Constitutional right a appears that respondents have conspired to deprive
Brocka, et al of the right to bail
o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as
a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they be given 7 days within which counsel
may conferwith their clients a no such requirement required under the rules
 Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres. Marcos a release narrated in Court’s
resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:
o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released a four on
Feb15 ’85 and one on Feb.8 ’85
o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the
accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition.
 Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend:
1. bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution
2. second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal – premised on one and the same act of
participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is…

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined – YES

RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of
inciting to sedition.

 GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final

 EXCEPTIONS:
1. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
3. When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
7. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground had
been denied
11. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners

In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state officials
in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et al’s release from detention BUT this PDA was
issued on Jan.28 ’85 and invoked only on Feb.9 ’85 upon receipt of TC’s order of release a violates
guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro, Manila
 Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production, prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox copy of it a
violates Court pronouncement that “individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished
with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official
custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)
2. SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information instead of a
petition for Habeas Corpus

The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted that such course of action would have
been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing:
1. Spurious and inoperational PDA
2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation
Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense could be
facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew

"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution.

If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where petitioners
were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and where a sham
preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any
manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals

211 SCRA 753
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building. Two units were leased (now
unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T. Dizon.
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a ‘month to month’ basis. One of the terms of the lease,
that of monthly payments, was violated by respondent.
Upon failure of respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for
conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U.
Ledesma (who is not a lawyer) during the Barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological
ailments as can be seen from prescription and receipts by her psychiatrist.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to retain the
services of a lawyer to initiate the ejectment proceeding.
MTC ordered respondent to vacate. RTC affirmed the MTC.
Respondent however found favor in the CA because of lack of cause of action. CA held that petitioner failed
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by respondent in the court below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
Issue:
Whether there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.
Held:
When respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay, he, in effect, was stating
that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation and/or amicable
settlement. Without the mandatory confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC.
Moreover, petitioner tries to show that her failure to appear before the Barangay was because of her recurring
psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1998, there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her
psychiatrist. The only conclusion is that 1998 was a lucid interval. There was therefore no excuse then for her
non-appearance. Therefore, she cannot be represented by counsel or by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.
Her non compliance with PD 1508 legally barred her from pursuing case in the MTC.

MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

FACTS:

 On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo. When
the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding judge,
Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.
 A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing
his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have
finally resolved the petition for review.
 The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed
the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. But the respondent
judge denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

RATIO: YES.

 It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct of a preliminary
investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution.
 Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal
or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court
in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the
merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary,
it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to
enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted
or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the
Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case
leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
 The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.

Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a
civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:
1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of
Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal
Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of
Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and
filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
Issues:
1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant
was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge
illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in
flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper
since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no
supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because
arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
? Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid
warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly
discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are
prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
? Search of moving vehicle
? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that
item to be searched must be within arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous
with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore,
in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea.
2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence
of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed,
petitioner’s purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable
evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this
score, we lift from respondent court’s incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also
unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense.
Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the
PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short
firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience
(sic) and a non-subversive context” and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous
laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm
is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply
the governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until
its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes
adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty
does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity
of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice
by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are
not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed
penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the
lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to “10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as
maximum.

RULE 113
People vs Sequerra
FACTS
In barangay Calaba in Bangued, Abra, at about ten o’clock in the morning of March 31, 1980, Renato Bonete
was shot in the back while driving his tricycle. Rushed to the hospital, he died shortly upon arrival, of severe
bleeding from the wounds he had sustained. In the afternoon of the same day, Danilo Sequerra was picked up at
his residence and thereafter investigated for the killing. He was subsequently charged with the murder of Bonete
and convicted after trial. The judgment 1 sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim’s heirs
P14,000.00 indemnity plus P3,000.00 for burial expenses and P10,000.00 as moral damages is now before us on
appeal.chanr
In addition to the doctor who testified on the results of the autopsy he conducted on the victim, four witnesses
were presented by the prosecution to prove Sequerra’s guilt. The most important of these was Rowena Bonete, a
15-year old girl, who was the victim’s passenger when he was shot that fatal morning. According to her, the
tricycle had just passed by the accused, who was standing along the barangay road, when he fired at the victim
and then immediately ran towards the fields, still carrying his gun. Terrified, she jumped from the tricycle and
started shouting that her uncle had been shot by Sequerra.
For his part, the accused claimed he was not in Calaba at the time of the killing, being then in a bus bound for
Abra, where he arrived at 3:30 p.m. on March 31, 1980. 6 By then, the crime had already been committed. In
corroboration, his sister, Cecilia Sequerra, testified that she had gone with him to the Philippine Rabbit Bus
terminal in Caloocan City, at about 7:30 a.m. on that date, and seen him off as he boarded the bus for Abra.
Before he left, she said, the accused had stayed with her at her brother-in-law’s house in Pasay City for about a
month.
Sequerra himself testified in his behalf and averred that in February 1980, after the town fiesta of Bangued, he
went to Pasay City, where he stayed at the house of his brother-in-law with his student sister, Cecilia. There he
remained until March 31, 1980, when at 8 o’clock in the morning, he boarded a Philippine Rabbit Bus to take
him back to Calaba in Bangued, Abra. Cecilia saw him off. In Tarlac, he had a snack with Domingo Gapuz, the
driver of the bus. He arrived in Bangued at about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon and proceeded to his house
where, being tired, he lay in his bed to rest.
ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty.

HELD: YES.
The decision of this case hangs mainly on the credibility of the witnesses. This matter in turn depends heavily
on the impressions of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the stand and
distinguish by their conduct between fact and fabrication. If there is no clear showing that he has committed a
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at his judgment, we shall sustain him.

The crime was committed in broad daylight, at about ten o’clock in the morning, in a quiet and uncluttered
place. One of the witnesses for the prosecution, Rowena Bonete, was actually riding in the tricycle driven by the
victim when he was shot only a few meters after they had passed the latter, who was standing by the road. The
other witness, Carolina Bonete, who heard the shot and looked on the scene of the crime was only 30 meters
away and had a clear view of what was happening. There were no other persons in the vicinity except the killer
and his victim. Significantly, both these witnesses knew the accused well and categorically identified him as the
killer. There could not have been, in the circumstances, any possibility of mistaken identity. As for witness
Concepcion Barsuela, she was also positive in pointing to the accused as the person whom the victim identified
as the person who had shot him. She said the victim mentioned the defendant’s name thrice.
Confronted by the full panoply of state authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of innocence to
lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither
is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, he is entitled to be freed.

But as solicitous as the Bill of Rights is of the accused, the presumption of innocence is not an automatic or
blanket exoneration. It is at best only an initial protection. If the prosecution succeeds in refuting the
presumption, it then becomes the outlook of the accused to adduce evidence that will at least raise that inkling
of doubt that he is guilty. Once the armor of the presumption is pierced, so to speak, it is for the accused to take
the offense and ward off the attack.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The attack has not been repelled in this case. It has disarmed and vanquished the accused and his guilt has been
laid bare. In the face of the weighty evidence against him, his invocation of the constitutional presumption of
innocence, having failed, must be rejected.
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City, they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.They approached the petitioner
and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 revolver, two (2) rounds
of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22
caliber gun. 4 the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and
ammunitions but failed to do so.

Issue:

Whether or not the warantless arrest and search was valid.

Ruling:

An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person arrested has committed it.

Contrary to the argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he
was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in
the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to
the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; At the time
the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they
did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

Facts: Before noon of August 08, 1987, an informant, by a telephone call, tipped the police officers that suspicious
looking men were at the street corner in Tondo, Manila. The Police Officers dispatched to the place and saw two
men looking from side to side, one of them, who was clutching his abdomen, turned-out to be Mengote. The
officers approched them and introduced themselves as policemen. The two men tried to run away but was subdued
by the officers, they were frisked and there found in possession of Mengote a 38 caliber revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber and a fan knife in the possession of his companion Morellos. They were arrested and the
weapons were taken from them. The revolver seized was used as evidence against Mengote but he contends that
the revolver should not be admitted as evidence because the seizure was the product of an illegal search which is
not incident to a lawful arrest.

Issue : Whether or Not the arrest of Mengote is legal??

Held : No. the Supreme Court held that the accused acts of merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his
abdomen,” do not constitute enough basis to implement a warrantless arrest. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by the accused in the
presence of the arresting officers.In this case, the Solicitor General argued that the actual existence of an offense
was not necessary as long as Mengote’s acts “created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers
and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed
it.” The Court shot down this argument stating that no offense could possibly have been suggested by a person
“looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and in a place not exactly forsaken.

PEOPLE vs. AMINUDIN

163 SCRA 402

FACTS: The police agents in Iloilo City received a tip from a reliable informer that the accused, Aminnudin, was
on a vessel bound for Iloilo and is carrying with him marijuana. The said vessel was to arrive few days after
such tip.

On the day of the arrival, the agents then waited at the port for the vessel. Upon arrival of the vessel and
when the suspect disembarked, they immediately frisked him and searched his bag which contained the marijuana.
Subsequently, the Aminnudin was arrested.

During the trial, the accused that alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed and that
his bag was confiscated without a search warrant.

ISSUE: Is the marijuana found in the accused bag admissible evidence?

HELD: No. The police agents had enough time to secure a warrant to arrest and search the accused but
did not do so. In addition to this, the arrest did not fall into any of the exceptions of a valid warrantless arrest
because the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so.

The People of the Philippines vs Mikael Malmstedt

Facts:

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine NARCOM inspection at Kilometer 14,
Acop, Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish, a derivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found him guilty
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the reversal of
the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there was no search warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or affirmed) because the accused
argues that the search and arrest was made without a warrant
Held:
The RTC decision is affirmed.
Ratio:
The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant when
in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable
cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present his passport.

PP vs. Madriaga

FACTS:

In the morning of March 27, 1987, a civilian informant appeared at the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit,
Caloocan City Police Station, and informed Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong and his men that a certain "Olan" whose
description was given by the informant, is engaged in the illegal traffice of marijuana somewhere at Elisa Street,
Marcela, Maypajo, Caloocan City. Forthwith, Cpl. Tamondong, as Assistant Chief and investigator of the same
unit, formed and dispatched a surveillance team of narcotics operatives to the place mentioned by the informant.
The team returned with positive result. After clearing the matter with the chief of the Anti-Narcotics Unit who
arrived in the office in the afternoon of the same date, Cpl. Tamondong gathered his men for a buy-bust operation.
At the briefing, it was agreed that Pat. Reynaldo Lechido will act as the poseur-buyer while the rest of the team
are to give Lechido a back-up support. Lechido was furnished by Cpl. Tamondong with a P10-bill which he
instructed his men to familiarize with. Soon after the briefing, the team on board two (2) motor vehicles, proceeded
to the area mentioned by the informant.
Not long thereafter, a man which fitted (sic) the description earlier given by the civilian informant
appeared. Lechido approached the man and told the latter that he would want to buy a (sic) P10-worth of
marijuana. Lechido handed the P10-marked money to the man who told Lechido to wait. Thereafter, the man left
and some (sic) few minutes later, he returned, at which point Lechido gave the pre-arranged signal to his
companions. The man handed to Lechido something wrapped in a newspaper, whereupon the other members of
the team swooped in. Lechido identified himself to the man as a police officer while the rest of the team placed
the man under arrest. Asked by Lechido as to what his name is, the man identified himself as the herein accused,
Rolando Madriaga. Lechido asked the man where he got the stuff, to which the man answered he got it from a
certain man also nicknamed "Olan", whose place is at the interior of the alley. Together with Rolando Madriaga,
Lechido and two of his companions entered the alley and as they were walking, Madriaga, pointed to a man
standing some 7 to 10 meters away from where he was apprehended, as the source of the stuff. Lechido and his
two companions approached the man, identified themselves to him as police officers, and thereafter frisked the
man. Found by Lechido inside the right pocket of the man's pants was the marked P10-bill. When queried, the
man answered that the money came from the other accused, Rolando Madriaga. Lechido got the marked money
from the man who gave his name as Rolando Pangilinan. The team brought both accused to the office of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit whereat they turned over the persons of both accused as well as the suspected marijuana stuff and
the P10-marked money to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong. In the ensuing investigation, both accused refused to give
any written statement upon being apprised of their constitutional rights.

ISSUE: W/N the buy-bust operation is legal.

HELD:

YES.
What actually obtained in the case at bar was an entrapment, not an inducement or instigation. Appellants
miserably failed to prove that they were in fact induced into committing the offense. Upon the other hand, the
prosecution successfully proved beyond any shadow of a doubt that the appellants were engaged in the illegal
traffic of marijuana, and that the surveillance team dispatched to conduct the buy-bust operation confirmed their
illegal business. the operation then was to expose, arrest and prosecute the traffickers. The latter were committing
a crime and needed no one else to induce them to commit it.

In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the
commission of the offense; the inducer thus becomes the principal. Entrapment then does not bar the
prosecution and conviction of the person entrapped. In instigation, however, the instigated party has to be
acquitted. 29
Entrapment has consistently proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. 30

The foregoing renders unnecessary a discussion on the third assigned error.

Case Title: US vs Delos Reyes

Classification: Treason

Facts: Antonio delos Reyes was convicted by the First Intance of Manila of treason and was sentenced to
imprisonment for 20 years and a fine of $5,000. Delos Reyes admitted to a constabulary detective that he is a
captain of the Katipunan Society. Further search of his residence gave discovery to a revolver along with a
captain’s commission under seals signed by a “secretary of war” Cenon Nigdao. Nigdao, who was captured
later, was later presented as a witness for the prosecution whereas the following were raised: Nigdao held office
only for one week, he commanded no forces; did not know that defendant made any use of his commission; that
they did not take up arms because they were here in Manila; and that he was living in the same house with the
defendant and gave him the commission there.

Issue: Did Delos Reyes committed treason?

Held: No. The court said that “There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in connection with
this charge than to receive this commission.” It was further held that the mere acceptance of the commission by
the defendant, nothing else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the law. Ergo, the
elements of treason was not meant. Also, the admittance of Delos Reyes to the constabulary detective could not
be admitted as evidence as “Testimony by an officer as to a confession made to him by the accused will not
support a conviction of treason, as a confession of this crime, to be effective, must be made in open court.”
Aftermath: Defendant was acquitted but without prejudice to the prosecuting authorities to pursue other crimes
as warranted.
Quotable Quote: The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence — the playing of the game of government, like
children, the secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and commissions all on paper,
for the purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the vicious — should not be dignified by the name of
the treason.

Terry vs Ohio
Doctrine:
An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer
reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
Facts:
An officer observed two men, the petitioner Terry, and Chilton, standing on a street corner. One would walk up
to a store window, look inside, and return to confer with his companion. This process was repeated about a dozen
times. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. Given the nature of their
behavior, and thinking that the men were “casing” the store for potential robbery, the officer confronted them and
asked for their names. The men mumbled a response, at which time the officer spun the petitioner around and
patted his breast. During this process of quick frisking, he found a concealed pistol, and removed the same. Thus,
the petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. Thereafter, the petitioner moved to suppress this
weapon from evidence. However, the TC, as affirmed by the CA, denied his motion.
Issue:
WON the search for weapon was unreasonable?
Held & Rationale:
No. An officer is justified in conducting a carefully limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be
dangerous in order to discover any weapons, which might be used to assault him or other nearby, even in the
absence of probable cause for arrest. The government’s interest in preventing harm must be balanced against the
invasion into a person’s privacy. But the policeman should use an objective test, and be able to point to specific
and articulable facts, which reasonably justify the intrusion. Effective crime prevention and detection is a
governmental interest in appropriate circumstances for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. It would be unreasonable to require that the policeman take
unnecessary risks. He has a need to protect himself and others in situations where he lacks probable cause for
arrest. In this case, nothing in the conduct of petitioner and his friends dispelled the officer’s reasonable fear that
they were armed.

EVIDENCE

RULE 128

1.PARANAQUE KINGS VERSUS CA

FACTS: Paranaque Kings the petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati on March 19, 1991 against
respondents Catalina Santos and David Raymundo for an alleged breach of the contractual right of “first option
or priority to buy”. It can be deduced from the facts that Catalina Santos is the owner of the parcels of land to
which the petitioner Paranaque Kings has been an assignee by Lee Ching Bing, the former lessee of the parcels
of land. That Catalina Santos instead of offering those lands first to the lessee Pranaque Kings pursuant to the
lease contract which specifically provides for the “first option to buy” sold it to David Raymundo. Thus,
Paranaque Kings filed this complaint. Instead of filing their respective answers, Santos and Raymundo filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents thus
dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. Appeal to the CA, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.
According to the respondents, the petition should be denied for not raising a question of law as the issue involved
is purely factual, therefore states no valid cause of action.

ISSUE: W/N the issue involved in this case is purely factual?

HELD: NO. The principal legal question as stated is whether the complaint filed by Paranaque Kings in the
lower court states a valid cause of action. Since such question assumes the facts alleged in the complaint as true,
it follows that the determination thereof is one of law and NOT OF FACTS. There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt of difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts

RULE 129

Pp vs. Fernandez

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale
in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code.
"That in or about and during the period comprised between December 14, 1988 to December 24, 1988, inclusive
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist
and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee,
recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI,
ULDARICO P. LEGASPI, SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD
P. VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T. CORREA,
DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ (hereinafter known as private complainants) without first
having secured the required license or authority from the POEA
.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.

The defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant whose testimony consisted mainly in denying the charges
against her. Appellant claimed that she never met any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of them.
She likewise denied having received money from anyone and asserted that she did not know any Liza Mendoza
who is the alleged treasurer of Philippine-Thai. Appellant maintained that although she had an office in Ermita
Building located at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, the said office belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products
Corporation which was engaged in the logging business. However, when questioned further, appellant admitted
being the president of Philippine-Thai but only in a nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-president, she
did not participate in any of its transactions. Appellant likewise insisted that Philippine-Thai was engaged solely
in the barong tagalog business.

After careful calibration of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the court a quo rendered a
decision holding that the defense of "denial" interposed by the accused could not prevail over the positive and
clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

ISSUE: W/N there was the admission by the defendant on trial is considered judicial admission.

HELD: YES.

The first assignment of error is anchored on the contention that the prosecution failed to prove one of the
essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment -- that the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.[7] The aforementioned element,
specifically the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers as
shown by the records of the POEA, was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and admitted
by the defense during trial. Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by the prosecution on the said
stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal
recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the appellant
of the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an admission
that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the stipulation
of facts is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.
Appellant posits the foregoing arguments to bolster her contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve
the prosecution of its duty to present evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged to the end that the
guilt of the accused may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, it should be said that the above contention and the arguments are insignificant in view of the
fact that records disclose that the prosecution had in fact presented evidence to prove the said element of the crime
of illegal recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certification issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA, attesting
to the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is licensed/authorized to recruit workers for employment
abroad, was offered and admitted in evidence without the objection of the appellant.[8]
Although appellant's arguments find no significant bearing in the face of the existence of "EXHIBIT I", they
nonetheless require deeper scrutiny and a clear response for future application. Hence, the following discussion.
Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular witness if presented in court would
testify to certain facts, and an admission of the facts themselves. According to the appellant, what was stipulated
on between the prosecution and defense counsel at the hearing on June 6, 1990 was "merely that the testimony of
the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be to the effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers",[9] Thus:
"Prosecutor
x x x Before we call on our first witness, we propose some stipulations regarding the testimony of the Chief
Licensing Branch of the POEA that Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic) licensed nor authorized by the
Department of Labor to recruit workers abroad.
Court
Would you agree?
Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor."[10]
She claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial admission of the fact of non-
possession of a license/authority but rather a mere admission that the witness, if presented, would testify to such
fact. This being the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence of such fact.
The corollary issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring
an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused -- equally applies to
a stipulation of facts made during trial. We resolved this issue in the negative.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is
automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The
conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "x x
x an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit x x x has prima facie authority to make
relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, x x x which unless allowed to be withdrawn are
conclusive." In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for
the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client.When such admissions are made x x x for the purpose of dispensing
with proof of some fact, x x x they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."[25]
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who represents
him.[26] For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The
rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would
result in serious injustice to the client.[27] No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth
noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the
prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in
conformity to defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial,
appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or
through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that neither she nor
Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense
counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:

"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made."

Fule vs. CA
FACTS:
A certain Roy Nadera sued Manolo Fule for violation of BP 22. The parties, during pre-trial, entered into a
stipulation of facts. Prosecution presented evidence but the defense, in lieu thereof, only submitted a
Memorandum confirming the stipulation of facts. It appears, however, that neither Fule nor his counsel signed
the stipulation of facts.
The trial court convicted Fule. On appeal, the CA upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction.
ISSUES: WON the CA erred in sustaining the judgment of the RTC convicting petitioner based solely on the
stipulation of facts (Issue before the SC).
HELD:
Yes. The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The confirmation by the defense of the said stipulation
of facts by a memorandum does not cure the defect because the Rules require both the accused and his counsel
to sign such stipulation of facts.

What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts,
as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely
on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the
admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be
presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an
attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened

The case was re-opened and remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence.
RULE 130

PP vs. Espinosa

FACTS:

On August 30, 1988, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, prosecution witness Lucresio Croda was in the
living room of his house near the crossing of Kisawi and Anlawagan, Barangay Payad, Pangatucan (sic),
Bukidnon, when he heard cries for help. As he went down the stairs, he saw the appellants drag the victim away
from the road towards his house. At a distance of approximately three fathoms from his house, he positively
recognized the victim as Renato Salvar. He also witnessed the accused-appellant Rogelio and Victor Espinoza
hack the victim several times with their long bolos while appellant Magbarit (sic) held back the victim who was
lying on his back. Overcome with fear, he rushed back to his house. He then assisted his wife who was in near-
faint (sic) after witnessing the incident.

Prosecution witness Charlito Guevarra2 (sic) testified that on the night of the incident, he was watching the
coronation ceremonies of the fiesta queen at the barrio hall when he received information from his brother,
Raul, about a hacking incident that took place at the crossing of Anlawagan and Kisawi. He immediately went
to the place and there saw Renato Salvar, seriously wounded and lying on his back.

Simplicio Salvar, Jr. who also proceeded at the crossing of Anlawagan and Kisawi after being informed that his
brother, Renato Salvar was the victim of an attack, was able to talk to the latter who was then still conscious and
coherent in speech. The victim identified the three accused-appellants as his assailants.

On the other hand, all three accused interposed the defense of alibi.

ISSUE: W/N the failure of the prosecution to produce the object evidence which is the bolo is an indispensable
requirement.

HELD: No.

The failure of the prosecution to present the "bolos" which were used in the commission of the crime did not
weaken the evidence against accused-appellants. We note that there was no showing that the "bolos" were
recovered from the scene of the crime. It is not remote that these "bolos" were disposed by the assailants to conceal
the instruments of the crime. But even without the "bolos" as evidence, there can be no doubt that the victim died
due to hacking by means of "bolos" on the part of accused-appellants Victor and Rogelio Espinoza.

It cannot also be doubted that the numerous wounds suffered by the victim were due to hacking by means of sharp
bladed instruments.

Eyewitness Lucresio Croda, positively identified Rogelio Espinoza, Victor Espinoza and Julian Magbaril as the
assailants of Renato Salvar. It is unrebutted that Lucresio's house is located at least three (3) fathoms4 away from
the scene of the crime. Moreover, during the hacking incident, the place was illuminated by the moon. (TSN of
Lucresio Croda, April 10, 1989, pp. 12-13). In People vs. Jacolo, et al., we held: Where conditions of visibility
are favorable, and the witness does not appear to be biased, his assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should
normally be accepted.5 This is particularly true, in this case, where the defense failed to impute any improper
motive on the part of Lucresio for testifying against the appellants.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-
Appellant.

Doctrine: Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Facts:
1. Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2)
pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are prohibited
drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
2. The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:
3. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox
copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
4. The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
5. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?"
Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00
and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
6. The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
7. The accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court
of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
8. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
a. This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money which,
according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
b. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary document falling
under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary
evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:
9. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.
Issue:
Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Held:
1. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
2. Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of
the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony
of the police officers.
3. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the
failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
4. We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt.
5. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug
addiction upon our people.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the accused-appellant.: