G.R. No.

L-30994 September 30, 1982

OLIMPIA BASA, ARSENIO BASA, NEMESIO BASA, RICARDO BASA, ATANACIA BASA, JULIANA BASA, and FELICIANO
BASA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES C. AGUILAR, Judge Presiding Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, GENARO PUYAT,
BRIGIDA MESINA, PRIMO TIONGSON, and MACARIA PUYAT, respondents.

VASQUEZ, J:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 2513,
entitled "Olimpia Basa, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Genaro Puyat, et al., Defendants. "

The seven (7) petitioners are owners co-pro-indiviso of an undivided ONE-HALF (1/2) share of a parcel of land located in
Barrio San Mateo, Arayat, Pampanga, with an area of 32,383 square meters, more or less. Private respondents Genaro
Puyat and Brigida Mesina were the owners of the other undivided half of the same parcel of land.

On March 6, 1964, Genaro Puyat, with the marital consent of Brigida Mesina, sold his ONE-HALF (1/2) share of the parcel
of land in question for the price of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS in favor of private respondents Primo Tiongson
and Macaria Puyat. Primo Tiongson is a son-in-law of Genaro Puyat who is married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter of
Genaro Puyat.

Seven (7) days later, on or March 13, 1964, the herein petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2513, praying that they be allowed
to exercise the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, for which purpose they deposited with the court
the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) as redemption money.

The trial court rendered the judgment dismissing the case. It ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to exercise the
right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, reasoning out as follows:

There is nothing repugnant, from the point of view of public policy, for parents to sell to their children. It could not,
therefore, have been intended by the framers of the Civil Code of the Philippines to include within the purview of the
term 'third person' the children of a co-owner of a thing. For after all, these children have an inchoate right to succession
to the same property. To hold otherwise, is to stretch the meaning of the law into ludicrious (sic) situations.

The logic of His Honor, the trial judge, carries more sentiment than law. It disregards the express letter of the law
invoked by the petitioners and ignores the pelosophy of the same. Article 1620 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only
a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the
share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common,

Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the
benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient
association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th Ed., 317.) It is intended to minimized co-ownership. The law
grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the of her owners are sold to "a third
person." A third person, within the meaning of this Article, is anyone who is not a co-owner. (Sentencia of February 7,
1944 as cited in Tolentino, Comments on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 160.)

Private respondent Primo Tiongson is definitely not a co-owner of the land in question. He is not even an heir of private
respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, nor included in the "family relations" of the said spouses as defined in
Article 217 of the Civil Code. The circumstance that he is married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat and
Brigida Mesina, is of no moment. The conveyance to the Tiongson spouses was by onerous title, made during the
lifetime of Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina. The alleged inchoate right of succession from Genaro Puyat and Brigida
Mesina, which pertained only to Macaria Puyat. is thus out of the question. To deny to the petitioners the right of
redemption recognized in Article 1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing co-ownership and to
contravene the public policy in this regard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of what, in
the words of Manresa, " might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which they have been thrust."

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and in lieu thereof, a new one is rendered declaring the
petitioners to be entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code with respect to
the ONE-HALF (1/2) share sold by private respondent Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina in favor of their corespondents
Primo Tiongson and Macaria Puyat. The private respondents shall pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bailon-Casilao v. CA (1988)Petitioners: Delia Bailon-Casilao, Luz Paulino-Ang, Emma Paulino-Ybanez, Nilda Paulino-
Tolentino, and Sabina BailonRespondents: CA and Celestino AfablePonente: Cortes, J.

The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of whether or not said petitioners
arechargeable with such laches as may effectively bar their present action. There is a parcel of land in the names of the
Bailons (Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia) as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and
Nenita are now dead, (Nenita being represented in this case by her children) Bernabe went to China and had not been
heard from since.It appears that Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a portion of the land to Donato Delgado. Rosalia alone,
then sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado
land which the Delgado had earlier acquired from Rosaliaand Gaudencio. Husband John Lanuza, acting under a special
power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of landto Celestino Afable, Sr. In all these transfers, it
was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the provisions of Act No.496 when the fact is that
it is. It appears that the land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas,mother of
the co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon, then in that of Donato Delgado, then in Poncianade Lanuza's name,
and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr. The petitioners in this case, the Bailons, filed a case for recovery of
property against Celestino Afable. In his answer, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through
prescription and said that the Bailons areguilty of laches. LC declared Afable co-owner because he validly bought 2/6 of
the land (the shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio)

CA affirmed. Prescription does not apply against the Bailons because they are co-owners of the original sellers. But,
anaction to recover may be barred by laches. CA held the Bailons guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint

Issue: Applicability of the doctrine of laches

Ratio: Initially, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common
without theconsent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners is required. The
rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in NCC 493: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and hemay therefore alienate assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personalrights are involved.

But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. SC has already ruled in other cases that even if
a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only hisown share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale. By virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio, which are valid with respect to
their proportionateshares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino
Afable, Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consentof the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
theproperty.Re: Proper action The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession but the divisionof the common property Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be
granted since the buyers are legitimate possessors in jointownership of the common property claimedRe: Prescription
Here, prescription cannot be invoked. Pursuant to NCC 494, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common , insofar as his share is concerned.