Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Root Cause Analysis Hartbarger
Root Cause Analysis Hartbarger
NUR 3241
Savanna Hartbarger
particular day, a nurse with one year experience in an urgent care who was recently added to the
schedule of the night shift in the ED. The general requirement for ED orientation was four
months, but this nurse had been taken off orientation early due to minimal staffing in the ED.
Shortly after the nurse arrived on shift, she was assigned to hold or admitted patients in the ED.
She noted that one of her patients had a heparin drip ordered which was a drip that she has never
administered during orientation. The nurse pulled the heparin bolus and drip from the Pyxis.
She asked coworkers to sign off on the bolus and drip with her, but all the coworkers
were busy with their own patients. Other nurses were new graduates and were uncomfortable
with heparin drips. One coworker offered to sign off on the heparin if she brought the rolled
computer to one of her patients’ rooms. The new nurse was concerned because her coworker
could not verify the heparin, but was willing to sign off on it without verification. The coworker
assured her that this was commonplace in the ED when acuity was high and the ED was
minimally staffed.
The nurse administered the heparin bolus and started the heparin drip on her patient after
programming of the smart pump. The charge nurse notified this nurse that her patient had a bed
assignment on the telemetry floor. The new nurse called report and transported her patient to the
floor. Upon transferring her patient to the stretcher, she noted that the IV bag was empty. The
heparin was supposed to infuse over several hours, but instead had infused from the short period
of time from initiation to transfer to the floor. The receiving nurse noted the error as well and
Background
HIGH RISK INFUSIONS 3
In this situation, this nurse had minimal critical care experience and was not allowed to
complete the appropriate length of orientation. She ignored policies and procedures for
medications that required dual verification from two registered nurses (Antonow, & Silver,
2000). She felt unsupported by staff members who either ignored safety measures or who were
new graduates or nurses with minimal critical care experience. She programmed the smart pump
inappropriately and ended up causing the medication error by infusing the heparin at a much
faster rate than it was intended. Unfortunately, this places the patient at higher risk for bleeding
The factors that contributed to this medication error included lack of nursing experience,
lack of critical care experience, lack of support from a charge nurse and coworkers, and
overriding safety measures (Feng, Bobay, & Weiss, 2008). Another factor that contributed to this
error was that leadership did not honor her orientation period where she could have honed her
critical thinking skills, assessment skills, and knowledge of high risk medications. In addition,
this nurse likely did not have shifts in the ED where she was assigned to admitted patients.
Heparin drips are not common in the ED, unless they are ordered for admitted patients who stay
in the ED overnight. Last, it is evident that the team as a whole did not follow policies and
procedures to ensure that safety was fostered at the highest standard in all of their patients
The first recommendation is to create an orientation checklist that should be signed off by
the preceptee and preceptor, including content such as critical care drips, high risk infusions, and
care of admitted hold patients in the ED. The second recommendation is to allow the nurse to
HIGH RISK INFUSIONS 4
complete a full orientation period, regardless of staffing issues. The gaps in staffing could be
filled with experienced ED travel nurses or critical care float pool nurses. The third
encourages honesty in the ED to encourage policy compliance (Montesi & Lechi, 2009). The
fourth recommendation is to ensure that there is an appropriate ratio of new graduate nurses to
experienced nurses in order to encourage competence and favorable learning experiences. The
fifth recommendation is to create smart pump technology or to at least research smart pump
technology that requires the sign-in code of two registered nurses. The sixth recommendation is
to hold mandatory education courses such as in-services where nurses can become competent in
The role of the nurse in this case is to report the medication error and realize that the
patient’s safety was compromised (Antonow & Silver, 2000). She should report the error to her
supervisor and also to a system such as Quantros that encourages reporting. The nurse should ask
for additional training or to extend her orientation period so she could develop competency in
skills or medications that she is unfamiliar with. In addition, she could participate in training
such as safety coach training that supports nurses when they speak up about safety concerns
(Feng, Bobay, & Weiss, 2008). She could also suggest changes in the ED such as team nursing
Summary
desire to learn, a consistent orientation for all staff, in-services to increase educational
opportunities, and encourage open communication where patient safety is of the utmost concern.
The safety of a patient lies not on the shoulders of one person, but on the entire department.
HIGH RISK INFUSIONS 5
References
Antonow, J. & Silver, M. (2000). Reducing medication errors in hospitals: A peer review
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1070324100260276
Feng, X., Bobay, K., & Weiss, M. (2008). Patient safety culture in nursing: A dimensional
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1365-2648.2008.04728.x
Montesi, G. & Lechi, A. (2009). Prevention of medication errors: Detection and audit. British
https://bpspubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1365-2125.2009.03422.x
HIGH RISK INFUSIONS 6
Appendix
(Two RNs did not follow policy (Urgent care background experience,
setting)