RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane
conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office
or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section
18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and
duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are
so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same
working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits
are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the
latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the
exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

Case 3: Oposa v. Factoran

Facts

This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring
the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it
was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him
cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and
approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's
refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural
law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower
court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issue

Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?

Ruling

Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based
on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an
obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal
standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must
give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

Relevance

The case of Oposa vs. Factoran has been widely cited worldwide for its concept of intergenerational responsibility,
particularly in cases related to ecology and the environment. For example:
  Oposa vs. Factoran's concept of "intergenerational responsibility" was cited in a case in Bangladesh.[1]
 The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) considers Oposa vs. Factoran a landmark case in
judicial thinking for environmental governance.[2]
 In the book Public Health Law and Ethics by Larry O. Gostin, Oposa vs. Factoran is cited as a significant
example of the justiciability of the right to health. [3]
 In the book The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development by the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law
Research Studies, a study cites Oposa vs. Factoran as basis for asserting that the right to breathe is part of
the right to life as an acknowledged human right.[4]

Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083)

Nature of the case

Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which allegedly
infringed the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of
contracts; Environmental law; judicial review and the political question doctrine; inter-generational
responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on
State

Summary

An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to
stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the
environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
(Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented others
of their generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: “[it]
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even
be said to predate all governments and constitutions”. The right is linked to the constitutional right to
health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for
succeeding generations as “the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.”

Significance of the case

This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in cases relating to
forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of the Philippino Supreme Court to economic,
social and cultural rights has proved somewhat inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in
the enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989); Manila
Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but at
least one instance in which the Court made a statement that economic, social and cultural rights
are not real rights (see, Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150, 5 January
1994).

Case 4: League of Cities v COMELEC

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Facts:

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.
Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This
Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving
Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint
Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in
Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners
also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal
protection clause

Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Ratio:
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or
units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,as worded
the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Case 5: Holy See v Del Rosario

The Holy See vs. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524

December 1, 1994
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.,
respondents.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set side a decision from the RTC of Makati.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City and is represented
by the Papal Nuncio in the Philippines. The petition arose from a controversy regarding a lot, Lot
5-A, of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Parañaque, registered in the name of
the petitioner. Lot 5-A is contiguous to two other lots, 5-B and 5-D. The three lots were sold to
Ramon Licup, who later assigned his rights to the sale to the private respondent, Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc., involved in real estate. Informal settlers were squatting in the property,
and dispute arose as to who would evict them. The conflict intensified when the lot was sold to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation by the petitioner. The private respondent
filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati against the petitioner and three other defendants:
Msgr. Domingo Cirilos, who acted as agent to the sellers, the PRC and Tropicana. It prayed for:
1) annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand and
Tropicana on the other; 2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; 3) specific performance of
the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots and; 4) damages. The petitioners
and Cirilos separately moved to dimiss the complaint: petitioners for lack of jurisdiction based on
soverign immunity from suit and Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion
was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion
to dismiss, reason being that the petitioner can no longer be immune as they entered into a
business contract. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. They then filed a “Motion for Hearing
for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional
Defense,” to facilitate the hearing in its defense of sovereign immunity. Private repondents
opposed the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. The trial court ordered the
resolution be suspended until after trial on the marits and directing the petitioner to file its
answer. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. The petitioner invoked its privilege
of sovereign immunity only on its behalf and on behalf of its official representatives, the Papal
Nuncio. Eventually, the Department of Foreign Affairs filed for a Motion of Intervention caliming
its legal interest on the outcome of the case concerning the diplomatic immunity of the
petitioner. It stated its adoption upon the claim of the petitioner with regard to its claim for
soeverign immunity from suit. This was opposed by the private respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner is
dismissed.

Reason: Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or absolute
theory, wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of another sovereign
without its consent and; b) restrictive theory, which puts conditions on when to recognize
immunity.
Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public acts or
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set side a decision from the RTC of Makati.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City and is represented
by the Papal Nuncio in the Philippines. The petition arose from a controversy regarding a lot, Lot
5-A, of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Parañaque, registered in the name of
the petitioner. Lot 5-A is contiguous to two other lots, 5-B and 5-D. The three lots were sold to
Ramon Licup, who later assigned his rights to the sale to the private respondent, Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc., involved in real estate. Informal settlers were squatting in the property,
and dispute arose as to who would evict them. The conflict intensified when the lot was sold to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation by the petitioner. The private respondent
filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati against the petitioner and three other defendants:
Msgr. Domingo Cirilos, who acted as agent to the sellers, the PRC and Tropicana. It prayed for:
1) annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand and
Tropicana on the other; 2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; 3) specific performance of
the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots and; 4) damages. The petitioners
and Cirilos separately moved to dimiss the complaint: petitioners for lack of jurisdiction based on
soverign immunity from suit and Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion
was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion
to dismiss, reason being that the petitioner can no longer be immune as they entered into a
business contract. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. They then filed a “Motion for Hearing
for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional
Defense,” to facilitate the hearing in its defense of sovereign immunity. Private repondents

HELD

Yes, The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal Foreign policy

The decision was penned by Souter, J.

The judgement of the CA for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. HVIRA is preempted or blocked.

Reasons

At the moment there is conflict in the interest of State power against policies on foreign relations, the
State must yield.
There is sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the president s foreign pol

opposed the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. The trial court ordered the
resolution be suspended until after trial on the marits and directing the petitioner to file its
answer. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. The petitioner invoked its privilege
of sovereign immunity only on its behalf and on behalf of its official representatives, the Papal
Nuncio. Eventually, the Department of Foreign Affairs filed for a Motion of Intervention caliming
its legal interest on the outcome of the case concerning the diplomatic immunity of the
petitioner. It stated its adoption upon the claim of the petitioner with regard to its claim for
soeverign immunity from suit. This was opposed by the private respondent.

acts jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is private or acts
jure gestionis (those that are for profit), then immunity cannot be invoked.
In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot 5-
A were made for profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation from the Archdiocese
of Manila for the purpose of building official residence of Papal Nuncio. However, when the
informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner decided to dispose the property,
not for commercial purpose. The DFA intervened as they established in a Memorandum and
Certification the privilege of sovereign immunity of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all
rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in the country. When the
plea of immunity has been recognized by the executive department, such shall be conclusive to
courts.

Case 6: American Insurance Association et al. v Garamendi

American insurance association et al. v. GARAMENDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 02-

722. June 23 2003

FACTS

California s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA or Act), requires any insurer doing
business in that State to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920-1945 by
the company itself or any one related to it.

Life policies issued during and during the Second Wolrd Ware were confiscated by the Nazi Government
of Germany.

GFA (German Foundation Agreement) was a result of negotiations at the national level.

President agreed that whenever a German company was sued on a holocaust era claim in an American
court the Government would :submit a statement that it be in this country s foreign policy interests for
the foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for such claims try to get state and local
governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive mechanism.

ICHEIC was established to follow claims. Will negotiate with European insurers to provide information
about and settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and which has setup procedures.

California made state legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insurers (HVIRA 1999)HVIRA
required any insurer doing business on the State of California to disclose information about all policies
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company or anyone related to it upon penalty of loss of
its state business license.

Upon HVIRA s enactment, the State of California issued administrative subpoenas against several
subsidiaries of European Insurance Companies participating in ICHEIC.

Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would damage ICHEIC, the only effective
means to process quickly and completely unpaid Holocaust era insurance claims, and that this would
derail the GFA.State Commisioner refused and continued to enact. Petitioner insurance entities
therefore filed this suit challenging the constitutionality of HVIRA.

District Court issued preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA, and granted petitioners summary
judgement

Ninth Court reversed holding that HVIRA did not violate Federal foreign policy

ISSUE

WON HVIRA interferes with the National Government s conduct of foreign relations.

W/N The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal foreign policy

HELD

Yes, The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal Foreign policy

The decision was penned by Souter, J.

The judgement of the CA for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. HVIRA is preempted or blocked.

Reasons

At the moment there is conflict in the interest of State power against policies on foreign relations, the
State must yield.

There is sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the president s foreign pol
icy, as expressed both in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and France, and in
statements by high level Executive Branch officials to require preemption here even without any
consideration of the State s interest.