British Airways vs.

CA; GR 92288;

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision dated November 15, 1989
of the Court of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the trial court2 in ordering petitioner British
Airways, Inc. to pay private respondent First International Trading and General Services actual
damages, moral damages, corrective or exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs as well as
the Resolution dated February 15, 19903 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the
appealed decision.

FACTS:
February 15, 1981: First International Trading and General Services Co. (First Int'l), a duly licensed domestic
recruitment and placement agency, received a telex message from its principal ROLACO Engineering and
Contracting Services (ROLACO) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino contract workers in its behalf
Early March 1981: ROLACO paid British Airways, Inc. (BA) Jeddah branch the airfare tickets for 93 contract
workers with specific instruction to transport the workers to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981
As soon as BA received a prepaid ticket advice from its Jeddah branch informed First Int'l.
Thereafter, First Int'l instructed ADB Travel and Tours. Inc. (its travel agent) to book the 93
workers with BA but it failed
So First Int'l had to borrow P304,416.00 for the purchase of airline tickets from the
other airlines for the 93 workers who must leave immediately since the visas are
valid only for 45 days and the Bureau of Employment Services mandates that
contract workers must be sent to the job site within a period of 30 days
First week of June, 1981: First Int'l was again informed by BA that it had received a prepaid ticket advice from
its Jeddah branch for the transportation of 27 contract workers.
Immediately, First Int'l instructed its ADB to book the 27 contract workers with the BA but only 16
seats were confirmed and booked on its June 9, 1981 flight.
June 9, 1981: only 9 workers were able to board said flight while the remaining 7 workers were rebooked to:
June 30, 1981 - again cancelled by British without any prior notice to either First Int'l or the workers
July 4,1981 - (6 + 7 workers) 13 workers were again cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981.
July 6, 1981: First Int'l paid the travel tax of the workers as required by BA but when the receipt of the tax
payments was submitted, only 12 seats were confirmed for July 7, 1981 flight
July 7, 1981: Flight was again cancelled without any prior notice
12 workers were finally able to leave for Jeddah after First Int'l had bought tickets from the other airlines
As a result of these incidents, First Int'l sent a letter to BA demanding compensation for the damages it had
incurred by the repeated failure to transport its contract workers despite confirmed bookings and payment of
the corresponding travel taxes.
July 23, 1981: the counsel of First Int'l sent another letter to BA demanding P350,000.00 damages and
unrealized profit or income - denied
August 8, 1981: First Int'l received a telex message from ROLACO cancelling the hiring of the remaining
recruited workers due to the delay in transporting the workers to Jeddah.
January 27, 1982: First Int'l filed a complaint for damages against First Int'l
CA Affirmed RTC: BA to pay First Int'l damages, attorneys fees and costs

ISSUE: W/N BA is not liable because there was no contract of carriage as no ticket was ever issued

HELD: Affirmed. MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages be deleted (reimbursed by ROLACO)
In dealing with the contract of common carriage of passengers for purpose of accuracy, there are two (2)
aspects of the same, namely:
 (a) the contract "to carry (at some future time)," which contract is consensual and is necessarily
perfected by mere consent - applicable in this case
(b) the contract "of carriage" or "of common carriage" itself which should be considered as a real
contract for not until the carrier is actually used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the
obligation of a carrier
Even if a prepaid ticket advice (PTA) is merely an advice from the sponsors that an airline is
authorized to issue a ticket and thus no ticket was yet issued, the fact remains that the passage had
already been paid for by the principal of the appellee, and the appellant had accepted such payment
Besides, appellant knew very well that time was of the essence as the prepaid ticket advice had
specified the period of compliance therewith, and with emphasis that it could only be used if the
passengers fly on BA
involvement of the BA in the contract "to carry" was well demonstrated when the it immediately
advised First Int'l
Acts of BA indeed constitute malice and evident bad faith which had caused damage and besmirched
the reputation and business image fo First Int'l

Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v CA GR No. 95582 Oct. 7, 1991

On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint[1] for damages against petitioners for the death of
Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid,
Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal
was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and
without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its
passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the
said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other
passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital
where he expired.

Facts: On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for th
edeath of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at
Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said date, while
petitionerTheodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in
a recklessand imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to
persons andproperty, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing
Pedrito immediatelyto the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to
the welfare of the victim,first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations
before bringing said victimto the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

Issue: W/N respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding
petitionersnegligent and liable for the damages claimed.

Held: No. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the
aboveholding of the Court of Appeals.The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor
had no knowledge that the victim wouldride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not
manifested his intention to board the same, doesnot merit consideration. When the bus is not in
motion there is no necessity for a person who wants toride the same to signal his intention to board.
A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making acontinuous offer to bus riders.It is the duty of
common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar,or motorbus,
to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers anopportunity to
 board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengersresulting from the
sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.It has also been repeatedly
held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need notmake an express finding of
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible topay the damages sought
by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the expressobligation to transport
the passenger to destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with adue regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is rightaway attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule thatnegligence must be
proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercisedextraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

Dangwa Transco. Co. Inc. v. CA

Facts:

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat. The
deceased was attempting to board a bus, but it suddenly accelerated forward. He fell off and the bus ran over
him, resulting to his death.

Issue:

Whether the bus is liable as a common carrier to the deceased who was still attempting to board

Held:

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order
to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

Planters Products, Inc. vs. CA; GR 101503;

Planters Products vs. CA Case Digest

Planters Products vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 101503 September 15, 1993

Petitioner PPI appeals to us by way of a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner theorizes that the Home Insurance case has no bearing on the present controversy because the
issue raised therein is the validity of a stipulation in the charter-party delimiting the liability of the shipowner
for loss or damage to goods cause by want of due deligence on its part or that of its manager to make the
vessel seaworthy in all respects, and not whether the presumption of negligence provided under the Civil
Code applies only to common carriers and not to private carriers. 19 Petitioner further argues that since the
possession and control of the vessel remain with the shipowner, absent any stipulation to the contrary, such
shipowner should made liable for the negligence of the captain and crew. In fine, PPI faults the appellate court
in not applying the presumption of negligence against respondent carrier, and instead shifting the onus
probandi on the shipper to show want of due deligence on the part of the carrier, when he was not even at
hand to witness what transpired during the entire voyage.

Facts: Planters Product Inc. purchased from Mitsubishi international corporation metric tons of Urea fertilizer,
which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen
 Kabushiki Kaisha. Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel respondent entered into between
Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as ship owner, in Tokyo, Japan.

Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, (4) of her holds were presumably inspected by the charterer’s
representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by
stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron
lids. Upon arrival of vessel at port, the petitioner unloaded the cargo pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the charter-party. The hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge.

Upon arrival at petitioner’s warehouse a survey conducted over the cargo revealed a shortage and the most of
the fertilizer was contaminated with dirt. As such, Planters filed an action for damages. The defendant argued
that the public policy governing common carriers do not apply to them because they have become private
carriers by reason of the provisions of the charter-party.

Issue: Whether or not the charter-party contract between the ship owner and the charterer transforms a
common carrier into a private carrier?

Held: A charter party may either her be time charter wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer, wherein the
ship is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a
single voyage. In both cases, the charter party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate
time or for a single or consecutive voyage.

It is therefor imperative that such common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the
whole or part of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the
case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both ship and its crew as in
bareboat or demise that it becomes a private carrier. Undoubtedly, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains in possession and control of the ship, although her holds may be the property of the charterer.

ISSUE: W/N a time charter between a shipowner and a charterer transforms a common carrier into a private one as
to negate the civil law presumption of negligence in case of loss or damage to its cargo

HELD: NO. petition is DISMISSED

 When PPI chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the
employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then
can we charge the charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when
the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so
 carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie presumption of negligence.
The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers
made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship's boom.
 bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage. More so, with a
variable weather condition prevalent during its unloading
 This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. Clearly, KKKK has sufficiently proved the
inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration; as well as the inadequacy
of its packaging which further contributed to the loss.
 On the other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner showing that the carrier was remise in the
exercise of due diligence in order to minimize the loss or damage to the goods it carried.

4. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co.,Inc; GR L-5203;

Standard Vacuum Oil Company v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc.G.R. No. L-5203 April 18, 1956
Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant to transport between the ports of Manila and Nin Bay, Sagay,
Iloilo, 2,916.44 barrels of bulk gasoline belonging to Plaintiff. The gasoline was delivered in accordance with the
contract but Defendant failed to transport it to its place of destination and so Plaintiff brought this action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the sum of P75,578.60 as damages.
Defendant, in its answer, pleaded that its failure to deliver the gasoline was due to fortuitous event or caused by
circumstances beyond its control and not to its fault or negligence or that of any of its employees. The court, after
receiving the evidence, rendered decision finding that the disaster that had befallen the tugboat was the result of
an unavoidable accident and the loss of the gasoline was due to a fortuitous event which was beyond the control
of Defendantand, consequently, dismissed the case with costs against the Plaintiff.
FACTS:
Defendant's barge No. L-522 was laden with gasoline belonging to the plaintiff to betransported from Manila to
the Port of Iloilo. Defendant's tugboat "Snapper" picked up thebarge outside the breakwater. The barge was
placed behind the tugboat, it being connectedto the latter by a tow rope. Behind the barge, three other barges
were likewise placed. Theweather was good when on that day the tugboat with its tow started on its voyage.
Theweather remained good on February 3, 1947. About 3:00 AM on February 4, the engine ofthe tugboat came to
a dead stop. The engineer found out that the trouble was due to abroken idler. A message was then sent to the
defendant's radio station in Manila informingits official of the engine trouble. The master of the Snapper
attempted to cast anchor butthe water areas around Elefante Island were so deep. In the afternoon, the
weather becomeworse and due to the rough condition of the sea the anchor chains of the Snapper' and thefour
barges broke. They were drifted and were dashed against the rocks. A hole wasopened in the hull of the Snapper',
which ultimately caused it to sink, while the barge No. L-522 was so badly damaged that the gasoline it had on
board leaked out. Defendant failed totransport the gasoline so plaintiff brought an action with CFI Manila to
recover damages.Defendant pleaded that its failure to deliver was due to fortuitous event or caused
bycircumstances beyond its control and not to its fault or negligence or that of any of itsemployees. The court
found that the disaster was the result of an unavoidable accident andthe loss of the gasoline was due to a
fortuitous event hence it dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant exercised extraordinary diligence and that the accident was due toforce majeure.
HELD:NO.
While the breaking of the idler may be due to an accident, or to somethingunexpected, the cause of the disaster
which resulted in the loss of the gasoline can only beattributed to the negligence or lack of precaution to avert it
on the part of defendant.Defendant had enough time to effectuate the rescue if it had only a competent tug for
thepurpose because the weather was good from 3:00 o'clock a.m. to 12:00 o'clock noon ofFebruary 4, 1947 and it
was only in the afternoon that the wind began to blow with someintensity,1 but failed to do so because of that
shortcoming. The loss of the gasoline certainlycannot be said to be due to force majeure or unforeseen event but
to the failure ofdefendant to extend adequate and proper help. Considering these circumstances, the
Courtpersuaded to conclude that defendant has failed to established that it is exempt fromliability under the law.
Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum ofP75,578.50, with legal interest from the date of the filing
of the complaint, with costs

5. PCI Lending and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc; GR 162267;

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 12, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City which ordered petitioner and Renato Gonzaga (Gonzaga) to
pay, jointly and severally, respondent the amount of P244,500.00 plus interest; and the CA Resolution2 dated
February 18, 2004 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
6. Westwind Shipping Corp. vs. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc; GR 200289 and 200314;

These two consolidated cases challenge, by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, September 13, 2011 Decision1 and January 19, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86752, which reversed and set aside the January 27, 2006 Decision 3 of the Manila City
Regional Trial Court Branch (RTC) 30. The facts, as established by the records, are as follows:

7. Air France vs. Bonifacio H. Gillego; GR 165266;

For review is the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56587 which
affirmed the Decision[2] dated January 3, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 137 in
Civil Case No. 93-2328.

CASE DIGEST: AIR FRANCE v. BONIFACIO H. GILLEGO (G.R. No. 165266; December 15, 2010)

FACTS: Gillego, then incumbent Congressman and Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on
Civil, Political and Human Rights, was invited to participate as one of the keynote speakers at the 89th Inter-
Parliamentary Conference Symposium on Parliament Guardian of Human Rights to be held in Budapest,
Hungary and Tokyo, Japan.

On May 16, 1993, Gillego left Manila on board Air Frances aircraft bound for Paris, France. While waiting at
the Airport for his connecting flight to Budapest scheduled a few hours after his arrival learned that Air France
had another aircraft bound for Budapest with an earlier departure time than his scheduled flight. He then
made arrangements for the change in his booking. He was given a corresponding ticket and boarding pass and
also a new baggage claim stub for his checked-in luggage. However, his baggage despite numerous follow-up
was never delivered to him prompting Gillego to purchase new set of clothes and other personal effects.

Gillego filed a complaint for damages against the Air France alleging that by reason of its negligence and
breach of obligation to transport and deliver his luggage, Gillego suffered inconvenience, serious anxiety,
physical suffering and sleepless nights. It was further alleged that due to the physical, mental and emotional
strain resulting from the loss of his luggage, aggravated by the fact that he failed to take his regular
medication, Gillego had to be taken to a medical clinic in Tokyo, Japan for emergency treatment.

The RTC found there was gross negligence on the part of Air France. It likewise found Air France guilty of
willful misconduct as it persistently disregarded the rights of Gillego. As to the applicability of the limited
liability for lost baggage under the Warsaw Convention, the trial court rejected the argument of Air France.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUES:

I. Was there legal and factual basis that Air France's actions were attended by gross negligence, bad faith
and willful misconduct and that it acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner
to justify award of moral and exemplary damages?
II. Is the amount of damages awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA as moral and exemplary damages
excessive, unconscionable and unreasonable?

HELD: I. In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove
that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract
and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.

The action filed by the respondent is founded on such breach of the contract of carriage with petitioner who
offered no satisfactory explanation for the unreasonable delay in the delivery of respondents baggage. The
presumption of negligence was not overcome by the petitioner and hence its liability for the delay was
sufficiently established.

The Court held that the trial and appellate courts did not err in finding that petitioner acted in bad faith in
repeatedly ignoring respondents follow-up calls. Clearly, Air France did not give the attention and care due to
its passenger whose baggage was not transported and delivered to him at his travel destination and scheduled
time; inattention to and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost
consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an
award of moral damages.

HELD: II. The amount of damages must be fair, reasonable and proportionate to the injury suffered. The
purpose of awarding moral damages is to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusement
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. On
the other hand, the aim of awarding exemplary damages is to deter serious wrongdoings. Hence, the Court
held that the sum of P1,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court is excessive and not proportionate to the loss or
suffering inflicted on the passenger under the circumstances.

DENIED

8. Delson Transport Lines cs. CA; GR 127897;

9. Cang, et.al. vs. Cullen; GR 163078;

10. Light Railway Transit Authority vs. Navidad; GR 145804

Romeo Reyes v. CA; GR 96492;

Felix Balanay Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez; GR L-39247;

Pascual Coso v. Fermina Fernandez Deza; GR L- 16763;

Nicolas Macam v. Juana Gatmaitan; GR L-42619;

Johnny Rabadilla v. CA; GR 113725;

Rebecca Viado Non, et.al. v. CA; GR 137287