Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Daniel Gutierez
Monday 4:30 – 7:30
1987 Constitution
Article II, Sec.2, 10. And 18
Article III, Sec. 8
The right of the people, including those employed In private and public sectors, to form
unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be abridged.
Article IX B, Sec. 2B
Article XII, Sec. 12
Article XIII, Sec. 3 and 14
Labor Code
Article 3
The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunitis
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just
and humane conditions of work.
1
freedom of contracts and non-impairment clause of the Constitution. CENTRAL also alleged
that the law violates the equal protection clause since bigger milling districts should provide
bigger shares than smaller ones.
Issue
1) Whether or not R.A. No. 809 is constitutional.
2) Whether or not the Act violates the equal protection clause.
Ruling
1) YES. Republic Act No. 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of
labor conditions in sugar plantations, hence whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on
freedom of contract and existing contractual obligations in constitutionally permissible. The
law was conceived and enacted as a social legislation designed primarily to ameliorate the
condition of the laborers in the sugar plantations, and the fact that at the same time the
planters would also be benefited by it does not detract from if it does not add to such basic
purpose of the Act. Further, the Act seeks to reduce the inequality in the benefits being
received by the Central and the laborers.
“When the welfare of the public is at stake, the state may, in the exercise of its police
power, enact legislation which may cause harm or injury to a certain class of the inhabitants
as long as it benefits the greater majority. The welfare of the people is the supreme law””
(decision of the Lower Court) It is beyond cavil that dealing as it did with the unfortunate plight
of the farm laborers crying for just and urgent amelioration and confronted with the usual
constitutional objections whenever contractual relations are sought to be regulated, Congress
ultimately availed of the state’s police power, in the face of which all arguments about
freedom of contract and impairment of contractual obligation is have generally been held not
to prevail.
It is not police power alone that sustains the validity of the statutory provision in dispute.
Having in view its primary objective to promote the interests of labor, it can never be possible
that the State would be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. Thus,
Section 5 of Article II of the 1935 Constitution, under the aegis of which the law in question
was enacted, made it one of the declared principles to which the people committed
themselves that “the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State.” As long as capital in industry or
agriculture will not be fatally prejudiced to the extent of incurring losses as a result of its
enforcement, any legislation to improve labor conditions would be valid, provided the assailed
legislation is more or less demanded as a measure to improve the situation in which the
workers and laborers are actually found and in the case at bar, there is not even a pretension
that the finances of the centrals would be anywhere in the red as a result of the enforcement
of Republic Act 809.
2) NO. The act does not violate the equal protection clause. The standard used by the
legislature is the amount of production in each distract, naturally, the planters adhered to the
bigger centrals should be given bigger shares, considering that the more a central produces,
the bigger could be its margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for the purpose of
enlarging the share of the planters. Understandably, the smaller centrals may not be able to
afford to have their shared reduced substantially which is evidently the reason why the law
has not been made applicable to centrals having a production of less than 150,000 piculs a
year. The Act does not discriminate against the workers in the centrals by not including them
among the components of labor in the apportionment of the fruits of their joint efforts with the
planters. The laborers in the central performs work the nature of which is entirely different
from that those working in the farms, thereby requiring the application to them of other laws
advantageous to labor, which upon the other hand, do not correspondingly favor plantation or
purely agricultural manpower. Laborers in the centrals are differently situated and are already
protected by other laws.
2
- Fidel Gotangco was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). He was caught with a
piece of lead material at one of the gates PAL Airfield compound. Such material was
presented as an evidence together with a signed statement by him, taken at an investigation,
wherein he admitted his apprehension by a company security guard with a lead material he
intended to take home for his personal use. The employer, PAL, seeks to dismiss Gotangco.
The Court of Industrial Relations decided that Fidel Gotangco was guilty of breach of trust
and violation of the rules and regulations of his employer. But respondent sees authority to
dismiss him on the basis of such guilt. It is believed however, that in this particular case
dismissal is too severe a pentaly to impose on Fidel Gotangco for trying to slip out a lead
material belonging to respondent. Because (1) it is his first time to commit the charge in
question for the duration of his 17 years of service with respondent; (2) the cost of said
material in negligible; (3) respondent did not lose anything after all as the lead material was
retrieved in time; (4) the ignominy and mental torture undergone by Gotangco is practically
punishment in itself; and (5) he has been under preventive suspension to date. For which
reason, it would seem more equitable to retain than dismiss him.”
- Petitioner was ordered “to reinstate Fidel Gotangco immediately without backwages.”
Petitioner insists on the dismissal of Gotangco, hence this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the CIR erred in not dismissing Gotangco.
Ruling
- No. When respondent Court after a conscientious appraisal of the facts did reach a
conclusion that was far from arbitrary and was impressed with an element of generosity to
which the law should not be a stranger, there is no valid ground for us to hold otherwise.
There is in the Constitution the guarantee of security of tenure. Where it could be shown that
the result would neither be oppressive nor self-destructive to the employer it cannot be
asserted that an outright termination of employment is justified.
The reliance of the petitioner in the case of Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Zulueta is
misplaced. In the case, Justice Laurel, declared “The whole controversy is centered around
the right of the Court of Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is
admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties towards his employer. We
concede that the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject
to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.” In another
Manila Trading Company case, Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union, the
same Justice Laurel made clear that the earlier doctrine did not call for automatic application.
The futility of this appeal becomes even more apparent considering the express provision
in the Constitution, requiring the State to assure workers “security of tenure.” Where the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in the light of all the circumstances disclosed,
particularly that it was a first offense after 17 years of service, reached the conclusion, neither
arbitrary nor oppressive, that dismissal was too severe a penalty, this Court should not view
the matter differently.
3
- On May 9, 1984, the labor arbiter rendered a decision dismissing Credo's complaint, and
directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every
year of service.
- Both parties appealed to NLRC. ON November 28, 1984, NLRC rendered a decision directing
NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wages and without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her
attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration but denied.
Issue
1) Whether or not NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering Credo’s reinstatement
with backwages
2) Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction to order Credo’s reinstatement.
Ruling
1) No. NASECO did not comply with the guidelines provided under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just
causes. It mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed 2 written
notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are
the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him.
Likewise, a reading of the guidelines in consonance with the express provisions of law on
protection to labor (which encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader
dictates of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employer’s
decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the
employer has afforded the employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.
In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credo’s
dismissal. Although she was apprised and “given the chance to explain her side” of the
charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus reading illusory
Credo’s right of security of tenure. That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard
and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the injunction to
apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her
defense was dispensed in only a day. Under Section 5, it provides that the worker may
answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable
period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo’s employment was dated November
24, 1983 and made effective December 1, 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on
terminating her services when she was informed on December 1, 1983 of the charges against
her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought of affording her after November 24, 1983
would merely be pro forma or an exercise of futility.
2) Yes. The reliance of the petitioner to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco
where this Court held that “There should no longer be any question at this time that
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service
law and civil service rifled and regulations” is misplaced.
The said ruling should not be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its
promulgation on January 17, 1985. Prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs.
Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the
NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in
government owned or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation
(NASECO).
The 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which National
Housing Corporation vs. Juco is based. Under the 1973 Constitution, it was provided that,
“The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. . . .” On the other
hand, the 1987 Constitution provides that, “The civil service embraces all branches,
4
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charter.”
The civil service does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC
under the general corporation law hence, the NASECO is under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
5
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it
is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not
condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but
only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot
be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the
punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are
clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great
policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are
not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of
their own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at
bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the
labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact
that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all,
should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have
strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If
regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a
prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of
labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.
6
Art 219 e,f
Employer – any person acting in the interest of an employer, direcly or indirectly. The
term shall not include any labor, organization or any of its officers or agents except when
actinf as emplyer.
Employee – any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code explicitly so states. It shall
inlcude any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection to a labor
dispute or because of any unfaur labor practice if he has not obtained any other
substantially equivalent and regular employment.
Feati University v Bautista
Facts
- The President of the respondent Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU wrote
a letter to President of petitioner Feati University, informing her of the
organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The Faculty
Club filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason
therefor the refusal of the University to bargain collectively.
- On that very same day, however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion
to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the
case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University,
it being an educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club,
they being independent contractors; and (2) the presidential certification is
violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an
industrial establishment and there was no .industrial dispute which could be
certified to the CIR.
Issue
Ruling
- An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom
employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. An employer includes
any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly. A
university that engaged the services of professors, provided them work and
paid them compensation or salary for their services is an employer even if it
considers itself a mere "lessee" of the services of said professors.
- Section 2(c) of the Industrial Peace Act does not state that the employers
included in the definition of the term "employer" are only and exclusively
"industrial establishments". On the contrary, the term embraces all employers
except those specifically excluded therein.
- An employee is one who is engaged in the service of another; who performs
services for another; who works for salary or wages.
- Same.—Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach
particular courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the
Industrial Peace Act. Teachers are employees.
7
by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and are on active flight and/or operational
assignments.” The petition which was docketed in the sala of Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador as Case 2939-MC was opposed in the name of the same
association by Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its President) on the
ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the petition. The Judge granted the petition.
Issue
Who is the president of
Ruling
- The term “labor organization” as defined by RA 875 is not limited to the
employees of a particular employer.—This Court cannot likewise subscribe to
the restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term “labor
organization,” which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as “any union or
association of employees which exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.” The absence of the condition which the court
below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being
limited to the employees of a particular employer, is quite evident from the
law. The emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for
which a union or association of employees is established rather than that
membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular
employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A. 875 “representative” is
defined as including “a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of
such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee
whom he represents.” It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a labor
dispute can exists “regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.”
- There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and bylaws of ALPAP which
indubitably restricts membership therein to PAL pilots alone.1 Although
according to ALPAP.
8
- In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing
Rules, which we again quote as follows:
“ ‘(c) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall
have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books
of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting
of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed.’
- Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter
does not become a legitimate labor organization. The only document extant
on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar
Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else. The
instant petition, at least for now, must thus be GRANTED.
*Federation – group of legitimate labor unions in a private establisment
organized for collective baragining or for dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment for their member unions or for participating
in the formulation of of social and employment policies, standards and programs,
registered with the Bureau.
3. Labor dispute
Art 219 L
Labor dispute – Any controvery or matter concerning terms and conditions of
employment or the association or representaton of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
9
Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc v NLRC
Facts
- Petitioner (inport) employees conducted mass action to express their
th
grievance regarding wages, 13 month pay, and hazard pay. A strike was
conducted my MLU. Such strike paralyzed the operations at the said port.
Inport filed a complait before the LA for illegal strike with prayer for a
restraining order, which the NLRC issued.
- Majority of the strikers returned to work (claiming that they did not voluntary
joined the strike), leaving herein private respondents who continued to
protest.
Issue
Ruling
- A strike is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; What a labor
dispute includes.—A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of
labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action
of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute
includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employers and employees.
- But strike must conform with the requisites: Must have notice and cooling off
period = illegal strike
10
C. Labor relations
1. Dipsute Settlement Methodology
Art 218 a
It is the policy of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bagraining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation,
as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.
2. Collective Bargaining
Kiok Loy v NLRC
Facts
- In a certification election, KILUSAN, a legitimate late labor federation, won
and was subsequently certified in a resolution by the BLR as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant (Company).
- Thereafter, the Union furnished the Company with copies of its proposed
CBA. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals.
The request were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.
- Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the
bargaining table, the Union filed a “Notice of Strike”, with the BLR on ground
of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
- The NLRC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:WHEREFORE, the respondent [company] is hereby declared guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now
Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.
Issue
WON the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling
- No. Collective bargaining, is one of the democratic frameworks under the
New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and
management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial
peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is
characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of
the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse “to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,
hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under
such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement,
if requested by either party.
3. Trade Unionism
Art 218 b,c
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the
promotion of social justice and development
4. Worker Enlightenment
Art 218 d
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligation as union
members and as employees.
11
It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officer to inform its members on the
provisions of its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing
labor relations system and all their rights and obligations under existing labor laws.
For this purpose, registered labor organizations may assess reasonable dues to finance
labor relations seminars and other labor education activities.
Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a ground for
cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officers from office, whichever is appropriate.
At least thirty percent (30%) of the members of a union or any member or members specially
concerned may report such violation to the Bureau. The Bureau shall have the power to hear
and decide any reported violation to mete the appropriate penalty.
Criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of above rights and conditions of
membership shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
Art 292 a
All unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees, union dues, assessments
and fines and other contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and
hospitalization benefits, welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative undertakings.
Bvrxxs1-3
Sec 1. Labor Education of Workers and Employees.
The Department shall develop, promote and implement appropriate labor education and
research programs on the rights and responsibilities of workers and employers. It shall be
the deuty of every legitimate labor organization to implement a labor education program
for its member on their rights and obligations as unionist and as employees.
12
- Controversy arose when petitioner insisted that the above provision are to be
interpreted differently. After due hearing, respondent Arbitrator rendered a
decision on May 19, 1990, upholding the union's interpretations of Article VIII,
Section 4 and Article XVII, Section 4, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
- In this petition for certiorari, petitioner assails the respondent Arbitrator's
construction of Section 4, Article VII (on emergency leave) and Section 4,
Article XVII (on the Union Education and Training Fund) of the CBA.
Issue
WON the arbitrator committed a grave abuse of discretion by ruling that the
respondent company should contribute to the Union Education and Training
Fund.
Ruling
- No. The Arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the respondent
company should comply with its obligation to contribute to the Union
Education and Training Fund the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00)
pesos per year by paying said amount to the Union at the beginning of each
and every year, or contributing P1,000.00 at the end of each and every
month during the lifetime of the CBA, at the option of the company. As
correctly observed by the Arbitrator, the employer's demand for the
submission of a seminar program "is foreign to the language of the
contract" with the union.
13
decision in NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of Labor and
the Office of the President of the Philippines, signifies a grant of authority to
dismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Consequently, and as correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, private respondent acted in good faith when it terminated the
employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of the strike by the
Court of First Instance.
- The substantive law on the matter enforced during the time of petitioner's
dismissal was Article 267 [b] of the Labor Code [in conjunction with the rules
and regulations implementing said substantive law.] Article 267 reads: "No
employer that has no collective bargaining agreement may shut down his
establishment or dismiss or terminate the service of regular employees with
at least one [1] year of service except managerial employees as defined in
this book without previous written clearance from the Secretary of Labor."
6. Industrial Peace
Art 218 f
To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace;
14
The Ministry shall help promote and gradually develop, with the agreement of labor
organizations and employers, labor-management cooperation programs at appropriate
levels of the enterprise based on shared responsibility and mutual respect in order
to ensure industrial peace and improvement in productivity, working conditions
and the quality of working life.
8. Wage Fixing
Art 218 b
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy
and the promotion of social justice and development;
15
9. Labor Injunction
Art 266 Injunction Prohibited
No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as
otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.
16
The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to
constitute an agreement entered into by the complainant and the
surety upon which an order may be rendered in the same suit or
proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to
assess damages, of which hearing, complainant and surety shall
have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose.
But nothing herein contained shall deprive any party having a claim
or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to
pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity: Provided,
further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a writ
of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its
Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as
he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their
witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the
Commission.
17
witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of
the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition
thereto,
- While no injunction may issued against any strike except when a labor
dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the national interest and
such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court
of Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875;
the respondent has sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act
No.875, respondent court had jurisdiction over the Company's "Urgent
Petition" .
10. Tripartism
Art 290 a, b Tripartism, Tripartite Conferences, and Tripartite Industrial Peace Councils.
a) Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a State policy. Towards this
end, workers and employers shall, as far as practicable, be represented in
decision and policy-making bodies of the government.
b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
may from time to time call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite
conference of representatives of government, workers and employers, and
other interest groups as the case may be, for the consideration and adoption
of voluntary codes of principles designed to promote industrial peace based on
social justice or to align labor movement relations with established priorities in
economic and social development. In calling such conference, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may consult with accredited representatives of workers
and employers.
A. Basis of Right
1. Constitution
Article III, Sec. 8, 1987
Article XIII, Sec. 3, 1987
Article III, Sec. 6, 1935
Article IV, Sec. 7, 1973
2. Statutory
Art 253 Coverage and Employee´s Right to Self – Organization
All persons employed in commerical, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious,
charitable, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have
the right to self organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers,
self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and benefit.
Art 255 Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to Join any Labor organization; Right of
Supervisory Employees
Managerial employees are not eligible to joinn, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in the collective
18
bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
collective bargaining units and/or legitimate labor organizations of their own. The rank and
file union and supervisors´union operating within the same establishment may join the same
federation or national union.
Republic Act No. 10911 – Anti Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 2016
19
instituted by Metrolab illegal on grounds that these unilateral actions
aggravated the conflict between Metrolab and the Union who were, then,
locked in a stalemate in CBA negotiations.
- Whether or not the Public Respondent Secretary of DOLE gravely
abused her discretion in including executive secretaries as part of the
bargaining unit of the rank and file employees
Ruling
- Prohibition to join labor organization extends to confidential employees
or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required
to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees.—
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and
assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has
extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by
reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act
in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise
privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
- legal secretaries are neither managers nor supervisors. Their work is
basically routinary and clerical. However, they should be differentiated from
rank-and-file employees because they are tasked with, among others, the
typing of legal documents, memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of
records and files, the giving of and receiving notices, and such other duties
as required by the legal personnel of the corporation. Legal secretaries
therefore fall under the category of confidential employees.
20
o These members of private respondent union are therefore not prohibited from
forming their own collective bargaining unit since it has not been shown by
petitioner that “the responsibilities (of these monthly-paid-employees) inherently
require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment as supervisors” or
that “they possess the power and authority to lay down or exercise management
policies.” Similarly, We held in the same case that “Members of supervisory
unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall
become eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file labor organization, and if
none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file
organizations.’’´´
o Where private respondents-employees were not privy to the agreement
between petitioner and the previous bargaining representatives as to their
exclusion from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from forming
their own union, they can never bind subsequent federations and union.
- To avoid confusion and fulfill the policy of the Labor Code and to be
consistent with the ruling in the Bulletin case, the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees should be allowed to join the union of daily paid rank-and-file
employees or to form their own rank-and-file union.—However, to prevent
any difficulty and to avoid confusion to all concerned.
Pan – American World Airways Inc v Pan- American Employees Association (April 29,
1969)
o Right to form unions; Freedom would be nugatory if employees cannot
choose their own officials.—The greater offense is to the labor movement
itself, more specif ically to the right of self-organization. There is both a
21
constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions
to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom to form
organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own
leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.
22
o A labor union can be considered an employer of persons who work for
it.—There is nothing in the records which support the Deputy Minister's
conclusion that the petitioner is not an employee of respondent ALU. The
mere fact that the respondent is a labor union does not mean that it
cannot be considered an employer of the persons who work for it. Much
less should it be exempted from the very labor laws which it espouses as a
labor organization.
o Petitioner as an employee of respondent labor union in case at bar,
proven.—In the case at bar. the Regional Director correctly found that the
petitioner was an employee of the respondent union as reflected in the
latter's individual payroll sheets and shown by the petitioner's membership
with the Social Security System (SSS) and the respondent union's share of
remittances in the petitioner's favor. Even more significant, is the respondent
union's act of filing a clearance application with the MOL to terminate the
petitioner's services. Bautista was selected and hired by the Union. He was
paid wages by the Union, ALU had the power to dismiss him as indeed it
dismissed him. And definitely, the Union tightly controlled the work of
Bautista as one of its organizers. There is absolutely no factual or legal basis
for Deputy Minister Inciong's decision.
4. Supervisors
23
Art 255
Art 219 m
Managerial employee is one vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is
not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgement. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this book.
24
greatly impaired if the employee's loyalties are torn between the
interests of the union and the interests of management.
25
suppressed. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals no
evidence that rules out the commonality of interests among the rank-and-file
members of the petitioner and the herein declared rank-and-file employees
who are members of the respondent union. Instead of forming another
bargaining unit, the law requires them to be members of the existing
one.
26
D. Workers With No Right of Self – Organization
1. Managerial and Confidential Employees
Art 255
Art 82
Managerial employees consists of those whose primar duty consists of management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof, and to
other officers or members of the managerial staff.
27
detrimental to the policy, interest or business objectives of the company or
corporation, hence they also cannot join.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants
constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
Ruling
o On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within
the term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a
union.
o There is no question that the said employees, supervisors and the exempt
employees, are not vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall,
discharge or dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not qualified to be
classified as managerial employees who iss employees. They are, therefore,
not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article
245[4] of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization.
o Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
28
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee.
o Confidential employees, by the very nature of their functions, assist
and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential
matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of
labor relations. Therefore, the rationale behind the ineligibility of
managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union was held
equally applicable to them.
o Access to information which is regarded by the employer to be
confidential from the business standpoint, such as financial
information or technical trade secrets, will not render an employee a
confidential employee.
o If access to confidential labor relations information is to be a factor in
the determination of an employees confidential status, such
information must relate to the employers labor relations policies.
2. Workers/Members of Cooperatives
Coop. Rural Bank of Davao v Ferrer – Calleja (Sep 26, 1988)
Facts
Issue
WON employees are disqualified from forming labor unions.
Ruling
29
o Members of cooperatives are disqualified from forming labor
organizations.
o Under sec 2 of PD No. 175, a cooperative is defined to mean organizations
composed primarily of small producers and of consumers who
voluntarily join together to form business enterprises which they
themselves own, control and patronize,
o An EE of such cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof
cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner
cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.
o HOWEVER, in so far as it involves cooperatives with EEs WHO ARE
NOT MEMBERS OR CO OWNERS THEREOF, such Ees are entitled to
exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective barganing,
negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Consitution and
existing laws of the country,
3. Non-Employees
Art 253
Singer Sewing Machine Company v Drilon (Jan 24, 1991)
Facts
Issue
Ruling
4. Fiduciary Employees
Metrolab Industries v Confessor (Feb 28, 1996)
30
o Fiduciary EE is an EE who holds a legal or ethical relationship of trust
with the ER. Those who by reason of their positions or nature of their
works are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial
EEs.
31
f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice pr discriminate against an employee for
having given or being about to give a testimony under this Code
g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code
h) To pay negotiation or attorney´s fees to to the union or its officers or agents as part of
the settlement of any issue in collective bagraining or any other dispute or
i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement,
Only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have
actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor prctices shall be held criminally
liable.
A. Policy
Art 218 b,c
2. Labor Union
BVR i
3. National Union/Federation
BVR kk
32
4. Legitimate Labor Organization
Art 219 h
Legitimate labor organization means any labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment, and which includes any branch or local thereof.
5. Mixed Membership
Toyota Motor Phils Corp v Toyota Motor phils Corp Labor Union (Feb 19, 1997)
33
o This in mind, the Labor Code has made it a clear statutory policy to prevent
supervisory employees from joining labor organizations consisting of rank-
and-file employees as the concerns which involve members of either group
are normally disparate and contradictory. a labor organization composed of
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all.
It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
6. Company Union
Art 219 i
Company union means any labor organization whose formation, function or administration
has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this Code.
C. Union Rationale
Mactan Workers Union v Aboitiz (June 30, 1972)
Facts
Issue
Ruling
United Seamen´s Union of the Phil v Davao Shipowners Assn (Aug 31, 1967)
o USUP was aware of the existence of a valid collective bargaining agreement
between the Shipowners and the Association which would operate as a legal
bar for the Shipowners to entertain USUP's demands. Knowing as it did that
its demands could not be entertained by the Shipowners, USUP at that early
stage could not have had any legitimate excuse for seeking recognition as
the sole collective bargaining agent of the employees.
o A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of
promoting the interests of labor without unnecessary labor disputes. That is
why it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining
agreements. But if it is made use of as a subterfuge, or as a means to
subvert valid commitments, it defeats its own purpose, for it tends to
undermine the harmonious relations between management and labor. The
situation does not deserve any approving sanction from the Court.
34
D. Labor Union and Government Regulation
1. Union Registration and Procedure
a. Requirements
Art 240 Requirements of Registration
A federaton, national union or industry trade union center or an independent union shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law
to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on
the ff requirements: (5)
a) 50 pesos registration fee
b) The names of its officers, their adresseses, the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the organizational meetinfs and the list of
workers who participate in such meetings;
c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members
comprising at least 20 percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate
d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of
its annual financial reports and
e) Four copies of the constitution and by laws ot the applicant union, minutes
of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in
it.
b. Registration Proceeding
BVRISI (qq)
Registration refers to the process of determining whether the application for registration
of a union or workers association and collective bargaining agreement complies with the
documentary requirement for registration prescribed by the rules.
35
DOLE, that the application is filed during the last sixty (60) days of
the agreement.
o But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter
of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for
registration are no longer required. Absent compliance with these
mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a
legitimate labor organization.
a) The labor federation or national union concerned shall issue
a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment
of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to the
Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance
of such charter certificate.
b) An independently registered union shall be considered an
affiliate of a labor federation or national union after
submission to the Bureau of the contract or agreement of
affiliation within thirty (30) days after its execution.
c) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union
shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the
procedure governing the reporting of independently registered
unions, federations or national unions shall be observed."
o In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers
submitted to the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president,
were not certified under oath by the secretary. Does such defect
warrant the withholding of the status of legitimacy to the local or
chapter? YES. The submission of the required documents becomes
the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for registration.
The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing
with is a bona-fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The certification
and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to
unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or
fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use
the union for dubious ends.
o In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify
the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a
legitimate status. We are not saying that the scheme used by the
respondents is per se illegal for precisely, the law allows such strategy.
Our only recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with
what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
o Thus, where as in this case the petition for certification election was filed
by the federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be
filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate labor
organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of
the mother union.
o The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local
union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the
petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union
must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this
right.
Phoenix Iron and Steel Corp v Sec. Of Labor (May 16, 1995)
o Compared with what happened in the Progressive case, this situation
before us now is even worse. There are no books of account filed before
36
the BLR, the constitution, by-laws and the list of members who
supposedly ratified the same were not attested to by the union president,
and the constitution and by-laws were not verified under oath.
o Since the `procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions' refers to the certification and attestation
requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that
the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts
submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these
requirements.
o The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed
documents upon union registration exists in the case of union
affiliation.
37
election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union.
o While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions for
certification election, they should not, however, be considered parties
thereto with the concomitant right to oppose it.
o What is required to be certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer and attested to by the local’s president are the
“constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and
the books of accounts” of the organization — the charter certificate
issued by the mother union need not be certified under oath.
BRVIV5 5and5
Sec 5 Denial of Application or Return of Notive
Where the documents supporting the application for registration or notice of change
of name, affiliation, merger and consolidation are incomplete or do not contain the
required certification and attestation, the Regional Office or the bureau shall, within
1 day from receipt of the application or notice, notify the applicant or labor
organization ocncerned in writing of the necessary requirements and to complete
the same within 30 days from receipt of notice. Where the applicant or labor organization
concerned fails to complete the requirements within the time prescribed, the
application for registration shall be denied, or the notice of the change of name,
affiliation, merger or consolidation returned, without prejudice to filing a new
application or notice.
38
o The local union’s by-laws shall not apply in the investigation of
charges against its members filed by its officers, who, under said
by-laws will also act as judges. In such a case, the mother union’s by-
laws shall apply.
o A mere minority of a local union’s membership cannot disaffiliate
their union from its mother union.
g. Effect of Registration
Pambansang Kapatiran et al v Sec of Labor (Feb 1, 1996)
o Certification Election; Petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the
expiry date of such agreement.—Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides
that “(n)o petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall
be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of
the sixty (60)-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such
five-year term of the collective bargaining agreement.”
o A local union maintains its separate personality despite affiliation with a
larger national federation.
39
organization instead of the submission of the original certificate is
not a fatal defect and does not in any way affect its legitimate status
as a labor organization conferred by its registration with DOLE. The
issuance of the certificate of registration evidently shows that FEU-IND
has complied with the requirements of Art. 234 of the Labor Code. The
requirements for registration being mandatory, they are complied
with before any labor organization, association or group of unions
or workers acquires legal personality and be entitled to the rights
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.
o The submission of a xerox copy of the union’s certificate of
registration to prove its legitimacy is sufficient, hence, the Med-
Arbiter correctly granted the petition for certification election.
40
- NO.There is no record in the Bureau of Labor Relations that the Amigo Employees
Union (Independent Union) is registered, and this is not disputed by petitioners. As
such unregistered union, it acquires no legal personality and is not entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organisations upon issuance
of the certificate of registration.
- Article 234 of the New Labor Code provides:
Requirements of Registration - Any applicant labor organisation, association, or
group of union or workers shall incquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organisations upon issuance
of the certificate of registration.
Tropical Hut Employee Union v Tropical Hut Food Market Inc. (Jan 20, 1990)
Facts
- The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market Incorporated organized a
local union called the Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU), elected their officers,
adopted their constitution and by-laws and immediately sought affiliation with the
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). NATU accepted the THEU application
for affiliation. A Registration Certificate was issued by DOLE in the name of the
Tropical Hut Employees Union — NATU. It appears, however, that NATU itself as
a labor federation, was not registered.
- A CBA was concluded between the parties which contained these clear and
unequivocal terms:
Sec. 1. The COMPANY recognizes the UNION as the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all matters
concerning wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment.
Union Membership and Union Check-off
Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at the time
of the signing of this Agreement or who become so thereafter shall be
required to maintain their membership therein as a condition of continued
employment.
Sec. 3—Any employee who is expelled from the UNION for joining another
federation or forming another union, or who fails or refuses to maintain his
membership therein as required, . . . shall, upon written request of the
UNION be discharged by the COMPANY.
- NATU received a letter that THEU was disaffiliating from the NATU federation and its
affiliation with the Confederation of General Workers (CGW). The general
membership of the so-called THEU-CGW held its annual election of officers, with
Jose Encinas elected as President. Encinas, in his capacity as THEU-CGW
- President, informed the respondent company of the result of the elections. Pacifico
Rosal, President of the CGW, wrote a letter in behalf of complainant THEU-CGW to
the respondent company demanding the remittance of the union dues collected by
the Tropical Hut to the THEU-CGW, but this was refused by the respondent
company.
- NATU VP Lontok, Jr., informed Encinas in a letter, concerning the request made by
the NATU federation to the respondent company to dismiss Encinas in view of his
violation of Section 3 of Article III of the CBA. Encinas was also advised in the letter
that NATU was returning the letter of disaffiliation. In view of NATU's request, the
respondent company suspended Encinas pending the application for clearance with
the DOLE to dismiss him. Members of the THEU-CGW passed a resolution
protesting the suspension of Encinas and reiterated their ratification and approval of
their union's disaffiliation from NATU and their affiliation with the CGW.
- Upon the request of NATU, respondent company applied for clearance with the
Secretary of Labor to dismiss the other officers and members of THEU-CGW. The
company also suspended them effective that day. Petitioner THEU-CGW wrote a
letter to Juan Ponce Enrile, Secretary of National Defense, complaining of the unfair
41
labor practices committed by respondent company against its members and
requesting assistance on the matter. The aforementioned letter contained the
signatures of one hundred forty-three (143) members.
- Secretary of THEU-NATU, notified the entire rank and file employees of the company
that they will be given forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of the notice within which to
answer and affirm their membership with THEUNATU.
- When the petitioner employees failed to reply, Arturo Dilag advised them thru letters
that the THEUNATU shall enforce the union security clause set forth in the CBA, and
that he had requested respondent company to dismiss them.
- Respondent company, thereafter, wrote the petitioner employees demanding the
latter's comment on Dilag's charges before action was taken thereon. However, no
comment or reply was received from petitioners. In view of this, Estelita Que,
President/General Manager of respondent company, upon Dilag's request,
suspended twenty four (24) workers on March 5, 1974, another thirty seven (37) on
March 8, 1974 and two (2) more on March 11, 1974, pending approval by the
Secretary of Labor of the application for their dismissal. As a consequence thereof,
petitioners filed a case of ULP against Tropical Hut Food Market, Incorporated,
Estelita Que, Hernando Sarmiento and Arturo Dilag.
- LA DECISION: LA issued an order holding that the issues raised by the parties
became moot and academic with the issuance of NLRC Order dated February 25,
1974, which directed the holding of a certification election among the rank and file
workers of the respondent company between the THEU-NATU and THEU-CGW. He
also ordered: a) the reinstatement of all complainants; b) for the respondent company
to cease and desist from committing further acts of dismissals without previous order
from the NLRC and for the complainant THEU-CGW to file representation cases on a
case to case basis during the freedom period provided for by the existing CBA
between the parties.
- NLRC DECISION: Ordered respondent company under pain of being cited for
contempt for failure to do so, to give the individual complainants a second chance by
reemploying them upon their voluntary reaffirmation of membership and loyalty to the
THEU-NATU and the National Association of Trade Union in the event it hires
additional personnel.
Issue
1) Whether or not the disaffiliation of the local union from the nation federation valid?
2) Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner employees resulting from their union’s
disaffiliation from the mother union illegal and constituted unfair labor practice?
Ruling
- YES. The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-settled.
A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest
of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant.
This right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association
(Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, No. L-45824, June 19, 1985,
137 SCRA 42).
- All employees enjoy the right to self organization and to form and join labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to
engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental
right of labor that derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the
protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws
or rules or regulations, We have always adopted the liberal approach which favors
the exercise of labor rights.
- There is nothing in the constitution of the NATU or in the constitution of the THEU-
NATU that the THEU was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation (pp.
62, 281, Rollo), The alleged non-compliance of the local union with the provision in
the NATU Constitution requiring the service of three months notice of intention to
withdraw did not produce the effect of nullifying the disaffiliation for the following
grounds: firstly, NATU was not even a legitimate labor organization, it appearing that
42
it was not registered at that time with the Department of Labor, and therefore did not
possess and acquire, in the first place, the legal personality to enforce its constitution
and laws, much less the right and privilege under the Labor Code to organize and
affiliate chapters or locals within its group, and secondly, the act of non-compliance
with the procedure on withdrawal is premised on purely technical grounds which
cannot rise above the fundamental right of self-organization.
43
- Management’s suggestion that union file necessary complaint in court in view of fact
that there are several unions claiming to represent employees does not constitute
failure or refusal to bargain in good faith to said union’s demands.—Contrary to the
pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the respondent Marcelo Companies did not
ignore the demand for collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20, 1967.
Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did was to apprise LAKAS
of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining representative in
the appropriate units involved, and suggested the settlement of the issue by means
of the filing of a petition for certification election before the Court of Industrial
Relations. This was not only the legally approved procedure but was dictated by the
fact that there was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with whom the
existing CB As were entered into, was demanding of respondent companies to
collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas &
Associates for MACATIFU and the MFWU, and the complainant LAKAS for MULU
which we understand is the aggrupation of MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU.
- Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of several unions is the legitimate
representative of employees, it is ULP for one of the unions to stage a strike and
demand that employer sit down with it for collective bargaining.—The clear facts of
the case as hereinbefore restated indisputably show that a legitimate representation
issue confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face of these facts and
in conformity with the existing jurisprudence, We hold that there existed no duty to
bargain collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of said companies. And
proceeding from this basis, it follows that all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS
such as the filing of the Notice of Strike on June 13, 1967 and the two strikes of
September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967 were calculated, designed and intended
to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it
notwithstanding that it was an uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of
Paulino Lazaro was already certified as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent
company. These concerted activities executed and carried into effect at the
instigation and motivation of LAKAS are all illegal and violative of the employer’s
basic right to bargain collectively only with the representative supported by the
majority of its employees in each of the bargaining units.
- A labor union cannot bring an action on behalf of employees who are members of
another union even if said employees signed the complaint.—Firstly, LAKAS cannot
bring any action for and in behalf of the employees who were members of MUEWA
because, as intimated earlier in this Decision, the said local union was never an
affiliate of LAKAS. What appears clearly from the records is that it was Augusto
Carreon and his followers who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto Carreon was not the
recognized president of MUEWA and neither he nor his followers can claim any
legitimate representation of MUEWA. Apparently, it is this split faction of MUEWA,
headed by Augusto Carreon, who is being sought to be represented by LAKAS.
However, it cannot do so because the members constituting this split faction of
MUEWA were still members of MUEWA which was on its own right a duly registered
labor union. Hence, any suit to be brought for and in behalf of them can be made only
by MUEWA, and not LAKAS. It appearing then that Augusto Carreon and his cohorts
did not disaffiliate from MUEWA nor signed any individual affiliation with LAKAS,
LAKAS bears no legal interest in representing MUEWA or any of its members.
44
The following may consititute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (3)
a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption
or ratification of the constitution, by laws or amendments thereto, the
minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification
b) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the election of
officers, minutes of the election of the officers and the list of voters
c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
BVRISI (g)
Cancellation proceedings refer to the legal process leading to the revocation of of the
legitimate status of a union or worker´s association.
BVRXIVS1-3
Sec 1. Cancellation or Registration; Where to File
Subject to the requirements of notice and due process, the registration of any legitimate
independent labor union, local/chapter and worker´s association may be cancelled by
the Regional Director upon the filing of a petition for cancellation of union
registration, or application by the organization itself for voluntary dissolution.
The petition for cancellation or application for voluntary dissolution shall
be filed in the regional office which issued its certificate of registration or creation.
In the case of federations, national or industry unions and trade union centers,
the Bureau Director may cancel the registration upon the filinf of a petition for cancellation
or application for voluntary dissolution in the Bureau of Labor Relations.
*Regional Officer refers to the office of the DOLE at the administrative regional level.
45
of Labor and Allied Social Services (CLASS) filed a petition for the
cancellation of the Registration Certificate issued to ADFLO.
The first hearing conducted by the BLR after the case was remanded to it for
further proceedings. However, since CLASS was not yet ready with its
evidence, the hearing was postponed. CLASS then filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence. ADFLO filed an Objection to Admission of Exhibits based on the
grounds that the exhibits were not marked nor identified by any witness
during the hearing of the case where ADFLO had been properly notified. In
the meantime, at the hearing of the case, CLASS failed to appear and only
ADFLO’s President Antonio Cedilla appeared. Unaware that an objection had
already been filed by ADFLO’s counsel, Cedilla manifested that ADFLO will
file its answer to CLASS’ offer of evidence within thirty (30) days. BLR
Director without first ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits of CLASS and
without any further hearing then cancelled the registration of ADFLO.
Issue
Whether or not a certificate of registration can be cancelled without hearing.
Ruling
No. The petitioner´s right to due process was violated in this case.Subject to
the requirements of notice and due process, the registration of any legitimate
labor union, chartered local and worker’s association may be cancelled by
the Regional Director, or in the case of federations, national or industry
unions and trade union centers, by the Bureau Director, by filing of an
independent complaint or petition for cancellation. The cancellation of a
certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor
organization. For without such registration, it loses — as a rule — its rights
under the Labor Code. Under the circumstances, petitioner was indisputably
entitled to be heard before a judgment could be rendered cancelling its
certificate of registration. In David vs. Aguilizan it was held that a decision
rendered without any hearing is null and void.
Under Article 283 of the LC, the certificate of registration of any legitimate
labor organization, whether national or local, shall be cancelled by the
Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor
organization no longer meets one or more of the requirments herein
prescribed,
46
illegal strikes staged on October 12, 1979 and later November 5–7, 1979
was evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for
certification election considering that the same was apparently filed only after
the October 18, 1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which directed the
holding of a certification election.
47
grants, the specific receipts thereof, the projects or activitites proposed to be
supported, and their duration.
48
Art 260 (a) Unfair Labor practices of Labor organization
To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self organization. However,
a labor organization shall have the right ti prescribe its own rules with respect to th acquistiion or
retention of membership.
1. Union Constitution
UST Faculty Union v Bitonoio (Nov 6, 1999)
Facts
Marino, et. al. are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU).
The union has a subsisting five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement with its
employer, the University of Santo Tomas (UST).
Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary General of USTFU, posted a notice
addressed to all USTFU members announcing a general assembly to elect
USTFUs next set of officers. Through the notice, the members were also
informed of the constitution of a Committee on Elections (COMELEC) to
oversee the elections. USTFU filed a separate petition with the Med-Arbiter,
directed against UST and the members of the COMELEC.
The petition alleged that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance
with USTFUs constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been
issued to govern the conduct.
The secretary general of UST, upon the request of the various UST faculty
club presidents issued notices allowing all faculty members to hold a
convocation. Denominated as a general faculty assembly, the convocation
was supposed to discuss the state of the unratified UST-USTFU CBA and
status and election of USTFU officers.
The med-arbiter issued a temporary restraining order against herein
appellees enjoining them from conducting the election but as announced, the
general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. New officers are elected.
The election of the appellants came about upon a motion of one Atty. Lopez,
admittedly not a member of USTFU, that the USTFU CBL and 'the rules of
the election be suspended and that the election be held that day. Former
USTFU officers filed the instant petition seeking injunctive reliefs and the
nullification of the results of the election. They alleged that the holding of the
same violated the temporary restraining order and accusing them of
Usurpation of power.
Issue
1) Whether or Not the Collective Bargaining Unit of all the faculty members in that
General Faculty Assembly had the right in that General Faculty Assembly to
suspend the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of the USTFU regarding
the elections of officers of the union.
2) Whether or not the suspension of the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws
of the USTFU in that General Faculty Assembly is valid pursuant to the
constitutional right of the Collective Bargaining Unit to engage in peaceful
concerted activities for the purpose of ousting the corrupt regime of the private
respondents.
3) Whether or not the overwhelming ratification of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement executed by the petitioners in behalf of the USTFU with the University
of Santo Tomas has rendered moot and academic the issue as to the validity of
the suspension of the Constitution and By-Laws and the elections of October 4,
1996 in the General Faculty Assembly.
Ruling
1) 1. No, Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a
labor union. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and
the concomitant obligations that go with this new status and becomes bound by
the unions rules and regulations. When a man joins a labor union, necessarily a
49
portion of his individual freedom is surrendered for the benefit of all members. He
accepts the will of the majority of the members in order that he may derive the
advantages to be gained from the concerted action of all. Just as the enactments
of the legislature bind all of us, to the constitution and by-laws of the union, which
are duly enacted through democratic processes, bind all of the members. If a
member of a union dislikes the provisions of the by-laws, he may seek to have
them amended or may withdraw from the union; otherwise, he must abide by
them. It is not the function of courts to decide the wisdom or propriety of
legitimate by-laws of a trade union.
2) 2. No for the following reasons. First, the October 4, 1996 assembly was not
called by the USTFU. It was merely a convocation of faculty clubs, as indicated in
the memorandum sent to all faculty members by Fr. Rodel Aligan, OP,. Second,
there was no commission on elections to oversee the election. Lastly the
purported election was not done by secret balloting.
3) 3. No, it should be decided upon by union members.
2. Nature of Relationship
Heirs of Teodore Cruz v CIR (Dec 27, 1969)
Facts
The Santiago Labor Union, composed of workers of the Santiago Rice Mill, a
business enterprise engaged in the buying and milling of palay at Santiago,
Isabela, and owned operated by King Hong Co., filed before the CIR a
petition for overtime pay, premium pay for night, Sunday and holiday work,
and for reinstatement of workers illegally laid off. As of then, the total sum
claimed by the workers.
The CIR ruled in favor of the workers but the worker's decade of travail was
not yet to be at an end, however, despite this Court's affirmance of the
judgment for the workers. The workers claimed that the computation was
lacking. The Workers claimed more assets from the Rice Mill but before the
Chief Examiner’s report was submitted, the Union pressed for the execution
of final judgement and upon filing a mandamus.
The Rice Mill’s motion for review was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Government took direct action in settlement of the case but the Union still
filed urgent motions for claims. The court rejected the appeal and the union
still rejected the quit claim offer by the Mill. One of the union directors
together with 49 of its members questioned the amicable settlement that took
place.
They claim that the Board of Directors did not have any express authority of
the members of the Santiago Labor Union to enter into any compromise and
that it was tainted by apparent bad faith on the part of the President of the
Union.
Issue
Whether or not the Amicable Settlement is Valid despite protests from the 49
members.
Ruling
No, for the Union was denied of formal conference in order to decide from
within. They were not afforded Due process of the law for the proposed
settlement was never held. The Rushed approval had dire consequences to
the union members. There was a failure in the administration of due process
for the rushed imposition of the ruling. There was the lack of authority of the
president to act on behalf of the union. That there was further considerations
that were forgotten such as reinstatement of personnel illegally dismissed.
50
Salunga v CIR (Sep 27, 1967)
Facts
In 1959, SMB entered in a CBA with National Brewery and Allied Industries
Labor Union-PAFLU, which was to take effect for 3 years. Said CBA
contained a closed-shop agreement. Salonga was a member of the union
since 1953. In August 1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union,
which accepted it 8 days after and transmitted the same to the Company on
August 29, 1961, with a request for the immediate implementation of said
agreement.
After being informed by SMB of the implementation of the agreement,
Salunga wrote to the Union to revoke his resignation and for him to continue
being deducted of his monthly union dues. He furnished the Company a copy
of the same. SMB, in turn, notified the Union of its receipt and said that it
shall not take any action on the case and shall consider Salunga still a union
member. The Union told SMB that his membership could not be reinstated
and it insisted on his separation from the service, to which the Company
replied that it is not insisting on his readmission and that following his perusal
of the CBA, Salunga decided on withdrawing his resignation without any
pressure or bad faith.
SMB eventually said that if the Union still considers him as having actually
resigned from the organization, and if it insists that he be dismissed him from
the service in accordance with the closed-shop agreement, it will have no
alternative but to do so. Upon reiteration by the Union of its request for
implementation of the agreement, SMB notified Salunga of his termination.
After seeking intervention from PAFLU, his dismissal was deferred but albeit
his request that SMB maintain the status quo as his appeal was pending, he
was still discharged from his employment.
Soon after, a proceeding for ULP commenced against herein respondents
and in due course, decision was rendered declaring the respondents guilty,
and have ordered for them to cease and desist from further committing such
acts complained of, with affirmative reliefs: readmission and continuation of
petitioner without prejudice to his rights as a member of the union, his
reinstatement to his former position with SMB, and for the decision to be
posted, with a copy of the certificate of compliance to be furnished to the
court after a month. On MR of the respondents, the decision was reversed by
the CIR, which dismissed the case.
Issue
1) WON the CIR erred in reversing the decision of the lower court declaring the
respondents guilty of ULP in effecting the closed-shop agreement provided in the
CBA.
2) WON SMB is guilty of ULP.
Ruling
1) YES. The Court upheld the decision of the lower court and ruled that the Union
acted arbitrarily in not allowing Salunga to continue his membership and it did so
without any just cause therefor. It also held that CIR did not reverse these
findings of fact or even question the accuracy thereof.
2) NO, the Court did not find SMB guilty of unfair labor practice. It did not merely
show a commendable understanding of and sympathy for Salunga’s plight and
even tried to help him, although to such extent only as was consistent with its
obligation to refrain from interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union.
If the resolution appealed from was affirmed, it will nullify the right of
union members to give their views on "all transactions made by the Union;" which
is part and parcel of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution - a
condition sine qua non to the sound growth and development of labor
organizations and democratic institutions.
51
The decision of the lower court was affirmed, and the appealed
resolution of the CIR en banc was reversed, with costs against respondents,
except the Company.
RATIO:
Unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in
discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the
union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground
therefor. If they may be compelled to admit new members, who have the
requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the
coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member,
who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his
resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked.
b. Right to Discipline
Villar v Inciong (April 20, 1983)
Facts
AEU under FUR attempted to have a certification election but due to the
opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied by the Med-Arbiter.
AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting among members and it was there
decided that an investigation of certain people would be held pursuant to the
constitution and by-laws of the Federation, of all of the petitioners and one
Felipe Manlapao, for "continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not
only the incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;"
spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees
of the management', and for causing divisiveness in the union.
A Trial Committee was then formed to investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. AEU-PAFLU and the Company
concluded a new CBA which, besides granting additional benefits to the
workers, also reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA,
including the union security clause reading, to wit:
o All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall
remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members
who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a
member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from his employment
upon written request of the UNION to the Company.
The petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial
Committee for the aforestated investigation of the charges filed against them
but they did not attend and instead requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the
charges which had been formalized by the AEU-PAFLU officers; they
contend that their actions were merely exercise of the right to freedom of
association.
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again
refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted.
Instead, they merely appeared to file their Answer to the charges and moved
for a dismissal.
52
Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial committee,
the PAFLU President found the petitioners guilty of the charges against them
and it was requested that they be terminated in conformity with the security
clause in the CBA. Meanwhile, they were placed under preventive
suspension and denied access to the workplace.
Issue
Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed
the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the preventive suspension and
subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of the exercise of their right to freedom
of association.
Ruling
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It
is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution.
However, a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision
in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA with a union
security clause and the stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal
and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the
collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein
petitioners, for non-union membership.
Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion from the
general membership of the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to the Decision of the
PAFLU national president. PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners
on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and after finding
them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership under the
constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated.
According to the OIC: dtripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental
issue in this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER OR NOT
PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND,
THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF
THE AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.
Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union affiliates
with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the
parent organization.
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or
accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the
superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The
constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it
issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable
contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between
the members of the subordinate union inter se.
'Due process' simply means that the parties were given the opportunity to be
heard. In the instant case, ample and unmistakable evidence exists to show
that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence,
but they themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to them.
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the right of self-
preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of
dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and
destruction of the very union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their
rights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy.
We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate
from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however,
suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security
clause of the CBA.
53
c. Due Process Rule
Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRR v Bugay (fEB 28, 1962)
Facts
Appellant Paulino Bugay was formerly an auditor of the defendant union. He
was at the same time payroll clerk of the Manila Railroad Company.
Sometime in March, 1953, he was requested by the secretary-treasurer of
the company to deliver certain documents which were in his possession
belonging to the union and in compliance therewith he delivered them without
consulting the officers of the union.
Making use of these documents, the management of the company filed with
the City Fiscal of Manila against Vicente K. Olazo, president of the union, a
charge for falsification of commercial document.
The City fiscal, after proper investigation, dismissed the charge.
Subsequently, charges for disloyalty and conduct unbecoming a union
member were preferred against appellant Bugay, and later the corresponding
investigation, appellant was expelled from the union. As a result, appellant
filed a charge for unfair labor practice against the union before the Court of
Industrial Relations
After due hearing, rendered decision holding that appellant's expulsion was
illegal it appearing that the same has not been approved by the majority of
the chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws. Hence,
the court ordered the reinstatement of appellant as union member and the
restoration to him of all his rights and privileges.
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. It is to be noted that both
in the investigation held by the investigation committee of the Kapisanan and
in the board meeting of June 14, 1953, where the committee's report
recommending expulsion was approved, Bugay was not present. As has
been pointed out earlier, the reason for Bugay's failure to attend the
investigation does not appear of record. On the other hand, during the board
meeting, the committee of three board members assigned to summon Bugay
failed to serve notice upon him because he was then in Lucena, Quezon.
Why all these proceedings were continued by the respondents inspite of
Bugay's absence remains unexplained in the record. But one thing is certain,
whatever might be the merits of the charge filed by respondent Olazo against
him, Bugay did not have sufficient opportunity to defend himself. Such
proceedings, being violative of the elementary rule of justice and fair play,
can not give validity to any act done pursuant thereto.
Besides, the contention that majority of the chapters voted in favor of Bugay's
expulsion is not borne by the evidence. An examination of the chapters to the
Kapisanan board of directors (Exhs. 7 to 28) shows that all of the votes,
except those of the Hondagua Chapters and Engineering Manila Yard
Chapter (Exhs. 14 and 17) were not validly cast.
(CFI-no sufficient cause of action, CIR-union is guilty, SC-affirmed CIR)
Issue
WON Bugay’s expulsion was illegal
Ruling
YES, there is unfair labor practice because expulsion was illegal. It was
found that not only has he not been given an opportunity to defend himself
but his expulsion was not submitted to the different chapters of the union as
required by its constitution and by-laws. The result was that because of his
expulsion he was subjected to humiliation and mental anguish with the
consequent loss of his good name and reputation. This is especially so
considering that the members of the union from which he was expelled
amounted to around 20,000 more or less. It is, therefore, an error for the
54
lower court to hold that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action
for the relief claimed by appellant.
DOCTRINE: Expulsion of a member is illegal if he is not given due process it
appearing that the same has not been approved by the majority of the
chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws. Hence, the
court CAN ORDER the reinstatement of appellant as union member and the
restoration to him of all his rights and privileges.
55
duly elected ocers and for ITM-MEA to absorb in the bargaining unit the
challenged voters unless proven to be managerial
Issue
Whether or not the 56 segregated votes for shall be included in the determination of
the results of the election of officer on the ground that their names do not appear in
the records of the Union submitted to the Labor Organization Division of the Bureau
of Labor.
Ruling
Yes. Submission of the employee’s names with the BLR as qualified
members of the union is not a condition sine qua non to enable said
members to vote in the election of union’s officers. It finds no support in fact
and in law. Per public respondent’s findings, the list consists of 158 union
members only, wherein 51 of the 56 challenged voters’ names do not
appear.
Adopting however a rough estimate of a total number of union members who
cast their votes of some 333 and excluding therefrom the 56 challenged
votes, if the list is to be the basis as to who the union members are then
public respondent should have also disqualified some 175 of the 333 voters.
It is true that under Article 242(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, only
members of the union can participate in the election of union officers.
The question however of eligibility to vote may be determined through the
use of the applicable payroll period and employee's status during the
applicable payroll period. The payroll of the month next preceding the labor
dispute in case of regular employees and the payroll period at or near the
peak of operations in case of employees in seasonal industries. Considering
that none of the parties insisted on the use of the payroll period-list as voting
list and considering further that the 51 remaining employees were correctly
ruled to be qualified for membership, their act of joining the election by
casting their votes after the agreement is a clear manifestation of their
intention to join the union.
They must therefore be considered IPSO FACTO members thereof said
employees having exercised their right to unionism by joining ITM-MEA their
decision is paramount. Their names could not have been included in the list
of employees submitted on to the Bureau of Labor for the agreement to join
the union was entered into only on May 10, 1986. Indeed, the election was
supervised by the Department of Labor where said 56 members were
allowed to vote.
b. Disqualification of Candidate
Manalad v Trajano (June 28, 1989)
Facts
The parties herein are employees of United Dockhandlers, Inc. They are
members of rival groups in the Associated Port Checkers and workers’ union
(APCWU) in said company, the petitioners’ faction being led by petitioner
Ricardo Manalad, with respondent Pablo Babula heading the group of private
respondents.
From their submissions, it appears that someties in 1982, the petitioners
were disqualified from running as candidates in the election of APWCU
officers by the Med-Arbiter.
However, on appeal, said order was set aside by the Director of Bureau of
Labor Relation on October 31, 1984.
The candidates of the petitioners, that is, Manalad, Leano, and Puerto won
over those of the private respondents, who were Babula, Mijares and
Navarro, for the positions of president treasurer and auditor, respectively.
56
As a consequence, the latter group file a petition for review with the court
assailing the aforesaid order of October 31, 1984 of the Bureau of Labor
Relations which had declared the aforesaid petitioners eligible to run for said
union offices.
The SC in a previous case, however declared vacant all positions and
ordered the winners of the elections to stop acting as officers, and to turn-
over all union funds.
Pursuant thereto, the director of the Bureau of Labor Relations issued an
order on July 10, 1985 to the effect that he was taking over the management
of the affairs of said union, ordering private respondents Babula and all other
persons to cease acting as officers of the union, and requiring them to turn
over the union funds to said director.
Subsequently, the Court’s aforesaid resolution of July 3, 1985 was modified
on July 17, 1985 by providing thath the special election shecduled on July
20, 1985 shall be held under the personal supervision of respondent Director
Trajano.
Private Respondents still won the elections, despite atemtps from petitioners
to have them disqualified for their alleged refusal to comply with the
resolution of the SC.
Director Trajano issued a resolution proclaiming private respondents as the
winners on the special election and duly elected officers of the APCWU, with
the following observation: “The submission that Mr. Babula failed to
completely turn over management of the union to the undersigned is within
the competence and authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon
considering that the mandate for such a turn-over came from the Court.
Meanwhile, the three-year term of the private respondents under the
disputed July 20, 1985 election expired on July, 1988.
Issue
Whether or Not the election of officers should be annulle
Ruling
It is pointless and unrealistic to insist on annulling an election of officers whose
terms had already expired. The SC would have thereby a judgement on a matter
which cannot have any practical legal effect upon a controversy, even if existing
and which, in the nature of things cannot be enforced.
Where the people have elected a man to oce, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
The court agree with the petitioners that disobedience to a resolution of the Court
should not be left unpunished.
However, before the alleged disobedient party may be cited for contempt, the
allegations against him should be clearly established. The contentions of
petitioners, even disregarding some evidential deficiencies, do not adequately
establish the basis for contempt.
On the Contrary, respondents have satisfactorily answered the averments
thereon.
At this juncture, it would further be appropriate to remind petitioners that even if
the disqualification of private respondents could be justified, the candidates of
petitioners certainly cannot be declared as the winners on the disputed election.
The mere fact that they obtained the second highest number of voted does not
mean that they will thereby be considered as the elected officers if the true
winners are disqualified.
c. Expulsion Remedy
Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap ( KMP) v Trajano (Jan 21, 1985)
Facts
57
— On June 30, 1981 a written request for request for accounts examination of the
financial status of the KMP Labor Union, the existing labor union at Franklin
Baker Company in San Pablo City, was filed by private respondent Catalino
Silvestre and 13 other employees, who are also members of the said Union.
Acting on said request, Union Account Examiner Florencio Vicedo of the Ministry
of Labor and Employment conducted the necessary investigation and submitted
a report.
— The report shows that there was a total amount of P1,278.00 of disallowed
expenditures. It also showed that the Union officers failed to keep, maintain and
submit for verification the records of union accounts for the years 1977, 78 and
79, or purposely suppressed the same. Third, it was also found out that
respondent union officers failed to maintain segregated disbursement receipts in
accordance with the 5 segregated union funds which are general fund,
educational funds, mutual aid fund, burial assistance fund and union building
fund, for which they maintained a distinct and separate bank accounts for each.
Lastly, the report showed that the constitution and by-laws of the Union is not
ratified by general membership hence, illegal.
— Private respondent filed for the expulsion of the union officers on the ground that
they committed gross violation of the Labor Code, specifically paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), (h), (j) and (k) of Article 242; and, the constitution and by-laws of the
Union.
— The union officers denied the imputation. They argued that the disallowed
expenditures were made in good faith and it was conduced to the benefit of the
members and they are willing to reimburse the same from their own personal
funds. As to the non-production of accounts, they argue that they were not the
officers since they were only elected in 1980 and not one of the former officers of
the union had turned over to them the records in question. Further, they averred
that the non-ratification of the constitution and by-laws of the union and the non-
segregation of the union funds occurred before they become officers and that
they have already been correcting the same.
— On April 28, 1982, Med-Arbiter Cabibihin ordered the holding of a referendum to
decide on the issue whether to expel or suspend the union officers from their
respective positions. Petitioners appealed the order to Director Trajano of the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
— Private respondents claimed that the appropriate action should be the expulsion
of the union officers and not a referendum.
Issue
Whether or not the union officers should be expelled.
Ruling
— If the union officers were guilty of the alleged acts imputed against them, said
public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of the New Labor Code and in the light
of Our ruling in Duyag v. Incoing, should have meted out the appropriate penalty
on them, i.e., to expel them from the Union and not call for a referendum to
decide the issue. Second, the alleged falsification and misrepresentation of the
disallowed expenditures were not supported by substantial evidence. The
expenditures appeared to have been made in good faith.
— The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults of misconduct to practically overrule the
will of the people.
d. Invalid Election
Rodriguez v DIR, BLR (Aug 31, 1985)
58
Facts
— The 2 cases were consolidated because they involve disputes among employees
of the Philippine Long Distance Company, who are members of the same union,
the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU). The disputes concern the validity of
the general elections for union officers in 1986, and the increase of union dues
adopted and put into effect by the incumbent officers subsequent to said
elections.
— The union’s by-laws provide for the election of officers every 3 years, in month of
July. Pursuant thereto, the union’s Legislative Council set the provincial elections
for its officers on July 14 to 18, 1986, and those for Metro Manila on July 25,
1986. The same Council also quite drastically raised the fees for the filing of
certificates of candidates.
— On July 8, 1986, acting on the complaints, the Med-Arbiter issued a restraining
order against the enforcement of the new rates of fees.
— Notwithstanding the cases questioning the candidates’ fees, the elections for the
provinces of Visayas and Mindanao and certain areas of Luzon were
nevertheless held on July 21 and 22, 1986, which are dates different from those
specified by the Legislative Council (July 14 to 18, 1986). The validity of elections
was challenged on the ground of lack of (1) due notice and (2) adequate ground
rules.
— A temporary restraining order was issued on July 23, 1986 acting on petitions
filed seeking to restrain the holding of the elections scheduled on July 25, 1986 in
Metro Manila. Despite the restraining order, the Union COMELEC proceeded
with the general elections in all the PLDT branches in Metro Manila on July 25,
1986. It then reported that as of July 15, 1986 the number of qualified voters was
9,429 of which 6,903 actually voted, the percentage of turn-out being 73%
— Marquez and Galvadores, and their respective groups, filed separate motions
praying that COMELEC be declared guilty of contempt for defying the TRO, and
for the nullification not only of the Metro Manila elections of July 25, 1986 but
also the provincial elections of July 21 and 22, 1986. On August 28, 1986, Med-
Arbiter Abdullah denied the petitions to nullify the elections. The judgment took
account of the fact that the turn-out of voters was 73%, much higher than the
previous voter turn-out of prior elections. In Med-Arbiter’s view was a clear
manifestation of the union members’ desire to go ahead with the elections and
express their will therein.
— The judgment was overturned by the Officer-in-Charge of Labor Relations on
appeal. The OIC’s decision, dated October 10, 1986 nullified the general
elections in the provinces and Metro Manila on the ground of (1) lack of notice to
the candidates and voters, (2) failure to disseminate the election rules to all
parties concerned, and (3) disregard of the temporary restraining order of the
Med-Arbiter.
Issue
Whether or not the general elections of 1986 was valid.
Ruling
— No. The dates for provincial elections were set for July 14 to 18, 1986. But they
were in fact held on July 21 to 22, 1986, without prior notice to all voting
members, and without ground rules duly prescribed therefor.
— The elections in Metro Manila were conducted under no better circumstances. It
was held on July 25, 1986 in disregard and in defiance of the temporary
restraining order properly issued by the Med-Arbiter on July 23, 1986, notice of
which restraining order had been regularly served on the same date, and the
proofs adequately show. As in the case of the provincial elections, there were no
ground rules or guidelines set for the Metro Manila elections.
— Undue haste, lack of adequate safeguards to ensure integrity of the voting, and
absence of notice of the dates of balloting, thus attended the elections in
provinces and in Metro Manila. They cannot but render the proceedings void.
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The claim that there had been a record-breaking voter turn-out of 73%, even if
true, cannot purge the elections of their grave infirmities.
— Free and honest elections are indispensable to the enjoyment by employees and
workers of their constitutionally protected right to self-organization. That right
“would be diluted if in the choice of the officials to govern . . . (union) affairs, the
election is not fairly and honestly conducted,” and the labor officers and
concerned and the courts have the duty “to see to it that no abuse is committed
by any official of a labor organization in the conduct of its affairs.”
b. Union Funds
Art 250 b,g,h,i,j,l,m,n,o
Art 289
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c. Source of Payament of Attorney´s Fees
Art 250 o, n
Art 228 b
Pacific Banking Corp v Clave ( March 7, 1984)
Facts
— Since January 1979, negotiations between the Pacific Banking Corporation and the
Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (PABECO) for a collective
bargaining agreement for 1979 to 1981.
— Atty Saavedra who was the lawyer for the union, filed his notice of attorney's lien on
March 24, 1920.
— The CBA was finalized on June 3, 1980. The union officials requested the bank to withold
around P345,000 out of total benefits as 10% of the attorney´s fees.
— Presidential Executive Assistant Clave directed that the attorney's fees may be
deducted from the total benefits and paid to Saavedra according to Article 111 of the
Labor Code, faliing to notice that the said article refers to a proceeding for recovery of
wages and not to CBA negotiations.
— Finally Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Venus Jr ordered the bank to pay the
union treasurer the attorneyñs fees less the amount corresponding to the protesting
employees.
Issue
WON attorney´s fees may be collected from the monetary benefits awarded in a collective
bargainin agreement.
Ruling
— Yes. Saavedra is entitled to the payment of his fees. Article 228 (222) ordains that
union funds should be used for that purpose. The union, not the employees, is
obligated to Saavedra.
o ART. 222. Appearances and Fees. - x x x. (b) No attorney's fees,
negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective
bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective agreement shall be
imposed on any individual member of the contracting union. Provided,
however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an
amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or
arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.
d. Examination of Books
Art 250 g, h, n, o
Duyag v Inciong (July 5, 1980)
Facts
— Respondents’ argument: the Bureau of Labor Relations may remove guilty union
officers only when members could not do so under the union’s constitution and
by-laws and that the removal should be subject to review by the SOLE.
— Opinion of the Director of Labor Relations: power of removal belongs to union
members since they were the ones who elected them; the med-arbiter and the
Director are only tasked to assist the union members in enforcing its constitution
and by-laws
Ruling
— The membership of Manalad and Puerto in another union is a sufficient ground
for their removal under the constitution and by-laws of the union
— Respondents violated the rights and conditions of membership in the union within
the meaning of Article 242 Labor Code. Hence, their expulsion is justified.
— Effects of violation of the rights and conditions of union membership: either
ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officer from office,
whichever is appropriate
— Said violation may be reported to be Bureau of Labor Relations by at least 30%
of all the union members or any member or members specially concerned. In
effect, the Bureau shall have the
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o power to hear & decide any reported violation in order to impose the
appropriate penalty.
o after hearing and even without submitting the matter to the union
members, erring union officials may be removed by the Director of Labor
Relations – as clearly provided in Art. 242
— Thus, the Director erred in holding that since the issue of expulsion is a political
one, only the union members can resolve it. It is necessary and desirable that the
Bureau of Labor Relations and the SOLE should exercise close and constant
supervision over labor unions, particularly the handling of their funds, so as to
forestall abuses and venalities.
— In the case at bar, the Director acted correctly in ordering an examination of the
books and records of the union – also in order to verify the charge against
respondents.
e. Deposit Funds
BVRXI
BVRXII
Consolidated Workers union v CIR (March 28, 1969)
There is no merit to the argument of herein petitioner that the order of the
court to deposit union dues into court deprives it of property without due
process of law.
It assumes that the union dues ordered to be deposited are its property,
which is precisely in issue in the main case. Moreover, as pointed out in the
appealed order, if the Industrial Court, after hearing, should ultimately find
that the Consolidated Workers Union is company dominated or is a company
union and order it disestablished, the result would be that petitioner would
have to return all moneys and dues collected by it from the workers, since
the union would have had no authority to represent the workers. Because the
moneys collected might be improperly spent by the time the disestablishment
order is made, it was logical for the court below to order that such moneys be
deposited in the meantime.
f. Union Dues
BVRXII
Rodriguez v DIR, BLR (Aug 31, 1988)
Facts
Issue
Ruling
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— Med-arb ordered the refund to the complainants.
— Sec of Labor affirmed but ordered that refund shall be limited to those union
members who have not signified their conformity to the check off of attys fees.
Issue
WON the check off was valid and legal
Ruling
— CHECK OFF IS ILLEGAL.
— ART. 241 OF LABOR CODE PROVIDES THAT CHECK OFF IN ORDER TO BE
VALID MUST COMPLY WITH 3 REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FOR UNION INCIDENTAL EXPENSES, ATTYS FEES
AND REPRESENTATION EXPENSES.
1.) Authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members
of the general membership meeting called for the purpose
2.) Secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting
3.) Individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the
employees concerned.
IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS NO INDIVIDUAL CHECK OFF AUTHORIZATION
BY THE EMPLOYEES CONCERNED AND SO THE ASSESMENT CANNOT BE
LEGALLY DEDUCTED BY THE EMPLOYER. IT SHOUD BE CHARGED TO
THE UNION’S GENERAL FUND OR ACCOUNT.
b) History
San Miguel Corp v Laguesma
They want one bargaining unit for the whole of Luzon.
Issue: WON smc is correct to have separate bargaining offices
Held: No. The exsitence of a prior baragining history is not conclusive. The
test of grouping is commonality of interest. They have the similar e.
c) Geography – Locationi
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UP Ferrer
If UP Diliman, Los Banos and Manila, its ok. If UP visayas, the no.
d) Corporate entities
Indophil Textile Mills Workers Union v Calica
CBA if there is a plant expansion, then the employees will become part of the
existing bargaining unit. After a while, Acrylic Corp
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