SECTION 13 - RIGHT TO BAIL judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.

Judicial
discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty
Basco vs Rapatalo will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335 March 5, 1997 upon the prosecutor.

Facts:
Petitioner filed a case for murder against Roger Morente. The accused filed a petition
for bail. The hearing for bail was repeatedly rescheduled and it was discovered later
on that the accused was already granted to post bail. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent judge Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful
disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case
without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
Respondent judge, in his comment, alleged that he granted the petition based on the
prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation
setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the
prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether
to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a
right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more
familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore,
the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended
bail.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the
accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is
not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have
relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is
not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation of
due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against
the accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
Wherefore, respondent judge was reprimanded by the SC with the WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was
cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion
for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and
approved the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
WON respondent judge gravely abused his discretion granting bail to an accused in a
murder case.

Held:
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted
bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense
in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.

Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's
declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a
right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's
familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is
faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising
People v. Judge Donato
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October
2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed
with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;
(b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for
bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since
rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135
of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing,
among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees.
Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a
condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten
days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration
indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus).
Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with
a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition
for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody
of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the
accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee
from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner
whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is
not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only
when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong
for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the
prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. FORTES [223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of

Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the
said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused.
Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was
granted for accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to
RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails
denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his
constitutional right to bail.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is
either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once
it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
Comendador vs. De Villa (as chief of staff of the AFP)
– Right to bail of Military Personnel
Facts:
• The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who are
facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d’ etat on December
1-9, 1989:
G.R. No. 93177-petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus- questioning the conduct
of the pre-trial panel and the creation of General Court Martial (GMC No. 14)
G.R. No. 96948-certiorari against the ruling denying them the right to pre-emptory
challenge (or that the Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged
by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court
shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof.)
G.R. No. 95020-certiorari- against the respondent judge on the ground that he has no
jurisdiction of GCM No. 14 and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail to
private respondents
G.R. No. 97454-certiorari- against the decision of RTC in a petition for habeas corpus
directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objection are also
raised.
• Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, and various crimes in relation to murder
• The pre-trail investigation (PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the
petitioners for counter-affidavit and of the affidavits of their witnesses. All were moved
to delay and the petitioners contend that there was no pre-trail investigation done
• In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it was denied by
GMC No. 14. The RTC granted him provisional liberty but he was not released
immediately, “pending the final resolution of the appeal to be taken.” Then the RTC
ruled that the right to bail covers military men facing court-martial proceedings
Issues:
• Whether there was violation of due process
• Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus, WON there
was a violation of the right to bail
Held:
• The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several
opportunities to be heard when they were asked to submit their counter-affidavits to
the PTI. They cannot claim that they were denied due process. “Failure to submit the
aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a
waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence."
• "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general
court- martial of jurisdiction."
• “We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R.
Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military,
as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.”
• However, a right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military,
where the right to bail does not exist.
• Solicitor General’s explanation of the exception:
• “The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt
military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.”
“…soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the
fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.”
“…the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,”
• Neither does it violate equal protection because the military is not similarly
situated with others.
• Dispositive part of the case:
• “As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not
acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the
intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners.
Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to
peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.”
• “ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under
Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.”
ALICIA A. BAYLON, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City,
Respondent.
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0 April 6, 1995
RE: FIRST INDORSEMENT DATED JULY 21, 1992 OF HON. FERNANDO DE
LEON, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
FACTS:
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an
information for double murder against several accused which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. D-10678, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et
al.," and thereafter raffled to respondent judge.
Subsequently, the accused filed on November 8, 1991 a petition for reinvestigation
which was granted and the Office of the City Prosecutor was given until December 23,
1991 to resolve the same. The reinvestigation was finally concluded by the said
prosecutor on March 31, 1992.
On December 21, 1991, a Saturday, during the pendency of the reinvestigation,
however, the accused filed a petition for bail, a Saturday, and requested that it be set
for hearing immediately the following Monday. Even with the strong opposition thereto
by the prosecution, a hearing on the petition was purportedly held by the trial court.
Then, reportedly on the basis of a joint counter-affidavit of the accused, an affidavit of
one Oscar Villaga, a certification of entry in the police blotter, and the position paper
submitted by the accused, and allegedly because there was no objection on the part
of the prosecution which was supposedly represented by Third Assistant Prosecutor
Rosita Castro, the court forthwith granted bail for the provisional liberty of each
accused in the amount of P40,000.00.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of Bail by the respondent judge was proper
HELD:
YES. Respondent Judge Sison stands charged with the now familiar malfeasance of
granting bail in a non-bailable offense without benefit of notice and hearing.
Specifically, it is averred that the prosecution was not given notice of at least three
days before the scheduled hearing on the petition for bail, in violation of the mandate
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and, worse, with two non-working days
between the filing and the hearing of the petition. It is likewise contended that during
the controverted hearing on December 23, 1991, the prosecution, which was not even
duly represented, was not given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of
the accused was strong.
There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent judge to support
and justify his grant of bail to the accused, namely, that time was of the essence,
considering that the accused had been detained since October 21, 1991; and that the
prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the granting of bail and to ask for an
opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against the accused.
We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the ambient
circumstances obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but have cautioned
respondent judge to be more circumspect in entertaining and resolving the petition
therefor. First, the accused were charged with double murder, each of which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a matter of right. Second,
no bail was recommended in the information which was filed on the bases of the
sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting clear and
strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused. Third, at the time of the application for
bail, there was still pending a reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office
of the City Prosecutor. It must be noted that the reinvestigation was at the instance of
the accused themselves, hence any resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof is
naturally and logically attributable to them. And, finally, the guileful setting of the
hearing of the petition for bail on December 23, 1991, when the same was filed only
on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday, readily casts doubt on the good faith in
and the regularity of the procedure adopted by the defense.
On the second contentiony, in the most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas, it was
categorically stressed that although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no
objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from
the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application.
Additionally, it must be borne in mind that a hearing is also necessary for the court to
take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court in fixing the amount of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied himself
that these requirements have been met can he then proceed to rule on whether or not
to grant bail.
NOTE(S):
We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed to the
sound discretion of respondent judge. But this does not mean, however, a lubricious
and untrammeled exercise of such discretion. We have held that admission to bail as
a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and
guided by the applicable legal principles, to wit:
. . . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence
because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally
and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not
a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.

The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua to death, such as murder, bail may be granted only after a
motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon
conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt
is strong. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the
court resolves the motion for bail.
Manotoc vs Court of Appeals Digest Held:

● A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
● The constitutional right to travel is not an absolute right. The Constitution provides:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court xxx." The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.

Facts: The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.
Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987 Constitution) states:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
in US for a certain time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public
management committee for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the health.
SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure,
and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner. The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision. (Ricardo Manotoc vs.
Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986)
estafa against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for
permission to leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his
desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." His motion was denied. He also wrote the Immigration Commissioner
requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said request was
also denied. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of
the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same was denied; hence, he
appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising
his constitutional right to travel.

Issues:

1. Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.

2. Whether the constitutional right to travel is absolute

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and
Fundamental Fairness in Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary
was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the
Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed
with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his
“immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted
his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take
cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court
of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
i. YES.
By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined
therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of
the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also
bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.
Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare
and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima
facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the
arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and
to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the
judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
ii. Yes.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not
at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds
application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.”
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in
the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as
a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States
was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against
his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of
bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding
basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that
may negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will
stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters;
that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
iii. NO.
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard
is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring
of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing
crime in our own country.
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its
trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as
well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof
“beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
“upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a

person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best
claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable
Government Of Hong Kong V. Hon. Olalia Jr. (2007)
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
Lessons Applicable: generally accepted international law, due process, bill of rights,
extradition
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
June 20, 1997: Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong effect an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons."
July 1, 1997: Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Juan Antonio Muñoz charged before the Hong Kong Court of 3 counts in violation of
Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and 7 counts of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999: warrants of arrest were issued against him
September 13, 1999: DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest - granted and NBI arrested him
Muñoz' Petition for Certiorari w/ the CA questioning the legality of his arrest - order of
arrest void
November 22, 1999: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition
DOJ Petition for Certiorari (became final April 10, 2001) - granted; order of arrest valid
October 8, 2001: Judge Bernardo, Jr. denied bail(then judge inhibited himself)
October 30, 2001: Judge Olalia on motion for reconsideration granted bail
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify:
1. December 20, 2001 Order allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz to post bail; and - nothing
in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings
2. April 10, 2002 Order denying the motion to vacate December 20, 2001 Order
ISSUE: W/N there is a right to bail in extradition proceedings
HELD: YES. DISMISS the petition. REMANDED to the trial court determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence”
Human Rights Law
It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community.
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty under
Section II, Article II of our Constitution. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.
Exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only.
the Court relied in Mejoff case upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee’s right to bail
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption
lies in favor of human liberty.
Public International Law
An extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a
crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing
its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. But while extradition is
not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:
1) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and
2) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law
This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will
best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest
"shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition
is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following
the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
By any standard, detention for over 2 years without having been convicted of any
crime is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
In criminal proceedings, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption
of innocence of the accused. While in an extradition proceeding, the assumption is
that the extraditee is a fugitive from justice, thus, he bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations under the time-
honored principle of pacta sunt servanda that the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these
rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213847 dated August 18, 2015
Ponente: Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
EN BANC
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged petitioner Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement
in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF).
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, petitioner filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him.
On July 3, 2014, after the motions were heard, Sandiganbayan issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his
Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan
on July 8, 2014. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to
post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight
risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
Sandiganbayan issued two resolutions denying petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail and
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014, respectively.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari to assail and annul the resolutions issued
by the Sandiganbayan before the Supreme Court.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
ISSUE #1: Whether bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion.
HELD # 1:
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or
restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with
a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or
even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none
of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset
of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect
for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time
many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
-end-

ISSUE #2: Whether petitioner is bailable since he is not flight risk.

HELD # 2: YES

The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international

community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release
if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
SECTION 14 prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
Criminal Due Process witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
1988] him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not
Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October case at bar.
1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep"
in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months
after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On
June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in
the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June
5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad
alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered
for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on
three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the
calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made
alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed
from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was
smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot
Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large
masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for
the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have
shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report
found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case
involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would
exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11
to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day
period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan
a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to
dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on
them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not
indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full
hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial
of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful
regard for the requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former
Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the
former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran,
(First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in
going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the
visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and
after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na
lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-
managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of
handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution
in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up
with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his
military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner
consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his
name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged
in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of
double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall
appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in
power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all
that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The
partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering
its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its
bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the
TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken
cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total
absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face
trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize
that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule
at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address
any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More
so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth,
and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the Philippines “(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any,
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
“(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing
FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice upon the main issue.
Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had “(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
later lured her into Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for “(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint
a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with accordingly.”
the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.
The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found
probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the
same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life
elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both
accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to
due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were
raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the
case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte
waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary,
but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should
not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not
acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court
for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

NOTES:
Due process in criminal proceedings
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court
“Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
“(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper
case, the civil liability.
Presumption of Innocence
PEOPLE V. DRAMAYO 149 Phil. 107
FERNANDO, J.:
There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made by counsel de
oficio in this appeal of the accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were
sentenced to life imprison-ment for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is
vigorously pressed that because the information alleged conspiracy on the part of
seven defendants, with only the two appellants being convicted, two having been
utilized as state witnesses and the other three having been acquitted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence as to their culpa-bility, the judgment of conviction against the
appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. To bolster
such a contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the proof offered by the prosecution
were noted. A careful study of the evidence of record would leave no other rational
conclusion but that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellants in the
manner as found by the lower court. Hence the appeal cannot prosper. We affirm.
The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the morning of January
9, 1964. The two accused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in
the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the
Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to
shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the deceased five days before by
being available as witnesses. The response was decidedly in the negative as they
themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals
who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the
house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those
present including the other accused Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Cresencio
and Severo Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school
house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito
Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo
and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to
station themselves nearby.[1]
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a
request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the
side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated
stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the
former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what
had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning,
he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he
had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police
were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo,
asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the
cause thereof.[2]
The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the
right lumbar region, and another in the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower
court reached its decision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now appellants,
Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty "beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
[murder], defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified
by the circumstance of evident premeditation and aggravated by night time, and
imposes upon each of the said accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the
penalty of [reclusion perpetua]."[3] Reference was likewise made in such decision as
to why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them, Crescencio Savandal
and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo
Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted.
Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus:
"From the beginning the accused Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with
the group but that he was fishing in the sea during the night in question. These facts
that is, that none of the prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these three
accused actually helped in the killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these
three accused were in-cluded in the case only much later after the filing of this case
against Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent contention of the
accused Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the night in
question; and the testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their
witnesses,] Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa-Billona, Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo
Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner, without hesitation, revealing a clear
conscience, and the fact that the testimonies of these witnesses have not been refuted
by the PC soldiers [whom they accused of maltreatment] when they were available to
the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very serious doubt as to the guilt of the
said accused."[4]
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now
appellants Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive
character that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E.
Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a
reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only
two of the seven accused were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous appraisal of
the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged,
thus calling for the affirmance of the decision.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it
must be, according to the Constitution.[5] That is a right safeguarded both appellants.
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if
the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always
been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense
is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes.[6] United States
v. Lasada,[7] decided in 1910, yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is not meant
that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation
of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense."[8] To the
same effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v.
Esquivel.[9] Thus: "In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the
attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the
pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the
guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to
the court, to the accused, and to the state."[10]
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi
inter-posed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the
credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being
entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The
force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three
accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite
quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no
question as to the other two who testified for the state being likewise no longer subject
to any criminal liability. The reference then to an opinion of the late Justice Laurel,
stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is
allowable only when no reason-able doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is
evident from the very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel
in People v. Manoji.[11] Thus: "Upon the other hand, there are certain facts which if
taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the
guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910] 18 Phil., 90, 96.) The finding of the two gold
teeth of the deceased in the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that
he gave the hat * * * to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our minds as to
the guilt of the appellant, but also seems to sustain the theory of the defense and
strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign
to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and
circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of
reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the
penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. * * *."[12]
The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on
the part of appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the
two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had
been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come
to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered
by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as
established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have
been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above
stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly
untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time,
there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants
being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold
the party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral
certainty having arisen as to their culpability.[13]
2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilt not having
been sufficiently demonstrated with the contention that the lower court overlooked or
did not properly consider material and significant facts of record that ought to have
substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such
brief, however, with due recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is
pressed, would not destroy the credibility of the facts as testified to concerning the
manner in which the deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants to
put an end to his life. That such a version could not have been concocted is shown by
the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the
deceased as the offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to
do away with the principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement
for the appellants to have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of
record pointing to no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them,
the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense
of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to
reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings
of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony
before him except when, as was not shown in this case, circumstances of weight or
influence were ignored or disregarded by him.[14]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 is affirmed with the modification

that the indemnification to the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum of
P12,000.00. With costs.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980] carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”

Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees
of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal
official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act,
or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction
of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for
the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly
possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment
of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
and thus, should be declared null and void declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52
remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from
another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from
younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new
blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be
declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV,
section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office
on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty
and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would
be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the
ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which
Marquez vs Comelec "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as
Facts: expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the
province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo
warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because
he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government
Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a
person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and
undue circumscription of the law.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly
agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law,
it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation
can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made
a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)
against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was
still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued
for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the
Philippines then.

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice"
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who
drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen
that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice
really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means
somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art.
73 of the IRR.

Issue:

What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?

Held:
CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE [194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991] the petitioner with his claims. The presumed innocence must yield to the positive
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law finding that he is guilty of malversation.

Facts: Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public
Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Funds.
Cashier in the said office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds
and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On April
13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a transfer
of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The Certificate of
turnover revealed a shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50.
After a final demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of
malversation was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that
the shortage was malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado
Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while
he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to
post the amount on his cashbook although he had not received the said amount. He
was convicted in Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of
the accused of the charge against him

Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the
positive findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the
evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him.
Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the
accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not
really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.

It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1

of the 4 checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accused’s
cash book 3 months after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent
when Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and
encashed such checks, was not proven.

Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of

the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by an authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds to personal use.

The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable

only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of
justice should be tilt in favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at
bar. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by
Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.
Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of
People Vs. Holgado the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not
G.R.L-2809; 22 Mar 1950 sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should
have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
Facts: qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by
the court.
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person,
he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said
Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty as instructed by Mr. Ocampo, who had
nothing to do with the case. The court did not inform the accused of his right to have
an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court did not inquire
whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time
to procure or assign an attorney de oficio.

Issue:

Whether or Not there was denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause

Held:

Yes, this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in
our Constitution. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. Under the rules of
Court, Rule 112, sec. 3: when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has
four important duties to comply with: 1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right
to have attorney before being arraigned; 2) After giving him such information the court
must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3) If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4) If the
accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial
court.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused.
The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real
and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the
plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of
the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction
is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the
(PRE- ARRAIGNMENT DUTIES OF TRIAL JUDGE) In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he
effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was
VS. able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is
EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-apellant incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision
G.R NO 122770, January 16, 1998 of the lower court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

Eduardo Agbayani was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter, Eden
Agbayani at the sanctity of their rented room on July 19, 1994 and was found guilty of
the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new
counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to
choose his own counsel. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never
prepared during all the scheduled hearings; worse, even waived the presence of
appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also averred
that the trial court uses its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private
complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial
judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse
the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.

RULING:

It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial
judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied
with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative procedure prescribed by law for
the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by
an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has also been held that unless the
contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to
inform that accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right.
Sec 19 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the
accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause
grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly
demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error
and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly.
Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the
counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either
of the charges.
Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that
Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond
crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on
assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.
the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA
3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the
absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was
acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted
estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily
included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since
his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the
accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime
to which he is convicted

Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause;
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of
law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which
although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Assistant City
Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner
demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the
NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had
supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with
the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the
petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence
this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded
as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.

Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share
percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with any contract
or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of
the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not
the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of
R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).

The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial
or business transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil,
or administrative in nature.

The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by
the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is
one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is
absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
 aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded
Borja Vs. Mendoza to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries,
[77 SCRA 422; G.R. No.L-45667; 20 Jun 1977] with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with
the arraignment of petitioner.
Facts:

Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not
arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial
in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The
case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent
Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his
constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and
without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case
was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled
because there was no arraignment.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not
arraigned.

Held:

Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may
be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be
convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that
requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time,
is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against
him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The
absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of
due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge
Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of
respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the