(1) INTRODUCTION

Good morning, your Honors. May it please the court, my name is Rod Bendolf Franco
Delgado. I am the second council for the respondents and my speech will revolve around
the intentions of the framers of our 1987 Constitution vis-a-vis the Family Code, and why
same-sex marriage should not be legalized.

As my argument states,
The drafters of the Constitution intended that marriage may only be contracted between
a man and a woman; hence, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code, in defining and limiting
marriage, are only in accordance with Section 3 (1), Article XV of the 1987 Constitution,
which compels the State to defend the right of the spouses to found a family.

CONSTITUTION; OUTLINE
(2)
Your Honors, as citizens of this country and as advocates of the rule of law, we have
sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution; to abide by all its provisions.

In the current debate on same-sex marriage, the term “spouses” in Sec. 3(1), Art. XV
of the 1987 Constitution, has been challenged to have more than one interpretation -
claiming that it does not only pertain to a man and a woman, but also couples of the
same sex. In doing so, we encounter an ambiguity. Your Honors, I will be analysing the
ambiguous term “spouse” in three levels: principle, history, & extrinsic aids.

These guidelines are persuasive, we ask for consideration that the Court would allow me to proceed.

(1st LEVEL) PRINCIPLE: VERBA LEGIS

(3)
For the first level, the term “spouses” should only be construed as a union between a
man and a woman in accordance with a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction.

In order to ascertain and determine the intended meaning of an ambiguous

constitutional provision, the following guidelines must be taken into consideration
together with the applicable rules, principles, doctrines, [...] and aids in construction
and interpretation” (Sualog, 2015).

The second guideline enumerated talks about the well-settled principle of verba legis
or plain meaning rule, wherein it states that words in the constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. The term
“spouses”, has been historically and legally referred to as a relationship ‘between a
man and a woman’. (Family Code, 1987)

Three well-settled principles: (a) verba legis – ordinary meaning, (b) ratio legis est anima – interpreted
in accordance with the intent of the framers, & (c) ut magis valeat quam pereat – interpret as a whole.
(4) (2nd LEVEL) HISTORY OF LAWS ON MARRIAGE
Your Honors, another guide to ascertain the intent of the framers is through reviewing
our history.
In examining the history of our laws on marriage, it shows that the definition constantly
remains as a union between a man and a woman.

The Rule of Canon Law, particularly a covenant between man and a woman, was
then promulgated in the Philippines being one of Spain’s dominions. The law of civil
marriage in 1870 was extended to the Philippines by Royal Decree in 1883. In 1889,
the Spanish Civil Code was likewise extended to the Philippines; these laws fixed the
duties and obligations of the husband and wife. General Orders No. 68 promulgated
on Dec. 11, 1899 regarding civil marriages was likewise made available only between
a qualified male and female. Act No. 3412 which took effect on 1927, retained the
definition of a male and female but included the age of consent. On Dec. 1929, Act
No. 3613 was approved, enacting a new law on marriage but retained the previous
requirements that marriage may only be solemnized between a man and a woman.

Three Sources of Law: (1) Constitution, (2) Statutes, & (3) Jurisprudence);
Weight/Treatment: a. Mandatory (Sources of Law) and b. Persuasive (Foreign/Cases, Principles)

(3rd LEVEL) EXTRINSIC AIDS: DELIBERATIONS

(5)
Your Honors, if there is still doubt with regards to the interpretation, resort should be
made to intrinsic and extrinsic aids of the construction; such as deliberations or
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. Former Constitutional Commissioner
Maria Teresa Nieva, a member of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Philippine Constitution, when asked to clarify what marriage meant, she said
“Generally, I think, the accepted definition of marriage is the union between a
man and a woman” (Nieva, 2018).

Aside from Ms. Nieva, it can also be inferred from other Constitutional Commissioners
during the Proceedings and Debates of the 1987 Constitution, that the term “spouses”
and “marriage” was defined as a union of a man and a woman.
On September 17, 1986, when Mr. Nolledo asked Mr. Villacorta about what they meant
by the phrase “on the free consent and equality between spouses”?. Mr. Villacorta
answered “This simply means that in a marital relationship, both the husband and
the wife have equal rights in that relationship [...]”. Another instance where
marriage was implicitly defined was during the deliberations on September 24, 1986.
Mr. Gascon had Mr. Tingson explain the phrase “the institution of marriage as the
foundation of the family,” Mr Tingson clarified that it is a positive suggestion that
the family should be based on people who are married to each other, man and
wife, and not just living together without the sanctity of marriage.

Do we have to resort to extrinsic Aids? Yes, in the case of Francisco Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar
Council it stated in the ruling that “If considering that the language of the subject constitutional
provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima.”
 CONCLUSION
(6)
Taking into consideration the basic meaning of the word, the history of our laws on
marriage, and the extrinsic aids shedding light on the intent of the framers, it is clear
that the drafters of the constitution intended that marriage may only be contracted
between a man and a woman. Hence, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code, is not
violative but is rather in accordance to Sec. 3, ART. XV of the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, same-sex marriage should not be legalized in the Philippines.

Finally, You Honors, we would like to clarify that we are not against same-sex
marriage, we are simply upholding the Constitution and respecting its established
institutions. As I have elucidated in my speech, the Constitution intended that marriage
may only be solemnized between a man and a woman; and to amend something as
sacrosanct as marriage, more so, the Constitution, it must be taken to the proper
institution that is authorized to handle such matter – which is the Legislature; lodged
with plenary power – as explained earlier by my co-council.

Your Honors, I would like to end this second presentation for the respondent side.
Thank you, you Honors. May it please the court.

A plenary power or plenary authority is a complete and absolute power to take action on a particular
issue, with no limitations

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS #1

Q: What is the weight of the ConCom interpretation in regards to the Constitution?

A: Although it may only be persuasive, “The intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the people adopting it is accorded much weight and due respect in the application
or interpretation of a constitutional provision.” (Sualog, 2015)

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS #2

Q: Is Section 3(1), Article XV of the 1987 Constitution self-executory?

A: No. Sec. 3(1), Art. XV is not a self-executory right, because of ruled in the cases of
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance.
: Mere statements of principles and policies. They need legislative enactments before they can
be implemented. Cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.

POSSIBLE QUESTION #3

Q: What is the primary source to ascertain the constitutional intent?

A: According to the case of “Ang bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections”, the primary source as to ascertain the constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the law itself.
 POSSIBLE QUESTION #4

Q: Do you think the framers of the constitution had foreseen every obstacle it may
encounter in the future regarding such laws?
A: According to Chief Justice John Marshall, in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, “a
constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as
nearly as human institutions can approach it.” (ONLY PERSUASIVE)
Chief Justice Marshall meant that the Constitution should be read as a document
“intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to various
crises of human affairs” (Constitutional Interpretation; Terrance Sandalow)

COMPILATION OF CASES CITED:

1.) Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council (Motion was denied)
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress”
refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that
these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of
the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from
congress.

ISSUE: Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional
as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a
representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one representative
that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only
intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary
in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The
Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
2.) Humberto Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
FACTS: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the
power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in
1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s
charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR
shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State

to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law
creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates
the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the
constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it
legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like
Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is
concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of
the local autonomy principle.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of
the equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that
some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended
by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of
the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons
or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal
protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does
not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.
3.) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
FACTS: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred
that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated
as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete
the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways &
Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill
1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

4.) Ang bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections

Facts: Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted
on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Decision: Petition dismissed. Pursuant to RA 7941, respondents may not be
disqualified from participating on the ground that they are political parties. The
Constitution also provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.”
5.) Cohens v. Virginia
Cohens v. Virginia, (1821), U.S. Supreme Court case in which the court reaffirmed its
right to review all state court judgments in cases arising under the federal Constitution
or a law of the United States. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for mandatory
Supreme Court review of the final judgments of the highest court of any state in cases
“where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and
the decision is against its validity” or “where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”

In a case involving a dispute over extensive lands, Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s

Lessee (1813), the Supreme Court had reversed Virginia’s highest court and
commanded it to enter a judgment in favour of the party originally ruled against. The
Virginia court refused to obey the Supreme Court’s mandate, declaring that “the
appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States does not extend to this
court.” As a result, the Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816) affirmed the
constitutionality of the Judiciary Act, thus asserting its right to appellate jurisdiction.

Chief Justice John Marshall did not participate in either decision because he and his
brother had contracted to purchase part of the land. Thus, the Cohens case presented
him with his first opportunity to express himself on appellate jurisdiction. Two brothers
named Cohen had been convicted in a Norfolk, Vir., court for selling District of
Columbia lottery tickets in violation of Virginia law. The Cohens claimed they were
immune from state laws because the lottery tickets had been authorized by Congress.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided against them on the merits of the case, an
opinion by Marshall reasserted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state courts and
took a harsh view of the reliability of state courts. Marshall wrote, “In many states, the
judges are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the legislature. [When] we
observe the importance which [the Constitution] attaches to the independence of
judges, we are the less inclined to suppose that it can have intended to leave these
constitutional questions to tribunals where this independence may not exist, in all
cases where a state shall prosecute an individual who claims the protection of an act of
Congress.”

Facts: An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of

Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of
Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then
declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the
national government.
Issue: Did the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to review the
Virginia Supreme Court's ruling?
Ruling: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the
Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this
jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall
argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and
federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall
declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was
correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.