CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS.

MERIS (470 SCRA 125, SEPTEMBER 16 , 2005)

FACTS:

Capitol Medical Center hired Dr. Meris in 1974 as Chief of its Industrial Service Unit (ISU). In 1992,
however, or after about 18 years of service, Dr. Meris was notified that the ISU will be abolished and that his
services will be terminated. He, however, doubted the closure.The ISU was not, in fact, abolished. It continued to
operate with Dr. Clemente as head. Dr. Meris believed it was a mere ploy for his ouster due to his refusal to retire.
He sought reinstatement but was unheeded. Dr. Meris then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the Labor
Arbiter dismissed the same and was only granted his hospital retirement plan. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the
retirement plan on the ground that Dr. Meris did not, in fact, retire. It ordered payment of separation pay
instead. The CA, however, ruled that Dr. Meris was illegally dismissed. Hence, present action by Capitol.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal?

RULING:
Yes. Although employers have management prerogatives, including the right to close the operation of an
establishment or undertaking, they must comply with the legal requirements and not offend the protected rights of
labor. Requisites: (a) done in good faith to advance the company’s interest; and (b) not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of employees under the law. Capitol failed to prove its good faith in closing the ISU. The
“Analysis of Income and Expenses” which showed there were losses was doubtful since it was prepared by the internal
auditor who happened to be a relative of Dr. Clemente. The accounting records, in fact, showed increasing revenues
from 1989 to 1991.

Danilo P. Javier (Bitoy Javier) vs. FlyAce Corporation

G.R. No. 192558, 15 February 2012

FACTS:

The petitioner alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks
at the respondent’s warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to certain
locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the company’s delivery vehicles, as pahinante;
that he reported for work from Monday to Saturday from 7:00 o’clock in the morning to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon;
that during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and payslips by the company; that on May 6,
2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon
the instruction of Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong), his superior. Thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without
notice; and that he was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal from work. Fly Ace denied
that he was not their employee and insisted that there was no illegal dismissal. Fly Ace submitted a copy of its
agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier for
his contracted services bearing the words, "daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)" and the latter’s
signatures/initials.

The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Javier failed to present proof that he
was a regular employee of Fly Ace. On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was favored and ruled that he was entitled to a
security of tenure. The CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former employee of Fly Ace and
reinstated the dismissal of Javier’s complaint as ordered by the LA.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there is existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

RULLING:

No. The Court affirms the assailed CA decision. The LA and the CA found Javier’s claim of employment
with Fly Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agree. Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of
liberality does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. It is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether the
party on whom the burden to prove lies was able to hurdle the same. "No particular form of evidence is required to
prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the
relationship may be admitted ”. The onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by
the requisite quantum of evidence. "Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto x x x." Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled tests to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. Of these
elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the
employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be
accomplished. In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. Javier’s
allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee relationship
on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test.

Bernard A. Tenazas, Jaime Francisco, and Isidro Endraca v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport
G.R. No. 192998, 02 April 2014

FACTS:
On July 4, 2007, Bernard A. Tenazas and Jaime M. Francisco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
R. Villegas Taxi Transport and/or Romualdo Villegas and Andy Villegas. At that time, a similar case had already been
filed by Isidro G. Endraca against the same respondents. The two (2) cases were subsequently consolidated. In their
position paper, Tenazas, Francisco and Endraca (petitioners) alleged that they were hired and dismissed by the
respondents. Tenazas alleged that on July 1, 2007, the taxi unit assigned to him was sideswiped by another vehicle
and for that he was fired. Francisco, on the other hand, averred that his dismissal was brought about by the company’s
unfounded suspicion that he was organizing a labor union. He was instantaneously terminated, without the benefit of
procedural due process, on June 4, 2007. Endraca, for his part, alleged that his dismissal was instigated by an occasion
when he fell short of the required boundary for his taxi unit.
For their part, the respondents admitted that Tenazas and Endraca were employees of the company, the former
being a regular driver and the latter a spare driver. The respondents, however, denied that Francisco was an employee
of the company or that he was able to drive one of the company’s units at any point in time.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal in the case at bar. The NLRC rendered a Decision,
reversing the appealed decision of the LA, holding that the additional pieces of evidence belatedly submitted by the
petitioners sufficed to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship and their illegal dismissal. The CA
rendered a Decision, affirming with modification the Decision dated June 23, 2009 of the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complainants were illegally dismissed from employment.

RULLING:

No. The petition lacks merit. "The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue."Corollarily, as Francisco was claiming to be an employee of the respondents, it is incumbent upon him to proffer
evidence to prove the existence of said relationship. "In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship, the Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of
the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the
employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called control test,
is the most important element." There is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforesaid elements. Any
competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Identification cards, cash vouchers, social
security registration, appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts, and personnel lists,
serve as evidence of employee status.

In this case, however, Francisco failed to present any proof substantial enough to establish his relationship
with the respondents. He failed to present documentary evidence like attendance logbook, payroll, SSS record or any
personnel file that could somehow depict his status as an employee. The CA’s order of reinstatement of Tenazas and
Endraca, instead of the payment of separation pay, is also well in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence Thus, it
was a prudent call for the CA to delete the award of separation pay and order for reinstatement instead, in accordance
with the general rule stated in Article 279 of the Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision
dated March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated June 28, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111150 are
AFFIRMED.

Alilem Credit Cooperative vs. Bandiola

G.R. No. 173489, 25 February 2013

FACTS:
Respondent was employed by petitioner as bookkeeper. Petitioner’s Board of Directors received a letter from
a certain Napoleon Gao-ay reporting the alleged immoral conduct and unbecoming behavior of respondent by having
an illicit relationship with Napoleon’s sister, Thelma G. Palma. This prompted the Board to conduct a preliminary
investigation. Respondent, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He, instead, claimed that the
accusation was a result of the insecurity felt by some members of the cooperative and of the Board because of his
growing popularity owing to his exemplary record as an employee. Thelma executed an affidavit likewise denying the
allegations of extra-marital affair. Meanwhile, on June 7, 1997, the Board received a petition from about fifty members
of the cooperative asking the relief of respondent due to his illicit affair with Thelma.
On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the
NLRC set aside the LA decision. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, but it failed to obtain a favorable decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s dismissal from employment is valid.

RULLING:
We find merit in the petition. It is undisputed that respondent was dismissed from employment for engaging
in extramarital affairs, a ground for termination of employment stated in petitioner’s Personnel Policy. A comparison
of petitioner’s old and new Personnel Policies attached by respondent himself to his Position Paper shows that under
the old policy, one of the grounds for termination of an employee is “commission of acts or commission (sic) of duties
that bring discredit to the organization,37” while under the new policy, one of the grounds is the “commission of acts
that brings (sic) discredit to the cooperative organization, especially, but not limited to, conviction of any crime,
illicit marital affairs, scandalous acts inimical to established and accepted social mores.”38 Contrary to respondent’s
claim, with the amendment of the Personnel Policy, petitioner did not create a new ground for the termination of
employment to make sure that respondent is removed from his position. The quoted ground under the old policy is
similar to that provided for in the new policy. The enumeration containing the specific act of “illicit marital affairs” is
not an additional ground, but an example of an act that brings discredit to the cooperative. It is merely an interpretation
of what petitioner considers as such.

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing that engaging in extra-marital affairs is a ground for termination of
employment not only under the new but even under the old Personnel Policy of petitioner. The effectivity of the policy
as to respondent cannot, therefore, be questioned. To be sure, an employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment.
The next question is whether procedural due process was observed in the termination of respondent’s services. “Before
the services of an employee can be validly terminated, the employer must furnish him two written notices: (a) a written
notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving the employee reasonable
opportunity to explain his side; and (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.” 44 The employer
must inform the employee of the charges against him and to hear his defenses. A full adversarial proceeding is not
necessary as the parties may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memorandum
or oral argument.

In this case, respondent was adequately afforded the opportunity to defend himself and explain the accusation
against him. Upon receipt of the complaint, petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation and even created an Ad
Hoc Committee to investigate the matter. Respondent was directed to explain either in writing or by a personal
confrontation with the Board why he should not be terminated for engaging in illicit affair.

Price vs. Innodata Phils.

567 SCRA 122 [2008]

FACTS:
Respondent Innodata Philippines, Inc./Innodata Corporation was a domestic corporation engaged in the data
encoding and data conversion business. It employed encoders, indexers, formatters, programmers, quality/quantity
staff, and others, to maintain its business and accomplish the job orders of its clients. Respondent Leo Rabang was its
Human Resources and Development (HRAD) Manager, while respondent Jane Navarette was its Project Manager.
INNODATA had since ceased operations due to business losses in June 2002. Petitioners Cherry J. Price, Stephanie
G. Domingo, and Lolita Arbilera were employed as formatters by INNODATA. The parties executed an employment
contract denominated as a "Contract of Employment for a Fixed Period," stipulating that the contract shall be for a
period of one year.
 On 22 May 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against respondents.
Petitioners claimed that they should be considered regular employees since their positions as formatters were necessary
and desirable to the usual business of INNODATA as an encoding, conversion and data processing company.
Respondents asserted that petitioners were not illegally dismissed, for their employment was terminated due to the
expiration of their terms of employment. Petitioners' contracts of employment with INNODATA were for a limited
period only, commencing on 6 September 1999 and ending on 16 February 2000.

On 17 October 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued its Decision finding petitioners' complaint for illegal dismissal
and damages meritorious. Respondent INNODATA appealed the Labor Arbiter's Decision to the NLRC. The NLRC,
reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and absolved INNODATA of the charge of illegal dismissal. On 25 September
2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision sustaining the ruling of the NLRC that petitioners were not
illegally dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were hired by INNODATA under valid fixed-term employment.

RULLING:
The Court finds merit in the present Petition. There were no valid fixed-term contracts and petitioners were
regular employees of the INNODATA who could not be dismissed except for just or authorized cause. The
employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. Equally
important to consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must
yield to the common good.Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties
are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply
contracting with each other.

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph. Provided, That,
any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such activity exists. Based on the afore-quoted provision, the following employees are accorded regular status:
(1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, regardless of the length of their employment; and (2) those who were initially hired as casual employees,
but have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they
are employed.

After considering petitioners' contracts in their entirety, as well as the circumstances surrounding petitioners'
employment at INNODATA, the Court is convinced that the terms fixed therein were meant only to circumvent
petitioners' right to security of tenure and are, therefore, invalid. The contracts of employment submitted by
respondents are highly suspect for not only being ambiguous, but also for appearing to be tampered with.