SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

63. Harry Stonehill v. Hon. Diokno, GR L-19550, June 19, 1967, Concepcion, C.J. (Searches and Seizures;
search warrants shall issue only upon probable cause determined by the judge personally; the warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized; else, searches in violation of person’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible in evidence against him- exclusionary rule)
FACTS:
42 search warrants were issued against petitioners and corporations of which they are officers to search the persons named therein and the premises
of their offices for "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)." as the subject matter of the offense and its proceeds or fruits or used or intended to be used as a
means of committing the offense which are described as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the RPC.”

Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for certiorari, prohibition etc. alleging that the search warrants are void as 1) they do not describe with
particularity the things to be seized, 2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized, 3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence,
4) the searches and seizures were illegally made, and 5) the documents, papers, cash seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants.
They pray that an injunction be issued restraining respondent-prosecutors from using the seized items in the deportation cases against them and to
have the search warrants declared void.

The things seized may be grouped into 2: 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations and 2) those found seized in the residences of
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether a search warrant for for "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)." as the subject matter of the offense, which is described as “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue and the RPC.” is valid and constitutional.

HELD: NO.
1. First group of things seized in the offices of corporations.
Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants and seizures for the reason that corporations have their respective
personalities separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners regardless of the amount of shares or interest they have in the corporations
and whatever office they hold therein. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed by third parties. Petitioners cannot object to the use in
evidence against them of those things seized from the offices of the corporations.

2. Second group of things seized in the residence of petitioners.

Petitioners claim that the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and thus void.

Under the constitutional mandate (Art.III, S2), two points are stressed:
1) that no warrant shall issue except upon PROBABLE CAUSE, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein, and 2) that the
warrant shall PARTICULARLY describe the things to be seized.

None of these has been complied with. The same were issued upon applications stating that the persons therein had committed a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, xxx.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in the applications. The averments were abstract. As a consequence,
it was impossible for the judges to have found probable cause, for the same presupposed the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

To uphold the validity of the warrants would uphold the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above- to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. The seriousness of the irregularities of the warrants made this Court amend its rules providing that “a search warrant shall not
issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. We added a paragraph “that no search warrant shall issue for more than one
offense.”

The warrants also authorized the search of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether they were legal or
illegal (“Books of accounts, xxx”). They sanctioned the seizure of all records of petitioners and the corporations whatever their nature, contravening
the command that the things to be seized be PARTICULARLY described.

3. Admissibility.
Respondents-prosecutors claim that even if the searches and seizures were unconstitutional, the documents, papers, and things seized are admissible
in evidence against petitioners, relying on Moncado v. People’s Court.

However, We rule that the Moncado case be abandoned. This was based on the theory that the criminal must not be allowed to go free merely
because the “constable has blundered” and that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches is protected by other means such as the
common-law action for damages, criminal punishment against those who procured the warrant, etc.

Most common law jurisdictions have given up this approach and adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. “Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed. – Judge Learned Hand.”

If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. If he has no
such evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find probable cause, hence no justification for issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime, which is indicative of absence of evidence to establish
probable cause.

The theory that criminal prosecution is sufficient protection against those who secure an illegal search warrant overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power. Even then, if they are convicted, they may be pardoned thru the pardoning power
of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
64. Esteban Morano v. Hon. Vivo, GR L-22196, June 30, 1967, Sanchez, J. (Searches and Seizures;
deportation proceeding and criminal proceeding are separate and distinct; guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure that probable cause be determined by a judge does not apply to deportation proceedings)
FACTS:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China, arrived in the PH on November 23, 1961. With her was her minor son Fu
Yan Fun. They were permitted entry in PH under a temporary visitor’s visa for 2 months.

On January 24, 1962, Chan married Esteban Morano, a Filipino. Born of this union was Esteban Morano Jr. Chan and Yan Fun
obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.

They were warned by the Commissioner of Immigration that if they do not leave the country on or before September 10, 1962, he
will issue a warrant for their arrest. But on September 10, Chan and Esteban and Yan Fun petitioned the CFI for mandamus to
compel the commissioner to cancel their alien certificates of registration and to prohibit the commissioner from issuing warrants
of arrest pending resolution of this case. The CFI declared Chan a citizen of PH upon her marriage with Esteban, but not Yan Fun.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Immigration, as authorized by the Immigration Act of 1940. may validly issue a warrant of arrest
againt Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun for their deportation after the expiration of their visa without violating the constitution.

HELD: YES.
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino does not ipso facto make her Filipino. She must show that she has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications of the Naturalization Law. Chan did not become Filipino.

Also in issue is the constitutionality of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940:
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commission of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as
a nonimmigrant."

Petitioners argue that this violates the constitution which limits to judges (“determined by the judge…”) the authority to issue
warrants of arrest. Thus, the legislative delegation of such power to the commissioner is unconstitutional.

Section 1(3) Art.III (*now section 2, Art.III) does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation
issued in accordance with law. It contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental
to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid
decision by a competent official, like a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commisisoner of Immigration, in pursuance of
valid legislation.

Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination of propriety
of deportation is not a prosecution for, or conviction of, crime, nor is deportation a punishment. The proceeding is in effect simply
a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want. A criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are
separate and independent.

Thus, the constitutional guarantee requiring the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge does NOT extend to deportation
proceedings.

The power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Also, a temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulation as
contained in the cash bond put up by him upon entry, among others, that in case of breach the Commissioner may require the
recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has been filed.
65. In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Andrew Harvey v. Hon. Miriam Santiago, GR 82544, June
28, 1988, Melencio-Herrera, J. (Searches and Seizure; guarantee against search and seizure contemplates
criminal prosecution; deportation proceedings are administrative; arrest for deportation is a preliminary
step toward possible deportation, thus constitutional)
FACTS:
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman are Americans residing in Laguna while Adriaan Van Den Elshout is Dutch also
residing in Laguna. They were apprehended from their residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) by virtue of Mission Orders by respondent Commissioner Miriam Santiago of CID.

Seized during their apprehension were photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses and
boys and girls engaged in the sex at. There were also posters and other literature advertising child prostitutes. They were with
children when apprehended.

Deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens. Warrants of arrest were issued against
petitioners by respondent for violation of the Immigration Act and Revised Administrative Code.

They filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that there is nothing in the PH Immigration Act nor Revised
Administrative Code which legally clothes the Commissioner with authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination
of probable cause leading to an administrative investigation, that respondents violated Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid warrants of arrest, search and
seizure as required by the provision, and that mere confidential information made to CID agents and their suspicion of petitioners’
activities that they are pedophiles are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention.

ISSUE:
Whether a Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation may order the arrest of suspected alien pedophiles
on mere suspicion of their activities without violating the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD: YES.
One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
Probable cause has been defined as referring to “such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in
themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.” The 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure also provide that an arrest without warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person 1) when a person
has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence , and 2) when an offense has, in fact,
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause after close surveillance for three(3) months during which their activities were
monitored. This justified the arrest and seizure of the photo negatives, photographs, and posters without warrant. Those articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and are admissible in evidence.

Even if their arrest was not valid at inception, formal deportation charges against them were filed. The restraint against their persons
became legal. A writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement has become legal although illegal at the beginning.

The contraints both in the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions contemplate prosecutions essentially CRIMINAL in nature. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character.

Respondent Commissioner’s warrant of arrest was issued specifically for violations of the Immigration Act and Revised
Administrative Code. Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the arrest
was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. Section 37 of the Immigration Law empowering the Commissioner of
Immigration to issue warrants of arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation of
aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country.

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing
be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
66. Mayor Abdula v. Hon. Guiani, GR 118821, February 18, 2000, Gonzaga-Reyes, J. (Searches and
Seizure; judge should determine probable cause personally- personally examine fiscal’s supporting
documents or require submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses; determination of probable cause by
a judge has a different objective than such determination by the fiscal- thus, judge must decide
independently)
FACTS:
A complaint for murder was filed against petitioners and 6 others in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, former
COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Prosecutor Panda in a resolution dismissed the charges of murder against
petitioners finding no prima facie case. But Panda recommended filing an information for murder against a certain Kasan Mama.
An information for murder was filed against Mama before respondent Judge Guiani.

Guiani ordered that the case be returned to the provincial prosecutor for further investigation. Judge Guiani noted that although
there were 8 respondents, the information charged only one of the eight respondents without the needed resolution required under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the RoC to show how the prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion.

Prosecutor Dimaraw was assigned to further investigate. Two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of
murder against petitioners and others. After evaluation of the evidence, Dimaraw found a prima facie case for murder against
petitioners. He recommended filing of charges against petitioners.

An information for murder was filed against petitioners with the RTC before Judge Guiani. The following day, judge Guiani issued
a warrant of arrest against petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion for setting aside the warrant, arguing that the information was
prematurely filed and petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the DOJ. A petition for review was filed with DOJ.
Despite this, judge Guiani did not act upon petitioners motion to set aside the warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether a warrant of arrest issued one day after the filing of the information in court despite the petitioners subject of such warrant’s
manifestation that they are yet to file a petition for review with the DOJ of the information is a valid warrant.

HELD:
Petitioners argue that the warrant of arrest was issued without Guiani personally examining the evidence or calling the complainant
and his witnesses. The information was filed at 4pm of January 2, 1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued on January
03, 1995. Respondent claims that there was no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the assistant prosecutor that
a preliminary investigation was conducted and probable cause exists, thus he issued the warrant of arrest.

"Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause “PERSONALLY.” The judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. He shall: 1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or 2) if on such basis he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a different purpose than that which is made by the judge. The
prosecutor passes upon whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should
be held for trial. The judge determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued, whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody to not frustrate the ends of justice.

Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify
issuing a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide independently. He must thus have supporting evidence OTHER THAN the
prosecutor’s bare report.

It is not required that the entire records of the case during preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge.
What is required is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment. A
judge cannot rely solely on the prosecutor’s recommendation.

Judge Guiani relied solely on the certification of the fiscal. Although the fiscal enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties, the Constitution commands the judge to personally determine probable cause. A judge failes this
duty if he merely relies on the certification or report of the investigating officer. The inordinate haste that attended the issuance of
the warrant of arrest and Guiani’s own admission belie any pretense of fulfillment of his duty.

The warrant of arrest was declared null and void.

67. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR 212140-41, January 21, 2015, Carpio, J.
(Searches and Seizures; Probable cause only requires “probability of guilt,” rests on belief, and may even
rest partially or entirely on hearsay if there is substantial basis to credit it) *See case 52
HELD:
The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay is greater than that in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to
establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence”
while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than bare suspicion or “less than evidence which would justify
conviction.”

There are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where probable cause needs to be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A
preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by
law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of arrest or a commitment order, if the accused
has already been arrested, shall be issued and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5 (b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a warrantless arrest when an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant shall be issued,
and only upon probable cause in connection with one speci-c offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or af-rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

In all these cases, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the likelihood or probability of guilt. The
determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. What is merely required is probability of guilt.

The determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense on the admissibility
or veracity of testimonies presented. These matters are better ventilated in trial. Probable cause has been defined as the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry on whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction, but
that it is BELIEVED that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

The determination of probable cause can rest partially or even entirely on hearsay evidence as long as the person making the hearsay
statement is credible. Hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.

Hearsay is admissible in a preliminary investigation because such is merely preliminary and does not adjudicate finally rights and
obligations of the parties. But in administrative cases where such are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence”
which cannot rest on hearsay. Thus, Ang Tibay cannot apply to preliminary investigations as this will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause to substantial evidence of guilt.
68. Nicomedes Silva v. Presiding judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, GR 81756, October 21, 1991, Fernan,
C.J. (Searches and Seizures; must comply with 1) constitutional and 2) statutory requirements of
determining probable cause personally and through searching questions and answers)
FACTS:
Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, chief of PC Narcom Detachment, filed an “application for search warrant” with the RTC against petitioners
Nicomedes and Marlon Silva. This was accompanied with a “Deposition of Witness.” On the same day, the RTC judge issued
search warrant No. 1, directing police officers to search the room of Marlon in the residence of Nicomedes for violation of RA
6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The search warrant was served.

Petitioners moved to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the ground that it was issued solely based on a mimeographed “Application
for Search Warrant “and “Deposition of Witness,” which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and 2) the judge failed
to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
RoC. The RTC denied the motion. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether a search warrant issued based on an “Application for Search Warrant” and a “Deposition of Witnesses” containing
questions and answers answerable by merely filling in the blanks with yes or no is valid.

HELD: NO.
Rule 126 of the RoC provide for the requisites for issuance of a search warrant:
"SECTION 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
"SECTION 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted."

The judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and
witnesses through searching questions and answers.

"The 'probable cause' for a valid search warrant, has been defined 'as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched'. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or
the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay."

In this case, the RTC judge failed to comply with the requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers to determine probable cause. The joint “Deposition of Witness” contained suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing “yes” or “no” in the blanks.
Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search warrant?" A Yes, sir. "Q Do you have
personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated above, and other proceeds of fruit of the offense,
used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as means of committing an offense?" A Yes, sir. "Q Do you know personally
who is/are the person who has have the property in his/their possession and control?" A Yes, sir. "Q How did you know
all this (sic) things?" A Through discreet surveillance."

The deposition not only contained leading questions but was also very broad. The questions were not probing but merely routinary.
It was already mimeographed and all the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine
probable cause by personally examining the applicant and witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Failure to
comply constitutes abuse of discretion.

The officers also abused their authority when, in implementing the search, seized the money of Antonieta Silva, who is not even
named as respondent. The warrant did not indicate seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes, and joints.

Search Warrant No.1 was declared null and void.

69. People v. Normando Del Rosario, GR 109633, July 20, 1994, Melo, J. (Searches and Seizures)
FACTS:
Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions in Criminal case 236-91 and illegal sale of regulated
drugs in 237-91. He pleaded not guilty. The RTC convicted him in both cases.
Prosecution’s version
Upon application of SPO3 Untiveros, RTC Judge Guia issued a search warrant authorizing search and seizure of an “undetermined
quantity” of shabu and its parephernalias in Del Rosario’s house. A raiding team was organized. It was agreed that PO1 Luna will
buy shabu from Del Rosario and after his return from Del Rosario’s house, the team will implement the warrant. During the alleged
buy-bust, Del Rosario handed over to Luna shabu. Luna paid him marked money then returned to the police station and informed
the raiding team that he had already bought shabu.

PO1 Luna with a companion went to Del Rosario’s house to implement the warrant. The search was witnessed by the Brgy. Captain,
Del Rosario, and the latter’s sister Norma. They found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, plastic .22 caliber, three
used ammunition and three wallets, one containing the marked money. There were also napkins and a burner. The seized items
were photographed thereat. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were taped and initialed, forwarded to the NBI
Forensic Chemist, and found positive for shabu.

ISSUE:
Whether Del Rosario may be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition due to the .22 caliber and used ammunition
seized in his home by virtue of a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of “shabu and its paraphernalia.”

HELD: NO.
The prosecution failed to call to the witness stand PO1 Luna, the poseur-buyer. There is thus absence of evidence to establish the
purported sale of shabu. The testimonies of the rest of the buy-bust operation are hearsay since the poseur-buyer was never presented
at the trial. This casts serious doubts that an illegal sale actually took place.

The version of the prosecution, that Del Rosario handed over to PO1 Luna shabu and he paid Del Rosario the marked money, that
Luna then returned to the police station to inform the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu, and that the team then
went to Del Rosario’s house to implement the search warrant is highly incredible. The record is devoid of any reason why the
officers did not make any attempt to arrest Del Rosario at the time he allegedly sold the shabu. This was the most opportune moment
to arrest him. The prosecution’s version is contrary to human experience. The usual procedure in buy-busts is for the officers to
arrest the pusher at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer.

We thus doubt that the shabu in the small canister was actually seized at the residence of Del Rosario. By calling witnesses after
the police had already entered the house, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu. The constitutional precept
that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved requires that to convict an
accused, the circumstances of the case must exclude all and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. The facts in this case
do not rule out the hypothesis that Del Rosario is innocent.

The accused cannot be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The search warrant implemented by the raiding
party authorized only the search and seizure of “the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
shabu and its paraphernalia.” The raiding team was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for its use and no other. A
search warrant is NOT a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to a crime. The constitution mandates that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to
be seized. Thus, the warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned nor described
with particularity in the search warrant. It cannot be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest for the accused’s
arrest was far from regular and legal. The firearm, being illegally seized, is not admissible in evidence.

Del Rosario was acquitted.

70. Ariel Vallejo v. CA, GR 156413, April 14, 2004, Callejo, SR., J. (Searches and Seizures; no need for
technical precision in describing things to be seized, only REASONABLE particularity; this requirement
makes general warrants impossible; search warrant must be for one specific offense)
FACTS:
Vallejo is a lawyer in the register of deeds of Isabela. On February 16, 2000, NBI agent Javier filed a sworn application for search
warrant before the RTC on the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela to seize “1) fake land titles, official receipts in the cashier’s
office, primary entry book, and other pertinent documents related therewith, 2) blank forms of land titles, 3) land transfer
transactions without payment of documentary stamps and capital gains tax, all of which are used in falsification of land titles and
being hidden in said office.”

On the same date, Judge Alban issued Search Warrant 2000-03 against Vallejo. It stated that “ It appearing to the satisfaction of
the undersigned after examining under oath NBI Head Agent Franklin M. Javier and his witness that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that Falsification of Land Titles xxx has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that the Registry of Deeds, xxx, Isabela, has in its possession and control” 1), 2), and 3) above.

Vallejo moved to quash the warrant, which the trial court denied. He filed a MR claiming that the warrant was in the form of a
general warrant. This was denied. The CA dismissed his appeal for being the wrong remedy and subsequently his petition for
certiorari for being filed out of time. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether a search warrant ordering the seizure of: “1 . Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's
Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith; 2 .
Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic) of Deeds; 3 . Undetermined
number of Land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of Documentary
Stamps.” is a valid search warrant.

HELD: NO.
The issue in this case is no less than the legality of the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It behooved the CA to look past of technicality
and to resolve the case on its merits considering Vallejo was invoking a constitutional right. In dismissing Vallejo’s appeal and
motion to admit petition for certiorari, the CA gravely abused its discretion.

Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites of issuing a search warrant. Failure to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required, only that there be
REASONABLE particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized. The requirement that
search warrants particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. The property to be searched for must be so particularly described to preclude the
possibility of seizing any other property.

The search warrant in this case failed to pass this test of particularity. The terms are too all-embracing with the intent of subjecting
all the records pertaining to all transactions of Vallejo’s office to search and seizure. The executing officer’s function is to apply
the description to its subject matter, which function may involve limited discretion in identifying the property described. A
description of such generality, however, as to lodge in the executing officer virtually unlimited discretion as to what property shall
be seized is repugnant to the constitution.

The search warrant must be issued for one specific offense. The questioned warrant is a scatter-shot warrant for having been issued
for more than one offense- falsification of land titles under the Articles 171 and 213 of the RPC and violation of RA 3019. A
warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. The application for the warrant also shows
that the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by Vallejo constituting the mentioned offenses.

Thus, they search warrant was struck down and the NBI ordered to return to Vallejo all items it seized from the subject premises.
71. People v. Roberto Salanguit, GR 133254, April 19, 2001, Mendoza, J. (Searches and Seizures; warrant
to search an object without probable cause does not invalidate the whole warrant if other object has probable
cause; description of place is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended to be searched; once search warrant has been executed, plain view doctrine
no longer allows admission of items found subsequently)
FACTS:
Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant with the RTC to search the residence of Robert Salanguit. He presented as witness SPO1 Badua,
who testified that as poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit in Salanguit’s room. The search
warrant was granted by Judge Español. A group of about 10 policemen searved the warrant.

They found 12 transparent plastic bags with a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box with the same substance, and 2 bricks
of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana weighing 1255 grams. The police then took Salanguit to the police station with the
seized items. The white crystalline substance was found to be shabu and the dried leaves found to be marijuana upon laboratory
examination.

Salanguit was charged with possession of 11.14 grams of shabu and another charge of possession of 1254 grams of marijuana. The
RTC convicted him. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether a search warrant authorizing seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia” despite there being
evidence of probable cause only as to the shabu and describing the place to be searched as only “Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City” is valid.

HELD: YES.
Rule 126, Sec.4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the PH. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are
fulfilled.

Salanguit assails the validity of the warrant: 1) no probable cause; 2) it was issued for more than one specific offense; and 3) the
place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.

1. Probable Cause - present

The warrant authorized seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” It is contended that there is no evidence
of the existence of the drugs. This has no merit.

SPO1 Bauda, the poseur-buyer, did not testify on anything about drug paraphernalia. But the fact that there was no probable cause
to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not make the warrant void. This would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. None was taken. If at all, the warrant would be void inly insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but valid as to the seizure of shabu as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as
to its existence.

It would be drastic if a warrant issued on probable cause particularly describing some items to be seized is to be invalidated in toto
because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by evidence. Thus, the first part of the warrant,
authorizing the search for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to drug
paraphernalia, is not.

2. Particularity of the Place - present

While the address stated is merely “Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the trial court took note that the records contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched: 1) the application for warrant stated that the premises was located between
No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan St.; 2) the witness described the premises as a house without a number located at Binhagan St., and 3)
the pencil sketch of the location.

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.

Thus, the warrant was properly issued, being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

3. Plain view doctrine on the marijuana - invalid

While the warrant authorized seizure of shabu but not marijuana, the seizure of the latter is sought to be justified on the ground that
the drug was seized within “plain view” of the searching party. Under this doctrine, unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. There must
be (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.

a. No prior justification
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and known to the police, it is reasonable to assume that the police
found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the warrant has been executed, the “plain view” doctrine can no
longer provide any basis for admitting the other items SUBSEQUENTLY found. The doctrine supplements the prior justification
– whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or other legitimate reason for being present
– and permits the warrantless seizure. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.

The other possible justification for intrusion is search pursuant to Salanguit’s lawful arrest for possession of shabu. But this is
limited to the PERSON of the one arrested and the PREMISES within his immediate control. The rationale is to prevent the person
arrested from obtaining a weapon or to reach for and destroy incriminatory evidence. The police failed to allege in this case the
time when the marijuana was found, whether before or contemporaneous with the shabu subject of the warrant, or within the person
or immediate area of Salanguit. Its recovery therefore presumable after the shabu had been recovered was invalid.

b. No apparent illegality
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. No presumption of
regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution. The marijuana was found in newsprint, not in a transparent container, thus these could not be readily discernible
as marijuana. Thus, the marijuana is inadmissible, but the confiscation is upheld.

4. Unnecessary force - justified

Rule 126, Sec.7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that if an officer is refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, he may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
part therin to execute the warrant.

The claim of the police that they had to use some force to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially
Salanguit, refused to open the door despite the searching party having knocked several times. The agents also saw suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the party’s forcible entry into the house, founded on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
72. People v. Tiu Won Chua, GR 149878, July 1, 2003, Puno, J. (Searches and Seizures; mistake in name
of person to be searched does not invalidate search warrant)
FACTS:
Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling y Chua were charged with illegal possession of a regulated drug, shabu.

Police, acting on an information that drug-related activities were going on at the HCL Building, Masangkay St., Binondo Manila,
surveyed the place. They conducted a test-buy operation. They were able to buy P2000 worth of shabu from appellants. They did
not immediately arrest the suspects but applied for a warrant to search Unit 4-B of HCL Building. Their application to search the
unit supposedly owned by “Timothy Tiu” was granted by the RTC. They went to the place armed with the warrant. They conducted
the search with the building coordinator and his wife as witnesses.

They searched the sala and 3 bedrooms of Unit 4-B. they found 1 big pack of 234.5 grams of shabu and 16 small packs of 20.3673
grams of shabu, etc.

The defense denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person as stated in the search warrant. He claimed
that he did not live in the apartment subject of the warrant but admitted that Qui Yaling is his mistress. Qui Yaling admitted being
the occupant of the apartment.

The RTC convicted Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. Hence this appeal. It is contended that the search warrant was issued in the name of
Timothy Tiu and did not include Qui Yaling and because of this defect, the search and arrest are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal
search, the evidence cannot serve as basis for their conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether a search warrant to search a certain “Timothy Tiu” when the real name of the subject of the search is Tiu Won Chua may
be executed and is valid.

HELD: YES.
There are only four requisites for a valid warrant: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2) probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A
mistake in the name of the person to be searched DOES NOT invalidate the warrant especially in this case since the authorities had
personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. a “John Doe” warrant satisfies the requirements as long as it
contains a description personae as will enable the officer to identify the accused. A mistake in the identification of the owner of
the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described.

The place to be searched was described properly, thus the warrant cannot be invalidated even if the name is incorrect. They can be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and place to be searched since they conducted a surveillance
and test-buy operation before obtaining the warrant.

But the search conducted on the car was illegal since it was not part of the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the
warrant. It is mandatory that the search be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. This cannot be a search
incidental to a lawful arrest since such must be limited to that point within the reach of the person arrested. The car was parked a
few meters away from the building and appellants were arrested inside the building.
73. Ruben del Castillo v. People, GR 185128, January 30, 2012, Peralta, J. (Searches and Seizures)
FACTS:
Pursuant to confidential information that Castillo was selling shabu, police, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at
Castillo’s house, secured a search warrant from the RTC and served it.

Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid” which prompted them immediately to disembark from the jeep and go directly to Castillo’s
house and cordoned it. Castillo’s house is a two-storey house and he was staying in the 2nd floor. They saw Castillo run toward a
nipa hut in front of his house. SPO3 Masnayon chased him but to no avail as they were unfamiliar with the entrances and exits of
the place.

In the presence of the barangay tanod Gonzalado and Castillo’s elder sister Dolly, the police searched Castillo’s house including
the nipa hut where he ran for cover. The men who searched the residence of Castillo found nothing. But one of the barangay tanods
was able to confiscate from the nipa hut 4 plastic packs of shabu.

Thus an information for violation of RA 6425 was filed against Castillo for possession of 0.31 grams of shabu.

He was found guilty by the RTC. The CA affirmed this decision. His MR was denied. hence this petition for certiorari. Castillo
claims 1)that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant since the officer who applied for it had no personal knowledge
of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation before such application, 2) the nipa hut is 20 meters away from his
house and is no longer within the “permissible area” that may be searched by the police due to the distance and the warrant did not
include the nipa hut as a place to be searched, and 3) he could not be presumed in possession of shabu just because they were found
in the nipa hut.

ISSUE:
Whether a prohibited drug, shabu, found by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut 20 meters away from the residence of Castillo, accused,
may be admitted in evidence for prosecution of possession of regulated drug.

HELD: NO.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

1. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It
only needs to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and it was committed by the accused.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause is paid great deference by a reviewing court as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances
as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. There is substantial basis in this case.

2. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized for it to be valid. A designation
or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In this case, the warrant specifically designates the residence
of Castillo. The items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut 20 meters from his residence. These items, being found in a
place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered fruits of an invalid warrantless search. The contention
that since it was a barangay tanod, a private individual, who found the items, they must still be admissible in evidence as the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches applies only against government authorities is devoid of merit.

The police asked for the assistance of the barangay tanods. Thus, the tanods acted as agents of persons in authority as defined under
Article 152 of the RPC. The LGC in Section 388 also describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.
Thus, the search was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

But even if the tanod were considered a private individual, making the items admissible in evidence, the prosecution failed to
establish constructive possession of the drugs.

3. The elements of illegal possession of shabu are 1) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug, 2) he is not authorized
by law or duly constituted authorities, and 3) he has knowledge that said drug is a regulated drug.

Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where it is found. The records do not show that Castillo owns the nipa hut nor was it established
that he used it as a shop. The prosecution failed to prove that the nipa hut was under Castillo’s control and dominion.
74. People v. Benny Go, GR 144639, September 12, 2003, Carpio-Morales, J. (Searches and Seizures)
FACTS:
Police conducted a test-buy operation at the residence of Go where they purchased P1500 worth of shabu. They did not immediately
arrest Go but applied first for a search warrant for Go’s residence. A raiding team went to Go’s house armed with the warrant
commanding them to “make an immediate search anytime of the day or night” of Go’s residence and to seize “shabu, weighing
scale, and other drug paraphernalia and proceeds of the above crime.”

Jack Go, Benny’s son, was the only one present at the time the policemen went to the residence. The police introduced themselves,
informed him that they had a warrant, and handcuffed him to a chair. They got barangay kagawads to be witnesses to the search
and to sign afterwards the inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search. They instructed the handcuffed Jack Go to witness the
search, but he refused saying that there is a barangay official anyway.

The police seized a plastic bag of shabu, a plastic bag of yellowish substance, a weighing scale, documents, passports, bank books,
checks, a typewriter, a check writer, dry seals, stamp pads, Chinese and PH currency, and Go’s Toyota car. The items, except the
car, were brought to the dining table on the ground floor of Go’s house for inventory.

Go’s wife and his friends arrived one after the other. Go himself arrived when the search was almost through. The police prepared
a handwritten inventory receipt and an “affidavit of orderly search” which he read to Benny Go, who signed them as did the
kagawads and Jack Go.

The police brought Go, his wife, son, and friends, and the items, to Camp Bagong Diwa Taguig, Metro Manila for investigation.
Benny was detained while the others were released. The arresting officers prepared an affidavit of arrest.

The prosecution presented the Yamato weighing scale recovered on top of Go’s frige although it was not among those listed in the
inventory receipt, affidavit of arrest, or return of search warrant.

The kagawad witness claimed that the inventory receipt presented in court had been replaced since their signatures were gone and
“Chinese Medicine” was replaced with “undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules” and that the shabu was not among
the items seized and inventoried. The defense witnesses/version claims that Jack Go signed the affidavit of orderly search and
receipt without having read them and only because he was hit by the police. Benny Go was also made to sign without having read
its contents and Jack Go was prevented from explaining its contents. On the way to Bicutan, the police told Benny that they wanted
P10M from him or he would be charged of possession of illegal drugs, which amount was reduced later to P5M to P2M then to
P500k. Benny refused the demands since he did not commit any crime.

The RTC convicted him of illegal possession. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

HELD:
What constitutes reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question determinable from considering the
circumstances, purpose of the search, presence of probable cause, the manner of serach and seizure, the place or thing searched,
and character of the articles procured.

Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked to justify an encroachment of rights, courts must cautiously weigh the evidence
before them. The warrant must conform strictly to constitutional and statutory requirements.

In this case, an examination of the testimonies of the police show several irregularities in the manner by which the search was
conducted.

By PO2 Abulencia’s own account, to enter the residence, they deliberately side-swiped Go’s car parked alongside the road instead
of following the regular “knock and announce” procedure under Section 7 of Rule 126 of RoC. Since the police had not yet notified
the occupant of their intention and authority to conduct a search and without a reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of
service of warrant would endanger its successful implementation, this sideswiping was unreasonable and unjustified.

He also claims to have immediately handcuffed Jack Go upon entry. He justifies that this was standard operating procedure and
that he was unfamiliar with Jack Go and unsure of how he would react. But there is no showing of any action of provocation by
Jack. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm, and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances,
the restraint of Jack was all the more unjustified even after the kagawads arrived.

While the search warrant authorized seizure of “shabu, wighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the above crime,”
the policemen seized numerous other items clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia. While an inventory was
prepared, it did not contain a detailed list of all items seized, particularly the voluminous documents. We have stressed the necessity
for a detailed receipt of the items seized to safeguard the right of the person (nature and kind of documents).

PO2 Abulencia presented to Benny for his signature the inventory (Section 10, Rule 126) without showing that Benny was informed
of his right not to sign it and to assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him.
We have held that an admission previously prepared by police is inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of rights as a
person under custodial investigation for an offense. This practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly
confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent. It is the police who confiscated
the items that should have signed such receipts. This is in the nature of an extra-judicial confession for an offense. The inventory
receipt signed by Go is thus not only inadmissible for violating his custodial right to remain silent, but it is also an indicum of the
irregularity of the manner the raiding team conducted the search.

The return of search warrant was also not veried under oath as required under Section 12(a) of Rule 126. The delivery of the items
seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory duly verified under oath is mandatory to
preclude substitution of said items. Section 12 of Rule 126 mandates the judge to ensure compliance with the requirements for 1)
the issuance of a detailed receipt, 2) delivery of the seized property to court, together with 3) a verified true inventory of the items
seized. Any violation of these constitutes contempt of court.

Thus, considering these irregularities, the reliance of the trial court on the disputable presumption that the police regularly
performed their duty was misplaced.

The affidavit of orderly search is not under oath, thus only a prepared form filled up after the search who instructed Benny, Jack
and the kagawads to sign as witnesses. Moreover, the affidavit purports to be executed by Benny, but he was not present when the
search took place, having arrived only when it was “almost through.” Thus, this affidavit prepared without aid of counsel and by
the very police who searched his residence provides no proof of the regularity of the search.

In fact, from the polices’ accounts, their search failed to comply with the provisions of Section 8 of Rule 126:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

The police admitted that the search of the upper floor where the shabu was allegedly recovered did not take place in the presence
of Benny or Jack. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. That the raiding team
summoned two kagawads to witness the search in the 2nd floor is of no moment. The RoC establishes a hierarchy among the
witnesses. The search should be witnessed by “two witnesses of sufficient age…” only in the absence of either the lawful occupant
or member of his family. Thus, the search should have been witnessed by Benny’s son Jack who was present. Jack did not waive
his right when he refused to witness since a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. He was handcuffed to
a chair, alone and confronted by five police who deprived him of liberty. He cannot be considered to have voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently waived his right to witness the search. Consent under such intimidating circumstances is no consent.

The numerous irregularities and departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126, tainted the search with
unreasonableness, compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized items inadmissible in evidence. Only
in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be
repressed.

With the exclusion of the shabu, the very corpus delicti, the conviction must be reversed.

The testimonies also fail to provide the moral certainty needed to sustain conviction. The two kagawads, witnesses to the search
chosen by the police in substitution of Jack, both testified that no shabu was recovered from the residence. The police claim that
the kagawads deliberately falsified their testimonies, but no evidence was presented. The police did not also actively pursue their
complaint for obstruction of justice against the kagawads with the DOJ.

As to the motion for return of personal documents, vehicle, and paraphernalia, the general rule is that only personal properties
particularly described in the search warrant may be seized by authorities. There are exceptions. Thus, evidence obtained through a
warrantless search may be admissible under: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The police sought to justify seizure of the P52,760 and Chinese Yuan 25,000 as either “proceeds of the offense” or “means of
committing an offense” under the warrant. But neither the money or car was particularly described in the warrant. In seizing the
items, the police were exercising their own DISCRETION and determining for themselves which items they believed were proceeds
or means of committing the offense. This is absolutely impermissible. The purpose of the requirement that the articles to be seized
be particularly described in the warrant is to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize.

They also claim that the seizure of passports, bankbooks, typewriter, etc. were “seizure of evidence in plain view.” Under the plain
view doctrine, objects within the “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

The police testimonies do not establish how they became aware of the seized items allegedly within their “plain view.” (“sa mesa
lahat iyan”, “atop the dining table located also at the sala”)

The illegal character of the dry seals and stamp pads cannot be said to have been immediately apparent. SPO1 Fernandez had to
first make an impression of the dry seal on paper before he could determine that it purported to be the seal of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been
turned over to the Chinese embassy and BID for verification.

Nonetheless, since the dry seals and stamps have been certified as counterfeit by BID, they may not be returned and are confiscated
in favor of the State. The bankbooks and passports, not belonging to Benny, may not be returned. Its seizure may be contested only
by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.