III.
Recruitment and Placement is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in a
A. Recruitment of local and migrant workers
1. General Provisions
People vs. Hon. Panis
G.R. No. L-58674-77. July 11, 1986
CRUZ, J:
FACTS
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the
CFI of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that
Serapio Abug, private respondent, “without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder
of authority to operate a fee-charging employment
agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee-charging employment
agency by charging fees and expenses and promising
employment in Saudi Arabia” to four separate
individuals.
Abug filed a motion to quash and contends that there
would be illegal recruitment only “whenever two or
more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee.” The informations filed against
him did not charge an offense because he was accused of
illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations.
The motion was denied at first but was reconsidered and
finally granted in the Orders of the trial dated June 24
and September 17, 1981
The view of Abug is that to constitute recruitment and
placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should
involve dealings with two or more persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the
petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more
persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment
to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The
other acts mentioned in the body of the article may
involve only one person and are not necessarily for
profit.
ISSUE: Whether or not for illegal recruiting be
committed there should be two or more accused in
accordance to Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code.
RULING: No. The proviso was intended neither to
impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an
exception thereto but merely to create a presumption.
The presumption is that the individual or entity is
engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the “canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring (of) workers).”
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in
Article 13 (b) will constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a
fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to
be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The
words “shall be deemed” create that presumption.
2. Illegal recruitment
f. Illegal recruitment vs. estafa
People vs. Calonzo
G.R. Nos. 115150-55. September 27, 1996.
BELLOSILLO, J:
FACTS
Sometime in February 1992 Danilo de los Reyes
and his brother-in-law Belarmino Torregrosa met with
the accused in Pasig. In that meeting Calonzo informed
them that he could provide them employment abroad,
particulary Italy, for a fee. Calonzo was so glib and
persuasive that De los Reyes and Torregrosa were
quickly convinced to cast their lot with him. On April
13, 1992, De los Reyes gave Calonzo P50,000.00. He
also pledged the Ford Fiera of his brother-in-law to
Calonzo for P70,000.00 in order to come up with the
P120,000.00 processing fee imposed by Calonzo. De los
Reyes was informed by Calonzo of his “scheduled”
departure for Italy on April 29, 1992. However, despite
the lapse of the period, De los Reyes and Torregrosa
remained in the Philippines although their recruiter
reiterated his promised to send them to Italy. On May 2,
1992 they boarded a place that was supposed to take
them to Italy but landed in Bangkok where according to
Calonzo, their visas would be processed. They stayed for
1 and a half months. Calonzo, at that time, already
returned to the Philippines.
Upon their return to the country with the help of
Loreta Castañeda they verified from the POEA whether
Clonzo or his R. A. C. Business Agency was duly
authorized and licensed to recruit people for
employment abroad. The POEA certified that the agency
was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas
employment.
The same situations happened to Hazel de Paula,
Elmer Clamor and Bernardo Miranda.
Reydante Calonzo was charged with illegal
recruitment in Large Scale and 5 counts of Estafa by
Bernardo Miranda, Danilo de los Reyes, Elmer Clamor,
Belarmino Torregrosa and Hazel de Paula. On April 5,
1994, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig found the
accused guilty as charged.
Calonzo assails his conviction by claiming that
the court bellow erred in disregarding the testimony of
Nenita Mercado, an employee of POEA, who
categorically stated that their records indicated that
Calonzo never processed complainants’ applications for
employment abroad. He concludes from that fact alone
that he cannot be deemed to have engaged in the
recruitment of workers for employment abroad. He also
argues that the court erred in charging him with estafa
for the amount claimed to have been collected by him
did not correspond to the amounts indicated in the
receipts presented by the complaining witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is also guilty of
Estafa.
RULING: Yes. As We ruled in People v. Turda that
recruitment of persons for overseas employment without
the necessary recruiting permit or authority from the
POEA constituted illegal recruitment; however, where
some other crimes or felonies are committed in the
process, conviction under the Labor Code does not
preclude punishment under other statutes. In People v.
Romero we said that the elements of estafa were: (a) that
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
Calonzo defrauded complainants through deceit. They
were obviously misled into believing that he could
provide them employment in Italy. As a result, the 5
complainants parted with their hard-earned money. The
amount defrauded of each complainant was
P120,000.00.
3. Liabilities
b. Foreign employer
Gagui vs. Dejero
G.R. No. 196036. October 23, 2013.
SERENO, C.J:
FACTS
On December 14, 1993, respondents Simeon
Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed separate complaints
for ilegal dismissal, non of salaries and overtime pay,
refund for transportation expenses, damages, and
attorney’s fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc., and
Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. ON May 7, 1997, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision ordering PRO Agency
Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly
and severally pay the complainants.
On October 30, 2002, respondents filed a
Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency Manila,
Inc.’s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment
Debtors. It included petitioner as the Vice-
President/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agency, Manila,
Inc. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion of
respondents finding Gagui and Lapuz liable to
complainant jointly and solidarily with the original
party-respondent adjudged liable under the Decision of
May 7, 1998.
As a result of the execution of the 2 nd Alis Writ
of Execution, an amount of P85,430.48 was garnished in
the petitioner’s bank deposit. However, since the
judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought the
issuance of a 3rd alis writ of execution. On December 15,
2004 the Labor Arbiter granted the motion. On
September 14, 2005 petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
3rd Alias Writ of Execution. The petitioners alleged that
apart from not being made aware that we impleaded as
one of the parties to the case, the dispositive portion of
the May 7, 1997 dispositive portion did not hold her
liable in any form whatsoever. The Motion was denied
by the Labor Arbiter.
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which
rendered a decision affirming the Labor Artbiter’s
finding. It ruled that “in so far as overseas migrant
workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042 itself that
described the nature of the liability of the corporation
and its officers and directors. . . . It is not essential that
the individual officers and directors be impleaded as
party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A
finding of liability on the part of the corporation will
necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers
and directors.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC decision. The
CA stated that there was “no need for petitioner to be
impleaded . . . because by express provision of the law,
she is made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila,
Inc., for any and all money claims filed by private
respondents.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be held
jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila,
Inc. in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042, despite
not having been impleaded in the Complaint and named
in the Decision.
RULING: No. Petitioner may not be held jointly and
severally liable, absent a finding that she was remiss in
directing the affairs of the agency.
R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to
regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It
aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses
suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad.
Section 10, 2nd paragraph of R.A. 8042 reads:
“The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This
provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent
for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall
be answerable for all money claims or damages that may
be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.”
In Sto. Tomas v. Salac, the Court held that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To
make them jointly and solidarily liable with their
company, there must be a finding that they were remiss
in directing the affairs of that company, such as
sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily
liable, there must be a separate finding that she was
remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in
the illegal dismissal of respondents. Examination of
records would reveal that there was no finding of neglect
on the part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the
agency. In fact, respondents made no mention of any
instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage the
agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing to
their illegal dismissal.
i. Theory of imputed knowledge
Sunace International Management Services, Inc., vs.
NLRC
G.R. No. 161757. January 25, 2006.
CARPIO MORALES, J:
FACTS
Petitioner, Sunace International Management
Services, a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan
Divina A. Montehermozo as a domestic helper under a
12-month contract effective February 1, 1997. The
deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese
broker, Edmund Wand, President of Jet Crown
International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February
1, 1998, Divina continued working for her Taiwanese
employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after
which she returned to the Philippines on February 4,
2000. On February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint
before the NLRC against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez,
the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign
principal alleging that she was jailed for three months
and that she was underpaid.
On April 6, 2000 Divina filed her Position Paper
claiming that under her original one-year contract and
the 2-year extended contract which was with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace. On the other hand,
Sunace argues that Divina could not anymore claim nor
entitled for the refund of her 24 months savings as she
already took back her saving already last year and the
employer did not deduct any money from her salary. It
further contends that she is not entitled to refund of her
14 months tax and payment of attorney’s fees because
there is no basis for the grant of tax refund as she
finished her one year contract and hence, was not
illegally dismissed by her employer. Such relief is only
available if the migrant worker has been dismissed
without just valid or lawful cause as defined by law or
contract. It also alleged that Divina’s 2-year extension of
her contract was without its knowledge and consent,
hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising
therefrom.
The Labor Arbiter rejected Sunace’s claim that the
extension of Divina’s contract for 2 more years as
without its knowledge and consent. The decision was in
favor of Divina. On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and
NLRC’s finding that Sunace knew of and impliedly
consented to the extension of Divina’s 2-year contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the theory of imputed knowledge
applicable to held that Sunace had impliedly consented
to the extension of Divina’s 2-year contract.
RULING: NO.
Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:
“As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as
obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divina’s]
employment contract necessarily bound it,”
it misapplied the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes to the
knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer Xiong, not the other way around. The
knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.