G.R. No.

L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will
not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein
involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French
rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the
courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects
the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the
United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall
said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high
seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line
drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105;
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded
by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the
Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the
ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
 those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the
proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the
local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the
consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon
Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other
than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a
part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the
crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His Britanic
Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively,
shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and
rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same,
and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses
and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each
nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject
always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation
Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not
triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship,
without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach
of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our
territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila
in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of
public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come
into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:

The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried,
kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been
surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."

The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the more than one crime
was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the complaint contained two
charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and,
consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated one charge from the other and file a
complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful possession of opium.
It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this
court.

The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:

The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as
August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of
the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to
inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and
afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of
opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same substance. The
hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's control, who
moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to
in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily,
that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband
in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he
ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.

It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B, properly constitute
the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of
investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that
they were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the
first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel should have left the Philippines, because
the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore.

And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important as evidence in this
cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows: itc-alf

FISCAL. What is it?

 WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service agent and taken
to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell.

On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because it refers to a sale."
But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already given this testimony, to wit:

FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?

WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him a sample of
opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the steamer, and the agent
asked that the vessel be searched.

The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay evidence, and the court
only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.

The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C,
contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that it was
true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his possession.

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in the presence of the
provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because the defendant spoke
English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by him in
Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of selling
it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the
same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount
of the value of about P500; that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another
cause, was his, and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already
been searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of
opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it
was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same
and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked
that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of
opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within
its district, on the wharf of Cebu.

The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to the
payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits
presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced
should have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned over to the customs authorities
for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court. lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found: That,
although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in
any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account
of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from
the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established
in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case,
was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject,
should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in
all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.

Antonio Sanz for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation
of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the
steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought
them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the
eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the
accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?

Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the intimation that there exists
inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent
on the facts before us.

In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion handed down by the Chief
Justice, it is found —

That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel
in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does no apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case
a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in
the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. 1awphil.net

A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the present instance is readily
observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present
case the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the
present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and
the one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other
prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel
from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In
the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium was imported from a
foreign country; in the present case there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However,
in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting
as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:

The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was
not necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium
was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which
subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.

Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we return to an examination of
the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who
shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are
synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port,
without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And
again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into
port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas.,
1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any
person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug
unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be
absurb to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the
mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an
amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the
defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal
importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible
misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not
present.

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the
sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004,
committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the
country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions
granted the motion to quash the Information5 which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262, committed as follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then
legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with
a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and
the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA],
in violation of the aforecited law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children:
CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in
September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents
reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their
children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only
sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income
as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC,
and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a
Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a
head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit
with their kids.8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of
abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a
Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived.10

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive
Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting
the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB]
is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts
complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering from mental and
emotional anguish "wherever she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that
the acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it
noting that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a
new law, the act itself which had caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred
within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of
the emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing about or into
existence of something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been brought
about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court
for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of the basic
characteristics of our criminal laws - territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear that there must be an
act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which
partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain
Liesel Mok" - which has been conceded to have been committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the Information must still
be ordered following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At
best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis
in the original)

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought
direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is
in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's
ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without
fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and
emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her
wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig
City where she resides can take cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court
in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime
or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)

As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.

In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an
acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that
this petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that
the petition was belatedly filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition was belatedly filed.
The date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension14 was filed - June 2, 2014 -
refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date when the said motion was lodged
before this Comi. The motion was in fact filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the
Rules of Court to file the intended petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a
Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to
file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's response to her
Letter16dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for
assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the
extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.
We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the
petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et
al., 17 where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private
offended party in the absence of the OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an
offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of
substantial justice so requires.18

Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show
that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that
the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The
only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal,
is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the
court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the
merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could
not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction. 20(Citation
omitted and emphasis in the original)

The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may
only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the
accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the c01Tect application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No.
9262 is a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the
law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted)

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh
the evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for
resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of
circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge
of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit
relationship took place outside the Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet no jurisprudence
on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that
probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned
by the law,27 the RTC furnished copies of the assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine
Senate through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and
Human Rights.28
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a great number
of Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In. April to September 2016, the number of
overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million, 97.5 percent of which were
comprised of overseas contract workers or those with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas
without contract.29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial
jurisdiction over a case of psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by
marital infidelity carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may be committed against women and
their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering
of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right
to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,
threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v.
People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section
5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime
are derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child.
As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar· such
acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims
who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional
anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated
in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but
the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence
inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only
one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing
mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
1âwphi1

should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA,
Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which
is personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable
element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as shown in the
vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in
Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The
estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon
City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction
where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of
either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
case will exclude the others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and
essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory,
that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a
material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband
are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the
case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity
must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same
beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over
the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed
abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine
courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May
2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch
113, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly
erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal
Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense
charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.

Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987,
reciting his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of
Manila on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in
the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present
position; that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations
of the petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only
known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29,
1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of
the complainant to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which
he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of
rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good
faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).

The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer,
criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.

The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught
by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM
officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the
time of his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments
(380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss
Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian
Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the
time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he was supposed
to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048,
dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346,
dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through
the Manila International Airport the following foreign currencies in cash and in checks:

without authority from the Central Bank.

Contrary to Law.

The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113,
presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or
attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly,
through other persons, through the mails or through international carriers except when specifically
authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central
Bank regulations.

Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange
in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes
of establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in
other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central
Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:

Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .— That any person who shall engage in the
trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and
regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange
and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12 years and I day and maximum
of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.

At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the
garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines
9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and
July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and
also to play in the casino; that he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in business with
him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their
own businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought
US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative
refused to accept his declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for which
reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought
in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared
(Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also
testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some business with him in the
Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them
came to the Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed
to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense. When
asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his
answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does not
understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he was
going back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because
of the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was because of
this fear that he was urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the
Philippines.

The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:

The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section
6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when
he was about to depart from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation
of Section 6.

What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country
was done the very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that
 clear intention to violate and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by overt acts of a person.

The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended to show that the accused
had no wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent in his decision:

... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the currencies confiscated
and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his business associates abovenamed. And
from the unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question
came from abroad and not from the local source which is what is being prohibited by the
government. Yes, simply reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that the currency
declaration is required for the purpose of establishing the amount of currency being brought by
tourist or temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The currency declarations, therefore,
is already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the
amounts actually brought in by them to correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be
taken out. Indeed, this Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner currency
declarations were made as testified to by the Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of
Customs representative never took part in all these declarations testified to by no less than five
(5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these employees are the favorites of these travellers. It
is the hope of this Court that the authorities must do something to remedy the evident flaw in the
system for effective implementation of the questioned Central Bank Circular No. 960.

But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal responsibility on the
accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring
the almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts
of Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.

The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict
the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had
the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens
rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice,
the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his
apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted
foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the Central
Bank as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency
declarations in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips
to the Philippines.

Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No.
960, the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency
he was bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were brought into
the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on several previous occasions when they came to
the Philippines, supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined
business ventures; that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take
the money out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which
occurred on July 6,1986 might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal
liability of the accused under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It
did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the
possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial.
It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of
foreign currency for other people. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts
of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal
checks of other people, as well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which
clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates
had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in some business ventures. The
respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial were
declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign
exchange in his possession. Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the respondent
judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associates
had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very
substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose of investing
in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in which
they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so
palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal
of the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in
this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.

He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least
the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in
spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the
currency listed in the information, which according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of
Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the
alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960
to justify the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for
the trial court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited CB
Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or non-
resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words,
CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency brought
in or out of the Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at
the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00,
if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount without specific authority from
the Central Bank.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency,
and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the
attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA
712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in
any branch of government service, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.