FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997.]

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO , petitioner, vs . INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL ,
respondents.

Yolanda Quisumbing - Javellana & Associates for petitioner.

Joracio R. Viola, Sr. for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; ACCRETION AS A MODE OF ACQUIRING PROPERTY;

REQUISITES; LEGAL CONSEQUENCES. — Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result
of the action of the waters of the river: and (3) that the land where the accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the
owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking,
distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the
sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code,
is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be
seen hut is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD REQUISITE NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — There is no
dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land: (c) the
Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed
land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to
the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own
tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is
deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DISPUTED LAND IS AN ACCRETION NOT ON A RIVER
BANK BUT ON A SEA BANK; THE APPLICABLE LAW IS NOT ARTICLE 457 OF THE CIVIL
CODE BUT ARTICLE 4 OF THE SPANISH LAW OF WATERS OF 1866. — There is no dispute
as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is
obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water
the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands and
Valeriano (108 Phil. 336, 338 [1960]) that: "Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay
cannot be considered as a sea. We nd said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea,
being a mere indentation of the same: 'Bay, — An opening into the land where the water is
shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct
from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake,' 7 C.J. 1013-1014."
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 The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION ON A SEA BANK,
MANILA BAY BEING AN INLET OR AN ARM OF THE SEA; AS SUCH, THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY IS UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE SPANISH LAW OF WATERS OF 1866, PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. — The instant controversy brings a situation calling for the
application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an
accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows: "Lands
added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof." In the
light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the
disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all
legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein
disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to
the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated
by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority." Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the
right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is
no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of
special industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either
the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land 1966, to be
the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA , JR ., J : p

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land
Registration case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee,
involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west
by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan
River ow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's
registered land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's
land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the
sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be
considered as foreshore land?
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 Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent
resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land
Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which was led by private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court of First
Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, led an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an
area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15,
1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano
Navarro, led a shpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty ve (25)
hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was
denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the
public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27,
1988, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the
property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's
application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the
Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, a rmed the grant. The then Executive
Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual led an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto
Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded
on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on
the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River ow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, led an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed su cient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the
public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of
Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the
same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of
Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. lexlib

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted
and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon led an opposition to Pascual's application.
Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public
domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in
possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a shpond permit issued by the
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 Bureau of Fisheries and con rmed by the O ce of the President; and that he had already
converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960,
Sinforoso Pascual led a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo
Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed,
through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-
175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon:
thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This,
notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having
been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the
subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land
registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on
November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs,
the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment nding the subject
property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the
subject of land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint

for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;

(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over
the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay
costs in both instances." 6

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned
the following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not nding the land in question as an accretion by
the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned
by applicants-appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.

3.. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is
controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not nding that the applicants-appellants [private
respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]." 7

On appeal, the respondent court reversed the ndings of the court a quo and
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 granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fty
(50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fty meters (50) meters from corner 5
towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the
parties in their respective briefs is — whether or not the land sought to be
registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed
by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the
Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject
land is accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore
land.

xxx xxx xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the
land immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which
is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the
west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and
Bulacan rivers come from inland owing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In
other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of
applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the ow of
both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was
formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto
the land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the
subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land
and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the
Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion
this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy
problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of
the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the
shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be
quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial
property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It is however undisputed that [private respondents'] land lies between these
two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as
a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the ow of the two is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at
their mouths.

It is, therefore, di cult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the
cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves of the
sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add
anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves
and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers owing towards
the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing
[private respondents'] land to accumulate therein

However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not
seem to accept this theory and stated that the subject land arose only when . . .
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 Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees thereat to serve as a boundary or
strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would
explain how the land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same
came from the sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few
trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have
stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this is not so because
the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of [private respondents'] clearly
show that the land that accumulated beyond the so-called boundary, as well as
the entire area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing
innumerable trees . . . . The existence of vegetation on the land could only con rm
that the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the
sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other
hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward ow which they
brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and
dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents']
land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's nding.
While it is true that the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay
fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an
accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly
what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the
Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:

'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made

on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said land is . . . sandwitched
[sic] by two big rivers . . . These two rivers bring down considerable amount
of soil and sediments during oods every year thus raising the soil of the
land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private respondents'].
About four- fth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are
planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of
these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land . . . subject of
this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And
having been formed by accretion, the said land may be considered the
private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant [private
respondents'] . . . .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government
should be withdrawn, except for the portion recommended by the land
investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and considered
foreshore. . . .'
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the
Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited 'the
same to the northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50
meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part
of the foreshore' . . . . 8

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private
respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the possession of the portion
of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.

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 On December 20, 1978, petitioners led a motion for reconsideration of the
aforecited decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the
same decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration led by the Director of Forestry. It, however,
modified its decision, to read, viz:
"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate
that portion included in their shpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and
hand over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion
is not within the strip of land fty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the
northern portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which
area is more particularly referred to as fty (50) meters from corner 2 towards
corner 1; and fty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181
. . ." 9

On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the
Director of Forestry, an extension of time within which to le in this court, a petition for
review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of
the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, led a petition
for review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We, however,
denied the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been
prematurely led at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners'
pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating
that the decision dated November 29, 1978 had become nal and executory as against
herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the
Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting
petitioners' request for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was led out of time,
citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for
reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and led within fteen (15) days from the notice of
the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have
palpably erred in appreciating the facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied
statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both
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 the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the
accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land
by the action of the sea which brought soil and
sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and
bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner
Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners
vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western
boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 1 1
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited
on the estate fronting the river bank 1 2 ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian
owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being
owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 1 3 The
alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen 1 4 but is not automatically registered
property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 1 5
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of
accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to
be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay
and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for
the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testi ed in open
court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's
foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land
began to rise. 1 6
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b)
petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers.
Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on
the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If
the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern
and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion
thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is
adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins
the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as
to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:
"Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a
sea. We nd said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere
indentation of the same:
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 'Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all
sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct
from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.' 7
C.J. 1013-1014." 17

The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land
on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not di cult to discern from
the facts of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:
"A perusal of the survey plan . . . of the land subject matter of these cases
shows that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the
western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the
northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both ow towards Manila
Bay. The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering
and there is no portion where the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila
Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be
considered an accretion caused by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that
the land he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his
registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered
as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 nds no
applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay." 1 8

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is
that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the
public domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the fact that
petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude
that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because
petitioners' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the
current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay
which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally
incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited,
not on either the eastern or western portion of petitioners' land where a river each runs, but
on the northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such
conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural
experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and
bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In ampli cation of this, plainly
more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting
opinion when he stated that:
"As appellants' (titled) land . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two
rivers to meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said
land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters . . . it is believed rather
farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through 'sediments of
sand and salt [sic] . . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the
ow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and
silt are deposited at their mouths,' why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt
and clay accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled land facing
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 Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers? That
being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was
not caused by the current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila
Bay) into which the rivers empty.
The conclusion . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence
which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the action of
the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original
applicant, testi ed on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the
shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get
higher after he had planted trees thereon in 1948. . . .
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. . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high
tide could reach as far as the dike of appellants' shpond within their titled
property, which dike now separates this titled property from the land in question.
Even in 1948 when appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan trees in
the land involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea
could still reach the dike. This must be so because in . . . the survey plan of the
titled property approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by
Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the
planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to rise or to
get higher in elevation.

The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the

sea water and at the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from
being carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former
shore at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and
dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in
question." 1 9

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and
bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the
drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of
Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of
petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea
bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the
sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of
the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano 2 0 that Manila
Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be
applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands
adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose 2 1 , Republic v. Court of
Appeals 2 2 , Republic v. Alagad 2 3 , and Meneses v. Court of Appeals 2 4 , we categorically
ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of
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 Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the
foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service,
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public
nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank
which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain,
the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due
form by a competent authority." 25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained
by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed
land as quali ed, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property
of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., concurs: The amendatory provisions of the Water Code (P.D. 1067) did not
affect Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

Footnotes

1. In CA G.R. No. 59044-K dated November 29, 1978, penned by Associate Justice Porfirio
V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Nestor B. Alampay, Jorge R. Coquia,
and Rafael C. Climaco, with Associate Justice Mariano Serrano, dissenting; Rollo, pp. 39-
54.

2. Resolution (on the First Motion for Reconsideration) dated November 21, 1980, penned
by Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la
Fuente, Nestor B. Alampay, Jorge R. Coquia, and Elias B. Asuncion; Rollo, pp. 68-69; and
Resolution (on the Second Motion for Reconsideration) dated March 28, 1982, penned
by Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la
Fuente, Nestor B. Alampay, Elias B. Asuncion, and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Rollo, pp. 90-91.

3. Fourth Civil Cases Division.

4. L.R.C. Case No. 18607.

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 5. Branch 1.

6. Decision in CA G.R. No. 59044 dated November 29, 1978, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 40-41.
7. Id., p. 3; Rollo, p. 41.
8. Id., pp. 3-6; Rollo, pp. 41-44.
9. Resolution in CA-G.R. No. 59044-R dated November 21, 1980, p. 1; Rollo, p. 68.
10. Docketed as G.R. No. 55584.

11. Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996; Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 374 [1995]:
Reynante v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 794, 799 [1992]; Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA
374, 385 [1991].

12. Paras, Edgardo, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 3, 1984 Edition, p. 211.

13. Santulan v. The Executive Secretary, 80 SCRA 548, 556 [1977].

14. Paras, supra, at p. 212, citing Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567; Roxas v. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; 3 Manresa 236.

15. Id., at p. 216, citing Grande, et al. v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962.
16. The pertinent portion of Sulpicio Pascual's testimony is as follows:

"Q: Is that portion contiguous to Manila Bay?

A: Near but not contiguous.

Q: During the high tide is that portion reached by water?

A: Before 1948.
Q: Before you introduced palapat and bakawan in that area?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It was only after you have planted palapat and bakawan . . . when
the sea water no longer reaches that area?

A: I only planted few trees in 1948 to serve as boundary and as

marker. . . .

Q: Was it only in 1948 that you observed that portion was becoming

higher?
A: At the beginning of 1948 I noticed that land was getting higher."

(TSN, June 11, 1969, pp. 9-11).

17. Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano, 108 Phil. 336, 338 [1960].
18. Petition pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 122-123.

19. Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mariano Serrano; Rollo, pp. 48-51.

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 20. 108 Phil 335 [1960].
21. 53 Phil. 423 [1929].

22. 31 SCRA 532 [1984].

23. 169 SCRA 455 [1989].

24. 246 SCRA 162 [1995].

25. Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil. 505, 517 [1911].
26. Joven y Monteverde, et al. v. The Director of Lands, 93 Phil. 134, 136-137 [1953].

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