Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PDVSA N° TITULO
APROB. Anibal Rosas FECHA NOV.98 APROB. Salvador Arrieta FECHA NOV.98
Indice
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 OBJETIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1 PDVSA – Petróleos de Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2 API–American Petroleum Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.3 ASME – American Society Of Mechanical Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.4 DOT–Department of Transportation (USA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.5 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5 DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6 PIPELINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2 Characteristics of a Pipeline System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7 RISK ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1 Release Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2 Flow Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.3 Consequence Analysis Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8 POPULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1 Population Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2 Pipeline Segmentation for QRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3 Sensitive Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.4 Probit Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9 FAILURE MECHANISMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1 Failure by External Mechanical Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2 Failure Data Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10 POTENCIAL FOR IGNITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11 PARAMETERS INFLUENCING ACCIDENT RATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.1 External Third Party Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2 Corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.3 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.4 Fatigue Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.5 Other Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.6 Pipeline Wall Thickness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
1 INTRODUCTION
Pipelines installations due to distinctive characteristics of their geographic
locations are particularly exposed to mechanical damages by some external
agents, as well as by potential failure of the material structures. The risk to third
parties, that such installations can present, depends on the type of product,
operation conditions (pressure, temperature), and type of failure in the material.
The criteria established in this guide are based on the consideration that the
design, construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of the equipment
are accomplished according to Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), standards and
procedures required for these installations.
2 OBJETIVE
This guide establishes the criteria that shall be applied in PDVSA pipelines and
asociated superficial equipment locations. The objective of this guide is to achieve
an appropriate level of protection to the persons and properties of third parties,
as well as to the surrounding environment against potential risks of catastrophic
events due to fire, explosion, and toxic release.
3 SCOPE
The scope of this standard covers pipelines used to transfer flammable or
combustible liquids, and/or flammable or toxic gases, in areas outside of process
facilities, warehouses, and distribution terminals. This section excludes
distribution systems for domestic and industrial gas in urban zones.
The requirements established by the laws, regulations, enactment’s, or current
official norms will prevail over all those established in this guide, except when this
guide exceed the requirements of those laws. In general, the guide is based on
technical application widely accepted in the industry at the national and
international level, for evaluating catastrophic risks in petroleum and
petrochemical installations, using PDVSA’s most up to date technology.
This guide shall be enforced for new PDVSA installations or expansions, and
major additions or modifications that are made to existing installations. Also, the
guide shall be utilized in the evaluation of the current risk level in existing
installations, with the objective of determining compliance with the risk tolerance
criteria established in PDVSA IR–S–02 document “Criterios para el Análisis
Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
The present guide applies to pipelines that are installed above or under ground.
Excluded from it are marine pipelines, ground, air and marine transportation.
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
4 REFERENCES
4.1 Venezuelan Law
Ley Orgánica para la Ordenación del Territorio
4.6 Others
1. Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis. American Institute of
Chemical Engineers. New York, 1995.
2. National Fire Protection Association Code 58: Storage and Handling of LPG
3. National Fire Protection Code 59A: Std. for Production, Storage, and
Handling of LNG
4. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group. “Gas Pipeline Incidents: A
Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group.” Pipes and
Pipelines International, 1970–1988.
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
5 DEFINITIONS
The definitions applicable to this guide can be found in the PDVSA IR–S–00
document “Definiciones”.
5.1 Others
Additional definitions include:
5.1.1 Consequence Evaluation
The analysis of a location specific incident sequence usually involving a fire,
explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be
qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an incident in terms of factors
such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage.
5.1.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
The process of hazard identification, followed by numerical evaluation of incident
consequences and frequencies, and their combination into an overall measure of
risk. Used by PDVSA to assess societal risk and individual risk to third parties and
individual risk to workers.
5.1.3 Worst Credible Case
An estimate of the consequences of the most sever incident considered plausible
or reasonably believable. This technique is used for estimated maximum loss
(EML) determination or contingency planning scenarios.
5.1.4 Hydrocarbon Piping Systems
It is the group of facilities made up of pipes, plants and stations, the purpose of
which is to transfer hydrocarbons from one or several supply sources to one or
several distribution systems, or to interconnect several supply sources.
5.1.5 Protection Area of Public Works of the Hydrocarbon Pipings Systems
It is the area located within the 200 meters, measured in horizontal projection, at
both sides of the pipe starting at the external pipes that the make up the system,
which has been established by Presidential Decree–Law, with the purpose of
providing an adequate security and protection to the facilities of said system.
Each 200 meter zone contiguous to the facilities that make up the Hydrocarbon
Piping Systems is divided into three: Maximum Security Protection Zone;
Safeguard Zone, and Controlled Protection Zone.
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
6 PIPELINES
6.1 General
6.1.1 The decision to install pipelines underground or aboveground shall be
accompanied by a risk analysis of each particular situation based upon the
requirements established in this guideline.
6.1.2 Underground pipelines shall be installed according to the minimum established
depths in documents PDVSA AK–212–O and PDVSA 90618.1.069.
6.1.3 To protect the piping systems against the intervention of third parties, the
following areas should be defined:
– Maximum Security Protection Zone
– Safeguard Zone
– Controlled Protection Zone
These areas shall be established by Decree – law in conformity with “Ley
Orgánica para la Ordenación del Territorio”.
Likewise, a Right of Way Zone shall be built to allow the operation and
maintenance of the piping system.
6.1.4 The zone mentioned in Paragraph 6.1.3 do not offer protection to third parties.
To this purpose it is necessary to establish a “Safety Zone”, which shall be
determined for each particular case, based on a quantitative risk analysis, which
will define the pipe installation, based on the requirements mentioned in this
document, with the purpose of obtain a “Minimum Risk” level, as it is established
in the risk criteria of PDVSA Document IR–S–02.
6.1.5 The placing of block valves shall be provided according to the ASME B31.4 and
ASME B31.8 standards, but also must take into account the proximity to
population and/or sensitive resources, and the tolerable risk level (see Section 7.3
for additional details).
7 RISK ANALYSIS
When pipeline accidents occur, they can result in property loss, fatalities, and
severe environmental damage. Typical causes of failure of buried pipelines
include material failure by corrosion and/or erosion, overpressurization and
ruptures/penetrations due to excavation or other causes.
In all PDVSA pipeline installations in which a risk to external third parties exists,
a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) shall be performed. Where appropriate, the
QRA shall include events involving thermal radiation, overpressure, toxic vapor
dispersion, and environmental effects as part of the evaluation.
The “Safety Zone” shall be defined in such as way that the thermal radiation, the
overpressure levels and/or the toxic dispersion reached along the pipe, will not
offer a risk higher than the “Minimum Allowable”, for population settlements,
highways and property of third parties in general, according to the allowance
criteria established in PDVSA Document IR–S–02.
In existing installations where the creation of short term secure zones at the
property limit is not possible for compliance with a minimum risk level, the risk level
established using the PDVSA tolerance criteria must be mitigated to achieve a risk
as low as practicable. In this particular case, extreme measures shall be taken to
prevent incidents through mitigation, especially for critical equipment that
presents high risk to third parties. Also, measures shall be taken to plan for
evacuation of third parties that can be potentially exposed.
The level of risk analysis required will depend on the issue that needs ROW to be
evaluated. If the issue is to determine the required separation distance for the
pipeline to another installation such as plants wells, power lines, etc., then a
Consequence Evaluation should be performed taking into account the probable
causes of the release. Hole sizes of 1/8”, 1”, and full bore to represent a corrosion
pit, a puncture leak and a major break, respectively should be considered.
For third party societal or individual risk determination, a QRA using a range of
hole sizes (1/8”, 1” and full – bore) should be performed.
For determining the Estimated Maximum Loss (EML), a Worst Credible Case
(full–bore rupture) scenarios should be selected.
pipe are important factors to consider when the inventory of the pipe and as a
result the release duration. For pipelines segments in mountainous terrain, the
liquid hydrostatic head must be taken into account in determining the maximum
flow from a rupture location. Omitting the hydrostatic head will result in seriously
understanding the release rate.
7.2.2 Gaseous Flow
For high pressure gas pipeline, there are three periods that need to be considered
in characterization of the release. There is an initial depressurization to an
intermediate pressure fed by the line–pack inventory. This release is sudden and
results in a vapor puff. This is followed by a continuous release until the
compressor is shut down (and/or isolation valves are closed). The steady–state
continuous flow will be determined by the compressor performance characteristic
and the pipeline resistance between the compressor and the break. In no case
can the flow exceed the maximum capacity of the compressor. The final phase
involves depressurization to atmospheric pressure. The duration of the final
depressurization phase will depend on the length of the pipeline between isolation
points, which defines the inventory. (see Section 7.3 for analysis of isolation). The
same situation is encountered with liquid pipelines in mountainous terrain where
a significant hydraulic gradient exists.
larger the ratio, the more horizontal (typically 10 degree from horizontal) the jet.
For vertical jets, the crater will not obstruct the jet, and the release can be modeled
as a free jet. For large hole areas (especially 100% releases), a 10 degree
orientation should be assumed, and modeled by using a low momentum release
model or by lowering the exit velocity used in a jet model.
Once the crater is formed, material will continue to be released from the ruptured
pipeline. Depending on the type and size of the line and the pressure, the material
can disperse in any one of several ways ranging from shooting straight ahead at
the end of the rupture to being sprayed upward after a line puncture from drilling
equipment. In addition, the crater or some other obstruction may absorb the
momentum of the jet release, causing it to entrain less air and increase its overall
dispersion hazard.
There is no single acknowledged approach for determining the size of a crater.
If one has estimated that the momentum of the initial discharge is sufficient to
remove the overburden, then one approach is to select several crater sizes and
test their effects on exit velocity and ultimate hazard distances. One can then use
the crater diameter which produces the set of maximum hazard distances as a
conservative estimate (Ref 4.5.1).
Aboveground pipelines can be addressed in the same manner as piping systems
in facility based assessments, with the recognition that the diking and grading
commonly found in facilities is unlikely to be present. There will also frequently be
a much longer length of line to empty even after pumps are shut down and valves
are closed.
An important parameter in the characterization of the hazard zones associated
with a gas pipeline release is the variable escape rate of gas from the rupture,
puncture or corrosion pit. A larger release will quickly depressure the line, and as
the line pressure declines, the mass flow out of the opening will also be reduced.
Studies have been performed to determine how fast this happens, and show that
after a very short time (on the order of seconds) the outflow will drop to the normal
flow rate that can be sustained by the capacity of the installed compression
equipment. The duration of the initial release is determined by the time it takes for
the pressure wave to travel from the release location to the upstream compressor
or emergency shutdown ESD valve and back. The initial release is short and can
be characterized with a puff model. The next stage involves a continuous release
until shutdown and isolation of the pipeline segment is achieved. This release is
characterizes as a steady state jet.
The effect of having emergency shutdown (ESD) valves installed along the
pipeline is to define the allowable mass available (defined by distance between
closed ESD valves) for final blowdown. The closer the valve spacing, the less
mass available for release and the faster the pressure in the pipeline decreases.
The value of the ESD valves is to limit the time during which the blowdown rate
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
occurs once the valves are closed. Hence, the release at this point needs to be
characterized as a blowdown of a fixed mass of material.
Determining the appropriate spacing for ESD valves is an analysis unto itself. It
is ultimately based on the pipeline release duration that one is willing to accept at
a particular location along the pipeline route. For examples, the acceptable
release duration may be higher for less populated areas. The total release
duration will be comprised of the initial puff, the time for leak detection/isolation,
and the final blowdown. The two key time period assumptions are the leak
detection interval and the time requirement for final blowdown. The valve spacing
analysis should consider the most probable large hole size, coupled with a range
of tolerable release duration assumptions. The spacing interval evaluation needs
to incorporate a cost/benefit analysis of the potential averted loss
(consequences), the valve installation cost, and scenario frequency for different
valve spacing alternatives.
8 POPULATION
8.1 Population Density
Population densities, also known as exposed population, are an important part of
a QRA for many reasons. A particular reason is that density is used to determine
the number of people affected by a given incident in a specific hazard area.
Population data can be available from different sources in different forms. Some
examples of data along sources a specified pipeline route are census reports,
detailed maps, zoning data, aerial or satellite photographs, videotapes of the
pipeline, or actual inspection of the pipeline by the analyst conducting the QRA.
(For information in how to obtain data see Section 4, Ref 4.5.1).
In some case in the absence of specific population data, default categories can
be used.
Table 1 (from Ref 4.5.1), gives one set of possible values based on the United
States Standards. These values are based on detailed examinations of census
data. For example, the average population density outside of standard
metropolitan statistical areas is approximately 20 people per square mile (US
DOC, 1984). The same reference gives 2,900 people per square mile for those
inside central cities. Other categories or representative densities can be assigned
based on the actual data for specific routes. In cases where densities are being
assigned based on visual inspections or with the aid of maps or aerial
photographs, the categories should be defined in terms of commercial and
industrial development as well. For example, ”suburban” might be expanded to
include mixed commercial/residential areas or moderately dense industrial areas
(Ref 4.5.1).
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
pipeline segment is that all factors are constant. When one or more factors
change, a new segment needs to be created. The level of change in a pipelines
segmentation would have a significant effect on the final risk calculation.
Generally, the incident scenarios do not change along the route except for special
locations. Thus, the consequence modeling results will remain the same unless
there is a major change in relative humidity, atmospheric temperature, terrain or
wind speed along the pipeline route. However, the parameters that will influence
the definition of pipelines segments are the population density and the
accident/release frequency. The magnitude of the consequence associated with
a release in the middle of a large urban area versus a release in a sparsely
populated rural area, or a change in pipeline design parameters would cause a
portion of the pipeline route to have a different incident rate than the previous
segment (Ref 4.5.1).
9 FAILURE MECHANISMS
As indicated in Section 7 of this guideline, general pipeline failure modes include:
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
1 inch to full
Hole Size <1/4 inch ¼ to 1 inch
rupture
1.65x10 –4 1.30x10 –4 8.12x10 –5
Expected failure rate
/pieces/year /pieces/year /pieces/year
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
In the delayed ignition there are other factors to take into account. In delayed
ignition probabilities can be determined as a function of the cloud area or the
location. In general, as the size of the cloud increases, the probability of delayed
ignition decreases. This is due to that the cloud has already encountered an
ignition source and ignited before dispersing over a larger area (Ref 4.5.1).
In a spill incident, it is very likely that, if a cloud does not ignite immediately, it would
encountering several ignition sources along its route. In this case the probability
of ignition would be given as a function of the cloud location and the ignition
sources present in the area. Ignition sources can be classified as follows:
S Open flames
S Electrical sources
S Hot surfaces
S Impact effects
Some examples of these sources include automobiles and other moving sources
(Ref 4.5.1).
The dependency on cloud size can be taken into account by screening whether
the hazard distance is even expected to reach the population. This also allows for
zoning to be taken into account if the pipeline is relatively isolated.
In addition to fire hazards, explosion hazards must also be considered. Explosion
potential is a function of the chemical and physical properties of the material in
combination with the available mass, degree of obstruction or confinement,
turbulence and other variables. Explosion probabilities are sometimes based on
reviews of past accidents. As a result, the likelihood of a vapor cloud explosion.
It is based primarily on judgment and material properties, explosion probabilities
given ignition for materials like LPG are often taken as 33 percent and for
materials like ethylene oxide are taken as 50 percent. Sensitivity analyses can be
run to test the effects of varying the explosion probabilities (Ref 4.5.1).
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
11.2 Corrosion
An installation shall not be constructed, repaired, replaced, or significantly altered
until a qualified personnel reviews the applicable design drawings and material
specifications from a corrosion control viewpoint and determines that the material
involved will not impair the safety or reliability of the component or any associated
components. The repair, replacement, or significant alteration of components
must be reviewed only if the action to be taken involves a change in the original
material’s specification.
Buried pipe shall be coated to resist external corrosion, and provided with a
cathodic protection system. Each exposed component that is subject to
atmospheric corrosive attack shall be protected from atmospheric corrosion by a
material that has been designed and selected to resist the corrosive atmosphere
involved or by suitable coating or jacketing.
ENGINEERING RISK MANUAL PDVSA IR–S–15
11.3 Maintenance
High maintenance standards shall be required to ensure that a pipeline operates
safely. The as–built condition of a pipeline shall be able to be maintained almost
indefinitely by high quality maintenance. Regular inspection of the cathodic
protection system shall ensure good installation condition.
A preventive maintenance program shall be in place which includes a schedule
of written procedures for regular testing and inspection of facility systems and
equipment. Each component in service, including its support system, shall be
maintained in a condition that is compatible with its operation or safety purpose
by repair, replacement, or other means. Safety and fire protection equipment shall
be tested or inspected at intervals not exceeding 6 months. Maintenance activities
on fire control equipment shall be scheduled so that a minimum of equipment is
taken out of service at any one time and fire protection is not compromised. (Ref
4.5.3).