LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND SEX/GENDER STUDIES:

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL

CONSIDERATIONS
Mark A. Clarke
University of Colorado at Denver
Ann Losoff English Language Services
Margaret Dickenson McCracken Australia
David S. Rood University of Colorado at Boulder
Two studies have investigated one purported manifestation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
of linguistic relativity-the relationship between gender loading in languages (a linguistic
construct) and the perception of gender (a psychological construct) by speakers of those
languages. The results of the study conducted by the University of Michigan Language
Behavior Research Group indicated that adult speakers of English and Hebrew categorized
objects/concepts in essentially the same fashion regardless of native language. The results of
our study (a replication of the Michigan studies) indicate that Arabic speaking adults categorize
essentially asexual objects/concepts in a markedly different way from English speaking adults,
suggesting that gender loading in Arabic influences Arabic speakers’ perceptions of those
objects/concepts. These findings appear to contradict conclusions reached by the Michigan
group

In this paper we review the studies briefly, and we question their value in illuminating the issue
of linguistic relativity. We then examine a number of theoretical and methodological issues
in linguistic relativity research. Given that the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf serves as the
foundation for most of the recent studies. we suggest that researchers need to develop a
theoretical framework which accurately mirrors the complexity and subtlety of his views
on the relationship between language and consciousness. We argue that such a
framework is available in the sociological/ philosophical tradition of phenomenology.
Phenomenologists ascribe an important (though not a causal) role to language in determining
an individual’s view of reality. Finally, we raise a number of methodological issues that result
from this perspective, and we suggest avenues for further research.

There is a long history of interest in the relationship between language and consciousness,
both in the profession literature and in the popular press.’ However, for the past fifty years,
the “linguistic relativity hypothesis” has been closely associated with the work of Benjamin
Lee Whorf and a great deal of research and speculation have developed which cite Whorf as
the stimulus.2 Therefore, in an examination of linguistic relativity, it is appropriate to begin
with Whorf‘s definition (1956:214) of the hypothesis:

We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers
are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their
linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated

In this excerpt, as in most of Whorf‘s writing, the importance of language in the

development of one’s “picture of the universe” is evident, yet the exact nature of the
relationship between language and consciousness is not clear. However, it is important to note
that Whorf does not ascribe causal significance to language. We would like to suggest,
furthermore, that Whorf‘s hypothesis is far more complex than has been recognized in much of
the recent research. In this paper we will examine theoretical and methodological aspects of
the hypothesis, specifically with regard to recent studies (Guiora et al., in press; Clarke et al.
1981) conducted to investigate the relationship between gender loading in languages and the
perception of gender. We suggest that these studies reveal very little about the relationship
between language and consciousness as Whorf described it. We argue that the sexigender
studies focus on a narrow and superficial aspect of the hypothesis, resulting in
epistemological errors and methodological weaknesses. The paper is divided into three parts:
Part one provides a brief review of recent sex/gender research. In part two we examine
phenomenology as an epistemological framework for Whorf‘s ideas. In part three we
discuss methodological implications and suggest avenues for further research.

Recent Research

The University of Michigan Personality and Language Research Group (see Guiora and
Acton 1979) has conducted a number of research projects designed to examine the relationship
between language and thought in the area of gender identity and perception.

1. This is a revised version of presentations made at the CoTESOL Applied Linguistics

Research Forum, November 1980, and at the TESOL Convention, March 198 I. The
informal style of those presentations has been retained. 2. It has recently come to
our attention that Louis Buchanan, Ryerson Polytechnical Institute. Toronto, is
compiling an extensive bibliography on linguistic relativity.

In one study, the research question addressed was “whether grammatical gender in
one’s native language influences the way in which male or female characteristics are assigned
to asexual objects” (Guiora and Acton 1979: 196; see also Guiora et al., in press). The study
was conducted with speakers of Hebrew and English. Hebrew, a Semitic language in which all
nouns and their modifiers are overtly marked for gender, represents maximum gender
loading, while English represents minimum gender loading. The assumption is that tasks which
require subjects to categorize “essentially asexual”objects/ concepts as masculine or feminine
will reveal the extent of influence of grammatical gender (a linguistic construct) on the
perception of gender (a psychological construct). In fact, results indicate that the assignment
of symbolic meaning to asexual objects by adult subjects is essentially the same regardless of
native language (Guiora and Acton 1979; Guiora et al., in press). These findings have led the
researchers to suggest the existence of universal criteria for the assignment of meaning,
indicating that “shared human experience is stronger than that of the particular constraints
imposed by the structure of native language” (Guiora et al., in press). Recently, we conducted
a replication of this study with speakers of English and Arabic, which, like Hebrew,
represents maximum gender loading (Clarke et al. 1981). While decidedly tentative, our
results show that Arabic speakers categorize objects and concepts in a manner which would be
predicted by the hypothesis of linguistic relati~ity.~ That is, twenty-one of thirty stimulus
words elicited significantly different reactions from the Arabic and English speakers, with
Arabic speakers classifying masculine-inflected words as masculine and feminine-inflected
words as feminine.
 Epistemological Considerations

An extensive examination of the relationships between language and thought is

beyond the scope of this paper, but it is necessary to sketch an outline of the debate. The
fundamental issue would appear to be, Does there exist an underlying, innate code for
organizing experience, from which languages develop different, though ultimately related,
systems for describing that experience, or is language one of several learned systems which
allow humans to develop an ordered perspective of reality?

3. In a recent critique of our study the Michigan group has disputed our interpretation of the
results of the Arabicl English study. See Herold (1982) and Clarke et al. (1982) for details.

Fodor, Bever, and Garret (1974:387) take the former position, asserting “that the nervous
system comes equipped with a language in which it does its computations, and that learning a
natural language involves learning to translate into and out of this computational code.” From
this perspective, the source of cognitive organization is assumed to lie in the inherent
structure of the posited “internal language,” not in the structure of the natural language
which one acquires as one grows up in a particular culture. Whorf took the second position,
that is, that the organism imposes no inherent structure on the cognitive organization of
experience, but rather that language provides a framework within which reality is
perceived and understood. That Whorf ascribed an important role to language in the
development of consciousness cannot be questioned. However, the nature of the
relationship, and the exact contribution of language, is not entirely clear. Whorf developed his
ideas over a number of years and in separate articles, and when he died was planning to
summarize his work. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAs Carroll
points out: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA. . . Language.
Thought and Realiiy is the title of the book which Whorf hoped to write, and for which a brief
outline is to be found among the papers he left at his death. The book.. . would have
attempted to present the implications of linguistics for the clarification
zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof our thinking about the
external world of reality. The notes indicate that the book, designed as a college textbook and
provided with suitable chapter-end quizzes. would have included in its appendix language
sketches of Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Kota, Azlee, Hopi, Swanee, Russian, Taos, Chinese and
Japanese. (Whorf 1956:23) It is unfortunate that the book was not written, because the
speculation which has resulted from the hypothesis often bears little resemblance to the ideas
as Whorf developed them. Recently, articles by Alford (1978) and Lucy and Schweder (1979)
have underscored the need for a careful reading of Whorf‘s work by researchers who purport to
examine issues in linguistic relativity. But our focus here is not primarily upon the debate
between Whorf‘s supporters and his critics. Rather, we would like to examine Whorf‘s
ideas within the framework of phenomenology and to suggest that researchers adopt this
discipline as the epistemological foundation for the study of language and consciousness.
Phenomenology is a sociological/ philosophical tradition which has its roots in the work of the
German philosopher Husserl (I859-1938), who phenomenology to cross-cultural experiences.)
fundamental assumption of phenomenology is that there is no “objective” reality which
exists independent of our apprehension of it. That is to say, reality is socially constructed;
our ability to function in society and to interact successfully with other human beings is a result
of our assumption that everyone agrees with our interpretation of reality. The following
points, excerpted from Berger and Luckman ( 1967:20-28), outline basic tenets of
phenomenology:

1. Consciousness is always intentional: We are always conscious of some- thing;

consciousness is directed, focused, not random or haphazard.
2. 2. I am conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realitie 4 The paramount reality
is the reality of everyday life, which I recognize as qualitatively different from that
of a dream, or a trance, for example.
3. I apprehend the reality of everyday life as an orderedreality: I live in a web of
relationships and spatio-temporal coordinates that I take for granted; patterns of
reality are seen as independent of my apprehension of them.
4. The reality of everyday life is organized around the “here”of my body and the “now”of
mypresent: I experience everyday life in terms of differing degrees of closeness and
remoteness, both spatially and temporally.
5. The reality of everyday life is intersubjective: It is taken for granted as a world I share
with others. I see life as an ongoing negotiation with others concerning the
interpretation of reality.
6. The reality of everyday life is structured both spatially and temporally: I can locate
myself in space and time; I am aware of my place in history and of my geographic
location.

These tenets serve as the barest sketch of phenomenological assumptions, but they
provide us with a set of organizing principles for the discussion which follows. The
fundamental similarity between phenomenology and the hypothesis private world with
the shared reality of the social world. As human beings, we successfully negotiate a
multitude of experiences every day because we “understand” what we hear and
experience. Furthermore, we behave as if everyone else shared our perception of
reality. This knowledge (and the behavior which results) is rarely questioned or even
examined; it is taken for granted and serves as the background for experience. It is
important to note that language plays an important role in this understanding of the
everyday world, for it is through language that we objectify our perceptions of reality
and through language that we seek to reaffirm those perceptions with others.

4. The first person singular pronoun is used to represent “ordinary” self-

consciousness in everyday life.
Whorfs ideas seem extremely compatible with the above tenets. He realized the
subtle and complex interrelationships of perception and experience, and he
attributed an important role to language: We dissect nature along lines laid down by
our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of
phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be
organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our
minds. (Whorf 1956:213)

Here he echoes a basic assumption of phenomenology, that reality is individually

and socially constructed, an artifact of our consciousness. Experience is a
“kaleidoscope of impressions” and we focus on aspects of it as we attempt to organize
it and to behave in ways which we deem appropriate. Language, for Whorf, played
a very important role in organizing experience into meaningful patterns:

users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different
types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation,
and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views
of the world. (Whorf 1956:221)

Whorf saw language not so much as a prism through which we view reality, but rather
as water on the window of consciousness, prismatic in effect, but constantly shifting
and changing, now permitting a clear view, now distorting images:

…….every language is a vast pattern-system different from others, in which are

culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only
communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and
phenomena, channels his reasoning and build the house of his consciousness. but he did
not promote a causal relationship between language and consciousness:
I should be the last to pretend that there is anything so definite as a “correlation”
between culture and language.

……… language, for all its kingly role, is in some sense a superficial embroidery upon
deeper processes of consciousness, which are necessary before any communication,
signaling. or symbolism whatsoever can occur, and which can, at a pinch, effect
communication- though not true agreement-- without language’s and without
symbolism’s aid. (Whorf 1956:239)

In fact, Whorf maintained that we are capable of focusing on or ignoring elements of

experience as necessary:
. . our psychic makeup is somehow adjusted to disregard whole realms of phenomena
that are so all-pervasive as to be irrelevant to our daily lives and needs. (Whorf
1956:210) There is a yogic mastery in the power of language to remain independent of
lower-psyche facts. to override them, now to point them up, now to toss them out of
the picture, to mold the nuances of words to its own rule, whether the psychic ring of
the sounds fits or not. (Whorf 1956:267

Whorfs recognition of the subtlety and complexity of the relationship between

language and consciousness led him to postulate two broad linguistic categories,
the investigation and elaboration of which, he believed, provided the most fruitful
line of inquiry for researchers interested in linguistic relativity. He labeled the first
phenotype, “the linguistic category with a clearly apparent class meaning and a formal
mark or morpheme which accompanies it; i.e., the phenotype is the ‘classical’
morphological category” (Whorf 1956:72), and the second cryptotype. “a submerged,
subtle, and elusive meaning, corresponding to no actual word, yet shown by linguistic
analysis to be functionally important in the grammar” (Whorf 1956:70). The
distinction between phenotype and cryptotype is developed in several of his articles.
Because of the importance which Whorf ascribed to an understanding of these
categories, and because the distinction does not seem to be recognized in much of the
speculation about Whorfs work, an examination of the topic seems justified here. The
phenotype is an overt phonological or morphosyntactic category, a linguistic marker
which requires the attention of the speaker/ hearer. Examples are gender marking
in Romance and Semitic languages and number and tense in English. A cryptotype
is a pattern of linguistic relationship which users of the language employ without
necessarily being conscious of it. Examples of cryptotypes are far more elusive than
are examples of phenotypes, because their existence can be shown only by analysis
of what Whorf called the “reactance” of the pattern. According to Whorf, a cryptotype:

is marked, whether morphemically or by sentence pattern, only in certain types of

sentence and not in every sentence in which a word or element belonging to the
category occurs. The class-membership of the word is not apparent until there is a
question of referring to it in one of these special types of sentence, and then we find
that this word belongs to a class requiring some sort of distinctive treatment, which may
even be the negative treatment of excluding that type of sentence. This distinctive
treatment we may call the reactance of the category. (1956: 89)

The search for cryptotype requires one to be aware of partially hidden relationships
which exists among language forms. Whorf ( 1956:7 1) gives the example of transitive
verbs which denote covering, enclosing, or surface attaching, the reactance of which is
that un- may be attached to denote the opposite. Thus, one can say uncover, uncoil,
and unfasten, but not unbreak, undry, or unspill. Unlike the situation which exists for
number or tense, there is no single word which denotes the existence of this class of
words, yet the constraints imposed are just as real. Another example provided by
Whorf (1956:76) concerns the phonemes /a/ and /@/. In English, /a/ occurs initially only
in demonstrative particles (the, this, there, etc.), while /@/ occurs initially in content
words (think, thin, thigh, etc.)

An examination of pairs of languages provides examples of the differences

between phenotypes and cryptotypes. One feature of discourse which is cryptotypical
in English (and most other languages) is the way a speaker shows the viewpoint from
which he or she is reporting an occurrence while simultaneously making clear the
sequence of the events as they actually happened. To focus on the victim of an assault
for example, we may use a passive construction (John was hit by Mary or It was John
that Mary hit or John was the one that Mary hit, etc.), but in each case the grammar
makes clear that the order of elements in the sentence does not correspond linearly to
the order of events. That is, the hitting began with Mary, even though the sentence
starts with John. This topic has been the subject of much linguistic literature lately (see
especially DeLancey 198 1 and references there) and is far too complex to treat
exhaustively here. One example, however, may be worthwhile. English sometimes
accomplishes the coding of viewpoint by lexical choice. Give and receive, for instance,
can describe the same event, but give portrays the event in accord with the temporal
sequence of events, from first mover to last mover, and the subject of the verb is
simultaneously first mover. With receive the reverse is true; the subject is not the first
mover, but the last one. Thus, receive marks the fact that there is a discrepancy
between the natural flow of the movement and the focus of our attention.
Speakers of English can (but need not) indicate the relationship between the flow of
an event and the reporting of it. In contrast, speakers of Jinghpaw, a language of
northern Burma, are required by their language to do so. In Jinghpaw, this
phenomenon is phenotypical instead of cryptotypical: nang shihpe ndai jaw dit dai,
“you gave him this,” but nang shihpe ndai,jaw mu? ai, “he was given this by you.”
Here nang is “you”; shihpe is “him,” dative; ndai is “this”;jaw is give. The contrasting
phrases, dit dai in the first sentence, and mu? ai in the second, indicate the viewpoint
from which the event is to be understood; dit dai indicates that events are being
reported in the sequence in which they occurred, while mu? ai requires the speaker/
hearer to focus on the endpoint of the event (DeLancey 1981:636-637). Our last
example is provided by a category which is unsystematically represented in English
grammar but overtly marked in other languages: the statement of the evidence on
which a report is based. In legalistic or journalistic English we find users of the
language being very careful to distinguish quotation from observation, or known fact
from conjecture, using such signals as alleged, she added that supposedly, etc. In many
American Indian languages, however, it is impossible to utter any sentence in which a
speaker does not provide a statement about the form of evidence behind the
assertion. For example, in Wichita, two translations of the English sentence They
saw it would be iki?i::s and e?iki?i::s. The first form unambiguously means “They saw
it, and I know it’s true because I witnessed it myself,” while the second form means
“1 heard that they saw it” or “They must have seen it, judging from the rest of what
happened” or something similar. There is no middle ground; this language does not
permit one to avoid such a statement of evidence in any sentence in which the past
tense is used (Rood, field notes).

5. Wichita is spoken in central Oklahoma. The colons in the translation indicate

vowel length.

The distinction between phenotypes and cryptotypes is found throughout Whorfs

work, constituting an important foundation for his attempts to describe the
relationship between language and thought. Because of Whorf‘s early death, we do
not know exactly how he conceived of the interaction between phenotypical and
cryptotypical patterns in a language, but we do know that he believed that
researchers should shift their focus to cryptotypes: Grammatical research up to the
present time has been concerned with the study of phenotypes. A certain type of
grammar proceeds as if linguistic meaning dwelt wholly in them. The anthropologist
should not be satisfied with such a grammar. any more than with an ethnology that
described only positive behavior and ignored the patterning of taboos and avoidances.
(Whorf 1956:72)

Whorf contended that the influence of language on cognition constituted pressure to

perceive the world according to the constraints imposed by one’s native language.
However, the complexity and subtlety of the relationship required him to develop a
descriptive schema which could accommodate both the obvious constraints of
language as well as the phenotypes and the elusive, partially submerged patterns
created by cryptotypes. It is our contention that productive scholarship in the area of
linguistic relativity will be accomplished only to the extent that researchers take into
account the distinction between phenotypes and cryptotypes in their investigations.
Furthermore, attempts to test hypotheses empirically should be meticulously
developed within a theoretical/epistemological framework which makes clear the
issues being examined. We would like to suggest that researchers who cite Whorf as
a primary reference need to examine his work carefully and to anchor their conclusions
firmly in the context of his analysis. While differences of interpretation of Whorf‘s
writing are inevitable given the fact that he developed his ideas over a period of
ten years in articles intended for widely different audiences, we find it difficult to
understand the basis for statements such as the following:

If Whorfs hypothesis were true, if it were thecase that differences among languages
caused substantial differences in cognitive functioning, the bilingual person would be in
a curious predicament. (Macnamara 1972:60; emphasis added) (Benjamin Lee Whorf
was) right in claiming an influence for language on behavior. and wrong in making this
claim unind(ferenriatrd, all pervasivr, permanenr and ohwlure.. Whorf‘s brilliant
insight clearly illuminated something that is real, but the extravagant claims made in
the name of his “princip1e”do not stand up in the cold daylight of empirical verification..
. . (Guiora 1981:177; emphasis added)

We have found nothing in Language, Thought and Reality which claims that language
causes “differences in cognitive functioning,” and we cited Whorf‘s writing at length in
an effort to show that Whorf believed that the influence of language on behavior was
anything but “undifferentiated, all pervasive, permanent and absolute.” The
“extravagant claims” made in the name of linguistic relativity were not made by
Whorf, and attributing to him simplistic views of linguistic determinism serves only to
obscure the usefulness of his insights.

In summary, we would like to make three points. First, the hypothesis of linguistic
relativity, Whorfian linguistic relativity, does not promote either a monolithic or a causal
view of the world. In the preceding pages we have quoted liberally from Whorf‘s
writings in order to emphasize the complexity of his perspective of linguistic
relativity. Second, we believe that phenomenology provides a reasonable
epistemological framework for Whorf‘s work. It is a discipline which allows for both
the systematicity required of any analysis of language and language-related behavior
and the flexibility required for an examination of the interaction of individual and social
phenomena. And finally, we believe that a great deal of speculation about linguistic
relativity has occurred without the necessary epistemological discussion, and
without an adequate understanding of Whorf‘s writings. If we take Whorf as the basis
of our work, and if we quote Whorf, then we should begin with Whorf; as Hoijer
(1965:230) put it, in responding to a critic of Whorf, “1 must enter again an objection to
what I consider to be a vulgarization of Whorf‘s work, and I refer you to his work.”

Methodological Questions

Given the preceding as a broad theoretical framework, a number of questions

arise as one attempts to design research procedures and to identify plausible
avenues for testing the validity of the linguistic relativity hypothesis.6 Taken in its
broadest terms, the issue is, What are the relationships between language,
culture, cognition, and personality? The question is extremely difficult to answer on
a philosophical/ theoretical level, and even more problematic when one attempts
to develop research tools and analysis procedures.

Language is, of course, a component of culture, and an important variable in cognition

and personality, but in research which attempts to identify the behavioral correlates
of language, it becomes extremely important that the “causes” of culture or
cognition or personality not be confused with “causes” of language, or, at least, that
we be able to tell one from the other. Fodor, Bever, and Garret (1974:384) state the
problem succinctly: “If.. one is going to explain differences in the cognitive
organization of speakers by reference to differences in the grammatical
organization of their languages, one had better have some way of demonstrating
the existence of the former that does not depend solely upon the existence of the
latter.” Because language is a fundamental element of our individual and social
existence, it is inextricably intertwined with our perceptions of reality; that is,
language is so much a part of the matrix of presuppositions which determines our
world view that we cannot examine its role in perception without running the risk
of confusing the object to be examined with the tools by which we conduct the
examination. In short, researchers interested in linguistic relativity are caught in
the species of Godel’s Paradox (see, for example, Godel 1962; Nagel and
Newman 1964) which, loosely paraphrased, states that for a wide variety of systems,
there will always be propositions which cannot be proved within the system. In the
case of studies which attempt to ascertain the degree of influence of language on
thought, the conditions necessary for proof lie outside the realm of experience
within which we live and work. That is, because we must use language to test our
hypotheses, and because we are subject to the same constraints as our subjects in
terms of our perceptions of reality and the extent to which those perceptions are
influenced by language, it becomes impossible for us to achieve the distance
necessary to examine the issue objectively.

Another major difficulty arises when we examine specifically the relationship

between sex and gender. The problem exists on several levels. In the first place,
nature has not been entirely cooperative; the distinction between male and female
is not neatly dichotomous, whether we are speaking in a strictly biological or
psychological sense. Male and female actually represent extremes on a continuum
(rather than mutually exclusive categories) with certain physiological
characteristics (such as external genitalia, body hair, bone structure, etc.) and
personality attributes (such as temperament, sensitivity, etc.) designated as more or
less appropriate for one sex or the other. Geertz (1977) points out, this
“appropriateness” varies dramatically from culture to culture so that, for example,
what is considered masculine in one group may well be considered feminine in
another or an attribute which is associated only with women in one society may be
considered to apply equally well to both sexes in another society. Thus, as one begins
a study of the type we have been considering, no assumptions can be made
concerning the meaning, whether denotative or connotative, of the terms masculine
and feminine. The situation does not improve much when we consider gender as
a linguistic construct. With languages which require morphosyntactic marking for
gender, one may find rules in grammar books and dictionaries which prescribe usage,
but rarely will there be unanimity for all possible cases. In a recent series of studies,
Zubin and Kopcke (198 1, in press) found variation among German speakers in the
assignment of gender to certain compound nouns. Before they could study affective
meaning in lexicon, they had to conduct an experimental test of gender assignment
and gender variation because “a) the dictionaries themselves indicate some variation,
b) the dictionaries are committed to a prescriptive stance leading to the concealment
of existing variation, and c) the study (of affective meaning in gender variation) makes
a survey of actual usage more appropriate than dictionaries as a data base” (Zubin
and Kopcke, in press). In our study (Clarke et al. 1981) we experienced similar
difficulties with Arabic; although dictionary entries were consistent, a number of
linguistically sophisticated native speakers claimed that several test items could be
either masculine or feminine. In short, even in the relatively unambiguous world of
grammar, we cannot assume that native speaker usage will be consistent or uniform.
Obviously, therefore, researchers who endeavor to ascertain the relationship
between gender loading in languages and gender perception in human cognition/
behavior will have to determine the “reality” of gender on both the linguistic and
psychological levels before they begin their study. And finally, of course, there
exists the problem of determining the relationship between gender (as linguistic
construct) and sex (as bio-socio- psychological construct). It must be remembered that
gender merely means “category” or “type.” Languages with gender loading are not
encoding a feature of the world which other languages happen to ignore; if they were,
there would not be the discrepancy in gender assignment which we find
everywhere (e.g., sun is masculine in Spanish but feminine in German). Gender is
the name given to certain arbitrary grammatical classes of nouns, and there are a
number of languages which have many more than two gender categories. For
example, Fula, spoken in Northern Nigeria, has twenty or twenty-five (see Arnot
1967). One can only speculate as to the impact of gender marking on speakers of
Fula, but it is certain to be different from that of English, Hebrew, or Arabic, and
we would not suspect them of attributing sex characteristics to inanimate objects
or concepts. It is to a large extent accidental that grammarians in the Western
tradition have associated gender classification with sex. This leads us to question the
nature of the process by which speakers of gender-inflected languages learn to
correlate linguistic structure with social phenomena. Do they perceive the world in
terms of masculine or feminine and neuter because their language emphasizes
these categories in the lexicon, or do they assign certain masculine or feminine
attributes to objects and concepts as post hoc rationalizations based on what they
have learned about the inflectional system of their language? Perhaps we are guilty
of a species of folk etymology, assigning masculine or feminine attributes to things
or concepts because we have learned to make the distinction in language. These
two broad questions-the extent to which researchers can distance themselves
from the issues to be studied and the relationship between perceptions of reality
and linguistic markers (illustrated by sex vs. gender)-represent formidable obstacles
which must be dealt with before progress can be made in the study of the Whorf
hypothesis, and they must be kept in mind as researchers interpret results and
draw conclusions. However, assuming that a satisfactory resolution to these two
problems can be reached, a number of other methodological considerations remain
to be dealt with. We would argue that there appear to be three basic steps involved
in seeking evidence of linguistic relativity:
( 1) identifying phenotypes and cryptotypes in a language, (2) hypothesizing possible
behavioral correlates, (3) conducting tests to see whether speakers of the language
demonstrate an influence of language on behavior which is somehow similar to
the behavioral correlates identified. These steps are presented in their logical order,
as well as in ascending order of difficulty of execution. The identification of
phenotypes and cryptotypes requires extensive linguistic analysis which is often
aided by the researcher’s knowledge of other languages. It was this sort of
contrastive analysis, after all, which led Whorf to examine the basis on which
“Standard Average European” languages organize reality. In principle, we should be
able to contrast two languages in the manner shown in Figure 1. Using this grid, one
can begin to systematically compare specific phenomena in two languages in the hope
of illuminating linguistic patterns which place constraints in cognitive functioning
(see Appendix for examples of topics which might warrant such a comparison).

Once one has identified linguistic phenomena which seem to indicate dramatic
differences in the way speakers of two languages encode (or ignore) similar
phenomena, the next step is to postulate specific behaviors or attitudes which could
be correlated with those phenomena. Such correlates might range from subjects’
anecdotal, introspective judgments on the denotative/ connotative meanings of
particular lexical items or syntactic patterns, to observations of individual and social
behavior. By the same token, the “tests” which one might apply (step 3 of the
investigative procedure) would vary depending on the nature of the phenomena
under scrutiny. Thus, one thinks of the plastic chip experiments used to test color
terms (see Lucy and Schweder 1979 and references) as well as
“participant/observer” types of research in which one attempts to identify and
describe behavior in “everyday” circumstances which would confirm or refute specific
hypotheses of language influence. Conclusion In this paper we have used a number
of recent studies as the focal point for a discussion of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of
linguistic relativity. After a brief examination of an experiment by the University
of Michigan Personality and Research Group and a replication by Clarke et al., we
state that the value of such research is limited because it focuses exclusively on overt
linguistic phenomena, phenotypes, ignoring the potentially more important
influences of covert, or cryptotypic, patterns of language. We assert that a great deal
of research and speculation has occurred which is based on superficial and/or
uninformed perspectives of Whorfs work, and we urge researchers to develop
hypotheses and conduct experiments within an explicit theoretical/epistemological
context. We offer phenomenology as one philosophical tradition which might
provide this context. Finally, we sketch a number of methodological procedures and
pitfalls which await the researcher. This paper is, in large part, speculation, and
the issue of linguistic relativity is one that will continue to receive mixed
reviews in the professional literature. We have attempted to develop an explicit
philosophical and methodological framework within which researchers can address
the question of the relationship between language, thought, and reality. In doing
this we acknowledge the insight of Schumann’s contention (1983) that our work
shares characteristics with both science and art. Reviewing second language
acquisition research, Schumann observes that the field has been governed by a
positivist orientation which is based on the presupposition that there exists a simple
reality or truth that can be discovered if sufficiently rigorous standards of
methodology are utilized. He argues that we need to approach our work from a more
artistic perspective, acknowledging the possibility that “reality” cannot be known in
its entirety, or, at least, that it will be impossible to arrive at criteria for judgment
upon which all researchers can unanimously agree.

As scientists, we must strive for acceptable levels of rigor and replicability.

However, as artists, we must acknowledge a certain level of subjectivity and aesthetic
interpretation in what we do. It is our hope that the preceding pages have provided
a starting point for the continued scientific/ artistic evaluation of the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis of linguistic relativity.

REFERENCES

Alford, D.K.H. 1978. The demise of the Whorf hypothesis (a major revision in the
history of linguistics). In Proceedings qf’rhe 4th Annual Meeting of the Berke1e.v
Linguistics Socier!. eds. J.I. Jaeger et al. Berkeley: Linguistics Department. University
of California at Berkeley.
Arnot, D.W. 1967. Some reflections on the content of individual classes in Fula and
Tiv. In Actes du Cvlloque International sur “LA CLASSIFICA TION NOMINALE DANS LES
LANGUES NEGRO-AFRlCA1NES”organise a Aix-en-Provence, 3-7Juillet 1967, ed. M.
Gabriel Manessy. pp. 45-68. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
Berger. P., and T. Luckman. 1967. The Social Construction
zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAqf Reality. New York:
Anchor Books. Berger. P., B. Berger, and H. Kellner. 1973. The Homeless Mind. New
York: Vintage Books.
Clarke, M.A. 1976. Second language acquisition as a clash of consciousness.
Language
Clarke, M.A., A. Losoff, M. Dickenson McCracken, and J. Still. 1981. Gender
perceptionin Learning 26:377-390. Arabic and English. Language Lrarning 31:159-169

Clarke, M.A., A. Losoff, and D.S. Rood. 1982. Untangling referent and reference in
linguistic DeLancey, S. 1981. An interpretation of split ergativity and related
patterns.
Language Dixon, R.M. 1979. Ergativity. Language 55:59-138. Fodor, J., T.G. Bever,
and M.F. Garret. 1974. The Ps-vchology of Language. New York:
Geertz. C. 1977. Common sense as a cultural system. Aniioch Review Summer:5-26.
Givon, T.. ed. 1979. Discourse and Syniax. Syntax and Semantics, vol. 12. New
York: Academic Press. Godel, 1962. On Formally Undecidable Proposirions of
Principia Mathematics and Reluied Sysiems, I. Edinburgh and London: Oliver and
Boyd. Guiora, A.Z. 198 Language, personality and culture or the Whorfian hypothesis
revisited. In On TESOL 81, eds. M. Hines and W. Rutherford. pp. 169-177.
Washington, D.C.: TESOL. Guiora, A.Z., and W.R. Acton. 1979. Personality and
language behavior: a restatement. Language Learning 29: 193-204. Guiora, A.Z., B.
Beit-Hallahmi, and A. Sagi. In press. A cross-cultural study of symbolic meaning.
Applied Linguistics. Haugen. E. Linguistic relativity: myths and methods. In
Language and Thought; Anrhropologicul Issues, eds. W.C. McCormack and S.A.
Werner. The Hague: Mouton. Herold, A. 1982. Linguistic relativity: transforming the
relative into the insensible. Language Learning 32:20 1-207. Hoijer, J. 1965. Language
in Culiure. American Anthropological Association, vol. 56.6, part 2, Memoir #79
(Dec.). Keenan, E., and B. Comrie, 1979. Noun phrase accessibility and universal
grammar. Linguisiic Inquiry 8: 63-99. Li, C.N., ed. 1976. Subject and Topic. New York:
Academic Press. relativity studies. Language Learning 32:209-217. 57x626457.
McGraw-Hill. A,. and R.A. Schweder. 1979. Whorf and his critics: linguistic and non-
linguistic Macnamara. J. 1972. Bilingualism and thought. In The Language Educaiion
of Minoriiy Nagel. E., and J.R. Newman. 1964. Godel:s ProoJ New York: New York
University Press. Natanson, M.. ed. 1963. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. New
York: Random House. Platero, P. 1974. The Navajo relative clause. lniernaiional
Journal of American Linguisrics Quirk. R., and. Greenbaum. 1973. A Cunci.re
Grammar of Conremporars Eng/ish. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Rood,
D.S., and A.R. Taylor. Forthcoming. Lakhora. Handbook of Northern American
Indians, vol. 16. Washington: SmithsonIan Institution. Sapir, E. 1921. Language; An
Inirodcrciion to /he /u& of Speech. New York: Harcourt. Brace and Company.
Schumann, J.H. 1983. Art and science in second language acquisition research. In On
TESOL '82: Pacific Perspecrives on Language Learningand Teaching. Washington, D.C.:
TESOL. Schutz, A. 1962. Collected Papers, Vol I. The Hague: Nijhoff. Schutz, A. 1964.
Collecred Papers, Vol I/. The Hague: Nijhoff. Taylor, A.R. 1969. A Grammar of
Blackfooi. Dissertation. University of California at Berkeley. Whorf, B.L. 1956.
Language, Thought and Realiiy. Edited by J.B. Carroll. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT
Press.