Van Dorn VS Romillo

- Divorced then still wanted share over wife’s property lols

Cause of Action: petition for certiorari and prohibition

Facts:
- Alice (petitioner) is a Filipino
- Richard (private respondent) is an American
- Married in HK in 1972
- Established residence in PH
- Divorced in Nevada, USA, 1982
- Alice remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn
- Romillo is the RTC judge

RTC:
- 1983, private respondent filed to have rights over petitioner’s business because conjugal
property, despite the divorce
- Petitioner said private respondent is barred because they are divorced already, hence
motion to dismiss
- Motion to dismiss was denied by RTC

Issue:
- What is the effect of the foreign divorce on their alleged conjugal property in PH
SC:
- Denial of motion to dismiss not supposed to be grounds for appeal, but this is an
exception because of patent grave abuse of discretion
- There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen.
- It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
- During divorce proceedings, they also agreed upon that they have no communal
property
- Private respondent authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd.,
to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community obligations.
- Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
 Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

GARCIA VS RECIO

Cause of Action: Petition for Review of RTC decision dissolution of marriage

Facts:
- Rederick Recio (respondent) is a Filipino who used to be married to Editha Samson an
Austrailian (1987)
- Had a divorce 1989 in Australia
- 1992 respondent became an austrailian
- Petitioner and respondent married in 1994, in application of marriage license respondent
was “single and Filipino”
- 1995 lived separately, in australia conjugal assets were divided

RTC:
- Petitioner filed complaint for nullity of marriage because respondent had subsisting
marriage with Editha Samson
- Respondent countered that it was already dissolved in a divorce decree, thus legally
capacitated to marry
- 1998 while case was pending respondent got the divorce decree
- Held that marriage was valid since the first one was dissolved but did not dwell on his
legal capacity which was the complaint alleged.

Issue:
- Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha was proven
- Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated

SC:
- Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha was proven
- To prove divorce there must :
- (1) foreign law allowing absolute divorce, (2) alleged divorce decree itself
- Respondent failed to establish these elements
- Must be proved as a fact based on our rules of evidence either by:
- (1) official publication, (2) copy thereof attested by officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
 stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
- The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
- Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
- The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
- Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
- In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
- Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.
- It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
- no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.
- the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted
- Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who
was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that
the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
 his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage. Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage
to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn
out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner
as a direct result of the divorce decree.
- Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case
to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner.

Republic VS Iyoy

Cause of Action: Petition for certiorari 45 prays for reversal

Facts:
- After marriage Crasus discovered wife to be hot-tempered, nagger, and extravagant
- 1984 wife left for US, married an american
- Got a divorce for her marriage with Crasus (lols not allowed bcs they are both filipinos)
- Fely went back to PH for the wedding of the eldest child
- 13 years since Fely left and abandoned Crasus

RTC:

- In the RTC level, complaint was filled for the declaration of nullity of marriage (1961) of
Fely and Crasus
- Crasus filed for psychological incapacity bcs hot tempered, nagger, and extravagant
- Fely countered that she was now an American married to Stephen Micklus and not hot
tempered, etc.
- Fely also countered that after securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship.
- Crasus submitted evidence (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which
he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; (2) the Certification,
dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of
the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly
used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.
- Fely didnot submit at all
- RTC declared it to void ab initio

CA:
- Affirmed RTC
- finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
 Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is
now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically
stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage
- the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of
Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

Issues and Ruling:

- WON the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
- totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient
- It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.
- WON Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable
to the case at bar.
- Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
- By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen.
- WON The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
- YES, The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender
of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
 AMOR-CATALAN VS CA

Cause of Action: Petition for Review

Facts:
- Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950
- migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized
citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988
- Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope

RTC:

- Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
- RTC Granted petition

CA:
- Reversed decision

Issues and Ruling:

- WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO
QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS
- Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which
brought embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an
interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect
her family from further embarrassment and humiliation
- Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and
respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens and that they
obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review
of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint
and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent
evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.
- Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we
cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict
remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.
- Case remanded to trial court
 BAYOT VS CA

Cause of action: Two petitions consolidated, first petition is a certiorari 65, and the second is a
45

Facts:
- Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979
- the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen
- initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
- On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8
ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry
after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement 10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically
stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."
- Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil
Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition 12 dated
January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approval of the
motion to withdraw the petition.
- On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating
under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
- On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage 16 on the
ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.

RTC:
- On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying Vicente's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support
pendente lite

CA:
- Granted preliminary injunction as requested by Vicente and TRO
- To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of
the following premises:
- the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint
or petition states a cause of action, Applying said rule in the light of the
 essential elements of a cause Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
- Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her
marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been
dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally
secured as an American citizen.
- Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious.
Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it
was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino
citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of
Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.
- Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations
to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for
and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a
little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition
for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
- Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she
secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and
impugning the validity of the divorce.

SC Ruling:
- Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
- the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen
through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a
few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
- Filipino citizenship was not in place at the time of filing divorce
- CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition,
taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition
to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of
cause of action, which we will expound later.
- Validity of Divorce Decree
- presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. It bears to stress that
the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of
the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the
 ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so.
- as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary
of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as
we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.
- Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
- As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marriage between
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby
dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."
- Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97
and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca
and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided
that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home
- Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce
court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not
limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.
- No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
- it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action.
- With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or
nullified. The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation
of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The
records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca
alleged that the support given had been insufficient.
- The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering
that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.