G.R. Nos.

L-58674-77 July 11, 1990 employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act
vs. of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First that presumption.
Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised
SERAPIO ABUG, respondents. Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to
produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his
CRUZ, J: custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have
13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word
follows: "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in
enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor
engaged in recruitment and placement. Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be,
First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or
Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or
from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee- those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of
and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric
by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment provisions that one cannot read against the background facts
in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in usually reported in the legislative journals.
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1 At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which
did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a
recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed
the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner a cynical deception at the hands of theirown countrymen.
promised or offered any employment for a fee. " 2 WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17,
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in 1981, are set aside and the four informations against the private
the Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and September 17, respondent reinstated. No costs.
1981. The prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3 SO ORDERED.
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being
prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor
Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first
two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement
without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the
informations, application of the definition of recruitment and
placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment
and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve
dealings with two or mre persons as an indispensable requirement.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of
two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such
persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts
mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one
person and are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso
should speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the
purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all
the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does
not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed
where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or
promise of employment but not when it is done through
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a
condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but
merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made
in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of
the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of

1
G.R. No. 184058 March 10, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MELISSA CHUA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment
(Large Scale) and was convicted thereof by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. She was also indicted for five counts of
Estafa but was convicted only for three. The Court of Appeals, by
Decision1 dated February 27, 2008, affirmed appellant’s conviction.
The Information2 charging appellant, together with one Josie
Campos (Josie), with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), docketed
as Criminal Case No. 04-222596, reads:
The undersigned accuses JOSIE CAMPOS and MELISSA CHUA
of violation of Article 38 (a) PD 1413, amending certain provisions
of Book I, PD 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the
Philippines, in relation to Art. 13 (b) and (c ) of said Code, as further
amended by PD Nos. 1693, 1920 and 2019 and as further
amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042 committed in a [sic]
large scale as follows:
That sometime during the month of September, 2002, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves
to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to ERIK DE GUIA TAN,
MARILYN O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR., HARRY
JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C. ANGELES for overseas
employment abroad without first having secured the required
license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required
by law, and charge or accept directly from:
ERIK DE GUIA TAN - P73,000.00
MARILYN D. MACARANAS - 83,000.00
NAPOLEON H. YU, JR. - 23,000.00
HARRY JAMES P. KING - 23,000.00
ROBERTO C. ANGELES - 23,000.00
For purposes of their deployment, which amounts are in excess of
or greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees as
prescribed by the POEA, and without valid reasons and without the
fault of said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed
to reimburse expenses incurred in connection with their
documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.
xxxx
The five Informations3 charging appellant and Josie with Estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 04-222597-601, were similarly
worded and varied only with respect to the names of the five
complainants and the amount that each purportedly gave to the
accused. Thus each of the Information reads:
xxxx
That on or about . . . in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud xxx in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused by means of false manifestations which they made to the
said . . . to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit
the latter as factory worker to work in Taiwan and could facilitate
the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said xxx to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to the said accused
the amount of . . . on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they
did obtain the amount of . . . which amount once in their
possession, with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage of said . . . in the
aforesaid amount of . . ., Philippine Currency.
xxxx
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Her co-accused Josie
remained at large. The cases were consolidated, hence, trial
proceeded only with respect to appellant.
2
Of the five complainants, only three testified, namely, Marilyn D.
Macaranas (Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry James King
(King). The substance of their respective testimonies follows:
Marilyn’s testimony:
After she was introduced in June 2002 by Josie to appellant as
capacitated to deploy factory workers to Taiwan, she paid appellant
₱80,000 as placement fee and ₱3,750 as medical expenses fee, a
receipt4 for the first amount of which was issued by appellant.
Appellant had told her that she could leave for Taiwan in the last
week of September 2002 but she did not, and despite appellant’s
assurance that she would leave in the first or second week of
October, just the same she did not.
She thus asked for the refund of the amount she paid but appellant
claimed that she was not in possession thereof but promised
anyway to raise the amount to pay her, but she never did.
She later learned in June 2003 that appellant was not a licensed
recruiter, prompting her to file the complaint against appellant and
Josie.
Tan’s testimony:
After he was introduced by Josie to appellant at the Golden Gate,
Inc., (Golden Gate) an agency situated in Paragon Tower Hotel in
Ermita, Manila, he underwent medical examination upon
appellant’s assurance that he could work in Taiwan as a factory
worker with a guaranteed monthly salary of 15,800 in Taiwan
currency.
He thus paid appellant, on September 6, 2002, ₱70,0005
representing placement fees for which she issued a receipt.
Appellant welched on her promise to deploy him to Taiwan,
however, hence, he demanded the refund of his money but
appellant failed to. He later learned that Golden Gate was not
licensed to deploy workers to Taiwan, hence, he filed the complaint
against appellant and Josie.
King’s testimony:
His friend and a fellow complainant Napoleon Yu introduced him to
Josie who in turn introduced appellant as one who could deploy
him to Taiwan.
On September 24, 2002,6 he paid appellant ₱20,000 representing
partial payment for placement fees amounting to ₱80,000, but
when he later inquired when he would be deployed, Golden Gate’s
office was already closed. He later learned that Golden Gate’s
license had already expired, prompting him to file the complaint.
Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as a
temporary cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of
Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng,7 she maintained that
Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and that Josie,
who is her godmother, was an agent.
Admitting having received ₱80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan,
receipt of which she issued but denying receiving any amount from
King, she claimed that she turned over the money to the
documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the
money to Marilyn Calueng whose present whereabouts she did not
know.
By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 36 of the Manila RTC
convicted appellant of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three
counts of Estafa, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of
accused Melissa Chua beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is
hereby rendered convicting the accused as principal of a large
scale illegal recruitment and estafa three (3) counts and she is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment.1avvphi1
The accused is likewise convicted of estafa committed against
Harry James P. King and she is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of
prision correctional as minimum, to Six (6) years and One (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum; in Criminal Case No. 04-22598; in
Criminal Case No. 04-222600 committed against Marilyn
Macaranas, accused is sentence [sic] to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional
as minimum, to Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 04-222601
committed against Erik de Guia Tan, she is likewise sentence [sic]
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2)
months of prision correctional as minimum, to Eleven (11) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused Melissa Chua is also ordered to return the amounts of
P20,000.00 to Harry James P. King, P83,750.00 to Marilyn D.
Macaranas, and P70,000.00 to Erik de Guia Tan.
As regards Criminal Cases Nos. 04-222597 and 04-222599, both
are dismissed for lack of interest of complainants Roberto Angeles
and Napoleon Yu, Jr.
In the service of her sentence, the accused is credited with the full
period of preventive imprisonment if she agrees in writing to abide
by the disciplinary rules imposed, otherwise only 4/5 shall be
credited.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals, as stated early on, affirmed the trial court’s
decision by the challenged Decision of February 27, 2008, it
holding that appellant’s defense that, as temporary cashier of
Golden Gate, she received the money which was ultimately
remitted to Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having failed to
prove the existence of an employment relationship between her
and Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the operations of Golden
Gate and the extent of her involvement therein.
Citing People v. Sagayaga,8 the appellate court ruled that an
employee of a company engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal together with his employer if it is shown that he,
as in the case of appellant, actively and consciously participated
therein.
Respecting the cases for Estafa, the appellate court, noting that a
person convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of Estafa as penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, held that the elements thereof were
sufficiently established, viz: that appellant deceived the
complainants by assuring them of employment in Taiwan provided
they pay the required placement fee; that relying on such
representation, the complainants paid appellant the amount
demanded; that her representation turned out to be false because
she failed to deploy them as promised; and that the complainants
suffered damages when they failed to be reimbursed the amounts
they paid.
Hence, the present appeal, appellant reiterating the same
arguments she raised in the appellate court.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The term "recruitment and placement" is defined under Article 13(b)
of the Labor Code of the Philippines as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. (emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as
amended, under which appellant was charged, provides:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. – (a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of
this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage
and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group. (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment
activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of
contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with an expired
license, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines. And illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group.
3
Thus for illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the
prosecution has to prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the
accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused
committed such illegal activity against three or more persons
individually or as a group.9
In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted
being a cashier from January to October 2002, was initially
authorized to recruit workers for deployment abroad. Per the
certification from the POEA, Golden Gate’s license only expired on
February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the roster of licensed
agencies on April 2, 2002.
Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who
enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the
fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure for
them employment abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the
complainants were motivated by improper motives, the trial court’s
assessment of their credibility shall not be interfered with by the
Court.10
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate,
that did not make her any less an employee to be held liable for
illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with
the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously
participated in the recruitment process. 11
Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal
nature of the recruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not
free her of liability either. Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or "The Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a violation of
which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus
immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa,
convicted of such offense.
[I]llegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in
se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud.12 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176264 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
TERESITA "TESSIE" LAOGO, Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition assails the July 31, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 693-M-2001. The RTC found
appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo was the proprietor and manager
of Laogo Travel Consultancy, a travel agency firm located along
Padre Faura Street in Manila. On March 7, 2001, an Information3
was filed against appellant and a certain Susan Navarro (Susan) in
Malolos, Bulacan charging them of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
(Large Scale). The information reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Susan
Navarro and Tessie [Teresita] Laogo of the crime of illegal
recruitment, penalized under Art. 38 in relation to Art[s]. 34 and 39
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1412, committed as follows:
That in or about and during the months of May and June 2000, in
the municipality of Bulacan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing that they are non-licensee or non-holder of
authority from the Department of Labor to recruit and/or place
workers in employment either locally or overseas, conspiring,
confederating together and helping each other, did then and there
wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in illegal recruitment,
placement or deployment activities for a fee, which they received
from complainants Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday, Rogelio Enriquez y
Buenavidez, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. y Fernandez, Dante Lopez y
Enriquez, Teodulo dela Cruz y Mendoza, Edwin Enriquez y
Panganiban and Gary Bustillos y de Guzman by recruiting and
promising them job placement abroad, more particularly in Guam,
which did not materialize, without first having secured the required
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
That the crime is committed in a large scale tantamount to
economic sabotage as the aforementioned seven persons were
[recruited] individually or as a group.
Contrary to law.
The charge stemmed from the following set of facts.
Sometime during the second week of March 2000, Susan invited
several individuals including six of the seven complainants –
namely, Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin
Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos – to her house in
Bulacan, Bulacan to celebrate the town fiesta. Appellant was
among the several guests in Susan’s house during the said
occasion.
According to Teodulo dela Cruz, during the fiesta, Gary Bustillos
introduced him to Susan as somebody who could help him find
work abroad. Since Susan was Gary’s aunt, Teodulo immediately
trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and
can work in Guam, USA. Upon Susan’s instruction, Teodulo filled
up an application form4 and gave her ₱3,000.00 after the latter
promised to process his application to work abroad.5 On May 22,
2000, Susan accompanied Teodulo to appellant’s travel agency
office in Ermita where he paid an additional ₱15,000.00 for his
placement fee.6 A receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo
Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by Susan.7 Months
later, when Susan’s promise to send him abroad remained
unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to
appellant’s office and to Susan’s house to follow up their
application, but the two always told them that their visas have yet to
be released.8
Similarly, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. also met Susan through Gary, who
himself was seeking help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susan’s
house, Billy saw Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, and Rogelio
Enriquez. Like him, the three were also seeking Susan’s help to
work abroad.9 Susan introduced Billy to appellant, who promised
him that she will send them abroad within three months.10 After the
meeting, Billy issued to Susan two Metrobank checks, dated March
4
11 and May 10, 2000, bearing the amounts ₱23,000.00 and
₱44,000.00, respectively, as partial payment for his placement fee.
11 On May 19, 2000, Billy also went to appellant’s travel agency in
Ermita and personally handed an additional cash of ₱6,000.00 to
Susan, who thereafter gave the money to appellant. Appellant
issued a corresponding receipt12 for the ₱6,000.00 cash bearing
her signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy.
After several months, no word was heard from either Susan or
appellant. Sensing that something was wrong, Billy decided to
report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan and filed
the complaint against Susan and appellant.13
Dante Lopez testified that he was also introduced by Gary Bustillos
to appellant and Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of
appellant’s travel agency. The two told him that they can send him
and his companions to Guam within the span of three months.14
Lopez paid both accused ₱6,000.00 to process his papers, covered
by a receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing appellant’s signature.15
Appellant’s promise, however, turned sour after three months.
When he confronted appellant, the latter told him that he would be
sent to a different country. Left without a choice, Lopez waited.
Again, the promise remained unfulfilled.16
According to Rogelio Enriquez, he also met appellant during the
town fiesta when Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan
introduced appellant as someone who could send him to work
abroad. Eager about the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave his
₱3,000.00 cash to Susan for the processing of his visa and
employment documents.17 He saw Susan hand the money to
appellant.18 A week later, Rogelio gave an additional ₱900.00 to
Susan.19 No receipts were issued on both payments since Rogelio
failed to complete the required ₱6,000.00 placement fee.20 Months
passed but Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or appellant.
Apprehensive, Rogelio verified the status of the Laogo Travel
Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that
neither of the accused nor Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit
workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with
his six companions, filed the complaint against Susan and
appellant.
Edwin Enriquez also paid ₱12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee
for his application to work in Guam. According to him, Susan’s
husband and appellant were present when he gave the money to
Susan during the town fiesta.21 Susan issued a receipt dated May
16, 2000 to Edwin. The receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel
Consultancy and was signed by Susan with a description which
says "Payment was for Placement Fee."22
Two other persons, namely Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday and Gary
Bustillos, Susan’s nephew, were among the seven who filed the
complaint against Susan and appellant. The two, however, later
decided to withdraw their complaints after executing their
respective affidavits of desistance.23
On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest24 were issued against Susan
and appellant. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.25
Susan, meanwhile, remained at large. An alias warrant of arrest26
was issued by the trial court against her but to no avail.
During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal
activities undertaken by Susan. She insisted that Susan was not in
any way connected with her travel agency and that she confronted
the latter when she came to know of Susan’s recruitment activities.
Appellant claimed that she even had to rename her travel agency
to Renz Consultancy and Employment Services to avoid being
associated with Susan’s recruitment activities.27
Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susan’s house during the
town fiesta, but denied knowing the other complainants. According
to appellant, she came to know Rogelio when Susan specifically
identified him as the one who cooked the dishes after some guests
prodded Susan.28
Unsatisfied with appellant’s explanation, the trial court promulgated
a Decision29 finding her guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The
fallo of the trial court’s July 16, 2002 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Teresita (Tessie) Laogo y
Villamor guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale, she is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 as
imposed by law[;] to indemnify the private offended parties x x x
actual damages, as follows: Teodulo dela Cruz – ₱15,000.00, Billy
dela Cruz – ₱73,000.00, Dante Lopez – ₱6,000.00, Rogelio properly considered, would change the result, we are bound by
Enriquez – ₱3,000.00, and Edwin Enriquez – ₱12,000.00[;] and to said findings.47
pay the costs of the proceedings. Appellant’s contention that she had to change the name of her
In the service of her sentence the said accused, a detention travel agency to disassociate herself with Susan’s recruitment
prisoner, shall be credited with the full time during which she had activities is too lame to deserve serious consideration. In light of
undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of the testimonies of the complainants that appellant with her co-
Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. accused promised them employment abroad, we find appellant’s
Pending the actual apprehension of the other accused Susan act of closing Laogo Travel Consultancy and establishing a new
Navarro, [who is] still at-large, on the strength of the warrant of one under her husband’s name48 as just an afterthought, a belated
arrest earlier issued, let the record be committed to the archives decision which cannot undo the damage suffered by the private
subject to recall and reinstatement, should circumstances so offended parties. It could indeed hardly be construed as a simple
warrant for due prosecution against her of this case. reaction of an innocent person, as it in fact smacks of a desperate
SO ORDERED.30 attempt of a guilty individual to escape liability or to confuse and
Appellant filed an appeal before this Court, but said appeal was dishearten her victims.
transferred to the CA following our pronouncement in People v. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31,
Mateo.31 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664 is
In her Appellant’s Brief32 before the CA, appellant insisted that she AFFIRMED in toto.
had no hand in the recruitment of the complainants and maintains With costs against the accused-appellant.
that the recruitment activities were made solely upon the initiative SO ORDERED.
of accused Susan Navarro.33 Appellant anchored her defense on
the testimonies of the complainants who declared that the
transactions and the payments were made not with her but with
Susan.34 Appellant admitted that her consultancy firm was merely
engaged in the business of assisting clients in the procurement of
passports and visas, and denied that her agency was involved in
any recruitment activity as defined under the Labor Code, as
amended.35
On July 31, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed
decision affirming appellant’s conviction.36 The CA noted that
although at times, it was Susan with whom the complainants
transacted, the records nevertheless bear that appellant had a
hand in the recruitment of the complainants. The CA pointed out
that appellant, together with Susan, repeatedly assured the private
complainants that her consultancy firm could deploy them for
overseas employment,37 leading the appellate court to conclude
that appellant consciously and actively participated in the
recruitment of the complainants.38
Aggrieved, appellant brought the case to us on appeal, raising the
same arguments she had raised at the CA.
We affirm appellant’s conviction.
Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or entity
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.39
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that
recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when
the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons,
individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large
scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a
form of economic sabotage.401avvphi1
But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused,
without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the
distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them
abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with
their money in order to be employed.41 It is important that there
must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the
person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad.42
Here, both the trial court and the CA found that all the five
complainants were promised to be sent abroad by Susan and
herein appellant43 as cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up
transactions between appellant and her victims were done inside
the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the
victims bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy,44 with
two of the said receipts personally signed by appellant herself.45
Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting together made
complainants believe that they were transacting with a legitimate
recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the
authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in
truth and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA.46 Absent any
showing that the trial court and the CA overlooked or
misappreciated certain significant facts and circumstances, which if

5
G.R. No. 214340
PEOPLE OF THE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
GILDA ABELLANOSA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the March 19, 2014 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00179 which affirmed
the September 9, 2002 Joint Decision2 of Branch 38, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, in Criminal Case Nos. 47984, 47985,
47987, 47988, 47989, 47990, and 47991 finding Gilda Abellanosa
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in large scale.
Appellant was charged with Illegal Recruitment in large scale
defined and penalized under Section 6(m) in relation to Section 7,
of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 47984 alleged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 47984
That on or about the 15th day of February, 1997, in the Municipality
of Pavia, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused falsely
representing to possess authority to recruit job applicants for
employment abroad without first having secured the required
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment/Philippine
Overseas Employment [Administration], did then and there willfully,
unlawfully[,] and illegally collect and [receive] from GEPHRE 0.
POMAR the amount of FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (₱5,500.00), Philippine Currency, as partial payment of
processing and placement fees for overseas employment, which
illegal recruitment activities is considered an offense involving
economic sabotage, it being committed in large scale under Sec.
6(m) paragraph 2 of Republic Act [No.] 8042, having committed the
same not only against Gephre O. Pomar but also against seven (7)
others.
CON1RARY TO LA W.3
Except for the date of the commission of the crime, the names of
the private complainants, and the amount purportedly collected
from them, the seven other Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
47985, 47986, 47987, 47988, 47989, 47990, 47991 were similarly
worded as the Information above. The following table provides a
summary of the names of the private complainants and the
amounts collected from them as follows:
(table)
During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges
against her. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: private
complainants Timogen 0. Pastolero (Pastolero), Zeno M.
Cathedral11 (Cathedral), Cecilia L. Orias (Orias), Janet P. Suobiron
(Suobiron), Nenita T. Bueron (Bueron), and Elsie P. Pelipog
(Pelipog). The prosecution also presented Angelica Oriemo
(Oriemo), Atty. Juan Amane (Atty. Amane ), and Benito Agarada
(Agarada). The testimonies of the witnesses established the
following facts: Pastolero, complainant in Criminal Case No. 47985,
testified that on February 15, 1997, he went to the house of Shirley
Tabema (Shirley) in Ungka, Pavia, lloilo, accompanied by his
grandmother, Oriemo, and cousins Pelipog and Gephre Pomar
(Pomar). When appellant arrived at around 12:00 noon, she
introduced herself as a recruiter from Brunei and showed them a
job order and calling card. Swayed by appellant's representations,
Pastolero filled out a bio-data sheet and applied for the position of
janitor. Appellant then asked for ₱5,500.00 as processing fee which
Pastolero's grandmother, Oriemo, paid. Oriemo also paid the same
amount of processing fee for her other grandson, Pomar. However,
appellant did not issue any receipt for the payments she received;
instead, she made assurances that Pastolero and Pomar could
leave for Brunei within two months from the payment of the
processing fee.
When Pastolero submitted additional documents to appellant on
April 1, 1997, the latter advised him to just wait for his visa.
However, after two months, Oriemo informed him that per
appellant, his visa had already expired.
Cathedral, private complainant in Criminal Case No. 47987,
testified that on February 16, 1997, he met appellant at the house
6
of Ernesto Taberna (Ernesto) in Ungka, Pavia, lloilo. Appellant, who
introduced herself as a recruiter of workers for Brunei, showed
Cathedral a job order and a calling card both indicating that
appellant was an Overseas Marketing Director of RTY Skill
Development Corporation. Appellant also represented herself as an
acquaintance of the Labor Attache assigned to Brunei; and that she
was a legitimate recruiter. Beguiled by appellant's representations,
Cathedral submitted his bio-data indicating therein that he was
applying as a cook.
On March 10, 1997, Cathedral gave ₱20,000.00 to appellant as
processing fee. Appellant did not issue any receipt despite demand
but assured him that the receipt would be given after the renewal of
his passport. On June 5, 1997, Cathedral received a photocopy of
his passport from Loida Monterde (Monterde), the secretary of the
appellant. He noticed though that the passport number in the
photocopy was the same as the number in his expired passport.
Cathedral thus asked Monterde to issue a receipt for the money he
paid, but Monterde told him to wait for the appellant. Thereafter, he
did not see the appellant anymore. It was only when he went to the
office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on June 11,
1997 that he came to know that the appellant was not an
authorized recruiter.
Orias, private complainant in Criminal Case No. 47988, testified
that on March 8, 1997, she met the appellant in Brgy. Mainggit,
Badiangan, Iloilo at the house of Shirley. Appellant introduced
herself as a recruiter from Brunei assured her and Suobiron that
she could give them work in Brunei. Orias thus applied for a job as
a waitress. Appellant then asked her to pay ₱25,000.00 as
placement fee and assured her that she would be deployed to
Brunei as soon as she had completed her papers. On April 1, 1997,
Orias gave appellant ₱l0,000.00. She asked for a receipt but the
appellant assured her that the receipt will be issued after full
payment of the placement fees. During the second week of May
1997, Orias, along with her co-applicants, met with appellant to
inquire when they would leave for Brunei. Appellant however told
them that their medical certificates had already expired.
When Orias and her co-applicants met Pelipog, the latter informed
them that she could not leave for Brunei because, according to
appellant, her papers had expired as well. Alarmed by such
development, Pelipog, Orias, and their co-applicants sought the
help of the NBI.
Suobiron, private complainant in Criminal Case No. 47989, testified
that on March 8, 1997, she went to Shirley's house along with
Jennifer Divinagracia (Divinagracia) and Orias where she met
appellant who introduced herself as a recruiter. The following day,
she went back to Shirley's house together with Orias and Bueron
and submitted her bio-data, medical certificate, NBI clearance, and
passport. Suobiron applied as a waitress and paid ₱l0,000.00 of
the ₱25,000.00 placement fee. When asked for a receipt, the
appellant just wrote the amount paid in a notebook since it was
only a partial payment. The full payment was supposed to be paid
in April, 1997 before departing to Brunei. They were not able to pay
the full amount of the placement fee because their visas did not
arrive. According to the appellant the reason for this was their
papers had expired.
Suobiron further testified that when she learned that Pelipog had
filed a complaint against appellant before the NBI, she also lodged
her complaint.1âwphi1
Bueron, private complainant in Criminal Case No. 47990, testified
that on March 8, 1997, she, together with Orias and Suobiron, went
to Shirley's house in Ungka, Pivia, Iloilo to apply for a job in Brunei.
At that time, appellant was also at Shirley's house interviewing
several applicants. Bueron initially applied as a waitress but the
appellant advised her to apply as a domestic helper because of her
height. After the interview, appellant told Bueron to submit her
picture, medical certificate, passport, and NBI clearance, and to
pay the processing fee. Appellant told her that her papers could not
be processed without first paying the processing fee. Thus, on April
1, 1997, Bueron gave ₱5,000.00 to the appellant as processing
fee. Despite submitting all requirements, appellant informed Bueron
that she did not get the job since her papers had expired.
Pe1ipog, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 47991,
testified that together with Orierno, Pomar and Pastolero, they went
to Shirley's house on February 15, 1997 to apply for work in Brunei.
Appellant introduced herself as the principal recruiter of RTY Skills
Development Agency and showed a job order and calling card
bearing her name. During her interview, appellant asked her if she
wanted to leave on the last week of March. Pelipog agreed and
paid processing fee in the amount of ₱12,500.00. When Pelipog
demanded the receipt, the appellant replied, "Why, you don't trust
me?" Thereafter, the appellant required her to submit her NBI
clearance and medical certificate.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the appellant as its sole witness. She
denied meeting any of the private complainants while she was in
Iloilo and maintained that her purpose in going to Iloilo was only to
assist Shirley in processing the latter's business license. Appellant
likewise denied that she received money from the private
complainants; she claimed that it was Shirley who was engaged in
recruitment activities.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of lloilo City, Branch 38 rendered
judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 6(m) in relation to Section 7, of RA 8042
(i1legal recruitment in large scale) in Crim. Case Nos. 47984,
47985, 47987, 47988, 47989, 47990 and 47991 and sentenced her
to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 and actual
damages in the total amount of ₱68,000.00. The RTC held that the
prosecution was able to establish that the appellant engaged in
recruitment activities without a valid license or authority when she
represented herself to private complainants as a recruiter and
promised their deployment abroad after receipt of processing and
placement fees; and that despite all these, the private complainants
were not given work abroad and their placement/processing fees
were not reimbursed. The RTC ruled that the illegal recruitment
was in large scale because it was committed against three or more
persons. The RTC found appellant's defense of denial as a
selt:serving negative evidence which cannot be given greater
weight than the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses.
However, as regards Crim. Case No. 47986, the RTC found that no
sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution hence,
appellant could not be held criminally liable.
The dispositive part of the RTC's Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused GJLDA ABELLANOSA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the violation of Sec. 6(m) in relation to Sec. 7
of RA. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1905, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47984,
47985, 47987, 47988, 47989, 47990 and 47991 and hereby
sentences he serve the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) in each of these
aforementioned criminal cases.
The accused is further ordered to pay actual damages [to] the
following private complainants:
(table)
However, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 47986,
judgment is hereby rendered acquitting her of the crime charged
therein.
The accused is entitled to the privileges under Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 19, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision and held
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, 6 Judicial
Region, Iloilo City, dated September 9, 2002 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 47984, 47985, 47987, 47988, 4 7989, 47990 and 47991 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, appellant elevated her case to
this Court. On February 25, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution14
requiring the submission of Supplemental Briefs. However, both
parties manifested that they would no longer file supplemental
briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their arguments
before the CA.15
Issue
7
The main issue raised by the appellant is whether the trial court
erred in finding that her guilt for the crime charged had been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant maintains that she
never met any of the private complainants during her short stay in
Iloilo. Appellant lays the blame and points to Shirley as the one
engaged in recruitment activities. She insists that she was a mere
visitor in the house of Shirley's mother and thus prays for her
acquittal.
Our Ruling
After a judicious review of the records of the case, we find the
appeal unmeritorious.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement,
viz.:
[A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Recruitment becomes illegal when undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority. Article 38 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment - (a) Any recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code,
to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall
be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement
officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage
and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Corollary to this, Section 6 of RA 8042 defines illegal recruitment as
Follows:
[A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee on non-holder
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, that any such non-licensee or non-holder
who, in any manner offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any
person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority:
xxxx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault Illegal recruitment when committed
by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment x x x is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
We agree with the trial court and the CA that the prosecution was
able to establish that appellant was engaged in illegal recruitment
in large scale. It was proved that appellant was a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad;
she offered or promised employment abroad to private
complainants; she received monies from private complainants
purportedly as placement or processing fees; that private
complainants were not actually deployed to Brunei; that despite
demands, appellant failed to reimburse or refund to private
complainants their monies; and that appellant committed these
prohibited acts against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.
To recall, private complainants Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias,
Suobiron, Bueron, and Pelipog testified that appellant went to
Pavia, Iloilo and represented herself as a recruiter who could send
them to Brunei for work; that appellant impressed upon them that
she had the authority or ability to send them overseas for work by
showing them a job order from Brunei and a calling card; and
appellant collected processing or placement fees from the private
complainants in various amounts ranging from ₱5,000.00 to
₱20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts despite
demands.
In addition, it was proved that appellant does not have any license
or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown
by the certification issued by 1he Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.16
Finally, appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the
minimum of three persons required by law, for illegal recruitment to
be considered in large scale.
Verily, the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty of
large scale illegal recruitment
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalties for illegal
recruitment in large scale as follows:
SEC. 7. PENALTIES -
xxxx
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than one million
pesos (₱l,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein
Provided, however, that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if x
x x committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
In the case at bar, we note that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in each of the seven
cases. Considering however our finding that the offense involved is
illegal recruitment in large scale, it being committed against three
or more persons, the penalty of life imprisonment shall apply
collectively to all seven cases lumped together, and not individually.
The same is true with the accompanying penalty of fine; it must
likewise be imposed collectively on all seven cases lumped
together, not individually. However, instead of fine of ₱500,000.00,
the amount should be increased to Pl million, or the maximum
amount of fine considering that appellant was a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority.17 However, the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, correctly ordered appellant to reimburse to each private
complainant the amount she respectively received from each of
them, save for Elsie Pelipog who should be reimbursed the amount
of ₱12,500.00 as stated in the Information and proved during trial,
and not ₱l2,000.00 as stated in the RTC Joint Decision.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 19, 2014
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CR HC No. 00179 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Gilda Abellanosa
is found GUILTY of illegal recruitment in large scale and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of Pl million, and to reimburse Elsie Pelipog the amount of
₱l2,500.00 instead of ₱l2,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 187160
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ERLINDA A. SISON@ "MARGARITA S. AGUILAR,", Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Erlinda A. Sison (Sison) from the
6 November 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals irtcA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02833. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 8 May 2007
Joint Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 211 (RTC) finding Sison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
(1) violation of Section 6, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act
No. 8042 (RA 8042), or illegal recruitment involving economic
sabotage, and (2) estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
Sometime in November or December 1999, Darvy3 M. Castuera
(Castuera) was introduced to Sison by her husband, a certain Col.
Alex Sison (Col. Sison), a police officer assigned at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Castuera's aunt, Edna Magalona, was then teaching
police officers at Camp Crame and Col. Sison was one of her
students. Col. Sison happened to mention that his wife can
facilitate papers for workers in Australia. Castuera and Magalona
then proceeded to Col. Sison's home in Las Piñas. There, they met
Sison and she briefed Castuera on the requirements for working as
a fruit picker in Australia.4
During that meeting, Sison introduced Castuera to another man
who related that he was able to go to Australia with Sison's help.
She also showed Castuera pictures of other people she had
supposedly helped to get employment in Australia. Sison further
narrated that a couple she had helped had given her their car as
payment. Because of Sison's representations, Castuera believed in
her promise that she could send him to Australia.5
Sison asked Castuera for ₱180,000 for processing his papers. After
some negotiations, Sison agreed to lower the fee to ₱160,000.
Castuera was to pay half before he leaves the Philippines and the
other half will be taken from his salary in Australia.6
On 16 June 2000, Castuera met Sison at McDonald's in SM
Megamall to give the ₱80,000 down payment. Sison issued a
signed document as proof of payment. Castuera's companions, his
aunt Edna Magalona and cousin Mark Magalona, also signed the
document as witnesses. Sison promised Castuera that she would
personally process his visa application.7
Sison, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera.
She told him that it was difficult to get an Australian visa in the
Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia to get one. She also said
that Castuera's Australian visa was already in Malaysia and his
personal appearance was required there.8
On 28 June 2008, Sison and Castuera left Manila for Zamboanga
City by plane and from there, rode a boat to Sandakan, Malaysia.
Sison told Castuera that he only needed to stay in Malaysia for a
week then he would proceed to Australia.9
Twice, they nearly overstayed in Malaysia. Each time, Sison and
Castuera would leave for Brunei, stay there for three days, and
then go back to Malaysia. The second time they returned to
Malaysia, they met several of Sison's other recruits - other Filipinos
who have come in through Thailandas well as Sison' s co-accused,
Rea Dedales (Dedales) and Leonardo Bacomo (Bacomo).
Castuera was told that the group would be proceeding to Indonesia
to process their Australian visas there. The group then left for
Indonesia.However, the day after arriving in Indonesia, Sison went
back to the Philippines, leaving Castuera and the other recruits with
Dedales and Bacomo.10
Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in
Indonesia was denied.11 Dedales said it was harder to get an
Australian visa from Indonesia and told Castuera to apply for a U.S.
visa instead. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his
U.S. visa, which he paid.12 However, when his U.S. visa came,
Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian passport bearing an
Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return
to the Philippines. He asked for his US$1,000 back but Dedales
would not return it. His Philippine passport was also not returned
immediately causing him to overstay in Indonesia. He found out
9
then that the extension papers that Dedales and Bacomo procured
for him were fake.13
Castuera sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Indonesia
and was able to return to the Philippines using his own funds.14
Upon returning to the Philippines, Castuera filed a complaint
against Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo at the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). The agency verified that
Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo did not have any license or permit to
hire and recruit for overseas employment.15
During the trial, Sison denied that she recruited Castuera for
employment. She maintained she was also a victim of illegal
recruitment by Dedales.16 She claimed that it was Dedales, then
working for a travel agency, who was processing her visa and ticket
to Australia. She further claimed that she accepted the down
payment money from Castuera because Dedales was already in
Malaysia at that time. When she and Castuera arrived in Malaysia,
she gave the money to Dedales. Like Castuera, she found out
when they arrived in Malaysia that her Australian visa application
had been denied. She also said that Dedales asked her for an
additional US$ l,000, which she gave.
However, upon learning that it was difficult to get an Australian visa,
Sison opted to go back to the Philippines. When Dedales and
Bacomo informed her that Castuera had been issued a U.S. visa,
Sison supposedly told them to apply the US$1,000 she paid to
Castuera's payment.
The RTC's Joint Decision
In its 8 May 2007 Joint Decision, the RTC found Sison guilty of
illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage and estafa:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused ERLINDA SISON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and hereby
sentences her, thus:
1) In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4035-H for Violation of Section 6 in
relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8042 (Illegal Recruitment-Economic
Sabotage) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment pursuant to
Section 6 (m) of R.A. 8042 in relation to Section 7 (b) thereof and
to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00) as the illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage;
2) In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4036 for Estafa under Article 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to suffer the penalty of four
years, two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim, Darby Castuera,
the sum of Php160,000.00 as actual damages.
In so far as accused Rea Dedales and Leonardo Bacomo are
concerned, who have been fugitives from justice and are not yet
arraigned, let bench warrants issue against them. Accordingly, the
cases against them are ordered archived until such time that they
shall have been arrested and arraigned.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC stated it was clear that Sison convinced Castuera to
apply for employment as fruit picker in Australia and induced him to
pay the fees needed for overseas employment.18
The RTC also held that Castuera was indeed "a victim of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate"19 since it was committed by
a group of three persons acting "in conspiracy" with one another.20
According to the RTC, the conduct of Sison and her co-accused
showed that they acted "in concert towards the accomplishment of
a common felonious purpose which was to recruit [Castuera] for
overseas employment even though they had no license to do so."21
As to the estafa charge, the RTC held that Sison and her co-
accused were also guilty of the same. The RTC pointed out that the
element of deceit was evident in the "false pretenses by which
accused deluded [Castuera] into believing that they ha[ve] the
power and qualifications to send people abroad for employment"
and which induced him to pay them Pll0,000 and us$1,000.22
The RTC also rejected Sison's claim that she was also a victim like
Castuera. The RTC stated that if that were true, then Sison should
have filed a case against the illegal recruiter, but she did not. It also
held that Castuera's positive and categorical testimony prevailed
over Sison's mere denials.23
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Sison appealed the joint decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals.
She maintained that she was also a victim of her co-accused
Dedales24 and that there was "no material and concrete proof that
indeed [she] offered or promised for a fee employment abroad to
two (2) or more persons."25 According to Sison, Castuera merely
sought her out to "enable him to transact with accused Dedales"26
who would facilitate his application for an Australian visa. She
claimed that there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt that her
transaction with Castuera was for recruitment or deployment to
Australia.27
Sison did not dispute her lack of license or authority to conduct
recruitment activities. However, she maintained that the transaction
she facilitated between Castuera and Dedales was "only for the
former to secure a visa, not a working visa." Further, she argued
that the procurement of a visa did not qualify as a "recruitment
activity."28
Sison also contested the ruling that she was guilty of estafa,
claiming that she "did not fraudulently or falsely [represent] herself
to possess the power, capacity or authority to recruit and deploy
[Castuera] for overseas employment."29
In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's joint
decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The decision of the court a quo dated May 8, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.30
The Court of Appeals held that all the elements of illegal
recruitment were sufficiently proven in the case.
First, Sison herself did not dispute that she is not licensed or
authorized to engage in recruitment or placement activities. This
fact was unknown to Castuera at the time of their transaction.31
Second, the Court of Appeals held that even if Sison did not directly
recruit Castuera, her actions led him to believe that she was
engaged in the recruitment business.32 Castuera was able to prove
that it was Sison who promised him a job as fruit picker in Australia
and even accompanied him to Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in
the guise of processing his visa application. However, the Court of
Appeals noted that this process was actually part of "defrauding
[Castuera] and inveigling him with false or fraudulent promises of
employment in a foreign land."33
Further, the Court of Appeals found that Sison made
representations about her purported power and authority to recruit
for employment in Australia and, in the process, collected various.
amounts of money from Castuera as placement and processing
fees.34 The Court of Appeals stated that it was "enough that these
recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to enlist
workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the latter to
tender payment of fees."35
The Court of Appeals further held that the illegal recruitment
activities of Sison and her co-accused constituted economic
sabotage. It underscored that "active participation of each
[accused] in the various phases of the recruitment scam formed
part of a series of machinations" which lured Castuera to part with
his hard earned money in exchange for guaranteed employment in
Australia.36 The Court of Appeals noted that Castuera would not
have gone along with traveling to Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia
and complying with Sison's further demands without the repeated
assurances of the latter.37
The Court of Appeals also affirmed Sison's conviction for estafa. It
held that the two elements of estafa were proven in the case. The
Court of Appeals found that Sison's misrepresentations facilitated
the commission of the crime. Sison deliberately misrepresented
that she had the power, capacity, or means to send Castuera to
Australia. The Court of Appeals concluded that Sison defrauded
Castuera through deceit.38
Sison appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to this Court via a
Notice of Appeal dated 25 November 2008.39
The Issue
The lone issue in this case is whether the guilt of Sison was
established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed, with modification as to the penalty imposed in
the estafa case.
Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate - Economic Sabotage
Under Article 13(b) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
also known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, recruitment and
placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
10
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement."
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand, is defined in Article 38:
Article 38. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT. - (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code. The Department of Labor and Employment
or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this
Article.
xxxx
RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, approved on 7 June 1995, further strengthened the
protection extended to those seeking overseas employment.
Section 6, in particular, extended the activities covered under the
term illegal recruitment:
II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes
referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license
or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines. Provided, that such non-license or
non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater
than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document
in relation to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or
commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a
license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to
quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the
transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and
conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to
employ any worker who has not applied for employment through
his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs
harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of
the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement
vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations
from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may
be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment
contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and
Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to
become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation
engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly on indirectly in
the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers
before departure for monetary or financial considerations other
than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing
rules and regulations;
(1) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined
by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of
their business shall be liable. (Emphasis supplied)
Simply put, illegal recruitment is "committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes."40
Illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or
license holders. Non-license holders are liable by the simple act of
engaging in recruitment and placement activities, while license
holders may also be held liable for committing the acts prohibited
under Section 6 of RA 8042.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits
illegal recruitment for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated
under Section 6 of RA 8042.41
In this case, Sison herself admits that she has no license or
authority to undertake recruitment and placement activities'. The
Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to
others that he or she could send workers abroad for employment,
even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal
recruitment.42
It is the absence of the necessary license or authority to recruit and
deploy workers that renders the recruitment activity unlawful. To
prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that "the accused gave
the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or
ability to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they
were convinced to part with their money for that end."43
On the other hand, illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, as
in the present case, has the following elements: (a) the offender
does not have the valid license or authority required by law to
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender
undertakes any of the "recruitment and placement" activities
defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or engages in any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under now Section 6 of RA 8042;
and (c) the illegal recruitment is "carried out by a group of three or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme."44 In the third element, it "is not essential that there be
actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act.
It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective."45
The acts of Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo show a common purpose
and and each undertook a part to reach their objective. Their
concerted action is evident in that either Sison or Dedales was
receiving payments from the recruits; that Dedales signed the
acknowledgment receipt from Sison; and that the three
accompanied their recruits together in seeking out their visas in
Malaysia and Indonesia. Further, the impression given to Castuera
and other recruits was that the three were indeed working together.
Since it was proven that the three accused were acting in concert
and conspired with one another, their illegal recruitment activity is
considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal
recruitment involving economic sabotage.
Section 7 of RA 8042 sets out the penalty for illegal recruitment
involving economic sabotage:
SEC. 7. PENALTIES -
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than
11
two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than one
million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if
the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age
or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
(Emphasis supplied)
The RTC rejected Sison's claim that she was also a victim of illegal
recruitment. The courts do not look favorably at denial as a defense
since "[d]enial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and
always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and
concocted."46 Denial "does not prevail over an affirmative assertion
of the fact."47
Sison's defense of denial is merely an atte.mpt to avoid liability. The
Court agrees with the RTC's assessment that Sison's claim that
she is also a victim of illegal recruitment has no credence.
It is hard to believe that Castuera would deal with Sison in the
manner that he had if he believed that she was also a mere recruit
like himself. For one thing, there is no proof of Sison' s transactions
with Dedales, except for a handwritten acknowledgment receipt,48
which is only backed up by her own testimony.
Also, if she were a victim, she would have taken action against
Dedales and Bacomo herself. Her husband was a member of the
Philippine National Police. It would have been easy to seek help in
apprehending the illegal recruiters. Sison also failed to explain why
she took no action to recover the ₱100,000 she allegedly paid for
her Australian visa, as well as the money to travel and stay in
Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. >>
Lastly, why would she have allowed, as she claims, the US$1,000
she allegedly paid to be applied to the U.S. visa application of
Castuera, someone she says she hardly knows, instead of trying to
recover the same, considering that Dedales failed to procure the
visa for which she ·paid? All these cast doubt on her claim of being
only a victim of Dedales.
At the very least, Sison gave the impression that she had some
sort of authority, whether or not Dedales is indeed the principal,
which is enough to amount to illegal recruitment. In any case, the
acknowledgment
receipts49 only serve to strengthen the case of conspiracy among
Sison and her coaccused.
Estafa
We affirm Sison's conviction for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be
convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 and
estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the RPC. In People v. Daud, the
Court explained:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction
for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for
estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does
not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It
follows that one's acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, and vice versa.50 (Citations omitted)
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 3 l 5(2)(a)
of the RPC are:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation
as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.51
All these elements are present in this case.
First, Sison misrepresented her qualifications and authority to send
Castuera to work in Australia. She actively made Castuera believe
that she had the ability to do so - she showed pictures of her
"recruits," had one of them give a testimonial, and told him stories
to convince him of such ability. It did not matter that "they had no
agreement"52 that their transaction was for recruitment or
deployment. All her acts were calculated to convince Castuera that
Sison was qualified to send him abroad for employment. It is
enough that she "gave the impression that [she] had the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes."53
Second, Sison's false representation was made prior to or
simultaneous to the commission of the fraud. Sison used these
false representations to convince Castuera that he would be able to
go to Australia and be a fruit picker, just like her other recruits.
These representations were clearly mere devices to convince
Castuera, whom she only met at that time, that she was a
legitimate recruiter.
Third, Castuera relied on Sison's representations. He believed that
she could send him to Australia because of the pictures and
testimonials she showed him. He also relied on the fact that his
aunt knew Sison's husband, a police officer, adding to her
trustworthiness. Sison banked on that trust to convince Castuera to
part with his money and be "recruited" into overseas employment.
Castuera believed that Sison had the same ability to send him to
Australia. He did not even ask for her authority or check for himself
with the POEA, relying instead on her word. This tells us that he
was fully convinced based on Sison's representations.
Fourth, Sison' s misrepresentation resulted in damage to Castuera.
He paid the ₱80,000 down payment that Sison required of him as
processing fee, but the purpose for which it was paid never
materialized. Likewise, said amount was never reimbursed to
Castuera despite his demands for its return.
Penalty
The penalty for illegal recruitment is correct based on Section 7 of
RA 8042. Since the illegal recruitment was committed by a non-
licensee or non- holder of authority, the RTC may rightfully mete
out the maximum penalty. Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC
stands.
The penalty for estafa, however, needs to be modified. Article 315
of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be tenned
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in determining
the penalty for estafa. Under this law, the maximum term is "that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under [the RPC]" and the minimum shall be "within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [RPC] for
the offense."54
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, "the minimum term is
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prision
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months). On the other hand, the maximum term is
taken from the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00,
provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years."55
In People v. Tolentino, the Court further explained:
The range of penalty under Article 315 is composed of only two
periods. To compute the maximum period of the indeterminate
sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods
should be divided into three equal portions, with each portion
12
forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum,
medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty are:
1. Minimum Period - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5
months and 10 days;
2. Medium Period - 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8
months and 20 days;
3. Maximum Period - 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Any incremental penalty, i.e. one year for every P10,000 in excess
of ₱22,000, shall be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years, at the court's discretion, provided the total
penalty does not exceed 20 years.56
To arrive at the correct penalty, the Court must determine the actual
amount defrauded from the victim.
Actual damages must be proven, not presumed.57 It should be
"actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable."58
Based on the evidence and testimony of Castuera, he only paid
₱80,000 as down payment because, under their agreement, the
balance of the placement fee was to be deducted from his salary
when he starts working in Australia. Thus, there is no basis for the
₱160,000. awarded by the RTC.
Based on the foregoing, the minimum penalty should be anywhere
from 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional in its minimum
period to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its
medium period. Thus, the R TC was correct in imposing the
minimum penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
However, the maximum period should be computed as the
maximum period that could be properly imposed under the RPC,
plus the incremental penalty resulting from each additional
₱10,000 in excess of ₱22,000 that was defrauded from the victim.
In this case, the amount is ₱80,000, which means that there must
be five more years of imprisonment added to the maximum period
imposed by the RPC.1âwphi1 Thus, the maximum period should be
13 years of reclusion temporal.
Lastly, Sison is ordered to pay legal interest of 6% per annum on
the amount adjudicated, to be reckoned from the finality of this
Decision until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02833 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4036 for Estafa
under A1iicle 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, appellant
Erlinda A. Sison is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to thirteen
(13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Sison is also
ORDERED to pay Darvy M. Castuera the amount of ₱80,000 as
actual damages, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the finality of this Decision until the amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225730
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JULIA REGALADO ESTRADA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
On appeal is the 20 August 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06771, which affirmed the 5
December 2013 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 10-278205-07 and 10-278208,
finding herein accused-appellant Julia Regalado Estrada (Estrada)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and for three
(3) counts of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
THE FACTS
Estrada was indicted for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and Estafa under four (4) separate Informations, the
inculpatory averments of which read:
Criminal Case No. 10-278205:
That on or about and during the period comprised between
February 2009 and March 2009, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud NOEL SEVILLENA, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations which she made to said NOEL
SEVILLENA prior to and even simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud, to the effect that she had the power and capacity to
recruit and deploy the latter as Master Baker in Dubai, and could
facilitate the processing of pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded
in inducing said NOEL SEVILLANA to give and deliver as in fact he
gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of
PhP61,500.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact, she
did obtain the total amount of PhP61,500.00, which amount once in
her possession, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, and
misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said NOEL SEVILLENA
in the aforesaid total amount of PhP61,500.00, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 10-278206:
That on or about and during the month of March 2009, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud JANICE A. ANTONIO, in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to
said JANICE A. ANTONIO prior to and even simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, to the effect that she had the power
and capacity to recruit and deploy the latter as Service Crew in
Dubai, and could facilitate the processing of pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
induced and succeeded in inducing said JANICE A. ANTONIO to
give and deliver as in fact she gave and delivered to the said
accused the total amount of PhP25,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact, she did obtain the total amount of PhP25,000.00,
which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
misappropriated, and misapplied and converted the same to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
said JANICE A. ANTONIO in the aforesaid total amount of
PhP25,000.00, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 10-278207:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between
April 2009 and May 2009, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud ALBERT M. CORTEZ, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations which she made to said ALBERT M.
CORTEZ prior to and even simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, to the effect that she had the power and capacity to
13
recruit and deploy the latter as waiter in Dubai, and could facilitate
the processing of pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to
meet the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in inducing
said ALBERT M. CORTEZ to give and deliver as in fact he gave
and delivered to the said accused the total amount of
PhP37,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact, she
did obtain the total amount of PhP37,000.00, which amount once in
her possession, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, and
misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said ALBERT M.
CORTEZ in the aforesaid total amount of PhP37,000.00, Philippine
currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 10-278208 (Large Scale Illegal Recruitment):
That on or about and during the period comprised between
February 2009 and May 2009, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully for a
fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
ALBERT M. CORTEZ, NOEL SEVILLENA and JANICE A.
ANTONIO as Waiter, Master Baker and Service Crew, respectively,
in Dubai, without first having secured the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, and
without valid reason and without the fault of the said ALBERT M.
CORTEZ, NOEL SEVILLENA and JANICE A. ANTONIO failed to
actually deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses incurred by
them in connection with their documentation and processing for
purposes of their deployment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 28 September 2010, Estrada, with the assistance of counsel,
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges against her.7
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The three (3) private complainants, Noel Sevillena (Sevillena),
Albert Cortez (Cortez), and Janice A. Antonio (Antonio), testified for
the prosecution. Mildred Versoza, Labor and Employment Officer at
the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA),
was also offered as a witness for the prosecution, but her testimony
was dispensed with in view of the defense's admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the POEA Certification8 stating
that Estrada was not included in the list of employees submitted by
ABCA International Corporation (ABCA) for acknowledgment.9
Their respective testimonies sought to establish that Estrada,
without the necessary license or authority from the POEA, recruited
them for overseas employment for a fee, as follows:
Private complainants separately met Estrada on various dates from
February to April 2009.10 Sevillena was encouraged by his father to
seek the help of Estrada as he knew her to be recruiting for
overseas work;11 Cortez met Estrada through his aunt who also
knew Estrada to be a recruiter for overseas work;12 and Jacinto
came to know Estrada after she chanced upon a tarpaulin
advertisement for overseas work on which Estrada's number and
address were posted.13
During their respective meetings, Estrada represented herself as
having power and authority to deploy persons abroad for overseas
employment.14 Cortez recalled that in their initial meeting, Estrada
told him that she works for Worldview International Corporation
(Worldview), a private recruitment agency for overseas
employment. She later told him, however, that she changed agency
because Worldview's license had expired.15
After their respective meetings, Estrada offered private
complainants various jobs in Dubai. In particular, Sevillena was
offered a job as a baker after he refused the initial job offer in Saudi
Arabia;16 Cortez was offered a job as a waiter;17 and Antonio was
offered a job as a cashier after she refused the first job offer as a
saleslady.18
The private complainants transacted only with Estrada to whom
they submitted all the documents necessary for their overseas
placement and to whom they paid processing, placement, and
other fees.19 Specifically, Sevillena paid ₱8,000.00 as processing
fee and ₱l7,000.00 as placement fee;20 Cortez similarly paid
₱8,000.00 as processing fee and ₱l7,000.00 as placement fee;21
Antonio paid ₱l0,000.00 as processing fee and ₱l5,000.00 as
placement fee.22 In addition to the fees they paid to Estrada, private
complainants alleged incurring other amounts relative to their
overseas placement. Cortez and Antonio paid the said fees
personally to Estrada at her house in Canlubang, Laguna;23 while
Sevillena paid the said fees personally to Estrada at his
godmother's house in Calamba City.24 Estrada did not issue a
single receipt for the said fees.25
Estrada also required the private complainants to submit
themselves to medical examination at the Holy Angel Medical Clinic
(HAMC) in Manila. Again, the private complainants paid the fees for
said medical examination personally to Estrada: Sevillena and
Cortez each paid ₱4,000.00;26 while Antonio paid ₱3,500.00.27 As
in the processing and placement fees, no receipt was issued for the
medical examination fees.28
Estrada further required private complainants, with the exception of
Antonio, to undergo the Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar
(PDOS).29 However, even after undergoing PDOS, payment of the
fees required, and submission of the documentary requirements,
Estrada still failed to deploy them abroad. Estrada repeatedly
promised them that their plane tickets were still being processed.
Estrada, however, failed to deliver on her promised deployment of
the private complainants; thus, they were prompted to file criminal
cases against Estrada.30
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Estrada herself. The defense also
presented as witness Emilia G. Cosmo-an (Cosmo-an), president
of ABCA International Corporation (ABCA), another recruitment
agency for deployment abroad. In the course of Cosmo-an's
testimony, however, the defense moved to declare her as a hostile
witness, but the trial court did not act on the said motion.31 Their
respective testimonies are as follows:
Estrada came to know the private complainants when they
separately went to her house and asked her help for them to work
abroad.32 Estrada insisted that she merely mentioned ABCA and
Worldview to the private complainants because she knew their
respective owners.33 She explained that prior to her meeting with
the private complainants, she worked as a secretary at a military
hospital in Riyadh; that the owner of Worldview, Madam Juico, was
her friend; that she also knew the owner of ABCA because the
owner's daughter was her former co-worker at the Riyadh hospital;
and that the complainants went first to Worldview where they got
her number.34
Estrada denied that her mobile number was posted on a tarpaulin
advertisement for work abroad. She alleged that what was posted
on the tarpaulin is the number of Worldview, and that the owner of
Worldview merely gave Antonio her number.35 She admitted that
Antonio indeed went to her house but averred that the latter merely
asked if she knew the owner of Worldview, to which she answered
in the affirmative as Worldview is the agency which handles her
documents every time she departs abroad for work. Antonio then
left and went to Worldview.36 Thereafter, Antonio's husband
info1med her that Antonio and her friends had already submitted
their applications to ABCA.37
With respect to Sevillena and Cortez, Estrada averred that the two
went to her house, together with their aunt,38 to ask if she could
deploy workers abroad to which she answered in the negative.
While in her house, Sevillena and Cortez met Antonio. The three
went to ABCA together.39
Estrada learned later from Sevillena and Cortez's aunt, as well as
from the owner of ABCA, that the two had already submitted their
requirements to ABCA.40 She also learned that despite completing
all the requirements, the two failed to depart because, according to
Cortez, they did not sign the contract because of the low salary
offered.41 Subsequently, Sevillena and Cortez went to her house to
ask for the return of the money they paid to ABCA. She insisted
that she did not receive any money from the private complainants
and that she did not recruit them for overseas work.42
On her part, Cosmo-an testified that she did not really know
Estrada having talked to her only once. She recalled that she met
Estrada at the parking lot of her office sometime in March 2010.
Estrada followed her and asked help for her relatives who were
looking for work abroad, to which she responded that she may be
able to help if there was a job order.43 Estrada returned to ABCA's
office later but they were not able to talk.44
14
Cosmo-an also denied that her agency received money from the
private complainants and claimed that her agency never required
applicants to pay placement and other fees.45 She insisted that
Estrada was not and has never been connected with ABCA in any
capacity.46 In fact, after she heard unpleasant rumors about
Estrada, she placed a newspaper ad/notice on 27 April 2010 that
Estrada was not and had never been connected with ABCA.47
Cosmo-an further denied knowing any of the private complainants.
48
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, the RTC found Estrada guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three
(3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish Estrada's guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It noted
that the certification from the POEA confirmed that Estrada had
never been licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. This fact, coupled with her pretenses that she had the
ability or influence to recruit private complainants for work in Dubai
clearly made her liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
against Julia Regalado Estrada, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 10278208, for the offense Illegal
Recruitment in a large scale, the Court finds accused Julia
Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the said
offense and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalties of Life
Imprisonment and Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 10278205, for the crime of Estafa (Under
Art. 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code) the Court finds accused
Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of Four (4) years Two (2) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Six (6)
years Eight (8) months and Twenty Five (25) days of prision mayor
minimum as maximum.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify private complainant Noel
Sevillena the amount of Twnety Nine Thousand Pesos
(₱29,000.00) representing the accused's civil liability therefor;
3. In Criminal Case No. 10278206, for the crime of Estafa (Under
Art. 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code) the Court finds accused
Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of Four (4) years Two (2) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Six (6)
years Eight (8) months and Twenty Five (25) days of prision mayor
minimum as maximum.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify private complainant Janice A.
Antonio the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00)
representing the accused's civil liability therefor;
4. In Criminal Case No. 10278207, for the crime of Estafa (Under
Art. 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code) the Court finds accused
Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of Four (4) years Two (2) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Six (6)
years Eight (8) months and Twenty Five (25) days of prision mayor
minimum as maximum.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify private complainant Albert M.
Cortez the amount of Twenty-Nine Thousand Pesos (₱29,000.00)
representing the accused's civil liability therefor.
SO ORDERED.49
Aggrieved, Estrada filed a Notice of Appeal.50
The CA Ruling
In its appealed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The
appellate court ruled that private complainants' categorical and
unequivocal avowal that Estrada promised and assured them of
work in Dubai, and their positive identification of Estrada as the
person who recruited and demanded payment from them naturally
prevails over her defense of denial. As such, the trial court aptly
ruled that the prosecution evidence convincingly demonstrated the
presence of the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale.
The appellate court further opined that a person who commits
illegal recruitment may be charged with and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under R.A. No. 8042, in relation to the Labor
Code; and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
Thefallo of the appealed CA decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
5 December 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47
in Criminal Case Nos. 10-278205-07 and 10-278208, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.51
Hence, this appeal.
THE ISSUE
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED IN
FINDING ESTRADA GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN
LARGE SCALE AND THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF THESE CRIMES BY PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE COURT'S RULING
The appeal lacks merit.
Elements constituting illegal
recruitment in large scale
sufficiently established
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority as
contemplated under Article 13(f) of the Labor Code, shall mean any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, procuring workers, and including referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit
or not.
Further, to sustain a conviction for illegal recruitment under R.A.
No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, the prosecution must
establish two (2) elements: first, the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and second, the offender
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of recruitment
and placement defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or any of
the prohibited practices enumerated under Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042.52 Further, in case the illegal recruitment was committed in
large scale, a third element must be established, that is, the
offender commits the illegal recruitment activities against three or
more persons, individually or as a group.53
The Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish
the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale.1awp++i1
First, it is not disputed that Estrada is not licensed or authorized to
recruit workers for overseas placement. During the trial, the
defense admitted the POEA Certification which stated that Estrada
is not included among the list of employees submitted by ABCA for
POEA acknowledgment. Therefore, Estrada is not authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment. This fact was not denied
by Estrada in her defense anchored only on the allegation that she
did not recruit the private complainants but merely mentioned
ABCA and Worldview to them.
Second, the prosecution was able to establish that Estrada
unlawfully engaged in activities which refer to recruitment and
placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of
R.A. No. 8042. Specifically, the prosecution was able to sufficiently
demonstrate that Estrada promised and recruited private
complainants for employment abroad for a fee.
This is amply supported by the testimonies of the private
complainants who categorically testified that Estrada promised
them employment and placement in Dubai as baker, waiter, and
cashier. More particularly, the private complainants positively
identified Estrada as the person with whom they transacted relative
to their alleged deployment to Dubai; the person who instructed
them to complete the documents necessary for their deployment
and to undergo medical examination; the person to whom they
submitted these documents; and the person to whom they directly
paid the processing, placement, medical examination, and other
fees.
It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including
their assessment of the witnesses' credibility, especially when the
CA affirmed such findings, are entitled to great weight and respect
by this Court.54 Further, in the absence of any evidence that the
15
prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the
trial court's assessment with respect to their credibility shall not be
interfered with by this Court.55 Thus, between the positive
identification and categorical testimony by the private complainants
and Estrada's unsubstantiated and uncorroborated denial, the
Court finds the former more credible.
Finally, it is clear that Estrada committed illegal recruitment
activities against the three (3) private complainants. Thus, the trial
and appellate courts properly convicted Estrada of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale.
Elements constituting Estafa
sufficiently established
The Court also sustains Estrada's conviction for three (3) counts of
estafa under Article 3l5(2)(a) of the RPC.
A conviction for illegal recruitment whether simple or committed in
large scale would not preclude punishment for estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the RPC.56 This is because no double jeopardy could
attach from the prosecution and conviction of the accused for both
crimes considering that they are penalized under different laws and
involved elements distinct from one another. Conviction under
Article 315(2)(a) requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a
third party, suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation. These are elements completely different from those
required for illegal recruitment.57
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that Estrada committed three
(3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, which
states that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
In this case, testimonial evidence established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that Estrada falsely represented herself as
possessing power to deploy persons for overseas placement. By
these pretenses, Estrada deceived the private complainants into
believing that she would provide them their desired jobs in Dubai.
This active representation of having the capacity to deploy the
private complainants abroad despite not having the authority or
license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit - the first
element of estafa. Moreover, because of her assurances, the
private complainants parted with their money in order to pay
Estrada the various fees which they thought were necessary for
their deployment abroad resulting in damage to each of the private
complainants - the second element of estafa.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the elements of estafa as
charged have been established. Thus, the Court affirms Estrada's
conviction for three (3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a).
Penalties
Section 6(m) of R.A. No. 8042 considers illegal recruitment in large
scale as an offense involving economic sabotage. In this regard,
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos (₱l,
000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall commit
illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court's imposition of the
penalties of life imprisonment and payment of fine in the amount of
₱500,000.00 upon Estrada.
The Court, however, modifies the penalties imposed by the trial
court with respect to the three (3) counts of estafa in view of the
enactment of R.A. No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount
or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending
for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised
Penal Code" as Amended and became effective on 17 September
2017. As its title suggests, R.A. No. 10951 updated to the present
monetary values some felonies listed in the RPC which penalties
are dependent on the amount or value of damage involved, thereby
effectively reducing the penalties for certain crimes, such as estafa.
Section 85 of R.A. No. 10951 modified Article 315 of the RPC in of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to indemnify private
this wise, to wit: complainant Albert M. Cortez the amount of Twenty-Four Thousand
SEC. 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act Pesos (₱24,000.00).
No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree SO ORDERED.
No. 818, is hereby further amended as follows:
"ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000.00) but
does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱4,400,000.00), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos
(₱2,000,000.00); but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
"2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over One million two
hundred thousand pesos (₱l,200,000.00) but does not exceed Two
million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000.00);
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000.00) but does not exceed One million two
hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000.00); and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does
not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00), xxx"
In this case, the prosecution proved that Estrada's fraud resulted in
the damage to Sevillena, Antonio, and Cortez in the respective
amounts which did not exceed ₱40,000.00. Thus, applying the
penalties under Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by Section 85
of R.A. No. 10951, Estrada should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period for each count of
estafa.
The Court further modifies the sums awarded to Cortez and
Antonio. With respect to Cortez, he testified that Estrada paid
₱5,000.00 as partial reimbursement for the amounts he paid to her.
58 This amount shall thus be deducted from his total monetary

award. As regards Antonio, it would seem that the trial court failed
to consider the ₱3,500.00 she had paid to Estrada for her medical
examination. The trial court may have overlooked that Sevillena
and Cortez had each paid for their medical examination which
amounts were not deducted from the final monetary awards. Thus,
the total monetary awards to the private complainants shall be as
follows: ₱29,000.00 for Sevillena; ₱28,500.00 for Antonio; and
₱24,000.00 for Cortez.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. The 20 August 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CAG. R. CR-H.C. No. 06771, which affirmed the 5 December
2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, in
Criminal Case Nos. 10- 278205-07 and 10-278208, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 10278208, the Court finds accused-
appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale.
She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 10278205, the Court finds accused-
appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentences her to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to indemnify private
complainant Noel Sevillena the amount of Twenty-Nine Thousand
Pesos (₱29,000.00);
3. In Criminal Case No. 10278206, the Court finds accused-
appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentences her to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to indemnify private
complainant Janice A. Antonio the amount of Twenty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱28,500.00);
4. In Criminal Case No. 10278207, the Court finds accused-
appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentences her to suffer the penalty

16
G.R. No. 229712
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
DELIA C. MOLINA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 14, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05977, affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
137, finding accused-appellant Delia C. Molina guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
On December 21, 2007, accused-appellant Delia C. Molina and
Juliet Pacon were charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale in an Information2 that reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses DELIA C. MOLINA and
JULIET PACON of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale,
defined and penalized under Section[s] 6 and 7 of Republic Act No.
8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995),
committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime in the months of April 2006 to
September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit for a fee, promise employment/job placement
abroad to five (5) persons, hence, committed in large scale, and
received payments from complainants, to wit:
MARIA C. LUYA – ₱75,000.00
GILBERT B. UBINA - 130,000.00
WILFREDO I. LOGO - 100,000.00
BENJAMIN B. DELOS SANTOS - 75,000.00
MAYLEN S. BOLDA - 70,000.00
in connection with the documentation and processing of their
papers for purposes of their deployment, but said accused failed or
refused to deploy herein complainants abroad without the fault of
the latter and to reimburse the above-enumerated amounts to said
complainants, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The case proceeded only against accused-appellant Delia C.
Molina, as co-accused Juliet Pacon was at-large. When arraigned
on April 7, 2009, accused Delia C. Molina pleaded not guilty.4 After
pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses the five private
complainants and Eraida Dumigpi, Senior Labor and Deployment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). On the other hand, the defense presented accused-
appellant Delia C. Molina as its lone witness.
Prosecution witness Wilfredo I. Logo, from Baliwag, Bulacan,
testified that in May 2006, he was referred by a certain Lita to Juliet
Pacon of Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corporation,
a recruitment agency, to apply for a job in Korea as a factory
worker. At the agency, he met Juliet Pacon who discussed with him
the work in Korea, the placement fee and the salary of Nine
Hundred Won, or about ₱45,000.00. He was told to pay half of the
placement fee, and once there is a job order, he was told to pay the
remaining balance. For this job application, he paid the agency
through Pacon, in cash and on installment basis, the total sum of
₱l00,000.00 on the following dates: (1) May 22, 2006 –₱3,000.00;
(2) May 23, 2006-₱7,000.00; (3) August 29, 2006 – ₱60,000.00;
and (4) September 14, 2006 – ₱30,000.00, all covered by cash
vouchers.5 The payments were all received by Juliet Pacon as
shown by her signature on the cash vouchers. Years passed. and
despite compliance with all the requirements of the agency, the
promised deployment did not materialize. Logo entertained doubt
as to his deployment abroad. He went back and forth to the agency,
but Pacon already went into hiding and could not be located. He
then went to the POEA and discovered that the agency had no job
order for Korea. He got confirmation that accused Molina was the
President of the agency as reflected in the POEA Certification6
dated July 13, 2011. Thereafter, he filed a complaint against Molina
and executed in support thereof his affidavit.7
Logo positively identified accused Molina as the owner of the
agency. He came to know accused Molina not only because Pacon
introduced her as the owner of the agency, but also because he
frequently saw Molina in her office in the agency everytime he went
17
there and paid his placement fee between the months of April to
September 2006.8 He was able to talk to accused Molina who
assured him of his deployment abroad.9
The second witness, Gilbert Ubiña, a resident of Cubao, Quezon
City, testified that in June 2006, his Auntie Lita accompanied him to
the agency located in Makati City to apply for a job abroad. At the
agency, he talked to Juliet Pacon who discussed with him the
requirements of the job order for a factory worker in South Korea
such as visa, passport, medical certificate; training and the
payment of ₱130,000.00 as placement fee. He paid the placement
fee in two installments: (1) ₱l0,000.00 on June 9, 2009; and (2)
₱120,000.00 on July 13, 2006, both evidenced by cash vouchers.10
The payments were received by Pacon in behalf of the agency as
evidenced by her signature on the cash vouchers of the agency. He
was assured by both accused Molina and Pacon of a monthly
salary of ₱45,000.00, but the promised job was not attained. Upon
inquiry from the POEA, he found out that there was no job order for
the agency. He also learned that accused Molina was the owner of
the agency.
In open court, Ubiña positively identified accused Molina,11 who
advised him and other applicants to complete all their requirements
for their immediate deployment to Korea where allegedly there
were many jobs waiting for them.
The third witness, Benjamin Delos Santos, a resident of San Juan
City, testified that in February 2006, he went to the agency,
Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corporation, located in
Palanan, Makati City, and applied as a factory worker in South
Korea. At the agency, he talked to Juliet Pacon who told him that he
would earn US$900.00 per month, and that he could leave
immediately upon submission of the requirements such as NBI
clearance, resume, pictures and a placement fee of ₱75,000.00.
He paid the placement fee in two installments: (1) ₱l0,000.00 on
April 26, 2006; and (2) ₱65,000.00 on May 8, 2006.12 Although he
complied with all the requirements, the agency failed to deploy him.
Thus, he went to the POEA where he found out that accused
Molina, whom he identified in open court,13 did not have any job
orders, and that Pacon was not licensed to get workers for
deployment abroad. Despite his demand for the return of his
money, he only received promises, but his money was never
returned.14 Then he filed a complaint and executed his affidavit.15
The fourth witness, Maylen Bolda, a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila, testified that she gave ₱70,000.00 to Juliet Pacon in
connection with her application for employment in South Korea.
She paid in two installments: (1) ₱10,000.00 on April 12, 2006; and
(2) ₱60,000.00 on April 26, 2006.16 Like her co-applicants, the
payments were evidenced by vouchers signed by Pacon. Upon
receipt of the money, Pacon told her to complete all the
requirements, which she did through the submission of the
payment, medical result, NBI clearance and pictures. Pacon
assured her that she would be able to depart for Korea as soon as
she completes the requirements. She was also able to talk to
accused Molina, who was introduced by Pacon to her as the owner
of the agency. As the promised employment did not materialize,
she demanded for the return of the money she paid, but only her
passport was given back to her. She positively identified accused
Molina in open court. Molina acknowledged that she was the owner
of the agency and she assured Bolda of her employment abroad.
The fifth witness, Maria Luya, from Lemery, Batangas, testified that
in April 2006, she came to know both accused Pacon and Molina
when she applied with the agency for a job in South Korea, upon
referral of her older sister who was in Korea. At the agency, she
met Pacon who was assigned as her recruiter. She also saw
accused Molina, who Pacon said was the President of the
company and that she does not talk with applicants as there are
recruiters for them. Pacon told her that there were job orders
already, so she had to pay and complete the requirements because
in a few months, she could leave for South Korea as a factory
worker. She submitted the required documents such as NBI
clearance, resume, photocopies of passport, birth certificate,
medical certificate, and identification pictures. She paid to Pacon
the processing fee of ₱75,000.00 in two installments: (1)
₱l0,000.00 on April 17, 2006 and (2) ₱65,000.00 on May 2, 2006.17
Despite submission of all the requirements of the agency, the
promised deployment did not materialize, so she went back and
forth to the agency many times to demand for the return of her
money, but to no avail. Based on the Certification18 dated July 20,
2007 issued by the POEA, she found out that while the agency was
registered, it did not have any job order, and that the agency was in
the name of accused Molina who told her and her co-applicants to
just wait as there were job orders already and that in a few months,
they would be able to go abroad and that their papers were already
being processed.
The last prosecution witness, Eraida Dumigpi, Senior Labor
Deployment Officer of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, identified
the two certifications19 dated July 13, 2011 and September 8, 2011
as having been issued by her office. She likewise confirmed and
affirmed the contents of both certificates, which stated that the
Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corporation,
represented by Ms. Delia C. Molina, President, was a private
recruitment agency whose license expired on March 31, 2007 and
was cancelled on May 30, 2008.
The defense presented as its lone witness the accused, Delia C.
Molina. Molina admitted that she was the former President of the
Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corporation, which was
a duly licensed recruitment agency established on March 31, 2006
as evidenced by the provisional license20 issued by the POEA. The
agency was not able to do its business for failure to submit the
requirements of the POEA, i.e., to submit new job orders. She
traveled abroad to look for such job orders. She departed from the
Philippines on May 21, 200621 as stamped on her passport.22 She
went to Egypt23 and on June 25, 2006, she went to Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia24 where she was able to obtain a new job order. The
suspension order against the agency was lifted on July 31, 2006,
and the agency started its operation on August 6, 2006 (but no
documents were marked and offered to this effect). During the time
that she was out of the country, from May 21, 2006 to June 29,
2006, her former secretary Angelita Palabay took charge of the
agency. She stated that co-accused Juliet Pacon had no relation to
her or to the agency in any capacity as Pacon was a total stranger
to her and had no authority to act for the agency. It was only in the
hearing of this case that she learned of the name Juliet Pacon.
Moreover, she has not met personally all the private complainants
in this case.
On cross-examination, accused Molina admitted that there were
about 100 cases of illegal recruitment filed against her in different
courts and that she was convicted of illegal recruitment in the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 148 and Branch 150 where the complainants
were illegally recruited for South Korea. She denied the recruitment
of private complainants and the payments made by them in this
case, more so, the cash vouchers showing such payments.
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision25 dated January 16, 2013, the trial court found
accused Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
The trial court held:
x x x [T]he crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is generally
committed when the following elements concur, to wit: (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
one to engage lawfully in recruitment and placement of workers; (2)
he or she undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
recruitment and placement as defined thereunder in relation to
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (3) that
the accused commits the acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group. In addition thereto, and more apt to the
case at bar, even if one is a licensee or holder of authority, he or
she will still be deemed liable for illegal recruitment in large scale if
he or she commits any of the defined acts under Section 6 of R.A.
8042.
After going over the pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence of the prosecution, vis-a-vis the defense of general denial
by the accused, this court finds that all the requisite elements
necessary to sustain a judgment of conviction for the defense of
illegal recruitment in large scale were established during the trial.
The attendance of the first element - that is, absence of a valid
license or authority to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers - is supported by the POEA certifications
and further bolstered and strengthened by the testimony at the
witness [stand] of Eraida Dumigpi, Senior Labor Deployment
Officer from the Licensing Branch of the POEA. The second
18
element pertaining to the performance of activities within the
meaning of recruitment and placement as defined under Section 6
of R.A. 8042 is substantiated by the testimonies of private
complainants Luya, Ubiña, Logo, Delos Santos and Bolda. The
third element is evident from the number of complainants, in the
instant case herein five (5) complainants, against whom the
accused committed illegal recruitment.26
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the prosecution having
established the guilt of accused Delia C. Molina beyond reasonable
doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused as
principal of large scale illegal recruitment and she is sentenced to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00), plus cost of suit. Accused Delia C. Molina is
further ordered to pay the following complainants the amounts
opposite their names as actual or compensatory damages, to wit:
1. Maria C. Luya – ₱75,000.00
2. Gilbert B. Ubiña – ₱l30,000.00
3. Wilfredo L. Logo – ₱l00,000.00
4. Benjamin B. Delos Santos – ₱75,000.00
5. Maylen S. Bolda – ₱70,000.00
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of filing this criminal case, February 7, 2008, until the amount
shall have been fully paid.
The case against co-accused Juliet Pacon is ordered ARCHIVED,
with standing alias warrant of arrest dated September 6, 2012.
SO ORDERED.27
The accused-appellant appealed the Decision of the RTC to the
Court of Appeals, raising this assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.
Before the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant professed her
innocence, arguing that while she \Vas the President of Southern
Cotabato Landbase Management Services, a duly licensed
recruitment agency, she never recruited or promised private
complainants any work in South Korea. She had no contractual
obligations or duty to deploy them for employment abroad. It was
accused Juliet Pacon who recruited and promised employment in
South Korea to private complainants. In fact, it was Pacon who
received private complainants' payments. Thus, considering that
she never demanded or received any amount from private
complainants as placement fee or other incidental expenses in
relation to their purported deployment, she had no contractual
obligation to reimburse any amount of money to them due to
accused Pacon's failure to deploy them abroad. Accused-appellant
asserted that there was no direct evidence that she gave private
complainants the impression that she had the power or ability to
send them abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to
part with their money in order to be employed. In fact, she had no
participation in the transactions between the private complainants
and accused Pacon. Hence, the charge of illegal recruitment
against her has no leg to stand on.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 14, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,28
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision is
AFFIRMED en toto.29
The Court of Appeals did not give credence to accused-appellant's
allegation that she neither knew Juliet Pacon nor authorized Pacon
to act in behalf of the agency, because the transactions happened
in her office. Moreover, private complainants identified accused-
appellant as the President of the agency. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court's findings that the elements of the crime
charged are present in this case. It found no reversible error on the
part of the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
Thereafter, the case was certified and the entire records thereof
were elevated to this Court for review.
In lieu of filing their respective Supplemental Briefs, the parties
manifested to the Court that they were adopting their respective
Appellee's Brief and Appellant's Brief filed with the Court of Appeals
for the instant appeal.
The issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale.
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals with
modification.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," defines illegal recruitment in
Section 6 thereof, thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided,
That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the
following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) xx x
xx xx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed
by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of
their business shall be liable.30
In this case, the provisional license31 granted by the POEA to the
recruitment agency Southern Cotabato Landbase Management
Corporation, of which accused-appellant was the President, was
valid from March 31, 2006 to March 31, 2007. On May 31, 2006,
Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, Administrator of the POEA Licensing
and Regulation Office, issued an Order32 stating that the license of
Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corporation "is hereby
suspended effective immediately for non-compliance with its
undertaking to submit requirements within 30 days from the date of
issuance of its license as a landbased agency, pursuant to Section
16, Rule IV, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations."
Accused-appellant testified that she travelled abroad, particularly to
Egypt and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to look for job orders, and
these trips were reflected on her passport. She .stated that she
obtained a new job order in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; hence, the
suspension order against the agency was lifted on July 31, 2006
(but no documentary evidence was submitted to support her
allegation) and that the agency started operating again on August
6, 2006. Based on a Certification33 dated September 8, 2011
issued by the POEA, the license of Southern Cotabato Landbase
Management Corporation expired on March 31, 2007 and the
license was cancelled on May 30, 2008.
The testimonies of private respondents and the records show that:
(1) private complainants Wilfredo Logo, Maylen Bolda and Maria
Luya applied at the recruitment agency for employment in South
Korea and paid for their respective placement/processing fee when
the agency's provisional license was already issued; (2) Benjamin
Delos Santos applied before the issuance of the provisional license
but paid the placement fee when the provisional license was
already issued, and (3) Gilbert Ubiña's application and payments
were made after the agency's license was suspended and before it
was alleged lifted on July 31, 2000, but before the agency's license
expired on March 31, 2007. Hence, it appears that the recruitment
agency, which accused-appellant headed, was a licensee or holder
of authority when the recruitment of private complainants was
made as the agency's license expired on March 31, 2007.
19
Nevertheless, accused-appellant is still liable under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 8042, which provides:
x x x [Illegal recruitment] shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-
holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xx xx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault.34
As the trial court stated:
Although it might be argued by the accused that her license/
authority as a private recruitment agency expired only in March
2007, and cancelled only in May 2008, and as such during the
period of time material to the instant criminal indictment she would
seem to be possessed of the requisite license and authority to
recruit, still, accused Molina cannot escape liability for the offense
charged because of her failure to reimburse to private
complainants the expenses they incurred in connection with the
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment when
her agency, and of which she is the President, failed to actually
deploy them without the private complainants' fault. The existence
of a valid license at the commencement of the recruitment process
will not justify an acquittal, for the provision and mandate of the
special law violated is clear, categorical and specific on this point.35
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant
cannot escape from liability for large scale illegal recruitment on the
ground that she did not recruit private complainants and participate
in their transactions with Juliet Pacon to whom complainants made
their payments, as the recruitment was made in the recruitment
agency of which accused-appellant is the President. Moreover,
private complainants Logo, Ubiña, Bolda and Luya testified that
they saw accused-appellant at the agency and she was introduced
to them by Pacon as the owner of the agency, and she even
assured them that they would be deployed for employment soon.
Private respondent Delos Santos also testified that he saw
accused-appellant at the agency and Pacon told him that she was
the boss and owner of the agency. Further, the cash vouchers,36
evidencing the payments made by private complainants to Pacon,
contained the name of the recruitment agency or its office address
in Makati City, showing that it was received by Pacon in behalf of
the agency whose President was accused-appellant. As stated by
the trial court:
To the mind and appreciation of this Court, it is of no moment that
in the cash vouchers evidencing payments of the placement fee by
all five (5) private complainants, the name of accused Molina did
not appear and all were paid to and accepted not by her, but by her
alleged agent, co- accused Juliet Pacon who remains at large to
date. Scrutiny of these vouchers, however, would show that all
payments were in the name of Southern Cotabato Landbase
Management Services, the private recruitment agency owned,
managed and presided by accused Molina. As held in the case of
People v. Crispin Billaber y Matbanua, "[T]he absence of receipts to
evidence payment to the recruiter would not warrant an acquittal, a
receipt not being fatal to the prosecution's cause." The clear,
categorical and straightforward testimonies of the private
complainants pertaining to the assurances given by accused
Molina herself about the existence of job orders in South Korea, the
certainty of deployment for work abroad upon completion of all the
requirements - which includes the payment of the placement fees --
and her subsequent failure to deploy them and return the money
paid by the private complainants have only been met and
controverted by a general denial by the accused. Such· negative
assertion, definitely pales in comparison to the affirmative
testimonies of the private complainants.37
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirm those of
the trial court, are binding on the Court. The Court may revise such
findings only when the accused-appellant convincingly
demonstrates that such findings were erroneous, or biased, or
unfounded, or incomplete, or unreliable, or conflicted with the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,38 which has not been
demonstrated by the accused-appellant in this case.
Under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042, illegal
recruitment "is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group," and
"[i]llegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage." Thus, the offense charged in the Information is illegal
recruitment in large scale because it was committed against the
five private complainants.
Moreover, Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042 provides that
in case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be liable. Accused-
appellant, as President of the recruitment agency, is therefore liable
for illegal recruitment in large scale for failure to reimburse the
expenses incurred by private complainants in connection with their
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment to
South Korea, which did not actually take place without their fault
under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8042 provides for the penalties for illegal
recruitment as follows:
SEC. 7. Penalties. -
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than
Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than One million
pesos (₱l,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.1avvphi1
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if
the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age
or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.39
Since illegal recruitment in large scale is an offense involving
economic sabotage under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No.
8042, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the
trial court imposing upon accused-:-appellant the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 under Section 7 (b) of R.A.
No. 8042. Although R.A. No. 10022, which took effect on May 7,
2010, amended the fine under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042 and
increased it to "not less than Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) nor
more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00) x xx if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage," the said amendment
does not apply in this case because the offense was committed in
2006, before the amendment took effect in May 2010.
The Court of Appeals also correctly affirmed the ruling of the trial
court ordering accused-appellant to reimburse to each of the
private complainants the amount she respectively received from
each of them, but the imposition of interest on the actual damages
awarded should be modified as computed from the date of finality
of the judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.
The Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated January 14, 2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05977,
sustaining the Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 137,
finding accused-appellant Delia C. Molina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and imposing
on her the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering her to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), plus cost of
suit, and to pay actual damages to private complainants as follows:
Maria C. Luya – ₱75,000.00
Gilbert B. Ubifia – ₱130,000.00
Wilfredo I. Logo – ₱100,000.00
Benjamin B. Delos Santos – ₱75,000.00
Maylen S. Bolda – ₱70,000.00
with interest on the actual damages awarded at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum with the modification that the said interest
imposed on the actual damages shall be computed from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

20
G.R. No. 179532 May 30, 2011
CLAUDIO S. YAP, Petitioner,
vs.
THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated February 28, 2007, which
affirmed with modification the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) resolution3 dated April 20, 2005.
The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
[Petitioner] Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the
vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.
The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt.
Francisco B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for
a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T
SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or
about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about
the sale on 06 December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento.
Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the
Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.
They were also informed about the Advisory sent by Capt.
Constatinou, which states, among others:
" …PLEASE ASK YR OFFICERS AND RATINGS IF THEY WISH
TO BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER VESSELS AFTER VESSEL S
DELIVERY (GREEK VIA ATHENS-PHILIPINOS VIA MANILA…
…FOR CREW NOT WISH TRANSFER TO DECLARE THEIR
PROSPECTED TIME FOR REEMBARKATION IN ORDER TO
SCHEDULE THEM ACCLY…"
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus
along with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the
payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-
month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment
of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally
dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for
immediate transfer but none was made.
[Respondents], for their part, contended that Yap was not illegally
dismissed. They alleged that following the sale of the M/T
SEASCOUT, Yap signed off from the vessel on 10 November 2001
and was paid his wages corresponding to the months he worked or
until 10 November 2001 plus his seniority bonus, vacation bonus
and extra bonus. They further alleged that Yap’s employment
contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no
arrangement was made for Yap’s transfer to Thenamaris’ other
vessels.4
Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal
Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract.
Subsequently, he filed an amended complaint, impleading Captain
Francisco Adviento of respondents Intermare Maritime Agencies,
Inc. (Intermare) and Thenamaris Ship’s Management
(respondents), together with C.J. Martionos, Interseas Trading and
Financing Corporation, and Vulture Shipping Limited/Stejo Shipping
Limited.
On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision5 in favor of petitioner,
finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed
by respondents. Moreover, the LA found that respondents acted in
bad faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation and
required him to produce an electrician certificate during the period
of his contract, but actually he was not able to board one despite of
respondents’ numerous vessels. Petitioner made several follow-ups
for his re-embarkation but respondents failed to heed his plea;
thus, petitioner was forced to litigate in order to vindicate his rights.
Lastly, the LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioner’s
contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine
months. The LA disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a decision is hereby
rendered declaring complainant to have been constructively
dismissed. Accordingly, respondents Intermare Maritime Agency
21
Incorporated, Thenamaris Ship’s Mgt., and Vulture Shipping
Limited are ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant
Claudio S. Yap the sum of $12,870.00 or its peso equivalent at the
time of payment. In addition, moral damages of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000.00) and exemplary damages of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) are awarded plus ten
percent (10%) of the total award as attorney’s fees.
Other money claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.
In its decision7 dated January 14, 2005, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s
findings that petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally
dismissed; that respondents’ bad faith was evident on their wilful
failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel; and that the award of
attorney’s fees was warranted. However, the NLRC held that
instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months,
petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided
under Section 108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated
in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission.10 Hence, the NLRC ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter finding the termination of complainant illegal is hereby
AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION. Complainant[’s] salary for the
unexpired portion of his contract should only be limited to three (3)
months basic salary.
Respondents Intermare Maritime Agency, Inc.[,] Vulture Shipping
Limited and Thenamaris Ship Management are hereby ordered to
jointly and severally pay complainant, the following:
1. Three (3) months basic salary – US$4,290.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment.
2. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
3. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
SO ORDERED.11
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,12 praying
for the reversal and setting aside of the NLRC decision, and that a
new one be rendered dismissing the complaint. Petitioner, on the
other hand, filed his own Motion for Partial Reconsideration,13
praying that he be paid the nine (9)-month basic salary, as awarded
by the LA.
On April 20, 2005, a resolution14 was rendered by the NLRC,
affirming the findings of Illegal Dismissal and respondents’ failure to
transfer petitioner to another vessel. However, finding merit in
petitioner’s arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision,
holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three (3) months
salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full
year of unexpired term which this can be applied." Hence –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration is hereby granted. The award of three (3)
months basic salary in the sum of US$4,290.00 is hereby modified
in that complainant is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion
of employment contract in the sum of US$12,870.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment.
All aspect of our January 14, 2005 Decision STANDS.
SO ORDERED.15
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC
denied.
Undaunted, respondents filed a petition for certiorari16 under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. On February 28,
2007, the CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the
NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed.
The CA held that respondents failed to show that the NLRC acted
without statutory authority and that its findings were not supported
by law, jurisprudence, and evidence on record. Likewise, the CA
affirmed the lower agencies’ findings that the advisory of Captain
Constantinou, taken together with the other documents and
additional requirements imposed on petitioner, only meant that the
latter should have been re-embarked. In the same token, the CA
upheld the lower agencies’ unanimous finding of bad faith,
warranting the imposition of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in
sustaining the LA’s interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In
this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 and held:
In the present case, the employment contract concerned has a
term of one year or 12 months which commenced on August 14,
2001. However, it was preterminated without a valid cause.
[Petitioner] was paid his wages for the corresponding months he
worked until the 10th of November. Pursuant to the provisions of
Sec. 10, [R.A. No.] 8042, therefore, the option of "three months for
every year of the unexpired term" is applicable.17
Thus, the CA provided, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision dated January 14, 2005, and Resolutions,
dated April 20, 2005 and July 29, 2005, respectively, of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission-Fourth Division,
C e b u C i t y, i n N L R C N o . V - 0 0 0 0 3 8 - 0 4 ( R A B V I I I
(OFW)-04-01-0006) are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months of basic salary computed at US$4,290.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment.
Costs against Petitioners.18
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration,
which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution19 dated August 30,
2007.
Unyielding, petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1) Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it
affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of –
"salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" – is constitutional; and
2) Assuming that it is, whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when
his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the
unexpired term" threshold.20
In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we
declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the case of
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.21 on March 24, 2009.
Apparently, unaware of our ruling in Serrano, petitioner claims that
the 5th paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of
Section 1,22 Article III and Section 3,23 Article XIII of the Constitution
to the extent that it gives an erring employer the option to pay an
illegally dismissed migrant worker only three months for every year
of the unexpired term of his contract; that said provision of law has
long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant
workers; and that said provision violates the equal protection
clause under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed
local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of
reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld from them up to their actual
reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042, have to waive nine months of their collectible backwages
every time they have a year of unexpired term of contract to reckon
with. Finally, petitioner posits that, assuming said provision of law is
constitutional, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it reduced
petitioner’s backwages from nine months to three months as his
nine-month unexpired term cannot accommodate the lesser relief
of three months for every year of the unexpired term.24
On the other hand, respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano,
aver that our pronouncement of unconstitutionality of the clause "or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
in Serrano should not apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals with the rights and
obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant
worker and is not merely procedural in character. Thus, pursuant to
the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application of the law
in this case. Moreover, respondents asseverate that petitioner’s
tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the
computation of the award as petitioner’s basic salary, as provided
under his contract, was only US$1,300.00. Respondents submit
that the CA erred in its computation since it included the said tanker
allowance. Respondents opine that petitioner should be entitled
only to US$3,900.00 and not to US$4,290.00, as granted by the
CA. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance
should be excluded from the definition of the term "salary." Also,
respondents manifest that the full sum of ₱878,914.47 in
22
Intermare’s bank account was garnished and subsequently
withdrawn and deposited with the NLRC Cashier of Tacloban City
on February 14, 2007. On February 16, 2007, while this case was
pending before the CA, the LA issued an Order releasing the
amount of ₱781,870.03 to petitioner as his award, together with the
sum of ₱86,744.44 to petitioner’s former lawyer as attorney’s fees,
and the amount of ₱3,570.00 as execution and deposit fees. Thus,
respondents pray that the instant petition be denied and that
petitioner be directed to return to Intermare the sum of
US$8,970.00 or its peso equivalent.25
On this note, petitioner counters that this new issue as to the
inclusion of the tanker allowance in the computation of the award
was not raised by respondents before the LA, the NLRC and the
CA, nor was it raised in respondents’ pleadings other than in their
Memorandum before this Court, which should not be allowed under
the circumstances.26
The petition is impressed with merit.
Prefatorily, it bears emphasis that the unanimous finding of the LA,
the NLRC and the CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is
not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the tribunals’ unanimous
finding of bad faith on the part of respondents, thus, warranting the
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. What
remains in issue, therefore, is the constitutionality of the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 and, necessarily, the
proper computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Verily, we have already declared in Serrano that the clause "or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an
exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the
said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-
month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one
year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.27
Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not
state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence, the
same violates not just therein petitioner’s right to equal protection,
but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution.28 Consequently, petitioner therein was
accorded his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months
and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
We have already spoken. Thus, this case should not be different
from Serrano.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the contrary.
The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation,29 we held:
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects
of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
reliance upon a law creating it.30
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in
the aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of
petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal
committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong
signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies
may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment
contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on
an unconstitutional provision of law.
In the same vein, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ postulation
that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in
the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner.
First. It is only at this late stage, more particularly in their
Memorandum, that respondents are raising this issue. It was not
raised before the LA, the NLRC, and the CA. They did not even
assail the award accorded by the CA, which computed the lump-
sum salary of petitioner at the basic salary of US$1,430.00, and
which clearly included the US$130.00 tanker allowance. Hence, fair
play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for
the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not taken
up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. They must
be raised seasonably in the proceedings before the lower tribunals.
Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by
the parties; consequently, issues not raised before the lower
tribunals cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.311avvphi1
Second. Respondents’ invocation of Serrano is unavailing. Indeed,
we made the following pronouncements in Serrano, to wit:
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and
leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order
No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of
Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas
overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of
the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any
work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.32
A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of
US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather
encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the
basic salary of petitioner. Respondents themselves in their petition
for certiorari before the CA averred that petitioner’s basic salary,
pursuant to the contract, was "US$1,300.00 + US$130.00 tanker
allowance."33 If respondents intended it differently, the contract per
se should have indicated that said allowance does not form part of
the basic salary or, simply, the contract should have separated it
from the basic salary clause.
A final note.
We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs.
In Olarte v. Nayona,34 this Court held that:
Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of
them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile
shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of
crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs
they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate
circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They
will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in
foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work
under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the
minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated August 30,
2007 are hereby MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months computed at the
rate of US$1,430.00 per month. All other awards are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

23
G.R. No. 156029 November 14, 2008
SANTOSA B. DATUMAN, petitioner,
vs.
FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND PROMOTION
SERVICES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 7, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No.
59825, setting aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower &
Promotion Services, Inc. recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman
to work abroad under the following terms and conditions:
(table)
On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying
the required placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed
Hussain took her passport when she arrived there; and instead of
working as a saleslady, she was forced to work as a domestic
helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent
only to One Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to
the agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of
Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).3
On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign
another contract, transferring her to another employer as
housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the duration of two (2)
years.4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to
return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no
choice, she continued working against her will. Worse, she even
worked without compensation from September 1991 to April 1993
because of her employer's continued failure and refusal to pay her
salary despite demand. In May 1993, she was able to finally return
to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and
Immigration Department.5
In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA
Adjudication Office against respondent for underpayment and
nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of her plane
fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586.6 While the
case was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for
underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months,
nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare.
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before
the Labor Arbiter, they were required to file their respective position
papers, subsequent pleadings and documentary exhibits.
In its Position Paper,7 respondent countered that petitioner actually
agreed to work in Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year
because it was the only position available then. However, since
such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they
mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating
petitioner's position as saleslady. Respondent added that it was
actually petitioner herself who violated the terms of their contract
when she allegedly transferred to another employer without
respondent's knowledge and approval. Lastly, respondent raised
the defense of prescription of cause of action since the claim was
filed beyond the three (3)-year period from the time the right
accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991.8
On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a
Decision finding respondent liable for violating the terms of the
Employment Contract and ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the
amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time
of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15)
months; and, (b) the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate
prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of plane
ticket, thus:
From the foregoing factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to
resolve in this case is whether or not complainant is entitled to her
monetary claims.
xxx
In the instant case, from the facts and circumstances laid down, it
is thus self-evident that the relationship of the complainant and
respondent agency is governed by the Contract of Employment,
the basic terms a covenants of which provided for the position of
24
saleslady, monthly compensation of US$370.00 and duration of
contract for one (1) year. As it is, when the parties - complainant
and respondent Agency - signed and executed the POEA -
approved Contract of Employment, this agreement is the law that
governs them. Thus, when respondent agency deviated from the
terms of the contract by assigning the position of a housemaid to
complainant instead of a saleslady as agreed upon in the POEA-
approved Contract of Employment, respondent Agency committed
a breach of said Employment Contract. Worthy of mention is the
fact that respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph
2, Brief Statement of the Facts and of the Case - admitted that
it had entered into an illegal contract with complainant by
proposing the position of a housemaid which said position
was then not allowed by the POEA, by making it appear in the
Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the
position of a saleslady. As it is, we find indubitably clear that
the foreign employer had took advantage to the herein
hopeless complainant and because of this ordeal, the same
obviously rendered complainant's continuous employment
unreasonable if not downright impossible. The facts and
surrounding circumstances of her ordeal was convincingly laid
down by the complainant in her Position Paper, from which we find
no flaws material enough to disregard the same. Complainant had
clearly made out her case and no amount of persuasion can
convince us to tilt the scales of justice in favor of respondents
whose defense was anchored solely on the flimsy allegations that
for a period of more than five (5) years - from 1989 until 1995 -
nothing was heard from her or from her relatives, presuming then
that complainant had no problem with her employment abroad. We
also find that the pleadings and the annexes filed by the parties
reveal a total lapse on the part of respondent First Cosmopolitan
Manpower and Promotions - their failure to support with substantial
evidence their contention that complainant transferred from one
employer to another without knowledge and approval of respondent
agency in contravention of the terms of the POEA approved
Employment Contract. Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its
disquisition on the alleged "contracts" signed by the complainant
that she agreed with the terms of said contracts - one (1) year
duration only and as a housemaid - to support its contention that
complainant violated the contract agreement by transferring from
one employer to another on her own volition without the knowledge
and consent of respondent agency. To us, this posture of
respondent agency is unavailing. These "documents" are self-
serving. We could not but rule that the same were fabricated to
tailor-fit their defense that complainant was guilty of violating the
terms of the Employment Contract. Consequently, we could not
avoid the inference of a more logical conclusion that complainant
was forced against her will to continue with her employment
notwithstanding the fact that it was in violation of the original
Employment Contract including the illegal withholding of her
passport.
With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondent Agency
failed to discharge the burden of proving with substantial evidence
that complainant violated the terms of the Employment Contract,
thus negating respondent Agency's liability for complainant's
money claims. All the more, the record is bereft of any evidence to
show that complainant Datuman is either not entitled to her wage
differentials or have already received the same from respondent.
As such, we are perforce constrained to grant complainant's prayer
for payment of salary differentials computed as follows:
January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)
US$370.00 agreed salary
US$100.00 actual paid salary
US$270.00 balance
US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00
We are also inclined to grant complainant's entitlement to a refund
of her plane ticket in the amount of BD 180 Bahrain Dinar or the
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the rate of exchange prevailing
at the time of payment.
Anent complainant's claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay,
we cannot, however, grant the same for failure on the part of
complainant to prove with particularity the months that she was not
granted vacation leave and the day wherein she did render
overtime work.
Also, we could not grant complainant's prayer for award of
damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding respondent Agency liable for violating the term of
Employment Contract and respondent First Cosmopolitan
Manpower and Promotions is hereby ordered:
To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND
FIFTY (US$4,050.00), or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of
payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15)
months;
To pay complainant the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate
prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of plane
ticket;
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9 (emphasis supplied)
On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision10
affirming with modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr.,
by reducing the award of salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to
US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows:
Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing
earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as
complainant had filed her complaint on May 31, 1995 when she
arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for
salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear
that only the claims for the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have
not yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate of US$370.00 vis-
à-vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00,
complainant is entitled to the salary differential for the said period in
the amount of $2,970.00.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
MODIFYING the assailed Decision by reducing the award of salary
differentials to $2,970.00 to the complainant.
The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
On July 21, 2000, respondent elevated the matter to the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
On August 2, 2000,12 the CA dismissed the petition for being
insufficient in form pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
On October 20, 2000,13 however, the CA reinstated the petition
upon respondent's motion for reconsideration.14
On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision15 granting
the petition and reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus:
Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations, the local agency shall assume joint and solidary
liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the contract,
including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability
compensation and repatriation.
Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of
private respondent "for salary differentials accruing earlier than
April of 1993 had indeed prescribed." It must be noted that
petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting
arguendo that its liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal,
the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in
the execution of the second contract, it is Our considered opinion
that the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration
of the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the
money claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed.
However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only
having abused its discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all,
in declaring private respondent entitled to salary differentials. After
decreeing the money claims accruing before April 1993 as having
prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to hold petitioner company
for salary differentials after that period. To reiterate, the local
agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer
for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract. Which contract? Upon a judicious
consideration, we so hold that it is only in connection with the first
contract. The provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a), Rule V, Book I
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f),
Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations were not
made to make the local agency a perpetual insurer against all
untoward acts that may be done by the foreign principal or the
25
direct employer abroad. It is only as regards the principal contract
to which it is privy shall its liability extend. In Catan v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 160 SCRA 691 (1988), it was held
that the responsibilities of the local agent and the foreign principal
towards the contracted employees under the recruitment
agreement extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
xxx
Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24 February
2000 and the Resolution dated 23 June 2000 of respondent
Commission in NLRC NCR CA 016354-98 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 thereon was denied in the
assailed Resolution18 dated November 14, 2002.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ABANDONED THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS AFFIRMED BY THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT AGENCY IS ONLY A [sic]
PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PETITIONER
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
The respondent counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in
ruling that it is not liable for the monetary claims of petitioner as the
claim had already prescribed and had no factual basis.
Simply put, the issues boil down to whether the CA erred in not
holding respondent liable for petitioner's money claims pursuant to
their Contract of Employment.
We grant the petition.
On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's
monetary claims
Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. - Every applicant
for license to operate a private employment agency or manning
agency shall submit a written application together with the following
requirements:
xxx
f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
xxx
(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer
for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with
the implementation of the contract; including but not limited to
payment of wages, death and disability compensation and
repatriation. (emphasis supplied)
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency
shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer.19 This
Court has, time and again, ruled that private employment agencies
are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.20 This joint and solidary liability imposed by law
against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to
assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment
of what is due him.21 This is in line with the policy of the state to
protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited
provision of the law and the policy of the state when it reversed the
findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As the agency which
recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with
the latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money
claims. Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the
claims and liabilities arising from the implementation of their POEA-
approved Contract of Employment.
We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of
respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original,
POEA-approved contract which had a term of until April 1990). The
signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign employer/
principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and
any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original
one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing
breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To accept the
CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our
overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local
recruiters, since the recruitment agency could easily escape its
mandated solidary liability for breaches of the POEA-approved
contract by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the
approved contract with another upon the worker's arrival in the
country of employment. Such outcome is certainly contrary to the
State's policy of extending protection and support to our overseas
workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the
substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of
employment contracts already approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period
of the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.22
Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated
their Contract of Employment when she signed another contract in
Bahrain deserves scant consideration. It is the finding of both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC - which, significantly, the CA did not
disturb - that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her
original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the
foreign employer.
In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote,23 we
held that the subsequently executed side agreement of an
overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which reduced
his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void
because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy.
The said side agreement cannot supersede the terms of the
standard employment contract approved by the POEA.
Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner
from US$370.00 to US$100 (BD 40.00) per month is void for
violating the POEA-approved contract which set the minimum
standards, terms, and conditions of her employment. Consequently,
the solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer
for petitioner's money claims continues although she was forced to
sign another contract in Bahrain. It is the terms of the original
POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the
relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency
and the foreign employer. We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC that the precepts of justice and fairness dictate that
petitioner must be compensated for all months worked regardless
of the supposed termination of the original contract in April 1990. It
is undisputed that petitioner was compelled to render service until
April 1993 and for the entire period that she worked for the foreign
employer or his unilaterally appointed successor, she should have
been paid US$370/month for every month worked in accordance
with her original contract.
Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign
employer which forced petitioner to remain employed in violation of
our laws and under the most oppressive conditions on the
allegation that it purportedly had no knowledge of, or participation
in, the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad. We cannot
give credence to this claim considering that respondent by its own
allegations knew from the outset that the contract submitted to the
POEA for approval was not to be the "real" contract. Respondent
blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a contract stating that
the position to be filled by petitioner is that of "Saleslady" although
she was to be employed as a domestic helper since the latter
position was not approved for deployment by the POEA at that
time. Respondent's evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of
the laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations
of innocence and put petitioner in a position where she could be
exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as what indeed
happened to her in this case.
We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of
innocence or ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of
acts of their foreign principals, as if the agencies' responsibility
ends with the deployment of the worker. In the light of the
recruitment agency's legally mandated joint and several liability
with the foreign employer for all claims in connection with the
implementation of the contract, it is the recruitment agency's
responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully
complied with and implemented properly by its foreign client/
26
principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid being
haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for
acts of its foreign principal.
On whether petitioner's claims for underpaid salaries have
prescribed
It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly
found that petitioner is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they
differed in the number of months for which salary differentials
should be paid. The CA, on the other hand, held that all of
petitioner's monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article
291 of the Labor Code which provides that:
Art. 291. Money Claims. - All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall
be filed within three years from the time that cause of action
accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis
supplied)
We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action
of petitioner had already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive
period should be reckoned from September 1, 1989 when
petitioner was forced to sign another contract against her will. As
stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for
underpayment of salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to
claim unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials)
accrue as they fall due.24 Thus, petitioner's cause of action to
claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she
had rendered service for that month (or at the end of October
1989). Her right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only
accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was
forced to work until April 1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb
this finding but held only that the extent of respondent's liability was
limited to the term under the original contract or, at most, to the
term of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation
of respondent's foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed
previously the reasons why (a) the CA's theory of limited liability on
the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a
right to be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to
work. To determine for which months petitioner's right to claim
salary differentials has not prescribed, we must count three years
prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only
claims accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the
complaint was filed on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her
claims for salary differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April
1993, or approximately eleven (11) months.25
We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary differential
due to petitioner at US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as approved salary
rate - US$100.00 as salary received = US$290 as underpaid salary
per month x 11 months). However, it should be for the period May
31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as
erroneously stated in the NLRC's Decision.
A final note
This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their
bounden duty to guarantee our overseas workers that they are
being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona fide employers. Local
agencies should never allow themselves to be instruments of
exploitation or oppression of their compatriots at the hands of
foreign employers. Indeed, being the ones who profit most from the
exodus of Filipino workers to find greener pastures abroad,
recruiters should be first to ensure the welfare of the very people
that keep their industry alive.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 7, 2002 and Resolution dated
November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825 are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated February 24, 2000 is REINSTATED with a
qualification with respect to the award of salary differentials, which
should be granted for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and
not May 1993 to April 1994.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993
FARLE P. ALMODIEL, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST
DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS., INC., respondents.
Apolinario Lomabao, Jr. for petitioner.
Vicente A. Cruz, Jr., for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Subject of this petition for certiorari is the decision dated March 21,
1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case
No.
00-00645-89 which reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's
decision dated September 27, 1989 and ordered instead the
payment of separation pay and financial assistance of
P100,000.00. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Commission and prays for the reinstatement of the
Labor Arbiter's decision which declared his termination on the
ground of redundancy illegal.
Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was
hired in October, 1987 as Cost Accounting Manager of respondent
Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable placement firm,
John Clements Consultants, Inc. with a starting monthly salary of
P18,000.00. Before said employment, he was the accounts
executive of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. for several years. He
left his lucrative job therein in view of the promising career offered
by Raytheon. He started as a probationary or temporary employee.
As Cost Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan,
coordinate and carry out year and physical inventory; (2) formulate
and issue out hard copies of Standard Product costing and other
cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3) set up the
written Cost Accounting System for the whole company. After a few
months, he was given a regularization increase of P1,600.00 a
month. Not long thereafter, his salary was increased to P21,600.00
a month.
On August 17, 1988, he recommended and submitted a Cost
Accounting/Finance Reorganization, affecting the whole finance
group but the same was disapproved by the Controller. However,
he was assured by the Controller that should his position or
department which was apparently a one-man department with no
staff becomes untenable or unable to deliver the needed service
due to manpower constraint, he would be given a three (3) year
advance notice.
In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was
installed and used at the Raytheon plants and subsidiaries
worldwide. It was likewise adopted and installed in the Philippine
operations. As a consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting
Manager allegedly entailed only the submission of periodic reports
that would use computerized forms prescribed and designed by the
international head office of the Raytheon Company in California,
USA.
On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate
boss and in the presence of IRD Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he
was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of
redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer its action or
transfer him to another department, but he was told that the
decision of management was final and that the same has been
conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he
was constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region, NLRC,
Department of Labor and Employment.
On September 27, 1989, Labor Arbiter Daisy Cauton-Barcelona
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that
complainant's termination on the ground of redundancy is highly
irregular and without legal and factual basis, thus ordering the
respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position with full
backwages without lost of seniority rights and other benefits.
Respondents are further ordered to pay complainant P200,000.00
as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney's fees.1
Raytheon appealed therefrom on the grounds that the Labor Arbiter
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its rights to dismiss
petitioner on the ground of redundancy, in relying on baseless
27
surmises and self-serving assertions of the petitioner that its act
was tainted with malice and bad faith and in awarding moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On March 21, 1991, the NLRC reversed the decision and directed
Raytheon to pay petitioner the total sum of P100,000.00 as
separation pay/financial assistance. The dispositive portion of
which is hereby quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. In its
stead, Order is hereby issued directing respondent to pay
complainant the total separation pay/financial assistance of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.2
From this decision, petitioner filed the instant petition averring that:
The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to (lack of) or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring as
valid and justified the termination of petitioner on the ground of
redundancy in the face of clearly established finding that
petitioner's termination was tainted with malice, bad faith and
irregularity.3
Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is
governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides as
follows:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. —
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee
due to installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the worker and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof. In case of termination due to installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled
to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment
to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at
least one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, one (1) month
before, of the termination of his employment on the ground of
redundancy in a written notice by his immediate superior, Mrs.
Magdalena B.D. Lopez sometime in the afternoon of January 27,
1989. He was issued a check for P54,863.00 representing
separation pay but in view of his refusal to acknowledge the notice
and the check, they were sent to him thru registered mail on
January 30, 1989. The Department of Labor and Employment was
served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and the
implementing rules.
The crux of the controversy lies on whether bad faith, malice and
irregularity crept in the abolition of petitioner's position of Cost
Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy. Petitioner
claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the
Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny
Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from the
Department of Labor and Employment as required by law.
Petitioner relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the
effect that corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting were
dispersed to other units in the Finance Department. And granting
that his department has to be declared redundant, he claims that
he should have been the Manager of the Payroll/Mis/Finance
Department which handled general accounting, payroll and
encoding. As a B. S. Accounting graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units,
21 years of work experience, and a natural born Filipino, he claims
that he is better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial
Engineer, hired merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its
equivalent in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager only during the
middle part of 1988 and a resident alien.
On the other hand, Raytheon insists that petitioner's functions as
Cost Accounting Manager had not been absorbed by Ang Tan Chai,
a permanent resident born in this country. It claims to have
established below that Ang Tan Chai did not displace petitioner or
absorb his functions and duties as they were occupying entirely
different and distinct positions requiring different sets of expertise
or qualifications and discharging functions altogether different and
foreign from that of petitioner's abolished position. Raytheon
debunks petitioner's reliance on the testimony of Mr. Estrada
saying that the same witness testified under oath that the functions
of the Cost Accounting Manager had been completely dispensed
with and the position itself had been totally abolished.
Whether petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager have
been dispensed with or merely absorbed by another is however
immaterial. Thus, notwithstanding the dearth of evidence on the
said question, a resolution of this case can be arrived at without
delving into this matter. For even conceding that the functions of
petitioner's position were merely transferred, no malice or bad faith
can be imputed from said act. A survey of existing case law will
disclose that in Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC,4 the position of
Sales Manager was abolished on the ground of redundancy as the
duties previously discharged by the Sales Manager simply added
to the duties of the General Manager to whom the Sales Manager
used to report. In adjudging said termination as legal, this Court
said that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where
the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. The
characterization of an employee's services as no longer necessary
or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an exercise
of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or
soundness of such characterization or decision was not subject to
discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the
NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and
malicious action is not shown.
In the case of International Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,5 this Court also considered the position of Government
Relations Officer to have become redundant in view of the
appointment of the International Heavy Equipment Corporation as
the company's dealer with the government. It held therein that the
determination of the need for the phasing out of a department as a
labor and cost saving device because it was no longer economical
to retain said services is a management prerogative and the courts
will not interfere with the exercise thereof as long as no abuse of
discretion or merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of
management is shown.
In the same vein, this Court ruled in Bondoc v. People's Bank and
Trust Co.,6 that the bank's board of directors possessed the power
to remove a department manager whose position depended on the
retention of the trust and confidence of management and whether
there was need for his services. Although some vindictive
motivation might have impelled the abolition of his position, this
Court expounded that it is undeniable that the bank's board of
directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine
whether the interest of the bank justified the existence of his
department.
Indeed, an employer has no legal obligation to keep more
employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that a cost accounting system
was installed and used at Raytheon subsidiaries and plants
worldwide; and that the functions of his position involve the
submission of periodic reports utilizing computerized forms
designed and prescribed by the head office with the installation of
said accounting system. Petitioner attempts to controvert these
realities by alleging that some of the functions of his position were
still indispensable and were actually dispersed to another
department. What these indispensable functions that were
dispersed, he failed however, to specify and point out. Besides, the
fact that the functions of a position were simply added to the duties
of another does not affect the legitimacy of the employer's right to
abolish a position when done in the normal exercise of its
prerogative to adopt sound business practices in the management
of its affairs.
Considering further that petitioner herein held a position which was
definitely managerial in character, Raytheon had a broad latitude of
discretion in abolishing his position. An employer has a much wider
discretion in terminating employment relationship of managerial
personnel compared to rank and file employees.7 The reason
obviously is that officers in such key positions perform not only
functions which by nature require the employer's full trust and
28
confidence but also functions that spell the success or failure of an
enterprise.
Likewise destitute of merit is petitioner's imputation of unlawful
discrimination when Raytheon caused corollary functions
appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by Danny Ang Tan
Chai, a resident alien without a working permit. Article 40 of the
Labor Code which requires employment permit refers to non-
resident aliens. The employment permit is required for entry into
the country for employment purposes and is issued after
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines
who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang Tan
Chai is a resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the
provision.
Petitioner also assails Raytheon's choice of Ang Tan Chai to head
the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department, claiming that he is better
qualified for the position. It should be noted, however, that Ang Tan
Chai was promoted to the position during the middle part of 1988 or
before the abolition of petitioner's position in early 1989. Besides
the fact that Ang Tan Chai's promotion thereto is a settled matter, it
has been consistently held that an objection founded on the ground
that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon
so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the
position. In the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that
Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the Court cannot
substitute its discretion and judgment for that which is clearly and
exclusively management prerogative. To do so would take away
from the employer what rightly belongs to him as aptly explained in
National Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC:8
It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference
with the employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The
determination of the qualification and fitness of workers for hiring
and firing, promotion or reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of
management. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not
vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC
(nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer is free to
determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all
elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.
There is none in the instant case.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission in reversing and annulling the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the contrary, the
termination of petitioner's employment was anchored on a valid and
authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the instant
petition for certiorari must fail.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169207 March 25, 2010
W P P M A R K E T I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S , I N C . , J O H N
STEEDMAN, MARK WEBSTER, and NOMINADA LANSANG,
Petitioners,
vs.
JOCELYN M. GALERA, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169239
JOCELYN M. GALERA, Petitioner,
vs.
W P P M A R K E T I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S , I N C . , J O H N
STEEDMAN, MARK WEBSTER, and NOMINADA LANSANG,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
G.R. Nos. 169207 and 169239 are petitions for review1 assailing
the Decision2 promulgated on 14 April 2005 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 1 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78721. The appellate court
granted and gave due course to the petition filed by Jocelyn M.
Galera (Galera). The appellate court’s decision reversed and set
aside that of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
and directed WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. (WPP) to pay
Galera backwages, separation pay, unpaid housing benefit, unpaid
personal and accident insurance benefits, cash value under the
company’s pension plan, 30 days paid holiday benefit, moral
damages, exemplary damages, 10% of the total judgment award
as attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:
Petitioner is Jocelyn Galera (GALERA), a [sic] American citizen
who was recruited from the United States of America by private
respondent John Steedman, Chairman-WPP Worldwide and Chief
Executive Officer of Mindshare, Co., a corporation based in Hong
Kong, China, to work in the Philippines for private respondent WPP
Marketing Communications, Inc. (WPP), a corporation registered
and operating under the laws of Philippines. GALERA accepted the
offer and she signed an Employment Contract entitled
"Confirmation of Appointment and Statement of Terms and
Conditions" (Annex B to Petition for Certiorari). The relevant
portions of the contract entered into between the parties are as
follows:
(table)
6. Housing Allowance
The Company will provide suitable housing in Manila at a maximum
cost (including management fee and other associated costs) of
Peso 576,000 per annum.
7. Other benefits.
The Company will provide you with a fully maintained company car
and a driver.
The Company will continue to provide medical, health, life and
personal accident insurance plans, to an amount not exceeding
Peso 300,000 per annum, in accordance with the terms of the
respective plans, as provided by JWT Manila.
The Company will reimburse you and your spouse one way
business class air tickets from USA to Manila and the related
shipping and relocation cost not exceeding US$5,000 supported by
proper documentation. If you leave the Company within one year,
you will reimburse the Company in full for all costs of the initial
relocation as described therein.
You will participate in the JWT Pension Plan under the terms of this
plan, the Company reserves the right to transfer this benefit to a
Mindshare Pension Plan in the future, if so required.
8. Holidays
You are entitled to 20 days paid holiday in addition to public
holidays per calendar year to be taken at times agreed with the
Company. Carry-over of unused accrued holiday entitlement into a
new holiday year will not normally be allowed. No payment will be
made for holidays not taken. On termination of your employment,
unless you have been summarily dismissed, you will be entitled to
receive payment for unused accrued holiday pay. Any holiday taken
in excess of your entitlement shall be deducted from your final
salary payment.
9. Leave Due to Sickness or Injury
29
The maximum provision for sick leave is 15 working days per
calendar year.
12. Invention/Know-How
Any discovery, invention, improvement in procedure, trademark,
trade name, designs, copyrights or get-ups made, discovered or
created by you during the continuance of your employment
hereunder relating to the business of the Company shall belong to
and shall be the absolute property of the Company. If required to do
so by the Company (whether during or after the termination of your
employment) you shall at the expense of the company execute all
instruments and do all things necessary to vest in ownership for all
other rights, title and interests (including any registered rights
therein) in such discovery, invention, improvement in procedure,
trademark, trade name, design, copyright or get-up in the Company
(or its Nominee) absolutely and as sole beneficial owner.
14. Notice.
The first three months of your employment will be a trial period
during which either you or the Company may terminate your
employment on one week’s notice. If at the end of that period, the
Company is satisfied with your performance, you will become a
permanent employee. Thereafter you will give Company and the
Company will give you three months notice of termination of
employment. The above is always subject to the following: (1) the
Company’s right to terminate the contract of employment on no or
short notice where you are in breach of contract; (2) your
employment will at any event cease without notice on your
retirement date when you are 60 years of age.
SIGNED JOCELYN M. GALERA 8-16-99
Date of Birth [sic] 12-25-55
Employment of GALERA with private respondent WPP became
effective on September 1, 1999 solely on the instruction of the
CEO and upon signing of the contract, without any further action
from the Board of Directors of private respondent WPP.
Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed
before the Bureau of Immigration an application for petitioner
GALERA to receive a working visa, wherein she was designated as
Vice President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she was constrained
to sign the application in order that she could remain in the
Philippines and retain her employment.
Then, on December 14, 2000, petitioner GALERA alleged she was
verbally notified by private respondent STEEDMAN that her
services had been terminated from private respondent WPP. A
termination letter followed the next day.4
On 3 January 2001, Galera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, incentive
plan, actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees against WPP
and/or John Steedman (Steedman), Mark Webster (Webster) and
Nominada Lansang (Lansang). The case was docketed as NLRC
NCR Case No. 30-01-00044-01.
The Labor Arbiter’s Ruling
In his Decision dated 31 January 2002, Labor Arbiter Edgardo M.
Madriaga (Arbiter Madriaga) held WPP, Steedman, Webster, and
Lansang liable for illegal dismissal and damages. Arbiter Madriaga
stated that Galera was not only illegally dismissed but was also not
accorded due process. Arbiter Madriaga explained, thus:
[WPP] failed to observe the two-notice rule. [WPP] through
respondent Steedman for a five (5) minute meeting on December
14, 2000 where she was verbally told that as of that day, her
employment was being terminated. [WPP] did not give [Galera] an
opportunity to defend herself and explain her side. [Galera] was
even prohibited from reporting for work that day and was told not to
report for work the next day as it would be awkward for her and
respondent Steedman to be in the same premises after her
termination. [WPP] only served [Galera] her written notice of
termination only on 15 December 2001, one day after she was
verbally apprised thereof.
The law mandates that the dismissal must be properly done
otherwise, the termination is gravely defective and may be declared
unlawful as we hereby hold [Galera’s] dismissal to be illegal and
unlawful. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal
cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the
matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer
to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
The law mandates that both the substantive and procedural
aspects of due process should be observed. The facts clearly show
that respondents were remiss on both aspects. Perforce, the
dismissal is void and unlawful.
xxxx
Considering the work performance and achievements of [Galera]
for the year 2000, we do not find any basis for the alleged claim of
incompetence by herein respondents. Had [Galera] been really
incompetent, she would not have been able to generate enormous
amounts [sic] of revenues and business for [WPP]. She also
appears to be well liked as a leader by her subordinates, who have
come forth in support of [Galera]. These facts remain undisputed by
respondents.
A man’s job being a property right duly protected by our laws, an
employer who deprives an employee [of] the right to defend himself
is liable for damages consistent with Article 32 of the Civil Code. To
allow an employer to terminate the employment of his worker
based merely on allegations without proof places the [employee] in
an uncertain situation. The unflinching rule in illegal dismissal
cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof.
In the instant case, respondents have not been able to muster
evidence to counter [Galera’s] allegations. [Galera’s] allegations
remain and stand absent proof from respondents rebutting them.
Hence, our finding of illegal dismissal against respondents who
clearly have conspired in bad faith to deprive [Galera] of her right to
substantive and procedural due process.5
The dispositive portion of Arbiter Madriaga’s decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby hold herein
respondents liable for illegal dismissal and damages, and award to
[Galera], by virtue of her expatriate status, the following:
a. Reinstatement without loss of seniority rights.
b. Backwages amounting to $120,000 per year at ₱50.00 to US $1
exchange rate, 13th month pay, transportation and housing
benefits.
c. Remuneration for business acquisitions amounting to Two Million
Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱2,850,000.00) and Media
Plowback Incentive equivalent to Three Million Pesos
(₱3,000,000.00) or a total of not less than One Hundred Thousand
US Dollars ($100,000.00).
d. US Tax Protection of up to 35% coverage equivalent to Thirty
Eight Thousand US Dollars ($38,000).
e. Moral damages including implied defamation and punitive
damages equivalent to Two Million Dollars (US$2,000,000.00).
f. Exemplary damages equivalent to One Million Dollars
($1,000,000.00).
g. Attorney’s fees of 10% of the total award herein.
SO ORDERED.6
The Ruling of the NLRC
The First Division of the NLRC reversed the ruling of Arbiter
Madriaga. In its Decision7 promulgated on 19 February 2003, the
NLRC stressed that Galera was WPP’s Vice-President, and
therefore, a corporate officer at the time she was removed by the
Board of Directors on 14 December 2000. The NLRC stated thus:
It matters not that her having been elected by the Board to an
added position of being a member of the Board of Directors did not
take effect as her May 31, 2000 election to such added position
was conditioned to be effective upon approval by SEC of the
Amended By-Laws, an approval which took place only in February
21, 2001, i.e., after her removal on December 14, 2000. What
counts is, at the time of her removal, she continued to be WPP’s
Vice-President, a corporate officer, on hold over capacity.
Ms. Galera’s claim that she was not a corporate officer at the time
of her removal because her May 31, 2000 election as Vice
President for Media, under WPP’s Amended By-Laws, was subject
to the approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission and
that the SEC approved the Amended By-Laws only in February
2001. Such claim is unavailing. Even if Ms. Galera’s subsequent
election as Vice President for Media on May 31, 2000 was subject
to approval by the SEC, she continued to hold her previous position
as Vice President under the December 31, 1999 election until such
time that her successor is duly elected and qualified. It is a basic
principle in corporation law, which principle is also embodied in
WPP’s by-laws, that a corporate officer continues to hold his
position as such until his successor has been duly elected and
qualified. When Ms. Galera was elected as Vice President on
December 31, 1999, she was supposed to have held that position
30
until her successor has been duly elected and qualified. The record
shows that Ms. Galera was not replaced by anyone. She continued
to be Vice President of WPP with the same operational title of
Managing Director for Mindshare and continued to perform the
same functions she was performing prior to her May 31, 2000
election.
In the recent case of Dily Dany Nacpil v. International Broadcasting
Corp., the definition of corporate officer for purposes of intra-
corporate controversy was even broadened to include a
Comptroller/Assistant Manager who was appointed by the General
Manager, and whose appointment was later approved by the Board
of Directors. In this case, the position of comptroller was not even
expressly mentioned in the By-Laws of the corporation, and yet, the
Supreme Court found him to be a corporate officer. The Court ruled
that —
(since) petitioner’s appointment as comptroller required the
approval and formal action of IBC’s Board of Directors to become
valid, it is clear therefore that petitioner is a corporate officer whose
dismissal may be the subject of a controversy cognizable by the
SEC... Had the petitioner been an ordinary employee, such board
action would not have been required.
Such being the case, the imperatives of law require that we hold
that the Arbiter below had no jurisdiction over Galera’s case as,
again, she was a corporate officer at the time of her removal.
WHEREFORE, the appeals of petitioner from the Decision of Labor
Arbiter Edgardo Madriaga dated January 31, 2002 and his Order
dated March 21, 2002, respectively, are granted. The January 31,
2002 decision of the Labor Arbiter is set aside for being null and
void and the temporary restraining order we issued on April 24,
2002 is hereby made permanent. The complaint of Jocelyn Galera
is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.8
In its Resolution9 promulgated on 4 June 2003, the NLRC further
stated:
We are fully convinced that this is indeed an intra-corporate dispute
which is beyond the labor arbiter’s jurisdiction. These consolidated
cases clearly [involve] the relationship between a corporation and
its officer and is properly within the definition of an intra-corporate
relationship which, under P.D. No. 902-A, is within the jurisdiction of
the SEC (now the commercial courts). Such being the case, We
are constrained to rule that the Labor Arbiter below had no
jurisdiction over Ms. Galera’s complaint for illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by Ms. Galera
is hereby denied for lack of merit. We reiterate our February 19,
2003 Decision setting aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated
January 31, 2002 for being null and void.
SO ORDERED.10
Galera assailed the NLRC’s decision and resolution before the
appellate court and raised a lone assignment of error.
The National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter not on the merits but for
alleged lack of jurisdiction.11
The Decision of the Appellate Court
The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the
NLRC. The appellate court ruled that the NLRC’s dismissal of
Galera’s appeal is not in accord with jurisprudence. A person could
be considered a "corporate officer" only if appointed as such by a
corporation’s Board of Directors, or if pursuant to the power given
them by either the Articles of Incorporation or the By-Laws.12
The appellate court explained:
A corporation, through its board of directors, could only act in the
manner and within the formalities, if any, prescribed by its charter
or by the general law. If the action of the Board is ultra vires such is
motu proprio void ab initio and without legal effect whatsoever. The
by-laws of a corporation are its own private laws which
substantially have the same effect as the laws of the corporation.
They are, in effect, written into the charter. In this sense, they
beome part of the fundamental law of the corporation with which
the corporation and its directors and officers must comply.
Even if petitioner GALERA had been appointed by the Board of
Directors on December 31, 1999, private respondent WPP’s By-
Laws provided for only one Vice-President, a position already
occupied by private respondent Webster. The same defect also
stains the Board of Directors’ appointment of petitioner GALERA as
a Director of the corporation, because at that time the By-Laws
provided for only five directors. In addition, the By-laws only
empowered the Board of Directors to appoint a general manager
and/or assistant general manager as corporate officers in addition
to a chairman, president, vice-president and treasurer. There is no
mention of a corporate officer entitled "Managing Director."
Hence, when the Board of Directors enacted the Resolutions of
December 31, 1999 and May 31, 2000, it exceeded its authority
under the By-Laws and are, therefore, ultra vires. Although private
respondent WPP sought to amend these defects by filing Amended
By-Laws with the Securities and Exchange Commission, they did
not validate the ultra vires resolutions because the Amended By-
Laws did not take effect until February 16, 2001, when it was
approved by the SEC. Since by-laws operate only prospectively,
they could not validate the ultra vires resolutions.13
The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE. The assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
is entered DIRECTING private respondent WPP MARKETING
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. to:
1. Pay [Galera] backwages at the peso equivalent of
US$120,000.00 per annum plus three months from her summary
December 14, 2000 dismissal up to March 14, 2001 because three
months notice is required under the contract, plus 13th month pay,
bonuses and general increases to which she would have been
normally entitled, had she not been dismissed and had she not
been forced to stop working, including US tax protection of up to
35% coverage which she had been enjoying as an expatriate;
2. Pay x x x GALERA the peso equivalent of US$185,000.00
separation pay (1 ½ years);
3. Pay x x x GALERA any unpaid housing benefit for the 18 ½
months of her employment in the service to the Company as an
expatriate in Manila, Philippines at the rate of ₱576,000 per year;
unpaid personal and accident insurance benefits for premiums at
the rate of ₱300,000.00 per year; whatever cash value in the JWT
Pension Plan; and thirty days paid holiday benefit under the
contract for the 1 ½ calendar years with the Company;
4. Pay x x x GALERA the reduced amount of PhP2,000,000.00 as
moral damages;
5. Pay [Galera] the reduced amount of PhP1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
6. Pay [Galera] an amount equivalent to 10% of the judgment
award as attorney’s fees;
7. Pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.14
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on 5 May 2005.
Galera filed a motion for partial reconsideration and/or clarification
on the same date. The appellate court found no reason to revise or
reverse its previous decision and subsequently denied the motions
in a Resolution promulgated on 1 August 2005.15
The Issues
WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang raised the following
grounds in G.R. No. 169207:
I. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling that the NLRC has
jurisdiction over [Galera’s] complaint because she was not an
employee. [Galera] was a corporate officer of WPP from the
beginning of her term until her removal from office.
II. Assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the NLRC has jurisdiction over [Galera’s] complaint, it should have
remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for reception of evidence
on the merits of the case.
III. [Galera] is an alien, hence, can never attain a regular or
permanent working status in the Philippines.
IV. [Galera] is not entitled to recover backwages, other benefits and
damages from WPP.16
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 169239, Galera raised the following
grounds in support of her petition:
The CA decision should be consistent with Article 279 of the Labor
Code and applicable jurisprudence, that full backwages and
separation pay (when in lieu of reinstatement), should be reckoned
from time of dismissal up to time of reinstatement (or payment of
separation pay, in case separation instead of reinstatement is
awarded).
31
Accordingly, petitioner Galera should be awarded full backwages
and separation pay for the period from 14 December 2000 until the
finality of judgment by the respondents, or, at the very least, up to
the promulgation date of the CA decision.
The individual respondents Steedman, Webster and Lansang must
be held solidarily liable with respondent WPP for the wanton and
summary dismissal of petitioner Galera, to be consistent with law
and jurisprudence as well as the specific finding of the CA of bad
faith on the part of respondents.17
This Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 169207 and
169239 in a resolution dated 16 January 2006.18
The Ruling of the Court
In its consolidated comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) recommended that (A) the Decision dated 14 April 2005 of
the appellate court finding (1) Galera to be a regular employee of
WPP; (2) the NLRC to have jurisdiction over the present case; and
(3) WPP to have illegally dismissed Galera, be affirmed; and (B)
the case remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of the
correct monetary award. Despite the OSG’s recommendations, we
see that Galera’s failure to seek an employment permit prior to her
employment poses a serious problem in seeking relief before this
Court. Hence, we settle the various issues raised by the parties for
the guidance of the bench and bar.
Whether Galera is an Employee or a Corporate Officer
Galera, on the belief that she is an employee, filed her complaint
before the Labor Arbiter. On the other hand, WPP, Steedman,
Webster and Lansang contend that Galera is a corporate officer;
hence, any controversy regarding her dismissal is under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. We agree with Galera.
Corporate officers are given such character either by the
Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws. Under Section
25 of the Corporation Code, the corporate officers are the
president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be
provided in the by-laws.19 Other officers are sometimes created by
the charter or by-laws of a corporation, or the board of directors
may be empowered under the by-laws of a corporation to create
additional offices as may be necessary.
An examination of WPP’s by-laws resulted in a finding that Galera’s
appointment as a corporate officer (Vice-President with the
operational title of Managing Director of Mindshare) during a
special meeting of WPP’s Board of Directors is an appointment to a
non-existent corporate office. WPP’s by-laws provided for only one
Vice-President. At the time of Galera’s appointment on 31
December 1999, WPP already had one Vice-President in the
person of Webster. Galera cannot be said to be a director of WPP
also because all five directorship positions provided in the by-laws
are already occupied. Finally, WPP cannot rely on its Amended By-
Laws to support its argument that Galera is a corporate officer. The
Amended By-Laws provided for more than one Vice-President and
for two additional directors. Even though WPP’s stockholders voted
for the amendment on 31 May 2000, the SEC approved the
amendments only on 16 February 2001. Galera was dismissed on
14 December 2000. WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang did
not present any evidence that Galera’s dismissal took effect with
the action of WPP’s Board of Directors.1avvphi1
The appellate court further justified that Galera was an employee
and not a corporate officer by subjecting WPP and Galera’s
relationship to the four-fold test: (a) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished. The appellate court found:
x x x Sections 1 and 4 of the employment contract mandate where
and how often she is to perform her work; sections 3, 5, 6 and 7
show that wages she receives are completely controlled by x x x
WPP; and sections 10 and 11 clearly state that she is subject to the
regular disciplinary procedures of x x x WPP.
Another indicator that she was a regular employee and not a
corporate officer is Section 14 of the contract, which clearly states
that she is a permanent employee — not a Vice-President or a
member of the Board of Directors.
xxxx
Another indication that the Employment Contract was one of
regular employment is Section 12, which states that the rights to
any invention, discovery, improvement in procedure, trademark, or
copyright created or discovered by petitioner GALERA during her
employment shall automatically belong to private respondent WPP.
Under Republic Act 8293, also known as the Intellectual Property
Code, this condition prevails if the creator of the work subject to the
laws of patent or copyright is an employee of the one entitled to the
patent or copyright.
Another convincing indication that she was only a regular employee
and not a corporate officer is the disciplinary procedure under
Sections 10 and 11 of the Employment Contract, which states that
her right of redress is through Mindshare’s Chief Executive Officer
for the Asia-Pacific. This implies that she was not under the
disciplinary control of private respondent WPP’s Board of Directors
(BOD), which should have been the case if in fact she was a
corporate officer because only the Board of Directors could appoint
and terminate such a corporate officer.
Although petitioner GALERA did sign the Alien Employment Permit
from the Department of Labor and Employment and the application
for a 9(g) visa with the Bureau of Immigration – both of which
stated that she was private respondent’s WPP’ Vice President –
these should not be considered against her. Assurming arguendo
that her appointment as Vice-President was a valid act, it must be
noted that these appointments occurred afater she was hired as a
regular employee. After her appointments, there was no
appreciable change in her duties.20
Whether the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
have jurisdiction over the present case
Galera being an employee, then the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
have jurisdiction over the present case. Article 217 of the Labor
Code provides:
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide x x x the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and other maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five
thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by
the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
In contrast, Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, or the Securities
Regulation Code, states:
The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall
retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate
disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved
within one year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission
shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/
rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
The pertinent portions of Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A, mentioned above, states:
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
32
members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it
concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or
associations.
Whether WPP illegally dismissed Galera
WPP’s dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural
due process.
Apart from Steedman’s letter dated 15 December 2000 to Galera,
WPP failed to prove any just or authorized cause for Galera’s
dismissal. Steedman’s letter to Galera reads:
The operations are currently in a shamble. There is lack of
leadership and confidence in your abilities from within, our agency
partners and some clients.
Most of the staff I spoke with felt they got more guidance and
direction from Minda than yourself. In your role as Managing
Director, that is just not acceptable.
I believe your priorities are mismanaged. The recent situation
where you felt an internal strategy meeting was more important
than a new business pitch is a good example.
You failed to lead and advise on the two new business pitches. In
both cases, those involved sort (sic) Minda’s input. As I discussed
with you back in July, my directive was for you to lead and review
all business pitches. It is obvious [that] confusion existed internally
right up until the day of the pitch.
The quality output is still not to an acceptable standard, which was
also part of my directive that you needed to focus on back in July.
I do not believe you understand the basic skills and industry
knowledge required to run a media special operation.21
WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang, however, failed to
substantiate the allegations in Steedman’s letter. Galera, on the
other hand, presented documentary evidence22 in the form of
congratulatory letters, including one from Steedman, which
contents are diametrically opposed to the 15 December 2000 letter.
The law further requires that the employer must furnish the worker
sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination
of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs
the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Failure to
comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality.23
WPP’s acts clearly show that Galera’s dismissal did not comply
with the two-notice rule.
Whether Galera is entitled to the monetary award
WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang argue that Galera is not
entitled to backwages because she is an alien. They further state
that there is no guarantee that the Bureau of Immigration and the
Department of Labor and Employment will continue to grant
favorable rulings on the applications for a 9(g) visa and an Alien
Employment Permit after the expiry of the validity of Galera’s
documents on 31 December 2000. WPP’s argument is a circular
argument, and assumes what it attempts to prove. Had WPP not
dismissed Galera, there is no doubt in our minds that WPP would
have taken action for the approval of documents required for
Galera’s continued employment.
This is Galera’s dilemma: Galera worked in the Philippines without
a proper work permit but now wants to claim employee’s benefits
under Philippine labor laws.
Employment of GALERA with private respondent WPP became
effective on September 1, 1999 solely on the instruction of the
CEO and upon signing of the contract, without any further action
from the Board of Directors of private respondent WPP.
Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed
before the Bureau of Immigration an application for petitioner
GALERA to receive a working visa, wherein she was designated
as Vice President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she was
constrained to sign the application in order that she could remain in
the Philippines and retain her employment.24
The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment
permit must be acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code
states: "Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for
employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who
desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall
obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor."25
Section 4, Rule XIV, Book 1 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations provides:
Employment permit required for entry. — No alien seeking
employment, whether as a resident or non-resident, may enter the
Philippines without first securing an employment permit from the
Ministry. If an alien enters the country under a non-working visa
and wishes to be employed thereafter, he may only be allowed to
be employed upon presentation of a duly approved employment
permit.
Galera cannot come to this Court with unclean hands. To grant
Galera’s prayer is to sanction the violation of the Philippine labor
laws requiring aliens to secure work permits before their
employment. We hold that the status quo must prevail in the
present case and we leave the parties where they are. This ruling,
however, does not bar Galera from seeking relief from other
jurisdictions.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos.
169207 and 169239. We SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 14 April 2005 as well as the Resolution
promulgated on 1 August 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78721.
SO ORDERED.

33