G.R. No.

L-16218 November 29, 1962

ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO BICERRA, CAYETANO BICERRA,

LINDA BICERRA, PIO BICERRA and EUFRICINA BICERRA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
TOMASA TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, defendants-appellees.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1962/nov1962/gr_l-16218_1962.html

The dismissal of the complaint was proper. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of
its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true
regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But
once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as
an immovable likewise ceases. It should be noted that the complaint here is for recovery of
damages. This is the only positive relief prayed for by appellants. To be sure, they also asked that
they be declared owners of the dismantled house and/or of the materials. However, such declaration
in no wise constitutes the relief itself which if granted by final judgment could be enforceable by
execution, but is only incidental to the real cause of action to recover damages.

G.R. No. L-55729 March 28, 1983

ANTONIO PUNSALAN, JR., petitioner,

vs.
REMEDIOS VDA. DE LACSAMANA and THE HONORABLE JUDGE RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, respondents.

REAL ACTION – filed where the building is located.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/mar1983/gr_l_55729_1983.html

The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property as provided in

article 415(l) of the Civil Code. 6 Buildings are always immovable under the Code. 7 A building treated
separately from the land on which it stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties
to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise
changed its character as immovable property. 8

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property
in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with
the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the
annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and
prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.

G.R. No. L-50008 August 31, 1987

PRUDENTIAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City; FERNANDO MAGCALE & TEODULA BALUYUT-
MAGCALE, respondents.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/aug1987/gr_l_50008_1987.html
In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this Court
ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the land, in said
provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property." (Lopez vs. Orosa,
Jr., et al., L-10817-18, Feb. 28, 1958; Associated Inc. and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al., L-10837-38,
May 30,1958).

G.R. No. L-11139 April 23, 1958

SANTOS EVANGELISTA, petitioner,

vs.
ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1958/apr1958/gr_l-11139_1958.html
It is, our considered opinion that said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or
other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in
Laddera vs. Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is
immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary
or lessee. This is the doctrine of our Supreme Court in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company,
37 Phil., 644. And it is amply supported by the rulings of the French Court.
These considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the rules on execution do not allow, and, we
should not interpret them in such a way as to allow, the special consideration that parties to a
contract may have desired to impart to real estate, for example, as personal property, when they are,
not ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation governing
sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind
of property is suited to its character, not to the character, which the parties have given to it or desire
to give it. When the rules speak of personal property, property which is ordinarily so considered is
meant; and when real property is spoken of, it means property which is generally known as real
property. The regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties may have
privately given to the property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the
convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings.
We therefore hold that the mere fact that a house was the subject of the chattel mortgage and was
considered as personal property by the parties does not make said house personal property for
purposes of the notice to be given for its sale of public auction. This ruling is demanded by the need
for a definite, orderly and well defined regulation for official and public guidance and would prevent
confusion and misunderstanding.
We, therefore, declare that the house of mixed materials levied upon on execution, although subject
of a contract of chattel mortgage between the owner and a third person, is real property within the
purview of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture of the
land, which, is real property
Annulment of Judgement CASE
A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereof by
virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been declared null and void
with respect to said real properties acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale. (De la Riva vs. Ah
Kee, 60 Phil. 899).